

TRANSLATING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE –

Analyzing the Local Implementation Process of Family Farmer Procurement
for the Brazilian School Feeding Program

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Foreword

“Writing a Ph.D. is a solitary process” is an expression I stumbled upon several times during my research. While studying organizational processes, I found this to be a fitting metaphor, but only partially true. Indeed, I experienced developing a vague project idea into this thesis as an exciting and transformative journey. Still, it was by no means a solitary act. Instead, this thesis results from innumerable stimulating, instructing, or supporting interactions, for which I want to express my deepest gratitude.

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My most profound appreciation belongs to my wife, Gabriela. She accompanied the process as an intellectual sparring partner during long walks, editor in chief during revision, comfort in doubt, and partner in crime for just everything else. Too often, she had to talk to the “wall” when I wandered around with my thoughts. Finally, I would like to thank my family and especially my parents, Christa and Hanspeter Wüst. With their unconditional and continuous support, they offered me the chance to pursue my own path. I dedicate this dissertation to both my caring parents and my wonderful wife.

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Luc Wüst

Abstract

This thesis concerns the study of how organizational actors adopt institutional change. The “Scandinavian institutionalism” literature has proposed a processual approach of translation for studying how organizational actors enact field-level ideas locally. So far, scholars have focused on the transformation of field-level ideas in the process of local enactment. Less attention had been paid to underlying social processes, that is, how actors interpret the idea and mobilize existing value systems to influence the local translation process. This study aims at addressing this gap in the literature.

For studying the local translation process, the Brazilian School Feeding Program was selected. This policy had experienced a comprehensive reform in 2009 and proposed an innovative approach to increase food security - creating local food systems by integrating family farmers as suppliers. Specifically, the research analyzes the implementation of novel legislation, which obliges municipal administrations to allocate a quota of federal endowments specifically for procurement from family farmers.

Following an interpretive-qualitative case study approach based on four municipalities in the state of São Paulo, an exploratory model for the local translation process will be developed. The concept of rationalities of local communities of meaning will be integrated into the model to conceptualize local value systems. The findings propose to conceptualize the local translation as a process of five phases comprising activities of understanding, mobilizing, adapting, implementing, institutionalizing. The unfolding of this translation process is guided and mediated by mobilized actor rationalities.

The study contributes to theory by proposing a processual model for the local translation process that considers both the transformation of the idea and the underlying social processes.

Zusammenfassung

Dies vorliegende Dissertation untersucht, wie Organisationen institutionelle Veränderungen annehmen. Von Proponenten „skandinavischen Institutionalismus“ wurde ein prozessualer Übersetzungsansatz vorgeschlagen, um zu untersuchen, wie organisatorische Akteure Ideen auf Feldebene lokal umsetzen. Bisher haben sich Wissenschaftler auf die Transformation von Ideen und Praktiken im Prozess der lokalen Umsetzung konzentriert. Der Frage, wie die Akteure die Idee interpretieren und bestehende Wertesysteme mobilisieren, um den lokalen Übersetzungsprozess zu beeinflussen, wurde bisher wenig Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Diese Studie zielt darauf ab, diese Lücke in der Literatur zu schließen

Als empirischer Kontext zur Analyse von lokalen Übersetzungsprozessen wurde das brasilianische Schulernährungsprogramm ausgewählt. Diese Politik hatte 2009 eine umfassende Reform erfahren und einen innovativen Ansatz zur Erhöhung der Ernährungssicherheit vorgeschlagen - die Schaffung lokaler Lebensmittelsysteme durch Integration von kleinen, landwirtschaftlichen Familienbetrieben als Lieferanten. Im Einzelnen analysiert die Studie die Umsetzung einer neuartigen Gesetzgebung, welche die Kommunalverwaltungen verpflichtet, eine Quote von Bundesmitteln speziell für die Beschaffung von Produkten von Kleinbauern bereitzustellen.

Aufbauend auf einem interpretativ-qualitativen Fallstudienansatz, der auf vier Gemeinden im Bundesstaat São Paulo basiert, wird ein Modell für den lokalen Übersetzungsprozess entwickelt. Zur Konzeption lokaler Wertesysteme wird das Konzept der Rationalitäten lokaler Sinngemeinschaften in das Modell integriert. Das vorgeschlagene Modell konzipiert die lokale Übersetzung als einen Prozess in fünf Phasen, welcher Aktivitäten zum Verstehen, Mobilisieren, Anpassen, Implementieren und Institutionalisieren umfasst. Der Übersetzungsprozess wird dabei von mobilisierten Akteursrationalitäten geleitet und moderiert.

Die Studie trägt zur Theorie bei, indem sie ein Prozessmodell für den lokalen Übersetzungsprozess vorschlägt, welches sowohl die Transformation der Idee als auch die zugrunde liegenden sozialen Prozesse berücksichtigt.

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List of Abbreviations

AGF	<i>Aquisição do Governo Federal</i> (Federal Government Acquisition)
Art.	Article
CAE	<i>Conselho de Alimentação Escolar</i> (School Food Council)
CAISAN	<i>Câmara Interministerial de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional</i> (Inter-ministerial Chamber for Food and Nutritional Security)
CECANE	<i>Centro Colaborador em Alimentação e Nutrição</i> (Alimentation and Nutrition Collaboration Center)
CFP	<i>Comissão de Financiamento da Produção</i> (Product Financing Commission)
Ch.	Chapter
CNME	<i>Campanha Nacional da Merenda Escolar</i> (National School Meal Campaign)
CNPA	<i>Conselho Nacional de Política Agrícola</i> (National Council for Agriculture Policies)
CNRA	<i>Campanha Nacional da Reforma Agrária</i> (National Agrarian Reform Campaign)
CONAB	<i>Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento</i> (National Supply Company)
CONSEA	<i>Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional</i> (National Council for Food and Nutritional Security)
CONTAG	<i>Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura</i> (National Confederation of Rural Workers)
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CUT	<i>Central Única dos Trabalhadores</i> (Unique Workers Centre)
DAP	<i>Declaração de Aptidão ao PRONAF</i> (Aptitude Declaration for the PRONAF)
EGF	<i>Empréstimo do Governo Federal</i> (Federal Government Loan)
ENG	English
EMBRAPA	<i>Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária</i> (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation)
EMBRATER	<i>Empresa Brasileira de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural</i> (Brazilian Company for Technical Assistance and Rural Extension)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FETRAF	<i>Federação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura Familiar</i> (Family Agriculture Rural Workers Federation)
FF	Family Farmer
FNDE	<i>Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Escolar</i> (National Fund for Development and Education)
IBGE	<i>Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística</i> (Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INAN	<i>Instituto Nacional de Alimentação e Nutrição</i> (National Institute for Food and Nutrition)
ITESP	<i>Fundação Instituto de Terras do Estado de São Paulo</i> (Foundation Institute of Land of the State of São Paulo)
MAPA	<i>Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento</i> (Ministry for Agriculture and Livestock supply)
MDA	<i>Ministerio de Desenvolvimento Agrario</i> (Ministry of Agrarian Development)
MEPF	<i>Ministério Extraordinário de Política Fundiária</i> (Extraordinary Ministry for Land Policy)
MPA	Movimento dos Pequenos Agricultores
MST	<i>Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra</i> (Landless Workers' Movement)
PAA	<i>Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos</i> (Food Acquisition Program)
PNAE	<i>Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar</i> (National School Feeding Program)
PNRA	<i>Plano Nacional da Reforma Agrária</i> (National Agrarian Reform Plan)
PPAIS	<i>Programa Paulista da Agricultura de Interesse Social</i> (São Paulo Program of Agriculture with Social Interest)
PRONAF	<i>Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar</i> (National Program for the Strengthening of Family Agriculture)
PRONAN	<i>Programa Nacional de Alimentação e Nutrição</i> (National Program for Food and Nutrition)
PT	<i>Partido dos Trabalhadores</i> (Workers Party)
Pt.	Portuguese
R\$	Brazilian Real
SFD	School Feeding Department

SNCR	<i>Sistema Nacional de Crédito Rural</i> (National Rural Credit System)
SOA	Secretary of Agriculture
SOE	Secretary of Education
ULTAB	<i>União dos Lavradores e Trabalhadores Agrícolas do Brasil</i> (Brazilian Farmers & Rural Workers Union)
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNIFESP	<i>Universidade Federal de São Paulo</i> (Federal University of São Paulo)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar

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1 Introduction

This chapter builds the starting point for the research. First, I identify the research gap and approach the research question empirically. Second, the chapter presents the research question, which I set out to answer. Furthermore, it states the expected contribution to theory and practice. Finally, the structure of the thesis will be introduced.

1.1 Identifying the Research Gap

In the last decades, scholars of institutional organization theory have developed a vivid interest in understanding institutional change and how actors mobilize resources to support or neglect newly arising institutions (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 2008). The early neo-institutional theory assumed that ideas remain unchanged objects and are diffused as isomorphic pressures throughout the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Organizations embedded in these institutions adopt these pressures as merely passive recipients (Fligstein, 2001, p. 110). This process of institutionalization finally leads to increasing homogeneity across an institutional field.

This premise of increasing homogeneity through the diffusion of institutional pressures and the lack of organizational agency have been challenged by the so-called “Scandinavian Institutionalism”, that proposed a different conception of how ideas spread (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996). By introducing the concept of translation, Czarniawska & Joerges (1996) indicate that ideas are not adopted as mere objects but reinterpreted and adapted to organizational needs. Inspired by the sociology of translation, put forward by Latour (1986) and Callon (1986), the Scandinavian institutionalists conceptualize the dissemination of ideas and practices as an active process of translation with a local re-creation of elements drawn from the institutional environment (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005b). Ideas, concepts, prototypes, or laws “travel” between local contexts in de-contextualized abstract objects and are re-contextualized through a generative process of translation (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996) or editing (K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996) to fit the new organizational context. In contrast to the traditional neo-institutional assumption of homogenization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), the translation literature employs a processual view that emphasizes the agency and unique local instantiations of institutional demands (Latour, 1986; Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014; Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017).

Acknowledging more agency to organizational actors in adapting and adopting field-level concepts has opened a new avenue for research. In contrast to earlier accounts,

where organizational responses to institutional pressures revolved around decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and other avoiding strategies (Oliver, 1991), translation overtly and imperatively foresees transformation during the adoption process (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996). Actors now assume a prominent role in *“the more or less deliberate transformation of practices and/or ideas that happens when various actors try to transfer and implement them”* (Røvik, 2011, p. 642). Accounting for the ways actors transform field-level ideas has become of great interest for organization scholars (e.g., Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010; Boch Waldorff, 2013; Cassell & Lee, 2017; Gondo & Amis, 2013; Morris & Lancaster, 2006; Powell, Gammal, & Simard, 2005; Vossen & van Gestel, 2019).

Many of these studies demonstrate how field-level ideas are adapted to fit organizational interests (Ansari et al., 2010) and needs (Nielsen, Mathiassen, & Newell, 2014). Others demonstrate that translations, despite their heterogeneity-generation potential, follow specific patterns (Kirkpatrick, Bullinger, Lega, & Dent, 2013; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; van Veen, Bezemer, & Karsten, 2011; Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014). Analyzing imitation of successful innovation cases, Sahlin-Andersson (1996) discovered that imitating organizations employ “editing rules” to adapt the circulating ideas to generate narratives that fit the local context. More recently, Røvik (2016) developed an instrumental theory proposing different modes of translation depending on contextual factors – copying, addition, omission, and alteration. These attempts for systematizing the translation process are of great value, as they bring back in certain predictability of translation processes, i.e., how actors adopt institutional change.

On the other hand, many studies examined the effect of language, meaning, or editing in explaining how field-level ideas adapt during translation into organizational or local contexts. However, they paid less attention to underlining organizational social processes (Vossen & van Gestel, 2019). Indeed, Røvik’s translation rules, for example, draw on the properties of the idea rather than on organizational processes. Even though he states that the translating organization is not a *“tabula rasa, but a context with existing distinctive structures, cultures and actors with various interests and power-bases”* (Røvik, 2016, p. 295), these factors are not further conceptualized. Concerning editing rules, Morris & Lancaster (2006) note that while the editing rules supported the contextualizing and adapting of the idea, they did not fully explain how local interpretation translates into practice. Other scholars have recently joined the chorus in calling for more attention to social processes underlying translation (Ansari et al., 2010; Perner & Skjølsvik, 2017; Vossen & van Gestel, 2019). Very concretely, Boch Waldorff (2013) indicates future research: *“It would therefore be relevant if future research would investigate in depth how translation processes are influenced by local actors’ different mobilization and interpretation of logics”* (p. 232).

Hence, we note that social dynamics in the translating context remain undertheorized. At the same time as agency in adopting ideas has been widely accepted, *“our understanding of what happens within the organizations when practices are adopted remains in a distinctively nascent state”* (Gondo & Amis, 2013, p. 229). In other words, while there has been substantial development in theorizing how ideas travel from one context to another, thereby being transformed more or less systematically over distance and time, we still do not know enough about the reasoning behind, and processes underlining the adoption of practices.

1.2 Empirical Approach to the Research Question

The Brazilian Agriculture sector is best described as a dualistic system with, on the one side, an industrialized and export-oriented “agribusiness” and the small-scale “family farming” that is mainly concerned with supplying products for the local and regional market on the other (Schneider, Shiki, & Belik, 2010). Historically, agricultural policies paid only limited attention to the specific development needs of small-scale producers. The state focused on the modernization of the agricultural sector and the cultivation of uninhabited areas to boost agricultural products’ exports in line with Brazil’s general economic strategy during the military dictatorship (Grisa & Schneider, 2014).

With the rise of democratic movements that led to the 1988 federal constitution, social rights have been more accentuated (Schneider et al., 2010). This development led to a rising preoccupation with the rural population, and policies to strengthen family agriculture started to emerge. In 2006, a legal definition of family agriculture underpinned the social and economic relevance of small-scale farming in Brazil and opened the path for a more institutionalized integration of family farming into public policies (*Lei N° 11.326, de 24 julho de 2006*).

The most recent example for directing priority towards the family farming development can be observed within one of the longest-standing Brazilian social policies, the national school feeding program (*PNAE – Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar*). The program, established in 1955, has been reformed in the sense that municipalities are since 2009 obliged to use 30% of the federal funding to source food from small-scale family farmers (*Lei No 11.947, de 16 de junho de 2009, Art. 14*).

The recent legal changes in the implementation of the national school feeding program are a materialization of changing institutions in the agriculture sector. The institutional field of agricultural policies are experiencing a transformation as family agriculture is emerging as a legitimate social category.

This research seeks to understand how this institutional change, i.e., the new family farmer procurement legislation, is being implemented within local contexts. How do

municipal administrations, the addressees of the new regulation, adapt to the changing institutional demands and adopt the practice? The requirement of sourcing a share of the daily food consumed in public schools from family farming represents a change of procurement logic, and practice, for the local executing organ. Rather than price as dominating criteria, it is now a combination of location and the product's origin from a specific social (and legally defined) group that governs the selection process. Put differently, embedded in the recent social tendencies, the procurement practices are subject to a change of logic from market to social criteria.

After several years of imposing the legislation, the results for the municipal implementation are mixed. Some municipalities voluntarily procure substantially more food from small-scale farmers than legally obliged, whereas others are not procuring any products from these producers (*Portal do FNDE, Dados da Agricultura Familiar, 5.11.2016*).

This result is somewhat surprising given the seemingly coercive character of the legal regulation. Despite an exceptions clause to justify the inability to comply with the law because of a lack of suitable producers¹, the design of the policy foresees sourcing on local, regional, or even national scope (*CD/FNDE N° 26, de 17 de junho de 2013, Art. 25*). Thus, the regulation should be as flexible as to allow participation of most municipalities. In other words, notwithstanding unfavorable local contextual factors, the municipalities should demonstrate minimal development in rising purchases from small-holder farmers. Even more, since there are municipalities that not only adopt the new legislation but completely adhere to small-scale farmer procurement. This diverse development in various municipalities poses the question of how municipal agencies react to the changing environment. In addition to the existence of local small-hold producers, other local and organizational factors also seem to determine the adoption of the legal requirement, e.g., the disposition and capacity of municipal agents to implement the policy.

1.3 Research Question

I have indicated the gap in the translation studies literature and briefly introduced the empirical context in the previous sections. In both, the phenomenon of interest is, of course, how institutional change is adapted and adopted by local contexts. They have in common that the field-level idea is quite well established, but the local context dynamics are not sufficiently known.

¹ These exceptions refer to i) informality of producers: producers are not registered and therefore not eligible for public contracts; ii) impossibility of producers to offer products on a sufficiently regular basis; iii) inadequate hygienic conditions. (*Lei N° 11.947, de 16 de junho de 2009, Art. 14 §2*)

Theoretically speaking, there has been an increasing preoccupation with the local meaning construction and how localized versions of macro-ideas are being translated into practice (Boch Waldorff, 2013). While there has been substantial research on how ideas transform during local adoption, we know little about how the actual “translation work” plays out and transforms ideas into practice (or not) (Cassell & Lee, 2017).

Empirically speaking, the Brazilian agriculture sector has transformed from an unquestioned imperative of supporting “export” agriculture to acknowledging the diverse rural plurality with family farmers as the backbone of the Brazilian food system (Grisa & Schneider, 2014). This broader social transformation has manifested in concrete policy measures to foster the development of family farmers. In this sense, the most comprehensive policy was the integration of family farmer procurement into the national school feeding program. Since 2009, municipalities are obliged to source 30% of federal funds from family farmers (*Lei 11.947/09, Art. 14*). This reform has far-reaching consequences for the local enactment of the PNAE, as it installed a new procurement modality. However, municipal reactions to this seemingly coercive changing institutional demand were diverse. This increases interest in revealing the local dynamics between municipal actors that lead to different forms of adoption.

The following research question emerged by combining conceptual and contextual takes on the phenomena of interests:

How do different municipal actors interpret the family farmer procurement practice for the national school feeding program and influence the implementation within the local context?

Three sub-research questions will guide the process of answering the overall research question for this project. They aim at identifying relevant actors, meaning constructs, and activities that influence the local translation process.

- *Who are the most influential (individual and organizational) actors? How are they affected by the regulatory change and in which relation do they stand to each other?*
- *Which cognitive frames exist, and how do local actors mobilize them?*
- *How are the locally constructed interpretations translated into practice?*

To address the gap in the literature, scholars have proposed opening the black box of institutional microfoundations (Powell & Rerup, 2017). I will follow this proposition, focusing analytically on the level of organizational communities and individuals to observe micro-instantiations of the emerging field-level change (Pallas, Wedlin, & Fredriksson, 2016).

Institutions are enacted by individuals that are embedded in social structures (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), which guide their reasoning and actions. In the literature, the

seminal concept of institutional logics emerged to theorize how institutions influence organizational behavior (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Institutional logics predominantly act on the interface between fields and organizations. In reference to institutional logics, but with an explicit focus on the micro-level, Schedler and Rüegg-Stürm (2013) proposed the concept of rationalities. Rationalities are conceived as socially constructed interpretive schemes of a given community of meaning that serve as the basis for the interpretation of the institutional environment, and subsequently, its changes (Schedler & Grand, 2016, p. 5). Rationalities, therefore, are locally constructed meaning systems that guide individual behavior. I will rely on this concept to conceptualize how local actors interpret the changing institutional demand and mobilize accordingly.

1.4 Contribution to Theory & Practice

With this research, I aspire to make contributions to both theory and policy.

On a theoretical level, this thesis contributes to the so-called “Scandinavian Institutionalism” by further theorizing the process of translation (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Latour, 1986). As explained in chapter 1.1, I will focus on how the underlying social processes are shaped by mobilizing by local meaning systems. Through an interpretive-qualitative case study approach, I will develop an exploratory model for the local translation process to address the call for further theorizing the social dynamics that play out during translation (Boch Waldorff, 2013).

With the local translation model, I aim to contribute to the understanding of how local actors interpret field-level ideas and how these perceptions influence local activities regarding the translation process. In addition to the more extensively studied question of *how* ideas change, qualifying underlying social processes may shed some light on *why* ideas do change.

For the policymaker, it is essential to understand the elements that constitute successful local policy implementation to improve both efficiency and efficacy of the policy. A deeper understanding of how policies are translated into practice on the municipal level allows for an improved policy design. Ideally, it permits identifying a typology of different implementation patterns, which enables conceptualizing a modular policy design that incentivizes a higher commitment to efficient implementation on the municipal level.

1.5 Structure

This thesis is structured as follows. Besides this introductory chapter, the thesis is divided into six other parts. The second chapter will lay the theoretical fundament for

the empirical analysis. The chapter starts with a short review of the institutional logics perspective and the concept of rationalities. Rationalities and communities of meaning are relevant concepts for the further analysis of how the translation process is enacted locally. In the second part, I introduce the literature on translation studies. Following the introduction, I structure the overview in research that focuses on the idea and its transformation and studies on the so far less theorized translation processes. I close the theoretical part by proposing a preliminary working model.

The third chapter presents the empirical context for the study – the Brazilian School Feeding Program. To better situate the analysis, I will first demonstrate the historical development of policies for the agriculture sector, food security, and the emergence of the family farmer identity in Brazil. Afterward, the Brazilian School Feeding Program and the reform in question will be introduced in detail.

Chapter four demonstrates the methodological approach to this study, which includes the justification of the method selection, case study selection, and the data gathering and analysis process.

Chapter five represents the central part of this thesis – the research findings. First, the four case studies will be introduced. Afterward, an actor mapping is developed inspired by insights from stakeholder theory. In the next part, I describe the rationalities, which were identified in the case studies. After the preliminary analysis, I present the developed model of the local translation process and explicate its different parts – the phases and transitions.

Chapter six discusses the results by contrasting the obtained findings with the existing literature on translation studies. Finally, chapter seven concludes the study with the contribution to theory and practice, limitations, and indications for future research.

2 Theoretical Orientation

In this chapter, I prepare the conceptual ground for this thesis. After an introductory paragraph, I introduce the literature on institutional logics (2.1) and communities of meaning with their rationalities (2.2). Section 2.3 bridges the two institutional streams, before section 2.4 discusses the extant literature on translation studies concerning the transformation of the idea (2.4.1) and focusing on the process (2.4.2). Finally, I propose a preliminary framework as guidance through the research process (2.5).

Early streams of the neo-institutional organization theory have pointed out that organizations become more homogeneous in their form, culture and output due to the structuration of the shared environment or field² (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). As new organizational forms diffuse and more organizations within a shared environment adopt them, these forms become “rationalized myths” of what constitutes a proper organization – irrespective of actual efficiency considerations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This ongoing diffusion exerts regulatory, normative, and cognitive pressures on organizations to acquire similar forms to be accepted as legitimate actors and thus, leading to *institutional isomorphism* (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In other words, when organizational forms and practices are being adopted and reproduced by a higher number of actors within a field, they become taken-for-granted or institutionalized, formal and informal “rules of the game” to which actors feel pressured to adhere for legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341; Zucker, 1977).

2.1 Institutional Logics Perspective

As a result of the institutionalization process of formal and informal rules and expectations, organizational fields are characterized by institutions that manifest a certain institutional logic (Thornton, Lounsbury, & Ocasio, 2012). Friedland & Alford proposed the concept of institutional logics as a “*set of material practices and symbolic constructions constituting organizing principles available to organizations and individuals to elaborate*” (1991, p. 248). These are rooted in a system of central societal institutional orders. They identify capitalism, bureaucratic state, family, democracy and religion as basic institutions of western society (1991, p. 249). Therefore, individual and organizational interests, identities, values, and assumptions are embedded in a prevailing institutional logic (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 6). Put differently, institutional logics determine one’s perception of the world and define which organizational and individual behaviors are judged legitimate.

² DiMaggio & Powell define the organizational field as an aggregated recognizable arena of institutional life with key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organizations that produce similar products or services (1983, p. 148).

Based on Friedland & Alford's approach to the inter-institutional system, Thornton et al. (2012) further developed the concept of institutional logics. In their seminal publication "the institutional perspective," they continue Thornton and Ocasio's (1999, 2008) endeavor to develop a *"metatheoretical framework for analyzing the interrelationships among institutions, individuals, and organizations in social systems"* (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2). They bundled ideal types of institutions into an altered inter-institutional system to foster theory development and empirical research. With this, they proposed some adaptations to the initial conceptualization from Friedland & Alford (1991). Thornton et al. (2012) integrate the new ideal type of institutions "profession," "corporation," and "community," while abandoning "democracy." The authors argue that democracy is a variation of the central institution state rather than an autonomous institution (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 67).

Friedland & Alford (1991) already claimed that institutions on a societal level are potentially contradictory. Transferred to the organizational field: Different actors may have different institutionalized expectations towards an organization. If the prescriptions of the multiple logics are incompatible, they lead to institutional complexity. The degree of complexity is thereby a function of the power structures within the field. Centralized fields demonstrate quite clear power structures with central actors enjoying high legitimacy and authority and are characterized by low complexity. In highly fragmented fields, in contrast, many different and incompatible demands raise the complexity. However, fragmentation is usually characterized by relatively high dispersion of power and, hence, the absence of sufficiently powerful actors to impose their demands on their environment.

Connected to the fragmentation of a field is its maturation. Maturation refers to the degree to which organizational fields are institutionalized with clear taken-for-granted logics and actors' social positions of its actors (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010). In the process of field maturation, fragmentation tends to decrease as one institutional claim prevails as the single "dominant logic." However, fields can accommodate multiple logics in a stable form, as long as the logics and their interrelations are clearly defined and predictable (Reay & Hinings, 2009). To satisfy conflicting institutionalized expectations, organizations need to find adequate adaptation strategies to obtain legitimacy (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Nonetheless, while the ambiguity of contesting institutional demands increases the organizational environment's complexity, they give leeway for agency by enabling different interpretations and responses to institutional pressures (Greenwood et al., 2011; Oliver, 1991).

Finally, as institutional logics require constant reaffirmation through organizational enactment, institutional complexity allows for dynamic mobilization or reconfiguration of such logics within local instantiations. These local instantiations of multiple logics may contribute to the further institutionalization of the field or be the starting point for

bottom-up-driven field-level institutional changes (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009). Changes may be based on organizational practice (Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012), new actors entering the field (Voronov, De Clercq, & Hinings, 2013), or business model innovation (Battilana & Dorado, 2010).

How institutional change processes unfold and manifest in the respective logics is central in institutional theory and this research project. Besides the bottom-up approaches described above, the impetus for institutional change may come from powerful actors within the field, i.e., state regulations (Bossard, 2016; Kirkpatrick et al., 2013). This type of imposing institutional change on the field actors is a coercive attempt to provoke the institutionalization of a new institutional logic by challenging existing guiding principles. How institutional change disseminates depends on field structure (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Reay & Hinings, 2005), individual perception, and organizational responses (Greenwood et al., 2011).

For the further course of this research, it is worthwhile to notice that the concept of institutional logic is essential as it connects individual and organizational behavior to field level and societal belief systems. Institutional logics offer interpretive schemes for organizations and individuals, who may mobilize these logics in their local meaning construction (Boch Waldorff, 2013). However, implementing a public policy does not deliver a comprehensive set of symbolic constructions and material practices. The creation of an institutionalized practice with the corresponding logic is the objective, not the cause. The regulation merely offers the institutional matters and manuals for material practices for the collective social construction of a given institutional logic. This institutionalization results from a constant dialectic process between the institutional demand and the local enactment of existing systems of meaning by the various actors. To capture the process of local interpretation requires departing from the conception of the organization as a unitary actor and explore the level of individual interaction, the so-called micro-foundations of institutional change (Lakshman & Akhter, 2015). The analytic inclusion of institutional micro-instantiations is also reflected in a growing interest among institutional scholars as it promises valuable insights into how institutions emerge, survive and change (Bévort & Suddaby, 2016; Pache & Santos, 2010; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012).

2.2 Communities of Meaning and their Rationalities

Changes in the institutional environment are interpreted and enacted by individuals, thereby confirmed and reinforced, or adapted and changed in reconstruction processes. However, this process does not happen in a void, but in social interaction with communities of meaning, among which shared interpretation patterns emerge. The interpretation of the institutional environment, and subsequently its changes, is based on pre-existing cognitive schemes of a community of meaning (Schedler &

Grand, 2016, p. 5). Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm refer to these collective cognitive schemes as *rationalities* (2013, p. 35). The authors describe rationalities of communities of meaning as constructed through a socialization process between individuals that are connected through shared activities and goals that require communication and interaction. Shared experiences lead to the development of common knowledge, values, argumentation patterns, and even language. Through institutionalization, rationalities acquire externalized qualities and become taken for granted (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). In this sense, they serve as legitimizing scripts for the community members' interpretation of the environment, reasoning, and action (Schedler, 2003; Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013).

Despite their similar conceptualization, rationalities and institutional logic differ in their analytical background. Whereas institutional logics are rooted in field-level institutions, rationalities emerge from social interaction in communities of meaning (Schedler & Grand, 2016, p. 5). Bossard (2016, p. 21) seconds this argument in proposing rationalities as concrete micro-level instantiations of macro-level institutional logics. What is more, both serve as guiding principles for individual action, but while cognitive schemes can be invoked and applied in specific situations, institutional logics cannot (Boch Waldorff, 2013, p. 222). Differentiating both concepts strengthens analytical precision and prevents further dilution of the already inflationary use of institutional logics.

Communities of meaning are not hermetically sealed constructs, and neither are their rationalities solid structures. They are constantly reified through the interaction of individuals, which are themselves influenced by their environments. As part of society, communities of meaning are embedded into the institutional order with corresponding logics. Their members may draw on different belief systems. Also, new members may enter the group and not only adapt to the established rationality but also invoke reconfiguration (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013). Additionally, powerful stakeholders, e.g., professional associations, may influence community members through "relational ties" (Greenwood et al., 2011).

The composition of influences that are exerted on a community of meaning is relevant as the perception of surging new institutional demands, i.e., institutional change, is contingent on the local rationality. The actors within communities of meaning interpret and materialize field-level logics locally if they are compatible with their historically shaped rationalities. If there is no compatibility, the institutional change demands will either be ignored, opposed, or reinterpreted (Schedler & Grand, 2016).

However, as rationalities are not stable constructions, introducing new institutional inputs may put into play political power games within the communities. Group members with low power might identify with the surging new logic and mobilize interests and allies, attempting to invoke open or subversive questioning of the established rationality (Battilana, 2006). What is more, organizations, or relevant local

enactment spheres in general, host various communities of meaning (Townley, 2002). Hence, what is valid for internal power conflicts is even enhanced across different communities of meaning since the potential of conflicting rationalities is higher (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013). Pache & Santos (2010) propose a typological framework on the internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands. Organizations react differently to conflicting institutional pressures depending on the nature of the demand and internal representation of the different demands. The nature of demand asks if the conflicting institutional pressures concern organizational means or ends and therefore allow predictions on the negotiability of the conflict. Whereas conflicts about means are negotiable, disagreements on the organizational objectives are more challenging to resolve. The organizational representation expresses the existence and power balance of the competing institutional pressures inside the organization. These two dimensions combined indicate the employment of different response strategies, such as *compromise*, *avoidance*, *defiance*, or *manipulation* (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). Besharov and Smith (2014) offer a similar conceptualization by proposing the dimensions of *compatibility* and *centrality* to determine the intra-organizational conflict potential of engaging with multiple institutional logics.

These analytical frameworks are valuable tools to analyze the local enactment of competing institutional demands. Undeniably, the typologies explored above permit a certain prediction of organizational reactions to institutional change and the corresponding emergence of conflicting demands. Nevertheless, they remain static models.

2.3 Changing Metaphors: from Diffusion to Translation

Even though the models mentioned above grant valuable insights into organizational predispositions to absorb institutional change, most contributions do not propose an adequate analytical account to theorize the process of unfolding local enactment. The process view operates hereby in a double level. In the first instance, the interest lies in the institutional change's local interpretation and implementation process. Whenever individual and organizational actions leave the spheres of taken-for-granted schemes, space for agency is created. Newly arising institutional expectations create such types of situations that require interpretation in affected communities of meaning. The result is a community-specific reality construction process with corresponding action or non-action (Schedler & Grand, 2016, p. 8). The interplay between institutional logics, rationalities, and their materialization in organizational action is not a straightforward process but requires translation (Callon, 1986; Schedler & Grand, 2016). Translation means a generative process that transfers newly arising institutional demands into concrete local action.

Second, it is of interest how the institutionalizing process unfolds across the field. The evolution of institutional theory and especially the institutional logics perspective has been accompanied by the descent in analytical level from field to the individual. The micro-foundations of institutions allow for more comprehensively theorizing agency in the interplay of institutional pressures and organizational responses (Greenwood et al., 2011; Oliver, 1991) and as a source of institutional change (Battilana et al., 2009). However, these accounts focus on the organizational or individual behavior and use the field either as a resource to explain different forms of exerted institutional pressures (for organizational responses) or to identify the enabling factors of institutional entrepreneurs (Battilana, 2006). Once initiated, the institutional change is assumed to diffuse across the field as early literature proposes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Conversely, the process of how newly arising institutional expectations spread across the field has experienced less theorizing within the classic institutional theory.

In the diffusion model, agency is exclusively located at the center of the diffusion, and the actors within the field merely act as a passive medium that transmits the institutional change demands mostly unchanged. This renders the field actors as passive recipients of institutional pressures or “cultural dopes” (Fligstein, 2001, p. 110). Diffusion is deemed a viable metaphor to explicate initial constellations for institutional change as it accounts for agency in the form of an institutional entrepreneur. However, it falls short in demonstrating how change is perceived throughout the field. Latour (1986) takes up this criticism to the diffusion model when he argues that: *“Diffusion defines three important elements in the spread of a token through time and space: the initial force that triggers the movements and which constitutes its only energy, the inertia that conserves this energy; and the medium through which the token circulates”* (pp. 266-267).

The diffusion model neglects the fact that concepts must be re-energized to spread further, which contrasts with the notion of inertia. Re-energizing happens when actors interpret and shape the token *“according to their different projects”* (Latour, 1986, p. 268). What is more, the model of diffusion and isomorphism does not propose an explicit theoretical account for variation across the field. Variation of local enactments is only implicitly accounted for on the level of the individual organization. Yet, theorizing the determinants of variation in the field is essential to identify strategies on how institutional change may be best framed and initiated. For example, a state actor may be able to design a new regulation considering variation in local enactment. Literature generally referred to as “translation studies,” proposes a complementary metaphor to the diffusion model (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996).

2.4 Translation Studies

Callon and Latour have introduced the notion of translation to describe processes of actor enrolment in their studies of power relations, focusing on the perpetual emergence of social associations throughout time and space (Callon, 1986; Callon & Latour, 1981; Latour, 1986). Czarniawska & Sevón followed Latour's proposal to replace the physical metaphor of diffusion with one of translation and thereby emphasize its richness of meanings, evoking different associations with movement and transformation (1996, pp. 6-7). One main virtue of the translation conception is that actors engage in an active transformation process when the idea travels in time and space; or, as Latour describes it concisely: *"each of these people may act in many different ways, letting the token drop, or modifying it, or deflecting it, or betraying it, or adding to it, or appropriating it"* (1986, p. 267). Different interpretations or translations throughout the field become the norm, whereas unmodified transmission becomes the exception that requires explanation. Despite this processual assumption being a central element of Actor-Network-Theory and somewhat conflicting with the institutional emphasis on structure, the notion of translation has inspired an entire stream of literature interested in organizational change - the so-called "Scandinavian Institutionalism." This term was coined by Czarniawska & Sevón in their seminal book on translating organizational change (1996, p. 3).

Drawing on the metaphor of traveling ideas and management fashion, Czarniawska & Joerges propose a conceptual approach on how ideas spread throughout time and space (1996). For ideas to travel from one context to another, they must be dis-embedded from their source and framed as abstract objects, such as documents, images, sounds, or more modern representations such as PowerPoint slides (Eriksson-Zetterquist & Renemark, 2016). In this form, the idea leaves local time/space to be communicated, transferred, and perceived in myriads of other local time/spaces – i.e., individuals in organizations. When arriving at a new local context, the ideas are re-embedded by materializing and transferring into practice, and if repeatedly enacted, to eventually become institutionalized (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996).

The authors draw on fashion as an explaining mechanism for which ideas are being objectified and translated repeatedly. Fashion works at the institutional "fringes" in a constant interplay between institutions limiting the variety of new trends and fashion that constantly undermines the existing order. What constitutes a trend that is widely followed is thereby depending on, firstly, if the idea grasps the *Zeitgeist* of a certain field or, to put it differently, if it is framed as a positive input for the actors; and secondly, if central or leading actors adopt the idea and contextualize it within their context and thereby create legitimating accounts for imitation. These legitimizing accounts may be narratives or enacted practices, observable in the field and generating images of action for localized interpretations of other actors (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996).

The proposition of a process-oriented model focusing on local implementation has directed towards a hitherto underexplored analytical lens to study the institutionalization of traveling ideas. An increasing number of studies has welcomed this cue to further theorize and systematize different aspects of the translation process (Boch Waldorff, 2013; Cassell & Lee, 2017; Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005a; Eriksson-Zetterquist & Renemark, 2016; Gutierrez-Huerter, Moon, Gold, & Chapple, 2020; Kirkpatrick et al., 2013; Mueller & Whittle, 2011; Nicolini, 2010; Nielsen, Wæraas, & Dahl, 2020; Pallas et al., 2016; Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014).

Cassel & Lee (2017) identify two broad approaches towards analyzing translation: The first focuses on the properties of the idea itself and how the idea changes. The second approach emphasizes the processes by which translation unfolds. This differentiation seems apt as it analytically follows the process from a field-level idea and its characteristics to the actual implementation. In addition, it reflects different, complementing levels of analysis. Whereas focusing on ideas and their metamorphoses emphasizes field-level heterogeneity (Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014), the process-oriented studies underscore local meaning creation and transfer to practice. Finally, the differentiation highlights focus on the outcome on the one side and the process on the other. I will orientate the remainder of the theoretical orientation along this division to decompose the translation process into different moments of translation. This is, of course, an analytical division as, either way, translation processes show components of idea-adaptation and implementation. What changes is the conceptual focus.

2.4.1 Studies Concerning the Idea Transformation

In contrast to the diffusion metaphor that assumes homogeneity throughout the field, the translation model accounts for heterogeneous local representations of ideas that are supposed to be the same or similar (K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). The translation is constituted by the local interpretation and implementation of traveling ideas (Gondo & Amis, 2013). If unconditionally accepted, the concept leads to new and unique local versions of any idea (Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005b), even somewhat unpredictable results (Latour, 1986), and appears as the key heterogeneity-producing social mechanism (Røvik, 2016). As a consequence, any study of local translation would remain a single incident with severely limited theorizing potential beyond the specific context.

Despite its heterogeneity-generating tendency, various studies open up the possibility that translation processes display more systematic outcomes, for example, in studies of total quality management (van Veen et al., 2011); the adoption of the “best practice” approach in the Italian public sector (Nicolini, Lippi, & Monteiro, 2019); or adopting reputation management for Norwegian hospitals (Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014), or

implementing hospital management reforms in European countries (Kirkpatrick et al., 2013). In addition to these empirical studies, conceptual approaches to translation patterns have also been proposed (Røvik, 2016; K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996).

Scholars focusing on translation have identified various patterns that guide this process. In analyzing imitation of successful cases, Sahlin-Andersson, for example, proposed essentially three “editing rules” (1996). First, when imitating organizational forms, local actors “edit” the idea by de-emphasizing or excluding time- and space-bound features of the original context. Removing contextual factors enhances the acceptability of a given idea throughout the field, as the local translations face different contexts. Second, when depicting or reconstructing accounts of enacted ideas, they are presented in a problem-solving logic, invoking a causal chain between activities and effects. Accidental or inexplicable circumstances and aspects are removed. The third set of editing rules concerns formulation. Through circulation and their repeated formulation, ideas or concepts acquire labels and are framed in narratives to attract attention in the relevant audience (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008, pp. 226-227).

In applying the concept of editing rules, Kirkpatrick et al. (2013) analyzed how the idea of a hospital management model changes when translated from its source context, the USA, into four European countries. Respective legislative initiatives accompanied all translations. The comparative dimension emphasized the local context and its structural – regulatory and political – implications that shape the “material” translation of templates, rather than symbolic and linguistic levels (Kirkpatrick et al., 2013, p. 58). Furthermore, in their study of translating lean management from the manufacturing to the construction industry, Morris & Lancaster (2006) found that the editing rules support contextualizing and labeling of the idea according to firms’ perceptions. However, as they emphasize in their study, editing rules did not fully explain how local interpretation is translated into practice.

Sahlin-Andersson’s (1996) “editing” rules point to the abstraction of an enacted success case to allow general representations to be adopted by actors in various contexts. However, not all ideas or practices are similar in their characteristics, and they differ in their ability to be abstracted. In his theory of rule-based translation, Røvik proposed *translatability* as representing the extent to which ideas or practices can be de-contextualized and translated into abstract representations without losing essential properties. *Translatability* is thereby conceptualized as a function of complexity, embeddedness, and explicitness of the idea (2016, p. 294).

Complexity is expressed in two aspects. First, the interrelation between technology and people. The higher the technical element with a straightforward application, the less context-specific and complex is the transition into an abstract object. The second factor that influences complexity, according to Røvik, is causal ambiguity. The more results of certain practices or concepts are attributable to clear factors, the better an idea is translatable into an abstract concept – or the lower its complexity (2016, p.

294). This second factor is directly pointing at the editing towards logic causal chains proposed by Sahlin-Andersson (1996).

When examining the embeddedness of a certain idea, two main aspects should be considered. On the one side, embeddedness is expressed through the centrality or dispersion of the concept between departments, organizations, or networks. The higher the concentration in few places, the easier the identification and demarcation of its knowledge base. On the other hand, the embeddedness is rooted in the non-migratory nature of ideas. It is higher if the necessary knowledge for enacting the idea is based in various inter-organizational contexts and is integrated or dependent on other practices (Røvik, 2016).

Explicitness, the last of the translatability-influencing pillars, refers to the implicitness-explicitness dimensions of knowledge (Polanyi, 1958). Explicit knowledge can be systematically verbalized and therefore easily transmitted and reinterpreted. Tacit knowledge, however, denotes a personal or organizational, inarticulate component that underlies a skillful performance. The higher the degree of implicitness of knowledge for the enactment, the lower its translatability (Røvik, 2016).

Translation is a performative process that requires de-contextualization and re-contextualization (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996). So far, the identified contextual conditions have focused on the de-contextualization of an idea. However, there are further determinants that influence the process of translation, especially in the process of re-contextualization. Røvik proposes two contextual conditions: the *transformability* of a concept and the “*relation between source and target context*” (2016, p. 300).

The *transformability* of the transferred token is conceptualized as the freedom of the translator to interpret and change the source context version or create his own versions (Røvik, 2016, p. 300). Two components seem important to determine the transformability: first, the more a practice or idea is depending on a clearly defined technological application, the less transformable it is; and second, the more the transfer process is regulated and monitored by powerful involved actors (e.g., headquarters, regulating bodies or rating agencies) the less the freedom of the recipient to manipulate the token (Björkman, Barner-Rasmussen, & Li, 2004; Nicolini et al., 2019; Røvik, 2011, 2016). In addition to regulative power, extensive education and training of organizational members in the target context are likely to lower the transformability of ideas and increase its actual entrenchment within organizations (Røvik, 2011, p. 640).

Finally, the relationship between recipient and source context constitutes the third contextual influence of the translation process. The main variable hereby is *similarity* or the degree to which both contexts show comparable characteristics. The translated idea or practice does not encounter an organizational void but rather a context with existing structures, culture, and practices. This may require major adaptations of the translated practice to be successfully implemented or, depending on the degree of

compatibility with existing practices, lead to resistance in the recipient organization (Røvik, 2016).

Based on the contextual conditions presented above, Røvik (2016) conceptualizes an instrumental theory of translation rules drawing from the literature of knowledge transfer and translation studies. Depending on the external conditions, translators in the target context may (deliberately or unconsciously) employ certain modification rules to guide the transfer processes. The first option consists of simply *copying* the concept within the target context. This rule is applied when the objective is to imitate a concept, either because it is perceived as successful (K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996), because of high uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), or because of low transformability. In other cases, it may be necessary to employ an *addition* or *omission* rule to add or leave out certain elements for a better fit in the target context. Ultimately, *alteration* grants the highest degree of modification of the idea. This rule may be employed to create a local innovation or when the source and target context differ strongly. However, the use of different translation rules does not necessarily raise the degree of heterogeneity across the field. Depending on the local context, different strategies may lead to higher similarity than would the use of the same rule. Almost always, however, does the use of copying or imitation promise less variation than other rules (Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014).

Table 1 below gives an overview of the different translation modes with their corresponding rules. In addition, the table is complemented with favorable context conditions for each type of translation.

Translation mode		Reproducing	Modifying		Radical
Translation rule		Copying	Addition	Omission	Alteration
Description		Replication of practices or results	Explication of implicit elements from the source context or Combination of existing elements from the recipient context with elements of the source context	Implication or subtraction of certain aspects from the desired source version to the recipient version	Comprehensive transformation of the source version or combining various sources creating a unique recipient version
Scope conditions	Translatability	high	medium	medium	low
	Transformability	low	medium	medium	high
	Difference between source and target context	low	medium	medium	high

Table 1: Typology of translation modes and context conditions (author based on Røvik, 2016)

In their study on reputation management adoption, Wæraas & Sataøen (2014) empirically operationalized the translation rules in the hospital context. Analyzing the adaptation process in Norwegian hospitals based on its outcome, they found that

certain aspects of reputation management were directly copied from theory, while others were omitted or added. Thus, translation processes indeed follow certain recognizable patterns. In addition, local translations resulted in rather homogeneous forms of adoption. The authors attribute this conformity at least partly to the high degree of institutionalization of the hospital field with dominant professional norms, which confirms the theory of isomorphic field pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This finding reconciles translation studies with the early neo-institutional claims insofar as *“local versions in an organizational field share salient features”* and *“lead to considerably less variation than predicted by Scandinavian translation theory”* (Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014, p. 251).

Ansari, Fiss & Zajac (2010) follow a similar approach for the conceptualization of practice adaption at the interface of population and organization level. Combining rational and institutional accounts for organizational behavior, they argue that diffusing practices are adapted and adopted in varying degrees of fidelity and extensiveness over time and depending on the technical, cultural, and political fit between idea and organizational context. Whereas fidelity denotes the degree of similarity between the field-level concept and organizational practice, extensiveness describes the degree of implementation. Nicolini et al. (2019) build on the practice adaption literature when studying the uptake of best practice approaches in Italy. They find that “made to fit” adoption patterns require a clear, objectified idea and central brokers for promotion; otherwise, the “benchmark” for faithful implementation would be missing. In their case, this “benchmark,” as well as central brokers, were absent, and a “bottom-up” adaption occurred. Against the expectation of complete idiosyncrasy, translation patterns emerged, depending on the positions and interests of adopters in the field (p. 220). Based on this observation, they propose a framework with varying adaption patterns depending on the power of the brokering agency and the autonomy of adopters in the field. This proposition underpins Røvik’s transformability claim (Røvik, 2011, 2016).

By introducing typologies of translation rules, translating actors are granted agency to the extent that the environmental factors allow and that local constituents require. The presented studies propose that translation processes seem to be governed by some degree of regularity. The thereby identified patterns take various forms. Either they guide translation as linguistic and symbolic (K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996) or material context (Kirkpatrick et al., 2013) editing rule. Or translation is contingent on the properties of the idea (Røvik, 2016) or depend on actor positions (Nicolini et al., 2019). This does not imply that local enactment must lead to homogeneity, rather local adaption still occurs, but results may be more systematic than unique versions (Latour, 1986; Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014).

Røvik based his instrumental theory on a process of idea transfer from a source context into a target context. He emphasized de-contextualization, as he discovered a bias towards contextualization in the translation literature (Røvik, 2016, p. 292). In

the empirical context of this research, the original “donor” context is missing, as it analyzes the implementation of a new act of federal regulation. Nonetheless, a written law fits Czarniawska & Joerges’ description of an abstract object, which is ready to be implemented. It could be imagined as the idea of being caught on the fly somewhere in time and space. In line with the argumentation of Wæraas & Sataøen, I argue that the use of the translation patterns is still applicable since valuable knowledge about the contextualization process could be lost if the de-contextualization is perceived as a necessary condition. Furthermore, there is no clear original donor context for many organizations that adopt the idea, as the idea may have already been circulating as a generally accepted concept (2014, p. 245). Wedlin & Sahlin (2017) consider this issue also conceptually by referring to different modes of imitation. Only in one of three modes is the translation referring to one original source context. The other modes refer either to already translated, local instantiations or mediation through “carrier individuals or organizations” such as management consulting firms.

2.4.2 Studies Emphasizing the *Process* of Translation

In the last section, we have seen that translation patterns provide a sound account for analyzing how ideas are de-contextualized, objectified, and more or less systematically re-contextualized. Studies on translation patterns offer valuable insights mostly from an *ex-post* perspective based on translation outcomes (Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014). This form of “reverse-process-engineering” inevitably includes an instrumental component that foregoes a processual perspective. The focus, therefore, is neither on how actors in local contexts interact to perform ‘translation work’ (Cassell & Lee, 2017) nor on how the idea is actually transmitted to various contexts (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017). As announced above, the next section will, thus, explore studies that focus on the actual *process* of translation.

2.4.2.1 Modes of Traveling

Circulation of ideas in the field presupposes that they possess a certain degree of mobility. The mobility depends on the form of the idea and the means of transportation that carry ideas to different places (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017). As stated above, for being able to travel, the idea is de-contextualized and transformed into an abstract representation, i.e., words, sounds, or images (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996) or, as it is the case in this research, laws, and regulations (Nicolini, 2010). How an idea travels, however, depends on modes of transportation. Wedlin & Sahlin (2017) identify three different modes: First, the *broadcasting mode* (March, 1999, p. 137), where a central idea or a set of practices is picked up by various actors and translated into different contexts. Broadcasting from a central idea or actor is likely to foster

homogenization throughout the field. This is different from a second variant, a *chain mode*, where the idea is translated from other translating actors. In this mode, the 'origin' is not necessarily known, and translating actors take up ideas stemming from a wider trend or fashion (Czarniawska, 2005). Third, translation of ideas may be mediated by actors or organizations circulating ideas across the field. These carriers, such as consultants, business schools, universities, or the media, energize the travel of ideas (Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002).

Nicolini (2011) differentiates "translation by contact" and "translation at distance" to describe the process of coalescing different forms of knowledge into relational practices as "sites of knowing." While "translation at distance" relates to transforming practices into abstract mediators in order to travel through time and space, as discussed at length above, "translation by contact" often incurs in physical proximity through discursive practices, artifacts, or infrastructures (2011, p. 614). Similarly, Mueller & Whittle (2011) emphasize the application of linguistic practices in translating ideas. They rely on a typical instance for translating by contact: A training session to introduce a new quality improvement initiative, in which thematic champions skillfully apply discursive devices to frame the participants' interaction with the idea.

2.4.2.2 Local Translation Activities

Czarniawska & Joerges' (1996) initial description of how ideas are being translated into new contexts remains rather punctual. Ideas arrive, are materialized, and transferred into practice. If repeated sufficiently often, practices become institutions. While these steps describe, of course, important points of passage for adapting and adopting an idea, they do not highlight the activities performed to achieve these "milestones." In other words, they do not caption the "translation work" (Cassell & Lee, 2017). In this subsection, I present findings from recent studies that emphasize the underlining micro and social processes.

Understanding and Adapting the Idea

When new ideas arrive in local contexts, they are engaged in a local process of meaning creation. Actors concerned with implementation assess the object regarding the compatibility or fit with their local circumstances, namely structures and practices (Ansari et al., 2010; Røvik, 2016). The process of assessing local fit comprises a series of activities. Local actors, which are individuals embedded in organizational contexts, construct local versions of the floating idea (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996) by theorizing (Nielsen et al., 2014), defining and comparing (Gutierrez-Huerter et al., 2020), and ascribing meaning (Boch Waldorff, 2013; Pallas et al., 2016).

Gutierrez-Huerter et al. (2020) identified a series of micro-processes for translating Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting practices from the headquarters in different national contexts. They found that translators engaged in defining, positively or negatively, the new practice and drawing comparisons with existing ones depending on their knowledge, awareness, or commitment to the practice. Ambiguity resulting from detected incompatibilities was addressed by seeking relevant knowledge, either from HQ or within the industry, for reducing uncertainties and identifying opportunities for coupling or repurposing the practice in the local context. When ambiguity cannot (or should not) be reduced or circumvented, conflicting aspects were simply filtered (Gond & Boxenbaum, 2013; Gutierrez-Huerter et al., 2020). In other words, actors engage in local meaning creation by trying to understand the idea and problematizing or reinforcing elements that fit the incoming idea to their own perceived reality, therefore adapting it (Morris & Lancaster, 2006; Røvik, 2016; K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). This process of meaning creation as a result of perceived reality is, hence, mediated by the rationality of local communities of meaning and their actors (Schedler & Grand, 2016; Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013).

The generation of, and agreement on localized versions, however, is by no means a trivial task but rather a complex process negotiated by a plurality of perceptions and interests (Latour, 1986, 1987; Pallas et al., 2016). Translation unfolds within contexts with existing relations and power structures in which actors follow strategic approaches in an attempt to assert their interests (Cassell & Lee, 2017). The arrival of an idea may trigger a diverse set of reactions from local actors. While some perceive the looming change as a window of opportunity to realize their interests, other deploy defense mechanisms (Oliver, 1991; Powell et al., 2005). Translation is likely to play out amidst conflicting interests until the localized version of the idea reaches an acceptable status (Røvik, 2011).

Mobilizing

Newly arriving ideas are likely to provoke mobilization within the local context by fostering or resisting the idea, and mobilizing manifests in different forms such as empowering, enrolling, convincing, or legitimizing (Boch Waldorff, 2013; Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; Nicolini, 2010; Pallas et al., 2016; Perner & Skjølsvik, 2017).

Latour (1987, p. 108) frames mobilizing as “*translating interests*,” that is, enroll others to supporting the interest of the person enrolling them. Thereby, different strategies are proposed to manipulate actors in translating their interests, depending on the discrepancy between differing interests. Intuitively, the higher the compatibility, the easier the mobilization of actors, and hence, the simpler the translation strategy. Similarly, Callon (1986) proposes moments of translation that aim at imposing ideas on others by appearing as an obligatory passage point for others’ objectives and

interests. The phases revolve around *problematizing* a situation, *interest* the addressees by proposing a solution, form alliances by *enrolling* actors, and, finally, *mobilize* to transform enrollment into action. Perner & Skjølsvik (2017, p. 149) confirm the notion of mobilizing as moving from acting individually towards collective action. In studying the implementation of procurement regulation, they found that less powerful street-level bureaucrats effectively mobilized into powerful groups, thereby balancing out power structures in the field. In their case, mobilizing started out as an unorganized and individual activity and developed into groups and movements with increasing visibility and convening power. Cassell & Lee (2017) second the value of enrolling and mobilizing allies to balance power structures. In their case, the unionist movement sought to retain proprietorship over the translation of the trade union idea against more powerful and central actors.

Also, mobilization comprises invoking social meaning. Boch Waldorff (2013) demonstrates that actors mobilized institutional logics to legitimize their vision on how to translate the homecare center into the local context. Likewise, Pallas et al. (2016, p.1680) found that the translation of ideas is a constant process of (re)construction in light of different existing and mobilized value systems in the local context.

2.5 Proposing a Preliminary Framework

The theorizing of pattern-based translation promises valuable contributions to understanding how organizations adapt organizational concepts in transferring them into local contexts. A main virtue of the translation perspective is to be concerned with local interpretation and materialization of circulating concepts (Pallas et al., 2016). The translation perspective contains, like the institutional logics perspective, a symbolic as well as a material component. Yet, the translation approach shows a stronger emphasis on actual practice implementation through the adaptation to the local context. This focus may be due to the connection to the ontology of actor-network-theory that stresses the co-construction of reality by the social world and material one (Latour, 2005). An organizational concept needs to be materialized in practice to gain any significance. Just like a law needs to be implemented in practice to unfold its intended effect. This contrasts with at least early institutionalist theory, where the focus of the investigation is on symbols decoupled from actual practice (Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014).

It is, therefore, useful to theorize general patterns of modification that influence the translation process since the conceptual objective is the effective implementation in a local context. On the one hand, what rule is applied for the translation depends on the degree of necessary adaption to materialize the concept in the local context. Furthermore, it is influenced by the described contextual conditions – translatability, transformability, and the relation between source and target context. The judgment

about the necessary and intended adaption, however, is contingent on the interpretation of the translating actors. There is more than one way to interpret an idea within a given context (Boch Waldorff, 2013, p. 221). It is here where the concept of rationality comes into play again. Individuals mobilize the interpretation schemes constructed by communities of meaning to assign meaning to the idea and its contextual properties. This leads to the following tentative propositions on how communities of meaning may interpret ideas and employ translation rules.

The more an idea is consistent with the translating actors' rationality, the higher the probability that they will try to imitate that idea in the local contextualization. Depending on the contextual factors, they will employ an adequate strategy to achieve this outcome (Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014). The most extreme case hereby is that the concept is so strongly embedded in their taken-for-granted assumptions of the world that the translation happens almost unconsciously. On the other side, the lower the compatibility with local rationalities, the local actors will perceive the need to change the idea, and the translation will tend to follow an alteration rule. This proposition holds true under two conditions: that the idea is still perceived as the solution to a problem by local actors (K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996), or the idea is connected to a coercive pressure that renders simply not implementing difficult (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The statement from Boxenbaum & Strandgaard Pedersen (2009) confirms this argument by indicating: *"to the extent that actors gain awareness of alternative frames of interpretations, they may deliberately try to translate an idea or practice in a manner that aligns with their own interests"* (p. 192).

So far, the translation has been analyzed under the premise that there was a uniform local rationality involved. Yet, as already described, usually there exist multiple rationalities inside organizations. These may be competing for a certain mode of translation and lead to political processes in the local context. If there is a dominant rationality, the outcome will tend towards the preference of this group (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013). The result is more open in the presence of various powerful rationalities. Groups might engage in the process of negotiation or try to enroll allies (Callon, 1986) inside the organization or in the form of powerful stakeholders of the organization. Another possible outcome might be organizational paralysis or ultimately split (Pache & Santos, 2010). Stakeholders may independently of internal conflicts promote their interests through relational ties. Depending on their social position, they may be able to influence the local interpretation of the idea at disposition. Finally, individual actors can follow individual interests in a diverging interpretation (Boxenbaum, 2006). In this case, they try to engage in an open or, more likely, subversive confrontation against the dominant or conflicting rationalities to provoke a change in the decision on the translation rule (Battilana, 2006).

Based on these roughly sketched propositions, this research is interested in how the translation process of institutional change is being operationalized within the local

context. The underlying assumption is thereby that the translation process reflects the local rationalities since the perception of the environment is filtered through the socially constructed reality. As pointed out, the process becomes more complex, the more diverging rationalities and individual interests are involved. In this case, there is room for agency to invoke new patterns of interpretation.

I will loosely orient my analysis on the four phases of translation that Czarniawska & Joerges (1996, p. 26) proposed in their early work and since have been further institutionalized in repeated empirical use (Eriksson-Zetterquist & Renemark, 2016, p. 5). In the first stage, the idea arrives. Second, the idea is materialized into objects. Objects hereby refer to any kind of materialization that supports the depicting of the idea. Third, the materialized idea will be translated into practice. If this enactment is repeated, the practice, and with it the idea, will be fourth institutionalized. My attempt is to integrate the influence sphere of local rationalities into the processual framework. For this purpose, some elements of Schedler & Grand's (2016) model on the managerial mobilization of institutional logics have been considered.

Figure 1 below depicts a preliminary working framework that resulted from the in-depth literature consultation. It shall serve as analytical guidance throughout the empirical research process. It is evidently bound to experience adaptations as my empirical data unfolds firstly into analytical categories and finally into a conceptual model. Nevertheless, and despite its age, the original depiction of the traveling of ideas metaphor still provides the main pillars for the translation process. Combined with the integration of rationalities, it serves as a simple orientation throughout the complex query of unfolding local translation.




Figure 1: Preliminary framework of translation (author adapted from Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Schedler & Grand, 2016)

3 Brazilian Agriculture, Food Security Policies & the Rising Family Farmer Identity

The introduced institutional change which is analyzed in this research occurs in a particular context of the Brazilian agriculture sector: the public procurement process for the National School Feeding Program of Brazil, which follows the double objective of guaranteeing food and nutritional security for students as well as fostering the family agriculture sector.

This chapter will show that the changing policy towards local development by including family farmers in an established and widespread food security initiative results from an extensive field-level process. Over the last decades, Brazilian society has experienced a profound transformation. The overarching social process was the transition from a military dictatorship to a democratic state. Through the democratizing process, societal groups, among them the rural workers in general and the small-scale farmers specifically, have regained social rights, and they increasingly claimed representation. In addition, the agriculture sector has experienced a shift from extensive support of export and monoculture production towards recognition of the local circuits of family farmers. In conceptual terms, there has been a change in the institutional environment for the agriculture field. Corresponding policies have recently started to emerge as the materializations of this institutional change.

It is necessary to present the context in detail to be able to fully comprehend the extent of this wide-ranging institutional innovation and its implications for the involved actors. Therefore, as a preliminary task, this chapter will introduce in its first part the historical development of public policies in the Brazilian agriculture sector from various analytical angles. First, a general historical timeline will be presented, where the focus lies on the surging of agricultural policies in the light of the national economic development. Second, the emergence of the collective social identity of “family farmers” will be introduced, which sets the basis for the more recent policy focus on agriculture. Third, as the backbone of the national food supply, family farming has achieved its widespread integration into the policy agenda thanks to the rising preoccupation with food security. Hence, the discourse on food security will be shortly discussed to lay the foundation for these two elements to coalesce in the analyzed policy in this research: The National School Feeding Program (PNAE). The PNAE builds consequently the second building block of this chapter. Considering its history, its modus operandi, and, first and foremost, the procurement process from family farmers, the chapter prepares for the individual case studies developed in the further course of this thesis.

3.1 Interlude: A Brief History of Agriculture & Food Security

Brazilian agriculture has experienced an impressive development between 1960-2000 and is today one of the most relevant agricultural producers worldwide. Brazil is among the global export leaders for coffee, beef, broiler, orange juice, sugar cane, ethanol, and soybeans (Santana & Nascimento, 2012).

Today, the Brazilian Agriculture sector is best described as a dualistic system with an industrialized and export-oriented “agribusiness” on the one side and the small-scale “family farming,”³ which is mainly concerned with supplying products for the local and regional market, on the other. The challenges these two systems are facing are different in nature and extent, which leads to a division of the sector with different governmental agencies responsible for each sub-sector⁴ (Schneider et al., 2010).

Despite the high socio-economic relevance of small scale-farming in Brazil, it accounts for around 85% of all farms and 75% of all rural workforce (IBGE, 2009b), agricultural policies historically paid only limited attention to the specific development needs of this producer category. The state focused on the modernization and industrialization of the agricultural sector and the cultivation of uninhabited areas to boost agricultural products' exports in line with Brazil's general economic strategy during the military dictatorship (Grisa & Schneider, 2014). The differentiated preoccupation with these two sectors has emerged only in the more recent history of Brazilian agricultural development. The following section briefly traces the path of Brazilian agriculture since the inception of major public policies for the sector in the 1960s.

3.1.1 Industrial Modernization

Beginning in the second half of the 1950s, the Brazilian government followed an accentuated strategy to develop its national industry to substitute the dependency on

³ In the Brazilian context, family farming has been defined by *Lei N° 11.326, de 24 julho de 2006*. Art. 3 prescribes the cumulative requirements: i) cultivating a property of maximal 4 fiscal modules (fiscal modules are defined for each municipality); ii) the majority of workforce from the family; iii) minimum percentage of income stems from the agricultural activity (defined through public administration); iv) lead of the productive activity through the family.

Before the legal definition, no formalized notion of family farming existed that included the social dimension of the nuclear family. Small-hold farms were identified through the area cultivated. One official denomination offers the public “Polonordeste” development program for the Northeast region in the 1970s, that limited the area for small-hold farmer to 50 ha (Wilkinson, 2008, p. 13). This threshold was also applied by academics, e.g. see Silva (1978, p. 39).

⁴ The agricultural ministry was divided into two separate ministries in 1996 with the establishment of the Extraordinary Ministry for Landholding Policies. In 1999, this ministry was renamed to Ministry for Agrarian Development (MDA), that was responsible for policies for small-hold farmers and indigenous and traditional communities (Santos, 2011, p. 70). In the aftermath of the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, the MDA was extinct and its competencies transferred into the Special Secretary for Family Farming and Agrarian Reform attached to the presidential chief of staff (*DECRETO N° 8.865, DE 29 DE SETEMBRO DE 2016*). This restructuring degraded its status from an independent ministry to a secretary.

imports. The state acted thereby as the decisive authority, facilitator of public, and private investments, and implementor simultaneously. The government focused on an urban-industrial economy, emphasizing industries considered essential for growth, such as automotive, steel, cement, aluminum, heavy machinery, cellulose, and chemical (Santana & Nascimento, 2012, p. 11). This rendered the agriculture sector mostly un-modernized in two different senses: first, only a few public policies aimed at the modernization of agricultural production, and these policies focused on specific products such as sugar cane and coffee for exportation. Also, technological modernization was not imperative due to the abundant land resources available for production expansion; And second, the “feudalistic structure” of rural property with “agrarian elites” remained, thus excluding the rural workforce from participating in the policy process (Delgado, 2010).

However, the transformation toward an industrialized economy was hampered by various factors until the beginning of the following decade. The backward agriculture encountered problems with the internal food supply, the therewith connected rising inflation put price pressure on the basic alimentation products, and limited import capacity of production materials due to the lack of foreign currency reserves slowed down the development process. In addition, critical stands against the pursued path of industrialization, promoted by the political left, were on the rise. In the agriculture sector, social movements were established, envisioning an agrarian reform in favor of small producers and rural work force, i.e., *Ligas Camponesas* (already in 1945); *União dos Lavradores e Trabalhadores Agrícolas do Brasil – ULTAB* (1954); and the *CONTAG* – a national union for rural workers – in 1963. These movements were backed with support from influential academic proponents and seized the political situation by revindicating rights for rural workers (“*Estatuto do Trabalhador Rural*” in 1963) and a preliminary legal basis for an agrarian reform (“*Estatuto da Terra*” in 1964) (Grisa, 2012, pp. 70-73).

3.1.2 Conservative Modernization of the Agriculture Sector

After the military coup in 1964, conservative forces regained power, and the regime started to suppress social movements together with their agenda for agrarian reform. The agrarian policy focus was being re-aligned with the national modernization strategy. Therefore, the regime fostered the agrarian elite to modernize agricultural production. Modernization of production was necessary as the traditional methods combined with land expansion were no longer sufficient to sustain the expansion at the pace required by the industrial sector (Santana & Nascimento, 2012, p. 13). The objectives expected from the agriculture sector were various: First, liberating workforce from the field for the urban center industries; Second, producing high-quality agricultural inputs for the surging agroindustry; Third, providing sufficient supply of

alimentation for the urban population and fourth, exporting agricultural goods to generate foreign currencies to finance imports (Grisa, 2012, p. 75).

In the second half of the 1960s, the so-called “conservative modernization” (Graziano da Silva as cited in Grisa, 2012, p. 76) process was initiated through various policy mechanisms. The term “conservative modernization” denominates the technical and organizational modernization of the agriculture sector between 1965 and 1982 while upholding conservatism in the political arena by emphasizing the interests of big land proprietaries. This again excluded rural workers from political participation (Santos, 2011, p. 60).

The military government focused on four policy pillars to foster national agriculture:

1. an extensive credit program was implemented.
2. To guarantee sales to farmers and flatten the volatility of market prices, the government intensified the already existing minimum price guarantees. The minimum price guarantee was configured as a counterpart to credit lines to secure sales to producers that invested in their production.
3. Research in agriculture technologies should foster technical transformation. For this purpose, the Brazilian Company for Agriculture Research (EMBRAPA) was founded in 1973.
4. Technical assistance should be granted to producers in applying new technologies and accessing credit and minimum price contracts. Analog to the EMBRAPA, the Brazilian Company for Technical Assistance and Rural Extension (EMBRATER) was established in 1974 (Grisa, 2012; Santana & Nascimento, 2012).

For the further course of presenting the developing Brazilian agriculture policy landscape, the focus will lie on the first two pillars, credit lines and minimum prices, and their impacts on small-scale as well as patronal agriculture. This short historical briefing includes references to macroeconomic aspects when deemed necessary.

The credit lines aimed at catalyzing investments and were governed by the National Rural Credit System (SNCR), established in 1965. They were intended to allow farmers to invest in modern production factors at lower interest rates compared to the financial markets. According to the text of the law No. 4829, special consideration was given to the situation of small- and medium-size farmers (*Lei N° 4829 of 1965*). However, as the interest rate and bureaucratic procedures were equal for all producers, small-scale farmers with a low income encountered various barriers to benefit from the programs. Hence, mainly large producers profited from cheap loans to invest in machinery or land and to specialize in commercial crops for export.⁵ In addition, geographical segregation occurred as producers from the relatively

⁵ Commercially most viable products were coffee, soy, wheat, sugar cane, orange and cotton (Grisa, 2012 p.80).

industrialized South and Southeast were better structured to access the rural credit lines. This “three-dimensional selection effect” of size, geography, and product accentuated the division between agricultural producers that achieved industrialized production on the one hand and underdeveloped small-scale producers on the other (Grisa, 2012; Santana & Nascimento, 2012; Santos, 2011, p. 62). Acknowledging this tendency of divergence, the military government emitted two resolutions in 1978 and 1979 to classify producers in different categories (mini, small, medium, big) with differentiated interest rates. These resolutions were the first step toward recognizing the small farmers’ interests, yet without significant impact (Grisa, 2012, p. 78).

The Brazilian minimum price system surged in 1943 with establishing the National Commission for Production Financing (CFP). The minimum price policy followed the objective to stabilize prices along the cycle of planting and harvesting, thereby guaranteeing income to producers and fostering production. The minimum price system operated historically through two different mechanisms: (i) Federal Government Acquisition (AGF), where the government purchased agricultural produce to a minimum price to form a strategic stock, and (ii) Federal Government Loans (EGF) that allowed producers to invest in storage to sell their products to better conditions later. Besides their early implementation, the instruments only gained relevant scale during the military dictatorship, when their volume began to rise steeply in reaction to food security issues. In fostering the producers via credits, the Federal Government Loans program was the principal instrument. However, compared to the rural credit lines, the minimum price guarantee was of substantially lower importance, with governmental expenses only reaching on average 8,5% of the amount granted through credits between 1965 and 1979 (Almeida, 2014).

The Brazilian economy experienced high economic growth rates during the 1960s and 1970s, with an average growth rate of 6.17% and 8.6%, respectively. This trend was abruptly interrupted through various external shocks, beginning with the second oil crisis in 1979, followed by a sudden increase of international interest rates and sharp contraction of private external lending (Santana & Nascimento, 2012, p. 26). The Mexican default in 1982 unleashed a global financial crisis that drove many developing economies into a deep recession (FAO, 2000, p. 147). No exception to this, Brazil entered into an economic crisis that persisted until the mid-1990s. In addition, the domestic inflation level increased dramatically within this time period (Santana & Nascimento, 2012, p. 26). The monetary and economic crisis forced the government to adopt several policy plans in line with the conditions of structural adjustment loans provided by the IMF and World Bank. In order to reduce inflation rates, generate a commercial surplus to pay foreign debts, and restore investments and economic growth, Brazil opted for a free market with export orientation, drastically reduced government spending and currency devaluation against the US dollar, cutting trade restrictions, and privatized state enterprises (Santana & Nascimento, 2012, p. 27).

Only after various economic adjustment plans,⁶ combined with introducing four new currencies,⁷ were implemented, the “*Plano Real*” (Eng: Real Plan) finally started to show signs of success at the end of 1996. This was already under the third democratic government, which Fernando Henrique Cardoso led.

The macroeconomic adjustments during the crisis had direct impacts on the agricultural sector. During the positive economic development in the 60s and 70s, the volume of agricultural credits multiplied by five times in one decade from R\$32 Bn in 1969 to R\$161 Bn 1979 (Banco Central do Brasil, 2012). However, with the outbreak of the economic crisis, policies for the agriculture sector followed the macroeconomic liberalization paradigm, changing from substantial state interventions to a market-oriented system with a decay of sector policies. Due to the debt crisis, the government was forced to substantially reduce the rural credit to serve external and domestic debts. The liberalization of the Brazilian economy and the therewith connected contraction of state interventions culminated in the early 1990s during the government Collor/Franco⁸ (1990-1994). This led to a dramatic decrease of granted rural credits: In 1996, rural credits represented less than 15% of the peak level in 1979 (Santos, 2011; p. 63). Furthermore, rising interest rates⁹ rendered financing more expensive and led to a series of debt restructuring or defaults (Santana & Nascimento, 2012). The credit shock and the economic crisis disproportionately affected the small-scale farmers and rural workers: millions of rural workers ended in unemployment, and many of the few small-scale farmers that had managed to access rural credits defaulted (FAO, 2000; Grisa, 2012, p. 78; Santos, 2011).

In light of the fiscal pressure on rural credit lines in the 1980s, the government started to expand the minimum price guarantee program as an alternative to sustaining income for the agricultural sector. This measure successfully led to an overall increase in grain production, especially of rice and corn. In this period, the federal government

⁶ The macroeconomic adjustment programs were as follows: Cruzado Plan I (February 1986); Cruzado Plan II (November 1986); Bresser Plan (June 1987); Summer Plan (January 1989); Collor Plan I (March 1990); Collor Plan II (February 1991); and Real Plan (June 1994) (Santana & Nascimento, 2012 p. 26).

⁷ The currency changes occurred as follows: 1. Change from *Cruzeiro* to *Cruzado* by dividing the face value of *Cruzeiro* by a thousand during the Cruzado Plan I (1986); 2. During the Summer Plan (1989) the *Cruzado Novo* substituted the *Cruzado* (elimination of three zeros); 3. Replacement of the *Cruzado Novo* by the *Cruzeiro* (one to one ratio) during the Collor Plan I (1990); 4. Introduction of the *Real*, pegged to the US dollar until 1999, during the Real Plan (1994) (Santana & Nascimento, 2012 p. 28-29).

⁸ Fernando Collor de Melo was the first directly elected president since 1960. In 1992 he was impeached due to corruption scandals and the vice-president Itamar Franco assumed the presidency until the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1993 (Grisa, 2012; Santos, 2011).

⁹ Besides the unfavorable macroeconomic development, the rising interest rates were based on three other factors: (i) in 1981, the international donor agencies forced the military government to limit the overall rural credit limit; (ii) In 1982, the government pegged the credit interest rates on the variation of the national consumer price index (INPC); and (iii) reduced the subsidies that reduced the interest rate for producers (Almeida, 2014, p. 43).

acquisition increased dramatically between 1984 and 1987, while the federal government loans decreased compared to the preceding decade. However, after these years, the guaranteed minimum price program turned inviable due to the continued inflationary price development combined with the fiscal restraints of the government. Therefore, the financial volume of the federal government acquisitions dropped massively and followed the macroeconomic process of deconstructing state interventions that were being reinforced during the early 1990s (Almeida, 2014, pp. 42-46).

Due to the depletion of rural credits, minimum prices, and the liberation of the trade barriers, private financing mechanisms started to regain traction when the economic situation improved in the mid-1990s. Supported by newly introduced financial instruments,¹⁰ national or multinational downstream industries intensified investments in agricultural production (Santana & Nascimento, 2012, pp. 31-32). This restructuring process of productive agriculture prepared the ground for focusing on family agriculture and establishing the National Program for Strengthening Family Agriculture (PRONAF) in 1995 – a rural credit program focusing on family farmers.

So far, the historical analysis of Brazilian agriculture has focused on economic developments. However, re-emerging and new social movements essentially pressured the government to create the PRONAF as well as future policies fostering market access for family farmers (Santos, 2011, pp. 65-67). They were responsible for the creation of the narrative and the social category “family agriculture,” which should restructure policies in the sector sustainably. The influence of social developments in the rural sphere on the policy mechanisms will be analyzed in closer scrutiny in the following sections.

3.1.3 The Rise of the Family Agriculture Identity

Parallel to the developments in the economic sphere, Brazil underwent extensive social and political changes between 1980-2000. Already in 1975, the military regime had implemented a strategy of “*slow, gradual, and secure transition*” to a civil government (Santos, 2011, p. 58). However, with the aggravating economic crisis in the 1980s, the regime’s transition strategy experienced increasing critics. The democratization process started to withdraw from military control, and civil society openly revendedicated the transition to a democratic government – i.e., with the “*Diretas Já*” movement (eng: Direct Vote now (for president)). Formerly oppressed union movements regained strength and reorganized opposition against the military regime

¹⁰ In this context especially relevant is the Rural Product Bond (*Cédula do Produto Rural - CPR*) established in 1994 (Lei 8929). The CPR is a title guaranteed by the financial system that allows forward selling to the agricultural producer to anticipate income for the production.

and its economic and rural modernization strategy. The so-called “*Novo Sindicalismo*” (eng: New Unionism) rose with the establishment of various new organizations. In the rural context, most relevant amongst them were the formation of another national union association, *Central Unica dos Trabalhadores* (eng: Single Central for Workers), and the emergence of the biggest Brazilian social movement, *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra - MST* (eng: Landless Workers’ Movement). In addition, with the foundation of the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT; eng: Workers Party), the unionist movement strived for more influence in the political arena. The societal protests, also supported by these new actors and their respective agendas, led to the election of a civil president in 1985 and the national constituent assembly in 1988 (Santos, 2011, pp. 63-67).

Along with the wider social changes occurred a transformation in the agricultural sector. The democratization process allowed an increasing plurality of social actors to revendicate political representation. Unions and social movements supported articulating the interests of the rural workforce and the small-hold farmers, proposing specific policies for small-hold producers, i.e., minimum price policies, credit lines, improved contractual conditions for integrated farmers. In this context, the agrarian reform regained increasing relevance in the rural public discourse with the establishment of the National Campaign for the Agrarian Reform (CNRA)¹¹ and the subsequent elaboration of the National Agrarian Reform Plan (PNRA) in 1985. The PNRA, however, was not thoroughly implemented due to the strong opposition of the still powerful agrarian elites (Delgado, 2010, pp. 42-44).

The various revindications for recognizing a plural society throughout the democratization process celebrated a major success with their consideration in the new federal constitution of 1988. On a meta-level, the political-fiscal system has been decentralized: states and municipalities received more responsibilities for implementing public policies. The decentralization gave the option of considering local contexts and approximated the political arena to local civil society. Additionally, a range of social rights was anchored in the institution. For the purpose of this work, the most important are: (i) the access to labor rights and retirement for rural workers and peasants (Art. 7),¹² (ii) the demarcation (and hence, recognition) of indigenous land and quilombo territories (Art. 67 & 68), (iii) the regulation of extractive practices in

¹¹ The CNRA was initiated by various organizations: (i) the Brazilian Association for the Agrarian Reform (ABRA); (ii) The Council for the Indigenous Missionaries (*Conselho Indigenista Missionário*); (iii) CONTAG; (iv) The Pastoral Land Commission (CPT); (v) Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic Analysis (IBASE); (vi) and parts of the National Confederation of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB). Already before and during the military dictatorship had the catholic church essential influence in constructing the union movements and later on the formation of the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores sem Terra* (MST) (Santos, 2011, p. 95).

¹² Social rights for rural workers have been promised since passing the “*Estatuto do Trabalhador Rural*” (eng: Rural workers Statute) in 1963, as has been mentioned earlier in this chapter.

protected areas and, (iv) the protection of small rural properties against attachment (Art. 5 XXVI) (*Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988*). The materialization of these rights in the constitution marked a counterbalance to the political prevalence of the liberal agribusiness agenda with its diametral opposing interests (Delgado, 2010; Schneider et al., 2010).

The decade of the 1990s can be characterized by the differentiation of two different political projects to develop national agriculture. On the one hand, the *neo-liberal* stream emphasized a deregulated free market with export-oriented Brazilian agriculture. This stream gave rise to the “agribusiness industry” that surged as a major player on the global market for agricultural produce. On the other hand, the *democratizing* stream continued constructing an “alternative” (and predominantly internal) rural development agenda. With the constitutional backing, social movements and civil society organizations moved from protest against the dictatorship to a more proactive posture in designing future rural development. In this context, various social groups sought political representation besides the traditional rural union movements’ demands. New “personalities” surged in the political arena, such as the “*sem terra*” (eng: landless), “*assentados*” (eng: settled people), and the “*agricultor familiar*” (eng: family farmer). Whereas the social identity constructs of the *sem terra* and *assentados* more directly demanded an agrarian reform and revindication of lands, the family farmer surged as a substitute of the small-scale producer notion that was predominant in the 1980s (Delgado, 2010, pp. 50-55).

The family farmer qualified through small-property production that is predominantly relying on family members. The social identity surged as a consequence of various factors: First, with the constitution of 1988, rural workers’ rights were formally institutionalized, and the rural unionist movement lost political momentum. Nevertheless, the family farmer as a small-scale entrepreneur and social category required differentiated assistance beyond retirement plans. Second, as a consequence of the first point above, family farming leaders’ power within the unionist movements ascended, demanding a focus on their necessities. Third, the small-scale farmers were disappointed about the lack of specific rural policies during the military dictatorship. Fourth, the ongoing intellectual debate on rural development identified family agriculture as essential for more democratic, sustainable, and inclusive development. Thereby, European experiences served as a reference. Fifth, global awareness about the environmental effects of industrial agriculture increased. Family farming entered the discourse on sustainable rural development as means of production to mitigate negative effects on the environment and the conditions of the rural population (Delgado, 2010, pp. 43-55; Schneider et al., 2010).

Already since the second half of the 1980s, the Brazilian rural landscape experienced a process of differentiation of social identities on the one side and of consolidation of their respective political articulators on the other. The MST quickly expanded to a

nationally well-organized movement, building the main driving force in the fight for agrarian reform. In line with this development, myriads of local, regional, and national organizations emerged nationally to support agrarian reform and interests of (now also denominated as) family farmers, so for example, the Family Agriculture Rural Workers Federation (FETRAF) or the Movement of Small-hold Farmers (MPA). The first one emerged as a specialized union out of the CUT; the latter has close links to the MST and the *Via Campesina*, the international peasant's movement. However, despite the multiplication and specialization of articulating organizations, they formed a common front for political mobilization on various occasions. For example, the big unions actively participated in the legislative process for the Agriculture Act in 1991 (Santos, 2011, pp. 98-100) (*Lei N° 8.171 de 17 de Janeiro 1991 - "Lei Agrícola"*).

Even though the Agriculture Act mainly followed the positions of agribusiness, the law considered small-scale agriculture at various points. For example, it stated that technical assistance organs should develop differentiated approaches for small producers and deliver services free of charge. Also, the regulative stocks should preferably be sourced from small-holders, and rural credit should be granted to acquire property and production. Furthermore, representatives of various rural workers and small-scale farmer organizations received a reserved seat on the newly formed National Council for Agriculture Policies (*Conselho Nacional de Política Agrícola; CNPA*) (*Lei N° 8.171 de 17 de Janeiro 1991*).

However, as these concessions did not suffice, the political articulation culminated in the first "*Grito da Terra Brasil*" (eng: Brazilian Earth Cry) in 1994, where all major rural movements¹³ organized a national mobilization. Various regional interventions preceded this national manifestation. Concerning family farmers, they demanded specific policies, namely credit lines, insurance of production, price mechanisms, research, and technical assistance for small-holders (Santos, 2011, p. 106).

In 1995, the CONTAG held its sixth national congress, where it decided to affiliate formally with the CUT and officially substituted the term small-hold farmer with family agriculture. At that moment, family agriculture was definitively set as the priority of the rural movements' agenda (Santos, 2011, p. 113). The political mobilization celebrated its first major success in the same year as the government established the PRONAF. As the first public rural credit program with an exclusive focus on small-scale farmers, the PRONAF has marked the "*...political and institutional recognition of the social category by the Brazilian State*" (Grisa & Schneider, 2014, p. 131; translated from Pt.). A second achievement followed in 1996 when the state recognized the importance of family farming and agrarian reform by establishing the Extraordinary Ministry for Land

¹³ The first Grito da Terra Brasil was organized by the CUT, Contag, MST, Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens (MAB), CNS, The National Fisherman Movement (MONAPE), and the Central Coordination for the Indigenous People's Articulation (CAPOIB) (Grisa, 2012, 116).

Policy (MEPF), in addition to the already existing Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Supply (MAPA). In 1999 the MEPF was transformed into the Ministry for Agrarian Development (MDA) (Santos, 2011, p. 70). The institutionalization process of family agriculture culminated with the legal definition of family agriculture. This formalized the social and economic relevance of small-scale farming for Brazil and served as a legal basis for a more institutionalized integration of family farming into public policies (*Lei N° 11.326, de 24 julho de 2006*).

The legal definition of family farming is the result of the social revindications to improve the socio-economic inclusion of family producers combined with the continued focus on rural development under Lula's presidency. Especially the focus on eradication of hunger and poverty gave impetus to transfer the social category of the family farmer from the political into the policy and legal arena. The following paragraphs will shed some light on how the newly established food security agenda fostered the advancement of family agriculture.

3.1.4 Converging Agendas: Family Agriculture & Food Security

After the economically and socially turbulent 1990s, the left-wing Workers Party assumed the government in 2003 and started to intensify rural as well as social policies. With the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the eradication of hunger became a priority of the Brazilian government, and the "Zero Hunger" initiative surged as a central mechanism to pursue this objective. Although food security issues did not emerge only in 2003, rather they have been present for half a century, the scope and scale of social policies experienced an unprecedented rise. The following paragraphs explain the path of food security policies and how they merged with the agriculture sphere to a new generation of public policies. Special attention receives thereby the role of the newly institutionalized family agriculture (FAO, 2014; Grisa, 2012; Schneider et al., 2010).

3.1.4.1 Food Security in Brazil – A historical short story

Historically, causes of food insecurity in Brazil were mainly framed as supply-side problems, and hence, policies focused on resolving therewith related issues. Takagi (2006) identifies three phases of policies tackling the challenge of food insecurity: First, from the beginning of the 20th century to 1970, the focus was on sufficient supply and distribution to all regions as well as contain price surges caused to shortages or speculation. The preoccupation with food supply was a direct consequence of the growing urban population, which eventually exceeded the rural in 1970. In this period fell the implementation of the minimum price guarantee program and the establishment of regional supply centers. Second, between the 1970s and until the

end of the following decade, the supply-side policies were complemented with direct assistance initiatives due to aggravating social and nutritional circumstances – especially for the low-income population. This included various initiatives for direct in-kind delivery of alimentation to the food insecure population or subsidized supermarkets with regulated prices. Third, at the beginning of the 1990s, coinciding with the macroeconomic tendency of liberalization, the government initiated dismantling centralized social and food policies.

Already in the 1980s, initiatives started to emerge that proposed new, more comprehensive policy frameworks for food supply and direct action against hunger. This shift of perspective away from mere preoccupation with food supply toward a more holistic understanding of the right to alimentation was based on various factors. Internationally, severe droughts and food crises in the early 1970s in Africa invoked concerted efforts from the international community to promote initiatives and policies to increase the production and productivity of alimentation and establish an effective global food security system.¹⁴ These food crises occurred within the age of the “green revolution,”¹⁵ which promoted a steep rise in agricultural productivity by using newly developed high yield crops and chemical fortifiers. The green revolution contributed to an increase in the global agricultural production by a factor of 1,6 between 1950 and 2000. However, rural poverty and malnourishment remained high, which indicated a structural inequality of the distribution system that is not exclusively related to production capacity. In light of these developments, the FAO added the notion of access to food to the original concept of food security as sufficient supply in 1982 (FAO, 2000).

In the academic discourse, Sen (1990) underpinned the proposition of structural food deprivation with various cases where production shortages did not cause famines.¹⁶ He argued that “entitlement failures” led to food insecurity for certain population groups. Entitlements are thereby understood as *“a person’s endowment of goods and services for exchange and the individual opportunities to perform exchange”* (Sen, 1990, pp. 36-37). Therefore, Sen proposes a holistic policy approach toward food security that increases the population’s entitlements in addition to food production. With his proposition, Sen has sustainably influenced the international discourse on

¹⁴ The famines in Sahel zone and Ethiopia cost between 150’000-300’000 lives and was caused through severe droughts. This led to the 1st World Global Conference on Food, promoted by FAO and the UN, with the aim to create a more productive and resilient global food system, including more equalitarian trade regimes and humanitarian aid initiatives (FAO, 2000).

¹⁵ The “Green Revolution” denominates a steep increase in productivity of the main crops, such as corn, rice, and wheat during the decades of the 1960-1970. This development was possible through the distribution of high yield crops and modernized production techniques using chemical fertilizers and pesticides (FAO, 2000).

¹⁶ E.g. during the famine in Bangladesh in 1974, the agricultural output was higher compared to the three preceding as well as the two following years. Main causes were a wave of rural unemployment that reduced the purchasing power combined with inflationary pressure on food prices (Sen, 1990).

food security, including the Brazilian “*Fome Zero*” program, which will be presented below.

In Brazil, the economic crisis in the 1980s led to a declining purchasing power of the urban population to the extent that food expenses consummated a growing share or surpassed the limits of household budgets. This underpinned Sen’s entitlement argument and put the demand side issues of food security increasingly in the center of the national discourse¹⁷ (Takagi, 2006).

Despite some articulation in the 1980s,¹⁸ food security only entered the political agenda in the following decade. In 1991, the policy document “National Policy for Food Security” was launched by a “parallel government” led by the then defeated presidential election candidate, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The main proposition of the document was to “*guarantee food security by ensuring that all Brazilians have, at all times, access to food for their basic needs*” (Takagi, 2006, p. 19). Following this publication, the initiative “Citizens’ Action against Hunger, Poverty, and for Life” was founded to mobilize for the purpose of food security. The successful articulation led to the establishment of the National Council for Food and Nutritional Security (CONSEA), which organized the first national conference on food and nutritional security in 1994. The council was formed by various Federal Government and civil society representatives and was to elaborate and implement a decentralized national strategy to combat hunger and misery. The foundation of the CONSEA contributed to integrating food security into the national policies in two ways: Firstly, food security entered the agenda of the federal government as a strategic question, and secondly, the council coordinated governmental initiatives through an inter-sectoral approach, which increased effects and avoided redundancies. However, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso assumed the presidency in 1995, the CONSEA was substituted through a consultative council on the solidary economy after only two years. Even though the food security issue remained in the public discourse, this replacement constituted a serious setback for accessing the government sphere (FAO, 2014; Takagi, 2006).

Food security only re-gained importance in the early 2000s as poverty and unemployment increased as a consequence of an economic crisis in the late 1990s. At this point, the *Instituto Cidadania*, a successor organization of the “parallel government,” started to conceptualize the “Zero Hunger” strategy – already three years before being implemented by then-president Lula (Takagi, 2006).

¹⁷ While the minimum wage in May 1980 represented 35% of the necessary value to secure the livelihood of a family, this value diminished to 18% in 1991, having the lowest peak in 1988/89 with 10% (Graziano da Silva, 1996 zit.in Takagi, 2006, p. 17).

¹⁸ In 1985, the 1st National Conference on Food and Nutrition was held to discuss the rising problems of food access. National Commissions were proposed, but which were not implemented. However, the issue of food security started to gain more public awareness (Takagi, 2006).

3.1.4.2 The Zero Hunger Program

With his first public appearance as newly elected president in 2003, Lula proclaimed the eradication of hunger as the top priority during his mandate and presented the Zero Hunger program (Takagi, 2006, p. 35). “Zero Hunger” (*Pt. Fome Zero*) was designed as a multi-faceted national strategy to eradicate hunger. The proponents of *Fome Zero* identified poverty as a central driver for malnutrition. Data from a 1999 household survey supported this preoccupation: At the time of conceptualizing the program, there were 44 million people considered very poor.¹⁹ This represented a share of 28% of the entire population (MDA, 2010, p. 19). Therefore, the strategy emphasized the need to combat poverty to extinct hunger, arguing that purchasing power of households was insufficient to provide adequate nutrition for the families and incentivize production. With this objective, Zero Hunger aimed to foster a more inclusive economic and social development (MDS, 2010; MDA, 2010).

On a conceptual level, the argumentation for the Zero Hunger strategy is aligned with the entitlement approach put forward by Sen, proposing a comprehensive social welfare program to improve the endowments of Brazilian families. Policies are structured around various pillars i) income generation, ii) strengthening of family agriculture, iii) access to cheaper food products, and iv) specific actions. The strategy focused on a mix of structural development with medium- and long-term scope as well as initiatives to grant short-term relief to the population in malnutrition or in a situation of vulnerability. **Figure 2** below depicts the vast scope of proposed actions in more detail:

¹⁹ Data from a 1999 survey of the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) zit. in MDA, 2010). Living with less than one Dollar a day is considered the poverty line. This definition was adopted by the World Bank in 1990. In 2015, this threshold has been raised to USD 1.90/day (Ferreira, Jolliffe, & Prydz, 2015).




Figure 2: Focus Areas of the Fome Zero Strategy (MDA, 2010, p.21)

As an inter-sectorial strategy, Zero Hunger involves more than 30 initiatives reaching 19 ministries and strives to commit also federal states and municipalities. To coordinate the strategy, the Extraordinary Ministry for Food Security and Combat of Hunger was created, which was later consolidated into the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger (MDS). In 2006, the national strategy was transferred into the legal sphere by creating the national system of food security act (*Le n° 11.346, de 15 de setembro de 2006*). Established by this law, the MDS led a newly constituted inter-ministerial chamber for food security (CAISAN). Also, the CONSEA was reactivated to guarantee civil society participation by granting 2/3 of its seats and the council's presidency to civic organizations (FAO, 2014).

The national food security agenda was increasingly institutionalized in the governmental sphere and culminated when CONSEA successfully proposed the 64th constitutional amendment of the human right to alimentation in 2010 and the National Plan for Food Security in 2011 (FAO, 2014).

On a policy level, the Zero Hunger initiative focuses on actions to enhance income and access to food. Whereas the income generation mainly functions through cash transfers for low-income families, the so-called family grant (*Pt. Bolsa Familia*), the access to food comprises a variety of mechanisms, ranging from direct food coupons to school meals, subsidized restaurants and food banks (MDS, 2010). Regarding policies for food production, the Zero Hunger program focused on family agriculture for various reasons: Firstly, rural poverty is a phenomenon of rural workers and small-

scale producers with low incomes. Implementing policies that increase income and labor opportunities through better market access for family farmers promise the highest impact for poverty reduction. Secondly, with the reinforced agenda for redistribution of land through the agrarian reform, a substantial class of family producers was recruited from rural workers or urban families that returned to the rural areas. Some of the settled families had no previous experience with agricultural production. Therefore, these “new rurals” required special attention in technical assistance to achieve insertion into the market. Thirdly, incentivizing small-scale farmers fosters possibilities for subsistence and supply for local food markets to reduce the distribution problems in remote areas. Fourthly, de-centralized local food systems foster crop diversification and create resilience to global food price volatility (FAO, 2014; IPC-IG, 2013; MDS, 2010).

3.1.4.3 Materializing Family Agriculture in Food Security - PAA

In creating the Food Acquisition Program (*Pt. Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos - PAA*) in 2003, the government implemented an innovative approach for family agriculture policies. The policy follows a double objective of strengthening family agriculture and securing access to food by connecting local production and food supply for populations in food insecurity. The government sourced products from family farmers to distribute food to people in insecure food situations or build public food stocks. This supports the commercialization of products on the one hand and enhanced food security on the other (IPC-IG, 2013; MDS, 2010).

Another major innovation of the PAA concerned the public procurement system: The procurement calls for the PAA were exclusively opened for family farmers and their respective organizations,²⁰ thereby waiving the competitive bidding under the public procurement law. Conventional competitive bidding factually impeded public market access for small-hold farmers due to lower price competitiveness as well as bureaucratic competencies compared to bigger producers and companies. In the PAA procurement, the government sets the price based on regional market research, with the possibility to pay a premium of up to 30% for organic products. The maximum value that producers can supply to the public institutions is capped depending on the modality of the program²¹ (IPC-IG, 2013). The different modalities are operationalized

²⁰ To participate in the PAA procurement process, family farmers need to obtain the *Declaração de Aptidão ao PRONAF* (DAP), a public certificate that proofs their family farmer status (Art. 19, Lei nº 10.696, de 2 de julho de 2003). In 2006, the definition of family agriculture has been formalized in the law 11.326. The requirements concern size of productive land, predominantly family internal labor, and income predominantly derived from agricultural production. Producers must meet these requirements to be eligible for family farming programs.

²¹ The PAA works through different modalities: 1) direct purchase for simultaneous donation, 2) direct purchase, 3) stock piling, 4) incentives for milk production and 5) institutional purchase. Each modality

via the National Supply Company (CONAB), federal states, and municipalities (MDS, 2014).

The establishment of the institutional market has been accompanied by an intensified assistance to capacitate producers in technical as well as organizational aspects. The PAA fosters the foundation of producer organizations, as contracts with CONAB are reserved to cooperatives and associations and allow for higher individual contract values (MDS, 2014).

The PAA as an innovative policy to foster family farmers has been implemented successfully on a national scale. The number of benefiting producers increased from 42'000 in 2003 to 185'000 in 2012, and in the first ten years of operation, over three billion USD have been invested in public procurement (IPC-IG, 2013). A series of studies deem the program was successful in expanding family farmer production and incomes through increased market access (Chmielewska & Souza, 2010; Doretto & Michellon, 2007), collective organization (Cunha, Freitas, & Salgado, 2017) as well as food crop diversification. The improved division of labor in the production allowed family members to pursue other professional activities outside of agriculture to diversify family income (Doretto & Michellon, 2007).

The positive results from the PAA served as the rationale for scaling up the family farmer integration in other public programs. From a rural development perspective, this was positive: Even though the PAA has expanded rapidly in the first decade, it still benefited only around 5% of the 4 million family farmers (IPC-IG, 2013, p. 12). Consequently, in 2012, the PAA was complemented with the institutional purchase modality, where public institutions such as university restaurants, hospitals, prisons, or army facilities were allowed to directly source from family farmers with the same simplified procurement regime. Already in 2009, the legislation for the National School Feeding Program (PNAE) was fundamentally revised, and the same procurement procedure was introduced for the supply of school food. As the implementation of this process is the main unit of analysis in this research, the following chapter presents the *Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar* (PNAE) in more depth.

3.2 Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar - PNAE

The *Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar* (eng: National School Feeding Program) is considered the longest-standing, implemented social policy in Brazil. Since its inception, the program has grown substantially and evolved from sporadic nutritional assistance to an integral pillar of the national food security strategy. The

has an individual cap between R\$ 6'500 – R\$ 20'000. Producers are allowed to participate in different modalities and hence, increase their maximum value (Secretaria Especial do Desenvolvimento Social, 2014).

numbers confirm this: In 2015, the PNAE served around 41.5 million children and cost around R\$ 3.76bn. The PNAE counts as one of the largest universal school feeding programs globally (FNDE, n.d.-b).

In the following subchapters, the historical development and the working mechanism of the PNAE will be introduced in more detail. A special focus lies on the mandatory procurement process from family farmers.

3.2.1 Historical Development of the PNAE

School meal initiatives reach back to the first half of the last century. Initial activities were increasingly formalized by establishing the National Food Commission in 1945 and the National School Meal Campaign (CNME) in 1955 (Peixinho, 2013).

Although the campaign was under the responsibility of the ministry of education, the PNAE consisted of distributing milk powder, which was mainly provided by international organizations – i.e., the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and later through the “food for peace” program of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Peixinho, 2013; Takagi, 2006).

In 1976, the school food policy was integrated into the 2nd National Food and Nutrition Program (PRONAN). The *PRONAN* was the first broad public program to augment food security by establishing a series of initiatives to deliver nutritious food to the low-income population, i.e., students, workers, mothers, and children. The operationalization of the program was centralized under the coordination of the National Institute for Food and Nutrition (INAN). The program gave preference to poorer regions and formally promoted the provision of products “*in natura*,” procured from small-scale farmers at competitive prices. Through the integration into *PRONAN II*, the school meals had the objective to deliver 15% of the daily nutritional needs. Milk powder had been complemented with soups, porridge and the meals were now predominantly produced by national industries. Since 1979, the policy was renamed to “*Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar – PNAE*”. Its implementation remained under the auspices of the *INAN* until 1984. Whereas *PRONAN* has been praised as the first national food security policy focusing on access (Takagi, 2006), some evaluations of the program criticized the low impact of the measures because of the lack of political and financial support, clientelist application of funds, and frequent delays (Peixinho, 2013; Schmitz et al., 1997).

A very crucial step forward to further institutionalize the PNAE has been made when the constitution of 1988 declared the right to food for all students of public elementary education. This right has been amended for all students in public schools in 2009 (*Constituição a República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Art. 208*). The concession of the right to scholarly alimentation was part of the substantial extension of social rights

in the new constitution as a result of civil society movements' articulation after the military regime.

In 1994, the organization of the PNAE changed from central to decentral execution by the municipalities and states whilst remaining financed by the federal government. Decentral execution resolved logistical issues that occurred with a central procurement system. Furthermore, the competence granted to lower administrative levels to close procurement contracts directly with the providers allowed for consideration of local food habits (*Lei N° 8.913, de 12 de julho de 1994*; Ribeiro, Ceratti, & Broch, 2013). The decentralization of the PNAE was an essential preliminary condition to implement local procurement, as it allowed the participation of small industries, commerce, and (family) farmers (Peixinho, 2013).

In the following period until 2003, various administrative innovations were implemented. In 1997, the National Fund for Development and Education (*Pt. Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Escolar - FNDE*) was created in a consolidation process that involved various federal and state-level secretaries and took over the financing of various programs, including the PNAE. Since then, the FNDE has managed the PNAE on the federal level and is organizationally integrated into the ministry of education. Two years later, the FNDE started to directly channel funds to states and municipalities that were earmarked for the school meal program according to the number of enrolled students. Furthermore, *Conselhos de Alimentação Escolar – CAE* (eng: School Food Councils) were established to control the implementation of the program from acquisition to delivery of school meals and report to the FNDE. Due to the importance of the CAE as a controlling organ, its existence in municipalities and states is conditional for the transfer of federal funds (*Medida Provisória N° 1.979-19 de 2 de Junho de 2000*). Finally, in 2001, the executing entities – Education Secretaries of the States and Municipalities – were to use 70% of received federal funds for basic products, respecting local food habits and agricultural production²² (Peixinho, 2013).

Under the government Lula and the Zero Hunger Initiative, the PNAE experienced an increasing preoccupation with school food's nutritional, health, and educational dimensions. To comply with this strategic focus, executing organs (states, federal district, municipalities) were obliged to install a nutritionist as the responsible technical expert for operationalizing the program. The responsibilities of the nutritionist include analyzing the nutritional profile of the students, elaboration of the menu and procurement requests, as well as educational activities focusing on healthy diets considering local habits (Peixinho, 2013).

²² According to *Medida Provisória N°2.178 de 28 de Junho 2001*. This rule was replaced with Art. 14 *Lei 11.947/2009*, which mandates executing entities to use 30% of federal funds for family farming procurement. Nevertheless, for understanding the insertion of family farming into the PNAE, it is an important fact.

3.2.2 New Legal Framework for the PNAE in 2009

So far, the most significant achievement of the PNAE is undoubtedly the decree of a consolidated piece of national legislation – *Lei N° 11.947 de 16 de Junho de 2009*. With this law, the federal government complied with the constitutional obligation to provide adequate alimentation, and furthermore, formalized recent changes as well as introduced innovations to the program. Art. 2 of the law condenses its priorities quite concisely in stating the following guidelines (Art. 2 Lei N° 11.947/2009)²³:

- i) Provision of healthy, balanced, and adequate food using a variety of products that respect the culture, traditions, and healthy nutritional habits. The school meals should contribute to the student's biological and psychosocial development and adoption of healthy nutrition habits by providing balanced meals and nutritional education;
- ii) Inclusion of nutritional education into teaching curriculum to allow students to develop healthy food and nutritional habits;
- iii) Universality of the service for all students in the public-school network;
- iv) Community participation and social control of the activities implemented by public agents to guarantee the provision of a healthy diet;
- v) Support of sustainable development by incentivizing the acquisition of diversified products from local suppliers, preferably from family farmers or rural family entrepreneurs, thereby prioritizing traditional indigenous or *quilombola* communities;²⁴
- vi) School feeding is an equal right of all students to guarantee food and nutritional security, thereby considering the biological differences due to age, individual health conditions, and populations in social vulnerability.

The guidelines already delineate three major innovations that the legislation introduces. Firstly, the program scope has been extended to include all students in public schools, from daycare institutions to high schools. Secondly, besides a stronger focus on providing a healthy and regionally embedded diet, nutritional education has become an official pillar of the program. Thirdly, and for the purpose of this thesis most important, Art. 14 obliges executing organs to use a minimum of 30% of funds received from the FNDE to procure directly from family farmers or their organizations.

²³ Translated from the original Portuguese.

²⁴ Quilombos are historic settlements, which have been established during the times of slavery. Refugees from the farms, mainly Afro-Brazilian descent slaves, united in these areas for protection and resistance. These settlements turned into communities claiming a special relation to the territories. However, these communities suffered severe oppression in the course of history (Schmitt, Turatti, & Carvalho, 2002).

To vindicate the Quilombos and their descendants, a process of social and legal recognition of their territories and culture has been established (*Decreto N° 4.887, DE 20 DE NOVEMBRO De 2003*). The acknowledgement as traditional community with special rights for the policies in family agriculture is an example for the recognition (e.g. *Art. 4 Lei N° 11.947, de 16 de junho de 2009*).

Analogous to the PAA, a special “public call” (*Pt. Chamada Pública*) procurement process waives the competition with non-family producers or companies. With this, the successful integration of family farmers in institutional markets through the PAA has been scaled up into a program with higher and more regular demand for agricultural products. Art. 14 further rules that offers made by agrarian settlements, indigenous or traditional communities, and *quilombos* enjoy preference over “conventional” family farmers and their organizations. This considers the weak socio-economic integration of these communities and opens preferred access to an institutional market.

To regulate the technical, administrative, and financial operations of the *Lei N° 11.947/2009* in more detail, the FNDE emitted the resolution *N°26 de 17 de Junho 2013*. This document prescribes the required daily nutritional values in quantity and quality meticulously. Also, the number of delivered meals varies, depending on the daily hours a child spends at the educational institutions.²⁵ Similar to the nutritional requirements, the resolution regulates the procurement procedure from the family agriculture (Art. 24-32 *Resolução CD/FNDE N° 26/2013*; Art. 25-32 adjusted through *Resolução CD/FNDE/MEC N°4/2015*).

After having introduced the historical development and the legal (or institutional) framework for the program, the following section will analyze the functioning of the PNAE generally and the procurement of family farmers specifically.

3.2.2.1 General Mechanism

The program is regulated, managed and financed by the *Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Escolar - FNDE*. The FNDE represents the federal government and distributes the funds to the executing organs according to the number of enrolled students in different levels and school days.²⁶ The daily values per student range from R\$ 0.32 to R\$ 2.00 according to the level of schooling and daily quota (part-time or full-time).²⁷ The transfer is automatically calculated, and the payments to the executing

²⁵ E.g. children in part-time daycare have the right to receive at least two meals a day, delivering 30% of their daily nutritional needs, whereas the required nutritional value for full-time daycare children is at 70% provided by at least three meals (*Art. 14 §2, Resolução/CD/FNDE N° 26*). In addition, Art. 15 of the same resolution regulates maximum values for sugar, saturated and trans fats, sodium etc. Also, the acquisition of canned products is limited (Art.23) and sweetened drinks with low nutritional values are banned altogether (Art. 22).

²⁶ The number of students is based on the school census of the preceding year (*Art. 4 Resolução N°26/2013*).

²⁷ The current rates are: i) daycare institutions: R\$ 1.07; ii) pre-school: R\$ 0.53; iii) indigenous and quilombo schools: R\$0.64; iv) elementary and high school: R\$ 0.36; v) education for young adults: R\$ 0.32; vi) fulltime education: R\$ 1.07; vii) Special program for public full-time high schools: R\$ 2.00; viii) students attending special education: R\$ 0.53 (website FNDE, accessed 12.11.2020).

entities are made monthly, from March to December.²⁸ In 2015, the program distributed R\$ 3.76bn to serve 41.5 million students (*FNDE, Dados da Agricultura Familiar, 17.12.2018*).

The executing entities are the secretaries of education in the states, the federal district, or municipalities, depending on the schools' administrative level. Generally, preschools and elementary schools are in competence of municipalities, whereas high schools, indigenous and *quilombola* schools are incorporated into the state administration. However, states may transfer the responsibility of serving school meals to municipalities for schools under their jurisdiction and compensate municipalities for their service (*Art. 7, Lei n° 11.947/2009*). Furthermore, philanthropic and community schools are susceptible to adhere to the program through special agreements (*Art. 5, Lei n° 11.947/2009*).

The executing entities are responsible for the operation of the program. This includes receiving the funds, creating the menu, publishing procurement calls, signing contracts, delivering daily meals, and nutritional education. Thereby, the executing entities may opt for centralized procurement, where the secretaries or municipalities are responsible for the acquisition process. On the other hand, a decentralized approach may be followed. In this case, private non-profit entities, e.g., school councils, parent or teacher associations, constitute "executing units" representing a school and managing the procurement process independently. They receive the funds from the executing entity and report back to it. However, this is an internal community decision, and in the relationship with the national administrator, the *FNDE*, the executing entities stay responsible and receive the funds that will later be transferred to the contracted partner (*Art. 6, Lei n° 11.947/2009*).

The executing entities are to prepare financial statements on the use of federal funds for auditing. In a first instance, the supervision is guaranteed by the School Alimentation Council (CAE),²⁹ which verifies the financial statements and reports to the *FNDE* for the audit (*Art. 19, Lei n° 11.947/2009*). The CAE is a deliberative organ with the objective to exert social control over the activities of the executing organ of the PNAE. The competences of the CAE are: i) control the obedience of the legal framework in the local implementation, ii) accompany and audit the expenditure of federal funds, iii) oversee the quality of procured products with respect to hygienic conditions and acceptability by students, and iv) control of and opine on the annual statement of the executing organ. In its function, the CAE is mandated to give notice on irregularities and analyze complaints. Its composition is a mix of representatives from the executive power, teachers, parents, and civil society. The mandate has a

²⁸ The *FNDE* transfers funds only for school months. January & February are summer holidays in Brazil.

²⁹ The composition of the *Conselho de Alimentação Escolar* (CAE) consists of representatives of government, school, parents and civil society (*Lei n° 11.947, de 16 de junho de 2009, Art. 18*).

duration of four years. To guarantee the civil control function, the council's president must not be the representative of the executive power (*Lei n° 11.947/2009*).

In addition, the PNAE is supported by the Federal Court of Auditors as well as by the public prosecution ministry to avoid misconducts and fraudulent practices in managing public funds (Art. 10, *Lei n° 11.947/2009*). These organs, however, will mainly be activated upon mobilization through the CAE, other actors involved in the implementation of the PNAE, or civil society.

The following **Figure 3** depicts the mechanism of the PNAE schematically. In this stage, the graph is limited to the *ex officio* actors of the program.




Figure 3: Mechanism for operationalizing the PNAE (source: author)

3.2.2.2 Procurement Process for Family Agriculture within the PNAE

As already stated, with the implementation of the *Lei n° 11.947/2009*, executing entities are obliged to place at least 30% of the FNDE funds to procure food directly from family farmers or via their respective organizations. By favoring the surged rural identity of family farmers, the federal government incorporates a developmental component into the PNAE that has far-reaching consequences for the strategic objective and its operationalization.

On the strategic level, the PNAE has evolved to serve a double purpose of contributing to food security as well as rural development. A remarkable aspect of this connection of objectives is their complementarity in various dimensions. Firstly, sourcing from

local farmers enhances the procurement of fresh, *in natura* products that are embedded in regional culinary culture and promise higher nutritional values as opposed to industrialized products. This fosters access to healthy food for students as well as their development of adequate food habits. Secondly, family farmers gain access to an institutional market in the size of R\$ 1bn. This bears great potential for improving their income and generally reducing poverty, which is highest in rural populations. As argued before, poverty has been identified as a major driver of food insecurity. The access to a distribution channel with steady demand incentivizes investments in production, i.e., higher volumes and capacitation. Higher volumes of available products potentially reduce food insecurity beyond the school meal program, whereas technical and organizational capacitation contributes to a professionalization of the rural small-hold production. Thirdly, from a governmental point of view, the inclusion of family farmers into the PNAE constitutes creating a policy for rural socio-economic development while not additionally burdening the public budgets.

On an operational level, the *Lei n° 11.947/2009* invoked a restructuring of the public procurement process. The “public call” procedure waives competition as the participation is restricted to producers that legally qualify as family farmers³⁰ and possess a DAP³¹ (*Declaração de Aptidão ao Pronaf*) – a legal document awarding the status of a registered family farmer entitled to participate in specific policies. Besides excluding other than family farmer producers, the procurement department is obliged to set a price for the goods based on research, preferably local farmers markets (Art. 29, *Resolução CD/FNDE n° 04/2015*). The PNAE limits the participation to R\$ 20'000 per DAP / year / executing entity. For legal entities, i.e., cooperatives, the sum of all individual values of the DAP certified producers constitutes the limit of participation in the institutional market (*Resolução CD/FNDE n° 04, de 2 de Abril de 2015, Art. 32*). This limitation aims at guaranteeing democratic access to the PNAE.

With all these conditions, the public call for the PNAE is an exception from the ordinary competitive procurement procedure as stated in *Lei n° 8.666 de 21 Junho de 1991*. It introduces a new logic, substituting price through affiliation to a social category as decisive criteria. This requires new criteria for selecting projects from the pool of

³⁰ Art. 3, *Lei n° 11.326, de 24 julho 2006* defines family farmers with following attributes: i) production area is no bigger than 4 fiscal modules; ii) economic activities for the establishment are predominantly carried out family members; iii) minimal percentage of household income must derive from the economic activities of this establishment; iv) manages the establishment with the family.

Fiscal modules under i) refer to an administrative measure, defined by the INCRA, that varies among municipalities depending on geographic characteristics, such as a) predominant agricultural exploitation; b) income potential through predominant exploitation; c) other types of influential agricultural activities; d) local “conceptualization of family agriculture”. The size of fiscal modules varies between 5-110 ha (Embrapa, n.d., accessed 19.12.2018).

³¹ The DAP was initially created for the PRONAF credit lines for family farmers. However, to seize administrative synergies, the DAP has been developed further and become somewhat an official family farming ID. Today, even formal producer organizations can acquire a DAP for legal entities.

interested family farmers. The allocation problem has been solved with a twofold cascade priority model: First, local production has priority over regional, state, and national procurement. Second, within each geographic category, organizations of agrarian reform settlements, traditional indigenous communities, and communities of *quilombos* are to be preferred, followed by organic family producers, formal producer organizations, informal organizations, and at last, single producers (Art. 25, *Resolução CD/FNDE n° 04/2015*).

Insufficient local offers are to be complemented by proposed projects from other groups while respecting the legally stipulated order. Special rules are foreseen for ties between groups of the same priority categories. As a last resort, a lottery decides if no agreement between the competing groups can be achieved (Art. 25, *Resolução CD/FNDE n° 04/2015*). Conversely, in the case of unsuccessful sourcing, a reduction of the 30% quota is allowed if the executing entity can prove the existence of certain aggravating circumstances³² (*Lei n° 11.947/2009, Art. 14; Resolução CD/FNDE n° 04/2015*).

The FNDE has published a step-by-step manual on the family agriculture procurement process to assist the executing entities. It is based on the legal framework and comprises ten steps from analyzing the budget to identifying the 30% threshold and to delivery of the product. In the following paragraphs, the steps from the handbook will be described shortly (FNDE, 2016).

The first step consists of evaluating the budget for the purchase of family agriculture products. In order for this to happen, the FNDE needs to inform the executing entity, i.e., state or municipal organs, about the value to be transferred prior to the start of the school year. The value depends on the school census of the preceding year. The value is the multiplication of the number of students enrolled in the municipality (or Federal state) schools by the total of lecture days and the stipulated value per student. The calculated value serves as the basis for planning the menu and needs to be communicated to the CAE and local family agriculture organizations.

Secondly, the FNDE recommends that the executing entity identifies the local family agriculture production. This requires an articulation of various actors in the local context, mainly between the secretary of education - in the person of the nutritionist, the secretary of agriculture as the mediator to the local producers, and the family farmers. The final product of this articulation should be a farmer's calendar, discriminating the local products, quantities, and harvest periods. Based on this mapping, the nutritionist can perform the third step: elaborating the menu.

³² These exceptions are: i) impossibility to issue fiscal documents; ii) unviability of regular and constant provision of products; iii) insufficient hygienic conditions of the production (*LEI N° 11.947, DE 16 DE JUNHO DE 2009, Art. 14 § 2°*).

The elaboration of the menu is solely the nutritionist's competence and forms an essential activity in the entire operationalization of the PNAE. The nutritionist needs to coalesce legal nutritional prescriptions, local food habits, and family agriculture offer under consideration of budget restrictions. The resulting menu has wide implications for further food procurement, defining to what extent the local offer is or can be considered.

When the menu and the necessary products are determined, the executing entity has to engage in price research. As already stated above, the procuring entity has to publish binding prices already in the public call. To evaluate prices, the *Resolução CD/FNDE nº 04/2015* foresees that price research is done in at least three local markets. Preference is to be given to local farmers' markets. In the absence of local markets (or prices for specific goods), markets in the regional, state, or national territory may be considered. In addition to the evaluated market price, costs for the supply to the schools, i.e., transport and packaging, will be included in the published price. Furthermore, the legislation considers the possibility of paying a premium for organic production up to 30% compared to conventional products. Executing entities may consult partners, such as organizations for technical assistance, secretary of agriculture, universities, or producer organizations, to conduct the price research.

The following fifth step consists of publishing the public procurement call. Due to the specific objective of preferring local family farmers, § 1º art. 20 of the *Resolução CD/FNDE 26/2013* dispenses the process of the usual competitive procurement mode. This exemption is valid only for the funds received by the FNDE but can reach 100% of it. The public procurement call must include all necessary information for the producers to propose a valid offer. This information includes products, quantities, delivery schedule, and place, as well as the determined price. The call has to be published in a journal with local circulation, posted at a publicly accessible place with high circulation and on the website (if existent), as well as disseminated with the local family farmer and technical assistance organizations. The call has to remain published for at least 20 days (Art. 26, *Resolução CD/FNDE nº 04/2015*).

After the public procurement call has been published, the producers elaborate their sales projects (step 6). The proposal must include the products, quantities, and a chronogram of delivery. Organizations may consolidate the offers of their producers. Also, proponents have to prove their eligibility (i.e., the existence of valid DAP) and guarantee that proposed products are from their establishment. For organizations with a legal entity, i.e., cooperatives, the legal representative may sign responsible for the proposal, whereas in informal groups, i.e., associations, all participating members have to sign individually. Therefore, to reduce bureaucracy, executing entities with an annual inflow of FNDE funds exceeding R\$ 700'000 are free to limit the participation in the public procurement call to organizations with a legal entity.

In step 7, the selection of projects takes place. In a first step, the eligibility of proponents according to Art. 27, *Resolução CD/FNDE nº 04/2015* is verified. After the formal eligibility is confirmed, the executing entity selects the projects according to the legally determined cascade (Art. 25, *Resolução CD/FNDE nº 04/2015*). Thereby, the proposals will be divided into local, regional, state, and national. Only local proposals will be analyzed in the first moment, and only if the demand cannot be satisfied, regional proposals will be considered, etc. Within each category, the order is as already above stated: 1) rural settlements, traditional indigenous and *quilombola* communities (no priority between these); 2) certified organic suppliers; 3) formal groups above informal groups and informal groups above individual producers. Also, the executing entity has to scrutiny that the individual limits of R\$ 20'000.- per DAP are respected.

Once a project is selected, the executing entity can require a sample for quality and sanitary control. Products will be tested against the requirements stated in the public procurement call, the sanitary legislation, and sensorial characteristics. This is especially relevant for products for which the legislation requires a mandatory analysis (e.g., animal or processed products). For the sensorial test, a committee of 12 persons, capacitated by the nutritionist, will evaluate the product. Furthermore, before an entirely new product may be introduced, an “acceptability test” with the students is to be conducted. If a sampled product fails to pass the examinations, the executing entity repeats the sample with the runner-up project until products are deemed adequate.

After successful quality control, the public procurement contract can be signed in the 9th step. The parties are the executing entity, legal representatives for organizations with legal entity and in case of informal associations or individual producers, all participating producers.

In the final step, the producers deliver the products according to the quantities and chronogram established in the contract. They receive the receipt that confirms the delivery to agreed terms and entitles them to the payment. It is worthwhile mentioning that agricultural production is inherently dependent on environmental influences. To avoid supply insecurity for student meals, the PNAE allows for product substitution of contractually agreed products for goods of similar characteristics. However, these changes have to be attested by the nutritionist and supported by the CAE.

The following **Figure 4** depicts the ten steps graphically from the manual for procurement from family agriculture to recapitulate the entire process.




Figure 4: Step-by-step manual for the PNAE procurement procedure (author based on (FNDE, 2016))

4 Empirical Research Design

While the preceding chapters laid out the theoretical orientation for this research project (see ch. 2), the current chapter will present the methodological approach adopted. Based on the Scandinavian institutionalist tradition of translation studies, this research strongly emphasizes a processual perspective on how ideas are translated into local contexts. Previous chapters of this research already discussed the idea in question, the novel procurement practice of the school feeding program, and the empirical context in which it is placed, namely the Brazilian agriculture policy landscape. The school feeding program underwent a profound reform in 2009, which required a reorganization of public procurement to strengthen local family farmers (see ch. 3). The question of how different actors in the municipalities interpret and influence the implementation of the novel procurement practice is at the center of this research.

The present chapter lays out the selected methodological approach to answer this research question. First, the rationale for the interpretive case study method will be described. Second, the selection of the case studies will be presented. The third step explains the data collection process. Fourth, the data analysis strategy will be described in detail.

4.1 Methods

The central objective of this study is the analysis of the local translation process of newly arising institutional demands. Therefore, this research is inherently processual. With the transition from the diffusion of material and symbolic objects towards a generative, action-driven translation, the analytical lens changed from a “weak” to a “strong” process view (Reay, Zilber, Langley, & Tsoukas, 2019, p. 2).

The research explores the local implementation process that was initiated in 2009 and already resulted in relevant changes in the examined contexts. While processes are by design in the constant making, to which the reoccurring implementation of family farming procurement is no exception, a local adaption had already taken place in the research sites. Langley and Tsoukas propose (2016, p. 8) a two-dimensional typology of process studies considering *approach* and *focus*. The focus concerns the timing of the study, either reconstructing the process from after-the-fact or describing it “in the flow.” With regard to these criteria, this is an “after the fact” study, a typical approach for translation studies (Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014).

The second methodological element, the approach, asks if the process is studied “from within” or “from outside.” Studies “from within” focus on “*capturing the evolving meaningful experience – the qualia – of those involved, through eliciting first-person accounts*” (Langley & Tsoukas, 2016, p. 8). As it aims to grasp actor perceptions and experiences throughout the translation process, this study can be placed in the “from

within” category. This research can be characterized as a reconstructive study if combining the two elements of the process perspective.

Complementing the process view and reinforcing the “within element,” this research builds on the ontological assumption that reality results from various socially constructed rationalities (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Individual and organizational actions are understood as contingent on their institutional environment, which provides a meaning system to interpret the world (Thornton et al., 2012). This ontological assumption has implications in the choice of research methods. Rationalities, in the socially constructed meaning, can hardly be measured or quantified but rather qualitatively described and analyzed. The social-constructivist character of rationalities corresponds to an interpretative method, which emphasizes “social roles” and ascribes meaning (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). In this research, I, therefore, follow a qualitative-interpretative approach to fulfill the epistemological demands of institutional theory.

As discussed in the theoretical orientation, the core of the translation tradition is its deep concern with the local contextualization of an idea. As this theoretical framework is based on an immanent emphasis on contextual influences on organizational factors, selecting a case study method was deemed appropriate. A quality of this form of research is to explicitly consider contextual factors in relation to the unit of analysis (Yin, 2014, p. 50). Furthermore, the objective is to explain local variations resulting from the implementation process of the novel regulation. Special attention is therefore given to the organizational agency that leads to the differing results in different municipalities. Methodologically speaking, this favors a multiple case approach that allows for theoretical replication, meaning case selection will consider similar contextual factors where the result is supposed to vary for anticipated reasons. In addition, multiple case studies typically provide a stronger base for theory building (Yin, 2014).

A multiple case study design can be holistic or embedded, depending on the number of units of analysis (Yin, 2014, p. 59). In the theoretical orientation, it has been argued that institutional pressures are enacted by individual actors, who draw on socially constructed cognitive schemes of their communities of meaning. This research aims to describe the interplay of these different rationalities and explicate their influence on the translation process. If the municipal implementation were conceptualized as a single holistic unit of analysis, such observation would not be possible. I opt, therefore, for an embedded design.

Finally, an inductive theory building of the case study design is suitable for this research project, even though the research question is theory-driven and supported by a broad literature of organizational responses to institutional pressures (Greenwood et al., 2011), as well as institutional micro-foundations (Pache & Santos, 2010). Nevertheless, the objective of observing the complex operationalization of the

translation process requires a certain degree of reflexivity that mere proposition confirmation does not offer (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).

4.2 Case Selection

To answer the research question of this thesis, four municipalities in the state of São Paulo, Brazil, were selected. Choosing municipalities in the same state ensured a similar institutional environment. The focus on one state is important given the continental dimensions of the country and the high levels of inequality concerning socio-economic development in different regions. Also, all municipalities were mid-sized cities. This selection intended to ensure that the municipalities were similar regarding contextual factors, such as size, number of students, and therewith connected operationalization of the school feeding program.

To account for the influence of the relevant rationalities within the translation process, cases where the contextual factors are favorable, were selected. This selection excludes cases that did not achieve the threshold because of the absence of suitable producers. Two different kinds of cases were selected within the municipalities where the context allows compliance to the regulation: municipalities that achieved substantially higher rates of family farming procurement and others where sourcing from family farming remains behind obligation. For each category, two cases have been selected. This approach corresponds to the logic of theoretical replication in multi-case study design, as the variation in the outcome is based on the theoretical assumption that existing local specifics foster or impede implementation (Yin, 2014, p. 54).

Therefore, as additional criteria to select from the groups of case studies, local specificities that promised interesting insights were considered. This additional criterion was conceptualized as an *intrinsic* element for case selection (Stake, 1998, p. 445). For example, one case study had received a state award for its operationalization of the school feeding program. Another case study was among the first to implement family farmer procurement in the entire state of São Paulo. Within the group of cases that did not comply with the law, I selected cases with characteristics that *a priori* would favor implementation, expecting contesting local context interrelations. One of the case studies is governed by a Workers' Party administration. Given that the policy was considered a flagship within the "Zero Hunger" program of the same political party, adherence was expected. In addition, this municipality hosts an agrarian reform rural settlement. Rural settlers are among the priority groups for providing to the program. Finally, a local producer cooperative was present in the fourth case, but the municipality was not procuring from family farmers.

4.3 Data Collection

Following an interpretive research approach, the objective is to grasp the phenomenon from the viewpoint of involved actors (Patton, 2002). The perception of actors is central to understanding how individuals engage with the process of translation. Therefore, semi-structured in-depth interviews are adequate as the main source of data (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). Interviews are an essential source of evidence, especially when the topic concerns human relations and actions (Yin, 2014). Furthermore, the analyzed phenomenon concerns the interaction of various local actors. In the sense of a stakeholder approach to the implementation process, interviews were conducted with influenced and influencing actors, such as municipal secretaries, cooperative leaders, producers, rural workers unions, and school principals. The inclusion of various actor-specific perceptions allows for constructing a more diversified and holistic understanding of the phenomena. Schwartz-Shea and Yanow referred to it as the concept of *exposure* (2012 as cited in Bossard, 2016, p. 45). In addition to the semi-structured interviews, other data sources were considered for this research, namely archive data and participant observation (Gioia et al., 2013).

Semi-Structured Interviews

In 2017 and 2018, 46 semi-structured interviews were conducted with actors in the municipalities, state-level organs, and the FNDE. Two additional interviews were conducted in 2020 for complementing information, rendering a total number of 48 interviews. Interviews were performed *in loco* (44) or per telephone (4) and lasted between 30 to 180 minutes. **Table 2** gives an overview of all the interviews. When possible, interviews with actors in the same functions from previous administrations were conducted. Also, two interview partners were interviewed in a double role.³³ While only one session was conducted with each interviewee, time is allocated to their roles separately in the overview. All but two interviews were recorded³⁴ and verbatim transcribed. All interviews were held and transcribed in Portuguese. Translation into English was performed in the analytical process of coding. Only respective data parts were translated into English. For external validation, the translated parts were reviewed by a second person, fluent in both languages.

The partners for the interviews were decided in two stages: First, based on the law and supporting policy documents (e.g., *Lei 11.947*; step-by-step manual), the principal

³³ Both actors from the case A: First, the current representative of the secretary of agriculture was also the current president of the CAE; second, the president of the rural workers union was the CAE president until recently before the empirical study in case A.

³⁴ The interviews with the CODEAGRO representative and Nutritionist III in Case B were not recorded due to technical problems. Handwritten notes were taken and considered for data analysis.

local implementation actors on the federal and municipal level were identified, and interviews conducted. These are:

- FNDE (federal)
- Secretary of education
- Nutritionist (responsible technician)
- Procurement department
- Secretary of agriculture
- CAE (president)
- Producers (and formal organization if existing)

Overview Interviews					
	Case A	Case B	Case C	Case D	State / federal organs
Secretary of Education	Oct 2018 (90')	Feb 2018 (60')	Jan 2018 (60')	Feb 2018 (60')	
Nutritionist (Responsible Technician)	1. Nutritionist III: Oct 2017 (160') 2. Nutritionist II: Oct 2017 (160') 3. Nutritionist I: Nov 2017 (100')	1. Director School Feeding Department: Oct. 2017 (120') 2. Current Nutritionist II : Oct 2017 (60') 3. Nutritionist III (former): Jun 2020 (40', not recorded)	Dec 2017 (120')	Nov 2017 (110')	
Procurement	Administrative Director SFD: Oct 2017 (160')	Dec 2017 (90')	Feb 2018 (60')	Nov 2017 (60')	
Financial Operations		Dec 2017 (75')	Jan 2018 (60')	Dec 2017 (90')	
Secretary of Agriculture	1. Oct 2017 (80') 2. Former SOA: Nov 2017 (70') 3. Former SOA: Jun 2020 (60')	Secretary of Economic Development: Feb 2018 (60')	Feb 2018 (70')	Dec 2017 (120')	
Director School				Feb 2018 (40')	
Technical Assistance (CATI, INCRA, ITESP, SEBRAE)	1. CATI: Oct 2017 (160') 2. APTA: Oct 2017 (120')	Oct 2017 (60')		ITESP: Dec 2017 (120')	1. ITESP: Jul 2017 (90') 2. CODEAGRO: Aug 2017 (60', not recorded) 3. SEBRAE: Feb 2018 (90')
President Council for School Alimentation (CAE)	1. Oct 2017 (60') 2. Former: Oct 2017 (40')	Dec 2017 (60')	Jan 2018 (90')	Dec 2017 (90')	
Union of Rural Workers	Oct 2017 (120')				
Family Farmer	Oct 2017 (180')	Dec 2017 (120')	1. President Cooperative: Feb 2018 (60') 2. Family Farmers: Feb 2018 (40')	Dec 2017 (40')	
Family Farmer (Assentamento, traditional community)	President Prod. Association: Oct 2017 (90')			Dec 2017 (120')	
National Fund of Educational Development (FNDE)					Jul 2017 (90')
Collaborating Centre for School Alimentation and Nutrition (CECANE)					Feb 2018 (75')
Total	15	10	8	10	5

Table 2: Overview semi-structured interviews (author)

In a second step, based on initial interviews with local actors, I engaged in snowball sampling (Patton, 2002, p. 237) to identify additional relevant actors for the implementation process. For example, rural extension organs or rural workers' unions are not necessarily present in every municipality. The same strategy has been followed to identify actors that were engaged in the process in an earlier stage, e.g., in predecessor administrations. Finally, snowball sampling was applied for the interview with state-level organizations. Interviews were conducted upon perceived relevance as well as the availability of interview partners.

Due to partially long geographical distances to the cases (e.g., case A), interviews were conducted in condensed blocks of (several) days between October 2017 and February 2018. Due to the linguistic and intercultural challenge as a foreign researcher, a Brazilian fellow researcher³⁵ accompanied me for the first two field trips, where we conducted fourteen interviews.

Through periods between the interviews, I could adapt the interview guide according to insights from previous interactions, which supported targeted questioning for relevant themes that emerged in earlier interviews.

The semi-structured interview guide (**ANNEX I: Interview Guide**) was designed with open questions to incentivize personal and narrative answers (e.g., *In your own words, how do you describe XYZ?*). In addition, the guide was divided into two parts: A first generic part which was similar for all interviews and questions addressing the following topics:

- *Personal background of the interlocutor*
- *Interpretation of the PNAE objectives*
- *Role in the operationalization of the PNAE*
- *Implications of family farmer procurement*

A second part of the interview guide focused on specific characteristics of the interview partner depending on their function. For example, the nutritionist was asked about the process of menu elaboration, the procurement department about the process of the public call, or the cooperative representatives about the organization of producers.

In addition, while the interview guide was followed, I remained open to exploring further interesting topics that emerged from the interview. For example, the CATI representative in case A disclosed to have been municipal secretary of agriculture and president of the CAE before the reform. This information opened an additional dimension to understanding the program implementation before and after the reform.

³⁵ The fellow researcher was member of the Center for Organization Studies at the University of São Paulo. He accompanied all the interviews, clarified linguistic doubts and to a minor extent, interacted with additional questions.

Archive data

In addition to semi-structured interviews, archival data were consulted, which was adequate for reasons of data triangulation (Yin, 2014) and essential given the theoretical underpinning of the research. The translation literature proposes a clear process on how field-level ideas are enacted locally. The abstract objects, i.e., texts, models, or presentations, serve thereby as a “blueprint” for local materialization (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996, p. 32). Furthermore, local materialization describes the process of how an idea is locally transferred in objects that reflect the assigned value by the actors involved in the translation (Eriksson-Zetterquist & Renemark, 2016). Hence, the analysis of documents on the field and organizational level builds an important basis to identify cognitive patterns.

The field-level documents consisted of the law itself, decrees, governmental guidelines, and further publications. Furthermore, various governmental agencies support the implementation and publish manuals and step-by-step explanations on how the new regulation should be carried out. Also, the federal transparency portal www.SiGPC.gov.br, where municipalities report on implementation, was consulted to collect information. On the local level, the document analysis focused on any written artifact connected to the policy. These were public calls for the procurement processes, menus, CAE protocols, or internal documents from different organizations. However, it should be emphasized at this point that the local implementation was scarcely documented beyond the few artifacts mentioned above.

Direct Observation

Finally, during the research process, I had the possibility to include direct observation as a data source. In two different case studies, I could observe interactions between municipal actors as a non-participant. In one case, I was allowed to observe a meeting between municipal representatives and local producers concerning the delayed launch of a public call (18.10.2017). Second, I participated in two state-level conferences on the PNAE. One conference was organized by the Institute of Food Technology in Campinas (25. & 26.10.2017) and the other by the CECANE-SP in the city of São Paulo (1. & 2.2.2018). Both events aimed to build municipal actors' capacity to implement the national policy, including family farmer procurement. This form of data collection provides additional insights and grants direct immersion into phenomena, which is not mediated through the perception of involved actors.

4.4 Data Analysis

The data analysis strategy was based on the “Gioia methodology” (Gioia et al., 2013), complemented by visual mapping to generate meaning from processes (Langley, 1999). While the “Gioia method” was central to increase the rigor of theory building from the qualitative data, it has been adapted to specificities of this research as presented in **Figure 5**. This approach is expressively encouraged by the authors as they see it as *a flexible orientation toward qualitative, inductive research that is open to innovation, rather than a ‘cookbook’*” (Gioia et al., 2013, p. 26).




Figure 5: Data analyzing strategy (author)

The different steps in the data analysis support answering the initially presented research questions (see ch. 1.3). As an overarching objective, the study aims to answer how municipal actors interpret the new procurement regulation for the national school feeding program and how they influence its implementation in the local context. On a theoretical level, this research question entails two major themes: First, how actors interpret newly arising institutional demands based on their rationalities, and second, what activities local actors perform to translate these demands into practice. Three sub-questions are to be answered to address both themes:

- Which actors are affected by the regulatory change, and how are they related to each other?
- Which cognitive frames exist, and how do local actors mobilize them?
- How are the locally constructed interpretations translated into practice?

The following paragraphs describe the data analysis steps, demonstrating how these supported answering the research question. As demonstrated in **figure 5**, the visual and the

actor mapping served as preliminary steps and were conducted before developing the “grounded theory model” (Gioia et al., 2013). Therefore, they will be explained first. Afterward, the identification process of rationalities will be explored before the “Gioia method” will be introduced and demonstrated how it was applied to this research context. While the research process generally followed an exploratory approach, some preliminary analyses were theory-driven. The actor mapping was informed by insights from stakeholder theory (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Also, the process of identifying the rationalities was embedded into the institutional logics framework by Thornton et al. (2012).

Visual mapping

The data collected through interviews, document studies, and field observations were organized in visual maps for each of the four implementation processes (see ch. 5.1 for the visual maps per case study). This initial mapping served to condense large amounts of information from different dimensions from the local implementation to one visual representation. Langley (1999) proposes this strategy to make sense of processes as it allows for depicting activities in different dimensions of the process, interactions and interdependencies, and chronological order.

Several actors, spanning organizational boundaries, interacted simultaneously in different arenas, such as public administration or producer organizations, to implement family farmer procurement in local contexts. Therefore, the visual mapping supported the structuring of these complex processes. Furthermore, creating representations of all cases in a similar form fostered comparability between cases, allowing for identifying similar sequences of activities and chronological comparison. Organizing representations are constructed from “raw” data and are, therefore, not theory (Langley, 1999, p. 702). However, they build the first step for more abstract conceptualizations of the local translation activities by first and second order coding. Also, mirroring data in the form of a process did enhance awareness for analyzing the data as such, which was a great analytical support during theory building.

Visual mapping facilitates concentrating various types of data in one graph. In addition, actors that are involved in the translation process can be more easily identified. However, visual graphs are not capable of demonstrating certain aspects, which are essential for this research. For example, power structures or cognitive patterns are less susceptible to visual representation (Langley, 1999). Therefore, further analytical tools (actor mapping) and concepts (rationalities) have been employed to operationalize these aspects.

Actor mapping

Actors were identified and mapped to answer the first research sub-question (see ch. 5.2). For this purpose, in a first step, field-level documents such as the legal framework

and supporting documentation were analyzed to identify actors who have a legally required function in the local implementation process. The reform targets municipal administrations and, more specifically, secretaries of education for operationalizing the program and procurement departments to purchase family farmer products. As a civil society control organ, the CAE (eng. school feeding council) oversees the correct implementation and hence, has a legal attribution. In addition, manuals on implementation (FNDE, 2016) foresee the support of the secretary of agriculture or rural extension organs to mediate between the administration and local family farmers. Finally, the legal framework mentions judicial bodies, which audit municipal administrations regularly and control for irregularities. This step served to assure that all legally required actors were considered for the actor mapping.

In a second step, data from the case studies were examined first to compare empirically identified actors with the legally indicated actors for completeness, and second, complement actors involved in local translation but not formally required. Such additional actors were, for example, the rural workers union, which was a central actor for the implementation of family farmer procurement in case A.

After having identified relevant local actors for the translation process, I have, in a third step, developed an actor salience framework inspired by stakeholder theory (R.E. Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997). With this framework, actors were characterized based on the attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency. These attributes define the actor salience, i.e., their propensity to influence the local translation process effectively. Based on the salience, actors were categorized as latent, expectant and definitive actors. In combination with the identified rationalities, the actor mapping served as a basis to reveal how actor constellations influenced the local translation process.

Identifying rationalities

The second sub-question concerning the cognitive frames was addressed by identifying prevalent rationalities in the local contexts (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013). As described in chapter 2.3, communities of meaning and their members construct specific rationalities, which serve as interpretive scripts that guide their perception of the world as well as their actions. Rationalities, while differing in their emergence, show conceptual similarities with institutional logics. Nevertheless, to identify rationalities in the local context, I followed Bossard's (2016) proposition to conceptualize rationalities as concrete instantiations of central institutional logics on the actor level. Observations in the local context, hence, indicate actor rationalities. However, as actors and communities of meaning are themselves embedded into a society-wide inter-institutional system, it is argued that their rationalities reflect institutional logics to some extent. This analytical bridge allows for linking rationalities to Thornton et al.'s (2012) institutional logics framework.

Following Bossard's (2016, p. 58) methodological approach, data parts that indicated specific values and belief systems were collected in a first step. Based on the institutional logics framework (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 73), these parts were coded for one or more ideal type institutions (Family, Community, Religion, State, Market, Profession, Corporation), hence, assigned to institutional logics. Already in this phase, some observations became evident. First, some categories were never mentioned, such as Religion. Second, although several actors invoked the family logic as an important element, only one family farmer in all four cases demonstrated traits of this logic. In some instances, other actors assigned the family element, e.g., public servants stating that participation in the program allows families to remain on their territory in future generations. This external assignment was not deemed a robust basis to distill an ideal-type rationality. Therefore, the family logic was integrated into the wider notion of community. While not exactly congruent, the community and family logics share some common traits, such as membership and loyalty to the group (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 73). Third, some parts were connected to more than one category. In a closer analysis of these parts, a correlation between a community and economic logic became apparent.

In a second step, the actor rationalities for the specific context of the National school feeding program were elaborated. The coded data segments were examined for typical building blocks of rationalities based on Schedler and Rüegg-Stürm's (2013) conception of rationalities as "*logic of action*," "*logic of reasoning*," and "*logic of construction*." Aligned with the approach of Bossard (2016, p. 59), the logic of action was operationalized with *strategy* (what strategies do actors enact to achieve their objectives?); the logics of construction and reasoning were operationalized as *objectives* (what are typical objectives for this rationality?) and *legitimacy* (How is legitimacy gained according to this rationality?). With these building blocks at hand, the local rationalities were compiled from the data sets, each rationality with a structure of legitimacy, objectives, and strategies (see ch.5.3).

The rationalities that were conceptualized for family farmer procurement are not actor-specific but rather ideal types of rationalities for further analysis and theorizing. In conceptualizing the rationalities from the data, it showed that the market and corporation elements were not sufficiently clearly distinguishable. Although some elements from both were identified, they were not deemed sufficiently distinct for separate conceptualization. Therefore, these elements were subsumed under economic rationality. Finally, the correlation of the economic and community elements further intensified when analyzing the data parts. Several actors argumentatively invoked the connection of local community and economic development. Therefore, a "local development" rationality was established.

Identifying prevalent rationalities in the local contexts was a decisive element for analyzing the local translation process. Assigning rationalities to actors served as an

analytical tool to reveal motivations for engagement into or negligence of the process. Actor rationalities were consequently integrated into constructing the data structure for the grounded theory model for the local translation process.

The “Gioia methodology”

The “Gioia method” to inductively develop grounded theory from qualitative data has received increasing attention (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et al., 2013). Central to this approach is the separation into a first and second-order analysis of the data. In the 1st-order analysis, first-order categories are constructed. It is imperative to stay close to the data in this phase. If possible, informants’ terms should be used. At this stage of the coding, in-vivo and descriptive codes are best suited to assure proximity to the data (Saldaña, 2013). Charmaz (2006) proposes to focus on action language and gerunds in first-order or initial coding. In the 1st-order analysis, the focus is not on condensing categories but on letting them emerge (Gioia et al., 2013).

In the 2nd-order analysis, 1st-order codes will be analyzed for commonalities or differences to distill emerging categories. In this phase, axial (Charmaz, 2006) or pattern (Saldaña, 2013) coding is applied to group the first-order categories into more theoretical concepts. In this phase, the researcher thinks all the levels together from data to 2nd-order concepts. Focus is increasingly on abstracting and theorizing. Resulting from this phase are 2nd-order concepts or even 3rd-order dimensions.

From the collection of first, and second-order concepts and possibly third-order dimensions, the data structure is built. The data structure is a pivotal part of the process as it visually demonstrates the path from raw data to theoretical concepts. In the last step, the static picture of the data structure will be transformed into a grounded theory model that demonstrates the dynamic relationships between the concepts that describe the phenomenon of interest (Gioia et al., 2013, p. 22).

Constructing the Local Translation Process

The preliminary analytical steps of visualizing the different implementation processes, mapping the local actors, and assigning rationalities laid the groundwork for developing the “*grounded theory model*” (Gioia et al., 2013) for the local translation process. In this step, the analytical focus was on answering the third sub-question to this research on how rationalities were translated into practice. Analytically speaking, the model searched to identify the translation activities that led to implementing the practice.

From an initial exploratory coding³⁶ (Charmaz, 2006) emerged two broad areas with regard to the translation process: First, activities to foster the local implementation; and second, contextual elements that supported or inhibited the transfer to practice. With this indication, further analysis was conducted for both areas, applying the “Gioia method” explained above. In a final step, the static data structure was transformed into an interactive processual model (Gioia et al., 2013).

Focus on Activities

As a preliminary activity, data pieces were identified that indicated activities of local actors about implementing the new practice. For this purpose, initial structural coding aimed to identify areas of interest (Saldaña, 2013).

In a 1st-order analysis with descriptive of in-vivo (translated into English) codes, 58 activities emerged. After consolidating activities from different cases and grouping very context specific activities, a total of 27 1st-order codes remained. In the 2nd order analysis, these categories were distilled to 12 second-order concepts. In this step, the first-order categories were put in relation to each other, trying to identify commonalities, differences and interrelations. In further iteration cycles with the theory, it was possible to identify five 3rd-order constructs, which identify phases of the translation process. On the basis of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd-order concepts, the data structure for the translation phases was built (**Annex II: Data Structure**).

Focus on Contextual Factors for Transitions

For the focus on transitioning between phases, the coding procedure was analogous to the activity focus. Data segments with indication to contextual factor were identified, and the 1st-order analysis performed, which rendered 23 instantiations of contextual factors that influence implementation. After further examination, these were condensed to 17 first-order codes. In the second iteration, seven 2nd-order codes were identified. In further analysis of the 1st- and 2nd-order concepts, three 3rd-order categories emerged. These categories could be assigned to different stages of transition along the process. The data structure for the contextual factors is presented in **Annex III**.

In the coding process, contextual factors that influence the transition to implement the practice were conceptualized. These were producer preparedness, rationality compatibility, and interest. While these concepts emerged from the information from the interviews, they were to a higher degree theory-driven than the activities. For

³⁶ This exploratory coding followed the advice of grounded theory scholars to code very extensively (Charmaz, 2006) and theory-agnostic (Gioia et al., 2013). This rendered a sum of 1426 codes for all four cases. These codes were then organized, grouped and assigned to the broad topics above.

example, while actors did refer implicitly to different rationalities, they would not identify them as such. Also, the data indicated a relation between producer preparedness, rationality compatibility, and interest. However, the relations varied from case to case. A cross-case analysis has been conducted to increase the understanding of the influence of the contextual factors on the transfer to practice (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). For this purpose, the family farmer procurement had been conceptualized as a two-party interrelation in a first step. Different configurations of producer preparedness and rationality compatibility have been proposed. These configurations either lead to implementation or not. Finally, as interest was located within the political sphere rather than in the actual implementation, it was evaluated as an additional factor.

5 Research Findings

This chapter presents the research findings. It is structured into four different parts. First, section 5.1 introduces the four case studies. Second, section 5.2 develops an actor mapping of relevant actors for the local translation of the family farmer procurement practice. Third, section 5.3 describes the rationalities, which were identified in the case studies. Finally, section 5.4 presents the developed “grounded theory” model for the local translation process. Section 5.4 is divided into the “phases of translation” (ch. 5.4.1), which describes the activities in the different stages of translation and “transitioning between phases.” The latter explains how the process advanced between the different phases.

5.1 Case studies

In this section, the four case studies will be presented. The introduction into each case comprises a short chronological orientation about the implementation history since the reform had been in force. Also, the local implementation process for each case is demonstrated in a visual mapping of the process. Finally, Cases A and B had successfully implemented the family farming procurement at the time of case selection, whereas cases C and D did not.

5.1.1 Case A

The municipality that serves as Case A is a mid-size city in the northeast of the State of São Paulo. The municipality counts a little less than 90'000 inhabitants (Biblioteca Virtual do Governo do Estado de São Paulo, n.d.). In 2018, around 11800 students were enrolled in the city and distributed over 50 schools (Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Escolar (FNDE), n.d.-a). The high number of schools is due to the geographic expansion of the municipality.

Furthermore, there are various Quilombola, indigenous, and traditional peoples' communities present in the municipality. In the case of traditional peoples, these are Caiçaras – communities that are spread mainly along the coastlines in the southeast of Brazil. These communities have preferred access to the PNAE family farming procurement.




Figure 6: Family farmer procurement 2011-2017, Case A
(based on Portal do FNDE, 2018)

When the new PNAE legislation came to force, the operationalization of the policy was outsourced to a private provider that delivered the meals to the schools. The service provider executed all activities from menu development, procurement to delivery of daily meals. The secretary of education maintained a department of school alimentation with a responsible nutritionist to oversee the correct fulfillment of the service contract, aligned with legal requirements. This form of program implementation was installed in 2006 after a new municipal administration took office in 2005.

In 2011, the outsourcing contract had been modified from complete program execution to the provision of labor only. The department of school alimentation internalized central practices for the school meal delivery: menu development, procurement, and logistic planning.

Even though the municipality had acquired small quantities of family farmer products – mainly bananas, manioc, and fruit pulp – already before the new law, a serious articulation with producers started only after reintegrating the PNAE into internal administrative processes. The reintegration led to the first “*Chamada Pública*,” or public call to acquire family farming products in August 2012. However, as the data from the FNDE show, the amount procured from family farmers remained low, with BRL 25’458.25 (Portal do FNDE, n.d.). Consulting the municipal transparency portal

shows that only two contracts had been concluded (Municipal transparency portal, Case A³⁷).

In 2013, a newly elected administration took office. The new administration was politically aligned with the party of the federal government that developed the legal framework. The administration started with fresh personnel in various positions. For the PNAE, most relevant were the changes within the education secretary and the agriculture secretary. A new nutritionist as head of the school feeding department was nominated, changing from the health secretary to the education secretary within the public administration.

With the new nutritionist, articulation within the municipality to procure from family farmers intensified. A cooling chamber was built to keep fruits and vegetables fresh until delivery to schools, facilitating the central reception of products at the school feeding department. This guaranteed sufficient facilities to start family farming procurement. Parallel to the infrastructure development, articulation between the nutritionist, the secretary of agriculture, the state rural extension organ, the local rural workers union, and the producers aimed at establishing local family farmer procurement. This process led to the increasing integration of family farmers into the product mix for the school food through three public calls in the years 2014 and 2015. Interestingly, the portfolio of products that were sourced from family farmers diversified. Whereas the first public calls focused on fruits and vegetables from the region only, one call in 2015 was for goods such as rice, beans, flour & oil. Family farmer cooperatives from the South of Brazil provided these slightly processed foods due to missing local production. Also, some slightly processed regional products started to be integrated into the school menu.

In 2015, nutritionist II renounced her position. Her successor, nutritionist III, had already led the school feeding department once and left the municipal service some years before the new legal framework came into force. Under the management of the new nutritionist, there was a continuation of family farming procurement with another public call in 2016. The procurement seemed to have achieved a certain balance, as the 2016 call was almost identical to the 2015 call for local fruits. Interestingly, however, all the minimally processed products from local farmers disappeared from the procurement list.

2016 was election year, and hence, in 2017, a new administration cycle for the local government started. The PT government had not been re-elected. With this change, politically indicated actors changed as well. The secretary of agriculture, who had been promoted to this post during the past administration and was heavily involved in integrating family farmers, left the administration. Within the secretary of agriculture,

³⁷ To guarantee anonymity of the municipalities and their actors, sources that directly identify the cases by name, remain anonymized. For further information, please contact the author.

another employee had been appointed to manage municipal supply. The nutritionist, even though being in a politically indicated position in this municipality, managed to maintain her position.

In mid-2017, the local school food council (CAE) mandate has come to the end of its four-year term. The CAE had played an active role in the integration of family farmers into the school food program. The active role may partly be because the CAE president was simultaneously president of the local rural workers union and had been in office for eight consecutive years. As the mandate is limited to two terms, a new president had to be elected. This process, however, did not occur as planned, and no successor was presented to the FNDE in time. An established and functioning CAE is a mandatory requirement for receiving federal funds, and therefore, the FNDE temporarily suspended the cash transfer to the municipality (Art. 41 I *Resolução 26/2013*; Art. 20 I *Lei 11.947/2009*). To remedy this situation, a new CAE was elected in July 2017, and the recently appointed representative of the agriculture secretary was elected president. Again, the CAE was presided by an actor that plays a double role in integrating family farmers.

Furthermore, in July 2017, the outsourcing contract had to be canceled. The court of auditors had repeatedly pointed out that the municipal administration was using inadequate funds for paying the service. The administration used resources that are reserved for teacher salaries and not complementary services such as school food³⁸. The contract included logistic services, such as stock and distribution of goods, mainly from family farmers, and meal preparation at schools. The public administration was forced to hire cooks through an emergency process. Logistic employees, on the other hand, had not been replaced.

Regarding family farmer procurement, no public call was launched in 2017. Instead, existing contracts with some family farmers were extended for two months, depending on the remaining balance for the year³⁹. Except for a cooperative from the South, that provides rice and milk powder, the renovation of contracts correlated with substantially lower values for producers compared to preceding contracts (Municipal Transparency Portal, Case A⁴⁰).

Also, some contracts with fruit pulp producers were not renovated due to infrastructure deficits at schools. Apparently, the blenders to mix fruit juice showed defects in almost all schools simultaneously. This led to the “blendergate,” where producers accused

³⁸ The FUNDEB (*Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica e de Valorização dos Profissionais da Educação*) is a federal allowance to support states and municipalities in the development of quality basic education (Lei N°11.494 de 20 de junho de 2007). Art. 23 I indicates prohibited uses for Fundeb Funds, thereby relying on Art. 71 of Lei n° 9.394, de 20 de dezembro de 1996, which clearly excludes school food as valid use.

³⁹ According to Art. 32 of the *Resolução CD/FNDE N°26/2013* the limit per producer with DAP is BRL 20'000.- per calendar year.

⁴⁰ For references that clearly identify case municipalities, please refer to the author.

the school feeding department of deliberately not purchasing new blenders to justify the procurement of industrialized juices. The department of school alimentation, in contrast, argued that budget restrictions impeded the acquisition of new blenders. The situation peaked in several mediation meetings with municipal and state officials. However, the mediation attempts remained without immediate success by the end of the field study.

Only in January 2018, the municipality published a new public call for local family farmer products. Launching the public call in January was an initiative of the municipal agriculture secretary to synchronize contract duration with the calendar year, which is decisive for the annual value producers are allowed to sell to the public administration. This synchronization facilitates bureaucratic procedures as well as financial planning and reporting (Interview Case A, Representative Secretary of Agriculture (SOA), 2017).

The municipality has launched its so far last public call in April 2019, and contracts were signed in May 2019. While not covering the entire school year from March to December, the contracts are in line with the calendar year and end in December 2019.

Figure 7 summarizes the process of family farmer implementation. The graph is divided into five horizontal areas: producers, civil society, public administration, and politics. Each represents a relevant arena for the center process of family farmer procurement (FF procurement). The arrows demonstrate the effects of the respective activity in an arena on the procurement process. The operation signs “+” and “-” indicate if the effect is positive or negative. Boxes that overlap various sectors affect different arenas. For example, successful public calls require the involvement of the public administration (agriculture and education secretary, procurement department) in publishing the call, the producers to present sales proposals, and the civil society, mainly in the form of the CAE, to oversee the process. Furthermore, the “explosion” boxes indicate frictions in the implementation process.

Implementation Process Case A




Figure 7: Implementing family farmer procurement in Case A (author)

5.1.2 Case B




Figure 8: Family farmer procurement 2011-2017, Case B (based on Portal do FNDE, 2018)

Case B concerns a city in the metropolitan region of Campinas, the second-largest city in the State of São Paulo. The municipality counts around 70'000 inhabitants (Biblioteca Virtual do Governo do Estado de São Paulo, n.d.). In 2017 were 13'733 students enrolled (Nutritionist, Case B, 2017).

The operationalization of the school feeding program was internalized when implementing legal changes to the PNAE. This means that the secretary of education handles the process from menu elaboration to procurement and cooking internally. Only the logistics from the central stock to schools is outsourced. The modus of operationalization has not changed until today.

After implementing the new legislation, the municipality in case B started to procure from family farmers immediately, although not yet achieving the legal minimum with 24.9% of FNDE funds in 2011. Subsequently, the share of family farmer procurement has increased dramatically to a peak of 77% of FNDE funds in 2014. While it did decrease between 2015 and 2017, it remained above 60% in all years (Portal do FNDE, n.d.).

Until 2012, the municipal administration was led by a mayor from the workers' party, aligned with the federal government. A municipal council with representatives from the secretary of agriculture, the state rural extension organ, the school alimentation department, and the procurement department was established to initiate family farmer

procurement. The council remained active until the end of the workers' party administration (Interview Case B, Representative CATI, 2017).

In 2013, a new administration under a mayor from the political center took over, which was re-elected in 2016 for another four years⁴¹. The new administration invoked changes in staff relevant for the local school feeding program: A new secretary of education and a new director for the school feeding department were installed, the latter coming from another municipal administration in the region where she already worked as a nutritionist for the school feeding program.

On the producer side, relevant developments had been initiated sometime before the new legislation arrived. In 2006, the local producer cooperative hired a trained economist, a specialist in agri-business and cooperative management, to become the cooperative's general manager. The organization had existed for six years already but lacked competitive power and capacity for development. The cooperative was located in a rent-free office space ceded from the municipal administration and exclusively sold chayote, a mundane low-price product.

The engagement of the manager started a process of professionalization in management as well as in production techniques. First, the cooperative left the dependency from the municipal administration and rented a headquarter. Administrative processes were professionalized and streamlined. Second, the cooperative invested in product quality. Producers were educated to increase the productivity of their resources, including water management, fertilizers, and the reduction of pesticides. For this purpose, rural extension organs were invited for courses on different aspects of production. Third, the cooperative started to offer services to the producers, such as collective input procurement and soil analysis. These measures increased productivity by up to 70%. Fifth, the cooperative strengthened the social relations between producers through joint workshops, courses, and events for the entire family. Sixth, the cooperative started to diversify production, including fruits, salads, and vegetables. Within three years, the cooperative passed from three products in their portfolio to twenty-two (Interview Case B, Director local cooperative, 2017).

When the PNAE legislation came to force, the cooperative immediately participated in public calls. Since 2010, they have been selling to the municipal administration of case B as the major provider for family farming products. Two years later, the cooperative already provided products to five municipalities in the region, and in 2016 to seven (Interview Case B, Director local cooperative, 2017).

⁴¹ Results for municipal elections in 2012 and 2016 retrieved from g1.globo.com (for exact URLs, please contact author).

In 2012, the cooperative entered the application process for a grant within the “Microbacias II – market access”-project, financed by the world bank group and the state of São Paulo⁴². The proposal was elaborated in collaboration with the director of the agriculture department in municipality B, which left the public administration for a rural extension organization when the new government took office in 2013. The cooperative received a grant for BRL 800’000.- to invest in a micro-industry for cooling, packaging, and processing products as well as vehicles. The construction was finished in 2016 (Interview Case B, Director local cooperative, 2017).

Beyond the cooperative, the secretary of economic planning started an initiative to increase the quality of rural livelihoods. One pillar of this program was strengthening local family agriculture with a six-month course targeted at producers that are not part of the cooperative. Whilst these producers still lack the necessary degree of professionalism and formality to participate in formal markets, the secretary envisions their integration in different markets in the medium-term. This potentially offers an additional future source of local products for the PNAE (Interview Case B, Secretary of Economic Planning, 2018).

Figure 9 below depicts the process for case B. The graph underpins the quick and smooth adoption of family farming procurement. The regularity and quantity of public calls indicate quick and stable implementation throughout time. Interestingly, in 2017 the municipal administration, independently of the PNAE process, initiated a producer empowerment program with the objective of better market inception.

⁴² The “*Microbacias II – Acesso ao Mercado*” project aimed at improving market access for organized family farmers, with different pillars: capacity building; financing business initiatives; public policies, market monitoring and rural extension; strengthening public institutions and municipal infrastructure. Cooperatives with at least 70% family farmers could get grants with a volume of BRL 800’000.- if complemented with 30% additional funds by the cooperative (Coordenadoria de Assistência Técnica Integral [CATI], 2020).

Implementation Process Case B




Figure 9: Implementing family farmer procurement in Case B (author)

5.1.3 Case C




Figure 10: Family farmer procurement 2011-2017, Case C (based on Portal do FNDE, 2018)

The municipality of Case C is situated in the metropolitan area of São Paulo, the capital of the state. The municipality counts around 67'000 inhabitants (Biblioteca Virtual do Governo do Estado de São Paulo, n.d.). The municipal school network comprises 38 schools with around 6300 students (Censo Escolar SP, 2017).

The current nutritionist has been in charge of the school alimentation since 2003. Municipal employees operationalize the provision of school food. In contrast to other cases, this municipality does not have a central stock. Products are directly delivered to the schools, which function as decentral stocks. In addition, the operationalization is completely managed by one nutritionist only (Interview Case C, Nutritionist, 2017).

When the novel legislation obliged municipalities to procure from family farmers, the responsible nutritionist started to seek information on the local production. As early as 2011, there are records of written requests to the secretary of agriculture to inform the items and quantities of local agriculture production. The interactions between the nutritional department and the secretary of agriculture showed that local production was insufficient to cover the needs at the time. The next formalized request occurred in 2015, still without success (Interview Case C, Nutritionist, 2017).

In the meantime, with the appointment of the current secretary of agriculture in 2011, the local agriculture engaged in the process of structuration. Although without a

technical background in agriculture, the secretary has close relations with the local producer community due to preceding activity in the rural credit business. As a first step, the secretary achieved that the municipal “house of agriculture” – local offices of the state rural extension organ CATI – had been re-installed after twenty years of inactivity. In addition to facilities, the municipality gained technical capacity with an agronomist responsible for the region. The local structuration process culminated in founding a cooperative to foster market access in 2015. Due to a lengthy formalization of all producers, the cooperative was able to participate in public procurement starting in 2017 (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2018).

In early 2016, the municipality received training from the CECANE – a collaborating center for school feeding and nutrition. CECANEs were initiated on behalf of the federal government in various states to support the local implementation of the policy. In São Paulo, the CECANE is integrated with the federal university of São Paulo (UNIFESP). Along with 41 more municipalities⁴³, the case municipality had been selected for a week-long training. The selection criterium was insufficient procurement from family farmers (Interview Representative CECANE-SP, 2018).

In 2017, a newly elected municipal administration took office, appointed a new secretary of education, and exchanged the entire procurement department. In July that year, the administration published the first public call for family farmer procurement (Municipal transparency portal, Case C⁴⁴). The local cooperative won the call and started to deliver to the municipal administration.

Shortly after launching the public call, the FNDE had suspended the transfer of funds. The municipality had been procuring prohibited products, a sweetened chocolate powder, and failed to react to notifications of auditing organs. The secretary of education had to personally appear in Brasilia to justify the municipal conduct at the FNDE to regain the funding. Apparently, the incident had been identified only after transfer suspension because the FNDE notified the preceding administration. After three months, the situation had been normalized, and the suspended funds were transferred retrospectively (Interview Case C, Secretary of Education, 2018).

Contracts with public farmers had a duration of twelve months until mid-2018 and were subsequently extended for some months. While the municipality did not source any products from family farmers until 2017, it achieved quite a steep increase short period. In 2018 the threshold was fulfilled with 36% family farmer procurement (FNDE, 2020).

Figure 11 depicts the translation process in municipality C. Different arenas of action are circled the central process of family farming procurement and influence its

⁴³ To these 41 municipalities counted also Case D of this research.

⁴⁴ For specific reference, please contact author.

outcome. The graph tangibly demonstrates that major activities occurred in the public administration and producer sphere. However, the process graph shows that the producers had to undergo a long-term structuration process to be apt for public procurement. This process was initiated and mediated by the public sphere, namely the secretary of agriculture. Furthermore, several single events positively influenced the family farming procurement, such as the training with CECANE, appointments of secretaries of agriculture and educations, or suspending the funds. The latter may be classified as a shock that further propelled the local implementation process.

Implementation Process Case C




Figure 11: Implementing family farmer procurement in Case C (author)

5.1.4 Case D




Figure 12: Family farmer procurement 2011-2017, Case C (based on Portal do FNDE, 2018)

Case D is a mid-sized city in the metropolitan area of the State Capital São Paulo with 150'000 inhabitants (Biblioteca Virtual do Governo do Estado de São Paulo, n.d.). The program for school feeding encompasses 51 schools with around 16500 students (Nutritionist, Case D, 2017).

On municipal territory, there is an agrarian reform settlement, which is governed by the state. The settlement was established in 2003 out of land occupation. The objective of the settlements is to cede (unproductive) public territories to rural workers for productive use. Responsible for the implementation of the agrarian policies is the *Fundação Instituto de Terras do Estado de São Paulo*, (Land Institute Foundation São Paulo) which is part of the State administration (ITESP, 2020).

When implementing the new legislation, the municipal school alimentation was operationalized entirely in-house. A non-nutritionist led the school alimentation department. With the arrival of the new legislation, a nutritionist responsible for technical aspects had to be hired. Although this was not a new requirement, which was already established in *Resolução CFN nº358/3005*, the National Council of Nutritionists notified the mayor about this necessity. This notification led to a division of functions between the program manager and responsible nutritionist.

In 2011 the currently responsible nutritionist for the program assumed the technical position. This engagement was already her second in the municipal school feeding administration. Before graduating as a nutritionist, she worked as a vocational nutritional technician (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017).

In 2013 a new municipal administration took office, politically aligned with the federal workers party government that designed the policy. While there occurred new nominations for political posts, i.e., the secretary of education, most relevant for family farming procurement was installing a nucleus for agriculture development and supply. To strengthen the implementation of agriculture policies, the house of agriculture was re-inaugurated after twelve years of inactivity. Also, by agreement with the state secretary of agriculture, an agronomist was ceded to the municipality to transfer knowledge to the local context. With the re-establishment of the house of agriculture, the foundation was built for the sector to reappear on the local political agenda. The municipal administration started to capacitate and organize producers with technical and commercial courses in collaboration with various federal and state rural extension organizations (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017).

In 2015 the municipality was selected, among other 41 municipalities, including case C, for training with the CECANE São Paulo due to insufficient family farming procurement. Compared to training courses organized by the municipal house of agriculture, which foremostly focused on producers, the CECANE training integrated actors from the administration. In particular, the one-week consultancy addresses the necessary activities of the secretary of education, nutritionists, procurement department, the CAE, and the secretary of agriculture to initiate the family farming procurement (Interview Representative CECANE-SP, 2018). This training seemed to transfer the articulation from the agriculture sphere to the entire administration as the municipality launched its first public call for vegetables in 2016 (Municipal transparency portal, Case D, 2020). Through this process, five local producers were successfully integrated as suppliers (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017).

In this period, some structural changes took place within the administration. In 2015, the position of the responsible nutritionist was transformed into a job-sharing format, with one nutritionist being responsible for day-care and the other for the schools (Nutritionist & CAE president, Case D, 2017). In the following year, the municipality switched from complete inhouse operationalization to outsourcing the logistics and the labor force in the kitchens (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017).

In 2017, the municipal administration had been reelected. Nevertheless, changes of politically indicated positions occurred: a new secretary of education and a new director of the procurement were appointed. In addition, the responsible nutritionist for

schools had been promoted to program manager, removing the division between the responsible technician for the PNAE and the program director. In July, the nutritionist responsible for the day-care section had been elected president of the CAE.

Regarding family farming procurement, the municipal administration extended the contracts with the five local producers for another year. In addition, a public call for non-perishable goods, rice, and milk powder was launched, targeting state-level cooperatives. As this call was launched in December, product delivery started in 2018 only. In the period after the field research, instead of launching further public calls, the municipality opted for extending contracts in 2018 as well as 2019 (Municipal transparency portal, Case D, 2020).

Figure 13 below demonstrates the implementation process. Case D initiated activities to prepare family farming procurement in 2013 with a changing government. Similar to Case C, municipal agriculture organs had to be re-installed to allow for producer articulation. Also, the mobilization of actors remained in the sphere of agriculture until the CECANE consultancy. Only after the perceived external pressure, the municipality started to procure from family farmers.

Implementation Process Case D




Figure 13: Implementing family farmer procurement in Case D (author)

5.2 Actor Mapping

The research project analyzes how different actors in the local context interpret the new legislation and how their engagement in the implementation process influences its result. Before analyzing different interpretive schemes, actors need to be identified and their positions in the local context of formal and informal interrelations defined. Based on reviewing laws, policy documents, reports, and academic literature, **Figure 14** shows the main actors that possibly influence or may be affected by the local implementation of PNAE.




Figure 14: Actors involved in implementing the PNAE (author)

This figure shows the actors that are involved in implementing the new legislation. It also demonstrates interactions between actors. In the static legal vision, the municipal executing entity is the central actor responsible for the implementation, which cumulates all relations with other actors. While the model is valuable for identifying the actors and their legally stipulated attributions, it falls short in qualifying the actors regarding their interest in the process and their power to influence it. In the following, a model will be presented that serves as a basis for the case study analyses.

5.2.1 Inspiration from Stakeholder Theory

To identify relevant actors for the policy implementation, stakeholder theory (R.E. Freeman, 1984) offers valuable insights. Stakeholder theory attempts to systematically analyze the organization's interrelations with its environment to identify relevant actors with a stake in the organization's activities that may influence the outcome of these activities. Although initially developed for strategic management (Freeman, 1984), it has proven as a powerful tool to evaluate actor interrelations also for public organizations (John M. Bryson, 2004; Lewis & Gilman, 2005), public policy (Friedman & Mason, 2004, 2005), and program evaluation (John M. Bryson, Patton, & Bowman, 2011).

Freeman's now-classic notion of stakeholders as *"any individual or group who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives"* (1984, p. 46) serves as an entry point for identifying stakeholders. This wide understanding of stakeholders includes a large variety of immediately, intermediately, or potentially concerned actors with some sort of claim or relationship with the organization. Also, the term *"can affect or is affected"* (Freeman, 1984, p. 46) implies that there is no necessity for a reciprocal relationship between the organization and stakeholders and allows influence to be exerted unilaterally in both directions (but of course also reciprocally). Furthermore, it emphasizes the potential ability of an actor (individual or collective) to influence the behavior of an organization or the outcome of a process. Therefore, in Freeman's notion, the stakeholder status is granted based on two characteristics of an actor: a (potential) claim and/or the ability to influence the organization (Mitchell et al., 1997).

For the initial identification of stakeholders, an approach as inclusive as possible seems valuable to prevent overlooking potentially influential or affected but powerless actors. An inclusive approach is even more relevant in affairs of public interest, such as public policies (Lewis & Gilman, 2005, pp. 162-164). On the other hand, widely conceptualizing stakeholders renders their effective management extremely complex due to the sheer number of potential actors. For reasons of complexity reduction, stakeholder management profits from an analysis that prioritizes some actors and their claims over others (Mitchell et al., 1997).

Drawing on the *"principle of who or what really counts"* (Freeman, 1994, p. 411), Mitchell et al. (1997) developed a theoretical proposition to identify and rank stakeholders along with the three attributes power, legitimacy, and urgency, which constitute their *"salience."* The framework allows the management of organizations to identify, categorize, and prioritize different stakeholders according to their perceived importance for successfully implementing the organizational strategy. The authors thereby refer to the attributes as follows:

1. **Power:** The authors rely on the Weberian definition that power is constituted through the *“possibility that one actor within a social relationship would be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance”* (Weber, 1922, p. 28; translated from German). While power is hard to grasp as a concept, it becomes more tangible through its application (Foucault, 1982). In describing types of resources for exercising power, Mitchell et al. (1997) rely on Etzioni’s proposition of coercive, utilitarian, or normative power. Whereas coercive power is based on physical resources of force, violence and restraint; utilitarian power draws on material or financial resources; and finally, normative power is based on symbolic resources (1964 as cited in Mitchell et al., 1997).
2. **Legitimacy:** For the definition of the legitimacy component, the authors rely on Suchman’s proposition of *“a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper and appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”* (1995, p. 574). This conceptualizing of legitimacy recognizes its socially constructed nature, elevating it from mere self-perception to a desired social good (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 867).
3. **Urgency:** Mitchell et al. (1997) propose two dimensions of urgency: a claim of a stakeholder is either (i) time-sensitive or (ii) critical for the stakeholder. These dimensions can be summed up as the degree to which a stakeholder’s claim requires immediate attention.

The classification or ranking is based on the number of attributes the stakeholder combines. In general, there are three basic groups: latent, expectant, and definitive stakeholders possessing one, two, or three attributes, respectively. The salience of an actor is expected to be higher the more attributes are combined on an actor. From the point of view of a managing organization, a higher salience translates into a higher priority to attend to the stakeholder’s claim (Mitchell et al., 1997).

Figure 15 depicts the different categories according to the attributes. Even though a clear sequence is difficult to define, it is assumed that within the three big categories, the presence of perceived urgency leads to the highest salience, followed by the assumption of a legitimate claim and the possession of power. This assumption seems intuitively right because a stakeholder is more likely to act upon a claim if he perceives it as urgent, no matter his power or legitimate claim.




Figure 15: Salience model with prioritization (author based on Mitchell et al. (1997))

However, the classification of stakeholders into different groups is not static as the number of attributes an actor combines may change over time. Actors may intentionally try to acquire more attributes, e.g., through coalition building, political action or skillfully invoking changes in the normative frame (Mitchell et al., 1997). Consequently, actors may be able to move from one category to another. On the other hand, actors may lose attributes through their actions or over time and descend to a lower priority category.

5.2.2 A Salience Model for Local Context Actors

The presented stakeholder mapping framework offers a fruitful inspiration to analyze actor constellations in local policy translation. The attributes legitimacy, power, and urgency describe the ability and propensity of actors to exert influence not only on organizational goals but on issues in general. The salience model encompasses essential components that influence the outcome of any project or process and can be transferred to policy implementation. Bryson & Roering (1987) analyzed the applicability of private-sector strategies to public sector and suggested that stakeholder approaches are highly valuable to public sector decision-making as it recognizes a wide variety of claims on the organization. While they were considering Freeman's conception, Bryson & Roering highlighted the weakness that the approach lacks a prioritizing mechanism (1987, p. 17). This caveat has been eliminated with the salience model by Mitchell et al. (1997), as empirical studies on the Kenyan land

reform process (K'Akumu, 2016) or public subsidies for professional sports facilities (Friedman & Mason, 2004, 2005) indicate.

Despite the uses for public policy, the salience model requires some re-formulation to be applicable to the PNAE translation. First, in private or public contexts, the salience model puts the focus on the organization to manage stakeholder engagement. In the case of the PNAE, the policymakers and the implementors are not identical. While the federal government has designed the policy, including its objectives and legal basis, the municipal and state administrations perform its implementation. The federal state assumes mainly five responsibilities in the implementation:

1. Set the legal framework.
2. Fund the policy.
3. Establish guidelines for the implementation.
4. Monitor the progress and, if necessary.
5. Sanction the implementing organs through withdrawal of future transfer payments.

Implementing organs for the local contexts across the country are the municipal and state governments – namely, the secretaries of education. This organizational division between policymaking and policy implementation leads to the constellation of municipal and state administrators becoming stakeholders in the implementation process. Therefore, the actor mapping for local municipal implementation is framed from the federal government's perspective and puts the implementation process in the center to which all local actors, including the municipal administration, are stakeholders.

Second, the attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency are kept very broad in the conception of Mitchell et al. and may profit from an adaptation to the specific context of this research. Therefore, the three attributes are being described in light of the local translation process of the new procurement regulation:

- **Power:** Translation studies essentially analyze the transformation of traveling field-level concepts into local context practices (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005b). This process requires the efforts of various actors on a cognitive and material level. First, the cognitive level comprises the collective meaning-making to interpret and edit the idea to fit into a local context. Second, materiality is expressed through locally enacting these edited ideas by establishing or integrating novel practices (K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). Both levels are inherently connected and mutually influencing elements of the translation process. Whereas interpretation shapes the cognitive foundation for novel practices, existing practices and routines are limiting or enabling factors for developing new practices (Røvik, 2016).

As the process from field-level concept to local practice is one of collective interpretation and coordinated action in which different actors may possess

different rationalities and follow various objectives, meanings likely need to be negotiated (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013). The outcome of such negotiations influences the outcome of the translation process. However, this negotiation does not occur in a void but in a local context with existing inter-actor relations, and therewith connected social positions (Battilana, 2006). It is, hence, important that the actor-mapping captures the relative influence sphere of actors to reflect local power structures. More precisely, actors may profit from a central position in the local decision-making process and possess the ability to mobilize their rationalities to influence said process. This can occur through legal status, political influence, or economic power.

- **Legitimacy:** Suchman's (1995) wide notion of legitimacy embraces the core elements most institutionalist scholars put forward. First, legitimacy is an inherently dialectic concept, and its sources are mostly external to the actor. Actors are granted legitimacy if they conform to the generally established belief system of reference audiences (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995). Defining the relevant audiences depends on the issue and the therewith involved social system. Second, legitimacy has different dimensions. A dimensional approach has been proposed in various seminal publications, although building on different categories: Scott (1995) proposed the dimensions - regulative, normative, and cognitive – along the pillars of institutions; Suchman (1995) promotes the labels of 'pragmatic,' 'moral,' and 'cognitive' and DiMaggio & Powell (1983) rely on isomorphic pressures – coercive, normative or mimetic. According to Scott (1995), the regulative or pragmatic dimension is based on following formal rules or laws. Compliance is guaranteed through the threat of coercive power or sanctions. Normative legitimacy draws on the social obligation to do what is considered morally appropriate. Finally, the cognitive dimension is based on orthodoxy. Behavior is culturally supported, unquestioned, and imitated (1995, pp. 34f.).

In the context of the PNAE, the federal state plays a central role as a gatekeeper through laws, directives, policy documents, and possible sanctions. It figures as the main audience for granting legitimacy. This constellation indicates the regulative dimension as the prevalent legitimacy assessment factor. For this actor mapping, legitimacy follows the narrowly defined, formal, or legal legitimacy (Weber, 1922, p.122). However, as the discussion in the chapter on the Brazilian context has shown, the legislation on including small-hold farmers is the tangible artifact of changing institutional demands towards the state. It embeds a wider normative component in the policy that legitimizes both the policy objective and the state in its role as legitimizing source.

More precisely, this means that legally constituted actors for implementation enjoy the highest legitimacy as their involvement is not only desired but required

to reach the policy objectives. Furthermore, actors that may not be constitutive elements in the policy framework but support achieving the objectives will also be considered legitimate. Lastly, as mentioned earlier, in the sphere of public policy, attention needs to be given to the effects of policy actions on society. Implementing new laws may unintentionally affect actors or groups that are not considered in a specific initiative. The public authorities must make an effort to identify these affected groups and take them into account.

On a methodological level, as the very subject of this research is the individual or collective normative belief-system concerning implementing the novel law, legitimacy for the actor mapping must remain narrowly defined and draw on the policy objectives. Therefore, I conduct the initial actor mapping from the federal state perspective on legitimacy. The “state” as an entity is comprised of individuals and communities of meaning with different rationalities. In this context, I comprehend the state as the policymaker represented through its artifacts – the formal regulations.

- **Urgency:** The attribute urgency has been proposed as two-dimensional: (i) timeliness or (ii) importance to the stakeholder. Mitchell et al. (1997) conceptualize their salience model for stakeholder management, implying that the organization manages its external relations. In this light, time sensitivity refers to the organizational relationship with their stakeholders and implies immediate management attention. The second dimension – critical claims for the stakeholder – invokes the urgency for the organization to act as it strives to maintain good relations with its stakeholders by considering their central claims. However, this type of urgency will need additional attributes – legitimacy or power – to lead to real immediate attention from a management perspective. For the actor mapping in our policy context, urgency will adopt a slightly different focus. At the center of the mapping is not an organization but an implementation process to which several actors have claims. Furthermore, due to the legality requirement to governmental action, there is lesser leeway for managerial decisions on timely attention to certain actors. Priorities are defined through the policy directives. However, involved actors may perceive their claims as critical and urgent, and they may try to influence the process. Therefore, urgency for this actor mapping will be defined as the likelihood of actors engaging in influencing the implementation of the PNAE.

Based on the salience model and its adaptation to the policy translation process, it is possible to establish the stakeholder categories for the local translation of the PNAE (see **Table 3** below). It is worth reminding the reader that this research is concerned with the influence of rationalities and their mobilization to influence the implementation

process. Therefore, the categories are centered around the actors' possibility to mobilize their rationality for its purposes.

Group of categories	Description	Category	Saliency	Expected implications for the implementation
Definitive stakeholders	The actor has urgency, legitimacy and power	1 definitive	high	Actor is highly likely to engage in the implementation process and influence it successfully.
Expectant stakeholders	The actor has urgency and legitimacy, but lacks power	2 dependent	moderate	Actor is highly likely to engage in the implementation process due to perceived urgency. The claims are legitimate and deserve attention. However, the lack of power limits the actor's possibility to influence the process. The actor may search for allies to increase the power.
	The actor has urgency and power, but insufficient legitimacy	3 dangerous	moderate	Actor is likely to engage in the process and possesses the power to influence the outcome. However, his claims are not legitimized. The actor may try to employ strategies to legitimize its perception of the necessary local translation.
	The actor has legitimacy and power but no urgent pressure	4 dominant	moderate	Actor may not take action despite potentially legitimate and powerful claims. This actor possibly will be approached by other actors to form alliances.
Latent stakeholders	The actor has urgency without power or legitimacy	5 demanding	low	Actor may mobilize resources to influence the implementation. Probably without success if the actor does not succeed to gain legitimacy and power.
	The actor has legitimacy without power or urgency	6 discretionary	low	Despite a legitimate claim, the actor may not engage due to lacking urgency and power.
	The actor has power without legitimacy or urgency	7 dormant	low	Actor will not engage in the process as the implementation does not seem to affect him. However, due to his power, the actor potentially increases saliency if perception towards policy implementation changes.

Table 3: Description of the Categories and their implications (author based on Mitchell et al. (1997))

5.2.3 Categorizing the Main Actors

When entering the municipal context of PNAE implementation, there are a variety of different actors presumably present. Even though the constellation of actors may vary from one municipality to another, some key actors are active in most contexts, for example, public organs, such as the secretaries of education or agriculture. Other actors entered the local context through new school alimentation frameworks, such as a nutritionist for the PNAE or the CAE. Also, most municipalities may count on (at least episodic) support from the state or federal rural extension organs as well as universities and their respective organs (CECANEs). Outside of the public administration, key actors are family farmers and their respective organizations, civil society organizations such as NGOs, or workers' unions. Less directly involved in the local implementation but a relevant actor is the FNDE, which mainly finances the program and monitors the implementation. To a fewer extent, the FNDE consults local actors. Furthermore, as mentioned in the chapter on Brazilian agriculture, state or federal tribunals are involved in audits and take action if irregularities occur. The main

actors identified in the case studies will be presented one by one, stating their expected salience.

5.2.3.1 Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Educação – FNDE

Whereas the FNDE is a federal organ and generally not physically present in the municipalities, its position as national coordinator for the PNAE renders an inclusion into the actor mapping essential. As the financing and monitoring organ, the FNDE possesses a high degree of formal power to influence the implementation in municipalities by sanctioning non-compliance by withdrawing funds. In practice, the revoking of funds will be the *ultima ratio*, as the successful implementation of the program is the objective of the FNDE. Furthermore, as a federal organ responsible for implementing the PNAE, its interests are both legitimate and critical to the process.

5.2.3.2 Responsible Nutritionist

With the implementation of the Zero Hunger program, municipalities were obliged to install a nutritionist to guarantee the nutritional adequacy of the school alimentation (Peixinho, 2013). To secure this objective, the nutritionist is responsible for planning the menu according to nutritional needs, which had been formalized with the *Lei 11.947* in 2009. Thereby, the nutritionist has to consider the legal framework, which prescribes balanced nutrition based on basic ingredients and respecting local culinary culture. The legal basis grants professional independence to the nutritionist's decision on the menu (Art. 11, *Lei 11.947/2009*). Therefore, the nutritionist *de facto* decides what products are to be procured for the school alimentation as long as budgetary and nutritional restrictions are respected. As the menu builds the basis for the further procurement process (Art. 13 *Lei 11.947*), this position indicates substantial power on the implementation process. Nevertheless, for procuring family farmer products via public call, the nutritionist depends on support from other actors, such as the procurement department to accept the new modality, the secretary of agriculture to liaise with producers, and the secretary of education to politically support the implementation.

The responsible nutritionist has a legal mandate to support implementing the new procurement procedure due to its responsibility to develop the menu (Art. 11&12 *Lei 11.947*). Supporting policy documents propose that the nutritionist, in collaboration with the agriculture secretary, invokes articulation with the family farmers to evaluate local production. This central and legally supported role of the nutritionist grants a high degree of legitimacy for her actions.

Regarding urgency, the legal mandate to use 30% of federal funds for sourcing from family agriculture implies a certain perceived criticality to activities of the nutritionist. As the cash transfer in the subsequent year is conditioned by fulfilling the 30% criteria, the nutritionist is interested in achieving the objective to secure funding. This perspective has two caveats: first, contrary to the objective of fostering local economy by regional family farmer sourcing, the nutritionist can comply with the law by sourcing from well-structured cooperatives located in other parts of the country. A justification that local farmers are not able to provide desired products or quality suffices. The possibility of overlooking local production facilitates restructuring the procurement process substantially as some cooperatives are comparable to industrial companies regarding price, productivity, and logistics. Constructing a local supply chain, on the contrary, usually requires a higher degree of commitment from the local authorities and especially the nutritionist. Second, the urgency to implement the 30% rule is subject to effective monitoring by the FNDE. Since monitoring and enforcement have increased throughout the implementation process, a high degree of urgency is assumed.

5.2.3.3 Secretary of Education

The secretary of education leads the department and is its political representative in the communal government. In the context of the PNAE, the education secretary is denominated executing entity. In this function, the head of the secretary is formally responsible for the school feeding program in the municipality. Next to the general oversight, this includes also allocating municipal resources to complement the federal endowment for school feeding, which is foreseen in *Resolução N°26/2013*.

As supervisor of the responsible nutritionist, the secretary of education possesses a high degree of power to influence the implementation of the PNAE. However, due to the detailed legal prescriptions on implementation with professional independence of the nutritionist, this power is formally limited to assure correct fulfillment of the minimum quota or politically decide to surpass the minimum.

Being the formal head of the executing entity, the secretary of education holds legitimate claims in the local PNAE translation. Besides the legal mandate, legitimacy is underpinned as the secretary holds overall responsibility for the secretary's activities, including the school feeding.

Given that cash transfer is conditional on complying with the legal requirements, non-compliance with the legal requirements has direct budgetary implications for the secretary of education. Therefore, the local implementation of the PNAE is of interest to the secretary and can be considered critical, as suspensions of cash transfers in Case A and C have shown. The urgency is further enforced through the constitutional

students' right to school feeding, which implies that the municipality must provide meals regardless of federal cash transfers (Art. 208 VII Brazilian Constitution).

5.2.3.4 School Food Council (CAE)

With the decentralization of the PNAE in 1994, CAEs (*Conselho de Alimentação Escolar*) have become mandatory organs for all states and municipalities that receive funding from the federal government (*Lei N° 8.913, de 12 de julho de 1994*), and have been maintained during the reform in 2009. The responsibility of the CAE is to guarantee an adequate implementation of the PNAE in their respective jurisdiction according to established general guidelines (Art. 19 Lei N° 11.947/2009). Namely, the CAE has to audit the financial statements, ensure sufficient quality of products, and channel complaints about irregularities in the implementation to state or federal authorities. As a collegial council with members from public administration and civil society, the council assumes an important role as a social control mechanism that legitimizes the work of the executing entity. The status as a local control mechanism with decision-making competence grants substantial power, with which the CAE can influence the implementation process. However, the case studies demonstrated that CAEs showed different degrees of engagement and power, ranging from a strong local decision-making organ (case A) to formal adoption to fulfill legal requirements (Case B), where the nutritionist factually led the council.

Due to its legal mandate as an audit organ, the CAE is not only an actor with legitimate claims on the program implementation. It is legally obliged to exert influence on the process if necessary, which grants the highest legitimacy to the claims of the CAE.

Finally, the PNAE is the reason for the existence of the CAE. Therefore, observing the correct implementation of the novel procurement mechanism is a critical activity for the council. Conversely, a well-functioning and active CAE is a constitutive element for receiving governmental funds, generating a reciprocal relationship. Therefore, the implementation process is relevant for the CAE, but its active engagement is critical to secure program continuation.

5.2.3.5 Municipal Agriculture Secretary and Rural Extension Organs

Due to the importance of agriculture for the Brazilian state, several institutions, on the federal, state, or municipal level, aim to foster rural development. Usually, at least one institution is present in every municipality, mostly the municipal secretary of agriculture or other departments with similar responsibilities (all cases). Different configurations are possible, i.e., an already existing office of a state-level organization is contracted to fulfill the local support, or both municipal and state level organizations are present

(case B). Examples for federal organizations are EMATER or INCRA (focused on rural settlements), state organizations in São Paulo are CATI (cases A, B), APTA (case A), and ITESP (case D, focused on rural settlements). Due to the similar profile of these organizations, the salience analysis for all of them will be integrated here.

The main task of the secretary of agriculture or rural extension organs is the articulation and accompanying of family farmers to achieve their inclusion in the program. It includes identifying the local production in terms of products, quantities, and harvest calendar and organizing producers to participate in the public calls and accompany them in their activities. Being part of the public administration, the secretary of agriculture is a bridging actor between the secretary of education and the nutritionist and the producers. The secretary of agriculture is a crucial actor for a thriving local family farming procurement through this mediator role. By supporting the family farmers in their production and organization, i.e., in associations or cooperatives, the secretary may increase output and quality. Well-coordinated production helps ensure a steady offer of high-quality local products, and strong organizations enhance negotiation power. Increased production and organization create incentives for the nutritionist to source from family farmers since it facilitates the procurement process.

However, despite its importance in articulating between the public administration and potential providers, the secretary's power to influence the process remains limited on both ends. On the one side, the secretary of agriculture is bound to structural elements. For example, the quantity and capacity of family farmers vary tremendously within and between municipalities. Furthermore, the secretary assumes a consultant role, but the decisions on products, modes of production, or the daily operations remain at the producers' will. On the other hand, the nutritionist elaborates the menu and holds the decision power over which products are being procured. The agriculture secretary's influence on the nutritionist is contingent on its ability to offer relevant, organized production and, to a certain degree, on the nutritionist's volition to consider local sourcing. Therefore, the power of the secretary has to be considered limited.

The secretary of agriculture's engagement in the PNAE is considered legitimate despite its absence in the legal framework. First, the articulation with the nutritionist and the family farmers is foreseen in the FNDE implementation manual for the acquisition of products from the family farmers (FNDE, 2016). Second, the secretary's engagement supports achieving the program objectives of fostering local economic development and providing local and healthy products for students (Art. 2, *Lei N° 11.947/2009*).

Fostering local agriculture through implementing programs and policies pertains to the responsibilities of the secretary of agriculture. While not being formally obligated, the urgency to engage in the process is deemed reasonably high. Establishing market

access for family farmers is one pillar of promoting local production. In addition, if the secretary of agriculture does not act autonomously, it seems likely that it will be engaged either by the nutritionist or by family farmers.

5.2.3.6 Procurement Department

The procurement department handles purchases and service contracting for the municipal administration. Depending on the organizational structure, procurement departments are either a central organ for all secretaries or decentralized directly within the respective secretaries. The latter form is more likely to occur in bigger cities. In all case municipalities for this research, procurement is centralized within the administration secretary. They act as a service provider for other departments in performing procurement processes for all kinds of goods and services that the municipal administration requires. The mainly operational department ensures that legally foreseen procurement modes are applied, either according to the general procurement law (*Lei* 8.666/93) or more specific regulations, i.e., the public call for family farmer producers (*Lei* 11.947/2009; *Resolução* 4/2015).

In the public call procedure, the procurement department receives the purchase request, indicating products, quantities, and mode of procurement (public call) from the education secretary. Price research is either performed directly at the procurement department or in collaboration with different local actors (secretary of education and agriculture, e.g., in cases A, C). The department is responsible for publishing the public call, conduct the public bidding session, and select the winning proposals. As the process is strictly regulated, the power to influence this process is low.

The procurement department plays a gatekeeping function in municipal administration to ensure that public procurement processes are complying with the legislation. In this role, its claims are legitimate. While the department carries out the public call, it does so only upon request. This renders the procurement department a relatively passive actor with no urgency regarding the PNAE implementation.

5.2.3.7 Family Farmers

Family farmers are the targeted beneficiary group of the new procurement mechanism. It supports the PNAE's objective to foster local economic development and grant market access to family farmers. Consequently, their role is to provide local products to the school food program with the objective to provide healthy food that respects regional dietary habits.

Already the fact that a specific policy envisions the inclusion of family farmers into local value chains indicates the relatively small power that family farmers possess, not only

concerning the policy but also generally in the Brazilian agriculture goods market. Besides the high socio-economic relevance of family agriculture as a production system for Brazil – 85% of all farms belong to this category, 75% of the rural workforce consists of family farmers that mainly provide internal food consumption (IBGE, 2009a) – the individual production unit remains marginalized due to low productivity, low degree of organization and market orientation, and insufficient capacity. This marginalization leads to a vicious circle, where family farmers experience low rent-appropriation for their production and consequently are unable to invest in their establishment due to lacking financial and human capital. Furthermore, there is a lack of bureaucratic competence within the family farmers group, leading to difficulties in even accessing markets that target to foster their development, such as the PNAE. A word of caution seems adequate at this point as family farmers cannot be characterized as a homogeneous group, and degrees of productivity or capacity and access to financial capital vary tremendously. But in the case studies for this research, well-structured entrepreneurs that successfully integrate into value chains and achieve economic development were a minority.

Concerning the ability to influence the policy implementation process, family agriculture faces endogenous and exogenous limitations. The first is related to the capacity and organization of family farmers. To revendicate integration into the PNAE, family farmers must offer adequate production and demonstrate the ability to deliver products regularly. Being organized in producer organizations fosters this ability as quantity and variety of products are enhanced, and administrative and logistical expenses are bundled. This facilitates articulation with the public administration. Exogenous limitations consist of the public administration's disposition to include local products in the menu. If not formally organized, family farmers face a significant barrier to exert influence on this decision. Therefore, the power to influence the local policy implementation process seems to be limited.

While lacking power, family farmers' stakes in the program implementation are highly legitimate. Art. 14 of the new legislation aims explicitly to integrate family farmers into the school feeding program. A legal obligation to earmark 30% of federal funds for family farmer procurement underpins the legitimacy. Furthermore, fostering local development through rent generation for family farmers by providing natural products for school children does tackle food security issues in two ways. First, school food is, in tendency, getting more balanced through integrating fresh and unprocessed fruits and vegetables and contributes to reducing malnutrition in both directions – hunger and obesity. Second, following Sen's (1990) endowment approach, generating additional rent for small-hold farmers combats rural poverty and improves access to basic goods. In addition, maintaining federal funds in the municipality propels the local economy due to the high probability that income is spent on other goods and services locally.

Finally, inclusion into the PNAE is a critical and urgent means to increase income for most family farmers and foster social development at large. With an average annual income of BRL 13'633⁴⁵, the possibility of selling an additional BRL 20'000 to each municipality offers immense potential to increase revenue and invest in productive activities. Because 25% of the rural population still lives in extreme poverty (compared to 5,4% in urban areas), income generation is relevant not only for the individual household but also for social development (FAO, 2016, p. 22).

5.2.3.8 Articulation Organizations (rural workers unions / NGOs)

Articulation organizations represent the interests of certain societal groups. In the PNAE context, these are mostly organized around the interests of family farmers. As civil society organizations, they organize the farmers and articulate or defend their interests against state organizations.

Especially relevant in this context are the rural workers' unions, which perform a variety of tasks, e.g., representation in social security, pension funds, provide legal assistance, emission of DAPs, organize capacity building courses as well as foster market access (Interview Case A, President local Rural Workers Union, 2017). For the PNAE, it is not unusual that the local union supports the articulation between the nutritionist and producers, which was the case in case study A. In this sense, the rural workers union assumes a role similar to the agriculture secretary. In addition to unions, although less common, NGOs support family farmers in professionalizing their production and gain access to local markets. Due to the similar roles in the process, these two types of organizations are discussed together.

The power to influence the local implementation process varies among organizations and their respective strength. Strength is thereby accounted for through the number and capacity of affiliated farmers as well as the available resources to mobilize. Similar to rural extension organs, the power is limited on two ends. On the one hand, articulation organizations need organized and productive farmers to assume a strong negotiation position in revindicating their inclusion into the PNAE. If farmers are not willing or capable of delivering necessary products, there is little sense in autonomous articulation. On the other hand, the power is limited through the nutritionist's competence to compose the menu. Therefore, power is limited for these organizations.

⁴⁵ This amount is based on the first ever and also latest census for family agriculture. The census was conducted in 2006 by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (*Pt. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística - IBGE*) number calculated by the author, based on table 1.8 (IBGE, 2009a).

Assuming that articulation organizations possess a mandate from family farmers, their claims on behalf of the represented group are legitimate. As the targeted beneficiaries of the procurement process, family farmers enjoy high legitimacy for actively trying to participate in the program. This legitimacy is then transferred from the principal to the agent.

Finally, as the interest representation of their principals is at the core of their purpose, articulation organizations likely perceive the active engagement in the PNAE implementation as urgent and critical.

5.2.3.9 Judicial Bodies

There are several judicial bodies involved in the supervision of correct implementation of the PNAE: State or Federal Courts of Auditors (“Tribunal de Contas do Estado / da União”), Public Prosecutor (“Ministério Público”) & General Comptroller’s Office (“Controladoria Geral da União”). The courts are activated through two mechanisms. First, a complaint about irregularities is brought to their attention. Appealing the court is open to all citizens (Art. 10, *Lei 11.947/2009*). Second, the court of auditors’ duty is to audit municipal activities regularly, including the PNAE implementation (Art. 8, *Lei 11.947/2009*). If irregularities are detected, an investigation is conducted. The organs focus on the correct application of federal funds.

Due to their legal mandate as judicial bodies, these organs possess substantial power to influence the implementation process of the PNAE. Juridical decisions are binding and will lead to suspension of the federal funding as the *ultima ratio*. Municipalities that are once involved in investigations will be observed more closely in subsequent review periods and are usually required to report about the correction of irregularities. The public judicial apparatus enjoys *per se* maximum legitimacy for its claims. With a legal mandate to regulate a policy, the courts of auditors and the public prosecutor are the official appeal bodies.

When defining urgency as the probability to engage in the implementation process, *a priori* urgency of the judicial body is deemed rather low. The organs mainly act upon denounced or, in regular audits, detected irregularities. Nevertheless, once the judicial organs are engaged, their claims turn rapidly highly urgent due to their criticality for the implementing municipalities.

5.2.3.10 CECANE

CECANEs are School Alimentation and Nutrition Collaboration Centers (“Centro Colaborador em Alimentação e Nutrição Escolar”) for the FNDE. To support municipal actors in implementing the PNAE, the FNDE has signed agreements with federal

universities in various states of Brazil. By mandate, CECANEs conduct research activities or consultancies in municipal contexts. In the state of São Paulo, the CECANE is integrated into the Federal University of São Paulo (UNIFESP). In 2015, the center conducted consultancies in 49 municipalities that had not yet procured family farmer products, including cases C and D of this research. During a one-week visit, the consultants engage public administrators (nutritionists, secretaries of education and agriculture, procurement departments), the CAE, and family farmers in a capacitation workshop. The objective is to inform and mobilize actors to implement family farmer procurement.

CECANEs support implementation in local contexts and the service is designed to be a capacity workshop rather than an audit. The consultants do not possess formal power to enforce compliance with the legal framework. However, the consultancy is concluded with an agreement on objectives, which are reported to the FNDE. After six months, CECANE consultants follow-up with the municipalities regarding their progress. The fact that results from the visits are reported to the federal government grants informal power to the CECANE to influence implementing organs. The perception of local actors that received training underpinned this as they referred to CECANE agents as audit organs.

Through the FNDE mandate to support local implementation, activities performed by CECANEs are deemed legitimate. In addition, the interventions are designed to propel the school feeding. Regarding urgency, in municipal contexts, the CECANEs act upon request from the FNDE. Engagements in municipalities are costly and time-consuming and, so far, such projects did only occur in 2015 and 2017 (Interview Representative CECANE-SP, 2018). Therefore, the urgency is deemed low, but when engaged from the FNDE, CECANEs show a high urgency in completing their consultancy assignments.

5.2.3.11 Students & Parents

Students in public schools are the main beneficiaries of the national school feeding program. Their parents, as legal representatives, are considered their spokespersons that will react to children's reporting at home. Therefore, even though active participation in implementing the procurement mechanism is not expected, a short analysis of a potentially affected actor is deemed adequate.

The entire procurement process aims at providing balanced alimentation for the students. Besides the legal requirements on nutritional values, the food needs to be edible and tasty for the majority of school children. To guarantee acceptability, products to be introduced must pass an acceptability test. Therefore, students possess a collective power to refuse certain products. However, this power has a

somewhat hypothetical character, as it requires extensive coordination of collective action. Besides, it is even less likely that the entire product portfolio from family farmers will be rejected already because salads and fruits are legally mandatory five times a week. Concluding, the power of students to substantially influence the implementation process is minimal.

Their claims, on the other hand, are highly legitimate. First, it is formally given as students are principal beneficiaries of the PNAE. Second, the policy potentially significantly impacts their physical integrity if the alimentation is not balanced or products are not safe.

Finally, the perceived importance of integrating family farmers in the school alimentation may be ambiguous. As urgency considers the individual perception, the awareness of school children about the necessity of healthy food is not clear. School food was provided before integrating family farmers; hence, it is not the quantitative but a qualitative argument. In addition, the new legislation prohibited all types of unhealthy foods and drinks. How much this change is perceived as an improvement by children must remain ambiguous.

Table 4 integrates the different actors into the established salience framework. It shows that the majority of actors are attributed to either a definite or expectant stakeholder status. The new PNAE regulation is a specific policy that concerns a niche within the school feeding program. Therefore, a relatively small number of stakeholders is concerned with the policy, but to a relatively high degree by legal mandate or urgent claims.

Group of categories	Description	Category	Salience	Actors
Definitive stakeholders	The actor has urgency, legitimacy and power	1 definitive	high	FNDE Secretary of education /local government Nutritionist CAE
Expectant stakeholders	The actor has urgency and legitimacy, but lacks power	2 dependent	moderate	Family farmers Articulaion organizations Secretary of agriculture Rural extension organs
	The actor has urgency and power, but insufficient legitimacy	3 dangerous	moderate	
	The actor has legitimacy and power but no urgent pressure	4 dominant	moderate	Judicial bodies, CECANE
Latent stakeholders	The actor has urgency without power or legitimacy	5 demanding	low	
	The actor has legitimacy without power or urgency	6 discretionary	low	Students, procurement department
	The actor has power without legitimacy or urgency	7 dormant	low	

Table 4: Actor salience for PNAE implementation (Author based on Mitchell et al. (1997))

5.2.4 Actor Relations

So far, the actor mapping has focused on presenting the attributes and the salience classes of different local actors. However, policy implementation is enacted through actor interactions which are embedded in different social networks. What is more, the constellation of actors in the local context influences the type of interactions. Various actors may collaborate to increase their power or legitimacy in negotiating the implementation. Other actors may see themselves confronting a strongly tied interest group, reducing their propensity to engage in the process actively (Scharpf, 2006). It is, therefore, vital to grasp the interrelations and forms of interaction between actors to analyze how the translation process unfolds.

Interactions between local actors have different origins as well as qualities. In part, these interactions are based on a legal mandate, while others emerge throughout the local enactment process or draw on already existing interrelations of actors through joint initiatives. Also, the intensity of interactions may vary from institutionalized collaboration to occasional interactions. Besides, interactions may change regarding intensity and quality throughout the implementation process, indicating different phases or conflicting interests. Scherer & Zumbusch (2013) observe that actors cooperate closely for objective and agenda-setting in regional development initiatives, but collaboration fades out in the actual implementation phase due to different rationalities. On the other hand, actors may forge coalitions with allies to improve their salience category, which will necessarily affect the actor constellation and the form of interaction. The probability for cooperation increases if actors follow the same interests or possess similar rationalities in relation to the policy objectives (Scharpf, 2006).

5.3 Rationalities in the Local Contexts

In chapter 2.2, rationalities were conceptualized as interpretive schemes of communities of meaning, as inherently collectively elaborated constructs. Rationalities, hence, are a logical framework that guides the reasoning and action of community members. While constructed and conceptualized collectively, rationalities nevertheless materialize in individual actions. In the data analysis section, I outlined how rationalities in the context of the school feeding program were conceptualized. This section presents the identified rationalities in the local context, which are summarized in **Table 5**.

	Professional Nutritionist Rationality	Bureaucratic Rationality	Economic Rationality	Local Development Rationality
Guiding Institution	Profession	Bureaucratic State	Market & Corporation	Community & Market
Actors	Nutritionists	Nutritionists, secretaries of education, administrative staff, procurement specialists	Secretaries of education, cooperative directors, well-capacitated producers	Rural extension organs, secretaries of agriculture, rural workers union, nutritionist (II, Case A), producers
Legitimacy	Professional competence	Legal mandate	Market as mechanism of economic growth, corporation as rent-appropriation	Community membership & identity, contribution to local economy
Objective	Healthy diet to foster students' development	Compliance with the national policy requirements	Economic efficiency & growth	Improve socio-economic status of community members
Strategy	Provision of a balanced, fresh and local diet	Secure approval from superior organs by implementation or justifying non-compliance	Allocate and bundle resources productively	Foster local economy by prioritizing local producers
Typical reference	"Children have the right to alimentation" (Interview Case D, Nutritionist, 2017)	"We need to follow the resolutions" (Interview Case C, Secretary of Education, 2018)	"We have perceived that leading with politics is not easy. Leading with the free market is a thousand times easier." (Interview Case B, Director local cooperative, 2017)	"Our interest is that producers can generate income & that money circulates locally" (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

Table 5: Identified rationalities in the case studies (author)

5.3.1 Professional Nutritionist Rationality

The professional nutritionist rationality is employed by the municipal nutritionists. In the context of the PNAE, nutritionists are responsible for the menu elaboration, its daily implementation, and nutritional education. They are officially denominated as responsible technicians for the school feeding program⁴⁶. *Resolução CFN nº 358/2005* explicitly defines the term “technical responsibility” as “*professional and legal commitment in the execution of activities, compatible with the professional education and ethics, aiming at the quality of services provided to society*” (Art. 1, translated from Portuguese).

The nutritionist rationality is embedded in the professional institutional logic (Thornton et al., 2012). The legal attribution emphasizes professional values in carrying out the activities and is underpinned by the empirical data. The rationality draws legitimacy from the professional competencies of the nutritionists, which is recognized by the legal framework. It grants nutritionists professional liberty in elaborating the menu (*Lei 11.947/2009*).

The professional nutritionist rationality has experienced an increasing recognition within the context of school alimentation. Historically, as described in chapter 3.2.1, the PNAE aimed at providing food supplements rather than balanced nutrition. Since transferring the responsibility for the school alimentation to municipal authorities in 1994, nutritionists started to gain a more prominent role. The new legislation in 2009 established clear rules for nutritional values and prescribed certain products. This legal novelty supported nutritionists in successfully applying their professional expertise. The professional nutritionist rationality increasingly gained space next to the dominant bureaucratic rationality, moving from supplying food towards providing a balanced and healthy diet. This transformation of the school food was reflected in the narratives of nutritionists. One nutritionist put it as follows: “*There was this transformation. Historically, we provided a snack (‘merenda’), today we serve a meal (‘refeição’), and we are still changing this concept*” (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017).

In the case studies, the nutritionist rationality did not occur isolated but was rather in constant interplay with other rationalities. On the one side, being executed within the narrow boundaries of regulation, some nutritionists showed a strong combination of the professional nutritionist and bureaucratic rationality. These nutritionists emphasized the necessity to comply with the legal framework.

We develop the menu for the period. Always within the guidelines of the FNDE. You know, there are all these regulations we have to follow, i.e., nutritional

⁴⁶ Where the school alimentation department comprises more than one nutritionist, one is appointed the responsible technician supported by the technical staff (Art. 6f., *Resolução CFN nº 358/2005*).

reference per age groups and time they pass in class. (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017)

On the other hand, one nutritionist showed a strong proneness to the local development rationality (for more detail on this rationality, see 5.4.4). Although all nutritionists shared the professional argument that local *in natura* vegetables and fruits contribute to a healthy diet, only one of them explicitly prioritized the local community in her actions: *"When I arrived at the education secretary, I was like wow: family farmers, let's buy! I want salad on the student's table, I want fruits, I want regional products"* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017).

Legitimacy

Being embedded in the professional institutional logic, actors demonstrating a nutritionist rationality obtain legitimacy through their professional expertise. Responsible technicians in the context of the PNAE must possess a university degree in nutrition (*Resolução* CFN 258/2005). Formal education ensures that nutritionists possess the necessary expertise to carry out the required tasks, considering that they are the only specialists in municipal contexts. The unique expertise grants nutritionists a high degree of autonomy in decisions related to school alimentation. This is underpinned by the legally stipulated autonomy in the menu elaboration and also respected within the municipal administration since other actors *"don't understand anything about nutritional values"* (Interview Case B, Secretary of Education, 2018).

This professional authority provides nutritionists with a strategic resource to justify activities against other municipal actors. One nutritionist put it quite blatantly when explaining how she introduced a rather expensive local product against concerns of the municipal administration: *"Well, I had to keep proving some things [nutritional facts], but that was a minor issue. Any technical justification does the trick. They do not understand anything"* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017).

The legal framework establishes objectives for nutritional values to balance the local professional autonomy and ensure a certain degree of conformity in the food provision (*Lei* 11.947/2009; *Resolução* CD/FNDE nº26/2013). This transfers part of the professional expertise into a regulative sphere, where federal regulation defines the nutritional grid while nutritionists translate it into local menus.

At the interface of municipal and federal levels, nutritionists relate with two professional organs. First, the FNDE possesses nutritional competencies and accompanies the nutritionists through audits. Also, the federal organ provides circumstantial support or organizes regional workshops to align professional practices in the program. Second, nutritionists are regulated through the national and regional nutritionist councils. The council acts as a national professional articulation organ and sets directives for the

actuation of nutritionists, including for the PNAE. Regional councils then audit nutritionists' practices.

External audits did not only validate nutritionist actuation in the realm of the program. They also served as a source of legitimation for nutritionist requests within the public administration. One nutritionist did emphasize that the exerted oversight from external actors did support the recognition of her demands for more balanced school nutrition:

We in the alimentation department always strived for improvement. But a lot of our requests remained unattended. Today, also thanks to the audits that are conducted with regard to school alimentation from the court of auditors and the regional council of nutritionists, our municipality is frequented by all agents from the PNAE, the current administration pays more attention to alimentation. (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017)

In summary, the legitimacy of the nutritionist rationality is based on professional competence to design healthy and nutritionally balanced menus. However, in the PNAE context, the expertise has been transferred into federal directives, which cover a wide range of decisions usually left to professional judgment. This combines normative and regulatory elements of legitimacy for the nutritionist rationality (Scott, 2003). Nevertheless, the formalization of professional expertise was well received by the nutritionists who deemed the policy as *"sociologically and nutritionally excellent!"* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017).

Objectives

The objectives that follow the nutritionist rationality put the right to food and the healthy development of students at the center. This includes but is not limited to guaranteeing food security. There are other factors to be considered, such as nutritional values, product quality, and variation. A nutritionist puts it as follows: *"The preoccupation is no longer to just to fill up and satisfy children's hunger during school time, no. It is their right to receive quality alimentation"* (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017).

Besides the focus on providing quality alimentation, the nutritionist rationality focuses on educating children about the nutritional values of different products, healthy food habits, or food production.

It is important to introduce children to seasonal fruits, so they get to know them as well, learn about the different nutritional values, feel the taste. A lot of children come to daycare, and they have never seen broccoli, for example. Therefore, we try to offer them this experience. (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017)

Strategies

To achieve the objectives of healthy nutrition, regular and diverse meals are included in the school feeding routine. Special emphasis is laid on providing fresh, natural, and to the least possible degree processed products. This has implications on the composition of the menu: unhealthy, processed products are being substituted through healthier alternatives: *“First thing I did was to exclude sausages from the menu.”* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017).

The transition of the menu towards fresher and more natural products favors local production. Therefore, the nutritionist rationality aligns with the legal obligation of procuring from local family farmers. Nutritionists acknowledge these synergies as the following statement underpins: *“Family farmer [procurement] benefits our intention of serving fresher and more natural products. Given the idea of the PNAE to source regionally, I think that one thing will push the other”* (Interview Case C, Nutritionist, 2017).

All nutritionists in the case studies undertook efforts to embed local products into their menus. The motivation, however, predominantly stems either from having fresh and seasonal products, i.e., the nutritionist rationality, or complying with the law, i.e., bureaucratic rationality. Only in case A emerged a clear rationale for sourcing locally.

The legal framework had been employed strategically to advocate for better-quality products within the municipal administration. Especially in situations of disinterest or political opposition, nutritionists relied on the legal basis and even more on its enforcement to emphasize the importance of good nutrition.

Stating our point of view is not enough. Showing the resolution, the notification of the court of auditors that we need to have three fruits a week, that we cannot just serve industrialized products, that it is written there in the resolution, this helps a lot. (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017)

5.3.2 Bureaucratic Rationality

The bureaucratic rationality is positioned in the central institution of the state (Thornton et al., 2012). Friedland and Alford (1991, p. 248) identify the logic as *“rationalization and regulation of human activity by legal and bureaucratic hierarchies.”* Weber (1922) conceives bureaucratic organization as technically superior to other forms due to its hierarchical structure, task specialization, and processual precision. Roles and responsibilities are clearly assigned to impersonal functions and activities governed by formal rules. This impersonal formality renders the bureaucratic organization calculable regarding means and procedures (Townley, 2008). Reliance on formal

regulation and predictability of action is of prominent relevance in public sector organizations.

In the empirical context, the bureaucratic logic is framed as the orientation towards compliance with legal requirements. The mandate for action comes from formal regulation and attribution. This follows from the characteristics of public administration, as a deputy secretary of education explains: *“For the purchase of products, we have the responsibility to follow a legislation. We cannot just buy from the neighboring supermarket. There is a legislation to be respected”* (Interview Case D, Deputy Secretary of Education, 2018).

With regard to the new PNAE regulation, the bureaucratic rationality emphasizes the necessity of faithful adoption of newly installed rules and processes. On the other hand, actors argue that complying with the law poses challenges. The new practice requires replacing institutionalized processes with a series of actors involved.

What I perceive is that we really want to follow the law. But there has been a gap because there is also an administrative and bureaucratic part to it that requires some contribution from the financial department as well: the entire purchase process, documentation as well as the adequation of all products. (Interview Case D, Deputy Secretary of Education, 2018)

Finally, the bureaucratic orientation manifested itself in the actor's clear perception of functions and responsibilities within the organization – i.e., the public administration – and institutionalized interactions. For example, the administrative practices of the procurement process follow a clear protocol and competencies for specialized tasks. Some of these tasks are of substantive nature (e.g., menu elaboration), and others are on the level of “administrative execution” (Interview Case D, Director Procurement Department, 2017). Implementing family farmer procurement, the procurement department acts as an execution organ. As a specialist department, they provide administrative services to a variety of actors according to their attribution. They conduct their highly specialized function with low involvement in respective processes as the following statement exemplifies: *“I don't just manage school feeding. For me, family farming products are just another item. I am no specialist in school feeding. I am a procurement specialist”* (Interview Case B, Director of the Procurement Department, 2017).

Legitimacy

The bureaucratic rationality draws its legitimacy from its legal mandate. Actions are considered legitimate if compliant with formal regulation. An important aspect here is the individual's commitment to the legally defined objective rather than to personal interests. Local actors implement a national policy and should aim at faithful translation

into local practice. In essence, legitimacy derives from the exact fulfillment of the assignment as predictably and efficiently as possible (Weber, 1922).

Compliance with established regulations has to be assured in practice. Audits, as well as documentation such as protocols and reports, serve this purpose. Legitimacy is gained by approval from competent superior organs. In the research context, municipalities are requested to annually report to the FNDE on their allocation of federal resources (Art. 8, *Lei 11.947/2009*). Regarding family farmer procurement, the administration must prove the achievement of the 30% rule or justify deviation from it (Art. 14, *Lei 11.947/2009*). Non-compliance may lead to the partial suspension of funds in subsequent years. Legitimacy is, hence, perceived as approved reporting and continued funding from the FNDE – whether for family farmer procurement or justification of its absence.

However, as the director of the family farmer development department at FNDE informed, the national organ does not possess sufficient capacity to audit municipal reporting in due time and is several years behind schedule. Therefore, annual reporting has not yet provoked any non-compliance notifications from the FNDE. Rather than relying on annual reporting, the FNDE collaborates with federal university centers, the CECANEs, to “*assist municipalities in elaborating strategies to implement family farmer procurement rather following a pedagogical than a punishment logic*” (Interview FNDE, Director Family Farmer Development Department, 2017).

CECANE consultancies, as well as the annual audits from the court of auditors or occasional audits from FNDE, were indeed perceived carriers of legitimacy. Unlike the annual reporting to the FNDE, in loco visits to the municipalities invoked a latent preoccupation with the legitimacy of local implementation. As a consequence of said visits, municipalities not procuring from family farmers initiated the process. The statement of a secretary of agriculture in case C points to this fact:

I tried to implement the public calls earlier but did not succeed. We started the first public call with this administration. We saw that there was pressure from the court of auditors and that there would be the need to justify [non-compliance] since it is the municipality's obligation. (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2018)

We can conclude that legitimacy in the bureaucratic rationality draws on compliance with the national legislation. From a municipal perspective, this legitimacy is maintained as long as reporting is approved and auditors do not notify non-compliance, endangering future cash transfers.

Objective

In the bureaucratic rationality, superordinate objectives are adopted. This follows from the obligation to carry out assigned activities as advised through the administrative organization. Therefore, the objective is to comply with the law. The PNAE legislation clearly states the objective of procuring at least 30% of the value of federal cash transfers from family farmers. Preference should be given to local producers. As stated in the exemplary citation below, actors in all case municipalities confirm this objective: *“The legislation states that all federal funds need to be allocated to the school feeding of which at least 30% are to be procured from family farmers”* (Interview Case A, Administrative Director School Feeding Department (SFD), 2017).

However, the law grants the possibility of justifying non-compliance with missing local production. As justification is considered within legal boundaries, this raises the threshold for the adoption of family farmer procurement. Adoption is likelier if substituting the established practice does not incur additional efforts.

Strategies

In the bureaucratic rationality, the strategy to assure compliance is obtaining control over the implementation process. Within the bureaucratic organization, this control is ensured through organizational hierarchy and influence through direct interaction. The research context of multi-actor policy implementation differs from the ideal type in both aspects.

First, whereas hierarchy and control mechanisms between federal and municipal administration exist, the increased organizational distance renders exerting immediate influence more difficult. The most evident steering tool is the financial transfers to municipalities. Partial or total suspension of funds is a strong enforcement mechanism. However, as withdrawing funds diametrically opposes the purpose of providing alimentation for students, this measure must remain ultima ratio and has not been applied to date (Interview Representative CECANE-SP, 2018)⁴⁷. Rather, the FNDE aims to provide municipal actors with assistance in implementing the policy through publications, i.e., technical notes, manuals, good practice reports, or *in loco* workshops and audits. The director for family farming development at the FNDE emphasizes the importance of partners such as the CECANEs at federal universities or rural extension organs. In addition, the FNDE organizes state-level conferences for program managers and has developed an online course to capacitate experts from

⁴⁷ Cash transfer suspension in the case studies were not based on failing to procure from family farmers, rather on other types of irregularities: Delayed re-election of the CAE (case A); procurement of prohibited products (case C).

rural extension organs (Interview FNDE, Director Family Farming Development, 2017).

The requirement to procure 30% of federal funds from family farmers is an output-based indicator. The FNDE elaborates guiding manuals to assist municipalities in developing strategies to achieve the result but does not prescribe the means. Aware of the different local contexts, the director for family farmer development at the FNDE states: *“they construct their own rules depending on the reality of each municipality”* (Interview FNDE, 2017).

Second, within the municipal context, implementation is not limited to public administration but involves actors beyond organizational boundaries. In addition, even within public administration, there are several secretaries involved, i.e., education, agriculture, and administration. Both factors limit the control over process implementation.

Intra-administration coordination depends on the responsiveness of the local government to promote secretary-spanning implementation. In the case studies, the responsiveness was demonstrated in varying degrees, fostering or impeding the implementation. For example, Case B municipality established an inter-secretary council to implement family farmer procurement (Interview, Case B, Representative CATI, 2017). The other cases reported more difficulties in initiating the process:

Even though the law existed since 2009 and I commented that we have to procure from family farmers, the response was ‘ok,’ and that was it. Today, this has changed. The secretaries that enter have different visions. (Interview Case C, Nutritionist, 2017)

Different strategies were available to municipal administrations depending on political interests. Since enforcement was low, at least initially, local actors could either start family farmer procurement or justify the non-compliance with difficulties in organizing the process. The empirical data indicates that actors following a bureaucratic rationality tended to the second option, emphasizing the difficulties of changing complex procurement processes. Below is an exemplary statement:

I think you should ask why we do not execute the 30% for family farmers. I think this is important because we can justify the non-compliance. This process does not only depend on us. The law requires that the public call is made first local, then regional, state and finally federal level. This really complicates the situation. . . . We do not have family farmers with sufficient capacity here. (Interview Case D, Administrative Director SOE, 2018)

As possibilities for non-compliance had been gradually limited through the intensified external pressure, such as CECANE consultancies and court of auditors' notifications,

efforts to implement family farmer procurement intensified. A nutritionist explained: *“The CECANE visit was extremely important for us. Everything that comes from the court of auditors, the nutritionist council or the CECANE supports our claim that we need to purchase”* (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017).

Finally, concerning the interaction with actors outside of the administration, namely family farmers and their organizations, the strategies of bureaucratically oriented actors emphasized the necessity to adapt to administrative procedures and requirements. Besides the public bidding and contract procedures, administration representatives highlighted the necessary compliance with sanitary regulations, packaging standards, and logistics. A nutritionist in case A explains:

They delivered randomly packaged, everything wrong. Zero sanitary regulations respected, worse, minus ten. I started to require adequation. They transported products in their car, packaged in bags. I started to require everything, adequate to the legal requirement. I told them that I would not continue buying until they improved, no matter what the prior administration allowed. (Interview Case A, Nutritionist III, 2017)

This prominent upholding of administrative procedures had been brought up repeatedly. For example, the director of supply at the agriculture secretary in Case A repeatedly used narratives like *“I want to put order to the house”*; *“to improve the processes”* or *“organize the work”* for the preoccupation with administrative procedures (Interview, 2017).

5.3.3 Economic Rationality

The economic rationality is rooted in the capitalist institutional order, which strives to accumulate and commodify human activity (Diesing, 1962; Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 248). The economic conception bears in itself two distinct dimensions, which are closely related: the market logic and the corporate logic (Thornton et al., 2012; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). The market logic is based on transactions between actors to increase profit. Resources are allocated productively and efficiently to maximize utility from interactions. Corporations, and subsequently the corporate logic, serves as a means to fulfill the self-interest of capital investors. Corporations are entities that efficiently coordinate the allocation of resources to increase the profit potential. This coordination is best facilitated by hierarchical structures that orchestrate the collective efforts of individuals within the organization. The corporate objective is to increase organization size and position in the market, leading, in turn, to higher profit opportunities (Thornton et al., 2012).

Within the empirical research context, the economic rationality had been identified in two facets: First, the emphasis on budget restrictions and the therewith connected

imperative of allocating resources efficiently to achieve a variety of conflicting objectives (Diesing, 1962). This rationality had mainly been employed by secretaries of education, and subsequently, nutritionists. For the secretaries, budget allocation for the entire education sector is a central responsibility, including school alimentation. The following statement exemplifies this: *“As secretary of education, first I have to take care of the resources, that the resources are applied as planned”* (Interview Case C, Secretary of Education, 2018).

Connected with the budget restrictions, actors repeatedly invoked that the federal *“resources we receive are not enough”* (Interview Case B, Secretary of Education). The PNAE is designed that municipalities complement federal funds. However, the general argumentation within the municipal context underpins that federal transfers are insufficient to provide proper alimentation. In fact, the municipality is obliged to contribute the major part so that they *“invest indefinitely more”* (Interview Case B, Secretary of Education, 2018).

The economic rationality within the administration becomes even more obvious at the operative level. Nutritionists perceive the budget restrictions as a limitation to their professional objectives and attribute the economic rationality to the secretaries of education. One example of the purchase of more expensive (and nutritionally superior) milk for toddlers demonstrates this indirect attribution very clearly: *“They ask ‘why should we buy the more expensive milk if we are not obliged by law?’ of course, they also read the legislation and they want us to buy the cheaper product”* (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017).

The second facet of the economic rationality identified in the case studies concerns the corporate logic. Predominantly cooperative leaders invoked this type of rationality, aiming to increase quality and quantity of production to improve market access. The cooperative serves thereby as an organizing element that directs production towards market demand and grants sales possibilities to producers. The long-term objective is that producers become well-organized rural entrepreneurs instead of small-scale family farmers, as the following statement indicates:

For the cooperative, it is important to capacitate the producer to develop the consciousness that he will always produce and always sell [...] They will become good family farmers or cease to be family farmers altogether. And they will help the cooperative to grow. (Interview Case C, President local cooperative, 2018)

Actors with an economic rationality perceive public procurement as a relevant catalysator for capacitating the producers to be competitive in other markets. However, the public market creates dependencies on political decisions and is assessed as not sustainable. *“You cannot rely on the policy because you never know if there will be a call. This year there is, next not anymore”* (Interview Case C, President

local cooperative, 2018). Furthermore, the imposed limit per producer is perceived to *“perpetuate the productive misery of family farmers”* (Interview Case B, Director local cooperative, 2017). The skepticism against public procurement is condensed in the following statement: *“We have perceived that leading with politics is not easy. Leading with the free market is a thousand times easier”* (Interview Case B, Director local cooperative, 2017).

This critique of the PNAE reflects the economic rationality that governs the cooperatives as productive organizations with the objective to increase production, market power, and finally, profit.

Legitimacy

The guiding principle granting legitimacy to the economic rationality is efficiency. It is valid for both facets identified in the case studies. The public administration must utilize its scarce resources efficiently to achieve its manifold objectives and legitimate the use of public funds. A director of the procurement department underpins this by comparing public administration to private organizations: *“The administration has to be managed like a private entity, which is a lot more efficient than public a one”* (Interview Case B, Director of the Procurement Department, 2017).

On the other hand, the cooperative actors with an economic rationality generate legitimacy by mediating between producers and the market, thereby reducing transaction costs. Economic organizations coordinate production more efficiently, improving their position in the market. Cooperatives are thereby a special construct, consisting of individual productive units that willingly merge to an organization with the very objective to increase efficiency in certain processes. The organization must provide benefits for both its members by increasing profits and for the market by offering added-value products. The director of the local cooperative in Case B puts it accordingly:

We worked very efficiently and generate revenue for the producers. If you have a small group [of producers] that are capacitated for quality and productivity, work with an efficient system to provide for good markets that pay for quality, if you add value by processing the products, you will have a great commercialization power. (Interview Case B, Director local cooperative, 2017)

Objectives

The economic rationality aims at maximizing outcomes with the restricted resource endowments. For the public administration actors in the PNAE context, this translates

into providing the required nutrition with limited funds. In the words of the deputy secretary of education in Case D:

We work within a certain standard. Of course, it could be better. We could, for example, offer other, more expensive fruits. We offer seasonal fruits because these are the cheapest ones. This is our way of saving some money. We do serve what is necessary, but we would like to offer more or better quality. (Interview Case D, Deputy Secretary of Education, 2018)

With respect to the corporate logic, the objective is to grow as an organization, generate more revenue, and improve market position. The president of the local cooperative in Case C confirms: *“For the future, our objective is to grow, for our producers outgrow the family farmer status and to access other markets”* (Interview Case C, President local cooperative, 2018).

Strategy

The municipalities rely on procuring more affordable products to achieve the objectives of maximizing the outcome. In some cases, this equals procuring family farmer products as they provide better quality for a lower price. This is especially the case when sourcing products from cooperatives: In case A, cooperatives from the South of Brazil deliver rice and beans to very competitive conditions, in Case B, the local cooperative is recognized to provide *“excellent quality products for lower prices than regional wholesale providers”* (Interview Case B, Nutritionist, 2017).

A second element was detected in two cases, where nutritionists started initiatives to better monitor the actual food consumption in schools with the objective to reduce procurement. To this end, the responsible nutritionist in Case B started to gather data on daily use per school, exactly imitating and weighting children's portions (Interview Case B, Responsible Nutritionist, 2017).

For the cooperatives to achieve their objective of increasing market positions, they assemble producers within a centrally coordinated organization. Cooperatives are special types of organizations with voluntary membership and less pronounced hierarchical structures as in other organizations. Cooperatives offer diverse benefits to producers, incentivizing them to adhere. These benefits include capacity development courses to improve productivity, agronomists to consult on planting techniques, and centralized administrative services to commercialize production.

We used all academic resources to improve our production. Producers started to produce more with fewer fertilizers by using them with the correct timing. In one month, we increased productivity by 70% by using calcium, a simple and cheap technology. In two years with reasonably technologized producers. (Interview Case B, Director local cooperative, 2017)

Regarding strengthening the market position, cooperatives aim to increase product diversity by incentivizing producers to start planting complementary products. Also, cooperatives install professional management that assumes sales-related responsibilities. One cooperative even installed a small processing unit to offer products in more convenient forms to the market. Finally, in the context of the PNAE, cooperatives compete for delivering at different municipalities simultaneously. The director of the local cooperative in case B confirms:

In 2009, we started with 22 products in our municipality, and today we are delivering 35 products in seven different municipalities. In between, we accessed a governmental funding program to install a micro-processing unit. (Interview Case B, Director local cooperative, 2017)

To summarize, the strategies of actors following an economic rationality are based on increased efficiency, internal organization, and exploiting market possibilities by adapting to its demands.

5.3.4 Local Development Rationality

The local development rationality coalesces elements from two different institutional orders – the community and the economic order (Thornton et al., 2012). Thereby, the local component draws on the community, and the development component refers to the economic order. In the following paragraphs, the local development rationality will be decomposed into these two parts.

The local component

The community logic draws on the sociological definitions of communities that mostly emphasize some combination of small scale, boundedness, and strong ties among its members (Almandoz, 2012; Calhoun, 2002). This opposes communities to the wider, aggregated, and anonymous society (Tönnies, 1887). As an analytical concept, the community has been alternatively proposed with different emphases on either local proximity (Christopher Marquis & Battilana, 2009), based on affect, loyalty, and values (Brint, 2001), instrumental aspects (Storper, 2005), or as political jurisdiction (Waldorff & Greenwood, 2011). In their edited volume on communities and organizations, Marquis, Lounsbury & Greenwood offer a definition that seeks to merge all these aspects: *“Communities are collections of actors whose membership in the collective provides social and cultural resources that shape their action. Membership can result from a number of factors including propinquity, interest in a common goal, or common identity”* (2011, p. xviii).

In the case studies, various of these dimensions of community were employed. The spatial dimension refers to the local, mainly municipal, community, bound together through geographical proximity and therewith connected relational networks. The municipal focus is expressed in various ways, depending on the actor who invoked it. In the narrowest context, school feeding, actors, mainly nutritionists, repeatedly referred to the importance of local food circuits, allowing for fresher and healthier products to students “from the community to the community.” Procuring local family farmer products is consistently connotated with better quality. Small-scale production is also often perceived as more sustainable, less invasive, or even organic. Two nutritionists from different municipalities summarized it in the following statements:

Today we serve salads almost on a daily basis. When we provide from family farmers, we obtain fresher products, without any pesticides and we support regional growth. (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017)

This year, when we managed to integrate family farmers, it was a big step for the municipality. It brought a leap in product quality and, what is more, it is produced here. (Interview Case C, Nutritionist, 2017)

A second dimension is expressed with a focus on the municipality as a political or administrative entity and resonates with the conception of the community as political jurisdiction put forward by Waldorff & Greenwood (2011). Considering the object of this study, a national public policy implemented through municipal administrations, this connotation is especially valid for political and administrative actors. Activities carried out by the municipal administration generally aim at strengthening the municipal community. For example, secretaries of education promote that the PNAE assists the administration in fostering the healthy growth of students. The construction of a municipal community is furthermore mirrored in linguistic terms: One secretary of education, for example, referred explicitly to the community when talking about the municipal inhabitants in the interview (Interview Case B, Secretary of Education, 2018); another secretary referred to municipal citizens, also when talking about students (Interview Case D, Deputy Secretary of Education, 2018).

Furthermore, the relational dimension emphasizes common identity traits and interests. In this research, various sub-communities within the local/municipal context can be identified, subsumed under the umbrella of the rural population. Characterizing the rural population draws on the differentiation between urban and rural contexts geographically, economically, socially, and culturally (IBGE, 2017). The administrative sphere separates between urban and rural areas. For example, the “Municipal Plan for Agricultural Development 2013-2016” in case municipality D divides population and area into urban and rural. In the case studies, the rural population is characterized by persisting permanence on the land and its productive use. The common denomination

was “family producer” for the individual or “family agriculture” for the collective community.

The group of family farmers, however, englobes various sub-communities, namely the “assentados” (Settlers, Case D), the “Caiçaras,” “indígenas,” and “Quilombolas” (traditional peoples⁴⁸, Case A). All actors acknowledged these rural identities through the legal constitution and distinct communities with specific social and cultural relations. For example, this manifested in the fact that indigenous communities received separate menus according to their ethnic identity (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017). Accordingly, both interlocutors (Caiçara and rural settler) for this research showed a high degree of auto-identification and consistently used the term community to refer to their peers. For example, the president of a traditional peoples’ producer association often substituted the terms families or (rural) neighborhoods with community (President producer association, Case A, 2017).

The spatial, jurisdictional, and relational aspects summarize the community component of the local development rationality. Even though with different emphases, they all refer to some sort of local orientation. For the purpose of this research, two community conceptions are of particular interest: primarily, the municipal and, secondly and more specifically, the family farmer community. Whereas the municipal logic emphasizes the geographical element of locality, the family farmer community draws on an ascribed common identity. Clearly, family farmers or rural communities are first and foremost considered as a fraction of the local municipal communities, but they are not limited to this geographical boundary. This is an important aspect for the conception of the local development rationality. Actors employing a local development rationality emphasized the primary objective to support family farmers within the municipality and subsequently the entire municipal community. Some actors, however, related to the family farmer community in prioritizing its members when expanding beyond municipal limits – either due to prior full exploitation of local products or complementing missing local production. A nutritionist exemplarily states: *“There were some producers from out of town for products that local farmers did not provide”* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017).

⁴⁸ The denomination traditional peoples is used as a reader friendly abbreviation. *Caiçaras* are traditional fisherman and considered traditional peoples by the Brazilian legislation, spread mainly along the coast lines in the southeast of Brazil. *Quilombolas* are also considered traditional peoples by the Brazilian constitution, they are communities of descendants of the age of slavery. *Indígenas* are indigenous peoples. While all three groups were present in the case municipality A, only *Caiçaras* were involved in the PNAE as producers.

The development component

The development component is embedded in the economic logic, which had been described in more detail in chapter 5.4.3. Whereas the community component serves to identify the common boundary (Thornton et al., 2012), the economic component indicates common interest or action orientation. Thornton et al. (2012, p.73) propose increasing the status of community members as a basis of strategy. In the context of local development, I propose that increased status is mainly achieved by improving the socio-economic condition of its members.

The economic component detected in the case studies draws from the economic rationality in the previous chapter, albeit a developmental variation. In this variant, producers are to be integrated into formal markets to offer better opportunities for income generation. Hence, market access serves as a means for poverty reduction (Sen, 2000). Furthermore, the development aspect manifests itself through the fact that the range of preparedness for actual participation in markets varied tremendously between family farmers. While some were structured as formal rural enterprises with high market orientation, others remained in the sphere of subsistence production, merely selling the surplus. Therefore, market access required prior formalization and capacitation of producers. Public policies and rural extension organs are perceived as supporters of this transition. One representative of the house of agriculture put it concisely:

With the implementation of public policies at the federal level, the producer, or the family farmer, had stopped being subsistence to become a commercial agent. [...] In other words, you take somebody from a situation of misery, give him technical assistance, public policies and the opportunity to commercialize. (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017)

The corporative element had been emphasized to improve market access. To increase coordination and bundle market power, producers should organize collectively in formal organizations, i.e., associations and cooperatives: *“The cooperative will support farmers in selling their products. Exiting the circle of producing and not knowing where to sell. With the cooperative they now know where to sell”* (Interview Case C, President local cooperative, 2018).

The tendency to organize in formal organizations is a reaction to market demands, including public procurement. High volumes and reduced transaction costs seem to be of strong relevance for formal contracting, e.g., public policies. Invoking the presupposed bureaucratic rationality of public administrators, a researcher from a local rural extension organ puts it:

Single producers are too small to access these markets but organized in a cooperative they would. They need to organize in a format that eases the work

of the municipality, which will not call ten producers for 50kg each. They want to make one call. Unless producers organize themselves, they will be left out because somewhere somebody will have the entire 500kg. (Interview Case A, Researcher APTA, 2017)

In case A, the public administration attempted to foster building local cooperatives via public procurement processes. The municipality planned to restrict participation in the public call to formal organizations. However, as producers did not succeed in forming a cooperative, the municipal administration discarded this idea in order not to endanger the ongoing individual sourcing (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017). This withdrawal from the cooperative requirement reflects the predominant local development rationality within the administration.

To conclude, the local development rationality seeks to bring economic development in the form of income generation to a specific community, thereby improving the standing of its members. The communities to be strengthened are local, municipal communities. Firstly, it is the rural family farmer, settler, traditional producer, and secondly, the entire municipal community.

Legitimacy

The legitimacy base for the local development rationality is the community. It is essentially a self-referential system in which the community members will evaluate actor behavior. Legitimacy stems thereby from the commitment to the community (Thornton et al., 2012). Having identified the objective of the local development rationality as economic growth for a given community, actors gain legitimacy by taking actions towards this goal.

Communities are built on many actors with at least partially different roles, interests, and identities. Despite this variation in the community composition, activities need to demonstrate a certain degree of convergence to attain legitimacy. In the context of the PNAE, there are different community roles identified – public administration, rural extension organs, and producers.

The public administration, mainly represented through the secretaries of education and agriculture, acts legitimately insofar as it allocates resources for the procurement from local family farmers or their respective organizations and performs public calls. Special emphasis is thereby given to allocating at least the legally required minimum to local farmers. Legitimized action is more apparent when it is questioned, as the president of a local producer association claims:

I asked the secretary of agriculture. The 30% that are ours [family farmers], don't they need to stay in the municipality? Why are they going to cooperatives in Rio

Grande do Sul or to companies? (Interview Case A, President Local Producer Association, 2017)

Following the local development rationality consequently, the municipality would go beyond the legal minimum to foster a higher economic development:

As I see it if done more intelligently, a lot more than 30% of the school feeding could be produced here in the city. They would leave the producer with money that would stay here in the city, and the schools would have fresh products. This would be a really nicely closed circuit. I believe we would have the capacity to produce around 80% locally. (Interview Case A, Local Producer, 2017)

Producers, on the other hand, gain legitimacy from the community by making efforts for market integration. These efforts include improving market orientation by formalizing as a producer, starting a commercially viable production planning, diversifying production, and uniting through formal organizations. If necessary, producers are encouraged to participate in courses to professionalize production:

It is a difficult task, which will not bring results in the short-term. What is coming in short-term and satisfies us are producers who already wanted to produce but did not have conditions. We capacitated them, they responded and increased production. (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017)

Rural extension organs gain legitimacy from supporting the procurement process, which includes mainly the articulation of actors and, depending on necessity, the organization, and training of producers. The local development rationality is central for rural extension organs due to their respective organizational objectives of fostering local agriculture. Therefore, the local development rationality is, in their case, also grounded in a professional logic.

Finally, in a wider notion, the local development draws its legitimacy by providing economic benefit for the entire local community. In the case of the PNAE, this includes not only family farmers but also the local economy as well as the students. Following is a sample statement of a representative of the secretary of agriculture: *“This money stays here. You help families directly or indirectly since you improve the entire local economy. If the producer has money and buys at local shops, this generally strengthens the community”* (Current Representative Secretary of Agriculture, Case A, 2017).

Objectives

The objective of the community logic is to increase the status of its members (Thornton et al., 2012). In the local development rationality, this is measured in the provision of economic growth to the community. Within the PNAE context, it translates to giving

the producers opportunities to generate income and generate benefits for the local economy. A former secretary of agriculture combines both elements in saying:

Our interest is that the farmer participates and is able to increasingly sell his products to our local procurement, that producers can generate income, and that money comes from outside and circulates locally. It almost enters into the idea of solidarity economy, increasing the integration of agriculture products and decreasing participation of companies. (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

The secretary of agriculture of another municipality informs his understanding objectives of local development by emphasizing the local short circuits:

Considering not only family farming, but the level of local agriculture, I think it is a pity to see products being produced in the municipality only to be commercialized elsewhere. It could be used here as a fresher product. (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

Furthermore, assuring rural livelihoods through the provision of income opportunities also fulfills a social function. Producers should have the possibility to remain in their activity as the following statement emphasizes:

We want to maintain the producers in their properties, but in a way that they can sustain themselves. Our focus today is to value this labor, value the people living in the rural zone, to increase the market power and ultimately to value the production of our city. (Interview Case B, Secretary of Economic Development, 2018)

Finally, again widening the scope by envisioning the entire community, a nutritionist explains the local development rationality within the PNAE context as follows:

The child has a right to healthy alimentation. The population and the family farmers have the right to pursue their activity in dignity. I think this is part of public policies, to provide the citizens with a decent life. (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017)

Strategies

Achieving the goal of bringing economic development to the local community is a coordinated effort of various actors. As an overarching strategy, actors following a local development rationality emphasize the need to foster the local economy.

Actors, predominantly rural extension organs, interpret the novel legal framework within the PNAE as a window of opportunity to increase family farmer procurement.

As will be demonstrated in chapter 5.4.1.4.2, actors seized leeway in decision making to prioritize local producers or at least family farmers in general. The strategy aims at mobilizing different actors within the local context, e.g., public administration, rural extension organs, producers, to participate in structuring a local economy.

Depending on the context readiness, e.g., if producers are organized in cooperatives or logistics are feasible, actors engage in preparatory activities to implement family farming procurement. In case A, for example, the secretary of agriculture and rural extension organs organized “road shows” in different neighborhoods to convince producers to participate in the public procurement. In addition, producers were supported in establishing harvest plans or their sales proposals for public calls. While it is the attribution of rural extension organs and the secretary of agriculture to support producers, the local development rationality rendered actors far more active than legally required. The following statement underpins the extra tasks carried out to facilitate family farmer procurement.

I, for example, could have been focusing more on the technical side of fostering producers, but I ended up helping out in the procurement process as they had a lot of difficulties, and we wanted the family farmer procurement to be successful. But if you do not incentivize, do not run after and let the process happen naturally . . . let's say, who has an interest in this is the agriculture secretary, and hence, it's us that have to run after it. (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

Another example concerns preparatory actions to improve local structures. In this sense, two municipalities (C and D) re-opened a physical space called the house of agriculture to coordinate the tasks regarding local agriculture. One municipality (case A) built facilities to receive family farmer products. Establishing a central stock decreased the logistic burden for producers as they did not need to deliver from school to school, which would have been a prohibitively high barrier for participation.

5.4 Analyzing the Translation Process

The translation of the legal framework into local practice has been analyzed in four different local contexts – case studies A, B, C, D. As explained in the methods section, ch. 4.1, these cases were selected based on their different outcomes. Cases A and B successfully started sourcing from family farmers, while cases C and D, at the time of case selection, did not or only in very limited amounts.

Throughout the research process, all municipalities arrived at implementing family farmer procurement, with case municipality C starting to source from family farmers in 2017. This made the reconstruction of the translation process possible for all cases. While each case demonstrated specificities in localized enactment regarding timing, velocity, or motivation, common patterns have been identified. **Figure 16** below depicts the grounded theory model for the translation process. It exposes the “translation work” (Cassell & Lee, 2017) performed, from exposure to the new legal framework to stabilization of routinized practices.

The model comprises five different phases with corresponding processes that are triggered by exposure to the idea. First, actors engage in the process of *understanding* the idea. As in our cases, the newly arriving idea is a legal obligation, actors sensed a necessity to engage in knowledge-seeking activities to understand its implications better. As the process of understanding is first and foremost individual, it is guided by personal belief systems or rationalities. Second, local actors engage in *mobilizing*. At this stage, individual actors seek support within the local context by forming alliances, creating translation fora to lead the process, or empowering actors to contribute to local enactment. Third, *adaption* denotes the phase in which local structures and practices on the one side, and the localized version of the idea on the other, are matched up to allow for, fourth, *implementing*. In this phase, actors locally enact the newly arrived idea. Experiences of implementing the new practice may be positive or negative, revealing how actors accept the practice and reinforce or discourage future enactment accordingly. Finally, fifth, repeated enactment of the practice leads to *institutionalizing*. For being institutionalized, the newly implemented practice is perceived as positive by involved actors, ambiguities concerning its performance decrease, roles and responsibilities are clearly settled and accepted.

In addition, two development paths were identified: an intrinsic and an extrinsic translation.⁴⁹ Whereas local actors in *intrinsic* translation cases (A, B) achieved to

⁴⁹ The terms *intrinsic* and *extrinsic* are borrowed from the psychological research tradition to identify the source of individual motivation. Intrinsic motivation is grounded in an innate interest in the activity or the internal drive to learn, to achieve a goal. Extrinsic motivation, in contrast, relies on external influences that induce an activity, such as rewards, incentives or sanctions (Ryan & Deci, 2000). These motivational concepts seem aptly to apply to this research context. From the four case studies, two cases implemented the family farming quickly (case A even before the reform) and outperformed the

transfer the new legal framework into practice through their own mobilization and adaption efforts, in the *extrinsic* cases (C, D), implementation took place after local actors reacted to external pressure. These different translation paths are relevant for the conceptualization of the transitions between phases. The empirical data indicates that rationalities, actor positions, and interests influenced (un)successful advancement from one phase to another. Furthermore, the empirical data showed no clear temporal distinction between the mobilizing and adapting phase, up to the extent that activities from each phase may be reversed in some cases. Therefore, the separation of these two phases, as well as their order, is purely analytical.

The analytical focus of this research lies in the local context, comprising different individual actors, organizations, and interactions. The model is conceptualized for the local context level to grasp the complete translation process. This emphasizes translation activities in the process rather than its actors. In fact, the case studies show that while certain activities occur in all cases, they are not necessarily carried out by the same actors.

The following chapters decompose the five phases of translation and explain the related translation activities in further detail. Subsequently, the transitioning between the phases will be analyzed based on producer preparedness, rationality compatibility, and interest.

legal threshold substantially. The commitment to family farmer procurement went beyond complying with the law. From the field-level perspective, these local contexts did show traits of intrinsic motivation for implementation. On the other hand, two cases started serious engagement with the procurement reform only after external - field-level - pressure had been exerted. Therefore, the motivation for implementation was drawn from external factors.




Figure 16: Local translation process (author)

5.4.1 Phases of Translation

This chapter will disassemble the local translation process in different phases and activities that emerged from the empirical data analysis. The subchapters follow the order of the elaborated conceptual model (see **Figure 16**).

The separation of the translation process into phases of translation invokes the perception of chronological order. However, the empirical context of public administration in Brazil is susceptible to changes according to political cycles. All case studies underwent at least one change in municipal administration with therewith connected changes in local actor constellations. Hence, although the model is chronologically coherent, it may be passed through multiple times in the overall implementation per case (as indicated through the arrow “changing actor constellations”). This renders translation not only a vertical (from field to the local context) but also a horizontal (time sequences) process. This is coherent with the processual claim that translation is constantly “in-the-making” (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996).

5.4.1.1 Understanding

The new legislation for the PNAE invoked far-reaching effects on its daily operationalization not only with regard to the altered procurement process but also nutritionally. After being exposed to the new law, local actors engage in the process of understanding it. The regulative pressure arising from the new legislation obliges municipal administration actors to inform themselves about its implications. Therefore, in this first phase of the translation process, actors try to create meaning of the newly arriving idea. In the case studies, this happened via the activities of seeking knowledge, peer-learning, and referencing. Each of these activities aims at constructing a localized understanding of the novel legal framework, which will serve as the basis for further action.

Peer learning and referencing allowed for creating inspirational source contexts for translating practices from one context to another. The source context is a prominent feature in theory but is missing when translating from the abstract idea, i.e., newly created legal framework.

Table 6 below depicts the data structure for the understanding phase with corresponding activities, 1st-order categories, and 2nd-order concepts. Furthermore, the table indicates in which cases actors engaged in respective understanding activities. Finally, rationalities, which guided the actors in their activities, are indicated.

Case	Initiating Actor	Involved actors	Guiding rationality	Activities concerning the implementation	1st-order categories	2nd-order concepts	3rd-order constructs
A, C, D	Producers / SOA / CAE President		Local development / bureaucratic	Invoke experiences from other municipalities as input for process structuration	Referencing to other municipalities	Referencing	Under-standing
A	CATI	CAE members / Nutritionist II	Local development	Visiting other municipalities with functioning FF procurement	Creating direct exchange formats with other implementing contexts	Peer learning	
D	House of Agriculture	Nutritionist	Local development / bureaucratic				
A	CATI / SOA	SFD / CAE / Producers	Local development	Organize presentations from representatives of other municipalities			
B	Nutritionists		Bureaucratic	Contact other municipalities for experience exchange			
A	SOA	SFD / CAE / Producers	Local development	Bring seminars from CECANE to municipality	Participating in knowledge transfer activities	Seeking knowledge	
B, C	Nutritionist		Bureaucratic	Participate in courses for FF procurement			
A, B	Nutritionist		Professional	Participate in conferences for PNAE and FF Procurement			
A, B	Nutritionists / SOA		Bureaucratic	Clarify doubts with FNDE /MDA / CECANE /other municipalities	Clarifying the rules		
A, B	Nutritionists / SOA / Rural Extension Organs / CAE		Bureaucratic	Study the legal framework			

Table 6: Data structure understanding phase (author)

5.4.1.1.1 Seeking Knowledge

In all case studies, seeking knowledge was a central action to understand the novel legislation and its local implications. In order to react to the rising institutional demands, actors must first understand how new requests affect their own practices. Two main activities were observed in the empirical contexts that intended to increase the knowledge on the PNAE legislation: Clarifying the rules of the game and participating in knowledge transfer formats.

Clarifying the rules

The first natural action for possibly affected actors is to read the legal texts and accompanying guidelines to understand its rules. Whilst this activity seems trivial, it is a precondition to creating local meaning that guides further actions. The president of the rural union (also former CAE president) in case A underlines:

First of all, you need to know the law; you need to know the PNAE. In my case, as I was president of the CAE, everybody knows that I have read the law back to back. They call me the living CAE. (Interview Case A, President Rural Workers Union, 2017)

The actors in the case municipalities differed in the degree to which they actively searched for information on how to implement the new law. While some actors were well informed about the PNAE legislation, others did not refer to it at all or did so incorrectly. Nutritionists, representatives from the secretary of agriculture and rural extension organs, and cooperative leaders showed a high degree of knowledge. Nutritionists seemed more concerned about complying with the nutritional requirements, whereas actors interested in fostering local procurement drew on the legislation as a legitimation to implement the new practice.

The perceived necessity to clarify processual steps varied according to the degree to which the new practice was a central task for the actor. For example, for the procurement department, *“reading the law and doing it”* (Interview Case C, Director Procurement Department, 2018) was sufficient information. Performing a public call is merely another modality of their daily procurement routines and is relatively easily integrated. For others, the legislation did not provide all the necessary information. Seeking clarification, they resorted to the FNDE and other federal organs for orientation on how to implement the practice.

There is no explanation on how to proceed with the procurement. We would need a manual, and I don't mean the one that already exists with articulating the producers, publish the public call, etc. This does not help at all. We read it, nice, but the practice is a lot more detailed. (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

This ambiguity created insecurities in local contexts. Actors concerned with implementing the policy had to get information from federal organs repeatedly:

We entered in contact with federal organs. The nutritionist contacted the FNDE to know what we should do. I myself contacted the ministry of agrarian development multiple times with questions about how to buy from associations. If we can procure from associations due to the question of receipts⁵⁰. We had a lot of doubts because there is fragility. We purchase, but if there is something wrong, we are also responsible. (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

⁵⁰ The issue of receipts in this case refers to the questions of collective or individual contracting. In the case A, some producers were organized in an association, however, the organization did not possess a DAP for a legal entity. Therefore, the contracts had to be signed with individual producers.

Participating in knowledge transfer activities

A second central activity to obtain the necessary information is participation in knowledge transfer practices. To support local implementation of family farmer procurement, FNDE and other organizations⁵¹ offer courses and conferences on different aspects of the PNAE, which usually include sessions on family farmer procurement.

Within the empirical context, predominantly nutritionists participated in official courses and conferences. The interviews showed that nutritionists from “intrinsic cases” with a higher family farmer procurement were more actively present in courses and conferences. The statement of the director of the school alimentation department in Case B confirms:

I have attended several courses on family farming. I went to São Carlos [regional conference], I went to ITAL in Campinas. In fact, just now in October I will go to another one. (Interview Case B, Director School Alimentation Department, 2017)

Actors in Case A attended courses from CECANE-SP in the state capital, specifically on family farmer procurement. Here, the nutritionist and secretary of agriculture jointly gathered information on the process: “*We went to a CECANE workshop in São Paulo, maybe nutritionist II told you about it, but we went there together to learn about buying from family farmers*” (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017).

In the course of the data gathering process, I had the chance to participate in two conferences on PNAE implications for municipalities. Both conferences covered a wide range of topics related to the policy – nutritionally as well as administratively. The implementation process was explained by specialists – either FNDE or state-level organizations - in a step-by-step didactic manner. Furthermore, both events provided formats for experience exchange by presenting good-practice cases. The main public was nutritionists from the entire state. Nutritionists from cases A, B, and C did each participate in one of these events.

5.4.1.1.2 Peer Learning

Peer learning was identified as a second pillar to enhance the understanding of how to translate new legal requirements into local enactment. Municipalities exchanged experiences with each other. This happened through *in loco* visits, workshops between various municipalities, or ad-hoc exchanges to concrete doubts.

⁵¹ Other organizations that offer courses are i) *Instituto de Tecnologia de Alimentos* (Institute for Food Technology); ii) CECANE-SP. Conferences are: i) *Encontros Regionais de Alimentação Escolar - ECONAE* (Regional Meetings for School Feeding), Interviews Cases A, B, C, Nutritionists, 2017.

In the process of local meaning creation, actors from municipalities A and D organized field visits in other municipalities that had already implemented family farmer procurement. The objective of these preliminary visits was to observe local practices to be similarly adopted, as the director of the house of agriculture in case D explained:

We took the nutritionists for a training visit to São Bernardo do Campo to learn from the group who had structured the process there. They learned how to do the entire process: the interactions with the producers, the types of products you need, seasonality, product specification of regional products so nutritionists can specify correctly. We facilitated all this preparation before launching the first call. (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017)

A similar exchange with the same municipality was conducted by nutritionist II and the secretary of agriculture from case A. However, as the municipality was already implementing family farmer agriculture, more specific topics seemed to be relevant:

We went to São Bernardo do Campo to visit the secretary of agriculture to see how they do it. They did have a great way to fix the price. It was the daily market price. This was great to see as we had exactly that problem. (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017)

The fact that both municipalities visited São Bernardo do Campo was no coincidence. The municipality had been promoted as a pioneering success case for family farmer procurement in an early publication from the ministry of agricultural development (Chaim & Belik, 2012).

In addition, case A representatives from the CATI and CAE visited other municipalities to observe family farming integration from a producer perspective. For this purpose, they visited municipalities in which producer organizations were successfully delivering for school alimentation. One of the visited municipalities was Case B, which regional CATI representatives recommended. The local CATI representative in case A was impressed by the degree of producers' organization:

We went to the case B municipality to visit the local cooperative that had participated in the microbacias program. The cooperative was led by a professional manager. The cooperative was very well organized, which is in contrast to our context, where from 60 producers, a handful was formalized. (Interview Case A, Representative CATI, 2017)

Organizing peer-learning visits is strongly related to the local development rationality. In both cases, the initiative for visits to other contexts came from the secretary of agriculture (A, D) or rural extension organs (A). Not only do these organizations aim at local rural development per institutional attribution, but also both interviewed actors

showed high dedication to foster local development. Participants in these peer-learning activities were nutritionists (A, D) and CAE members (A).

In addition to visiting other local contexts, the CATI representative in case A also organized seminars inviting neighboring municipalities to share their experiences:

The CATI representative organized a seminar to explain how it works. He brought people from the neighboring municipality to share their experiences. They had good access to family farmers there and therefore achieved to implement ahead of us. This was great, and we learned a lot. (Interview Case A, Nutritionist I, 2017)

Finally, the third form of peer learning had been fostered in case B. The administrative director of the education secretary maintains informal connections with the neighboring municipalities to exchange experiences or clarifying doubts about the administrative procedures for the PNAE. *“I talk with other municipalities, and we exchange information. Either I call them, or they call me when anyone has doubts.”* (Interview Case B, Administrative Director for the Ed. Sec., 2017)

While being a form of knowledge-seeking and therefore closely related to the activity described in the subsection above, peer learning differs in the source of information. As opposed to knowledge seeking, which consists of gathering information from federal organs and their publications (laws, resolutions, etc.), the peer-learning formats aim at providing insights and exchange of experiences between implementing contexts. In other words, while knowledge-seeking is a vertical flow of information from federal to local context, peer-learning emphasizes the horizontal notion of traveling ideas from one context to another (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996).

5.4.1.1.3 Referencing

Referencing was identified as a third activity that contributes to the understanding of the novel idea. Referencing is the activity of referring to practices of other implementing contexts. Individual actors used references to “role model municipalities” to point to alternative solutions to specific aspects of implementing family farmer procurement. Referencing was used by actors independent of their position and role within the implementation process. Common in all instances, however, was the aspiration to indicate better solutions to a problem existing in the actor’s own context. Referencing was strongly applied in case A and, to a lesser extent, also in Cases C and D.

The sources for referencing varied, depending on who engaged in referencing. Public administration actors drew parallels to other municipalities based on peer-learning or knowledge exchange activities (see section before). Exemplary for the knowledge exchange mode is the statement of the CAE president of Case C:

During a workshop, I saw a contribution from municipal actors of Barueri [a neighboring municipality]. It was enchanting because everything was perfect. They had a centralized kitchen, organized distribution, a nutritionist for every six schools, etc. And here we realize that we are still far to reach that level. (Interview Case C, CAE President, 2018)

In other cases, references came from personal visits to other municipalities. Explaining the slow growth of family farming procurement in Case D due to preoccupation with missing products to provide meals, the director of the house of agriculture draws parallels to São Bernardo do Campo, a municipality that they had visited for peer-learning.

I understand their worries about not being supplied. Changing from a system of conventional procurement to family farmers is entering into a process you don't know. Exiting secure procurement to enter social purchases benefits more people, but at what risk when you don't get products for three days? 150'000 meals. Hence, I understand their side to start with incremental steps. This is exactly what São Bernardo did as well. (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017)

In case A, a producer referred to the neighboring municipality in several instances. His knowledge of other implementation modes is based on personal experience from delivering products to the other municipality. He thereby points out the efforts from the neighboring administration to buy from family farmers compared to the case municipality. Especially since nutritionist III took office, he senses the missing interest of the municipality in buying from local producers. Contracts are signed, but the products are not requested. This is in stark contrast to his "role model municipality":

Let me give you an example: the other municipality signs contracts for the calendar year. Last week [October], they called me to ask if I had more products to sell as my personal limit [20'000.- BRL] will probably not be achieved. Now see the difference! They want to buy, even risking buying products that are not in the contract, but they want to buy. (Interview Case A, Local Producer, 2017)

The statements cited here are references made during the interviews. Therefore, referencing is an activity that also serves the researcher for interpreting the process of local meaning creation. However, all actors did invoke other implementing contexts as part of their reasoning on the local translation without being questioned. This deliberate and unsolicited referencing indicates that their understanding is constructed by relying on these experiences and that they would reference them within local discourses. During the fieldwork, this assumption was confirmed for case A, when the representative of the secretary of agriculture refers to the abovementioned producer: "He is generally at the forefront of the process. He is very well informed. He sells to

our neighboring municipality as well as to our municipality” (Interview Case A, Representative SOA, 2017).

5.4.1.2 Mobilizing

In the first phase of the local translation process, actors interpret the new law against their rationality and deduce opportunities to exploit or responsibilities to satisfy the institutional demands. Based on these implications, actors are activated and start *mobilizing*. In the context of this research, this refers first and foremost to mobilizing local actors to support implementing the new law actively. As means to achieve this objective, however, also time, effort, and resources were mobilized. Three mobilizing activities have been identified in the case studies: enrolling allies, creating local coordination fora, and empowering actors. For the purpose of this research, the latter refers mainly to empowering family farmers.

Activities aimed at mobilizing local actors were predominantly initiated by the rural extension organs, which include secretaries of agriculture, and articulation organizations, i.e., the rural workers union. In all four cases, they perceived the new law as an opportunity for fostering local agriculture, a central institutional objective for all of these organizations. This concentration of initiative on one actor category is in contrast to the understanding phase, where activities were performed by varied actors affected by the novel legislation. In addition, rather than the activities of meaning creation – which may occur individually or collectively - mobilizing focuses on inherently collective interactions. **Table 7** below demonstrates the data structure for the mobilizing phase. It emphasizes that actors in the agriculture sphere initiated interactions.

5.4.1.2.1 Enrolling Allies

Implementing the family farmer procurement in local contexts is a multi-actor process. It involves various actors with different power bases from the public administration, private sector, and civil society, the latter mainly through representation in the CAE. This dispersed actor structure requires cooperation beyond organizational boundaries. While organizations dispose of hierarchical power structures for resource coordination, cooperation between organizations requires a stronger emphasis on agreeing on common objectives and actions. Therefore, actors must convince and activate supporters to pursue their objectives. In short, actors must enroll allies.

In the case studies, enrolling allies focused strongly on the agriculture sphere, where rural extension organs joined forces and activated family farmers to engage in the procurement process.

Case	Initiating Actor	Involved actors	Guiding rationality	Activities concerning the implementation	1st-order categories	2nd-order concepts	3rd-order constructs
A	CATI	Union	Local development	Alliance building: sharing office, dividing mobilization of producers	Joining forces	Enrolling allies	Mobilizing
C	SOA	Cooperative	Local development	Secr. recruits non-family farmers to structure a cooperative, share facilities			
D	House of Agriculture	ITESP	Local development	Close collaboration to mobilize settlers			
A	CATI	Producers / micro bacias community	Local development	Interest producers in participating through meetings, road shows in neighborhoods	Activating producers to engage in FF procurement		
A	Union	Producers / Union members	Local development	Overcome producers prejudice against public procurement with official contracts			
A	Union / CATI / SOA	CAE / Nutritionist	Local development	Demonstrate interest of administration to procure from producers			
B	Cooperative director	Producers	Local development	Organize to improve product quality, diversification and bureaucratic competences	Incentivize formal organization	Empowering actors	
A	Union	Producers	Economic / local development	Start organizing producers in a cooperative			
C	SOA	Producers	Economic / local development	Organize producers in a cooperative to improve coordination			
D	House of Agriculture / ITESP	Producers	Local development	Initiate the formation of producer associations			
D	SOA	Producers	Local development	Offer courses for capacity building in cooperation with SENAR / CATI	Capacitate producers for commercial production		
C	SOA						
A	Union / CATI						
B	Cooperative	Producers	Local development	Offer courses for capacity building			
A	Union / CATI / SMAPA	Producers	Local development	Assist producers in elaboration of proposals for public call			
A	CAE / SOA / Union	CATI / nutritionist	Local development	Use the CAE meetings as coordination forum for organizing FF procurement	Establish a task force for local implementation	Establishing local coordination fora	
B	SOA	Proc. Dep. / Nutritionist / CATI	Local development / bureaucratic	Establish a local committee to organize the first public calls for FF procurement			
C, D	CECANE	Local actors	Bureaucratic	Consultancy on how to implement FF procurement (Action: summon all actors for coordination)	External support to initiate implementation		

Table 7: Data structure mobilizing phase (author)

Joining forces

Secretaries of agriculture, rural extension organs, and rural workers' unions worked towards an extensive implementation of the family farmer procurement. In all four case studies, these actors followed a local development rationality, which is highly compatible with the claims of the new legal framework. However, as demonstrated in the actor mapping (see ch. 5.3.3.5), rural extension organizations face the challenge of relying on the secretary of education and producers to implement the new practice successfully. Actors on both ends must be activated and convinced. Additionally, producers must be organized. Except for case B, where a strong cooperative already existed, rural extension actors needed to cooperate in organizing the producers in the municipalities and increasing their influence on the implementation process.

In case A, for example, the secretary of agriculture, the locally present extension organs, and the rural workers' union shared the work of mobilizing producers: *"We had to work together to achieve our goals because doing it alone is very difficult"* (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017).

The rural workers' union and the CATI had already agreed on institutional cooperation in 1994. Both organizations supported each other in their efforts to advance local agriculture. In the PNAE context, the mobilization of producers was shared between the organizations: The CATI organized one group of producers and the union another⁵². As an organ of the local administration, the municipal secretary of agriculture supported the mobilization, mediating between the secretary of education and the producer side.

In Case C, the municipal secretary of agriculture actively created alliances. First, through an agreement with the state rural extension organ CATI, the secretary reopened the house of agriculture and established a physical facility for producers with technical assistance from state agronomists. Second, the municipal secretary initiated the establishment of a cooperative to attend regional procurement calls. For this project, the secretary joined forces with a group of non-family farmer producers with extensive experience and resources to support family farmers in professionalizing their production. The formalization process of the cooperative had been initiated in 2015. The current president of the cooperative had prior experience as president in an association of medium to large-scale producers. He explained his role in this collaboration as follows:

The cooperative started with a group that wanted to establish a cooperative, and they asked me to support them. As I had a series of experiences as producer and

⁵² This separation has grown historically through the state-level project "microbacias", in which the CATI accompanied a group of producers, mainly of banana and manioc, to increase production and market access, incl. school feeding even before the legal requirement (Interview Case A, Representative CATI, 2017).

president of the association, I was elected president of the cooperative. In my role, I give my experience and time to help organize the cooperative. (Interview Case C, President local cooperative, 2018)

The founding of a mixed cooperative between family and non-family farmers to supply for the PNAE was an unorthodox but essential element to mobilize actors for the local implementation. The close cooperation is manifested in the fact that the cooperative is headquartered in the building of the secretary of agriculture. In addition, the administrative work is divided by two employees, one from the cooperative, one from the secretary.

Finally, case D accommodates a state-level rural agrarian reform settlement. Rural settlers are under the auspices of special rural extension organs, i.e., the ITESP in the state of São Paulo. ITESP regulates the distribution of territories to settlers and accompanies them in their rural activity. The settlement in case D, previously an occupation, was relatively recently transitioned into legality from an occupation. Therefore, most settlers took up rural activity after being officially placed as settlers. With low capacity and resources available, these producers required training and market access. For this reason, the ITESP and the municipal house of agriculture cooperate to integrate settlers into local markets. ITESP provides *“the condition for producers to start producing”* (Representative ITESP, Case C, 2018), and the house of agriculture organizes capacity-building activities and mediates with the local administration to implement local procurement. The director of the local house of agriculture explains:

It is a delicate process since the settlement is the state’s responsibility. We approached the ITESP, the responsible organ for the rural settlement, and we started cooperation to work together for the settlement. (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017)

While the forms of cooperation varied from case to case, the intention of joining forces for achieving a common goal was identified as a common characteristic. Also, all involved actors followed compatible rationalities, which facilitated cooperation beyond organizational boundaries.

Activating producers

A second activity to enroll allies consisted in arousing producers’ interest to participate in the program. Family farmers were generally small-scale producers that sold their products on the spot either at farmers’ markets or to wholesale distributors. These *ad hoc* transactions do not require any type of formal registration, contract, production planning, and payment is immediate. Contracts with the public administration, in contrast, require prior formalization of producers, a production planning for the contract

period, and payment is only made after delivery at a fixed price. This generated mistrust and reluctance to enter commercial relationships with the administration, which was perceived as too bureaucratic. The former secretary of agriculture in case A points out:

Producers showed great reluctance to sell to the administration. They claimed that it takes too much work and the administration pays late . . . They perceived the administration as very bureaucratic. (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

The secretary of agriculture in case C confirms this when referring to the formation of the local cooperative: *“The producers did not have any trust. It took me great effort to construct this trust and unite producers for the cooperative”* (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2018).

Building trust was, therefore, a main activity for the secretaries and rural extension organs, especially in cases A, C, and D, where no cooperative preexisted. In case A, they organized “road shows” in the different regions to explain the new procurement process and to underline the interest of the municipality to purchase from producers:

We organized meetings in the different regions and informed the producers that we wanted to demonstrate how the procurement works. We encouraged them to participate. We wanted to show them that the municipality is interested in buying from them. (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

The president of the rural workers’ union in case A puts the emphasis on eliminating the prejudice about delayed or missing payments:

My job as a union leader is to convince producers to sell to the school feeding, to convince them that selling to the school feeding is selling to the municipal administration, to convince them that the law is very clear in stating that the administration has to pay until the 15th day of the following month. (Interview Case A, President Rural Workers Union, 2017)

The activation of producers is a crucial step for enrolling allies since implementing local procurement would not be possible without their interest. Once enrolled, most producers needed to formalize before being able to participate in the program (see ch. 5.5.1.3.1).

5.4.1.2.2 Creating Local Coordination Fora

A key activity for successful mobilizing was identified in the creation of local coordination fora. Cases A and B, both translating the practice successfully, established a “task force” to coordinate the implementation of the family farmer

procurement practice. Integrating relevant public administration actors, these councils served as local translation sites, where implications were negotiated and strategies for implementing the new procurement practice developed. The form, however, was different in cases A and B.

In case A, the existing school alimentation council (CAE) was used as a coordination forum for family farmer procurement. Relatively quickly, the CAE started to take the lead in implementing the new practices, as Nutritionist I informed: *“For the family farmer procurement, the CAE was very active, supporting the implementation. In the beginning, we had a lot of meetings to get things started”* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist I, 2017).

Integrating family farmer issues into the CAE agenda offered three advantages: First, the council was already established and functioning. Second, as a deliberative, legally mandated council, it served as a legitimate forum for decision-making. In addition to statutory members, the nutritionist and rural extension organs regularly participated in meetings, underpinning its central function. Third, as producers were not organized in formal organizations, the CAE served as a substitute coordination layer on the producer side. In the words of the former secretary of agriculture: *“The CAE reunited all the actors that are concerned with agriculture. In these moments we could officially discuss things since it was a [deliberative] council”* (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2020).

In case A, the CAE was historically grown into an active and well-articulated actor in the local context. The focus on family farmers is strongly connected to the fact that from 2005 to 2017, representatives from CATI and the rural workers union presided over the council. The local CATI representative naturally claims that *“the coordination of family farmer procurement should happen in the municipal school alimentation council,”* but also criticizes that the statutory composition of the CAE in case A *“does not foresee participation of agriculture organs. My participation as a CATI representative was more a personal than institutional initiative”* (Interview Case A, Representative CATI, 2017).

In addition to coordinating activities, the CAE served as an institutionalized site for producers to express their interests and claims directly with the public administration. When the new CAE president got elected in 2017, she re-oriented the CAE. Even though the new president supported the need to foster local family farmers, she demonstrated a bureaucratic tendency by emphasizing compliance with legal processes. In the words of the new president:

Members of the council did confuse its role; it is not an organ to foster family farming, even though it is one pillar of the PNAE. The CAE has to audit the local implementation of a variety of directives. Family farming is just one of them, and if the administration is buying 30%, it is already complying with the legal

requirement, and we cannot demand a lot more than this. (Interview Case A, CAE President & Representative SOA, 2017)

This affected the function of the CAE, and it lost part of its mobilizing power in favor of family farming procurement. This re-direction of the CAE was an artifact of changing actor constellation and shift in rationality congruence in the local context. A producer summarizes:

The last president was excellent. He made things get going and demanded our rights. The new president, she does not have this experience and is still learning. They have a good dialogue, but the administration does not have the intention to buy at large. (Interview Case A, Local Producer, 2017)

Whereas the secretary of education sees the change as:

I think the CAE is quieter this year. There is no political pressure anymore as it seems there was before. Through its diversified constitution of members, the discussions are ampler and focused on dialogue. (Interview Case A, Secretary of Education, 2017)

The CAE as a coordination organ is not the source of successful implementation in the local context but rather a reflection of actor and rationality constellations and interests. The CAE grew organically into the coordination role. However, a steep decline in local family farmer procurement correlated with CAE's withdrawal as a coordination organ.

In case B, the municipal administration reacted immediately to the new legal obligation. An additional council was established to assess possibilities on how to implement family farmer procurement. The council was promoted by the local agriculture director and comprised representatives from the school alimentation department, the procurement department, and the local representative of the state rural extension organ.

After defining the necessary adaptations within the public administration, such as the new procurement process and the development of a differentiated menu, the administration was prepared for implementation. An enhancing factor in the local context was the presence of a well-structured producer cooperative to attend the municipality with family farmer products. Through the rapid and coordinated engagement into adopting new institutional demands and the high degree of context preparedness, the local implementation of the family farmer procurement process was among the first in the state of São Paulo. The local CATI representative clearly attributes this smooth implementation to the initiative of the local agriculture director and the council:

That our municipality was among the first ones in the state actually to buy from family agriculture was the merit of an agronomist in the municipal administration.

They followed what was foreseen in the legislation precisely, and they initiated a local council for family farmer procurement. (Interview Case B, Representative CATI, 2017)

The local council ceased to exist when the administration changed in 2013. Nevertheless, the municipality had successfully established the procurement practice in these years, and sourcing from the family farmer cooperative continued in high quotas despite the new administration. Therefore, the local council can be understood as a catalyzing forum to initiate procurement.

This temporary form of coordination council contrasts the CAE solution in case A, where no formal producer organization was present. Therefore, the local coordination forum worked essentially as a standing forum to match production and demand for each public call.

Examples of creating spaces for coordinating the local implementation were only identified in the intrinsic cases (A, B), which achieved high quotas of family farmer procurement. This is in contrast with the extrinsic case studies (C, D), where no such fora were established. In those cases, such formats were only created on an *ad hoc* basis when the CECANE visited the municipalities to consult local actors in structuring the procurement process. While both cases started procuring after having received external support, neither of the two case municipalities established a local coordination organ.

5.4.1.2.3 Empowering Actors

Empowering actors was identified as a third mobilizing activity. In the research context, this predominantly aimed at strengthening family farmers' capabilities. While producers are the beneficiaries of the 30% rule, they were the least salient actors within the local contexts due to lacking power. This lack of power stemmed from different aspects: First, to a great extent, producers were not technically capacitated to a necessary degree to provide products in required quantities and frequency. Second, producers were not sufficiently organized to demand implementation collectively. In addition, the lack of organization required a constant accompanying from rural extension organs, a service that in the long-term is susceptible to deterioration. Finally, and connected with the latter, atomized producer structures increase the administrative burden for the public administration. In comparison with formal producer organizations, where one contract is signed, single producers are contracted individually, demanding an additional mobilization of resources by the administration.

To remedy this incongruence of power and capacity, rural extension organs and cooperative management engaged in empowering activities. The main activities in the

case study contexts were incentivizing formal organizations such as cooperatives and capacity building.

Incentivize formal organization

In all case studies, rural extension organs emphasized the benefits of formal organizations to participate in the PNAE procurement. The underlying rationale of reducing transaction costs and increasing income generation potentials has been described at length in the section on the local development rationality (see ch. 5.4.4). The accumulation of producers in formal organizations is seen as a necessary development for sustainable integration in the public procurement, as a representative of rural extension organs puts it: *“A first step today is to incentivize a process of “cooperativism” urgently. Initiate today so that few years down the road there will be no justification for having to accept single producers”* (Interview Case A, Representative CATI, 2017).

Therefore, initiatives to structure cooperatives or associations have been identified in all case municipalities. In Case B, the cooperative was constituted even before the PNAE reform. However, family farming procurement fostered its growth and development. The expansion was supported by the early integration of the cooperative into the public procurement and the administration’s decision to limit public calls for formal organizations (Interview Case B, Representative CATI, 2017). This granted the cooperative the possibility to generate steady income. In addition, the department for agriculture and the local rural extension organ supported the cooperative in accessing a funding program for micro-industries from the state government and the world bank.

The idea of the “micro bacias” program is for cooperatives and associations to improve market access by investing in small industries. Here in the municipality, there is a cooperative that benefited from the program. Our role is to support them as a facilitator. (Interview Case B, Representative CATI, 2017)

By receiving investment and professionalizing production, the cooperative grew steadily. Within two years, they were selling their products to five different municipalities. In 2017, over 35 products were sold to seven municipalities and via the newly installed cooperative shop (Interview Case B, Director Cooperative, 2017).

In case C, the secretary of agriculture successfully mobilized producers for a cooperative. With *“a vision to bring the producers to the market and. in the future, access other sales channels”* (Interview Case C, President cooperative, 2018), the secretary of agriculture mobilized producers to participate in the cooperative, which started to operate in 2017. Structuring the cooperative was supported by a group of “big” producers by allocating experience, material and financial resources. While

achieving to establish the cooperative, the secretary points out the challenge of convincing producers to take action towards a more entrepreneurial activity:

Small-scale farmers need to be involved, evolve, being entrepreneurs, and risk a little more. Luckily, we got the cooperative going, but it is not an easy task. We see a lot of municipalities that tried to establish cooperatives but did not succeed. (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2018)

In case A, rural extension organs and the municipal administration pushed producers to form organizations. The CATI aimed at provoking organization through conversations and workshops by specialists in cooperativism, and the public administration planned to limit the public calls to formal organizations. While attempts for procurement from formal organizations failed, producers led by the president of the rural workers union were initiating the process to establish a cooperative: *“The documentation is ready, what is missing is the money. But soon we will establish the cooperative to be able to supply for the PNAE”* (Interview Case A, President Rural Workers’ Union, 2017). In addition, a local producers association was trying to reorganize into a cooperative to better access public programs, specifically the PAA and PNAE:

We want to establish a cooperative as we have seen that there are various possibilities similar to the PNAE, such as the PAA. But we need to be organized in the cooperative. (Interview Case A, President Local Producer Association, 2017)

However, neither initiative materialized in the time of field research. Underlying social conflicts within and between different producer groups seem to inhibit trust and cooperation. The former secretary of agriculture emphasizes these challenges:

Our municipality has a very diverse producer structure. People from the North have a history of conflicts among them. They are traditional communities with a long-standing history in the municipality, but they have trust issues among them. People from the South arrived more recently, but with a rural producer identity. What is lacking is a solid relationship built on trust between all the actors. (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

Finally, the topic of missing trust and resistance to build a cooperative is prevalent in case D as well and inhibited meaningful initiatives for constructing associations. The house of agriculture, together with the ITESP, initiated the formation process but not yet with success:

Settlers, in comparison to conventional producers, did not arrive with a rural identity. We are in the process of construction with 60 families. We had three associations, but all with problems. Why? Because of specific interests. One

group wants to produce, the second group doesn't, and the third works outside of the settlement. (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017)

Initiatives for cooperative building or strengthening were successful in two municipalities. In both municipalities, the public administration recognized the formal producer organizations and started procuring from these cooperatives in substantial quantities (Cases B and C). This underlines the local development rationality of rural extension organs and that the articulation of producers in formal organizations is essential for market access.

Capacitate producers for commercial production

In addition to incentivizing formal organizations, capacity building was identified as a second activity for empowering actors to participate in the local translation actively. Family farmers in the case studies demonstrated a great diversity regarding preparedness to engage in formal contracts with municipal administrations. While some producers were highly trained in production techniques, e.g., hydroponic production, with high market orientation, others remained in very rudimentary modes of production. The latter has been characterized by an interviewee as *"if it rains, the plant grows well. If it doesn't, they do not water it, either"* (Case A, Administrative Director SFD, 2017).

In all case studies, courses to increase the technical and commercial capacity of family farmers were offered. Predominantly, courses were organized by the public organs and conducted by federal rural extension organs, which offer these courses free of charge. In case B, the cooperative accessed the federal capacity-building institutions directly.

Thematically, the vast majority of courses focused on technical aspects of production: productivity, product quality, sustainability of production. The rationale behind the capacity building was distilled by the cooperative director in case B:

Good products always find markets. This is why we invested in capacity building. We used the entire system of rural extension, all available academic resources for developing an exceptional quality standard. We tried to be efficient in the use of resources, soil, and water to produce more and better quality in less space. We reduced pesticides to create an environment of production for the future. (Interview Case B, Director Local Cooperative, 2017)

In case D, the rural extension organs recognized the low qualification, especially of the rural settlers consisting of a significant part of "new rurals." As an integral part of the settlement agreement, inhabitants are obliged to take up agriculture production. Hence, equipping them with all necessary production factors was essential. After

receiving productive land through the agrarian reform, producers now required substantial capacity building. Therefore, the local house of agriculture and ITESP cooperated in organizing a comprehensive series of capacitation workshops on technical issues and “*how to sell to the government*” to prepare them for market integration (Interview Case D, Representative ITESP, 2017).

Already before the reform, traditional producers in case A had been capacitated through a local NGO. During a multi-year project, producers had been instructed in pulp processing from a variety of local fruits. In addition, a common kitchen with a freezing container had been installed, allowing the community to produce in bulk and store the pulp (Interview Case A, President Local Producer Association, 2017).

5.4.1.3 Adapting

The third phase consists of *adapting*. Newly arriving ideas require preliminary adaptation for adoption in the local context. Generally, translation literature refers to adaptation by fitting the idea to the local context, following more or less systemized patterns (Røvik, 2016) or editing rules (K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996).

On the one side, local actors may adapt the idea in the process of local meaning creation to ensure a higher fit to the context. The degree to which local actors may mold the idea based on their rationality or interest varies according to the transformability of the idea (see ch. 2.4.1). In the case of the PNAE, the new idea is a law sanctioned by the federal government. Implementation is at least partly enforced by the FNDE, the state court of auditors, or CECANE. Therefore, the freedom to adapt and alter the idea is limited. However, local actors did use the leeway that the regulation leaves to adapt the idea to better fit local context and rationalities.

On the other hand, the adoption of a new idea may require local context adaptation. This is relevant in cases where actors do not enjoy high degrees of liberty to transform the idea, but implementation is required. Alternatively, actors may interpret the new idea as an improvement to the status quo and deliberately seek to change the local context to faithfully adopt the idea. Most cases analyzed in this research experienced local context adaptation, either concerning local structures or practices. Nonetheless, all instantiations shared that local actors initiating the adaptation were mobilized by a local development rationality aiming at integrating family farmer procurement.

The three identified forms of adapting – idea, structures, and practices – will be described in more detail in the following pages. **Table 8** below summarizes all specific activities that relate to the phase, including the initiating and involved actors as well as their respective guiding rationalities.

Case	Initiating Actor	Involved actors	Guiding rationality	Activities concerning the implementation	1st-order categories	2nd-order concepts	3rd-order constructs
A	Nutritionist II	Mayor	Local development	Build a cooling chamber to receive fresh products centrally	Create necessary infrastructure to implement FF procurement	Adapt local structures	Adapting
A	Nutritionist II	Mayor	Local development	Purchase a refrigerated truck for transportation			
C	SOA	CATI	Local development	Re-activate the house of agriculture (cooperation with CATI)	Re-activate municipal articulating organs		
D	Director House of Agriculture	Mayor	Local development	Re-activate the house of agriculture (cooperation with State rural extension organ)			
C	Producers willing to participate	CATI / House of Agriculture	Local development	Formalize producers (get necessary documentation)	Prepare producers for formal commercial relationships		
D	Producers willing to participate	CATI & ITESP / House of Agriculture	Local development	Formalize producers (get necessary documentation)			
A	Producers willing to participate	CATI & Union	Local development	Formalize producers (get necessary documentation)			
All cases	Nutritionist		Local development	Change the practice of menu development to structuring the menu around FF products	Focus the menu elaboration on FF products	Adapt local practices	
A	Nutritionist II		Local development / professional	Innovate new products for the school feeding based on FF products			
All cases	Procurement department		Bureaucratic	Establish public call as procurement modality	Adapting the procurement procedure		
A	Producers	CATI & Union	Economic / local development	Diversify production to better attend school feeding demand	Adapt production patterns		
B, C	Cooperative	Producers	Economic	Diversify production to better attend school feeding demand			
A	CAE / Nutritionist / SOA/ CATI / Union		Local development	Repurpose the CAE as operational decision-making & coordination organ	Alteration of idea elements	Adapting the idea	
D	Director of admin. support	Director House of Agriculture	Bureaucratic	Create local interpretation (local procurement as pre-condition)	Omission		
A	Producers		Local Development	Create local interpretation (FNDE funds for FF)	Addition		

Table 8: Data structure adapting phase (author)

5.4.1.3.1 Adapting Local Structures

To implement family farming procurement, actors in cases A, C, and D engaged in adapting local structures. All adaptations aimed at establishing or increasing the context readiness for adopting the new procurement practice. While some changes in structures consisted of establishing the necessary infrastructure to operationalize family farmer procurement, others focused on institutional strengthening of local agriculture within the municipal administration. Finally, to participate in public procurement procedures, a majority of producers required prior formalization.

Establish infrastructure for family farmer procurement

When nutritionist II assumed her position in case A, the school feeding had recently been reintegrated from formerly outsourced services. The school feeding department was not prepared for receiving family farming products due to lacking refrigerated storage space. On the other hand, requiring producers to deliver directly to schools on every week would impose prohibitively high barriers for family farmers for two reasons: First, logistics in the municipality are challenging due to long distances; and second, producers did not dispose of the resources and coordination capacities to bear these operational costs. Structures had to be adapted to enable the implementation of the local procurement, as nutritionist II confirms: *“I installed a cooling chamber at the school alimentation department. I made them construct one to receive the family farming products. There was no space for this, we had to build everything”* (Interview case A, Nutritionist II, 2017).

Delivering products to a centralized stock was a viable option for atomized family farmers. However, this transferred the logistic burden to the municipality. Hence, in addition to the cooling chamber, a refrigerated truck had to be purchased. With the adaptations, the public administration prepared for implementing family farmer procurement. Also, the commitment to foster local procurement over other forms of complying with the law demonstrates the predominant local development rationality.

Re-activate municipal organs for agriculture

In two other municipalities, C and D, the public administration did not dispose of a local organ for fostering agriculture when the new law came into force. However, a physical facility for supporting the local agriculture is central for effectively implementing the procurement practice. This has been underpinned throughout this research. Municipal organs for agriculture assume a central position in mobilizing and empowering producers as well as coordinating with other departments in the administration. They are a driving force for the translation of family farming procurement into the local context.

Therefore, local actors concerned with agriculture in both municipalities revitalized a physical facility – the house of agriculture – for mobilizing producers. In both cases, an agreement with the state secretary of agriculture was signed, securing the support of agronomists to assist producers in technical issues. In case C, the house of agriculture was re-opened in 2012: *“The house of agriculture was inactive for more than twenty years. We re-activated it, we got equipment from the CATI and an agronomist was allocated to the municipality”* (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2018).

A little later, in 2013, the new administration in Case D put a focus on agricultural public policies. With this resurged interest, a director for accessing public policies was nominated, and he initiated the re-installing of the house of agriculture. This happened similar to Case C, through an agreement with the state secretary ceding an agronomist for the municipality. The director explains the development as follows:

The house of agriculture was closed for fifteen years, and producers remained without technical assistance. With the new administration in 2013, the mayor was giving priority to agriculture policies, which were extinct in the previous administration. Before 2013, the administration did basically not recognize that agriculture existed in this municipality. (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017)

In addition to re-installing the houses of agriculture, both interviewees emphasized that the first step consisted of regaining the producers’ trust after a period of missing assistance. Only afterward, the processes of constructing, empowering, and capacitating were initiated. In the words of the secretary of agriculture: *“The producers, principally the family farmers, were suspicious. All of a sudden, they had an ally in me and technical support. But we first had to build up the relation of trust”* (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2018).

Formalize Producers

Except for case B, producers in the municipalities were insufficiently formalized to enter commercial relationships with the public administration. Family farmers must be registered with the tax authorities and possess a declaration of aptitude for the PRONAF (DAP) to participate in the PNAE procurement. The DAP serves factually as a certification that the rural establishment qualifies as a family farm. Public policies aiming at this category of producer require this document, which is emitted by state rural extension organs. The CATI representative in case A explains the local producer structure as follows:

You asked if producers were prepared to participate in the public procurement? No, in various aspects. We work here with traditional communities, as opposed to other municipalities, where producers are already organized. Here, from

around 60 producers in question, some 3-4 had documents necessary to participate. People did not even have fiscal registration to emit an invoice. (Interview Case A, Representative CATI, 2017)

Therefore, to prepare for participation in the PNAE, producers had to be formalized first. This involves a series of bureaucratic processes, in which producers were usually supported by rural extension organs, as the following statement underpins:

Many producers sold their products in corner stores. They were not registered. Suddenly, the municipality wanted to buy from these producers. What does it take? DAP. Then you have to check if the producer can get a DAP. They also need a fiscal registration. For this, you need to go to the union. (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

The director of the house of agriculture in case D made similar accounts by emphasizing the difficulty of not having the responsible organ for DAPs in the municipality. Therefore, the municipal actor accompanies producers to avoid missing documentation for obtaining the DAP:

When the producer approaches us, we inform him already which documents he needs, and we check the documents. We do the triage here so that when the producer arrives at the secretary, he does not miss anything. (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017)

Finally, one of the reasons for the delay in establishing the cooperative in case C was missing documentation from its members:

All the bureaucratic issues took a long time because we had many producers that did not even have the proper documentation. So, we first had to resolve this, and, therefore, we only started in 2017. (Interview Case C, President Local Cooperative, 2018)

To conclude, before the family farmer procurement could be implemented, the adaptation of local context structures was necessary. This involved establishing the necessary infrastructure as well as re-inaugurating local agriculture facilities for the effective mobilization of producers. Also, producers needed prior formalization. In addition to the act of obtaining documents, this process transitioned the local agriculture from the informal to the formal market.

5.4.1.3.2 Adapting Local Practices

To prepare to transfer the new law into practice, actors engaged in adapting local practices. On the one side, implementing family farming procurement required changes in menu elaboration and procurement practices within the municipal

administration. On the other side, producers also adapted their practices to support adoption.

Integrating family farmer products

The necessity to integrate family farmer products into the menu – and therewith connected procurement requests – required changing the menu development practice. Before the reform, nutritionists in all observed cases demonstrated a similar procedure to compose the menu. In a first step, the annual product demand was calculated based on the number of students and days of lecture. The foundation of the menu was thereby quite stable. The federal nutritional requirements⁵³ for carbohydrates, vitamins, proteins, etc., were translated into basic products for a meal, e.g., rice, beans, meat, salads, and fruits. Second, based on these calculations, the nutritionist files the procurement request for an annual supply contract. Third, based on the available products, the definitive menu was developed either on an annual (Case A), monthly (Cases B, C), or weekly (Case D) basis.

From local family farmers, predominantly fruits and vegetables were integrated into the school feeding program. Before the reform, nutritionists procured these products entirely from conventional providers without considering the origin of products. With the reform, the menu elaboration practice was expanded. Before filing the request for procurement, nutritionists have to engage with the local producer community to assess local production (FNDE, 2016).

All nutritionists in the case studies started to consider local production. A nutritionist in Case B explains how family farming production was initiated: *“Relatively early, we had a meeting with the cooperative manager to define what products could be sourced by local farmers. We were able to substitute certain CEASA [wholesale market] products with theirs”* (Interview Case B, Nutritionist III, 2020).

The commitment to family farmer product inclusion varied between nutritionists. Some nutritionists specifically focused their menu on integrating more products and innovated new meals to increase the quota. For example, Nutritionist II in case A developed a new bread recipe with local fruit pulp. Fruit pulp was a major product for a group of producers (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017).

⁵³ *Resolução CD/FNDE 26/2013* prescribes meticulously in Section II, what percentage of the daily nutritional needs are to be covered in each stage of basic education. Also, the school menu has to include three weekly servings of fruits and green salads (Art. 14). Furthermore, limits for saturated and trans fats, sodium as well as simple sugars are imposed (Art. 16).

Adapting the procurement procedure

The procurement of family farmer products is carried out through a special modality: the public call. Unlike conventional procurement, the call is addressed only at family farmers and their organizations, thereby following a clear cascade of local, regional, state, and federal levels. *“The law always prioritizes the local”* (Interview Case C, Director Procurement Department, 2018). Also, in the spirit of a redistribution policy, public authorities research the prices and fix them in the call. Therefore, price concurrence is waived (Art. 14, Lei 11.947/2009). Although the public call is not a newly created modality, it is usually not used for the procurement of spot market goods. This change in procurement practice caused resistance by procurement departments as the former secretary of agriculture in case A complained:

Often, we had problems because the actual purchase is made by the procurement department and not the education secretary. They perform the process, and they are not used to public calls for purchases. We had serious problems concerning procurement because the PNAE legislation prescribes something, but the administration secretary wants to use the 8.666 [conventional procurement law]. (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

A relevant difference between public call contracts and conventional price registers is the allocation of funds. As public calls are concluded with contracts, they oblige the municipality to procure the contractually stipulated value. This is in contrast to the price register, where the winner of the bidding is obliged to offer the product at an agreed price for the quantity and period in the register. Therefore, in public calls, the budget is earmarked throughout the entire contract period, whereas this is not the case for the price register. Therefore, the municipality *“needs the budget already earmarked for a public call, but not for the price register”* (Interview Case B, Director Procurement Department, 2017).

Diversify Production for PNAE

Producers also engaged in practice adaptation to improve integration into the policy. While nutritionists assessed the local production, producers reacted to the demand of the municipal administration. They started diversifying their production, aligning it with prospective procurement. The CATI representative in case A described the transition precisely: *“When the law started, around 15 producers were delivering to the school feeding program. They provided predominantly banana and manioc. Then, when the 9’000⁵⁴ arrived, the process diversification started”* (Interview Case A, Representative CATI, 2017).

⁵⁴ The 9000 are referring to the initial limit per DAP, which was at BRL 9’000.- per producer (*Resolução/CD/FNDE* n° 38/2009). This value was changed to BRL 20’000.- per DAP with Art. 32 of the *Resolução FNDE* N° 26 in 2013.

The cooperative in case B was exemplary for the adaptation to the new market opportunity. The cooperative drastically increased the variety of products from 22 to 36 products and implemented a comprehensive annual production planning:

When we started to work with the municipalities, we had to work on regularizing the production. We initiated a production schedule so that we were able to provide a steady supply throughout the year. In addition, we created redundancies with at least three producers for the same product. If something happens to one, we have others to supplement. (Interview Case B, Director Local Cooperative, 2017)

With the diversification strategy, the cooperative went from delivering to one municipality in 2009 to seven in 2017. In cases without a cooperative, e.g., in case A, rural extension organs stepped in to coordinate diversification between producers. Finally, individual producers started to produce certain items just to attend the public administration: *"I currently deliver two products to the municipality, which I started to plant only for this purpose"* (Interview Case D, Local producer, 2017).

5.4.1.3.3 Adapting the Idea

The local adaption process mainly focused on adapting the local context to fit the legal requirements. This may, as argued before, be grounded in the low transformability of the idea due to its regulative character. Laws are prone to demand faithful translations when the issuer has a strong authority base, and implementation is prescribed to a high degree (Røvik, 2011).

Nevertheless, in the process of understanding, local actors interpreted the law against their rationality and adapted it to fit the local context or interest. They did so in adding, omitting, or altering elements of the idea (see ch. 2.4.1).

Municipal representatives in all cases omitted the possibility to procure family farming products from outside the local context. While cases A and B successfully implemented local family farmer procurement and case A later complemented from outside the municipality, cases C and D did not. They claimed missing local production. What is more, neither of these municipalities launched a procurement call to attract family farmers from outside the local community. Representatives in case D even explicitly omitted the possibility of procuring outside from their municipality. In their narrative, the preference given to local products changed into a precondition for being allowed to launch public calls for regional, state, or nationwide procurement. In the words of the financial and administrative director:

The program prescribes that the procurement be first made in the municipal context, and only afterward in regional, state and federation. This really complicates it for us because we do not have sufficient local producers. (Interview Case D, Administrative Director SOE, 2018)

The director of the house of agriculture, although not proposing the order as strictly, support this claim by dividing different geographical reaches into phases:

We are now launching a call for rice and milk, which will not be from the municipality, but at least from family farmers. If you procure from outside, you are already in the second phase. (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017)

While local producers enjoy priority in procurement, it is not a condition to first having signed contracts with local producers to be allowed to source from beyond municipal frontiers. However, this adaption of the idea seems to support the bureaucratic rationality prevalent in the secretary of education. In addition, it may be of interest for the administration to focus on the municipal economy for political reasons.

In case study A, local actors altered the attributions and competences of the CAE. As a civil society organ, the CAE has the legal attribution to accompany the correct implementation of the PNAE and audit the financial statements. However, the local actors repurposed it as a coordination forum for local translation (see ch. 5.4.1.2.2) and granted it extensive decision powers over operational issues. Nutritionist II repeatedly referred to the necessity of getting approval from the CAE: *“Everything has to be approved by the CAE first”* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017). The union leader states: *“What the CAE decides, the mayor has to follow”* (Interview Case A, President Rural Workers’ Union, 2017). Other actors did even attribute the power to set rules for paying the maximum surplus for organic products or dismissing the nutritionist if the CAE is unsatisfied with the work (Interview Case A, Researcher APTA, 2017).

This concentration of power in the CAE is a clear alteration of function. It was most pronounced during a period when most actors followed a local development rationality, and integrating family farming was imperative – even beyond the 30%. Establishing a local “legislative” organ served as a legitimizing vehicle for justifying decision to favor family farmer procurement that went far beyond the legal minimum. After the change in administration in 2017, the CAE was repurposed to its legal mandate, losing part of its power to push family farmer issues. The administrative director of the school feeding department in Case A concisely describes the repurposing of the CAE in the administration 2013-2017:

The past administration gave so much priority to family farmer procurement that the CAE meetings, where you have the focus on auditing the school feeding, had been transformed into a family farmer meeting. (Interview Case A, Administrative Director SFD, 2017)

Finally, local producers created a narrative that federal funds are reserved for procurement from family farmers. Funds not used for family farming will return to the

FNDE. This led to the repeatedly uttered argument that the municipality prefers to return funds rather than buying products from family farmers. However, legally, the municipalities only need to use 30% for family farmer procurement.

They continue to buy from companies. Why? If you can buy the products with money from the federal government when there is no money for nothing, why not use that money? . . . They are buying from companies with the municipal budget.
(Interview Case A, Local Producer, 2017)

To conclude, adaptation in the case studies showed a clear emphasis on local context adaptation. Infrastructure had been installed, and rural extension organs revived as preliminary activities for adopting the new procurement practice.

5.4.1.4 Implementing

The fourth analytical process phase – *implementing* – concerns transferring the idea into practice. Whilst preceding phases focus on preparatory actions, implementing enacts the actual practice within the local context. Actors have been exposed to the new law, made meaning out of it against their own rationalities, and understood its implications. Accordingly, they mobilized allies and resources to activate essential agents for implementation and adapted both the local context and the idea to increase the fit for adoption.

Whereas preparatory activities consisted partly of individual actions and partly of collective interactions, implementing the new procurement practices requires the concerted efforts of local actors. This includes the public administration as well as the producers.

Also, while the translation process as a whole may be repeated over time, e.g., because of changing administrations, the implemented practice is constantly reoccurring. Therefore, the practice may be further reinforced through positive feedback loops, such as positively evaluated outcomes from family farming procurement or innovations that facilitate its repeated implementation. Conversely, negative outcomes or opposition from local actors may discourage the future implementation of the practice. Reinforcing and discouraging focuses on the evolution of the practice based on incremental adjustments to improve or undermine the practice after its implementation. This is in contrast to the adaptation phase, which conceptualizes adapting the local context for the translation process from idea exposure to routine.

The intrinsic cases started implementing the practice earlier in comparison to the extrinsic cases. Naturally, actors in intrinsic cases had more experience with family

farming procurement. Therefore, insights for this chapter will predominantly draw on cases A and B.

This research focuses less on the practice itself but rather on the perceptions of local actors and how these influence the translation process. This focus had methodological implications for this section. The enacted procurement practice was analyzed based on the FNDE step-by-step manual to identify possible deviations. The deductive approach contrasts with the grounded theory method applied to identify translation work along the process, including the reinforcing and discouraging elements of implementation. Therefore,

Table 9 (p. 159) reflects the data structure for reinforcing and discouraging elements, and **Table 10** (pp. 160-161) presents the enacted practice compared to the FNDE manual.

5.4.1.4.1 Enacting Practice

All case study municipalities implemented family farmer procurement, albeit in varying degrees of intensity and regularity. Case B adopted the practice as early as 2010 and implemented annual calls with increasing volumes. In case A, the practice was implemented firstly on a small scale, before a second cycle of the translation process led to extensive adoption. Case A was most affected by changing administrations, which influenced the practice regarding intensity and regularity. Case D started local family farming procurement in 2016 by contracting local producers. While local procurement has been perpetuated with contract extensions, a second, and this time regional, call for rice and milk powder was issued in 2017. Case C initiated family farmer procurement in 2017 and immediately sourced nearly 30%.

In performing the practice, local actors enact the new law. In the context of this research, the practice in question is family farming procurement for the school feeding program. This practice consists of a series of actions performed by various actors. **Table 10** below consolidates the different actions of the family farming procurement practice for all four case studies. It indicates involved actors for each activity. The structure of the table is oriented at the FNDE step-by-step manual (see ch. 3.2.2.2) as municipal practices reflected the federal guideline relatively adequately.

Analyzing the practices demonstrates that the actual procurement process was implemented quite homogeneously in all case municipalities. This similarity between cases is based on the fact that the actual procurement procedure is highly formalized and regulated due to its integration into the wider administrative routine of public procurement. Differences emerged mainly in activities that rely on contextual factors, such as mobilizing producers or operationalization of delivery.

Case	Initiating Actor	Involved actors	Guiding rationality	Activities concerning the implementation	1st-order categories	2nd-order concepts	3rd-order constructs
B	Nutritionist		Economic	Local FF products facilitate operations and are cheaper	Practice as improvement	Reinforcing practice	Implementing
All cases	Nutritionist		Professional	FF procurement increased quality of products			
A, B, C	Nutritionist		Local development	Maintain menu ambiguous to allow for substitution or announce substitute products	Prioritize novel practice		
A, B	Nutritionist		Local development	Include more varieties from one to the next call			
B	Nutritionist	Procurement department	Local development	Reserve product categories for public call, only residual value for conventional procurement			
A	Mun. admin. nutritionist		Bureaucratic	Synchronize the public call duration with fiscal year to improve transparency and reduce administrative burden	Refine practice		
A	Mun. admin. nutritionist		Economic	Redefine prices in 3 month intervall			
A	Nutritionist III		Bureaucratic	Parallel procurement and not being flexible for substitution	Insist on compliance	Discouraging practice	
A	Nutritionist III		Bureaucratic	Insisting on rules without consideration of producer limitations			
D, A	Nutritionist	Procurement department	Bureaucratic	Extend contracts instead of opening new calls	Avoiding practice		
A	Nutritionist III	producers	Bureaucratic	SFD does not order products that are in the contract			
A	SFD		Bureaucratic	Delaying public call due to (anticipated) problems			
A	Producers	SFD	Bureaucratic	Producers do not deliver to agreed times	Emphasize operational problems		
A	SFD		Bureaucratic	Secretary of education does not have sufficient logistic staff			
A	SFD		Bureaucratic	Producers do not respect logistic and quality requirement			
A	Producers	SFD	Bureaucratic	Fraudulent practices by farmers			

Table 9: Data structure implementing phase (author)

FNDE Manual		Case Studies									
Step by step guideline		Case A			Case B			Case C		Case D	
		Actors	Activities	Actors	Activities	Actors	Activities	Actors	Activities	Actors	Activities
1	Determine Budget	Secretary of Education, administrative department secr. of ed.	The municipality fulfills the 30% rule. FNDE budget is complemented by other sources of resources. Controversy on how to optimally allocate resources and which quota should be reserved for FF procurement.	Secretary of education, administrative and financial director secr. of ed.	The municipality fulfills the 30% rule. FNDE budget is complemented by other sources of resources. Controversy on how to optimally allocate resources and which quota should be reserved for FF procurement.	Secretary of education, administrative and financial director secr. of ed.	Determine 30% of the FNDE cash transfer as budget for FF procurement.	Secretary of education, administrative and financial director secr. of ed.	Determine 30% of the FNDE cash transfer as budget for FF procurement.		
2	Articulation between nutritionist and producers	Nutritionist, secretary of agriculture, union, CATI producers (cooperatives)	The union and CATI consolidate local productions to be communicated to the nutritionist.	Nutritionist, cooperative	The communication between nutritionist and local cooperative is direct. This includes the information about the annual production as well as weekly delivery coordination.	Nutritionist, secretary of agriculture, producers	Nutritionist receives the annual production from the secretary of agriculture, which shares the office with the cooperative.	Nutritionist, house of agriculture, producers	Nutritionist receives the annual production from the secretary of agriculture, which shares the office with the cooperative.		The house of agriculture coordinates local production mapping and informs nutritionist. Only one call in 2016. Afterwards extended contracts without new public call for local products. Procurement for non-perishable products in 2017 from regional cooperative.
3	Menu Elaboration	Nutritionist	Nutritionists calculate the annual demand based on legally required nutritional values. The menu usually consists of carbohydrates, proteins and vitamins. Family farmer products are considered for vegetables and fruits. Since 2015, FF procurement also for beans and rice. All nutritionists elaborate the menu for an entire year.	Nutritionist	Nutritionist calculates the annual demand based on legally required nutritional values. The menu usually consists of carbohydrates, proteins and vitamins. Family farmer products are considered for vegetables and fruits. The entire request for vegetables and fruits is first reserved for FF, only secondarily for other suppliers. Based on the annual request, the nutritionist elaborates the menu for a month.	Nutritionist	Nutritionist calculates the annual demand based on legally required nutritional values. The menu usually consists of carbohydrates, proteins and vitamins. Family farmer products are considered for vegetables and fruits. Based on the annual request, the nutritionist elaborates the menu for a month.	Nutritionists	Nutritionist calculates the annual demand based on legally required nutritional values. The menu usually consists of carbohydrates, proteins and vitamins. Family farmer products are considered for vegetables and fruits. Based on the annual request, the nutritionist elaborates the menu for a month, publish it weekly.		Job sharing between two nutritionists, one for daycare centers and one for schools. Nutritionists calculate the annual demand based on legal nutritional values. The menu usually consists of carbohydrates, proteins and vitamins. Family farmer products are considered for vegetables and fruits. Based on the annual request, the nutritionists elaborate the menu for a month, publish it weekly.
4	Price Research	Department of School Alimentation, Secretary of agriculture, CAE	Price research in 3 local markets: farmers market, supermarkets, regional cooperatives. Since 2018: price research every 3 months to reflect oscillating market prices.	Procurement Department	First years of implementation, the price research oriented on price from regional wholesale markets. With accruing experience, the municipality gets three reference prices from regional cooperatives.	Procurement Department, secretary of agriculture	Procurement department leads the process of price research. The secretary of agriculture provides support to quote three prices. Prices levelled to consider price fluctuation during the contract period.	Procurement Department	Procurement department leads the process of price research. The secretary of agriculture provides support to quote three prices. Prices levelled to consider price fluctuation during the contract period.		For local products research is conducted in three local supermarkets. For regional products, prices research done with regional cooperatives.

Table 10: Family farming procurement practices in case studies (author based on collected data & FNDE manual)

5.4.1.4.2 Reinforcing Practice

Various supporting factors were identified that reinforced the implemented practice of family farmer procurement. Reinforcing refers hereby to fostering an environment for more extensive implementation within the municipal context. The factors consisted of positive evaluation of the outcome, strategies to prioritize family farmer procurement, and concrete actions to refine the practice.

Practice as improvement

The first, and probably the most impactful, reinforcing element is perceiving the new practice as an improvement. For example, all nutritionists confirmed that product quality increased when the municipality started to procure from family farmers. The argument in favor of family farmer products is twofold: First, local product circuits allow for fresher products since the distance between field and school is shortened. *“The products are local. Our lettuce did not come from anywhere in São Paulo, pass through the CEASA [wholesale market] before it is delivered to us”* (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017). What is more, the short circuits allowed for the integration of products that were not purchased before: *“We were able to integrate strawberries and guava. This was not possible before because products had always gone bad before they arrived here”* (Interview Case B, Nutritionist III, 2020).

Second, nutritionists were unsatisfied with product quality from wholesale providers. Products often arrived in bad condition – *“rotten onions and apples brown inside”* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017). The CATI representative in case B explains the low quality as follows:

Unfortunately, the wholesale and supermarkets sell the refuse to public schools. They buy cheap products and sell them at a good price to schools. They present good products in the bidding but deliver the bad quality, and for the school chefs, it is difficult to refuse on the spot. (Interview Case B, Representative CATI, 2017)

In addition to a leap in quality, nutritionist II in case B informs that, in their case, products from family farmer organizations are also procured at a lower price. Finally, operationalization is easier when the producer is local. If products are not as required, the cooperative resolves the issue immediately.

Prioritize local production

Nutritionists developed strategies to prioritize family farmer products. These are divided into actions before launching a public call and during its implementation. First, nutritionists aim at increasing the share of family farmer products in procurement. Case B, for example, reserves all vegetables and fruits they procure for family farmers and only subsequently opens the product category to conventional bidding: *“We*

complement products that the cooperative does not supply with conventional bidding, but the cooperative does deliver a lot" (Interview Case B, Director School Alimentation Department, 2017).

Through this prioritization, family farmer products were successively integrated. While case B restricted family farmers to vegetables and fruits, municipalities A and D increased their share in integrating new product categories. Next to exploiting more diverse local products, both cases started to procure rice and milk from cooperatives – either from the other regions (D) or states (A). The nutritionist in case D confirms: *"We have already initiated a call for rice and milk from cooperatives to be procured next year."* (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017).

Second, strategies during the operationalization of family farmer procurement supported successful implementation. Nutritionists in cases A and B explicitly designed their menu in an ambiguous way to allow for product substitutions. They did not specify types of salad or fruits in the published menu. If producers are not able to provide one product, they are allowed to replace it with another. The nutritionist in case C published a list of allowed substitute products already with the call. As an example, follows the explanation from Nutritionist II in case A:

If they didn't have one product, we put another one. Planning is one thing; reality is another. If they couldn't provide lettuce, they provided any other green salad. For fruits, I already put seasonal fruits; for pulp, seasonal pulp. We gave this flexibility. Otherwise, it would have been very difficult to follow the menu. (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017)

Refine practice

Finally, as a reaction to two problems that arose during earlier enactments, case municipality A refined the family farming procurement practice.

To balance the high price volatility throughout the year, the administration started to conduct the price research every three months instead of once before launching the public call, as was done before. During harvest, the market tends to be flooded with products, and prices drop. Conversely, during "off-season," prices increase over the market average. This poses two problems for an annual price fixation: First, depending on which season the price research falls, prices may be too low or high. Whereas low prices are advantageous for the administration, high prices may unnecessarily burden the budget, or products may be not sourced in necessary quantities or not at all. The second problem, closely related to the former, is product delivery. If prices paid by the administration fall below the market price, producers stop delivering to the school food program and sell their products on the spot market to increase profit. On the other hand, when public prices are above market prices, it opens the door for fraudulent

practice. Producers buy products on the spot market and re-sell them to the public administration with profit. Both cases occurred in the case municipality.

It already happened that we did procure local bananas and then the guy brings them in boxes of a wholesale market. These bananas were from another region. You see that the guy did not plant them. (Interview Case A, Administrative Director School Alimentation Department, 2017)

To solve the problem of inadequate prices, the municipal actors re-interpreted the legislation for local needs. Beginning with the public call in 2018, the public administration started to periodically reassess prices to adapt to price fluctuations (Art. 9.1, Public Call 03/2018 Case A).⁵⁵

Furthermore, to reduce the bureaucratic burden and increase transparency for producers, the administration planned to synchronize contract duration with the calendar year, guaranteeing that contracts terminate at year-end. So far, the contract duration and the financial year were incongruent, which led to bureaucratic challenges. First, the annual limit per producer and municipality of BRL 20'000.- is fixed for the calendar year. Contracts with a different timeline force the administration to divide the procurement from individual producers between two calendar years to respect the legal limitations. Also, purchases from earlier contracts in the same calendar year have to be considered for succeeding contracts. Second, contracts require the administration to block contractually agreed resources for their duration. The remaining balances of each contract need to be rescheduled to the same contract for the following year. Besides the additional administrative process, the FNDE limits the transfer to 30% of the annual budget (Art. 38 XX lit. a, *CD/FNDE Resolução 26/2013*). To avoid this unnecessary bureaucracy, the municipal administration wanted to seize the delay in publishing a call in 2017 to restart new contracts at the beginning of 2018:

We are planning to initiate the contracts in January 2018. They will work from January to December 2018. The contracts used to work from July to July, but the producer can sell [BRL] 20000.-. There was always the issue that producers had a positive balance when the new year started. This was a little complicated, and we want to improve this. (Interview Case A, CAE President, 2017)

⁵⁵ Even though price adjustments were possible before this innovation, they required the producers to request an additive term for the contract, which means engaging in an additional bureaucratic process. Compared to the possibility of selling on the spot market, these are high transaction costs, which disincentivize requesting price adjustments for public contracts. This is also reflected in the case study, where only two contracts have been adapted to grant a better price to producers (Municipal transparency portal, Case A).

5.4.1.4.3 Discouraging Practice

In contrast to reinforcing activities, municipal actors also emphasized elements that discouraged the further implementation of family farmer procurement. By discouraging practices, local actors, mainly from within the municipal administration, hampered more extensive adoption of the procurement practice. Namely, these elements consisted of insisting on bureaucratic processes, avoiding the practice, and emphasizing the operational problems.

The conceptualization of discouraging practices relies on data from cases with more experience in implementing the practice through repeated procurement cycles. These are mostly the intrinsic cases. Both cases underwent changes in the municipal administration, and hence, the practice was implemented with different actor constellations and rationalities at work. Actors therefore perceived relative differences from one administration to the next and evaluated their handling of the practice accordingly. For example, in case A, nutritionist II showed a clear orientation towards a local development rationality, which was backed by the political interest of the administration. Hence, the procurement practice was strongly promoted during this period in spite of challenging implementation. Over time, this changed as nutritionist III, associated with a strong bureaucratic logic, entered the department. With the new administration two years later, the actor constellation tilted towards a focus on administrative processes with low interest in taking on the effort to structure local value chains.

Following the letter of the law, not its spirit

Municipal actors had various strategies to deal with family farmers. While some nutritionists remained flexible for the new practice to settle in, others did strongly focus on compliance with rules. While compliance with the regulation is, of course, mandatory, it sometimes appeared as justification to discard the new practice in favor of conventional procurement. While not specifically referencing only to the municipal administration in case B, the CATI representative expresses his experience in the following words:

They create impediments. I think the municipalities find it easier to deal with wholesale providers. It seems that difficulties are created instead of facilitating the process in the sense of "there is a document missing etc." (Interview Case B, Representative CATI, 2017)

As a precursor for most discouraging practices, nutritionists in all cases engaged in parallel procurement. That is, all products that are purchased via family farmer contracts were also procured via a conventional price register. In contrast to a contract, the price register does not oblige to actually procure the product. It serves as a pre-

fixed price agreement for the case the municipality requests the item. Therefore, the price register functions as insurance for the nutritionist if the family farmers' delivery falls short. Parallel procurement can serve as an enabling and discouraging factor, depending on how the nutritionist seizes the possibility of substituting. On the one hand, it allows to also procure smaller quantities from family farmers complemented by conventional products. Furthermore, it takes pressure from the process of installing a new practice since a backup option exists.

However, on the other hand, it also constitutes a strategic option to avoid family farmer procurement more easily. For example, in contrast to the reinforcing strategy of substituting products, parallel procurement facilitates rejecting an alternative option based on regulations and turning to procurement from conventional providers instead. The statement of nutritionist III in case A emphasizes this clearly:

Concerning the family farmers, I put the products on the price registration minutes of a local supplier as well. If the farmers let me down and call me: "I don't have kale," I order from the supermarket because I need kale. I am obliged to serve vegetables. (Interview Case A, Nutritionist III, 2017)

Furthermore, nutritionists may insist on relatively high sanitary and packaging standards for family farmers to comply with, as the following example shows:

They had no sanitary vigilance whatsoever, but I started to require things. They delivered products in their cars, packaged in bags. Where are the plastic boxes? Where is all the compliance with the CVS5 [Nutrition Regulation for Sanitary Control]? They didn't have any quality standard, and since I have been here, I did not accept it this way, no matter what the other administration did. (Interview Case A, Nutritionist III, 2017)

Sanitary vigilance varies between product categories. Unprocessed *in natura* vegetal products, as were mainly sourced, are exempt from a governmental analysis. Nutritionists and school employees check products upon arrival for their characteristics and quality. Processed products need analysis from competent federal, state, or municipal agencies. Animal products are usually analyzed by the municipal inspection service of the agricultural secretary (FNDE, 2016).

Avoid practice

In addition to a strong emphasis on regulation, municipal administrations demonstrated strategies to avoid more extensive implementation of the family farmer procurement. First, public calls were replaced by extending existing contracts with producers. For example, in case A, instead of publishing a follow-up call, contracts with producers were prolonged for two months as a producer confirms:

If they had a real interest, they would start planning a new call some months before the contract ends. But that is not what happened. They extended some contracts with producers that still had a capacity [from the BRL 20'000 limit] for two months. (Interview Case A, Local Producer, 2017)

Case D launched the first public call in 2016 with a handful of producers. Since then, the contracts had been extended several times. During a time when producers started to organize themselves to provide more items, this practice inhibits increasing the quota of family farmers. In addition, by extending contracts, prices are not renegotiated:

When the first cycle was about to end, they did not do a new public call but stayed with the producers that were already providing, renewing the contract for another year. But since there was no public call, there was no price negotiation. (Interview Case D, Agrarian Reform Producer, 2017)

Also, producers report that municipalities were purposefully delaying public calls. In case A, for example, the administration did not renew the expiring public call in July 2017. The nutritionist initially justified this step with the missing communication of a harvest plan from family farmers that serves as the basis for the public call. While waiting for said list, the department was informed that the following year's overall budget would be decreased.⁵⁶ his new information convinced the administration to wait to publish a new call until the definitive budget is confirmed. Thereby, the procured value from family farmers may be reduced.

I was waiting for the producers to deliver the list. In September, they did not bring the list. In October, we have been informed that the budget will decrease next year. So, we decided not to launch a new public call and wait until we have the confirmed budget. If the budget decreases from 5 to 3.5 million, how do we earmark one million for the family farmers? (Interview Case A, Nutritionist III, 2017)

While budget restrictions impact the procurement practice and a reduction of family farming contracts may be adequate, canceling it altogether indicates a certain reluctance to engage in local family farmer procurement. Two factors second this. First, according to producers, the nutritionist was informed about the production (Interview Case A, President Local Producers Association, 2017). Second, procurement from a cooperative did not decline in 2017. In contrast to local producers,

⁵⁶ The global budget is composed of FNDE funds and contribution from the municipality. This budget cuts are due to reduction in the municipal contribution as the federal funds are based on the number of students enrolled *Resolução CD/FNDE No 26/2013, Art.38.*

the cooperative did deliver to schools directly. Concerning workload generated for the school alimentation department, this resembles conventional procurement.

Finally, Producers claim that the parallel procurement allowed nutritionists to circumvent contracts with family farmers. Producers in case A and B informed that the administration did not procure the entire quantity but instead reduced procuring due to menu changes to items the family farmers do not provide. The director of the local cooperative in case B says:

The producer focuses his production on the program. In one week, the nutritionist says that she wants 100 broccolis. In the next week, she changes her menu and does not order any of them. The producer relied on this demand and now passes the tractor over his broccolis because he has no market to sell them. (Interview Case B, Director Local Cooperative, 2017)

In case A, the municipality stopped procuring fruit pulp from local producers as apparently the blenders, which are needed to mix the pulp into juice, showed defects in all but two schools. While nutritionist III argued that the initiated procurement process did not render a provider, other municipal agents informed that the budget was insufficient to replace the blenders (Interview Case A, Secretary of Education, 2017). The nutritionist started procuring juice boxes from an industrial producer instead. A producer in case A confirms this avoidance practice and adds his explanation why this is possible despite valid contracts: *“The contract has no value whatsoever because there are no punishments for breach. The contract says that I will buy from you, but in fact, I am not obliged to buy”* (Interview Case A, Local Family Farmer, 2017).

Emphasizing operational challenges

Discouraging practices did not exclusively originate within the municipal administration. In case A, producers repeatedly did not meet delivery deadlines and provided the goods with a delay. This interfered with the schedule of distributing the products from the central stock to schools. These problems persisted over time, as nutritionist II and nutritionist III mentioned. Nevertheless, also regarding this issue, the tonality between the two statements seems to be slightly different with nutritionist II being more comprehensive than nutritionist III:

More or less. They organized themselves, but sometimes they delivered with a delay, sometimes not all the products did arrive in one day, they delivered in two or three times. But ok, we remained flexible in the beginning to make the thing happen. Not everything was perfect, but that's life. (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017)

Family farmers do not deliver to schools directly but to our department here. Every Monday morning at 7 am, they should deliver, but they deliver at 7, 8, 11 am. They delay a lot. Sometimes, they deliver even the next day. They are very unorganized. (Interview Case A, Nutritionist III, 2017)

Connected to the delivery of products was the issue of inadequate packaging. Producers used inadequate packaging or transport to deliver goods. Transport issues were mainly related to missing adequate vehicles to transportation greater quantities. However, producers did not manage to organize joint transport, either due to geographical distance, personal differences or missing willingness to share the costs (Interview Case A, Representative CATI, 2017). When products arrived at the department for school food, they often did so in inadequate packaging. While the majority of cases concern inadequate boxes for *in natura* products, which is less problematic, cases concerned with processed products were more serious. This led to rejections of products.

We see things here that you would not believe. For example, one time, a producer arrived here with a processed product. Processed products need to be in a primary sealed packaging and in a secondary layer. The primary packaging was ok, but the second layer of packaging was an empty bag of dog food. Of course, we had to reject it. (Administrative Director SFD, Case A, 2017)

Since 2016, the municipality has started to better specify requirements for transport and packaging in public calls to react to these challenges. On one side, the clauses of public calls clearly mention control mechanisms and rejection criteria. On the other, the list of products to be procured already indicates which products require special packaging or cooled transportation (Public calls 2016, 2018, 2019, Municipal Transparency Portal, Case A).

In line with promised improvements through better specifying requirements, the administration followed higher ambitions with resolving the logistical challenge. All interviewed actors in the school feeding department and the secretary of education set out a vision that producers one day will deliver directly to schools.⁵⁷

The ideal would be that the producers organized themselves and achieved to deliver directly to the schools. This would be interesting for us and a big step forward for them. I think that logistics is our biggest challenge today. (Interview Case A, Secretary of Education, 2017)

⁵⁷ This includes nutritionist III, a further representative of the School Alimentation Department and the education secretary at the time of the interviews in October and November 2017.

This statement underpins the intention to streamline the logistic process and to reduce the workload for the administration. Besides this being a natural objective, it reflected the tense personnel situation in the school feeding department at the time. The department was understaffed due to the termination of the outsourcing contract, which included chauffeurs for school delivery as well, as the administrative director informs: *“For the producers, it is difficult to master the logistical challenge, but the administration has internal problems, too, regarding the distribution. We are short of chauffeurs and vehicles”* (Interview Case A, Administrative Director SFD, 2017).

The geographical situation of the municipality aggravates the logistics challenge. Case municipality A stretches over almost 100km while being scarcely populated. School chauffeurs usually need two days to deliver all the products. Considering this situation and the degree of producer organization, it does not seem very likely that the producers will be able to start delivering to schools anytime soon.

Finally, as described in “refining practice” (see ch. 5.4.1.4.2), producers delivered items to the school feeding program that were not originated from their productions. The re-selling to the municipal administration occurred in Case A. This fraudulent practice is explicitly prohibited as it undermines the idea of strengthening family farming.

To conclude, the implementing phase showed that all municipalities successfully enacted the procurement practice locally. The formal practice of procuring from family farmers was, in addition, implemented in a relatively homogeneous way, as the comparison with the FNDE manual showed. Furthermore, the practice had been both reinforced and undermined during its repeated implementation. Most intriguing in this respect is the case transformation from predominantly reinforcing elements to undermining practices in Case A.

5.4.1.5 Institutionalizing

The fifth and final phase of the local translation process, institutionalizing, describes the transition from the implementation phase to a stabilized practice. Practices are stabilized when they have achieved a certain regularity in terms of enactment and are perceived as legitimate. Actors decreasingly question the rationale behind the new practice and start to perceive it as conventional.

From the analyzed case studies, only municipality B institutionalized the family farmer procurement to a notable degree. This is based both on the observable practices as well as on the cognitive level. **Table 11** summarizes the aspect of institutionalizing.

Case	Initiating Actor	Involved actors	Guiding rationality	Activities concerning the implementation	1st-order categories	2nd-order concepts	3rd-order constructs
B	Nutritionist	Procurement Department	Bureaucratic	Following the process of edital elaboration of earlier years	Taking the FF procurement process for granted	Institutionalizing practice	Institutionalizing
B	Mun. admin.	Cooperative	Local development	Launching public calls every year	Reoccurring implementation		

Table 11: Data structure institutionalizing phase (author)

First, the frequency and regularity with which the family farmer procurement practice had been enacted since its inception imply stabilization. Since 2010, the municipality launched public calls every year with increasing volumes until stagnating on a level twice as high as legally mandated. In comparison with other case studies, this extensive implementation is unique.

Second, since the implementation of the practice, the municipality administration has changed. As shown in other case studies, replacing actors impacted the enactment of the practice. In case C, procurement was only initiated after a new administration took office in 2017. In case A, both changes in local administration showed strong effects on the practice, reinforcing as well as undermining it. However, in case B, the practice was taken for granted by the newly entering nutritionist in 2013. Family farmer procurement had been implemented for three years already and seemed to be established. The nutritionist explains her personal adoption of the practice as follows: *“For the public call, we just follow the standard from earlier years. Nobody in the administration questions this, we just maintain the procedure”* (Interview Case B, Director School Alimentation Department, 2017).

To conclude, the data demonstrating the institutionalization of the practice remains scarce, with just one case confirming this conceptualization. However, the velocity and stability with which the practice had been institutionalized in municipality B indicate this development path of the local translation. This is enhanced by the fact that the practice withstood changes in the local administration.

5.4.2 Transitioning between Phases

This chapter explores how transitions between the different phases of the translation process occurred in the analyzed case municipalities. While the translation phases describe the activities for adoption, they do not explain how the local context actors advanced the process from one stage to another. However, given the different

translation pathways detected in the case studies, understanding how the idea is being adopted along the process is fundamental.

In the case studies, three central moments of transition were identified (see **Figure 16**): First, activation between the understanding and mobilizing phase; second, transfer to practice between the adaption and the implementing phase; and third, stabilizing the practice between the implementing and institutionalizing phase. The shift from mobilizing to adapting was too fluid and ambiguous to allow for a clear differentiation between the two. In fact, in some cases, activities from both phases overlapped, rendering the differentiation in the model rather more analytical than chronological.

Furthermore, transitions acted on different analytical levels. The first transition is predominantly based on individual perception of the newly arriving idea and the therewith connected possible activation. The transfer to and stabilizing of the practice draws on actor constellations and interactions, emphasizing the local context level and including different actors.

Different case studies demonstrated varied translation paths. Cases A and B implemented the family farming procurement successfully in their respective local contexts. Therefore, their process is denominated as *intrinsic translation*. In contrast, in cases C and D, the implementation started after external pressure had been exerted. Therefore, these are named *extrinsic translation* cases.

Finally, implementing family farmer procurement in the public administration takes place in an inherently political arena, influenced by election cycles. Therefore, every four years, elections may lead to changing administrations. Together with the mayor, various commissioned public servants are replaced, e.g., all secretaries and, in some cases, even the nutritionist. This renders the translation process susceptible to political changes and may lead to restarting local translation.

5.4.2.1 Activation by Rationality Fit

In the first moment of transition in the translation process, actors are activated after having engaged in understanding activities. The novel institutional demand had been interpreted against rationalities and interests. Depending on the rationality fit, this resulted in individually perceived implications for further action. Rationality fit denotes the consistency between claims of the novel idea and the individual world view. A high congruence between the idea and the rationality led to activation. Actors perceive the new idea as legitimate, and they seize the window of opportunity to pursue personal or institutional objectives. Low rationality fit, in contrast, increased the probability of low commitment to engaging in adopting the new idea (Schedler & Grand, 2016).

High Rationality Fit

In the case studies, actors with a local development rationality were consistently activated by the novel idea. Predominantly, these were the secretaries of agriculture and rural extension organs. In their case, in addition to actor rationalities, the PNAE also fitted their organizational objectives. For them, the new PNAE legislation was perceived as an opportunity to foster local agriculture. The following statement of the CATI representative exemplifies:

With regard to structuring the cooperative or even the producers, the PNAE brought huge advantages. It guarantees sales for BRL 20'000.- to a price that hardly anybody else would pay. What is more, this value can be multiplied according to the capacity of the cooperative by attending different municipalities. (Interview Case B, Representative CATI, 2017)

In addition to the rural extension organs, nutritionist II in case A also followed a local development rationality and hence, was activated by the new law. When she assumed her position in 2013, she immediately initiated the mobilization process for family farmer procurement. Reiterating the following statement supports her local development emphasis: *"Wow, family farmers, let's buy! I want salad on the table. Therefore, I did convoke a meeting with producers the second week in office"* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017).

High rationality fit activated actors to engage in mobilizing and adapting activities. As described in previous chapters, rural extension organs were the predominant initiator of mobilizing activities in both the agricultural and municipal administration sphere (see ch. 5.4.1.2). Also, local development rationality actors initiated the adaptation of local structures and practices, e.g., re-establishing houses of agriculture (Cases C and D) or installing necessary facilities (Case A; see ch. 5.4.1.3).

From the translation process perspective, the activation of rural extension organs and secretaries of agriculture is essential. These actors possess the necessary relations and resources to activate, empower and coordinate local producers to participate in the procurement. On the other hand, being public organs, they dispose of the necessary legitimation and bureaucratic competence to mediate with the local administration. Other local actors had also ascribed the role as an initiator for the translation process to them. The nutritionist I in case A confirmed: *"When the new law arrived, the producers organized to sell to us. The CATI led the initiative supported by the union"* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist I, 2017). In addition to the initiating role, rural extension actors were leading the local mobilizing activities in all cases. Exemplary the statement of the administrative director of the school feeding department in case A: *"Who did stand out during the last administration was the agriculture secretary. The*

staff did dedicate a lot of time and hard work for the inclusion of family farmers” (Interview Case A, Administrative Director SFD, 2017).

Low Rationality Fit

Beyond the agricultural sphere, rationality fit was lower. Nutritionists, secretaries of education, and administrative staff, were mainly guided by bureaucratic rationalities and emphasized the necessity to comply with the law. However, the arriving idea did not activate these actors. Rather, bureaucratic actors remained inactive, expecting activation or attempting to avoid the new practice.

While the claim of local procurement resonated with the nutritionist professional rationality (see ch. 5.3.1), nutritionists also occupy administrative functions within the administration. Procurement concerns an administrative task that requires interactions and considerations beyond the professional rationality, such as budget, logistics or political priorities. Therefore, as explained in chapter 5.3.1, nutritionists could not only rely on their professional rationality regarding family farmer procurement. They mostly demonstrated bureaucratic rationality in these matters. Even though nutritionists pointed out that *“we knew since 2009 that we need to fulfill the 30%”* (Interview Case C, Nutritionist, 2017), initiative was limited. An Example is the nutritionist in case C, who inquired about the local production already in 2011, but since *“the quantities did not match,”* did not undertake further activities until 2015 (Interview Case C, Nutritionist, 2017).

Also, in both extrinsic cases, no public calls had been published before external pressure was exerted, reflecting the idea adaptation performed by bureaucratic actors, as described in chapter 5.4.1.3.3. The administration in case D argued that local procurement is a precondition for being allowed to source from other producers. While local producers enjoy preference, procurement is not limited to local purchases (Art. 25, CD/FNDE *Resolução* n° 26/2013).

However low the propensity to actively engage in adopting the practice, organizational restraints also diffculted initiative in extrinsic cases. First, in the extrinsic cases, agricultural organs had to be re-installed before being able to support the local mobilization of producers. Without an organization – rural extension or cooperative – in place to coordinate producers, this task is more challenging for nutritionists. Second, nutritionists are embedded in the structures of the secretary of education and, therefore, are subordinate to the secretary. Questions of interest may have inhibited further mobilization (see following chapter).

In conclusion, actors with local development rationality served as initiators for the adoption process, which was verified in all the case studies. High rationality fit was, hence, identified as a necessary condition to start the local translation process.

Furthermore, “local developmentalists” not only functioned as ignition but also led the activities during the mobilizing and adaptation phase, which predominantly concern the producer sphere.

The difference between high and low rationality fit was most evident when regarding nutritionists. While one nutritionist demonstrated a local development rationality and acted upon the new legislation, all other nutritionists showed a bureaucratic rationality and remained inactive. Even though they acknowledged the necessity to comply with the law, they expected other actors to initiate the process. Finally, initiators were consistently representatives of public administration organizations. Producers never took the initiative but were rather mobilized.

5.4.2.2 Transfer to Enacted Practice

In the second moment of transition, the idea starts to be locally enacted. Although actors with a local development rationality were activated and initiated the translation process in all case studies, only the intrinsic translation case studies succeeded in transferring the idea into practice without external enforcement.

When analyzing the four case studies, three local enabling factors were identified as decisive for the type of translation path: First, producer preparedness that resulted from the mobilization and adaptation phase; second, compatibility with the nutritionist rationality; and third, the political interest of the public administration to adopt the practice. All three local enabling factors jointly affect the nature of the translation process. Only some combinations of enabling factors led to intrinsic implementation, where the municipal contexts enacted the practice autonomously. Other configurations of these factors indicated extrinsic implementation. In these cases, external enforcing was necessary as the trigger for enacting the practice. Therefore, external enforcing will be discussed as the fourth but external enabling factor for the transition to enacted practice.

For analytical reasons, the factors will be described separately below. Finally, the analysis of the enabling factors will be based on the identified rationalities presented in chapter 5.3 and the outcome of the translation phases from chapter 5.4.1.

For the local context actor constellations, the family farmer procurement can be operationalized as a transaction between producers and the public administration. On the one side, as a representative actor for the municipality, the nutritionist must demonstrate the willingness to integrate family farmer products. On the other side, producers, mobilized by rural extension organs, must be able to satisfy this demand. The transactional conception seems apt, as the procurement practice is, *de facto*, aiming at establishing a contractual relationship between the two actors. When framed as the interrelation between two actors, the local enabling factors can be applied to

generate different combinations of producer preparedness and rationality compatibility that proliferate intrinsic translation. The third factor, interest, represents the alignment with the local political agenda. However, whenever the empirical data indicated otherwise, this was integrated into the analysis.

5.4.2.2.1 Local Producer Preparedness

The local producer preparedness essentially mirrors the results of the mobilizing and adapting phases in the translation process, focusing on the producer side. Preparedness is increased when producers possess production capacity, are formalized to participate in public contracts, and are organized in a formal organization. Particularly the requirement for formal organizations was identified as central for a high producer preparedness. Formal organizations reduce the transaction costs for the municipal administration in two respects: First, as a legal entity, the cooperative is able to sign a single procurement contract instead of contracting producers individually. Second, the cooperative assumes the coordination of producers to match demand and supply and elaborates consolidated sales proposals. In the absence of formal organization, this task usually was performed by rural extension organs.

Describing the implementation of family farmer procurement, the director for family farming development at the FNDE (Interview, 2017) stated: *“all municipalities start from different realities.”* Therefore, activation and mobilization of producers start at different levels of capacity and organization. This variation is true for the analyzed case studies, demonstrating a wide range of producer preparedness.

In Case B, a functioning cooperative already existed when the new PNAE legislation arrived. The cooperative had professional management and was engaged in a professionalization process for its production. Therefore, mobilizing activities from the municipal director of agriculture focused more on coordinating the administration than producers. The high producer preparedness allowed for prompt and straightforward implementation of family farmer procurement. With the successful insertion into the public market, the cooperative accessed financing from a state program to establish a micro-processing facility to further improve its marketing potential. This grant was accessed with support from the local CATI representative.

In Case A, the new procurement procedure *“only validated an existing situation”* (Interview Case A, CATI representative, 2017). Some local producers already provided products for the school feeding program. However, at this time, the school alimentation was outsourced to a private company, and volumes sourced from family farmers were relatively low. Also, only a few producers were sufficiently formalized to enter public procurement contracts. Although a local producer association existed, its

capability to organize producers was limited, and due to a missing legal entity, contracts had to be concluded individually. During the empirical data collection, a cooperative had been in planning for some years but did not materialize due to personal conflicts between farmer communities. Therefore, the producer preparedness with regard to organization remained low in case A.

The rural production in case C was reasonable in size both in terms of the number of producers as well as in farm size, as the municipal secretary of agriculture confirms: *“Family farmer producers here are not these small farms with low sales. Our producers here cultivate around 10 hectares. For family agriculture, they are quite big”* (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2018).

Producers were integrated into other markets, delivering to local supermarkets, regional wholesale markets, or other municipalities via cooperatives from out of town, as a producer informed (Interview Case C, Local producer, 2018). While production existed, producer preparedness was considered low due to atomized producer structure when the reform arrived. Therefore, after re-installing the house of agriculture in 2012, the secretary of agriculture incentivized producers to form a cooperative to improve market access, including public procurement. This process demanded several years. However, in 2017 the cooperative formalized and quickly *“around a hundred producers adhered”* (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2018), allowing the cooperative to compete in public calls in the entire region. Therefore, preparedness in case C was low until 2017 due to the unorganized producer structure but increased drastically in 2017 with establishing a formal organization.

In case D, the agriculture production can be characterized as dualistic:

On the one side, there are well-established family farmers with access to markets. They don't need public policies; they already have their channels. On the other side, you have rural settlers that hardly have any production capacity and learn to produce commercially now. (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017)

When the new legislation was passed, the rural area was neglected by the municipality. *“The previous mayor informed the national statistics bureau that the municipality has no rural production”* (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017). Only in 2013, the house of agriculture was re-installed, and with it, the preoccupation with local farmers returned. With regard to public policies, the focus was on family farmers with the necessity to better integrate into markets, including rural settlers. While the municipality invested in *“over 25 courses for capacity building between 2015-2017”* (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017), the professionalization of producers was slow due to limited prior capacities of rural settlers. Also, attempts of consolidating producers within the settlement to a formal

organization have not yet been successful. Therefore, the producer preparedness in case D remained low.

The producer preparedness characterizes the agriculture side to the family farmer procurement and influences the implementation of the practice. The higher the preparedness, the less additional support from the municipal administration is required. In all case studies, rural extension organs achieved to increase producer preparedness until the initial implementation of the practice. However, the process of preparing producers progresses slowly, and the degree of improvement depends on the producers' adaptation capacity to integrate an economic rationality. The secretary of agriculture in case C describes it as: *"working the heads of the producers"* (Interview, 2018) to adopt new production techniques and orient themselves to more formal markets. The producers' disposition to adapt can be proxied with their rationalities. Some producers followed an economic rationality and succeeded in orienting their production to market demands. The economic rationality was most pronounced at formal organizations and their producers (see chapter 5.3.3). Other producers demonstrated a local development rationality, depending on public policies to access more formal markets. A producer confirms: *"I produce for the PPAIS⁵⁸ and the PNAE. 90% of my production goes to these programs because the markets are very contested and prices low"* (Interview Case D, Local producer, 2017).

The leading role in improving preparedness further underpins the importance of activation actors and their initiative to mobilize and adapt local context. The next section examines the reaction of the municipal administration to the reform based on producer preparedness and predominant rationalities.

5.4.2.2.2 Rationality Compatibility

The case studies indicated producer preparedness as an enabling factor for family farmers to participate in public procurement procedures. However, the decision of whether to procure remains at the municipal administration. The administration publishes procurement calls and hence, adopts the practice. The disposition to adopt the new practice was found to mainly depend on the rationalities of nutritionists as they are *"key actors to push the family farmer procurement"* (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017). Different combinations of producer preparedness and

⁵⁸ PPAIS (*Programa Paulista da Agricultura de Interesse Social*) is a procurement program from the State of São Paulo to strengthen family farmers. 30% of state budgets for food procurement in state institutions (e.g. prisons, hospitals, universities) are to be allocated for family farmer procurement (Portal do Governo SP, 2017).

predominant rationalities in the administration were identified. Some led to intrinsic translation, while other combinations did not.

As described in chapter 5.3, all nutritionists followed a professional rationality that favored the local procurement based on nutritional reasons. However, due to their administrative function, as explained in the chapter on rationality fit, they demonstrated traits of other rationalities for the family farmer procurement. Two rationalities were most relevant for nutritionists: bureaucratic rationality and local development rationality. The rationalities emphasized different strategies for adopting the reform (see ch. 5.3).

The empirical data indicated that there were different configurations of predominant rationalities in handling family farmer procurement and producer preparedness, which influenced the transition to practice. **Table 12** summarizes the different combinations. In the following, the different combinations will be examined.

Rationality	Producer Preparedness	Translation path
Local development	High	Intrinsic
	Low	Intrinsic
Bureaucratic	High	Intrinsic
	Low	Extrinsic

Table 12: Rationality compatibility with producer preparedness (author)

Local Development Rationality

In the constellation with a local development rationality, producer preparedness was not decisive. This configuration led to intrinsic translations. Due to the objective of local development, nutritionist's strategies circled around the integration of local producers despite the additionally required effort compared to conventional procurement. From the four case studies, only nutritionist II in case A demonstrated a distinguishable local development rationality.

When she assumed her position in the school feeding department in 2013, the municipality had already procured from family farmers. However, the volumes were low, and only a few producers were contracted. Despite this incipient stage, the nutritionist was immediately activated, and *"the first thing I did was structuring the family farmers, I had this in mind already"* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017). This actuation signaled the interest of the municipal administration to implement the

procurement practice as the nutritionist was determined to adopt the new practice. This is a condition for low producer preparedness and the therewith connected additional workload as the former secretary of agriculture emphasizes:

It is important the nutritionist understands the importance of the program and wants to purchase. [Nutritionist II] was an extremely important example in this sense to show interest because implementing the procurement is extremely hard work. (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

During the period of nutritionist II, the procurement from family farmers quadrupled in two consecutive years in comparison to the previous year, despite not having any type of producer organization in the municipality. This mobilization was continually performed by the rural extension organ, the rural workers' union, and the secretary of agriculture – all actors that also follow a local development rationality. The activities of all actors were coordinated in the CAE (see ch. 5.4.1.2.2).

The nutritionist's rationality and the therewith connected volition to engage in structuring local family farmer procurement is an essential precondition. As a central actor in the school feeding program, the nutritionist retains decision power. However, in combination with low producer preparedness, a concerted effort of the nutritionist and all rural extension organs is pivotal. They compensated for the missing organization element that a cooperative would provide. Nutritionist II describes the necessity of support and coordination in the following statement:

From the beginning, we were supported by the rural workers' union. Without their support, the thing doesn't go anywhere. In addition, the president of the union became president of the CAE. Backed by this function, he could coordinate the mobilization. (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017)

Bureaucratic Rationality

Whereas the producer preparedness was of minor concern in combination with the local development rationality, this is not the case for the configuration with bureaucratic rationality. Therefore, the compatibility will be explained for both high and low producer preparedness.

In cases with high producer preparedness, the bureaucratic municipal administration implemented family farmer procurement extensively. A formal organization with sufficient production capacity was thereby identified as a crucial element to allow for mobilizing the municipal administration to engage in family farmer procurement.

In Case B, the local cooperative was prepared for procurement since the inception of the new legal framework. Through the initiative of the municipal director of agriculture, a municipal committee for implementing the novel legal framework was established.

Whilst there were initial doubts about the capacity of the cooperative to provide products of high quality regularly, the procurement was initiated as early as 2010 and has constantly increased since then.

Case B restricted family farmer procurement to formal organizations in order to reduce the transaction costs, as the local CATI representative confirms:

In our municipality, procurement was limited to formal organizations. The administration preferred this for two reasons: First, it facilitates procurement. It is easier if one person delivers compared to thirty. Second, it aimed at strengthening the cooperative. (Interview Case B, Representative CATI, 2017)

This limitation corresponds to the objective of bureaucratic rationality to limit the adoption work to a minimum. Cooperatives with a high commercial capacity mimic conventional procurement. What is more, the cooperative participated in conventional procurement processes with products it did not produce itself to increase its portfolio. The “one-stop-shop approach” further reduced administrative tasks for the administration (Interview Case B, CATI Representative, 2017). Another aspect of facilitating was the establishment of direct articulation between the cooperative and the school feeding department. While the coordination committee ceased to exist, no other rural extension organ was necessary to assume a mediating task. The cooperative organized the producer side for the procurement process and communicated directly with the nutritionist during operationalization.

The pronounced market orientation of the cooperative enabled growing access to municipal public procurement. It mirrors an economic rationality within the management of the cooperative. The local CATI representative identifies a crucial success factor in the economic rationality: *“In my opinion, the cooperative’s success is mainly thanks to their director, a trained business administrator that succeeded in professionalizing the organization”* (Interview Case B, CATI Representative, 2017).

The director of the school feeding department emphasizes that the cooperative facilitates its compliance with the law: *“If we like it or not, but the cooperative plays a huge role for us”* (Interview Case B, Director School Feeding Department, 2017).

Case study C clearly demonstrates the impact of high producer preparedness. Producers were unorganized until 2017 when the cooperative was established. Therefore, the municipality experienced the entire range of producer preparedness. First, the municipality did not implement the practice at all. Second, even though the municipality only started procuring from family farmers after experiencing external pressure, the purchases from the cooperative increased steeply in the same year. While the motivation for implementation may be attributed to external pressure, I argue that the extensiveness of adoption is grounded on the existence of the cooperative. In 2017, the municipality’s family farming procurement went from 0% to 25.9% of federal

funds, hence, almost fulfilling the legal requirement (Portal do FNDE, Dados da Agricultura Familiar, 24.10.2019).

Finally, low producer preparedness paired with bureaucratic rationality in the municipal administration did impede the adoption of local procurement. This low compatibility had already been indicated for case C (before 2017). While unorganized producers require additional attention for market integration, the bureaucratic municipal administration aims at maintaining existing procurement practices. A strategy employed by municipalities in cases A and D to comply with the reform was, therefore, to source products from cooperatives from other regions.

Case D demonstrated low producer preparedness with no local formal organization and low production capacity among producers, mainly from the rural settlement. While the mobilization and adaption phases were initiated in 2013 by the newly established house of agriculture, the municipal administration only initiated family farmer procurement upon external pressure in 2015. This delay may be partly explained through the low local producer capacity (see ch. 5.4.1.3.3). However, besides the fact that external obligation was necessary for the municipality to enact the practice, two additional factors indicate low compatibility: First, after the initial public call with single local producers, the administration opted for repeatedly extending contracts instead of launching new calls to integrate more producers. Yet, in the meantime, the house of agriculture capacitated and mobilized more interested producers: *“If they launched a public call today, I would have at least ten additional producers interested in the program”* (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017). With extending contracts, the administration blocked further local development. Second, as indicated above, the administration started procuring from regional cooperatives. The administrative director of the secretary of education justified this strategy as follows: *“We need to fulfill the 30% requirement and there are not enough local producers”* (Interview Case D, Administrative Director SOE, 2018). Although local production was still not sufficient to reach the threshold, the focus on cooperatives does indicate the preference for formal organizations over mobilizing local single producers.

The period with nutritionist III in case A confirms the incompatibility of low producer preparedness and bureaucratic rationality. Between 2013 and 2015, case A experienced unprecedented growth in family farming procurement. The increase was primarily based on local farmer purchases, complemented by cooperatives with products not locally produced. Although family farmer procurement increased in 2016, it decreased in 2017, when no public call was launched for local producers. However, the contract with the cooperative was extended. This shift in priorities was underpinned by accounts from nutritionist III, who repeatedly emphasized that local *“producers are really unorganized and this generates problems”* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist III, 2017) and that a formal organization is vital in her view: *“I wish that they would*

organize in a cooperative, invest in logistics and professional production. But unfortunately, they don't have this vision" (Interview Case A, Nutritionist III, 2017).

In addition to the preference for contracting formal organizations, the bureaucratic rationality is apparent in the desire of the public administration to align the public calls with conventional procurement processes: *"Ideally, family farmer procurement would also work with price registers because with the register we are not obliged to purchase"* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist III, 2017).

To conclude, depending on the degree of producer preparedness, some configurations with nutritionist rationalities are more prone to lead to adopting the practice. Cases where producers were organized in a formal organization, experienced higher probabilities to successfully implement family farmer procurement. This is due to the tendency of nutritionists to demonstrate a bureaucratic rationality. As had been described in chapter 5.3.2, compliance with the law is imperative for the bureaucratic rationality. However, with the possibility to justify non-compliance with low producer preparedness, preference is given to already established and known procedures.

5.4.2.2.3 Interest

Finally, the last enabling factor, interest, influences the transfer to practice. Interest is here conceptualized as the interest of the local government. The reform, obliging to restructure procurement processes, may fit into the political agenda or encounter resistance from local political actors. In the context of the PNAE, relevant political actors are predominantly secretaries of education and, secondly, mayors. While mayors define the political agenda, secretaries of education supervise the financial and operational program implementation, considering the political priorities. The political agenda is, hence, reflected in the propensity to adopt the new practice. In the case studies, interest worked in both directions: to foster family farmer procurement adoption and inhibit it.

Political interest positively affected implementation in case A during the workers' party administration between 2013 and 2016. The political alignment with the national government seemed to reinforce local implementation, as the following statement of the administrative director of the school feeding department confirms: *"During the last administration, the political question weighted a lot. It [Family farmer procurement] had to be implemented no matter what!"*⁵⁹ (Interview Case A, Administrative Director SFD, 2017).

⁵⁹ The interlocutor was referring to the low producer preparedness and logistical challenges that diffculted the implementation of the practice (Interview Case A, Administrative Director SFD, 2017).

The political backing allowed nutritionist II to adapt the local structure and invest in an adequate infrastructure, e.g., the cooling chamber. In her words: *“The mayor gave me a ‘carte blanche.’ He said the school feeding is the cherry on top of the cake, we have to make a special effort”* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017).

In this period, the political program coalesced with an actor constellation that favored local implementation and led to extraordinary growth, even though the producer preparedness was quite low.

In other cases, political interest inhibited the adoption of the new practice. In case C, the administration between 2009 and 2016 had no interest in implementing family farmer procurement. While not clearly stating the reasons, the nutritionist pointed out:

We already knew since 2009 that we would have to comply with the 30%. We tried various times, but with the past administration, we did not succeed. It seemed that they did not give any importance to the issue. (Interview Case C, Nutritionist, 2017)

This statement is seconded by the secretary of agriculture, who recognizes a change in interest to the actual administration. However, he also emphasizes that there was external pressure on the new administration:

This administration showed more interest in formalizing the process, even though there were notifications of the court of auditors. But in comparison to the past administration, who did not launch one public call, they seem more open, and we achieved to launch the first call this year. (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2018)

This statement underpins that actors’ political positions are subject to change in election cycles. In all four cases, municipal administration changed at least once since the implementation of the reform. Therefore, interest within the municipal administration changed along the translation process, reorienting its direction.

Case A, for example, experienced a reorientation in political interest. As stated above, the last administration fostered the integration of local family agriculture products. This changed with the new administration, where the *“intention is to outsource the school feeding again to cut costs . . . School alimentation does not bring any votes”* (Interview Case A, Administrative Director SFD, 2017). In fact, during the data collection, *“political will”* was invoked as the major challenge for the implementation of family farmer procurement. It resembled a narrative as virtually all actors outside the administration alleged the current administration of *“lacking political will”* if compared with the precedent one (e.g., Interviews Case A, President Rural Workers’ Union; CATI Representative; Local producer, APTA representative, 2017).

Missing political will was also an issue in municipality D. Until 2012, the municipal administration neglected the agricultural sphere completely. With regard to school feeding and family farmer procurement, the nutritionists tried to raise awareness for the new legal framework, *“but we were never heard. The new administration is more open, also because of all the audits”* (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017).

5.4.2.2.4 External Enforcing

In cases where local enabling factors had not been sufficiently present, the local family farmer procurement was not adopted. As follows from previous chapters, this was based either on the incompatibility of producer preparedness and nutritionist rationality, opposing interests, or both.

Two of the analyzed case studies (C and D) failed to adopt the new practice. Both municipalities showed similar local characteristics as the starting point for implementation: low degrees of producer preparedness combined with bureaucratic rationality within the administration. The nutritionist and the secretary of agriculture in Case C initiated the first attempts to adopt the new practice but did not succeed due to the lack of interest within the administration (see ch. 5.4.2.2.3). In case D, the administration completely neglected rural production until 2012. Initial mobilization of producers started in 2013 with establishing a house of agriculture – a step performed in 2012 in case C. However, local family farmer procurement had not been adopted in both cases, which invoked a series of external enforcement measures.

First, federal cash transfers for the school feeding program oblige municipalities to report annually to federal organs. Thereby, the municipality must either confirm the fulfillment of the 30% rule or justify the non-compliance (Art. 8, *Lei 11.947/2009*). In addition, regular audits by experts from the state court of auditors examine the use of federal funds, including funds for the PNAE, in which they notify about non-compliance with obligations. Both cases were repeatedly notified about the missing implementation. The deputy secretary of education in case D admits: *“in some moments, the court of auditor notified us that the municipality needs to comply”* (Interview Case D, Deputy Secretary of Education, 2018).

Similarly, the secretary of agriculture in case C confirms that the court of auditors was exerting pressure to comply with the law:

For us to supply for the school feeding program was already an ongoing fight. We tried to implement it but didn't succeed. We just did the first public call with this administration. We also saw that there was pressure from the court of auditors. It [Non-compliance] would have been necessary to justify as it is the municipality's obligation. (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2018)

Second, based on data from municipalities that did not adopt family farming procurement, the FNDE mandated the CECANE-SP to provide consultancy to municipalities in the state of São Paulo. In 2015, CECANE visited 49 municipalities, including cases C and D, to incentivize local family farmer procurement. During a one-week visit, all local actors were oriented on how to adopt the practice. The responsible technician nutritionist in case D explains the visit as follows: *“they offer a service to identify problems, they called a meeting with various sectors, procurement, the secretary [of education] and the nutritionists”* (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017).

Although the CECANE consultancy is not a formal audit, the results are forwarded to the FNDE (Interview Representative CECANE-SP, 2018). Nevertheless, within the municipal context, they served as an indicator of federal monitoring. The CAE president in Case C pointed out: *“They clearly stated that if, for example, the court of auditors observes the same irregularities again, they know that we had already been notified about them”* (Interview Case C, CAE President, 2018).

Finally, albeit not directly related to family farmer procurement, in 2017, the FNDE suspended cash transfers to case C for purchasing prohibited products. The municipality had been procuring a sweetened chocolate powder and did not react to notifications of auditing organs. The secretary of education had to personally justify the municipal conduct at the FNDE in Brasília to regain the funding. The incident had been identified only after transfer suspension because the FNDE apparently notified the preceding administration. After three months, the situation had been normalized, and the suspended funds were transferred retrospectively (Interview Case C, Secretary of Education, 2018). Even though the irregularity did not concern family farming procurement, the nutritionist suspects that the municipality perceived the suspension as a warning to comply with all aspects of the law:

Previously, the administration did not pay much attention to it [FF procurement], maybe because funds had not been blocked. Because, as I see it, municipalities usually act based on resource transfers, and if they are blocked, they start to do the process correctly. (Interview Case C, Nutritionist, 2017)

The combination of these external enforcement mechanisms incentivized the municipalities to adopt family farmer procurement. While case D launched the first call still in 2015 (delivery starting in 2016), case C succeeded in sourcing from family farmers in 2017 with the new administration. Despite the delay, the CAE president attributed *“extreme importance”* to the CECANE consultancy, not only in structuring the family farming process, but also in managing the cash transfer suspension.

Similarly, the nutritionist in case D perceived the external pressure as an accelerator for adopting the practice: *“The CECANE visit, along with all the notifications from the*

court of auditors, was extremely important for us. It gave our argument that we need to buy [from family farmers] more weight" (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017).

5.4.2.3 Stabilizing the Practice

In the third moment of transition, the enacted practice is consolidated into an institutionalized practice. As explained in chapter 5.4.1.5, only case municipality B achieved the state of stabilization. Empirical data indicates that the transition was based on repeated reinforcement of the practice.

In addition to the obligation to comply with the new legislation, the practice was perceived as an improvement to the established routine regarding product quality, costs, and operationalization (see ch. 5.4.1.4.2). I argue that this positive outcome of the newly implemented practice was based on three factors: first, the high producer preparedness (ch. 5.4.2.2.1); second, the compatibility with the predominant rationality within the school feeding department (ch. 5.4.2.2.2); and third, the installing of an inter-secretary coordination council for implementation (ch. 5.4.1.2.2).

The coordination council prepared the ground for implementing the new practice. It mobilized relevant actors within the municipality and translated the reform in a manner *"exactly like the law prescribes"* (Interview Case B, CATI Representative, 2017). In addition, it established a protocol on how to proceed with the procurement. This later facilitated also the transition to new actors, i.e., the new director of the school food department, that could follow established protocols. On the other hand, the local cooperative facilitated the transition from conventional to family farmer procurement by minimizing the switching costs for the municipal administration. The cooperative succeeded in providing higher quality products while not increasing the administrative burden.

This smooth transition from conventional to family farmer procurement is in contrast to other case studies, where switching incurred additional problems for the municipal administration. In case A, where the practice also had been repeatedly implemented, problems with the operationalization, e.g., logistics and packaging, persisted. This inhibited the institutionalization of the practice as a representative from the secretary of agriculture confirms: *"I think it [FF procurement] already works somehow, but it is not in automatic mode because there are still a lot of problems in the execution"* (Interview Case A, Representative SOA, 2017).

5.4.2.4 Changing Actor Constellation

Repeatedly, I have indicated that the local translation process is embedded in a political context. Hence, local actor constellations are subject to changes corresponding to election cycles. In Brazil, municipal administrations are elected for four years. Heads of secretaries are appointed for the same duration. Furthermore, the administration can appoint other functions within the municipality as “commissioned positions” (Art. 37, *Constituição Federal de 1988*). The decision about which positions are commissioned vary between municipalities. For example, in cases A and B, the nutritionists were commissioned as the director of the school food department, whereas nutritionists in cases C and D were career public servants. If not reelected, administration changes, and with it usually also the appointed servants.

As explained at other points of this thesis (see, e.g., ch. 5.4.2.2.3), all case municipalities experienced at least one change in administration, and the new actor constellations affected the translation process in varying degrees. Cases C and D only started implementing the practice after new administrations took office and after the adoption was enforced. The reasons for non-intrinsic adoption have been sufficiently explained in previous chapters. At this point, it should be noted that the changing actor constellations are what allowed for first time-enactment.

In contrast, Case A and B changed administrations *while* already enacting the practice. In case B, for example, switching administration did not invoke strong effects, even though the director of the school feeding department was exchanged. The practice had already achieved a certain degree of stability (see ch. 5.4.2.3). Conversely, in case A, two administration changes profoundly influenced the translation process. Due to a high quota of commissioned positions, the actor constellation, and with it the rationality configurations, altered substantially. The administrative director at the school food department, a career servant who worked in all three administrations, puts this as follows:

It is a learning experience on how to start this thing, how to do all the processes. But then there is another disturbing issue, which is the functioning of public administration. With a newly entering administration, all secretaries and first-tier servants are exchanged, and these are the ones that decide. Unfortunately, often, the one who enters lands on his position with a parachute and doesn't really understand what he decides. Until they understand the issues, this takes a long time. (Interview Case A, Administrative Director SFD, 2017)

Due to the high fluctuation of central actors for the adoption of family farmer procurement, the influence of changing actor constellations on the translation process will be demonstrated by case A. The changing actor constellations influenced not only the volume of family farmer procurement but also the modes of mobilization and

adaptation. In other words, changing actor constellations led to reinitiating the local translation process as central actors had to be integrated into the practice.

Case A can be divided into four periods. The first period from 2009 to 2012 was characterized by the reintegration of the school feeding program from outsourced services in 2011. A first public call was launched in 2012, albeit with a very limited volume. The adoption of the practice remained in an *“embryonic stage”* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017).

Serious efforts to implement family farmer procurement started in the second period from 2013 to 2015 under the workers’ party administration and the complete exchange of commissioned positions. Mobilizing and adaption re-started on a new level of intensity. In this period, necessary infrastructure was built, and the CAE functioned as a coordination forum.

The local translation was heavily influenced by actors following a local development rationality. While rural extension organs and producers were consistently guided by this rationality through all phases, in this period also the nutritionist adhered to the local development rationality. In this period, the local development rationality was predominant and backed by political interest. Nutritionist II interpreted the cooperation as follows: *“The political will and the interest of the producers aligned really well and allowed for this stratospheric purchase”* (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017). This congruence was manifested in a steep increase in family farmer procurement. In two consecutive years, the numbers quadrupled. Family farming procurement increased from 0% in 2013 to 54,96% (BRL 837’000.-) of federal funds in 2015.

The common objective of integrating local family farmers served as a solid foundation to launch implementation. Organized through the CAE, these members created a common localized version of the new legal framework and coordinated activities accordingly. In this period, a local community of meaning had emerged, spanning different professionals and organizations. Most importantly, the community englobed the nutritionist, a crucial actor for fostering the enactment of the practice. Describing the central position of the nutritionist with the words of the president of the rural workers union: *“Political will of the nutritionist is central. Only if the person with the pencil in hand wants, family farmer purchase happens”* (Interview Case A, President Rural Workers’ Union, 2017).

In 2015, nutritionist II resigned during an administration cycle. The new nutritionist III re-entered the municipal administration, initiating period III. She had been the director of the school feeding department in Case A before the reform. In contrast to her predecessor, she demonstrated a bureaucratic rationality, materialized in a strong focus on administrative processes (see ch. 5.4.1.4.3). With this change, the configuration of producer preparedness and nutritionist rationality changed to a more unfavorable setting. However, while all other actors remained unchanged, *“nutritionist*

III profited from an already structured process, which she could continue” (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2020). This was reflected in the increasing percentage of family farmer procurement to the peak of 68% of federal funds (Portal do FNDE, n.d., accessed: 25.7.2020). However, due to decreasing nominal values of cash transfers in 2016,⁶⁰ the nominal value of family farmer purchases decreased if compared to 2015.

In 2017, period IV, a new government assumed, exchanging commissioned servants. With this, the actor constellation changed, and a new socialization process between different actors had to unfold. Two essential vacancies had to be occupied: a responsible representative within the agriculture secretary and the new president of the CAE. Both positions were occupied with the same person, who was reassigned within the agriculture secretary. In contrast to all other rural extension actors, the new representative of the SOA /CAE president demonstrated a tendency towards a bureaucratic rationality. While still acknowledging the importance of fostering local agriculture, the motivation was legitimized by the legal basis. Her rationality was transferred to the CAE as well. Instead of functioning as a coordination council for family farmers in the preceding administration, the objective was redirected to the legal attribution, as explained in chapter 5.4.1.2.2 on the coordination fora. Returning to a previously presented statement underpins this hybrid position: *“If the administration is buying 30%, they already comply with the law, and there is not much more we can expect”* (Interview Case A, Representative SOA, 2017). Finally, the new administration did not share the political interest in unconditionally fostering local procurement. In fact, the administrative director of the school feeding department recognized that *“the tendency is to outsource again.”* This indicates an economic rationality as outsourcing is perceived as a cost reduction measure (Interview Case A, Administrative Director SFD, 2017).

In comparison to phase II, all definitive actors have shifted to other rationalities in the fourth phase. Definitive actors had been defined as combining power, legitimacy, and urgency attributes (see ch. 5.2.2). Therefore, the power base for implementation shifted between periods. The reported values of family farmer procurement confirm the decreased focus on family farming procurement: in 2017, 41% of federal funds were procured (Portal do FNDE, n.d., accessed: 25.7.2020). Although this quota is still well above the legal threshold, it is a dramatic decline compared to previous years. In addition, in 2017, around 60% of family farmer procurement was allocated to procurement from cooperatives, accounting for 28% of federal funds. Compared to 2015, when the cooperatives quota of family farmer procurement was at 43%, this

⁶⁰ The reduction of cash transfers was based on the termination of a service contract with the state government. Until 2015, the municipal administration served school meals for state schools as well and was compensated for this service (Interview Case A, Nutritionist III, 2017).

represents a stark increase. Nominal values for cooperative procurement decreased from BRL 350'000.- to BRL 300'000.- but the total family farmer procurement dropped from BRL 837'000.- in 2015 to BRL 587'000.- in 2017 (FNDE, SiGPC, n.d.). These numbers clearly show that the decline in family farmer procurement unfolded predominantly by cutting local producers. Also, it confirms the preference for formal organizations of bureaucratic rationality nutritionists (see ch. 5.4.2.2.2).

The shift in rationality and the therewith connected shift in priority towards formal organizations was noted by local producers:

The contracts with the previous nutritionist [II] were managed better. Since the new nutritionist assumed, it has become clear that she has no interest in buying from local farmers. The nutritionist [III] herself says that she has no patience to work with producers. Producers allege that she doesn't want to buy. (Interview Case A, Local Producer, 2017)

But not only producers perceived the new actor constellation and the reorientation in implementing the practice. Other members of the contested community of meaning delegitimized nutritionist's III strategy. This becomes obvious when the local APTA representative compares the actuation of both nutritionists: *"Nutritionist II really pushed it [FF procurement]. She confronted various obstacles just to make it happen. Nutritionist III, in contrast, plays her political role with a minimal effort to comply with the law"* (Interview Case A, Researcher APTA, 2017).

To conclude, the changing actor constellation, with the substitution of various central actors, fundamentally influenced the ongoing implementation. In fact, the 2017 change in administration indicated a partial re-initiation of the translation process. Actors who had recently entered the administration had to engage in understanding activities. Mobilization experienced alterations since the CAE as coordination organ was re-negotiated. Actor relations experienced a change due to altered rationality compatibilities, eventually decomposing the previously constituted community of meaning.

6 Integrating the Translation Model in Extant Literature

This chapter discusses the findings that were presented in the preceding chapter. In a first step, the developed model for the local translation process for implementing the family farmer procurement practice will be integrated with the existing literature.

As informed in the introduction to this thesis, translation scholars have called attention to organizational processes that explain how ideas are being translated into local practices. So far, the focus had been on explicating the *how* and less the *why* of idea transformation (Vossen & van Gestel, 2019). This emphasis has been reflected in the theoretical orientation, where studies concerning the idea, namely the patterns of translation (e.g., Røvik, 2016; K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996), were discussed extensively (ch. 2.4.1). In contrast to this, studies focusing on the process itself were less comprehensively available (ch. 2.4.2). The local translation process model, which has been elaborated by analyzing four case studies, aims to further theorize underlining processes.

The focus of the model is twofold: First, it demonstrates how field-level ideas are translated into local practices. It emphasizes the “translation work” that local actors perform to facilitate local enactment (see ch. 5.4.1). The model indicates a series of activities that are structured in five different phases of translation. Second, the model integrates local meaning construction processes by demonstrating the role that rationalities and their mobilization assume for the type of translation.

This section will discuss the five theorized phases, the transitions between them, and the role of rationalities in the local translation process. The five phases of translation follow a general translation logic of creating meaning from an arriving idea, adapting and transferring it to practice but propose a more fine-grained understanding (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Gutierrez-Huerter et al., 2020).

The five phases indicate a sequential order. The phases were detected in the case studies, which in general adhered to this order. However, as already described in the findings section, the translation activities were not always strictly carried out in this sequence. This is especially true for the “preparatory” mobilizing and adapting phase, showing overlaps and changes. For example, the adaption of local structures, i.e., re-opening houses of agriculture, sometimes marked the beginning of the mobilization of family farmer producers. However, for the adaption of local structures, municipal actors had to be mobilized for political support, and state rural extension organs enrolled as allies to allocate specialists to these facilities.

Finally, as pointed out earlier, being a model for a reoccurring process, the local translation passed recursively through different phases. For example, producers were re-mobilized and organized for participation in each procurement process,

underpinning the strong processual emphasis of translations again as a never-finalized process (Pallas et al., 2016).

In the following subsections, I will discuss each phase separately and add the processual perspective by reviewing how transitions played out.

6.1 Understanding

The understanding phase encompasses processes that increase information about the idea to support the local meaning creation process. Activities include seeking knowledge, peer learning, and referencing. In all cases, local actors actively engaged in bringing information to the local context from outside sources, although the content and origin varied. In the case of seeking knowledge, the federal government was contacted by local administration actors to clarify rules and doubts about the practice. Thus, these activities aim at reducing experienced ambiguity, which is consistent with findings in other studies. For example, Perner & Skjøsvis (2017) identified that regulators also engaged in practices of searching information and clarifying doubts in a comparable case of implementing new management consulting procurement practices. In the context of practice transfer in multinational companies, Gutierrez-Huerter et al. (2020) found that translating agents sought more information either at the headquarters or industry when they experienced high degrees of ambiguity. When comparing these studies, translation occurred in all three cases in a setting that included a clear subordinate relation between a central broker (Nicolini et al., 2019) with substantive regulative power over the translation process and translating field-level actors. The central actor was the headquarters of a multinational company in one case and the federal government in the other two cases. This complies with extant literature proposing that actors attempt to clearly understand how to implement the idea due to looming enforcement (Røvik, 2016).

The second mode of understanding activities promoted in the model was peer-sourced and aimed at imitating success cases (K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). Actors from the local context engaged in referencing or peer-learning experiences with other municipalities that were promoted as success cases by field-level translating agents (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017). In contrast to knowledge seeking, which was predominantly motivated by conformity motives to regulative pressures, peer-learning activities were positively framed as inspirational experiences. Peer-sourced activities were consistently initiated by actors that interpreted the idea as desirable in light of their own rationality (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013). The primary objective was understanding local instantiations of the practice in other contexts as a basis for their own translation. In addition, peer-learning visits were also intended to enroll central, local actors as allies that were invited along (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987).

These differences in type and intensity of engagement in understanding activities varied according to local actor rationality and the centrality of the novel idea for individual routines. Thereby, rationality influences the perception of the idea and emphasizes different aspects of it (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013). Conversely, centrality denotes the degree to which the novel practice concerns, and potentially challenges, central elements of the actor's routines and rationalities (Besharov & Smith, 2014). Combining these two factors indicated how actors created meaning. Although Besharov & Smith (2014) analyzed the interplay and conflict potential of multiple institutional logics, I argue that the compatibility and centrality dimensions may fruitfully be transferred to the spheres of rationalities and routines.

For example, procurement officers predominantly followed a bureaucratic rationality in relation to the new practice. Bureaucratic actors' main concern was to comply with the law with minimal effort (see ch. 5.3.2). The public call for family farmer procurement is a marginal activity in their professional routines, occurring mainly once every year. Even though the public call is at the center of their professional and organizational attributions, i.e., the procurement of goods and services, it was perceived as one modality among many procurement procedures and could effortlessly be integrated. Studying the novel legislation was deemed sufficient. The newly arriving idea neither questioned central elements of established formal procurement routines nor profoundly challenged the prevailing bureaucratic rationality. Rather, in the procurement specialists' perception, it was quite compatible with the bureaucratic emphasis on upholding formal processes. This finding supports Besharov & Smith's (2014) claim that high compatibility and low centrality of concurring logics reduce the potential for conflict.

For nutritionists, in contrast, the reform invoked quite substantive changes to their functions, which led to a more extensive preoccupation with the novel legislation. In addition to studying the legal framework, nutritionists did engage with the federal organs to clarify doubts or participate in knowledge transfer activities such as conferences, workshops, or peer visits. However, the rationale for these activities differed as effects did not only concern the formal process of family farming procurement but also the professional nutritionist sphere. Whereas nutritionists had to understand the formal practice to comply with the law, they seemed to emphasize the professional rationality when describing their meaning creation of the reform, referring to new requirements for school menus. Even family farmer procurement had been depicted from the professional nutritionist rationality in stating that products are of higher quality and fresher. This was reflected in understanding activities performed by nutritionists. Knowledge about the formal process had mostly been acquired by studying the legal framework or clarifying doubts with federal organs. Active participation in knowledge transfer activities, such as conferences and courses, aimed

predominantly at nutritional aspects and only secondarily the formal family farmer procurement (see ch. 5.4.1.1.1).

In other words, whereas the administrative procurement process activated predominantly bureaucratic rationality traits, the nutritional dimension appealed to the professional rationality. This interplay of rationalities had been identified in the data analysis (see ch. 5.3.1). The professional rationality dominated the meaning creation process and guided the individual attention to understanding activities related to nutritional aspects (Thornton et al., 2012). As the reform concerned the school feeding routines, it was highly central for nutritionists – even though in their perception more to nutritional aspects rather than the procurement. The new procurement practice was highly compatible with the professional rationality. Therefore, the reform and professional rationalities were mostly aligned with low potential conflict (Besharov & Smith, 2014). It was less the case when focusing on the administrative procurement process. Although highly relevant, and hence, central, nutritionists did not show the same engagement with understanding activities. In fact, whenever they participated in peer-learning activities for implementing family farmer procurement, the activity was organized by rural extension organs – except for nutritionist II in case A.

Finally, rural extension organs with a local development rationality perceived the new practice as a desirable window of opportunity to foster local family farming (Battilana, 2006). To enroll relevant local actors for their vision of the localized idea, they engaged in inherently more extensive understanding activities, such as organizing *in loco* visits to success cases (Latour, 1987). Fostering local agriculture is a central *raison d'être* for rural extension organs. Thus, being able to incentivize a local production circuit with formalized producers and long-term contractual relations with the municipality is a major opportunity to achieve organizational goals. Especially in case studies with atomized producer structure, the rural extension organs were pivotal not only for initiating the procurement but for continuously coordinating between producers and administration. This renders the new procurement practice central to their routines and compatible with their rationalities (Besharov & Smith, 2014).

6.2 Mobilizing

Mobilizing processes aim at enrolling allies (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987). It encompasses a cognitive and a material dimension (see ch. 2.4.2.2). The cognitive dimension is emphasized by institutional translation scholars (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996) and refers to mobilizing of meaning systems, such as institutional logics (Boch Waldorff, 2013; Pallas et al., 2016) or rationalities (Schedler & Grand, 2016), for the process of local meaning creation. The material dimension is rooted in the actor-network-theory approach to translation (Callon, 1986;

Latour, 1987), where actors are enrolled in supporting one's interest. While, of course, both are inextricably connected with rationalities shaping actions, this phase in the elaborated translation model focuses on material mobilization as an underlining social process.

Mobilizing in the case studies originated from actors with a high fit between the idea and their rationality. More specifically, in all cases, actors demonstrating a local development rationality initiated local mobilizing. In all but one instance, these "activating agents" for the local context were rural extension organs and local secretaries of agriculture, which is not surprising. The agriculture secretary and rural extension organs assume the role of a formal field-level representative in the local context, and its agents import institutional claims from their reference system (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013).

The ties to the institutional field were even more pronounced for the state-level rural extension organs. Due to their more central field position, these actors disposed of broader access to circulating resources to promote translation. For example, peer-learning visits to role model municipalities were organized upon recommendations in organizational or professional networks. Thus, although locally based, state actors assumed a role as institutional carriers that enhance the circulation of ideas (Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002). Finally, secretaries of agriculture did show a high multi-rational competence (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013) in communicating to both spheres affected by the translation of the family farmer procurement practice. Due to their privileged position as agriculture advocates within municipal administrations, they were assigned high legitimacy by both actor groups – administrators and farmers.

As stated above, mobilizing activities in the local context followed the objective to enroll and empower allies. Thereby, the process evolved in two different spheres: internally within the administration and externally with producers. Internally, the secretaries of agriculture intended to engage other departments to participate in the translation process. One activity consisted of providing peer-learning experiences, as has been described above. Furthermore, translation committees were established, or the existing ones were repurposed. In meetings, central, local actors discussed and agreed on localized versions of the new practice, thus materializing the idea locally (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996). Discursive generation of a socialized local understanding of the practice through physical gatherings has also been emphasized by Nicolini (2011, p.614), calling such processes "translation by practice" as they foster the exchange of knowledge and alignment in further actions. Indeed, the present study underlines the importance of creating local translation fora for early idea adoption. In cases where the practice had been adopted rapidly and extensively, central actors have convened regularly to coordinate activities. This indicates that the mobilization of local actors may be catalyzed through active engagement.

On the producer side, mobilization focused on empowerment and collective organization. In a first step, producers had to be convinced to participate and formalized to be even able to partake in the procurement. In a second step and going beyond mere formalization, all cases incentivized the establishing of formal organizations, such as producer cooperatives.

Being organized in formal organizations was identified as a crucial factor for local producers to participate in the procurement process, and to a lesser extent, for the practice to be adopted at all. As follows from the findings, the intrinsic adoption of the procurement practice was highly dependent on the local actor constellation (see ch. 5.4.2.2). Intrinsic adoption hereby refers to implementation without the exertion of external pressure. Compared to conventional procurement, purchasing from individual farmers renders the process more work-intensive. There is a need to coordinate production, and contracts are individually signed. Hence, the logistic burden is transferred to the administration due to the low capacity of small-scale producers. Cooperatives, on the other hand, mimic conventional procurement and act as single points of contact for the municipality while organizing producers. This coordination function of the cooperatives reduces implementation costs for the municipality.

The case studies showed that both variations of procurement practice were implemented, although in different degrees of extensiveness. While in municipalities where cooperatives existed, the practice was implemented quite rapidly and extensively, this was not the case for contexts without formal organizations. Only one case implemented the new procurement practice extensively without the presence of local formal producer organizations. Examining the predominant rationalities from central actors showed that the additional workload of individual procuring is only accepted by actors with a high fit between rationality and idea. These findings relate to the notions of technical and cultural fit proposed by Ansari et al. (2010) but exacerbate and connect them: high technical fit, i.e., cooperatives present, led to extensive adaption, irrespective of rationality compatibility. Low technical fit only led to extensive implementation in combination with a high rationality (or cultural) fit.

What is more, organizing in cooperatives increased the social position of producers in the local context. With increasing enforcement by federal regulators, municipalities were obliged to start complying with the law. Through organizing in cooperatives, producers, supported by the agriculture secretaries, were able to put more pressure on the municipalities to procure products. This increased social positioning confirms similar findings from other studies that emphasize the potential to rebalance power structures through mobilizing (Cassell & Lee, 2017; Pemer & Skjølsvik, 2017).

6.3 Adapting

As shown in the theoretical orientation (see ch. 2.4), adaptation is inherent to the translation process (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Latour, 1986). When ideas travel from one context to another, actors interpret them differently and adapt them to their needs and interests. Hence, translation is an interpretive process (Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005a). This study is, of course, no exception to this and accounts for the adaptation of the idea.

Findings indicate that local actors “edited” the new procurement practice according to their context (K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996) and were guided by their rationalities (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013). For example, local bureaucratic administrators emphasized the obligation to procure locally before producers outside the municipality could be considered. This narrative justified their longstanding inactivity in implementing the new practice. Although local production was indeed minimal, the law explicitly foresees the integration of producers from other regions. On the other hand, local actors adapted the idea to foster local procurement in adding competences to the local CAE. Proponents of the new practice installed the CAE as a coordination organ for implementing family farmer procurement and interpreted its role as far more powerful than what was legally mandated. It was used as a local legislative organ to create a localized version in favor of extensive adoption. Hence, local actors did add or omit elements to the idea to fit it to their rationality and interests (Røvik, 2016).

The elaborated model, however, proposes to explicitly consider adaption of the idea *and* the local context. In fact, the empirical findings suggest that adaptation of context may be equally pronounced as the transformation of the idea (see ch. 5.4.1.3). The study found that actors whose rationality was aligned with the idea engaged in adapting the context to fit the idea. During the translation process, local actors in multiple cases invoked local context changes to prepare the adoption of family farmer procurement. For example, in one case, producers did not dispose of logistical means to deliver products directly to schools. The municipal administration was not adequately equipped to take over the logistics either. Rather than adapting the idea, the nutritionist had a cooling chamber constructed and a refrigerated truck purchased. Furthermore, the agriculture secretary did not dispose of a physical location to attend producers in two cases. Also, technical assistance from trained agronomists was not available. As a reaction to the new window of opportunity for strengthening the local agriculture, houses of agriculture with professional support were established. These facilities were important factors for further mobilizing producers.

In addition, in anticipation of the new practice, local actors started to adapt therewith related practices. Although translation processes naturally imply changing practices while enacting an idea, these activities served as preparation to foster adoption. For

example, in expecting the procurement practice to be enacted, producers started to diversify their production.

This prominent focus on local context adaptation in structures and practices proposes a contribution to theory. While not completely unexplored, extant literature has paid less attention to explicitly theorize local context adaptation (for an exception, see: Gutierrez-Huerter et al., 2020). Rather, it seemed an implicit assumption resulting from the processual ontology that the translating actor changes along with the transformation of the idea (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Langley & Tsoukas, 2016).

One insightful theoretical account for organizational adaptation was proposed by Gondo & Amis (2013). They conceptualize variance in practice adoption based on the two axes acceptance and conscious implementation. Acceptance refers to the degree to which organizational actors accept a practice, and conscious implementation denotes the degree to which actors are actively involved in the adoption process. In their conception, when actors show high acceptance and a high level of conscious reflection on the implementation process, they commit to the original prototype and, therefore, rather search for organizational inconsistencies (Gondo & Amis, 2013, p. 233). Furthermore, they argue that these dimensions are negatively correlated. The more acceptance is taken for granted (Zucker, 1977) and reflected in a discourse of similarity, the less likely is a conscious reflection in adoption. Conversely, implementing a practice, the local meaning-creating discourse should emphasize differences to established practices and structures (Gondo & Amis, 2013). The current study confirms their argument. Actors with a high fit between rationality and the new practice showed high acceptance, and to foster faithful adoption, changed the context. Also, the practice of family farmer procurement was perceived as institutional change or external shock (Pemer & Skjølsvik, 2017) rather than diffusing institutionalized practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

Furthermore, the high focus on context adaption and faithful adoption underscores Røvik's (2016) instrumental theory of translation patterns. Two factors seem especially relevant. First, the translation process was increasingly enforced by state and federal organs. Enforcement reduces the transformability of the idea. Second, and probably more relevant for the adaption of context rather than the idea, actors aimed at copying the essence of the idea, as they identified with the central claim of local development.

6.4 Implementing

The implementing phase enacts the translated practice locally. It is, hence, the result of the preparatory activities in the preceding phases. The formal administrative procedure to conduct the procurement did not vary substantially between the implementing cases (see **Table 10**). In addition to highly detailed legislation, the FNDE

published a step-by-step guideline on how to procure from family farmers. This guideline includes templates for the form of the public call and a sample contract document. With these guiding documents, formal artifacts, such as the public calls, became increasingly uniform up to the degree of literally copying the template (Røvik, 2016).

Nevertheless, the formal artifact of the public call served as explicating device to settle local conflicts by clearly integrating contested issues. These issues arose through the changing administration and the therewith connected rationality constellation. While the former administration was clearly oriented towards local development, the successor administration demonstrated a bureaucratic rationality. To increase the share of family farmer procurement, the former administration relied on a series of rather informal arrangements with producers, such as allowing for substitution of products that were not on the menu or an agreement to pay the maximum surplus for organic products. With the change in actors, these arrangements were invalidated. To resolve these conflicts, they were made explicit in the public call (Røvik, 2016).

Also, local actors engaged in a series of reinforcing or discouraging strategies based on their rationalities. The reinforcing strategies were mainly based on positive reinforcement, either through flexibilization of the operationalization by informal arrangements or by refining the practice. This strategy was applied in the constellation of a nutritionist with a local development rationality and unorganized producers. The second reinforcing strategy was based on positive outcomes of the material enactment. Actors evaluated the practice as improvement and therefore adopted the practice more extensively, creating a technical fit (Ansari et al., 2010).

The discouraging strategies revolved around tactics to avoiding the practice (Oliver, 1991). Avoidance occurred in the combination of unorganized producers with bureaucratic logic. The strategies included, for example, to formally comply with the family farmer procurement, but in parallel, procure products conventionally as well. While local development rationality actors would allow for substituting products, the bureaucratic actor falls back on the conventional procurement. This tactic may be characterized as a minimally complying decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

6.5 Institutionalizing

The institutionalizing phase promotes the stabilization of the adopted practice. While only one case study, case B, achieved to institutionalize the practice to a certain degree, it nevertheless promotes some insights for abstraction. In the case study, two factors fostered stabilization of the practice: first, the newly implemented practice was perceived as an improvement as it was less expensive and led to better product quality. This resonated with the professional rationality of the nutritionists and the

economic rationality of the secretary of education (see ch. 5.3). Second, the local actor constellation included a well-established formal cooperative able to provide the majority of needed products. The presence of the cooperative rendered the additional effort for the municipal administration minimal. These factors combined incentivized repeated implementation of the new procurement practice, reinforcing it positively with each cycle. With each reiteration, the practice reached a higher degree of stabilization as actors increasingly perceived it as a routinized practice. The idea had been enacted, and it acquired an institutionalized status (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996).

What is more, the practice had acquired institutional status within the municipal administration in a short amount of time. Even changing actor constellations did not impact the reoccurring implementation. When a new director for the school feeding department arrived after three years of implementation, the practice was already established as factual. Therefore, the new director of the school feeding department perceived this practice as already taken for granted, and she followed the established protocol for procurement without questioning it. This transmission from one generation to the next, although via the artifact of a procurement protocol, is in line with what Zucker (1977) called cultural persistence.

This process of institutionalizing an incoming new field-level idea by repeated implementation confirms Czarniawska's and Joerges (1996) proposed model for local translation – as well as the preliminary framework of this thesis - rather faithfully. All the proposed milestones - arriving of the idea, local materialization, transfer to practice, and finally, institutionalization, were observed in case study B.

6.6 Transitioning: Rationalities, Actor Positions, and Interest

The research indicated that actor rationalities play a central role in the local translation process. They frame individual interpretation and guide subsequent action (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013). Rationalities guided the unfolding of the identified translation process, influencing the translation path substantially. Most apparently, actor rationalities were decisive for advancing the translation process from one phase to another. Therefore, the translation process is mediated by rationalities.

The findings indicate two crucial moments in the process where rationalities surface most apparently: First, activation through rationality fit of local actors to engage in mobilizing and adapting activities, and second, rationality compatibility between local actors as a precondition for local enactment. In the following paragraphs, rationality fit and compatibility will be discussed in light of extant literature.

6.6.1 Rationality Fit

The developed translation process model identified activation of local actors through rationality fit as an essential precursor to advance from the understanding phase to subsequent phases of local translation. Actors with a high fit between the incoming idea and their rationality were activated to engage in mobilizing and adapting activities. Actors with a low rationality fit did not. In the case studies, actors following a local development rationality were consistently activated by the reform, whereas actors with other rationalities were not mobilized to the same extent (see ch. 5.4.2.1).

Rationalities act as cognitive filters for individual perception, justification, and action (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013). The rationality fit draws on the congruence of the actor's worldview on what is desirable and legitimate on one side and the claims of the newly arriving idea on the other. This can be shown in the reform's objective, which is well-aligned with the goals of the local development rationality. Both the reform and the development rationality aim at fostering local agriculture. Therefore, actors not only accepted the newly arriving idea (Gondo & Amis, 2013) but used the reform as a further legitimization of their goals (Boch Waldorff, 2013) and were consistently activated to foster implementation.

The fact that newly arising institutional demands are interpreted against the preexisting cognitive schemes and provoke actor reactions is widely established in the literature (e.g., Oliver, 1991; Schedler & Grand, 2016, 2022 (forthcoming); Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013; Thornton et al., 2012). This study fills in seamlessly in these theoretical accounts. The reform supplied an *"image of action"* (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996, p. 40) to activate actors with high rationality fit. Conversely, where the field-level idea did not fit into their rationalities, actors remained inactive and avoided adherence to the reform (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). Rather, they deployed legitimizing accounts on how the reform was incompatible with the local context (Gutierrez-Huerter et al., 2020).

Activation through rationality fit is in line with Thornton et al. (2012) and their microfoundational framework on how institutional logics mediate individual cognition by guiding the focus of attention and activating aspects such as identities, goals, and schemes for social interaction. The local development rationality directs attention to the window of opportunity to achieve goals and meet the expectations towards the social identity of rural extension organs. It activates these traits and mobilizes actors.

6.6.2 Producer Preparedness & Rationality Compatibility

The second moment in the translation process where rationalities were identified as gatekeepers for advancing the implementation was the transfer to enacted practice. More specifically, the compatibility of the nutritionist's rationality with the producer

preparedness in the municipality was a central factor for the successful transfer to practice. The case studies indicated that nutritionists followed either a local development or a bureaucratic rationality in implementing the procurement practice. While the local development rationality led to intrinsic implementation in any case, the bureaucratic rationality did so only in combination with high producer preparedness (see ch. 5.4.2.2.2).

The compatibility with the local development rationality can be derived from the individual activation through rationality fit as discussed in chapter 6.6.1. The individual goals are compatible with the objectives of the reform, and hence, the nutritionist is inclined to integrate family farmers into the procurement procedure. Even then, if this means adapting the procedure to account for the low degree of producer preparedness, i.e., signing individual contracts and assuming a part of the logistic burden. The nutritionist perceives the institutional demand as desirable and hence adopts the demands. The commitment to newly arising institutional demands and therewith connected priority of faithful adoption has been widely discussed in institutional organization theory. Sahlin-Andersson (1996) bases her “editing rules” on the assumption that individuals in the target context perceive the idea or practice as an improvement to the status quo. The literature on organizational responses explicitly foresees the “acquiescence” strategy to comply with institutional demands (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). Also, as discussed in chapter 6.3, Gondo & Amis (2013) explicitly theorize a high degree of acceptance for faithful practice adoption.

The compatibility with the bureaucratic rationality was identified to be conditional to a high producer preparedness. More specifically, only when producers were organized in formal organizations, such as cooperatives, compatibility was given. This constellation is based on two interrelated factors: First, the disposition of bureaucratic actors to engage in the reform; And second, the function of formal organizations in the procurement process.

As described in chapter 5.3.2, actors following a bureaucratic rationality emphasized the necessity to comply with legal requirements of the reform to receive continued funding. In the early-stage implementation, compliance could be achieved by either procuring from family farmers or justifying non-procurement. Only over time, family farmer procurement started to be enforced through notifications and in loco consultancies from the CECANE. The combination of low enforcement, the possibility of justification, and no inherent motivation to foster local development increased local requirements for family farmer procurement. In essence, procurement only occurred in scale where producers could maintain the transaction costs for the public administration low, i.e., when they were organized in cooperatives.

Formal organizations transfer the coordination of the producers from the municipal administration to the producer sphere. In addition, cooperatives possess a legal entity

and reduce the administrative burden for the procurement department since only one contract has to be signed. For the public administration, the procurement from cooperatives is similar to the established practice of conventional procurement. In other words, cooperatives mimic conventional suppliers to fulfill the demands of the central actor in the field of public procurement – the municipal administration (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

Maintaining switching costs for the nutritionist low was essential for the successful implementation of family farmer procurement. Also, family farmer procurement through cooperatives was compatible with existing procedures. Besides changes to the administrative process for the procurement call, which the procurement department mainly carried out, the practice remained similar for the nutritionist. The compatibility with the bureaucratic rationality was improved since implementing the new practice did not affect central elements of institutionalized practices (Besharov & Smith, 2014). Thanks to favorable local conditions, the nutritionist was able to comply with institutional demands with minimal effort (Oliver, 1991). This constellation is similar to what Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm call “zones of indifference” (2013, p.77). They apply the concept to multi-rational organizational contexts, where potentially conflictual situations are avoided because actors are not affected strongly enough. Albeit not in an intra-organizational context, “zones of indifference” can be transferred to this research: The local development claim of the reform potentially contrasts with the bureaucratic rationality. However, since the nutritionist can simply replace the supplier to comply with the law and achieve her objective, she is indifferent about the means. This seconds Pache & Santos (2010) in conceptualizing organizational responses based on the nature of conflicting demands, more specifically, if they concern goals or means. According to them, conflicting demands are more likely to be resolved if they concern means rather than goals.

Whereas high producer preparedness led to compatibility with bureaucratic rationality, and hence, adoption of the new procurement practice, low producer preparedness invoked different reactions. Even though the nutritionists’ objective remained complying with the new reform, they opted for justifying non-procurement rather than implementing it. As justification was allowed, the municipal administration did not undertake efforts to structure procurement or to partially comply by procuring a fraction from individual family farmers. Nutritionists were avoiding the practice as far as possible (Oliver, 1991). However, with increasing external enforcement, this strategy had become less viable. Coercive pressures of federal institutions provoked municipalities to initiate family farmer procurement (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

Nevertheless, efforts to comply remained low as long as producer preparedness was low. Rather, nutritionists with a bureaucratic rationality demonstrated their low acceptability of the reform in more subtle manners by adapting the idea or by

emphasizing the local context's incompatibility. On the one hand, nutritionists simply ignored elements of the legal framework that did not comply with their rationality or were deemed not suitable for their context. For example, the possibility of compensating missing local farmers by procuring from farmers from other municipalities was not considered. The local priority rule for a given procurement process had been repurposed towards a precondition of prior local sourcing before producers from other municipalities are allowed to supply. The possibility to directly compensate missing local production from outside of town had been filtered. Already Gond & Boxenbaum (2013) found that local actors engage in contextualization work, such as “filtering, repurposing or coupling” when adopting new field-level ideas. Whereas they focused on increasing political, cultural, or technical fit for a new practice, this study suggests that contextualization work can be employed as a legitimizing strategy to decrease this fit.

A second strategy was to emphasize the incompatibility of the local context for implementing the practice. In case A, nutritionist III used logistic challenges or sanitary concerns to delegitimize procurement from individual family farmers. At the same time, she dedicatedly praised the good collaboration with cooperatives. This manifested in how the practice was implemented under her management: While the municipal administration still procured from local producers, the share of cooperative procurement from other states increased substantially. Emphasizing incompatibility was also identified as a defense mechanism by Gutierrez-Huerter et al. (2020) in their conceptualization of micro-processes of translation for CSR reporting standards.

In general, the incompatibility of low producer preparedness with the bureaucratic rationality confirms the literature in its claim of idea adaptation in the process of translation (e.g., Ansari et al., 2010; Gond & Boxenbaum, 2013; Gondo & Amis, 2013; Røvik, 2016). However, while most studies focus on adaptation for compliance or improved implementation, this research emphasizes the motivation to create a mismatch for avoiding adoption. In addition, this study explicitly puts actor rationalities at the center of analysis for the assessment of the fit.

6.6.3 Actor Constellations

Closely related to the analysis of actor rationalities is the actor constellation. Actor constellations influenced the local translation process in two ways: First, actor rationalities manifest most tangible through actions. To what extent these actions influence the local translation process depends on the social position of the actor. Second, changing actor constellations re-configured the rationality composition in the local context or even reinitiated the local translation process (see ch. 5.4.2.4).

The actors had been mapped according to their power, legitimacy, and urgency in chapter 5.2. However, the mapping does neither indicate actor rationalities nor interrelations between actors. In analyzing the local translation, power relations played out according to the power dimension in the actor mapping. As described above, the nutritionist occupied a central position in the local implementation context, equipped with the power to decide over which product to procure from whom. The school menu is the plastic artifact of the almost unilateral decision power of the public administration in the procurement process. Local actors, e.g., rural extension organs or producers, could mobilize and adapt to prepare for practice adoption, but implementation depended on the volition of the nutritionist, or in some cases, of the secretary of education. This “hierarchical” structure (Scharpf, 2006, p. 88) renders the nutritionist’s rationality dominant, to which remaining actors have to adapt. The interplay of central and peripheral actors with corresponding legitimacy, resource, or power endowments is a constitutional element of field theory and has been widely discussed (e.g., Battilana, 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2011). Suffice to say at this point that this research is no exception with regard to such power structures, albeit to an extreme degree in which one actor – and its rationality – dominates the “local field.”

The second observed aspect of the actor constellation was its change over time. By being embedded in a political context with election cycles, the local translation process was subject to re-configured actor, and subsequently, rationality constellations. This has implications for the translation process as a collective effort of meaning creation and negotiation (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013). New actors need to be socialized to the reform and integrated into the translation process to create their meaning. However, these actors add their rationality to the local context. Depending on the actor’s social position and the degree of institutionalization of the practice, this can affect the translation process profoundly or reinitiate it entirely.

The case studies showed different outcomes of changing actor constellations. In a context with an already institutionalized procurement practice, even the exchange of the nutritionist did not affect the translation, confirming the cultural persistence of “taken-for-granted” processes (Zucker, 1977). In contexts with less established structures, exchanging the nutritionist had far-reaching influences: accelerating, extending, or downsizing implementation. This reinforces the importance of the nutritionist’s activation through rationality fit and its compatibility with the local context, i.e., producer preparedness.

The findings of this research indicated that coalitions of local actors could improve resilience to changing central actors. In case A, a strong coalition of the CAE, rural workers union, rural extension workers, and producers succeeded in maintaining a high level of family farmer procurement despite the entrance of a new nutritionist with

a bureaucratic rationality and low producer preparedness. Even though the nutritionist had set priorities on procurement from formal organizations, individual producer contracting remained high. All actors of the identified coalition followed a predominantly local development rationality. Only after rural extension organs and CAE were replaced with a more moderate bureaucratic actor, the alliance lost its momentum, and local farmer procurement decreased (see ch. 5.4.2.4).

The fact that aggregation of (peripheral) individuals to (central) collective actors may skew power relations had already been conceptualized repeatedly and is closely connected to the discussion on mobilizing (see ch. 6.2). Callon & Latour (1981) elegantly conceptualize macro-actors as a collectivity of individual wills translated into one voice. Cassell & Lee (2017) found in their study on translating the trade union idea that alliances of less powerful actors were able to retain proprietorship of the translation process. Similarly, in policy research, Scharpf (2006) described the aggregation of individual actors to a complex actor that increases the degree of organization. Actors develop a common action orientation, and interdependency between individuals increases. Members of the coalition, while still acting upon individual resources, agree on common objectives, which can be articulated in negotiations with non-members. This is in strong analogy to the constellation in case A, where the local development coalition, at least temporarily, managed to maintain the idea of local procurement over cooperative procurement. With the overt focus on the rationality constellation, the findings of this research add a cognitive layer to analyzing power relations.

6.6.4 Interest

In the context of this research, it is important to differentiate interest from rationalities. As had been discussed at length, rationalities constitute socially constructed, taken-for-granted cognitive schemes through which the environment is interpreted and actions legitimized (Schedler, 2003; Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013). Interest, on the other hand, concerns the action orientation towards individual or organizational goals. From a set of possibilities, actors select these actions that best cater to the achievement of these goals in their perception (Latour, 1987, p. 108). Hence, while rationalities serve as a cognitive filter and define how we perceive and construct reality, interests constitute action orientations towards personal goals. Of course, they share overlapping features. Rationalities, for example, provide a frame for what goals are deemed legitimate in the community of meaning. However, also within a single rationality, different goals might be accepted as logical and legitimate. For example, nutrition professionals may have different strategies in providing healthy food to children, but both can be based on professional reasoning. Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm (2013) distinguished between conflicts of interests versus rationality conflict. Conflicts

on interests may be resolved with arguments. Conversely, rationality conflicts lack a common basis for understanding the arguments of the opponent. They are perceived as irrational (p.57).

In the context of this research, interest was identified as an enabling factor in the form of political alignment. As shown in the findings section (ch. 5.4.2.2.3), political agendas influenced the propensity of municipal administrations to adopt the procurement practice. Depending on personal or party objectives, the reform implementation was fostered or hampered. Due to the hierarchical relations within the local municipal administration, elected political representatives had authority over actors that operationalized the implementation. This central social position within the implementing context served as the basis for exerting coercive power according to political interests (Battilana, 2006). With regard to the operationalization of the reform, the political actors, i.e., mayors, preferred to establish guiding action orientations for their subordinates than being actively involved. Analyzing from a local translation perspective, the interests of political agents served as (de)legitimizing factors for reform implementation, and local administrative actors acted accordingly.

7 Conclusion

The sixth chapter discussed the developed local translation model in light of extant literature. The final chapter concludes this dissertation by summarizing the contributions to theory (ch. 7.1) and practice (ch. 7.2). Furthermore, it will state the limitations of the present research (ch. 7.3) before closing by proposing some further research implications (ch. 7.4).

7.1 Contribution to Theory

In addressing the call for further theorizing the interplay between meaning systems and social processes (Boch Waldorff, 2013), this thesis developed an exploratory model for the local translation process that aims to contribute to this endeavor. Particular emphasis was given to the influence of rationalities on underlining processes of “translation work” (Cassell & Lee, 2017). Rationalities were thereby conceptualized as micro-instantiations of institutional logics (Bossard, 2016). By focusing on the implementation process of a public sector reform at the interface with the agriculture sector, I selected a context where the translation inherently spans organizational boundaries. This selection accentuated the diversity of local actors and their respective rationalities, intending to enhance conceptual sharpness.

By developing an exploratory model for the translation process in five phases, our understanding of how actor rationalities shape concrete translation activities could be advanced. The focus on material action may be a valuable complement to the extant literature that emphasizes the symbolic dimension of translation (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005b; K. Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). The theoretical account identified that cognitive schemes play a dominant role in mediating the entire process of mobilizing, adapting, reinforcing or discouraging the local adoption.

Furthermore, the study found that a high fit between actor rationality and idea can reverse the prevalence of adapting the idea over context adaptation. It is an inherently implicit assumption in translation studies that the actor and the context change while translating new ideas. However, few studies have explicitly theorized context adaptation (for an exception, see: Gondo & Amis, 2013). I argue that this overt emphasis on local context adaptation results from innovative coalescing of the cognitive and material spheres of translation, conceptualized in this research by analyzing the interplay of rationalities and social processes.

Finally, the study identified a local development rationality rooted in the community and economic institutional logic. This rationality focuses on local economic

development and builds a micro-instantiated counterpart to a surging institutional development in the Brazilian agriculture sector: small-scale rural development.

7.2 Contribution to Policy Making

While relatively recently adopted the current form, the National School Feeding Program has quickly become a landmark in the Brazilian policy landscape for its double-edged approach in securing food security while promoting rural development. The focus on long-ignored family farmers bears the potential to contribute to sustainable local food systems with empowered rural producers. Furthermore, by promoting a decentralized approach, the program fosters closer ties between municipalities and their productive rural population. On the other hand, coordinating implementation for 5'570 municipalities is an ambitious task for policymakers. After analyzing the local implementation of the family farmer procurement practice in four of them, this thesis aspires to give valuable inputs for further developing the policy implementation from an external observer perspective.

First, the research has revealed the importance of public agents that focus on rural development, may this be within the municipal secretary of agriculture, state or federal rural extension organs. In all four case studies, these agents demonstrated a high degree of identification with the policy's objective and assumed a leading role in initiating and coordinating the process of locally implementing the family farmer procurement practice. Rural extensionists possess the required legitimacy in both worlds and can mediate between them.

Second, formal organizations are essential for family farmers to participate in the PNAE. The case studies have shown that municipalities with well-structured and managed local cooperatives implemented the procurement practice more quickly and extensively. In contrast, municipalities with an atomized producer structure did not achieve the same results. This difference is due to the reduced implementation costs for municipal administration when cooperatives organize and coordinate local production and perform the administrative procedure. In addition, a formal organization brings higher income potential. In both case studies where cooperatives were present, they accessed not only the PNAE in other municipalities but also other public policies, such as the PPAIS and PAA. Cooperatives exploit these synergies more easily.

Third, effective enforcement mechanisms work. For this research, two cases with substantially higher family farmer procurement than the legal threshold and two cases with low degrees of compliance were selected. Both cases with low degrees of compliance started procuring from family farmers throughout the research process. In the interviews, it became evident that the municipalities initiated the process due to

repeated notifications from the court of auditors. Thereby, the consultancies from the CECANE granted valuable support for the municipalities in how to initiate the family farmer procurement. The findings indicate that focusing intensely on these capacity-building activities, accompanied by close monitoring, may be promising to incentivize implementation.

Fourth, transparency enhances accountability. Data on the program implementation must be readily available. Furthermore, data on contract fulfillment should be accessible. It is imperative to communicate what quota of producer contracts are actually procured openly. Empirical findings indicate dissatisfaction with the current degree of transparency. While the open-access transparency portal offers some insights, it would profit from more comprehensive information and a simplified user interface targeted at a population with low digital literacy.

Fifth, and connected to the previous point, the potential of the local *Conselho de Alimentação Escolar* is not seized. The experience in one municipality with an active CAE showed the importance of a functioning civil society control organ and integrating family farmers into the PNAE. Unfortunately, the fieldwork also uncovered also “CAEs de gaveta,” which exist on paper but do not actuate. Also, with the attribution of overseeing the implementation of the policy, including family farmer procurement, it would be justified to grant representation to family farmers in the CAE.

7.3 Limitations of the Study

To answer the research question: *How do different actors in municipalities interpret the reform of the national school feeding program and influence the implementation within the local context?* I have selected an explorative research approach. Based on four qualitative-interpretive case studies (ch. 4), I developed a “grounded theory” model for the local translation of the family farming procurement practice.

The exploratory, interpretive-qualitative approach to the research topic allows for a thick description of the analyzed phenomenon in its context. Basing the analysis on the interpretations and meanings of the actors that implemented the family farming procurement practice locally grants increased proximity to the specific processes in this context. However, this comes with the tradeoff of limited generalizability. Nevertheless, I argue in line with Gioia (2013) that general concepts can also be discerned from interpretive-qualitative research.

The study focused on the local implementation of a reform in the Brazilian public sector at the interface with agriculture. Thereby, four case studies in the state of São Paulo were analyzed. While the policy is implemented nationally, it has to be considered that Brazil is a country of continental dimensions. The institutional environment and the

socio-economic rationalities vary tremendously, which may well influence the process of translation.

7.4 Future Research

Chapter 6 discussed the model for the local translation process in light of the extant research, and the previous section lined out some limitations. From this starting point, some queues for future research emerged.

First, the grounded theory model developed in this research is based on an exploratory study and builds only a starting point for researching underlining social processes in translation studies. However, in the essence of process research, all is always in the making, and several aspects could profit from future research. For example, while various relevant phases and activities for the translation process were identified and theorized, their interrelations may gain more specificity from further refinement. Also, the institutionalizing phase could not entirely be apprehended as only one case achieved this stage. In addition, while the interest had been operationalized as boundary conditions for the local translation process, it was not fully explored. Future research endeavors could focus on the role of interest in the translation process.

Furthermore, the theoretical model was developed for the translation of a public procurement practice. It may be insightful to transfer the model into other sectors and contexts. In addition, exploring the phenomenon through a different theoretical lens might bring fruitful results. For example, a practice approach could bring more in-depth insights into theorizing a practice of translation, with an explicit focus on the activities that local actors perform to enact an idea locally.

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ANNEX I: Interview Guide

Interview Guide – Technical Nutritionist in Charge of the PNAE

Focus: Process of elaborating the menu, collaboration with other departments and actors in the municipality (producers, technical assistance agencies)

1. **Personal**
 - 1.1. What is your professional background?
 - 1.2. For how long have you been working in this position?
 - 1.3. Where have you worked before?
2. **PNAE**
 - 2.1. General
 - 2.1.1. In your own words, what is PNAE's purpose as it exists today?
 - 2.1.2. What are your responsibilities in the operationalization of the PNAE? (to complement the questionnaire)
 - 2.1.3. What are the persons/organizations with which you collaborate the most in the operationalization of the PNAE? (The most relevant)
 - 2.1.4. In your daily work you collaborate with people from other professions, correct? How is the experience of this collaboration? Which are the areas where there is a potential for conflict?
 - 2.1.5. Since the implementation, have there been changes in operationalization? What kind of changes and what are the reasons for these changes?
 - 2.2. Process of elaborating the menu
 - 2.2.1. Could you explain the school meal planning process to me, step by step? From the definition of the budget to when the food arrives at the students' table?
 - 2.2.2. What is the time span of the planning (e.g., biannual, annual?) When does it start?
 - 2.2.3. How does the menu planning work (who is involved? Formal or informal collaboration? Are there elaboration routines?)
 - 2.2.4. Who is involved in deciding the types of food?
 - 2.2.5. As the technical nutritionist in charge, do you have contact with the local producers (or local production)? Do you consider them in the elaboration of the menu? If yes, is this institutionalized?
 - 2.2.6. What are the criteria for a food item to be included in the menu?
 - 2.2.7. As a nutritionist, do you take into consideration the price of the product? If yes, what is the reference you use?
3. **Outsourcing**
 - 3.1. Are there outsourced services in school feeding? If yes, which?
 - 3.2. Since when is this service outsourced?
 - 3.3. In your opinion, why was it decided to outsource?
 - 3.4. How does the collaboration with the third-party works?
4. **Public Call**

- 4.1. Do you participate in the process of preparation of the documentation for the public call? If so:
- 4.2. Do you have formal (or informal) routines for launching the public call? (e.g., official launch meeting within the secretariat, “milestones” project plan, closing meeting?)
- 4.3. Is there a manual describing how to make public purchases from family farms? (for the municipality)
- 4.4. Which actors (e.g., secretariat, producers, CATI, etc.) are always integrated in the decision making on the menu and the public call?
- 4.5. How do you decide which proposals to choose? What are your criteria, as well as the procedure for decision making?
5. Products
 - 5.1. What products does the municipality buy in greatest quantity and frequency? (Is there a product that you buy a lot more than others?)
 - 5.2. Can you indicate if the products are local?
 - 5.3. How do you assess the quality of the products from family farmers?
6. Logistics
 - 6.1. Who is responsible for the PNAE’s logistics? (internal or outsourced?)
 - 6.2. How does product delivery work in the municipality?
 - “conventional” products
 - products from family farmers?
 - 6.3. Is there a warehouse or a cold chamber?
 - 6.4. How does the distribution of food items to the kitchens work?
 - 6.5. How would you describe the schools’ infrastructure? Does this factor somehow impact on the design of the menu?
7. School Feeding Council (CAE)
 - 7.1. Is there a CAE in the municipality?
 - 7.2. Could you please indicate who are the CAE’s members and the dates of their meetings?
 - 7.3. What are the CAE’s responsibilities?
 - 7.4. What is your collaboration with the CAE?
8. Additional questions
 - 8.1. Has there been any progress in the PNAE in recent years?
 - 8.2. What are the key factors for PNAE to be a success?
 - 8.3. Who are the key actors for the operationalization of the PNAE? (it can also refer to technical assistance)
 - 8.4. Is there documentation (minutes, contracts, etc.) for PNAE activities?

Would you like to make a final comment or consideration?

Interview Guide - Municipal Secretary of Education

Focus: General vision, governance structure, political arena

1. Personal
 - 1.1. What is your professional background?
 - 1.2. For how long have you been working in this position?
 - 1.3. Where have you worked before?
 - 1.4. Are you affiliated with a political party?
2. General
 - 2.1. What are your main responsibilities as municipal secretary?
3. PNAE general
 - 3.1. In your own words, what is PNAE's purpose as it exists today?
 - 3.2. What is the importance of school meals in the school routine? And for children's lives in general?
 - 3.3. What are the objectives of integrating family farming into PNAE in the municipality?
4. PNAE's administration
 - 4.1. Could you explain me, in your own words, how the school feeding process unfolds, from planning to delivering food to students?
 - 4.2. What are your responsibilities within the operationalization / administration of the PNAE?
 - 4.3. In which activities are you actively involved for the administration of PNAE?
 - 4.4. Who are the people / secretariats / departments / organizations that you collaborate with the most in the operationalization / administration of the PNAE? (The most important)
 - 4.5. Are there internal control mechanisms in place for making school meals operational?
5. Budget
 - 5.1. Who decides on the municipal budget for school meals?
 - 5.2. How does the process of allocating resources for school feeding work?
6. Additional
 - 6.1. Has there been any progress in the PNAE in recent years?
 - 6.2. What are the key factors for the PNAE to be a success?
 - 6.3. Who are the key actors for the operationalization of the PNAE? (it can also refer to technical assistance)
 - 6.4. Is there documentation (minutes, contracts, etc.) for PNAE activities?
 - 6.5. Would you like to make a final comment or consideration?

Interview Guide - Bidding and purchasing sector (responsible for public calls)

Focus: Public call process

1. Personal
 - 1.1. Background:
 - 1.2. Position:
 - 1.3. Period in the municipal administration /current position:
 - 1.4. Responsibilities:
2. PNAE
 - 2.1. In your own words, what is PNAE's purpose as it exists today?
 - 2.2. What are your responsibilities in the operationalization of the PNAE?
3. Public call
 - 3.1. Have public calls for the PNAE already been made in the municipality?
 - 3.2. How does the family farming purchase process work? Could you explain step by step what you do?
 - 3.3. Considering the process of buying from family farmers, when (at what point of the process) are you inserted?
 - 3.4. How does the price research work?
 - 3.5. Where do you publish the public call?
 - 3.6. Is there a lot of support from family producers?
 - 3.7. How does the evaluation of delivered projects work?
4. Relationship of the public call with other means of purchase
 - 4.1. What are the main differences between the public call and the bidding process?
 - 4.2. In your opinion, is public procurement an adequate means for purchasing from family farming?
 - 4.3. In addition to buying from family farmers, in which other areas are public calls used?
5. Irregularities
 - 5.1. Have there been any problems with the bidding process for school meals? If so, which?
 - 5.2. Problems with the public call for family agriculture?
6. Implications of family farming in the PNAE
 - 6.1. What are the effects of the insertion of purchasing from family farmers in the PNAE?
 - 6.2. What are the key / critical factors for PNAE to be a success?
 - 6.3. Who are the key actors for the operationalization of the PNAE? (it can also refer to technical assistance)
 - 6.4. Would you like to make a final comment or consideration?

Interview Guide - Technical Assistance Organization (House of Agriculture)

Focus: Local producers' organization, DAP emission, collaboration with the municipal administration for the PNAE

1. Personal
 - 1.1. Background:
 - 1.2. Position:
 - 1.3. Period in the current position:
 - 1.4. Responsibilities:
 - 1.5. General responsibilities of the house of agriculture:
2. PNAE
 - 2.1. What is PNAE's purpose as it exists today?
 - 2.2. What should be the focus of efforts at PNAE to achieve these goals?
 - 2.3. Do you or the secretary of agriculture assume any formal responsibility for the operationalization of the PNAE?
 - 2.4. Could you tell me the story of the implementation of PNAE (purchase from family farmers) in the municipality?
 - 2.5. Who are the actors with whom you most collaborate in the operationalization of the PNAE?
3. Agriculture (family farming)
 - 3.1. How do you characterize the family agriculture in the municipality?
 - 3.2. How would you describe the collaboration / organization status of these producers?
 - 3.3. Did the secretary of agriculture support the formation of the cooperative in any way?
 - 3.4. Is there a multi-annual plan for the agricultural development in the municipality?
4. Family farmer's agriculture and PNAE
 - 4.1. How do you describe the insertion of family farming in school meals (PNAE) in the municipality?
 - 4.2. Did the secretary of agriculture support the insertion of family farming in the PNAE in any way? If so, how?
 - 4.3. What are the biggest challenges for the integration of family farmers in the PNAE?
 - 4.4. Are there any actions / initiatives for (better) integration of family farming in the PNAE?
 - 4.5. Who are the key actors for the insertion of family farming?
5. DAP
 - 5.1. Could you explain me how the application process works until the Declaration of Aptitude is delivered to PRONAF (DAP)?
6. Additional
 - 6.1. What are the key processes, programs and initiatives for regional socioeconomic development?
 - 6.2. Would you like to make a final comment or consideration?

Interview Guide - Current President of the School Meals Council (Conselho de Alimentação Escolar – CAE)

1. Personal
 - 1.1. Background:
 - 1.2. Position outside the CAE:
 - 1.3. Period in the current position:
 - 1.4. Responsibilities at the CAE:
2. PNAE
 - 2.1. What is PNAE's purpose as it exists today?
 - 2.2. Could you tell me the story of the implementation of PNAE (purchase of family farming) in the municipality?
 - 2.3. What are the main actors (organizations, people, departments) in the operationalization of the PNAE in the municipality?
 - 2.4. With which actors do you collaborate the most in the operationalization of the PNAE?
3. CAE
 - 3.1. Since when does the CAE exist in the municipality? Since when are you part of it and until when? Who do you represent? What is the frequency of meetings?
 - 3.2. Could you explain me what are the CAE's responsibilities?
 - 3.3. How is CAE fulfilling its responsibilities? What are the activities?
 - 3.4. One of CAE's main attributions is to provide a technical opinion on accounting documents. Could you please describe the process of analysis of the accounting documentation by the CAE?
 - 3.5. Did any changes in the PNAE happen due to CAE's action?
 - 3.6. Were there any irregularities in relation to which the CAE needed to take action? Complaints about operationalization in schools can also be considered in the answer. How was it solved?
 - 3.7. Is the CAE aware of the menus in the municipality? And about the changes and innovations in the menu?
 - 3.8. Are there official (or unofficial) communications channels with:
 - DAE ; Schools ; Civil Society ; Secretary of education
4. Family Farming and PNAE
 - 4.1. How do you evaluate the integration of family farming in the PNAE in the municipality?
 - 4.2. Was the thematic of family farming already discussed in the CAE? If yes, in which sense? (Were family farmers present in a meeting?)
 - 4.3. What are the challenges of integrating family farmers in the PNAE?
5. Final
 - 5.1. Has there been any progress in the PNAE in recent years?
 - 5.2. What are the key factors for PNAE to be a success?
 - 5.3. Would you like to make a final comment or consideration?

Interview Guide – Cooperative/ producer

1. Personal
 - 1.1. Background:
 - 1.2. Profession:
 - 1.3. Period working in this profession:
2. Cooperative
 - 2.1. Since when does the cooperative exist?
 - 2.2. How many members does the cooperative have? Do all of them have a DAP? Are they all in the same municipality?
 - 2.3. Which are the main products?
 - 2.4. Which are the main sales channels? (supermarket, market, public programmes)
3. Cooperation
 - 3.1. Could you please explain me the organizational structure of the cooperative?
 - 3.2. Could you please explain me how the cooperation among members work? (e.g., joint production, joint machines, purchase of inputs?)
 - 3.3. Is there a business / growth / development plan for the cooperative?
4. PNAE
 - 4.1. Are you familiar with the PNAE?
 - 4.2. What is PNAE's purpose as it exists today?
 - 4.3. Do you supply for the PNAE? Since when? For which municipalities?
 - 4.4. Which products do you supply? Quantity and values?
 - 4.5. Who are the actors with whom you collaborate the most in the operationalization of the PNAE?
 - 4.6. Are you aware of whom the PNAE prioritizes in the purchase from family farming? Do you feel this prioritization in any way?
 - 4.7. Did PNAE improve your chances of commercializing your products?
5. Family farming and PNAE
 - 5.1. What are the main challenges in integrating family farmers in the PNAE?
 - 5.2. Which are the key actors for the insertion of family farming?
6. Additional
 - 6.1. What are the key processes, programs and initiatives for regional socioeconomic development?
 - 6.2. Would you like make a final comment or consideration?

3rd-order constructs	2nd-order concepts	1st-order categories	Typical citation
Understanding	Referencing	Referencing to other municipalities	"Let me give you an example: the other municipality signs contracts for the calendar year. Last week [October], they called me to ask if I had more products to sell as my personal limit [20'000.- BRL] will probably not be achieved. Now see the difference! They want to buy, even risking buying products that are not in the contract, but they want to buy." (Interview Case A, Local producer, 2017)
	Peer learning	Creating direct exchange formats with other implementing contexts	"We took the nutritionists for a training visit to São Bernardo do Campo to learn from the group who had structured the process there. They learnt how to do the entire process: the interactions with the producers, the types of products you need, seasonality, product specification of regional products so nutritionists can specify correctly. We facilitated all this preparation before launching the first call." (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017)
	Seeking knowledge	Participating in knowledge transfer activities	"I have attended several courses on family farming. I went to São Carlos [regional conference], I went to ITAL in Campinas. In fact, just now in October I will go to another one." (Interview Case B, Director School Feeding Department, 2017)
		Clarifying the rules	"We entered in contact with federal organs. The nutritionist contacted the FNDE to know what we should do. I myself contacted the ministry of agrarian development multiple times with questions about how to buy from associations. If we can procure from associations due to the question of receipts. We had a lot of doubts because there is fragility. We purchase, but if there is something wrong, we are also responsible." (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

3rd-order constructs	2nd-order concepts	1st-order categories	Typical citation
Mobilizing	Enrolling allies	Joining forces	"In 2013, when we entered [new administration], it was clear that we needed a partnership. The education secretary was interested, which is the one that buys, and we met to discuss how we make the producers participate. We had to extend. If I am not mistaken, twelve producers participated when we started. Together with the nutritionist, CATI and the union we discussed how to strengthen this. We organized meetings in the region and disseminated information on how this process could work." (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)
		Activating producers to engage in FF procurement	"Producers showed great reluctance to sell to the administration. They claimed that it takes too much work and the administration pays late. [...] They perceived the administration as very bureaucratic." (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)
			"My job as union is to convince producers to sell to the school feeding, to convince them that selling to the school feeding is selling to the municipal administration, to convince them that the law is very clear in stating that the administration has to pay until 15 th day in the following month." (Interview Case A, President Rural Workers Union, 2017)
			"We organized meetings in the different regions and informed the producers that we want to demonstrate how the procurement works. We encouraged them to participate. We wanted to show them that the municipality is interested in buying from them." (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)
	Empower	Incentivize formal organization	"A first step today is to urgently incentivize a process of cooperativism. Initiate today so that few years down the road there will be no justification for having to accept single producers." (Interview Case A, Representative CATI, 2017)
		Capacitate producers for commercial production	"Good products always find markets. This is why we invested in capacity building. We used the entire system of rural extension, all available academic resources for developing an exceptional quality standard. We tried to be efficient in the use of resources, soil, and water to produce more and better quality in less space. We reduced pesticides to create an environment of production for the future." (Interview Case B, Director Local Cooperative, 2017)
	Establishing local coordination fora	Establish a task force for local implementation	"The CAE reunited all the actors that are concerned with agriculture. In these moments we could officially discuss things, since it was a [deliberative] council." (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2020)
		External support to initiate implementation	"We had a committee for the family farmer procurement at the time, I participated for the CATI. There was the agriculture director from the municipality, who organized it and the girl from the procurement department" (Interview Case B, CATI Representative, 2017)

3rd-order constructs	2nd-order concepts	1st-order categories	Typical citation
Adapting	Adapt local structures	Create necessary infrastructure to implement FF procurement	"I installed a cooling chamber at the school alimentation department. I made them construct one to receive the family farming products. There was no space for this, we had to build everything." (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017)
		Re-activate municipal articulating organs	"The house of agriculture was inactive for more than twenty years. We re-activated it, we got equipment from the CATI, and an agronomist was allocated to the municipality." (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2018)
		Prepare producers for formal commercial relationships	"When the producer approaches us, we inform already which documents he needs, and we check the documents. We do the triage here so that when the producer arrives at the secretary, he does not miss anything." (Interview Case D, Director House of Agriculture, 2017)
	Adapt local practices	Focus the menu elaboration on FF products	"Before I did the menu, I called them [the producers] for a meeting to see what they want to sell to me. I do not want to buy Kiwi or carrots here. This was crucial as producers saw that they could continue producing what they know to produce. This gave credibility." (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017)
		Adapting the procurement procedure	"Often, we had problems due to the fact that the actual purchase is made by the procurement department and not the education secretary. They perform the process, and they are not used to public calls for purchases. We had serious problems concerning procurement because the PNAE legislation prescribes something, but the administration secretary wants to use the 8.666 [conventional procurement law]." (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)
		Adapt production patterns	"When we started to work with the municipalities, we had to work on regularizing the production. We initiated a production schedule so that we were able to provide a steady supply throughout the year. In addition, we created redundancies with at least three producers for the same product. If something happens to one, we have others to supplement." (Interview Case B, Director Local Cooperative, 2017)
	Adapting the idea	Alteration of idea elements	"What the CAE decides, the mayor has to follow." (Interview Case A, President Rural Workers Union, 2017).
		Omission	"The program prescribes that the procurement be first made in the municipal context, and only afterward in regional, state and federation. This really complicates it for us because we do not have sufficient local producers." (Interview Case D, Administrative Director SOE, 2018)
		Addition	"They continue to buy from companies. Please explain me why! If you can buy the products with money from the federal government in a time, where there is no money for nothing, why not use that money? [...] They are buying from companies with the municipal budget." (Interview Case A, Local Producer, 2017)

3rd-order constructs	2nd-order concepts	1st-order categories	Typical citation
Implementing	Reinforcing practice	Practice as improvement	"We were able to integrate strawberries and guava. This was not possible before because products had always gone bad before they arrived here." (Interview Case B, Nutritionist III, 2020)
		Prioritize novel practice	"If they didn't have one product, we put another one. Planning is one thing; reality is another. If they couldn't provide lettuce, they provided any other green salad. For fruits I already put seasonal fruits; for pulp, seasonal pulp. We gave this flexibility. Otherwise, it would have been very difficult to follow the menu." (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017)
		Refine practice	"We are planning to initiate the contracts in January 2018. They will work from January to December 2018. The contracts used to work from July to July, but the producer can sell [BRL] 20000.-. There was always the issue that producers had a positive balance when the new year started. This was a little complicated and we want to improve this." (Interview Case A, CAE President, 2017)
	Discouraging practice	Insist on compliance	"They create impediments. I think the municipalities find it easier to deal with wholesale providers. It seems that difficulties are created instead of facilitating the process in the sense of 'there is a document missing etc.'" (Interview Case B, Representative CATI, 2017)
		Avoiding practice	"If they had real interest, they would start planning a new call some months before the contract ends. But that is not what happened. They extended some contracts with producers that still had a capacity [from the BRL 20'000 limit] for two months." (Interview Case A, Local Producer, 2017)
		Emphasize operational problems	"We see things here that you would not believe. For example, one time, a producer arrived here with a processed product. Processed products need to be in a primary sealed packaging and in a secondary layer. The primary packaging was ok, but the second layer of packaging was an empty bag of dog food. Of course, we had to reject it." (Interview Case A, Administrative Director SFD, 2017)
3rd-order constructs	2nd-order concepts	1st-order categories	Typical citation
Institutionalizing	Institutionalizing practice	Institutionalizing	"For the public call, we just follow the standard from earlier years. Nobody in the administration questions this, we just maintain the procedure." (Interview Case B, Director School Feeding Department, 2017)

3rd-order constructs	2nd-order concepts	1st-order categories	Typical citation
Activation by rationality fit	Activate	Emphasizing necessary compliance	"We knew since 2009 that we need to fulfill the 30%, but the quantities did never match." (Interview Case C, Nutritionist, 2017)
		Seize the opportunity	"Who did stand out during the last administration was the agriculture secretary. The staff did dedicate a lot of time and hard work for the inclusion of family farmers." (Interview Case A, Administrative Director SFD, 2017)
	Rationality fit	PNAE support FF market integration	"With regard to structuring the cooperative, or even the producers, the PNAE brought huge advantages. It guarantees sales for BRL 20'000.- to a price that hardly anybody else would pay. What is more, this value can be multiplied according to the capacity of the cooperative by attending different municipalities." (Interview Case B, Representative CATI, 2017)
		PNAE fosters local agriculture and short circles	"The program is really good. It fosters food distribution for the farmers in addition to stimulate a healthy diet for the children." (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)

3rd-order constructs	2nd-order concepts	1st-order categories	Typical citation
Type of Translation	Rationality Compatibility	Building a community of implementation	"When we entered [the administration] we knew that we need a cooperation. There was interest from the education [secretary], the one who buys, we joint together to think about how we make the producers participate. It was the nutritionist, CATI, the union and us and we thought about how to strengthen this." (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)
		Ideological bias influences type of implementation	"It is important the nutritionist understands the importance of the program and wants to purchase. [Nutritionist II] was an extremely important example in this sense to show interest because implementing the procurement is extremely hard work." (Interview Case A, Former Secretary of Agriculture, 2017)
		justifying non-compliance	"We need to fulfill the 30% requirement and there are not enough local producers." (Interview Case D, Administrative Director SOE, 2018)
	Producer preparedness	Existing local FF procurement before law	"What changed? I think people were relatively prepared, they already provided products for the school feeding. Hence, it only officialized a reality." (Interview Case A, Representative CATI, 2017)
		well-articulated producers	"When I arrived in 2006, we liberated the cooperative from the public administration and we started the to develop a company, with financial resources, a physical facility. In a second step, we started to invest in quality beacuse good products always sell. (Interview Case B, Cooperative Director, 2017)
		low producer preparedness	"We need to fulfill the 30% requirement and there are not enough local producers." (Interview Case D, Administrative Director SOE, 2018)
	Interest	FF procurement not a priority in the municipality	"We already knew since 2009 that we will have to comply with the 30%. We tried various times, but with the past administration we did not succeed. It seemed that they did not give any importance to the issue." (Interview Case C, Nutritionist, 2017)
		Supportign FF procurement by fit with political agenda	"The mayor gave me a 'carte blanche'. He said the school feeding is the cherry on top of the cake, we have to make a special effort." (Interview Case A, Nutritionist II, 2017)
	Exerting external pressure	External support to initiate implementation	"The CECANE visit, along with all the notifications from the court of auditors, was extremely important for us. It gave our argument that we need to buy [from family farmers] more weight." (Interview Case D, Responsible Technician Nutritionist, 2017)
		Enforcing compliance	"For us to attend the school feeding program was already an ongoing fight. We tried to implement it but didn't succeed. We just did the first public call with this administration. We also saw that there was pressure from the court of auditors. It [Non-compliance] would have been necessary to justify as it is the municipality's obligation." (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2018)

3rd-order constructs	2nd-order concepts	1st-order categories	Typical citation
Re-initiating the translation process	Changing Actor Constellation	New administration possibilitates implementation	"This administration showed a bigger interest in formalize [the public call], even without the notification of the court of auditors. Because, even though it was notified by the court of auditors before, the last administration did not perform a public call." (Interview Case C, Secretary of Agriculture, 2018)
		Changing nutritionist affects implementation negatively	"The contracts with the previous nutritionist [II] were better management. Since the new nutritionist assumed, it has become clear that she has no interest in buying from local farmers. The Nutritionist [III] herself says that she has no patience to work with producers. Producers allege that she doesn't want to buy." (Interview Case A, Local Producer, 2017)
		New Administration starts over again	"It is a learning experience on how to start this thing, how to do all the processes. But then there is another disturbing issue, which is the functioning of public administration. With a newly entering administration, all secretaries and first-tier servants are exchanged, and these are the ones that decide. Unfortunately, often, the one who enters lands on his position with a parachute and doesn't really understand what they decide. Until they understand the issues, this takes a long time." (Interview Case A, Administrative Director SFD, 2017)
		New actors with higher consciousness for administrative procedures	"During the last administration, the political question weighted a lot. It [family farmer procurement] had to be implemented no matter what! Now the new representative in the CAE and the secretary of agriculture are more conscious [about a balanced implementation]." (Interview Case A, Administrative Director SFD, 2017)

Curriculum Vitae

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EDUCATION

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