Inter-institutional Cooperation in Global Governance: Why Do Intergovernmental Organizations Participate in Transnational Public-Private Governance Initiatives*

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January 30, 2021

Abstract

This paper examines the participation of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in transnational public-private governance initiatives (TGIs). In TGIs, IGOs cooperate with governments, business, and civil society organizations to address global or transnational problems. However, not all IGOs become involved in TGIs, and those who do participate vary in the extent of their involvement as well as the types of initiatives they join. Using the Transnational Public-Private Governance Initiatives in World Politics Data, I empirically map the variation of IGO involvement in 636 TGIs created in the period between 1885 and 2017. I develop theoretical explanations for the observed variation and empirically probe the explanatory power of these arguments using statistical analysis. I find that organizations with larger secretariats and centralized institutional structures are more frequently involved in TGIs in general. I also find that the effect of the level of democracy among the member states of an IGO varies across types of TGIs. My findings provide an important empirical basis for advancing research on IGO orchestration, inter-organizational relations in global governance, and regime complexity.

Keywords: transnational public-private governance initiatives, intergovernmental organizations, institutional complexity, inter-organizational relationships, orchestration.

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*This research was funded by the Swiss Network for International Studies and the Basic Research Fund of the University of St. Gallen. I would like to thank Philipp Genschel for the stimulating discussions that facilitated the development of this project.

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Introduction

Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) are important actors in world politics. They pursue ambitious goals, such as containing the use of violence, facilitating free trade, or promoting human rights (Wallace and Singer, 1970; Shanks, Jacobson and Kaplan, 1996; Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke, 2004). Their activities influence the behavior of governments and multinational corporations in a broad range of issue areas and affect the lives of millions of people around the globe (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Yet, the resources IGOs have at their disposal to work towards the achievement of their goals are limited (Hawkins et al., 2006; Abbott et al., 2015). To reduce this disparity between goals and resources, IGOs have developed strategies that include other governors, including governments, other IGOs, business, and civil society organizations, in various ways (Keohane and Nye, 1974; Johnson, 2014; Hale and Roger, 2014; Abbott et al., 2015; Andonova, 2017).

One such strategy is the participation of IGOs in transnational public-private governance initiatives (TGIs) in which they cooperate with governments, business, and civil society organizations to address global or transnational problems. By participating in TGIs, IGOs obtain access to resources and capabilities that they would not have otherwise which, in turn, allows them to be more effective governors. Becoming engaged in TGIs and collaborating with business and particularly civil society organizations may also enhance the legitimacy of an IGO. But not all IGOs become involved in TGIs, and those who do vary in the extent of their involvement and the types of initiatives they join. IGOs also differ in the degree to which they are able to shape governance outcomes in TGIs. How can we explain this variation?

In this paper, I empirically map the variation of IGO involvement in TGIs using a new dataset on 636 TGIs created in the period between 1885 and 2017 (Westerwinter, forthcoming). I develop theoretical explanations for the observed variation and start to empirically probe them using statistical analysis. My findings suggest that IGO capacity, member state democracy, and organizational centralization are positively related to the extent to which an IGO becomes involved in TGIs. The policy scope of an IGO is also positively associated with its participation in transnational governance initiatives. In addition, I also find heterogenous effects of the level of domestic democracy among an organization's member states on the TGI involvement of IGOs. While more democratic organizations are more likely to be involved in TGIs that are engaged in standard-setting and monitoring, they are not different from less democratic IGOs when it comes to TGIs that perform other governance functions (e.g. agenda-setting, service provision). These findings suggest the development of more nuanced theoretical explanations of IGO involvement in transnational governance and point toward additional quantitative and qualitative analysis. The paper contributes to ongoing international relations debates on regime complexes, inter-organizational relationships, orchestration, multi-stakeholder initiatives, and global governance.

IGO participation in TGIs: patterns and questions

The number of TGIs has been growing rapidly in the past decades. Figure 1 presents the net cumulative total numbers of TGIs based on initiatives' founding and termination dates. Up until the 1980s, the growth rate of TGIs in the international system was low. TGIs were not absent from the scene of world politics, but constituted a relatively marginal phenomenon. During the 1990s, however, we observe a dramatic shift in the speed of TGI growth. Compared with a moderate growth rate in the earlier periods, we have an exponential growth between 1990 and 2010. This evidence is consistent with other studies of transnational governance. According to Abbott and Snidal (2009), for example, TGIs are a recent phenomenon. While few such initiatives existed before 1994, since then their number has increased steadily. Likewise, Bulkeley et al. (2012) show that most transnational governance arrangements that address climate change issues were created after 1997 and Hoffmann (2011) finds that 46 of the 58 climate change experiments in his dataset were initiated after 2001-2002.

Figure 1: TGI growth



TGIs vary markedly in the participation of states, IGOs, business, and civil society organizations. As we can see in the bottom row of table 1, the TGIs in the dataset vary in their overall size. The average number of total participants is about 127 with a standard deviation of about 591.[1] The smallest TGIs in the sample have a minimum of three participants and include initiatives such as the Global Alliance for Workers and Communities and the Water Futures Partnership. By contrast, by far the largest initiative in the sample, the United Nations Global Compact, has more than 13,000 participants of which 9,638 are business actors. We also observe variation across participant groups. On average, the TGIs in the sample have just under ten and just above four state and IGO participants respectively. Business and and civil society organizations are on average more involved with about 63 and 49 participants from each group. This result resonates with previous work that finds that civil society and particularly business organizations are more frequently involved in governance initiatives that include public and private actors than governments and IGOs (Bulkeley et al., 2012). Importantly, as indicated by the standard deviations, TGIs vary in terms of average numbers of participants from all four groups. With respect to IGO participation, we observe initiatives with no IGO involvement as well as initiatives that include up to 56 IGOs.

Table 1: Participation in TGIs

	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.	Observations
States	9.82	17.33	0	191	608
Business	62.90	424.49	1	9,638	576
Civil society	48.88	188.35	1	3,489	589
IGOs	4.04	4.98	0	56	614
Total	127.26	591.14	3	13,157	567

Additional variation becomes visible if we examine participation in TGIs across issue areas. Table 2 reports average participation numbers across ten issue areas.[2] Starting with the average total number of participants, we can see that total participant numbers range from 70 on average in the development domain to more than 175 in the security area. Note that while security TGIs are few compared to TGIs in other issue areas (Westerwinter, forthcoming), they are the largest in terms of the average number of participants and particularly in terms of civil society participants. Business actors are also strongly involved in security TGIs, but the largest average number of business actors is involved in initiatives that

[1] The maximum numbers of observations taken into account for calculating average participant numbers differ across participant groups and from the total sample size of 636 because of missing data on participants. For the initiatives with missing data on participants, we were able to confirm that their participants fulfill the criteria to be included as TGI but we could not obtain information about specific participants.

[2] For more information on the coding of TGI issue areas, governance functions, and institutional design as well as related descriptive statistics, see Westerwinter (forthcoming).

govern trade and commerce issues. Overall, civil society organizations are on average the largest group of participants in development, health, security, and technical TGIs, while business constitutes the largest group of participants in environment, finance, human rights, social affairs, and trade and commerce initiatives. Compared to civil society and business, state and especially IGO participation is low across issue areas and in none of the issue areas do we find states or IGOs constituting the largest group of TGI participants. IGOs are on average most frequently involved in security, finance, and technical TGIs, and least frequently involved in human rights, development, and environmental protection initiatives.

Table 2: Participation in TGI across issue areas

	States	Business	Civil society	IGOs	Total
Development	9.11	24.22	34.38	1.72	69.43
Environment	8.98	40.07	32.59	1.72	83.36
Finance	6.36	40.88	25.12	2.04	74.40
General	7.98	40.63	29.06	1.91	79.58
Health	11.50	21.69	58.38	1.83	93.40
Human rights	6.80	40.74	34.52	1.64	83.69
Security	11.89	60.89	99.84	2.83	175.45
Social affairs	9.02	37.87	36.90	1.97	85.76
Technical	6.76	29.74	50.83	2.02	89.35
Trade & commerce	7.12	61.68	19.74	1.84	90.39

Examining the differences in participation patterns based on the governance functions that TGIs perform, we find that initiatives that work on standard implementation, monitoring, and agenda-setting are particularly large (see table 3). State and IGO participation is low across governance tasks, with the highest average state and IGO participant numbers recorded in monitoring, implementation, and agenda-setting TGIs. We also find that business and civil society organizations are especially active in implementation TGIs. This resonates with the argument that one of the key motivations underlying the creation of public-private modes of global governance is to mobilize the resources and expertise of business and civil society for implementing international rules and standards (Reinicke and Deng, 2000; Börzel and Risse, 2005; Abbott and Snidal, 2009).

Table 3: Participation in TGIs across governance functions

	States	Business	Civil society	IGOs	Total
Standard-setting	9.45	94.07	27.39	3.82	136.37
Implementation	11.01	190.43	72.24	4.30	282.20
Monitoring	13.05	97.15	47.58	4.30	165.86
Funding	10.62	34.94	45.64	3.96	97.15
Capacity-building	9.06	51.68	47.86	4.17	112.95
Service provision	9.91	40.81	44.36	3.93	99.23
Agenda-setting	11.26	86.71	66.52	4.37	169.88
Knowledge creation	9.49	40.22	45.59	4.08	100.78

A similar pattern emerges from the average participant numbers across TGI institutional design features. The largest initiatives are those with monitoring provisions, secretariats, and enforcement procedures. This is in line with rational choice theories of international cooperation that link the size of a group of actors that seek to achieve institutionalized cooperation to the design features that are required for successful cooperation (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Kahler, 1992; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001; Koremenos, 2016). All four participant groups mirror this trend in the overall sample, with TGIs with monitoring, enforcement, and secretariats being the largest in terms of average number of states, IGOs, business, and civil society actors. In addition, IGOs as well as states show a slight tendency toward participation in TGIs that explicitly specify the behavioral obligations of participants and governance targets. This could suggest that IGOs are particularly prone to become involved in initiatives that specify behavioral obligations and adopt institutional structures which provide for some level of organizational structure (secretariat), verifying compliance (monitoring), and addressing instances of non-compliance (enforcement) if needed.

Table 4: Participation in TGIs across institutional design features

	States	Business	Civil society	IGOs	Total
Secretariat	11.95	88.62	57.72	4.62	165.20
Founding document	14.12	77.80	56.16	4.26	153.29
Obligation	12.29	34.16	16.12	4.06	69.16
Dispute settlement	7.91	30.08	26.87	2.90	68.05
Decision-making	7.34	28.91	33.12	3.24	72.91
Monitoring	12.53	212.07	78.01	4.08	308.39
Enforcement	5.80	93.30	33.17	2.76	135.04
Forum	7.18	36.33	29.69	3.26	81.24

In addition to observations at the TGI-level of analysis, the data allows us to treat states, business, civil society organizations, and IGOs as the unit of analysis, and to examine their participation in TGIs. Here, I provide a first exploration of patterns of IGO participation in TGIs. Figure 2 shows the most integrated IGOs in TGIs in 2017. Notably, the World Bank and the European Union (EU) clearly lead the way in terms of participation in TGIs. In 2017, they participate in considerably more TGIs than the Food and Agriculture Organization, which is the third most integrated IGO. Other organizations that are among the twenty most involved IGOs include the World Health Organization, the International Labour Organization, and the International Renewable Energy Agency. Several development banks, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the African Development Bank, and regional organizations other than the EU, such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, are also involved in a large number of TGIs. Thus, IGOs that are frequently involved in transnational governance initiatives operate in a broad range of issue areas, differ in their size and mandates, and include universal as well as restricted membership organizations.

Figure 2: IGO participation in TGIs



International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), European Union (EU), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), African Development Bank (AfDB), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations (UN), International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), African Union (AU), International Energy Agency (IEA), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), European Investment Bank (EIB), International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).

These descriptive observations give rise to important questions: 1) Why do IGOs vary in their participation in TGIs; 2) Why do some IGOs participate more than others; and 3) why do IGOs become more involved in some types of TGIs and not others? In the next section, I begin to develop explanations that can help addressing these questions.

Explanations

The previous section showed that IGOs vary in terms of the frequency with which they become involved in TGIs, while at the same time variation exists across TGI issue areas, governance functions, and institutional designs. In this section, I discuss existing theories of IGOs to develop explanations for this variation. I particularly focus on orchestration, access for transnational actors, IGO autonomy.

Orchestration is a special form of inter-institutional interaction between IGOs and other governors, which serve as intermediaries between the IGOs and their governance targets (Abbott and Snidal, 2009; Hale and Roger, 2014; Abbott et al., 2015; Abbott, Green and Keohane, 2016; Abbott, 2018). In IGO orchestration, intermediaries may be other IGOs, transgovernmental networks, business, and TGIs. When an IGO orchestrates a TGI, the IGO provides the TGI with support and ideational resources, which empower the TGI and increase its ability to pursue its goals successfully. Given the shared goals that the orchestrating IGO and the intermediary TGI seek to attain, increasing the intermediary's effectiveness also makes the IGO more likely to perform well. In fact, orchestration is a strategy for IGOs to achieve their goals effectively in light of a shortage of their own capabilities (Abbott et al., 2015). Thus, orchestration has the potential to enhance the effectiveness of intermediaries, such as TGIs, as well as IGOs. In light of this potential of orchestration to enhance IGO effectiveness and to facilitate the achievement of IGO governance goals, it might be that IGOs that lack the resources to govern effectively on their own may be particularly prone to become involved in TGIs to obtain access to resources that they would not have otherwise.

While orchestration holds the potential to enhance an IGO's capabilities, it also requires substantial amounts of resources to begin with. Participating in a TGI is costly. This applies to all actors involved including IGOs. IGO staff needs to spend some of their scarce time obtaining and processing information about the governance activities of a TGI and attend meetings. If the goal is to shape the activities of TGI in accordance with IGO preferences, IGO representatives in TGIs also need to engage in some way in agenda-setting, proposal making, document drafting, lobbying for their positions, negotiating, implementing decisions, and monitoring. Because of their tripartite nature negotiations in TGIs are often complicated and protracted (Abbott and Snidal, 2009). In addition, TGI activities often occur across the globe. Together, this implies that engaging in the operations of a TGI and effectively orchestrating it for the purposes of achieving governance goals can be costly for an IGO. Thus, while the orchestration of TGIs may be an appealing governance strategy for IGOs with small budgets, small staff, and little resources in general, it might in fact be only IGOs that possess a certain amount of resources and organizational capacity that are able to pursue this strategy effectively. In sum, orchestration theory suggests that IGOs that lack governance resources have incentives to become involved in transnational governance initiatives. At the same time, we can argue that because participation in TGIs is costly it might only be those IGOs that have a sufficient amount of resources at their disposal that are able to pursue this strategy to further enhance their governance effectiveness.

Theories that focus on the access of transnational non-state actors to IGOs highlight the potential resource and legitimacy advantages for IGOs that are related to providing non-state actors with access to the decision-making bodies and broader operations of an IGO (Tallberg et al., 2013). Allowing non-state actors, such as NGOs and business, to participate in IGO deliberations and decision-making provides the IGO with access to information, funds, technical capacity, and other resources, to which it would have otherwise no access. This resonates with the emphasis on the governance enhancing effects of orchestration. In addition, including non-state actors in IGO decision-making can also be a strategy to increase the democratic legitimacy of an organization. IGOs are often confronted with complaints about their lack of transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability (O'Brien et al., 2000; Tallberg, Bäckstrand and Scholte, 2018). The United Nations Security Council and international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are prominent examples. One way to address these concerns is to give transnational non-state actors the opportunity to become involved in IGO decision-making. They may be allowed to provide information to government representatives and IGO staff, attend meetings, and make statements during negotiations (Tallberg et al., 2013). In turn, such participation from non-state actors may increase the perceived legitimacy of the resulting decisions and the IGO as a whole.

This legitimacy seeking strategy of IGOs that is reflected in the granting of formal access of non-state actors to IGO decision-making and deliberations may also be a driver of IGO involvement in TGIs. By becoming involved in a TGI, an IGO obtains access to and develops collaborations with NGOs, business, and other non-state actors. In doing so, the IGO may develop a reputation as particularly non-state actor friendly and open toward their involvement which, in turn, might positively affect its perceived legitimacy. In fact, pursuing TGI participation and providing transnational actors with formal access to its decision-making may be two sides of the same coin both geared towards increasing an IGO's legitimacy. The fact that the World Bank is both a champion in terms of TGI participation and has improved its accessibility for transnational actors in the recent years points into this direction. Transnational access and TGI participation may also be mutually reinforcing. IGOs that provide transnational actors with access may become involved in TGIs because of the advice and lobbying of non-state actors. On the other hand, IGOs that are involved in TGIs may over time decide to formally open up toward transnational actors based on positive learning experiences within multi-stakeholder initiatives and the forming of trust and good working relationships with non-state actors. As a consequence, we may expect that IGOs with high levels of transnational access are also frequently involved in TGIs. In addition, we might expect that factors that positively affect transnational access, such as the level of democracy among the member states of an IGO (Tallberg et al., 2014), also facilitate the TGI participation of IGOs.[3]

Finally, TGI participation may be an autonomy enhancing strategy of IGOs. Research on IGOs highlights that states as the principals of IGOs seek to address the moral hazard problem of delegation to IGOs by creating tight control mechanisms and keeping IGO autonomy low (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Hawkins et al., 2006; Johnson, 2014). From this perspective, high policy autonomy of an IGO is expected to have a negative impact on its performance since higher autonomy increases the risk of moral hazard and distracts an organization from achieving the goals that motivated its creation. By contrast, recent studies have argued that policy autonomy facilitates IGO effectiveness (Hardt, 2014; Lall, 2017). Policy autonomy, in these accounts, shields an organization from the interference of member states, which allows it to focus on fulfilling its mandate. In this context, IGOs that seek to enhance their effectiveness may strive for enhanced autonomy vis-à-vis their state principals to be better able to pursue their goals.

The participation in TGIs may be one strategy through which IGOs may seek to increase their autonomy. Shifting governance activities to the forum of one or more TGIs removes it from the direct control of an IGO's state principals and enhances an IGO's room for strategic maneuvering. Since TGIs are typically not based on international treaties or other formal or legally binding agreements, IGO officials may be able to engage with TGIs as part of their existing mandate and the day to day activities of pursuing this mandate without requesting the formal permission of their principals. In addition, given their often informal organizational structures (Westerwinter, forthcoming), pursuing governance activities within the framework of a TGI may also make IGO activities invisible or at least more difficult to detect for principals. If TGI participation is an autonomy enhancing strategy for IGOs, we should observe that IGOs with low levels of autonomy are among the organizations that frequently participate in TGIs. In addition, we should also observe that TGIs that are informal in terms of their organizational structures are especially

[3] At the same time, TGI participation may be an alternative strategy to increase collaboration with transnational actors for those IGOs that would like to, but are not able to, increase formal access because they are, for example, blocked by their internal decision-making procedures and lack of state support for opening up. This would suggest that it is particularly those IGOs that lack transnational access, but would be interested in increasing it, which participate frequently in TGIs. However, while the level of transnational access is observable, the preferences of IGOs are not, which makes it difficult to operationalize this hypothesis.

prominent among the TGIs in which IGOs become involved. At the same time, however, it might be that a certain level of IGO autonomy and room for maneuvering is needed to become engaged in TGIs to begin with. This would suggest that higher IGO autonomy is related to more extensive TGI participation.

Empirical analysis

In this section, I begin to explore the empirical implications of the theoretical discussion presented in the previous section. I explore the link between IGO participation in TGIs and a first set of explanatory variables based on the information on IGO participation in TGIs in the Transnational Public-Private Governance Initiatives in World Politics Data (Westerwinter, forthcoming). My main dependent variable, *TGI participations*, is a count variable that captures the number of TGI participations of an IGO in 2014. I use data on IGOs' TGI participations in 2014 because of limited data availability on the independent variables that I include in the analysis. I use alternative specifications of this dependent variable which take into account IGO participation in TGIs that perform specific governance tasks (e.g. agenda-setting, capacity-building, funding) in additional analyses. My analysis is based on all 334 IGOs included in the Correlates of War (COW) Project's data on intergovernmental organizations that are not terminated in 2014 (Pevehouse et al., 2015).[4] Since my dependent variable is a count of IGOs' participations in TGIs, I use count regression methods to estimate my models (Long, 1997; Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). With the sample variance being substantially larger than the sample mean, my dependent variable is likely to be characterized by over-dispersion, i.e. the conditional variance is larger then the conditional mean. A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that over-dispersion parameter is not equal to zero after estimating a negative binomial model confirms the presence of over-dispersion in my dependent variable. A negative binomial model is, thus, more appropriate to model my data than the relatively simpler Poisson model (Long, 1997; Cameron and Trivedi, 2013).

To test whether IGOs with more resources at their disposal do more frequently participate in TGIs, I use two proxies. The first variable is a count of the member states of an IGO. I use data on IGO member states as reported in the most recent version of the COW Project's data on IGOs (Pevehouse et al., forthcoming). Given that for many IGOs a sizeable portion of their budget is based on financial contributions

[4] I thank Jon Pevehouse for sharing the most recent version of the COW Project's IGO data prior to its public release.

from their member states, IGOs with more member states should, everything else being equal, be able to draw on larger amounts of resources. The second variable, captures the annual budget of an IGO in 2014 US Dollar. I focus on the annual budget of the IGO headquarters, the budget of IGO branch offices or local projects are not taken into account. I focus on the budget of the IGO headquarters because the theoretical discussion about IGO involvement in other global governance institutions emphasizes the strategic and resource considerations of IGOs as strategic actors. If it is true that IGOs become involved in TGIs because of their resources or because they try to compensate for the lack of own resources, then the budget of the IGO headquarters is a useful first proxy to explore this possible relationship. The data on IGO budgets was newly collected for this project. Information was obtained between August and October 2019 and drawn from IGO public websites, annual reports, other primary documents, and secondary sources. I use the natural logarithm of the number of IGO member states and annual budget.

I also explore whether the size of the secretariat staff of an IGO shapes its involvement in TGIs. Based on the theoretical discussion above, we might expect that IGOs with larger secretariats have more capacity and are therefore more likely to become involved in TGIs frequently. Larger secretariats provide more opportunity to participate in more governance initiatives than smaller administrative units. Conversely, we might expect that it is particularly IGOs with small secretariats that reach out to TGIs to broaden their resource pool and improve their ability to achieve their governance goals. To examine this relationship, I include a variable that captures the number of the members of staff of the main secretariat of an IGO. This includes full-time employees and other types of secretariat staff. Like the date on IGO annual budget, the secretariat size data was newly collected for this project based on information on IGO public websites, annual reports, and other primary and secondary sources. I use the natural logarithm of this variable in my analysis.

To examine whether an IGO's TGI involvement is affected by the level of domestic democracy among its member states, I use the Polity IV data (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995) and its 21-point scale to measure countries' level of democracy. Based on this measure of domestic democracy of IGO member states, I compute the average level of IGO members' domestic democracy. If IGO participation in TGIs is driven by the level of democracy of member states, this variable should have a positive effect on IGO participation in TGIs. I also draw on IGO members' Polity IV scores to compute the absolute difference between the least and the most democratic member state of an IGO. I use this variable as a proxy for the preference heterogeneity of IGO principals which principal agent theories link to agent autonomy. In a nutshell, these theories argue that principal heterogeneity increases the autonomy of IGOs and provides them with room for maneuvering that is not available to IGOs whose members interact on the basis of more homogenous preferences.

Furthermore, based on new data on the institutional design features of IGOs (Reinsberg and Westerwinter, forthcoming), I create a variable, *centralization*, which approximates, in a rough way, the degree of IGO centralization (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001). Specifically, drawing on indicator variables that capture whether an IGO has a secretariat, monitoring, enforcement, and dispute settle mechanisms, I create an ordinal index that measures how many of these four design elements are present in an IGO. This variable ranges from zero for IGOs with none of these elements present and therefore low levels of centralizations to four in IGOs in which all four features are observable and which therefore score high in terms of centralization. Extant theoretical work suggests that higher levels of centralization should correlate with higher levels of autonomy. In terms of IGO capacity, this variable also captures, in a crude way, the organizational capacity of an IGO in terms of the presence of a secretariat and other organizational structures relevant for effective global governance.

To take into account geography, I include the variable *OECD* in my analysis. This variable captures whether the main secretariat of an IGO is located in a country that is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development or not.

Finally, I control for IGO age and policy scope, i.e. number of issue areas in which an IGO operates, using information contained in the COW Project's IGO data and new data on IGO design (Reinsberg and Westerwinter, forthcoming). Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for all variables included in my analysis.

Table 6 presents a set of first results. We see that, across model specifications, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between an IGO's resources as captured by the number of its member states. IGOs that can draw on the support from a larger group of member states are more frequently involved in TGIs. This effect is also substantively relevant. If we increase the *Log member states* variable by one standard deviation beginning at its sample mean, we observe an increase in the predicted number

Table 5: Summary statistics dependent and independent variables

	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.	Observations
TGI participations	3.805	14.799	0	158	334
Log budget	16.893	3.604	0	26.844	203
Log secretariat staff	3.946	1.894	0	10.404	280
Log member states	2.875	1.313	0	5.268	334
Mean democracy	5.125	3.520	-8.833	10	306
Democracy difference	13.771	6.544	0	20	306
Centralization	1.554	1.029	0	4	334
OECD	0.479	0.500	0	1	334
Age	45.910	27.721	3	202	334
Policy scope	1.901	1.165	0	8	334

of TGI participations from 0.73 to 1.31 or by 80 percent. The relationship between IGO resources proxied using an organization's annual budget and IGO participation in TGIs is not consistently statistically significant across models, although the sign of the coefficient is positive in all models. These first two findings suggest that TGI participation is not a strategy that helps IGOs that lack resources to increase their capabilities. Instead, it is an instrument that is used by organizations that possess already some resources to further enhance their governance capacity. In other words, it is an additional governance strategy in the repertoire of already capable organizations.

We also observe a consistently positive and statistically significant relationship between the size of an IGO's secretariat and its propensity to become involved in TGIs. Substantively, a one-standard deviation increase in the *Log secretariat staff* variable from its sample mean, leads to an increase in the predicted number of TGI participation from 0.73 to 1.96. This is a 168 percent increase. This in line with the finding about IGO resources and suggests that it is organizations with an already high level of organizational capacity reach out to TGIs in order to further enhance their governance activities and pursue their goals. Alternatively, this positive relationship could also reflect the strive of larger bureaucratic agencies to create room for maneuvering for themselves away from the control of their state principals. These two interpretations can be complementary and future research could explore the exact mechanism that is at work here based on in-depth case studies and process tracing.

Turning to the relationship between IGO design and TGI participation, the results presented in table 6 suggest that a higher level of centralization is related to more frequent TGI participation. Here, a one-standard deviation increase of IGO centralization from its sample mean brings about an increase in TGI participation from 0.73 to 1.07 or 47 percent. Since centralization captures to some extent the level of delegation of authority from state principals to IGO bureaucracies, this finding suggests that IGOs with more autonomy are more prone to become involved in transnational governance initiatives.

The level of democracy among member states and the heterogeneity of domestic regime types among member states are not related to IGO participation in TGIs. Thus, neither domestic civil society demands for the promotion of transnational governance nor the preference heterogeneity among member states shape the extent to which an IGO decides to join TGIs.

In terms of control variables, we observe no relationship between IGO age and participation in TGIs which is distinguishable from zero. By contrast, policy scope is consistently positively associated with IGO participation in TGIs, although this effect is not statistically significant in most of the models, which suggests that IGOs that operate in a broader set of issues and address a broader range of problems are more likely to become engaged in TGIs. This may indicate that the complexity and scope of the problem

Table 6: Negative binomial regression estimates TGI participation of IGOs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log budget	0.298***	0.146**	0.095	0.075	0.079
	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Log member states	0.818***	0.583***	0.634***	0.358*	0.447*
	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.123)	(0.176)	(0.188)
Age	0.004	−0.000	−0.001	−0.000	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Policy scope	0.284**	0.176	0.172	0.134	0.142
	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Log secretariat staff		0.445***	0.505***	0.538***	0.521***
		(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.094)
Mean democracy			0.037	0.081	0.104
			(0.044)	(0.055)	(0.062)
Democracy difference				0.054	0.053
				(0.035)	(0.035)
Centralization				0.362**	0.372**
				(0.122)	(0.122)
OECD					−0.317
					(0.330)
BIC	746.052	682.197	668.605	668.782	672.991
Observations	203	189	177	177	177

Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests two-tailed. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$.

that IGOs address has an impact on the extent to which they reach out to other governors to join their efforts. The more complicated the problem at hand, the more likely an IGO integrates institutionalized cooperation with governments, business, and civil society into its portfolio of governance strategies. This finding may also suggest that with increasing complexity of its activities and IGO seeks governance strategies that allow room for experimentation and learning about new, complex problems (de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel, 2013).

So far, I have treated all TGIs as equal. Yet, the TGIWP data shows that TGIs vary along a broad range of dimensions (Westerwinter, forthcoming). One of these dimensions that is likely to be relevant for IGO decisions to join TGIs is the governance tasks that initiatives perform. TGIs can perform a number of functions, such as agenda-setting, capacity-building, funding, standard implementation, knowledge generation and dissemination, monitoring, service provision, and standard-setting. If IGOs strategically decide whether to become involved in TGIs, then the task that the initiatives perform a central element in IGO considerations. In order to explore whether TGI governance tasks make a difference for the factors that shape IGO TGI participation, I re-estimate model 5 in table 6 using eight alternative dependent variables that capture the number of participation of an IGO in TGIs that are involved in agenda-setting, capacity-building, funding, standard implementation, knowledge generation and dissemination, monitoring, service provision, and standard-setting.

Table A-1 in the appendix presents the results. We can see that the positive relationships between the number of member states, secretariat size, and level of centralization and IGO involvement in TGIs exist across types of TGIs. We also observe that the level of member state democracy is an important driver of IGO participation in TGIs that perform monitoring and standard-setting tasks. This could suggest that democratic IGOs are particularly interested in working with TGIs that bring together multiple stakeholders to set standards and monitor the implementation of international rules and standards.

Conclusions

In this paper, I have started to use the Transnational Public-Private Governance Initiatives in World Politics Data to explore the participation of IGOs in transnational public-private governance initiatives. I have documented some patterns in the involvement of IGOs in TGIs that raise important questions about the drivers underlying these patterns. I have also started to develop explanations for this variation based on existing theories of international organizations and conducted some initial empirical analysis. The preliminary results highlight interesting correlations that warrant further statistical and qualitative analysis as this memo evolves into a paper.

Instead of a conclusion, I discuss some ideas and questions for the next steps of the project. First, my preliminary analysis suggests avenues for further developing the theoretical discussion. On the one hand, further theory-building is needed with respect to the independent variables and the mechanisms through which they shape IGO participation in TGIs. For example, the role of material and organizational resources as well as IGO autonomy and their impact on IGO participation in TGIs require additional theorizing. On the other hand, more theoretical work is needed to incorporate heterogeneity among TGIs into the explanation of IGO participation in transnational governance. Which types of TGIs do IGOs become involved in? Do specific IGOs seek participation in particular TGIs? What role does the complementarity or redundancy of TGI and IGO governance task play in shaping IGO involvement in TGIs?

Second, more data collection is needed to improve my analysis. The large-*n* data needs to be expanded. building on existing work (Hooghe and Marks, 2015; Lall, 2017), more fine-grained measures of IGO autonomy would be useful to develop better empirical tests of the relationship between IGO autonomy and TGI participation. Beyond additional quantitative data, developing a qualitative case study holds the promise to further delve into the causal mechanisms that drive IGO engagement in TGIs. This case study could focus on one or a few IGOs and compare their overall TGI activities. Comparing a few regional development banks could be insightful. A case study could also focus on a single or a few TGIs and examine how different IGOs become involved and engage in TGI operations. If the focus is placed on individual IGOs, a case study could focus on a case that is well-explained by initial statistical models or a deviant case. Independent of the particular case study design, an in-depth case study would make a substantial contribution to the project particularly given the relative early stage of the development of theories of IGO involvement in transnational governance.

Third, what is the impact of IGO involvement in TGIs on IGO effectiveness? While the development of proxies of IGO effectiveness in the context of a large-*n* analysis is challenging, it holds the promise to examine whether the engagement with other global governance institutions affects the degree to which IGOs perform well. As a start, one could build on existing work and use methods of web-scraping and text analysis to capture the policy activity of IGOs and the extent to which produced policy outputs are related to the governance tasks that IGOs are created to address (Biermann et al., 2012; **?**). While this would only be a first step, it would nevertheless hold the promise to make an important contribution to the project and to our understanding of the consequences of global governance complexity more generally. Alternatively, including IGO activity in terms of the production of policy outputs could be an interesting potential predictor of IGO participation in TGIs that could be explored theoretically and empirically.

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Appendix

A IGO participation in TGIs with different governance tasks

Table A-1: Negative binomial regression estimates TGI participation of IGOs

	(Agenda)	(Capacity)	(Funding)	(Implementation)	(Knowledge)	(Monitoring)	(Service)	(Standard)
Log budget	0.155	0.098	0.112	0.062	0.072	0.064	0.066	0.077
	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.071)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.062)
Log member states	0.566*	0.543*	0.497*	0.592**	0.565*	0.390	0.535**	0.394*
	(0.226)	(0.218)	(0.246)	(0.221)	(0.229)	(0.206)	(0.207)	(0.194)
Age	0.000	−0.002	−0.001	0.011*	−0.000	0.008	−0.001	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Policy scope	0.055	−0.025	0.099	0.055	0.107	0.116	−0.025	0.039
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.119)	(0.095)	(0.111)	(0.088)	(0.102)	(0.081)
Log secretariat staff	0.550***	0.602***	0.458***	0.486***	0.667***	0.465***	0.592***	0.416***
	(0.118)	(0.113)	(0.122)	(0.105)	(0.120)	(0.099)	(0.107)	(0.092)
Mean democracy	0.044	0.096	0.148	0.123	0.024	0.210**	0.003	0.209**
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.084)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.066)	(0.072)
Democracy difference	0.074	0.089*	0.045	0.017	0.074	0.073*	0.051	0.057
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.033)
Centralization	0.437**	0.508***	0.444**	0.382**	0.349*	0.393**	0.408**	0.376***
	(0.142)	(0.138)	(0.152)	(0.127)	(0.147)	(0.120)	(0.132)	(0.110)
OECD	−0.710	−0.743	−0.711	−0.857*	−0.574	−0.796*	−0.235	−0.671*
	(0.423)	(0.399)	(0.436)	(0.390)	(0.422)	(0.365)	(0.381)	(0.342)
BIC	424.780	476.949	431.442	396.141	474.795	401.726	495.819	393.497
Observations	177	177	177	177	177	177	177	177

Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests two-tailed. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$.