

H-Diplo | ISSF Tribute to the Life, Scholarship, and Legacy of Robert Jervis: Part I issforum.org

4 February 2022 | <https://issforum.org/to/JervisTribute-1>

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


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FOREWORD

This is a very special issue of the H-Diplo/International Security Studies Forum (ISSF). Robert Jervis, the founder of ISSF and, in the judgment of the forum's organizers, the most distinguished international relations scholar of his generation, succumbed to cancer this past December. As a way of honoring his memory, we wanted to give people in the field a chance to talk not just about his work, but also about what he meant to them personally, both as a scholar and as a human being.

An unusually large—indeed, quite overwhelming—number of people will be participating in this forum, so large, in fact, that we are breaking it down into two parts. The part we are publishing today begins with an introduction by Richard Immerman and an essay by Diane Labrosse on Bob's ISSF work, and is followed by the tributes that were received by mid-January, concluding with a doggerel by Page Fortna. We are also republishing here the autobiographical essay Bob wrote for the H-Diplo/ISSF "Learning the Scholar's Craft" series two years ago, along with a truncated copy of his C.V. that includes his honors as well as his publications. That list naturally includes the many books and scholarly articles he published in the course of his career, but Bob also wrote many relatively informal pieces for H-Diplo/ISSF—more, in fact, than any other contributor. Since those pieces provide an important window into what he was like as a scholar, we are including a list (with links) of his main contributions to those online publications. We also include a short list of three articles in which he talked about his life and scholarly career.

The second part of the forum, consisting of essays and appreciations that could not be submitted by the January deadline, will be coming out in the summer.

Finally, we wanted to express our thanks to JD Work, a research scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, for allowing us to publish his wonderful November 2019 photograph of Bob Jervis reading a copy of *IO* in his office in the International Affairs Building. Thanks also to Tom Christensen for drawing the photo to our attention.

INTRODUCTION: THE INCOMPARABLE ROBERT JERVIS BY RICHARD H. IMMERMANN, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY, EMERITUS

Although I cannot claim to have been a student of Bob Jervis, I came close (and weren't we all Bob's students?). I met Bob sometime in 1987—it must have been the fall. By this time, although a tenured professor in history, my attraction to political science and international relations had become hard to miss. (Bob probably more than anyone else in either discipline persuaded even the most skeptical historian that while history and IR represented two “sides,” each illuminated and profited from the other). I had majored in Government as an undergraduate, and my first job after receiving the Ph.D. was in the Department of Politics at Princeton. There I worked with Fred Greenstein, and he introduced me to political psychology. Fred, however, concentrated on personality and politics. He recognized that for the kind of projects I wanted to pursue, I should learn about the cognitive dimension as well.

So at Fred's suggestion, when I applied for a fellowship that funded training in a different discipline, I recruited Bob to be my mentor. I knew of Bob only because I had read his already iconic *Perception and Misperception*.¹ He didn't know me from a hole in the ground. (Or so I thought—as I would rapidly learn, Bob read anything and everything; he even had a book of mine in his indescribably cluttered office. When undergoing treatment for his cancer, he rejected my advice that he go for walks in Central Park because, exhausted from the treatments he was receiving, his priority was conserving his energy for reading.) Bob characteristically agreed to help me out, I received the fellowship, and virtually overnight he became integral to my life.

Bob made it so easy for me to become not only his mentee but also his friend and colleague. We all know how difficult academics can be, especially those that have reached the exalted heights that Bob had even back then and that keep the impossibly hectic schedule that he did. Nevertheless, he was warm, welcoming, compassionate, and patient almost to a fault. He never seemed to be in a rush, even when I was. His inquisitiveness was legendary, and he always had one more question to ask. Often it was about a book in my field that he had read and I had sheepishly to admit I had not. Although a private person, he would also ask about my family or some other personal matter. Later he would ask about my father, who as fate would have it, ended up sharing a law office suite with Bob's. Over the following years, he would go out of his way to compliment me for something I'd written, or buck me up if I received a less-than-sterling review, always in a peer-to-peer manner. I appreciated Bob's use of the adjective “marvelous” so much that I resented Billy Crystal's mocking it. For the record, I thought Bob funnier than Billy Crystal. Warm, welcoming, compassionate, and patient—that was Bob.

And oh so smart. Yet like everything else about Bob, he “carried” his intelligence with ease. Over the course of this two-year fellowship, I spent countless hours with him at Columbia. Among the first substantive conversations we had was about his classic article, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” which to my embarrassment I had not yet read.² It's brilliant, and as is the case with so much of Bob's writing, remarkably accessible. Often after reading something Bob wrote I thought to myself, why had I not thought of that? Why hadn't anyone? I of course knew the answers.

That conversation, during which Bob ping-ponged back and forth between, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” and *Perception and Misperception*, dramatically revised my conception of Cold War history (which I revised again a decade later after reading his “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?”³) We followed up that conversation with one about the

¹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

² Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 167-214.

³ Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3 (Winter 2001): 36-60.

Logic of Images.⁴ He asked me how much I knew about signaling. Only a little, I answered. Within an hour's time, I knew a great deal more. I can't even begin to capture our conversations about *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, which he was wrapping up at the time and for which he would win the Grawemeyer Award.⁵ Bob's explanation of the questions that drove him to write *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* prompted me to reread Bernard Brodie's *The Absolute Weapon*, which it turned out Dwight D. Eisenhower when, appropriately for this forum, he was president of Columbia University, had read in draft and thus became vital for my work on Ike's strategy once he reached the White House.⁶ Bob consistently identified questions that in retrospect were commonsensical yet only he thought to ask and answer.

Bob graciously introduced me to his colleagues at Columbia from whom he was confident that I could learn and perhaps, because I was a historian, that they could learn a little from me. He also invited me (Bob never insisted) to attend several of his graduate seminars. Through them, I met a sampling of the many Jervis students who would go on to distinguished careers themselves. (The number and quality of Bob's graduate students alone warrant his position on the Mt. Rushmore of IR scholars.) I rarely said anything. I listened and consumed—as would any historian of US foreign relations after his initial introduction to unfamiliar theories, particularly when a student (but never Bob that I can recall) responded to a criticism of one theory by citing another. I also had to come to grips with the primacy of parsimony, a word alien to my historian's vocabulary. What I would describe as a mischievous look would appear on Bob's face when he discussed these conversations with me after class.

Bob's classes weren't electric; that was not his style. I nonetheless hung on every word he said, which were uniformly intelligible even to an IR neophyte like me. Bob's seminars resembled an extended, informal conversation that because of his knowledge, skill, and preparation covered the spectrum of core issues. Several years later Bob invited me, along with Marc Trachtenberg and several other historians, to attend James McAllister's dissertation defense. What a fabulous experience that was, for James above all but only slightly less so for the rest of us. And what better evidence of the generosity and thoughtfulness that Bob rained on his students—on top of his wisdom, stimulation, and inspiration.

Yet the highlights of my visits to Columbia were the late-afternoon seminars that Bob hosted. These were distinct from the lunches and brown bags, ultimately dubbed "Jervis lunches," that his Columbia colleagues and graduate students write about effusively and which I learned from their essays in this forum were continuations of what he began at UCLA. Bob's ability to lead a discussion without dominating it was uncanny. If there was no reading that he thought appropriate for his selected subject, he wrote a paper on it. I'm sure Bob Jervis was among the first to apply prospect theory to the Vietnam War, and I don't believe he ever published that paper, which was substantial. He conceived of it solely as a vehicle to collect his thoughts and provoke our thinking. I never again read a document the same way that I had before attending these seminars. I must also interject, and this is not simply a side bar, that Bob taught me about the necessity of serving cookies at what one might call extracurricular meetings. I almost ran afoul of the federal government's ethics rules when, later, as an assistant deputy director of national intelligence (ADDNI), I insisted on applying the lesson that I learned from Bob. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) Office of Legal Counsel warned me that, should I request reimbursement for refreshments for a workshop I convened with former presidential briefers, I risked violating legislation enacted in the wake of Vice President Dick Cheney's January 2001 meeting with his energy task force. To me, Bob's rule was sacrosanct; I paid for the cookies out of my personal research funds.

Ironically in this regard, in a convoluted way it was because of Bob that I became an ADDNI. I had examined a CIA covert action prior to my receiving that fellowship, but my focus was on the agency as an implementer of policy. That was par for a historian's course. I attribute the evolution of my concern with the dynamics of intelligence analysis, and with intelligence

⁴ Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

⁵ Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

⁶ Frederick Dunn, Bernard Brodie, et al., *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946).

reports and estimates as inputs into the formulation of policy, largely to my reading and discussions of Bob's work. Surprisingly in retrospect, his stint as a CIA consultant during the Jimmy Carter years never came up during our early conversations. That may have been because Bob rigorously adhered to the strictures of his security clearances. His postmortem on the fall of the Shah had not yet been declassified. Further, he was just beginning to publish on intelligence, a subject that was still peripheral to me. I was writing a book with Bob Bowie, however, and we became very close. Bowie, as Carter's director of the National Foreign Assessment Center (the short-lived product of the merger of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and the National Intelligence Officers) had hired Bob to write the postmortem. After one of Bob's afternoon seminars that Bob Bowie attended, he told me about it and the reason for his selection of Bob. Intrigued, I discussed the postmortem with Bob Bowie over subsequent years in the context of our writing about decision-making processes. I don't recall when I first discussed it with Bob Jervis.

It was during those years that Bob emerged as the leading US scholar of intelligence. I read everything he wrote, drawn to his arguments about how hard it is for intelligence analysts to reach accurate judgments in light of the universe of uncertainty in which they operate and the ambiguity of their sources, the gaps in their sources, and often the unreliability of their sources. Then there are their beliefs and preconceptions. Inspired by his logic, evidence, and theoretical insights, I all but adopted Bob's interests and concerns. Less directly this time, he again became my mentor.

Accordingly, Bob's scholarship on intelligence was in large part responsible for my grasping the opportunity to serve as the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analytic Integrity and Standards when offered the position in 2007. The authors of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that created my office designed it to address precisely the shortcomings in the analytic process that Bob had identified in his writings.⁷ He had begun to argue that these shortcomings could be mitigated albeit not resolved through more effective exploitation of historical and social science methods. (*Why Intelligence Fails* did not come out until 2010, but he foreshadowed his arguments in earlier articles and papers, and we had discussed them extensively.⁸) No one outside the Intelligence Community (and too few inside it) were as interested as Bob was in what my staff and I were doing. Repeatedly he would take the train down to Langley to talk, after which we would go to dinner to talk some more. Often he would use these "sessions" to pull out a copy of a document that he wanted to show—and give—to me. He never lost sight of my scholarly agenda.

Of course, Bob never lost sight of his own scholarly agenda. When at Langley he would meet with his friends in both the CIA and ODNI's National Intelligence Council. They were his friends, but they were also "primary sources of sorts." He was like a kid in a candy store, but what a kid and what a store. No scholar had the sources within the IC that Bob did, because those sources within the IC trusted Bob like no other scholar. An exemplar is the special issue of the *Journal of Intelligence and National Security*, which Bob helped to organize and to which he contributed an essay. More than a half-dozen essays by commentators on and participants in the production of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program comprised the symposium. Bob conceived of it as an instrument to educate scholars, policymakers, and the public.⁹

⁷ Public Law 108-458, The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 17 December 2004, <https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/pidb/legislation/pdfs/public-law-108-458.pdf>. See section 1020 in particular.

⁸ Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). See also Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29 (February 2006): 3-52; and Jervis, "The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence Reform," *The Forum* 4 (June 2006): DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2202/1540-8884.1108>.

⁹ "Anatomy of a Controversy: The 2007 Iran Nuclear NIE," special issue of *Intelligence and National Security* 36 (2021), <https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fint20/36/2>. Bob and James Wirtz co-edited this symposium for a volume scheduled for publication by Routledge in 2022.

Indeed, the nexus that Bob established with the IC was anything but a one-way street. He was passionate about encouraging intelligence officials to draw on scholars both for their subject-matter and methodological expertise, and he used his personal relationships to promote such outreach at every opportunity. Whenever invited to contribute his own expertise, in whatever capacity, he eagerly accepted. His postmortems on the fall of the Shah and the IC's inaccurate estimate of Iraq's President Saddam Hussein's allegedly hidden Weapons of Mass Destruction are well known; Bob wrote a book and articles about them. But unknown are the other postmortems to which he contributed, many of which will likely remain classified. In 2011, for example, Bob agreed to "help" the IC with a postmortem on its assessments of the political crisis in Egypt through Mubarak's resignation.¹⁰

I returned to my day job at the start of 2009, and for the remainder of the decade and for almost the entire next one Bob and I collaborated on a different undertaking. To a still underappreciated extent, it underscores Bob's dedication to improving our understanding of international relations, setting the historical record on those relations straight, and thereby servicing the academic community and national interest, which Bob judged inseparable. I don't know for certain when he became chair of the CIA's Historical Review Panel. I know that the HRP first met in 1996, and he was a member. I also know that it could not have been longer than a year before he became its chair, and unlike the other charter members, he never chose to leave. More than a decade later, I began a 10-year tenure as the chair of the State Department's Historical Advisory Board (the HAC). Until the HRP was dissolved during the Trump administration and Bob was dismissed without so much as a word of thanks, we formed a team that pushed and pushed and pushed for the declassification of CIA documents, principally but not exclusively so that they could be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series.

Not once during these years did Bob neglect to call me on the phone (Bob liked the phone) prior to a meeting of the HRP to ask what his committee could do to help mine and accelerate the publication of a FRUS volume. What volumes were the CIA holding up, he would inquire, what was the status of a document under review by the High Level Panel if one had been convened (HLPs ruled on requests by the State Department's Office of the Historian [OH] to acknowledge and document a covert action in FRUS), was the CIA's targeted review program interfering with OH's declassification requests, and parallel questions. The rate of publication of FRUS volumes accelerated dramatically during Barack Obama's second term. OH deserves the credit for that. Nevertheless, it must share a lot of it with the HRP (recently reconstituted as the Historical Advisory Panel--HAP), and Bob Jervis is largely responsible for that. Literally days before his death he wrote me about his plan to draw upon his relationships with senior officials in the Biden IC to promote declassification.

The dozens of essays that follow reinforce, amplify, and expand on my experiences with, judgments about, and respect for Robert Jervis. He was truly one of a kind, and the contributors pay tribute to him as such. It is a testament to Bob's distinctiveness that while his scholarship deserves all the praise the essays bestow on it, and that scholarship is the fundamental reason for honoring him by this H-Diplo/ISSF forum, his personality, or more accurately his humanity, receives equal billing.

Bob would have been uncomfortable reading the words his friends, colleagues, and students apply to him. He preferred to shine the spotlight on others, not himself. He may well have turned these compliments into some kind of joke. Yet I am certain that every person who ever met him would endorse their applicability. Editing only for purposes of grammar, a non-exhaustive list of the adjectives that appear, in most cases more than once, include "thoughtful;" "modest;" "generous;" "honest;" "compassionate;" "humble;" "unassuming and self-effacing;" "anti-dogmatic;" "courteous;" and "humorous." Bob possessed "wonderful values," "deep convictions" juxtaposed with a "sense of epistemic modesty," and a "strong moral compass." He was a "class act" and a "good man." He was a "gem of a human being." He was a "mensch."

What is more, Bob's citizenship, whether directed toward his students, his department and colleagues, or the profession, should serve as a model for us all. The amount of time and energy he devoted to his students and colleagues was "truly

¹⁰ Bob sent me an outline for his "work-plan" for that postmortem. That outline, in my judgment, provides valuable insight on his understanding of the estimative process and on his efforts to improve the IC's analytic work. I plan to discuss it in a contribution to the July forum; a copy of the document itself will also appear there.

remarkable,” wrote one contributor. He was a “student-focused teacher” and “colleague-focused departmental citizen,” commented another. That citizenship was manifest in multiple ways, some rare if not *sui generis*. He did not have the time nor was he obligated to participate in university governance, but he found it. His support for his colleagues was “beyond the call of duty,” in the words of one, who added that this was “something doubtless legions of his friends, colleagues, and disciples would also say.” Bob arguably extended his greatest support to younger scholars, whether graduate students, departmental colleagues, or associates he encountered through his endless activities. “[E]ncouraging,” “protective,” “enthusiastic,” “constructive” yet willing to exhibit “tough love” when he thought it was warranted, he “always treated [them] as equals.” Nothing gave Bob greater satisfaction than to open doors for others to walk through.

Bob built communities in the classroom, in the hallways, and in cyber space. He “made sure people got to know one another” and “provided the cement by which everyone remained connected to others through their mutual attachment to him.” Some of the communities he built became institutions. Exemplifying the latter, his founding of and dedication to H-Diplo/ISSF is a core element of many of the essays and discussed in depth by managing editor Diane Labrosse. Bob also built communities and institutions in the metaphoric editorial room. H-Diplo/ISSF would fit that category, but so would the book series he and Bob Art founded at Cornell University Press. It proved a singular success, and Bob’s stewardship was vital to that. His contributions went beyond the conventional responsibilities of a general editor. His reviews of manuscripts were the stuff of legend, frequently running “eight pages or more.” He would supplement those reviews with bibliographic suggestions that only Bob Jervis could make.

In terms of his community-building and his service to that community, Bob’s decades-long chairmanship of the CIA’s Historical Review Panel (Historical Advisory Panel) emerges in bold relief in a great many essays. Often it does in the context of Bob’s efforts, successful efforts, to actualize his conviction that political science and history were mutually constitutive. His interest in and appetite for history was “voracious” and “insatiable;” an “ideas person, not a data one so much,” he was a “rare breed” who “took historians as seriously as he did theorists” and accepted the universality of contingency as an article of faith. Bob had “a talent for theory and a taste for history.” The reason transcended his commitment to supporting his theoretical interventions with empirical evidence. Through his writings, his teaching, his lectures, and his service, Bob taught us all “about the nature of the ‘border area’ where the fields of history and political science meet.” One of his IR students thanks Bob for teaching her that her affinity for political science and history did not require her making a “choice” in order to achieve success.

Bob’s many years leading the HRP and incalculable contributions to the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series reflect and represent his devotion to excavating this border area. Bob poured over the CIA documents that the Office of the Historian sought to publish in FRUS and “steadfastly struggled with CIA officials to accelerate” their declassification. To describe these struggles as uphill battles is an understatement. Yet Bob was so knowledgeable about the historical context, did his homework so thoroughly, and made the case so reasonably and respectfully that he was astonishingly persuasive. He “was a master at pushing back . . . without triggering defensiveness.” As another former chair of the State Department’s Historical Advisory Committee who campaigned with Bob to win the release of CIA documents for inclusion in FRUS wrote, in his leadership of the HRP Bob proved himself “a diplomat who rubbed people the right way!”

No matter how much praise one heaps on Bob, it can’t be enough. He was an exemplary teacher and “unmatched as a mentor.” His criticisms were “cutting” but never “cruel.” He delivered them “kindly.” “[O]pen and warm,” Bob could make any class, no matter the size, seem an “intimate seminar” to the students. He needed neither a booming voice nor technological aids to gain their “rapt attention.” He “approached the materials . . . like a jazz musician riffing on a theme.” Students sometimes had to work hard in order to piece all the movements together. That was the point. At the end of a course taught by Bob Jervis, students were “intellectually satisfied,” “more curious” than before, and inspired by his “enthusiasm for knowledge.” They were also in awe.

Bob’s scholarship requires little introduction. It’s easy to lose count of the number of contributors who refer to him as a “giant.” They also call him an “intellectual magpie” because his ideas emerged from so many different sources; a “great artist;” “brilliant;” a “pioneer;” “brave;” a “Popperian” who considered a theory worthwhile only if it could be proven false; a “gadfly” who upended conventional wisdom and challenged his readers to think differently; a “silverback” (the gorilla who

protects the others and keeps the troop together); an “intellectual deity,” and a “field leader” and “field maker.” The last epithet is as amorphous as it is appropriate, because it is impossible to identify Bob with a single field beyond the big tent of “International Relations.” Yet some would argue even IR is insufficient; he is presented as an “honorary diplomatic historian” and (jokingly) a “diplomatic historian manqué.”

The bottom line is that Bob’s powers of analysis were so extraordinary; his thirst for knowledge, understanding, and answers so unquenchable; his curiosity so “inexhaustible;” his intellectual interests so heterogeneous and sweeping; his “powers of observation” so “acute;” his appreciation of complexity so “deep;” and his insistence on rigor and granularity so uncompromising that he never fit comfortably in one theoretical or methodological box. Ideas “came so easily to him,” one essay reads, “that he could scarcely bring himself to trumpet their importance.” The “breadth of his contributions” is “stunning,” reads another. He “provided his insight and guidance not only to scholars with whom he agreed, but also to those with whom he strongly disagreed.” Bob’s research methods and strategy alone command attention from this forum’s contributors, as does the scholarship that underlay his letters of recommendation.

Many argue that Bob should best be remembered for his pioneering work applying the insights of cognitive psychology to understand how why and how policymakers behave as they did and as they do. Sure enough, his book most frequently cited in this forum is *Perception and Misperception*. Yet *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* won the Grawemeyer Award, and in his autobiographical essay on “Learning the Scholar’s Craft,” Bob described *System Effects*, which likewise won prizes, as his most important book.¹¹ Another contributor anoints Bob the “dean” of intelligence studies. One former student provides a list of the “fields” to which Bob’s scholarship was “seminal”: “political psychology, structural realism, nuclear strategy, arms control, deterrence, regime theory, diplomatic history, intelligence analysis, and complexity theory.” His prodigious output over more than a half-century defies categorization and generalization. In this sense, he was “truly a *rara avis*.” Bob’s influence on cohort after cohort of graduate students was without parallel. He was the “philosopher king” of the discipline.

The passing of Bob Jervis leaves an immense void in the field of international relations and international history. It leaves an equally immense void in the lives of the contributors to this forum and many, many others. He leaves us as orphans. Yet Bob leaves a legacy that makes the field and our lives much, much richer. The following essays (and a doggerel!) discuss and pay tribute to that legacy.

¹¹ Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); and Jervis, “How I Got Here,” *H-Diplo Essay Series on Learning the Scholars Craft*, March 4, 2020, <https://issforum.org/essays/PDF/E198.pdf>.

BOB JERVIS AND H-DIPLO/ISSF

BY DIANE LABROSSE, EXECUTIVE AND MANAGING EDITOR OF H-DIPLO, AND
SENIOR EDITOR OF H-DIPLO/ISSF

It is fitting that this tribute, and the follow-up one in June, will be published on H-Diplo/ISSF. Bob Jervis was the founding editor of the International Security Studies Forum (ISSF) in 2009 and worked tirelessly on its behalf until a week before his untimely death.¹ ISSF represents Bob's vision of the endless potential of drawing IR scholars and diplomatic historians into constructive dialogue and interaction with each other. Even more, it speaks to Bob's legendary generosity and kindness, his boundless curiosity about and knowledge of diplomatic history, and his desire to push the boundaries of digital publication and scholarly engagement.

As so many of the tributes in this forum attest, Bob never pulled rank or issued orders, and was always courteous, engaged, and supportive. He set the bar very high with his dedication to H-Diplo/ISSF and his grasp of the unlimited possibilities of online publication. All of us who were fortunate enough to have worked with Bob on the ISSF project were beneficiaries of his immense wisdom, deep sense of collegiality and fairness, and extraordinary work ethic and drive.

Working with Bob over the past thirteen years was a gift. The amount of work he did for ISSF, which represents a mere drop in the bucket of his scholarly and professional concerns, was nothing short of amazing.

What Is H-Diplo?

H-Diplo, the open-access online publication site and listserv for thousands of scholars of diplomatic history and foreign policy, was founded in the early 1990s. As its managing editor, I was aware that Robert Jervis not only subscribed to H-Diplo but also judged it to be worthwhile. I knew that because he took the time to send notes when he thought that we had published something that was valuable. He continued to send me notes up to the end; receiving comments like "This is important," or "This is excellent," was a thrill.

It was also a gift. H-Diplo had been founded by John Gaddis and others as part of the Humanities and Social Sciences Online network (H-Net),² and so it always had an impressive and large roster of distinguished scholar-subscribers who wrote for us when asked. Bob was unique, however, since he also actively participated in the intense online discussions, most of which concerned historical interpretations of volatile subjects like the dropping of the atomic bombs, the US war in Vietnam, US policy during the Cold War, 9/11, and the like.

Starting in the early 2000s, the H-Diplo editors transformed a simple listserv network into the flagship diplomatic history website. We did so by publishing reviews and roundtables on important new books and articles, state of the field essays, and original-content essays. We also highlighted the work of junior scholars and reached out to those at smaller institutions and across the globe. We realized that we could marry the speed of online publishing with the depth of print publications to change the way that new scholarship emerged and was discussed. Our book reviews appeared almost immediately after the books were published, and article reviews were published simultaneously with the articles themselves. The change was in part a response to the many subscribers who told us that they wanted to find a way to write reviews without waiting for up

¹ The terms H-Diplo/ISSF and ISSF are used interchangeably here: basically, ISSF editors work for H-Diplo/ISSF but are otherwise not affiliated with H-Diplo in any way; H-Diplo editors work for both H-Diplo and ISSF.

² H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online (H-Net) is an independent, non-profit scholarly association that offers an open academic space for scholars, teachers, advanced students and related professionals. It is built around an online system of networks moderated by certified editors. Its "vision is of the humanities and social sciences transformed by the immense potential of digital technologies and oriented around moderated intellectual exchange, collaborative production, and the open dissemination of knowledge." <https://www.h-net.org/>.

to two years for them to appear in a print journal. At the same time, our style guidelines and strict editing standards ensured that our reviews would be fair and courteous. Even better, we were not constrained by word limits. There was no paywall or entry fee; anyone with an internet connection could and still can join in. Meanwhile, we established contacts with the leading journals in the field, starting with *Diplomatic History* and the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, as well as with the major university presses, and actively started to commission reviews. We also realized the cross-disciplinary possibilities of online publication, and organized reviews of selected relevant IR works.

That Bob Jervis, a giant in the field of IR, supported H-Diplo in this transformation added immensely to its appeal and its growing reputation. One of our inaugural roundtables featured Fredrik Logevall's 2001 *Choosing War*.³ Never having assigned a roundtable at that point, I asked around for a few scholars who might want to write for us. Bob's name was at the top of every list. To my surprise, Bob almost immediately answered my invitation and agreed to review what he called an important work. So too did Lloyd Gardner, Jeffrey Kimball, and Marilyn Young. By the mid-2000s, we were publishing over 300 roundtables and reviews per year. Emerging new scholars began to inform us that having their first book featured in an H-Diplo Roundtable was a mark of distinction and an important part of their tenure files.

The Origins of H-Diplo/ISSF

In March 2009, at the behest of Bob and on the behalf of a small group of IR scholars, I was contacted by T.V. Paul, the chair of the International Security Studies Section (ISSS) of the International Studies Association. They were interested in the possibility of creating an ISSS list analogous to H-Diplo that would review IR books as well as the articles in journals such as *Security Studies* and *International Security*. The initial idea was to create a sister list for H-Diplo that would appeal to IR scholars and offer a place where security studies and the policy issues that grow out of this scholarship could meet. The H-Diplo model of speed plus depth would suit the mission perfectly. Since Bob thought highly of H-Diplo, he proposed it to the group as the model to emulate. We were of course deeply flattered. The initiative had the support of Sean M. Lynn-Jones, William C. Wohlforth, and a host of other notable scholars and journal and center directors who joined the editorial board. The project eventually took the name International Security Studies Forum.⁴

After a few weeks of discussions, and a frank assessment of the work involved in crafting a new list and a review program from scratch, we decided to graft ISSF onto H-Diplo as a subsidiary sister list. H-Diplo's experienced review editors, Tom Maddux and Seth Offenbach, had already demonstrated what a dedicated editorial team could do. George Fujii, our skilled web and production editor, had pioneered the publication of H-Diplo's pdf-formatted reviews and oversaw our web design. ISSF publications would be edited, formatted, and published on H-Diplo as well as the ISSF website, reach its large subscriber base, and be grounded upon H-Diplo's existing in-house publication program. In short, Bob's larger goal of creating a space where historians of diplomacy and IR scholars would be able to read each other's work, participate in cross-disciplinary panels, and follow the latest developments in both fields would be met. This became ISSF's grounding principle.

The final details were hammered out in April 2009 at the Williams/H-Diplo Conference on New Scholarship in American Foreign Relations that was graciously hosted by James McAllister at Williams College. Bob delivered the keynote address, "International Politics and Diplomatic History: Fruitful Differences," which decisively justified the need for the new H-Diplo/ISSF partnership and the future benefits of cross-disciplinary engagement.⁵ To illustrate the point, the conference

³ Fredrik Logevall. *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

⁴ It also had institutional sponsors and was associated with the A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. See <https://issforum.org/about>.

⁵ <https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Jervis-InaguralAddress.pdf>.

featured four roundtables; two on new diplomatic history books and two on new IR books, and involved a number of historians and IR scholars.⁶ The four roundtables were eventually published on H-Diplo and ISSF.

Then we got to work.

Over the years Bob recruited a highly talented number of IR and security-studies specialists as managing editors for ISSF, ranging from Chris Ball to James McAllister to Frank Gavin to the current holder of the position, Joshua Rovner. Their task was to double down on assigning innovative policy roundtables and reviews of the security-studies literature, thereby tapping ISSF's full potential. The result is a vast archive of IR-related reviews, roundtables, policy debates, and forums. After the first few years, in part to boost the number of ISSF publications, the H-Diplo team assumed more work and ISSF was fully merged with H-Diplo. Tom Maddux officially came over as commissioning editor, as did Seth Offenbach and, most recently, Andrew Szarejko. In 2017 Bob and Frank Gavin convened an ISSF conference on the future of ISSF that was generously hosted by Michael Horowitz and the University of Pennsylvania's Brown Center and Perry World House. One valuable outcome involved the addition of a new layer of expertise to ISSF with the creation of a large board of Associate Editors (AE). They represented the cream of the new generation of IR scholars, and would organize roundtables and policy forums for the list.⁷ For many years Joshua Rovner and Stacie E. Goddard chaired the AE team, which is now overseen by Rovner and Jennifer L. Erickson.

Thanks to our dedicated team of editors, and Bob's steady and innovative leadership, H-Diplo/ISSF has produced consistently illuminating and germane publications and policy roundtables. As McAllister writes in his tribute essay, invitations that contained the words "Bob Jervis wonders if ..." or "Bob Jervis will be writing the introduction..." were impossible to decline. ISSF remained under Bob's direction throughout. In the beginning, given Bob's extensive commitments elsewhere, he maintained mostly an advisory role, but as ISSF took shape and expanded, his involvement in it deepened and resulted in daily or weekly communications with me.

Bob's ISSF Writings

One of the hallmark features of H-Diplo/ISSF are its essays and series. Many were either conceived by Bob or included an essay or introduction by him. No matter the topic, he always wrote something that was interesting and learned, and suggested a dynamic roster of contributors. The history/IR nexus was the focus of much of that work, and he wrote with both audiences in mind, as few others could have done (see John Gaddis's humorous take on Bob's work with one historian in particular). I have spent the last few weeks reading through the archive, and was struck by the vast amount and scope of Bob's writing for us. A random and necessarily short selection of Bob's ISSF work follows.⁸

In 2014 Marc Trachtenberg wrote the article "Audience Costs in 1954?" which was sparked by Logevall's Pulitzer prize-winning book, *Embers of War*.⁹ Bob wrote a substantive response to that essay, noting that the essay "sits fruitfully at the intersection of history and political science, and has much to offer in terms of both substance and method," before taking up three important points that allowed him to draw on both IR theory and the historiography on the subject. He concluded by drawing on his work on signaling:

⁶ For the full roster of panels and panelists, see <https://leadership-studies.williams.edu/about-2/archived-events/>. The roundtables were published on H-Diplo and ISSF during the week of 18 May 2009.

⁷ <https://issforum.org/team>.

⁸ A selected list of Bob's H-Diplo and ISSF work is included in Appendix III of this tribute.

⁹ Logevall, *Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 2012).

As a political scientist, I seek parsimonious explanations and think there are important generalizations to be had, but they may not be simple ones.

In all of this, the signals that are perceived may differ from those that are intended to be sent.¹³ As I noted, Nixon's alert in October 1969 not only failed to impress Soviet leaders, it was barely noticed. Trachtenberg shows that in 1954, far from believing that the bellicose statements of the Eisenhower administration might trap them into using military force, Chinese leaders thought that public opinion was holding the administration back. There was no fear that Eisenhower would have to intervene lest he show domestic opinion that he was failing to live up to his word; rather the fear was that after the November elections the administration would be less bound by public opinion. To some extent the state can control the signals it sends, but it has much less influence over how they are received and interpreted. Those of us who have written deductive arguments about signaling make strong arguments about how signals ought to be interpreted, but, unfortunate as this is for decision-makers and theorists, the theories that matter are those held by the perceiving states, and these are often different from those of scholars and, more importantly for the conduct of foreign policy, different from those held by the state doing the signaling.¹⁰

This exchange sparked a follow-up forum in which Trachtenberg and Bronwyn Lewis wrote original essays on "Audience Costs and the Vietnam War," to which Richard Betts, Bob, Fredrik Logevall, and John Mearsheimer wrote responses.

In his introduction, Bob opened with his usual nod to both disciplines, writing

Bad wars make challenging history, as is clear from the papers by Bronwyn Lewis and Marc Trachtenberg. Although their focus is on audience costs, both this question and the case of American decision-making in Vietnam raise and shed light on multiple theoretical questions. These two essays move us a significant step forward on several fronts.

He concluded

As Trachtenberg, Lewis, and others have noted, even if it is domestic rather than foreign audiences whose reactions most concern presidents, and they are likely to focus much more on the substance of what the president has done than on whether or not it is consistent with what he has said. So to argue against the centrality of audience costs in the technical sense of the president fearing that he will be punished for not living up to his pledges does not mean that the reaction of domestic opinion is unimportant. My guess is that Nixon felt that he could abandon South Vietnam if need be because domestic opinion had written off that country, or at least felt that the U.S. had more than lived up to its obligation to try to save it. To the extent that domestic opinion was important in Johnson's decision, I think it was not that he believed that people would compare his words to his deeds, but the fear that, irrespective of what he or Kennedy had said, he would be blamed for losing South Vietnam. What was salient in his mind was the price the Democrats had paid for 'losing China,' even though Truman had not pledged to save it. Similarly, to say that Nixon's policy was not shaped by the manipulation and fear of audience costs is not to claim that public opinion was unimportant. Far from it; after the failure of his original policy of prevailing in Vietnam by linkage and feigning madness, it was the unwillingness of the domestic public to continue the war that carried the day. Domestic opinion and domestic politics were primary; it was just that audience costs in the narrow sense were at most a small part of this.¹¹

¹⁰ Trachtenberg, "Audience Costs in 1954?" ed. Labrosse, published by H-Diplo/ISSF on 6 September 2014, <https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Forum-1.pdf>.

¹¹ H-Diplo/ISSF Forum on "Audience Costs and the Vietnam War," 07 November 2014 <https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Forum-3.pdf>. He included references in this paragraph to Jervis, "Signaling and Perception," in

In September 2017, we published a forum on Trachtenberg's essay, "New Light on 1914?," which featured responses by Dale C. Copeland and Stephen A. Schuker. Bob again wrote the introduction, opening with one of his great jokes,

In introducing this Forum, I am reminded of the joke that when the latest entry into heaven is told that each newcomer is expected to tell the others about a major event in his life, he says that he will talk about a flood he witnessed. His guardian angel nods, adding 'Just remember that Noah will be in the audience.' All of us have learned—and continue to learn—from the scholarship of Marc Trachtenberg, Dale Copeland, and Stephen Schuker, whose works blend history and political science...¹²

In 2016, Joshua Rovner commissioned and chaired a large number of policy roundtables that were designed to be fast, deep, and jargon-free, including the inaugural one on the Chilcot Report¹³ for which Bob wrote an essay, as did John Bew, Seth Center, James Ellison, William Inboden, Louise Kettle, and Rovner himself.¹⁴ Bob opened his essay, "The Mother of all Post Mortems," as follows:

The main news about the Chilcot Report is that the picture it paints is a familiar one. It seems to me that at least in its coverage of the run-up to the war, it largely confirms what most scholars had come to believe. But that should not be a cause for disappointment, because the point of inquiries like this is to lay out the historical record and reach sensible judgments, not to be original.

He ended as follows:

If the 9/11 attacks did not 'change everything' in the UK as they did in the US, for the former as well as the latter it reduced the tolerance for risk and made more salient low-probability but high-impact events. Contrary to both the common generalization that heightened tensions lead people to focus on the immediate future, and the normative claim that we are better off looking to the future, leaders in both countries were moved by fears, not of what was likely to happen soon, but for the longer-run. Indeed, it was clear that invading Iraq would increase the immediate risks. They mislead the public not about the danger they saw, but when they believed it might eventuate. Presumably, their underlying assumption is that while they, being stewards of their countries' fates, were mature enough to give proper weight to the future, their publics were not.

In a 2018 roundtable organized by Stacie Goddard on Ron Robin's *The Cold War They Made: The Strategic Legacy of Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter*, Bob framed his introductory comments with a discussion of his relationships with the famous couple, and also justified the need for the forum:

Those outside of the field of national security policy may be skeptical that there needs to be a book about the careers and legacies of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, names that are not only

Kristen Monroe, ed., *Political Psychology* (Mahwah: Erlbaum, 2002): 293-314, and Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970; 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

¹² H-Diplo/ISSF Forum on "New Light on 1914?" 5 September 2017, <https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Forum-16.pdf>. Earlier, in 2010 we published Trachtenberg's "French Foreign Policy in the July Crisis, 1914: A Review Article," ed. Labrosse, 26 November 2010; reissued on 1 October 2015. <http://issforum.org/essays/3-french-foreign-policy-in-the-july-crisis-1914> and <http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/3-Trachtenberg.pdf>.

¹³ The Chilcot Report of 06 July 2016 detailed the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot, into the British role in the 2003 Iraq War.

¹⁴ H-Diplo/ISSF Policy Roundtable on the Chilcot Inquiry, 18 September 2016, <https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-1-chilcot>.

unfamiliar to the general public, but may not be known to most students of international politics. But they were indeed important. Albert's death was marked by a memorial ceremony at the U.S. Senate, attended by numerous dignitaries including President Bill Clinton (181). Ron Robin has written a fascinating if critical study of them, filled with insight and details that even people like myself who thought we knew the full story will find intriguing. At the start, I should note that I know almost all the characters Robin discusses: I audited a course with Albert (following Robin's practice, I will use the Wohlstetters's first names to differentiate them) at Berkeley in 1965 and interacted with him while I was at UCLA in the late 1970s; I met Roberta on several occasions (I also corresponded with her, something I had forgotten until Robin kindly sent me a letter he found in her archives); I was a colleague of Bernard Brodie, Albert's fierce rival; and I know Paul Wolfowitz a bit, and was a colleague and remain a friend of Zalmay Khalilzad, two of Albert's most important students, each of whom receive chapter-length treatment. Taking advantage of the fact that there are three other reviewers in this Roundtable, I will concentrate on the Wohlstetters's contributions to nuclear strategy, which is the area I know best.¹⁵

In the summer of 2020, Bob mused about organizing a discussion about the White House presidential tapes and suggested the roster of writers. In response, a few months later, H-Diplo published "The Importance of the White House Presidential Tapes and in Scholarship," which featured essays by Matthew Evangelista, James Goldgeier and Elizabeth Saunders, Luke Nichter, and Marc Trachtenberg.¹⁶ In 2021, Bob's questions about the effects on historical scholarship of the digitalization of archives resulted in "Scholars and Digital Archives: Living the Dream?" At Bob's suggestion Richard H. Immerman chaired and introduced the forum, which included essays by Matthew Connelly, Kaeten Mistry, Christopher J. Prom, and Joseph C. Wicentowski.¹⁷

The most important and far-reaching ISSF/H-Diplo publications have been our two series of essays on Donald Trump's presidency. The first, "America and the World: 2017 and Beyond," asked a group of historians and IR experts to consider what diplomatic history and international relations theory could tell us about the likely future of the United States in the world, and what tools and insights the H-Diplo/ISSF community could provide to make sense of a fundamentally evolving situation.¹⁸ Bob wrote the inaugural essay, "President Trump and IR Theory." His opening was a classic:

I never thought that I would write the phrase 'President Trump,' let alone link it to IR theory. But the former is a great opportunity for the latter. Scholars of international politics bemoan the fact that our sub-field cannot draw on the experimental method. Well, now we can.¹⁹

¹⁵ H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable, Volume X, No. 17 (2018) on Ron Robin. *The Cold War They Made: The Strategic Legacy of Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017). 19 November 2018; <http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Roundtable-10-17.pdf>.

¹⁶ H-Diplo/ISSF Forum 25 on the Importance of White House Presidential Tapes in Scholarship, published on 2 November 2020, <https://issforum.org/forums/25-tapes>.

¹⁷ H-Diplo Forum on "Scholars and Digital Archives: Living the Dream?" ed., Labrosse, 6 October 2021, <https://issforum.org/forums/Forum-2021-2.pdf>.

¹⁸ <https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5a-policy-series-introduction>.

¹⁹ H-Diplo/ISSF Policy Series, "America and the World - 2017 and Beyond, Introductory Essay by Jervis, "President Trump and IR Theory," 2 January 2017 <https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/Policy-Roundtable-1-5B.pdf>.

In 2019, Columbia University Press published a selection of these essays in *Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the Twenty-First Century*.²⁰

The second series, “America and the World—The Effects of the Trump Presidency” kicked off in January 2021. Again, Bob composed our inaugural essay, “The Trump Experiment Revisited,” even if it was published later than expected due to his condition. He wrote,

Four years ago I wrote that the Trump presidency would provide a test for many IR theories. It was clear from Trump’s campaign and his personal style that both his policy preferences and his methods of operation were outside of the political mainstream, and indeed this was a major part of his appeal to voters, even if they did not necessarily approve or even know of the specific policies he was advocating. What made his period in office so valuable to IR scholars, even if they disapproved of him and what he sought to do, is that it provided insight into the classic arguments about how much freedom of action an American president has and the level of constraint domestic interests and the international system will apply. On this topic I found Kenneth Waltz’s well-known levels of analysis framework particularly useful.

Here I want to discuss the results of the experiment and then turn briefly to what this means for the Biden presidency. Even in science, where scientists can clean their test tubes, the results of experiments often are unclear and susceptible to multiple interpretations. So in this case we should not be surprised that we—or at least I—see a muddy picture. One complication is that the experiment was not run under ideal conditions. Trump not only had unusual views, but was inexperienced in running a large and complex organization and had a short attention span for most issues. Richard Neustadt famously reported that President Harry Truman thought that his successor would not be able to manage the executive branch: “He’ll sit here, and he’ll say, ‘Do this! Do that!’ *And nothing will happen.*” Truman underestimated Eisenhower, but his prediction applies years later to Trump, in part because many of the people he appointed to high positions did not share his views.²¹

His cautious conclusion warrants quoting in full:

What this means is that we cannot fully judge the Trump experiment at the end of his term. The impact of what he has said and done will last longer and, for better and for worse, will carry over into the Biden presidency and perhaps beyond. The difference that Trump’s idiosyncrasies have made is, then, yet to be fully determined. Furthermore, we may be misled by the use of the standard comparative method to judge the question I originally posed about how constrained Trump would find himself when he took power. The instances of continuity between Trump and Biden at first glance suggest that the former was not as innovative as it might seem. He instead was responding to pressures from the domestic or international environment that would have yielded a similar response, regardless of who was president, since Biden behaved as he did. While this may be true, it is also possible that Biden was able (or compelled) to act in this way only because Trump had charted a new course. As in so many cases of history and international

²⁰ Jervis, Francis J. Gavin, Joshua Rovner, and Diane Labrosse, eds., *Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

²¹ Jervis, “The Trump Experiment Revisited,” ed. Labrosse, H-Diplo/ISSF Policy Series: America and the World; the Effects of the Trump Presidency, 1 February 2021; <https://issforum.org/to/ps2021-7>; forthcoming in Robert Jervis, Diane Labrosse, Stacie Goddard, and Joshua Rovner, eds., *The Liberal Order Strikes Back? Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and the Future of International Politics* (Columbia University Press, forthcoming). The quotation is from Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: Wiley, 1960), 9; emphasis in the original.

politics, it is not easy to choose between these alternative explanations, and at this point all I can do is to raise the question.

A selection of essays will be published this year in a second edited volume, also with Columbia University Press, titled *The Liberal Order Strikes Back? Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and the Future of International Politics*. In one of his final communications with me, Bob sent the revised draft of his essay for the book.

Finally, in late 2019 I told Bob about a new series of essays I was designing for H-Diplo called “Learning the Historian’s Craft.” I asked him to write for us and to suggest the names of IR scholars, which would allow us rename the series “Learning the Scholar’s Craft: Reflections of Historians and International Relations Scholars” and cross-post it on ISSF. Bob agreed; his wonderful essay, “How I Got Here,” appears in the first appendix to this tribute. The “Scholar’s Craft” series now includes essays by over fifty distinguished scholars in both fields (so far).²² Bob concluded his with a statement that also summarizes the purpose of ISSF: “This enjoyment and stimulation that we hope leads to a collective better understanding of the world is of course the point of our shared enterprise.”²³

I tried to convince Paul Schroeder, who was in his early nineties, to write for us, and he agreed when Bob sent a letter (Bob always sent letters or picked up the telephone when needed). Unfortunately other matters intervened, and Paul had to withdraw. Shortly after that, in December 2020, he passed away. Schroeder’s death, and the sense of loss that it created, led to the creation of a new H-Diplo/ ISSF series of retrospective appreciations of the scholarship of those who are no longer here to write for the “Scholar’s Craft” series.

At Bob’s suggestion we opened the series with a tribute to Schroeder. Bob planned to write the introduction and suggested that we find two diplomatic historians and two IR specialists to write for us in order to encompass the full range of Schroeder’s work. By the time the essays by Beatrice de Graaf, Jack Levy, T.G. Otte, and John A. Vasquez were edited and finalized, Bob was struggling with his treatment and exhaustion. To his very great regret he felt that he could not go ahead with the introduction. Marc Trachtenberg kindly agreed to step in, but just before publication Bob told us that he wanted to write a personal note and would find a way to do so.

His tribute, “Paul Schroeder: Bringing Moderation, Morality, and Progress Back In,” was heartfelt and lovely, detailing the intense intellectual engagement of two giants over many decades. It was also bittersweet given Bob’s own situation. He wrote the lines that so many of his colleagues would apply to him only a few months later:

The symposium on Paul Schroeder’s scholarship was worthy of its subject, who made so many contributions to our understanding of international history and international politics.... I trust that the scholarly community and perhaps the interested public will continue to grapple with the issues he raised. I know my own research and understanding of the world would have been much simpler and cruder without his scholarship and conversation. He was a treasure and will be sorely missed.²⁴

Coda

²² The essays, which begin on 22 January 2020 with Andrew Bacevich’s story, are available at <https://issforum.org/category/essays/formation-essay/page/10>.

²³ Jervis, “How I Got Here,” Learning the Scholar’s Craft Series, 04 March 2020; <https://hdiplo.org/to/E198> and <https://issforum.org/essays/PDF/E198.pdf>

²⁴ Jervis, “Paul Schroeder: Bringing Moderation, Morality, and Progress Back In,” H-Diplo/ISSF Forum 28 on the Importance of Paul Schroeder’s Scholarship to the Fields of International Relations and Diplomatic History, <https://issforum.org/forums/28>.

In his essay for this forum, Paul Kennedy touches on Bob's intense work for H-Diplo/ISSF during the COVID-19 pandemic and his illness. Like so many of those who have also written tributes, I was privileged to be in communication with Bob until the last days of November 2021. We continued to discuss promising new works and to assign reviews and plan new series, while Bob sent updates on his condition and his own projected deadlines for ISSF writings ("the cancer has read its Darwin," he wryly reported after a promising treatment had lost its efficacy). The amount of work he did during this period was simply astonishing.

What is also astonishing, in retrospect, is the fact that despite Bob's regular and frank reports on his condition, I had the sense that things would somehow carry on indefinitely. This false sense of optimism²⁵ (wishful thinking, really) remained, even after the arrival of what would be Bob's last note, along with a copy of his revised essay for our second Trump volume. He wrote that his situation "isn't good" after the failure of a recent treatment, and that the new one had "only a 20% chance of working." "But," he added, "at least [the chances are] not 0, and all the nasty effects of the disease and the treatment are controllable," with the exception of the deep exhaustion that had dogged him from before his diagnosis.

I expected to receive a follow-up note the next week, as had occurred so many times during the roller-coaster reports over the course of Bob's illness and treatments. Sadly, that note never arrived.

Bob Jervis was a treasure and will be sorely missed.

²⁵ Keren Yarhi-Milo talks about a similar false sense of optimism at the end of her poignant essay; those by Bob's former students like Rose McDermott, Mira Rapp-Hopper, and James Wirtz speak volumes about Bob's courage and grace during his illness. All of the others testify to what a fundamentally fine and decent man Bob was.

REMEMBRANCES OF THE BOB JERVIS I KNEW BY ROBERT ART, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

I knew Bob Jervis a long time – 54.5 years to be exact. For more than five decades, we had a close friendship and a fruitful academic collaboration. Below are a few of my remembrances of Bob, drawn from the earlier years of our relationship.

How We Met

I first met Bob in the late summer of 1967. I was finishing my thesis, and Bob had come from Berkeley to complete his. Tom Schelling brought both of us to Harvard's Center for International Affairs, known in Cambridge at the time as the CIA, later changed to the CFIA for obvious reasons. We were to be office mates for the year, me on a postdoc and Bob on a predoc. Our office was in an old, slightly decrepit building behind the Center's main brick building, quite close to the Harvard Divinity School. This building was put up quickly during World War II, meant only as a "temporary" building, to be torn down when the war was over. This "temporary" building was still going strong in 1967 and in fact lasted many decades after that.

First Impressions

I cannot recall all my first impressions of Bob, but several clearly stand out. He certainly did dress informally -- polo shirts and khaki pants, never a tie or jacket. He had a tendency to mumble his words near the end of a sentence. He had a twinkle in his eye that he could deploy whenever he chose. When I first met him at our assigned office, his materials, which turned out to be the various chapters of his thesis, were all over the place, taking up nearly all the available table space. He seemed quite friendly and down to earth, but for some reason I cannot recall, also slightly odd, a feeling that quickly dissipated.

Bob was delighted to find out that I would not be coming to "our" office very often. Part of my time would be spent at Brandeis, where I took a half-time teaching position. The other half of my time was supported by the Center postdoc, but since I tended to work at home, I would not be making much use of the CFIA office. We turned out to be compatible office mates because I was almost never there.

Intellectual Firepower

It was a good thing that I was an absentee office mate. Had I come to the office every day, I doubt either one of us would have met our research obligations. We loved to "talk shop" – shop talk not being the latest scuttlebutt but rather the substance of our field. Bob was so much fun to talk to, and so gratifying, because he knew so much. I always came away from a discussion with him, over all those years, intellectually the richer. It was not the facts he mentioned, but his insights about the big picture. In a field where too many have an uncanny instinct for the insignificant, Bob always had his eye on the big picture and weighty subjects. He had the instinct for the jugular – for the crucial assumptions, arguments, and flawed reasoning. Go to any of his articles or books. What you will find is a treatment of an important theoretical problem or a weighty contemporary issue, together with an extended analysis that comprehensively outlines the issues and resolves them. Bob was truly a "big picture guy."

Bob's interests, knowledge, and critical reasoning faculties were truly awesome. He not only knew in depth those subjects he chose to study, he studied a large number of them. His vast knowledge and ability to recall much of what he read never ceased to amaze me. If I needed to get smart quickly on a subject, Bob was the person I called to find out what to read and what to look out for. He remains the best-read political scientist I have known, and over the course of a 55-year career, I have known a lot of them.

But it not just Bob's vast knowledge that is remarkable, it is what that mind of his produced over the course of his long career. Bob stands among those few that we call the leaders of our fields -- those very few who possess the best theoretical

minds and produce the best theoretical work. I cannot remember which of Bob's first two books Tom Schelling wrote this blurb for, but he put Bob's intellectual gifts thus: "Jervis has a talent for theory and a taste for history." I think that about sums up Bob's special brand of scholarship.

Evidently, a lot of other people appreciated the innovative quality of his work. He was elected to membership in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Philosophical Society, and about just six months before he died, the National Academy of Sciences. He was especially proud of the last two. Since the Philosophical Society has a very small elected membership, becoming a member is really a big deal. The National Academy is dominated by the natural sciences, making election for social scientists especially difficult. Bob was also elected President of the American Political Science Association by political scientists of all stripes, not just international relations experts, and won numerous other awards. During his career, Bob Jervis garnered about every academic award of distinction that a political scientist could hope to receive.

Psychology and Statecraft

Early in his career Bob almost singlehandedly created the special area of international relations theory that blended history, international politics, security, and psychology. In this area, Bob's intellectual output has to be seen as "foundational" because so much subsequent work was built on his pioneering work.

At first, I was skeptical of the psychological approach as applied to international politics. I remember saying to Bob: (1) "How can you take the results from experiments with teenagers making decisions concerning their likes and dislikes about popular music and use those findings to understand the ways statespeople make life and death decisions"? And (2) how do you know that what you are saying is valid about the given psychological mechanism under discussion when there is so much disputation about it among the psychologists?

His answer to the second question was: "you can always find an expert to back you up." I knew his answer to the second question was Jervis humor at work; Bob took his scholarship much too seriously to be satisfied with such a flippant answer. I do not remember him giving a clear response to the first – the relevance of how teenagers make decisions to the ways statespeople make their decisions, but he probably did. I just do not recall it. What I do remember vividly is the cumulative effect of Bob's work on me. He showed rather convincingly in case after case after case how psychology could be profitably used to understand the dysfunctions in statecraft decisionmaking, and why these dysfunctions recurred again, and again, and again. It was the cumulative weight of Bob's evidentiary work that made me finally concede: "Bob, I guess you are right."

The High Bar for Mastery

I used to gently tease Bob when I found an article or a book that he had not read. Mind you, this happened quite infrequently, but on those rare occasions when it did, I took full advantage of it. In response to my feigned incredulity, Bob seemed almost apologetic, as if saying to himself "I should have read this." Or he would say, "such and such colleague told me the book was no good." Finally, I would say: "Bob, for goodness sake, I am teasing."

I recall one instance that was not about what Bob had not read, but rather about his retention of what he had been reading. About five years into our friendship, I had a year off to do research. I decided to learn some European diplomatic history, my reasoning being that this was an invaluable laboratory for scholars of international politics, especially those interested in theorizing about great power politics. Besides, Bob had been doing so, so it must be sensible for me to also do so.

During one of our many discussions about European diplomatic history, I began talking at some length about the politics surrounding the Berlin Congress of 1878. I went into a lot of detail for a long time and then stopped. Bob looked at me with a face, not of panic but of great concern and perhaps even alarm and said: "I am not reading, and remembering, European diplomatic history at that level of detail. Maybe I need to work harder on that." I saw how worried Bob was, or at least I thought he was worried, and said in response: "Bob, I just finished reading a book on this subject. It is at my fingertips, but

there is no way I will remember all this stuff one month from now.” I mention this incident because it shows how much Bob could demand of himself and how high he could set the bar for mastery of a subject.

Bob and Baseball

Once on our way to New Jersey to visit my wife’s parents, Suzanne (my wife) and I stopped in Newtown, Connecticut to stay overnight with Kathe (Bob’s wife) and Bob at their invitation. It was then that I learned of Bob’s passion for, and skill at, baseball.

Our son David, who was about ten at the time, was an avid baseball fan. He was also a serious baseball card collector and loved to play the game and learn the various stats of the players and the teams. I was terrible at baseball and knew little about its history and nothing about the stats. Not so, Bob, I discovered.

I had never thought of Bob as a “jock,” and was completely floored to see him hit high popups for David to catch. Again and again, Bob threw the ball up in the air and then hit the ball so high that I almost lost sight of it. Bob was in the groove. It was clear that he had played a lot of baseball growing up and had not lost his touch. Watching Bob hit those high flies, one after another, to David, who caught most of them, was poetry in motion.

Bob was not only good at hitting and fielding, he had a real command of the stats. David was an addict for baseball stats. He brought with him a baseball encyclopedia and began to question Bob about wins and losses of this pitcher, the batting records of various players, notable games of the past, and so forth. David knew a lot also. So, there were Bob and David trading statistics from memory late into the night. I can say that David had met a kindred spirit when it came to baseball stats. Bob clearly had a lot of fun also.

Collaboration

Bob and I collaborated on two projects that did well. The first was our introductory reader in international politics, entitled *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, the first edition of which came out in 1973 and the fourteenth of which will be out in 2023. The other was the Cornell Series in Security Studies (CSSA), initiated in 1982 and now in its forty first year, with new editors.

I often asked myself how we sustained these two projects for so long. First, I think, was the deep respect for, and trust in, one another’s expertise and judgment that we developed over the years of working together. The other reason is that we both viewed these two projects in terms of service to the profession. We envisioned the reader not as merely a collection of good articles in the field, but also as an attempt to give some intellectual coherence to the field of international relations. We saw CSSA as a key venue for younger scholars to publish their dissertations and get their start in building their careers.

Bob believed strongly in service to the profession. When he became very sick and had just months to live, Bob said to me, “we need to bring in a younger scholar to help us out with the 14th edition. You’re not getting any stronger and neither am I.” I said to Bob: “do we really need to do this, at our age?” Bob’s retort: “think of it as service to the profession.” Here he was, only a few months away from his deathbed, still thinking about the profession of political science and his obligations to it. The sense of service was embedded in Bob’s DNA. (We asked Tim Crawford to join us in completing the 14th edition and were lucky that he agreed.)

Loss

Bob was a gem of a human being. With his passing, I feel as if I lost my older brother. I miss him terribly.

BOB JERVIS: A MAN WITHOUT ENEMIES

BY RICHARD K. BETTS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

My first encounter with Bob Jervis was half a century ago, as a first-year graduate student in his Gov 230 seminar on theories of international politics. The syllabus was an ideal voluminous survey of the literature, and I cribbed from it six years later when, as a lecturer, I taught the course after Bob's departure for UCLA. I recall the class in particular because Peter Katzenstein was in it (auditing?) and he regularly dominated the class discussion, but most of all because of my pride in getting a straight A from Bob –before the prevalence of grade inflation! I was a late bloomer academically and didn't take such a grade for granted. Many years later, at Bob's 60th birthday party, I was gratified to see that he was a bit of a late bloomer too. At the party he displayed copies of his old report cards from the Fieldston School, and I was pleasantly surprised to see a lot of B grades. Maybe for selfish reasons I liked to think that he affirmed the notion that creativity and great intellectual achievements do not depend on early performance according to standard metrics.

I had only infrequent contact with Bob for the next twenty years, but we shared an interest in developing the academic study of intelligence. He was arguably the dean of this field, which only emerged in a serious way at the end of the 1970s when waves of declassification began to provide reliable empirical material for study. He came to the subject through his work in political psychology, while I came to it via work on the staff of the original Senate investigation of U.S. intelligence agencies (the Church Committee). This combination fueled some cross-fertilization and we crossed paths occasionally in purveying our academic insights as consultants in the intelligence community. While I've been primarily a policy analyst, Bob was the consummate theorist, but unlike some eminent theorists he was eager to apply his ideas to policy when opportunities arose, and without the naiveté often found among cloistered academics about what constitutes real policy relevance.

Probably because of his work with CIA, Bob was apparently on a list of potential appointees in the incoming Clinton administration at the end of 1992 when I got a call from someone on the transition staff who was compiling information and opinions about candidates. I assume that I was contacted because I had previously spent fourteen years in the Washington policy milieu, including several months on leave from the Brookings Institution as a foreign policy advisor in Walter Mondale's presidential campaign, and had some connections among insiders. I gave Bob a strong recommendation but then the caller asked, "Is he quirky?" I responded, "What do you mean?" He answered that he'd heard that Bob dressed "unconventionally." What could I say, other than that unconventional was conventional in the academic world, and I knew Bob was happy to dress appropriately when circumstances required since I had heard that he dressed up for the opera. I mention this only because in the various reminiscences about Bob that I've heard in the days after his death fondly humorous remarks about his clothing choices seem to pop up.

Another aspect of Bob's personality that I kidded him about whenever possible was his Manhattanite provincialism – that is, his view, which is typical of many raised in the city, that it is the only place to be, and indeed that there is scant reason ever to go anywhere else. This was a trait Bob flaunted, albeit with an eye twinkle. An international affairs expert who had to be dragged into foreign travel – indeed, I think he never got to Asia even once – is unusual. When Harvard tried to recruit Bob in the late 1980s, Sam Huntington, originally a New Yorker himself, lamented to me that conversation had revealed they couldn't entice him because of his attachment to "the high life in Manhattan."

One of our colleagues once characterized Bob as a "conflict avoider." At the time this sounded like criticism for unwillingness to embrace contention forthrightly. Like our colleague I too tend to prefer frank confrontation in most cases, but I wouldn't criticize the difference in Bob's inclination if such it was. He did not avoid polite debate and was quite adept at making critical points indirectly, or stepping up to aggressive argumentation on the rare occasions when importance and effectiveness demanded it. The milder diplomatic style may well have underwritten his success in leading the profession, and in any case it had a strongly admirable side. As Ken Prewitt said in a Zoom meeting soon after Bob's death, Bob was a man who had no enemies. That was something unusual and laudable.

I owe many sorts of thanks to Bob. He was a personal friend for the past thirty-plus years since I came to Columbia despite the many demands on his time as not just a professor called on by administrators more than most but as a leader of the

profession outside. I had to love him because he appreciated my work more than many others have. We often (definitely not always) shared a similar tilt in attitudes toward contending arguments, and when Bob agreed with me in a debate with others I took special comfort and confidence in my position. He is one of two especially eminent political scientists (Huntington the other) who supported my career progress and had faith in my work despite its not being in step with the main methodological trends of recent times. He was instrumental in getting me to Columbia at a time when I was, in a sense, damaged goods, the president of another great university having just vetoed my appointment after it had been voted by its government department. He supported me beyond the call of duty several times along the way in my career – something doubtless legions of his friends, colleagues, and disciples would also say.

These recollections dwell on Bob's personal relationship more than his intellectual influence on me. The latter was not so much in specific matters of research as in simply being a model of theoretical innovation, intellectual breadth, and erudition. If any critic ever mounted a major attack on any of Bob's ideas or writings, let alone a telling one, I missed it. Bob and I shared the devotion to accumulating, annotating, and relying heavily on books, which used to be typical of academics but has become less so in the computer age. His appreciation of the empirical discipline that psychology and history should impose on political science rang ever truer in the heyday of rational choice theory and emulation of economics. That Bob was chosen as president of the American Political Science Association at the same time that the latter trends were ascendant (and which he supported as a fellow traveler and intellectual pluralist) is especially powerful testimony to his stature. Indeed, he had no enemies – personally, intellectually, or professionally.

ROBERT JERVIS: A MUCH BELOVED “GIANT GADFLY”

BY THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

I am grateful to Richard Immerman, Diane Labrosse, and Marc Trachtenberg for asking me to contribute to this collection of essays about my mentor, colleague, and friend, Bob Jervis. They approached me just after I agreed to write an essay for *Foreign Affairs* with Keren Yarhi-Milo, who is also Bob's former student, current Columbia colleague, and friend.¹ But I still wanted to participate here as I know how important H-Diplo was to Bob and I could not pass up an opportunity to honor a wonderful person with an amazing career.

My solution was to rework an earlier essay that I wrote in 2017 as the chair of an H-Diplo roundtable review on two of his books. One of those was the new edition of his classic *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* and the other was a collection of his essays under the very appropriate title *How Statesmen Think*, the question that motivated Bob's work for six decades. I started that piece by calling Robert Jervis “both a giant and a gadfly” in the field of International Relations. In responding to my essay in the roundtable discussion Bob humorously thanked me for branding him “a giant gadfly.”² This is why I use that phrase in the title here.

Before I turn to his many professional contributions, however, I wanted to share a story that I believe partially captures Bob's generous, humble, and humorous personality. I told this story several years ago when I spoke at a session in his honor at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Here goes.

I was a graduate student at Columbia University in the late 1980s, and one year I was lucky enough to secure an outside grant that provided funds for a small office in what is now the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies. This placed me just a few doors from Professor Robert Jervis, who had taught two of my classes, was my boss when I was a teaching assistant, and had joined my dissertation committee.

It was in this time period that Bob received the Grawemeyer Award for his book, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, a prestigious honor that includes a substantial monetary prize.³ In his generosity, he decided to share the wealth by providing an unlimited supply of gourmet ground coffee and a coffee machine in a public space in the Institute. For a struggling graduate student in the pre-Starbucks era this meant a lot. No more trips to the local Greek diner to get weak coffee in smallish blue paper cups decorated with the Parthenon. What was much more important than the coffee, however, is that the coffee machine provided multiple opportunities for me as a student to chat with Prof. Jervis and other members of the very busy faculty (note: we never referred to him as Bob until we defended our dissertations).

On one such occasion, Prof. Jervis approached me at the machine with an opened envelope and a letter. (This was also the pre-email era!) Prof. Jervis had a quizzical look on his face. He handed me the letter and said, “Tom. I do not know how I should feel about this letter. Is it an insult or a compliment?” The letter was from a refereed publication rejecting something he had submitted. He was asking me about how to react to one of the referee's comments, which read: “in this piece, the author is trying hard to be Bob Jervis. But this author is no Bob Jervis.” I laughed very hard then and still laugh now as I

¹ Thomas J. Christensen and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “The Human Factor: How Robert Jervis Reshaped our Understanding of International Politics,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 7, 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-01-07/human-factor>

² See the H-Diplo Roundtable Review of Jervis's *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017) and *How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable 10-4, 8 December 2017 <https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Roundtable-10-4.pdf>.

³ Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

write this. Prof. Jervis was free of an inflated ego and full of humor, so he laughed along with me. When I composed myself, I told him that I found this to be a great compliment to him as a scholar, however insulting it was to the piece in question.

At the APSA meeting at which I presented this story, I hoped that the many young scholars in the audience would take heart in it. Even the great Bob Jervis, who was receiving a lifetime achievement award that day, could have his work be summarily rejected by an academic publisher and could still find that an occasion for laughter and affirmation.

I now turn to a discussion of Jervis's path-breaking work.

An Appreciation of Robert Jervis's Work

Robert Jervis was at the same time a giant and a gadfly, a leader and a subversive in the field of international relations. In his career, Jervis often was very much a theorist in the mainstream political science tradition. In some of his most famous works—including “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” and *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*—Jervis showed his skill at creating deductively derived theories about how states should respond to structural and technological changes in international security affairs.⁴

Those works are extraordinary and made an enormous contribution to the literature. But Jervis often noted with frustration that actual policy makers often diverged from the expectations and prescriptions of his theories. He lamented that, despite the inescapable background condition of mutual nuclear vulnerability, the two Cold-War superpowers still developed destabilizing offensive nuclear weapons designed to target their enemies' arsenals, planned to fight ‘limited’ nuclear wars of various levels of intensity, and obsessed about local conventional balances of power around the world. Jervis thought it would have been safer and less fiscally burdensome if Washington and Moscow had fully accepted the condition of mutually assured destruction and properly understood the stabilizing effects that condition should produce at all levels of potential military conflict.⁵

Jervis was, however, much more than a mainstream IR theorist. He was also an honorary diplomatic historian (and not coincidentally, he was a major force in both creating and sustaining H-Diplo/ISSF, the sister website of H-Diplo). Especially in books like *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* and *How Statesmen Think*, Jervis was interested in explaining how leaders actually behaved, rather than how they should have behaved according to a pure, context-free theoretical logic. His real rebellion against mainstream political science was his insistence that decision makers, at the end of the day, are human: they suffer from cognitive limitations, biases, and personality quirks. Those individual characteristics often make them poor subjects for deductively derived, structural explanations for how rational actors *should* interact under assumptions about their motivations assigned to them by scholars and in the face of objective changes in the environment in which they operate. In the preface of the revised edition of *Perception and Misperception* Jervis states that the book itself does not have a single clear theoretical take. This is true, unless, of course, one considers intelligent and historically rooted skepticism about clear theoretical takes to be a strong theoretical position.

How Statesmen Think, an updated compilation of previously published works, continued in this tradition. In a very real sense the book brings together Jervis's two skills as a deductively oriented social-science theorist and an inductive diplomatic historian. Jervis was enamored of general theories of coercive diplomacy, like Thomas Schelling's Nobel Prize-winning game theories of conflict, and general theories of human psychology, like Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman's Nobel Prize-

⁴ Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30:2 (January 1978): 167-214.

⁵ For Jervis's complaints about U.S. military doctrine under conditions of mutually assured destructions, see Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*; and Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). In *How Statesmen Think*, 186-187. Jervis recognizes that there was a long overdue acceptance of “security dilemma thinking” under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's rule, which did not begin until 1985.

winning work on prospect theory.⁶ But Jervis was a master at demonstrating that while the theories themselves may be general, it takes a tremendous amount of detective work to apply them to real-world cases. To illuminate the parsimonious power of the elegant theories, we need to get into the particular psychological makeup and perceptions of the leaders in question.

In Schelling's theoretical work on coercive diplomacy, a core concept is the perceived status quo that can either be preserved through deterrence or changed through compellence. Since Schelling deems compellence much more difficult to achieve than deterrence, the distinction could hardly be more important. So the need to understand leaders' varying perceptions of the status quo is built into the theory in a way that strongly privileges scholars like Jervis, who are steeped in diplomatic history, over the vast majority of game theorists in political science, who have focused almost exclusively on mathematics in their intellectual training and simply assume as given many things that in the real world vary wildly and consequentially.

The same can be said for one of the most important lessons of Schelling's game theoretic work, which is repeated often in the essays in *How Statesmen Think*: successful deterrence requires credible threats of punishment if proscribed behavior is adopted; but it also requires credible assurances that the punishment will be withheld if the perceived status quo is preserved. Without such assurances, the target has no reason to comply with the demands attached to the threat. There is always tension between these two equally important missions in coercive diplomacy, and that tension is captured by the concept of the security dilemma: a country's individual efforts to secure itself through defense buildups and deterrence can be misread by another state as fundamentally hostile and aggressive, leading to a countering effort that leaves both sides less secure.

To understand successful and failed instances of deterrence (or compellence), we need to comprehend not only the threatening and reassuring signals sent but how those signals are perceived by the target. In his qualitative research, Jervis was therefore careful and rigorous to show what leaders actually were thinking. Such care, however, is rarely reflected in the coding of cases for large n databases in the mainstream security studies literature, which ironically prides itself on superior scientific rigor.

Just as Schelling's theories are broadly applicable but difficult to apply in every case, so is Tversky and Kahneman's prospect theory. Since humans behave very differently when protecting what they have than they do when gaining new things, how issues are framed by individuals as being in the realm of gains or the realm of losses is all important. We need to know a lot about the psychology of individual actors in the political world to determine what they themselves would consider a gain from the perceived pre-crisis status quo and what they would consider a loss. We can do so only through careful empirical research into leaders' psychology in every case.

Bob Jervis applied these analytic skills not only as a scholar and teacher but as a public servant. He served an advisor to the intelligence community in order to both help officials there understand the causes of catastrophic intelligence failures and to decide what documents could be safely declassified and released to the general public. In my years interacting with people from that community I have heard nothing but praise for Bob both as a keen but fair critic, but also as a generous and empathetic fellow traveler who understood how difficult it is to draw accurate conclusions from a world of imperfect information and, sometimes, intentional deception by foreign governments.

Scholars who are former foreign policy practitioners, like James Steinberg and Phillip Zelikow, have praised Bob Jervis's work as useful tool in both policymaking and intelligence analysis.⁷ As a former official myself, I agree with them. Jervis's

⁶ Representative examples of their work include Thomas Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); and Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," *Econometrica* 47:2 (March 1979), 263-291.

⁷ See their comments in the H-Diplo Roundtable Review of Jervis's *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* and *How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics*, <https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Roundtable-10-4.pdf>.

theoretical toolbox is much more useful to policy makers than most theories in international relations because contingency is built into his generalizable approaches. There is plenty of room to allow for consideration of what policy makers know from experience to be important: individual leaders matter; context matters; diplomatic signals need to be crafted carefully to demonstrate both resolve and restraint; and how the other side thinks about an international crisis or problem is as important, and sometimes more important, than how one's own side thinks about such issues.

Bob Jervis published *How Statesman Think* and a new edition of *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* in 2017, the same year that Richard Thaler won the Nobel Prize for his work in behavioral economics, which, like the work of Jervis and Tversky and Kahneman, treats economic actors as full humans, rather than robotic utility maximizers. It may be fitting that the books were also published in the first year that President Donald J. Trump was in office. Trump's election demonstrated the importance of the individual leader and his or her psychology in international politics in ways that Jervis's work captures so well. And in an indirect and unintended way, Trump's Presidency validated Jervis's subversive arguments about the need to consider such particularistic variables in social science.⁸ Many scholars who take a very different approach and suggest in their work that what really matters in domestic and international politics are broad structural pressures on political actors, and not those actors' individual personalities, had their theoretical convictions tested by Trump's election. Many expressed uncharacteristic worry over this particular individual's presence in the Oval Office. Perhaps deep down, they think more like Robert Jervis than their published works might suggest.

⁸ See Jervis's thoughts on Trump's election and presidency in Jervis, "President Trump and IR Theory," H-Diplo/ISSF Policy series 1-6 (2017), "Diane Labrosse, ed., January 2, 2017, <https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/Policy-Roundtable-1-5B.pdf>; and "President Trump and IR Theory," in Jervis, Francis J. Gavin, Joshua Rovner, and Diane Labrosse, eds., *Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018): 3-7; as well as Jervis, "The Trump Experiment Revisited," Labrosse, ed., 11 February 2021, <https://issforum.org/essays/ps2021-7>, and "The Trump Experiment Revisited," in Jervis, Labrosse, Stacie Goddard, and Joshua Rovner, eds., *The Liberal Order Strikes Back? Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and the Future of International Politics* (Columbia University Press, forthcoming).

BOB JERVIS: A VERY SPECIAL COLLEAGUE BY MICHAEL COX, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (LSE)

Bob Jervis was without doubt one of the true ‘greats’ of IR whose originality, open-mindedness and creative energy made him a very special colleague indeed. Bob brought out his first major book back in 1970 (*The Logic of Images in International Relations*), six years later published his classic, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations*, and thereafter continued to write one important study after another, ranging from nuclear weapons to intelligence.¹ As *The Washington Post* noted in its obituary of Bob, the breadth of his research was astonishing. Indeed, his work shaped not only international relations theory but the fields of history, psychology, and sociology as well. He was truly one of a kind.²

Yet in spite of his reputation as an IR ‘theorist’ (he opined once that some kinds of IR theorizing could “be highly abstract”) Bob never went down what might loosely be called the road of parsimony. An admirer of Thomas Schelling and Glenn Snyder amongst others, Bob almost certainly thought of himself as an intellectual ‘fox’ - open-minded and curious - rather than a narrowly focused ‘hedgehog’. I also suspect that his immersion in diplomatic and international history warned him off of being too certain. In fact, I always thought of Bob (I have no idea if he did) as being something of a Popperian in his attitude to knowledge, basically taking it as a given that a theory could only be considered worthwhile if it could be proven to be false! Anyway, he knew far too much history to believe in certainty. “Idiosyncratic factors matter,” he once remarked, as of course did the sometimes random choices made by human beings. As a sympathetic observer once put it, Bob Jervis always believed that “uncertainty and systemic complexity” placed “extraordinary limits on rational and predictable action.”³ This did not mean that he underestimated the broader social and economic forces shaping and dividing the world. The Cold War, for example, was the expression of such forces, he argued in one of his many robust essays.⁴ On the other hand, to understand “outcomes in world affairs” we had to take account of the role played by “individuals’ perceptions and formative experiences.”⁵

It was perhaps for this reason that Bob never seemed to be much taken with the heated ‘paradigm debates’ that IR loved engaging in from time to time. Thus while neoliberals battled it out with their neorealist rivals – the so-called ‘Neo-Neo’ debate - Bob stood back and made the entirely sensible suggestion that both had important things to tell us about the ‘different worlds’ they studied. So why not draw intellectual strength from both? Which in turn raises the question about his own form of realism. Here it would be fair to say that he was always regarded as a realist, though [he] once pointed out that there was never just one iteration of that particular species, but five. It was certainly not ‘monolithic.’ Nor, in his view, was it incapable of explaining co-operation or the role played by institutions in the international system.⁶

¹ Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Jervis, Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

² *Washington Post*, December 14, 2021.

³ See the debate in Stacie Goddard’s review of James W. Davis, ed., *Psychology, Strategy, and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2012), H-Diplo/ISSF Review Essay 23, 16 May 2014, <https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/RE23.pdf>.

⁴ Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3:1 (Winter 2001): 36–60.

⁵ Quote from Thomas J. Christensen and Karen Yahri-Milo, “The Human Factor: How Robert Jervis Reshaped Our Understanding of International Politics,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 7th, 2022.

⁶ Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation,” *International Security* 24:1 (Summer 1999): 42–63.

However we define Bob theoretically, Bob himself was never anything but engaged, whether in thinking through the deeper causes of the Cold War (which he did not regard as a ‘security dilemma’) or the role played by his own country in world politics. A child of the free speech movement at Berkeley in the early 1960s, and a critic of the American war in Vietnam (and later of G. W. Bush’s war of choice in Iraq) Bob never went as far as those on the radical left who saw some demi-urge in Washington to make the world safe for capitalism and the corporations. The powerful could certainly be self-righteous. Economics obviously played a part in shaping US strategy. However, American foreign policy, in Bob’s reading at least, was run by people with limited options who operated in a universe of incomplete knowledge whose main objective it seemed was to make sure they remained in office. But they were rarely stupid or venal. Indeed, he was highly critical of those academics (who in many cases had had no experience in government - unlike Bob) who adopted a rather superior attitude towards policy insiders.⁷

Nor did he think that the United States was either the font of all good or all evil. It was, as he once remarked in a review of the work of Steve Walt and John Mearsheimer, just like most other great powers in history which made mistakes (of which he agreed there were many) but did so not because of some fundamental structural flaw at home or adherence to a certain ideology – most obviously liberalism - but rather because like all other great powers in history, it overreached. There was nothing especially unique or exceptional about that, he seemed to be saying.⁸

On a more personal note, I first got to know Bob when we here at the LSE were looking to build an academic partnership with Columbia University. Together with Volker Berghahn and Bob Legvold at the Columbia end (and Arne Westad and Svetozar Rajak at ours), this particular transatlantic venture finally bore fruit in the shape of a two-year LSE-Columbia University Double Degree in International and World History. Exploring what Bob would have called the ‘system’ through the forces that have made and continue to remake it – including wars and diplomacy – it is a course of which Bob would, I think, have very much approved drawing as it does from a wide range of disciplines taught in both London and New York.

Bob was also extraordinarily active in supporting the work of H-Diplo. Indeed, as Diane Labrosse recently reminded us, Bob was not only a contributor and editor, but in 2009 also founded the International Security Forum, becoming its executive Editor.⁹ And what a contribution he made introducing a series of great debates on a whole range of diverse topics from the role of the CIA and US foreign policy since 1947 right through to a series of reflections by scholars - including myself – on the work of the well-known French theorist of International Relations (virtually unknown in the US), Bertrand Badie.¹⁰

Badie I guess was someone whose work intrigued Bob, especially his work on the longstanding use of humiliation as a systemic practice wielded by dominant powers within the international system.¹¹ Having just finished a lengthy study myself of John Maynard Keynes’s *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* in which humiliation of the defeated in Paris in 1919 and

⁷ Bob once observed that “among too many academics, both political scientists and historians... [there was] a real smart-ass attitude” towards policymakers. See his revealing interview, August 12, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/an-interview-with-robert-jervis-reflections-on-political-science-politics-and-policy/>.

⁸ Jervis, “Liberalism, the Blob, and American Foreign Policy,” *Security Studies* 29:3 (2020): 434-456.

⁹ “Obituary for Robert Jervis,” *H-Diplo*, December 10, 2021; <https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/9270091/obituary-robert-jervis>.

¹⁰ Bob acutely observed in his introduction to the H-Diplo debate on Badie’s important book that it is yet “another mark of the fact that the discipline of international politics is not itself highly international that he is so little known in the United States.” H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable, Volume X, No. 10, 2018, <https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Roundtable-10-10.pdf>.

¹¹ Bertrand Badie, *Humiliation in International Relations: A Pathology of Contemporary International Systems* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017).

1920 helped lay the ground for the twenty years' crisis which followed,¹² I was much taken with what Badie had to say, as I think was Bob. Moreover, there was and remains - as Bob probably suspected at the time - much to be learned from Badie. Indeed, without pushing the lesson too far, doesn't the West today confront two powers in the shape of Russia and China who believe – rightly or wrongly – that they have been humiliated in the past and that they have every intention of righting what in Bob's terms they perceive or misperceive to be an historical wrong? It is certainly to Bob's immense credit that he had the imagination to bring the work of a colleague on one side of the Atlantic to the attention of those on the other. It is perhaps even more significant that we can (yet again) turn to the work of Bob Jervis to help us understand some of the complex reasons which have led us to the dangerous impasse in which we all find ourselves today.

¹² Reviewed by John Milton Cooper in *H-Diplo* Review Essay 245, 16 June 2020; <https://networks.h-net.org/node/6193759/pdf>.

HOW BOB HELPED ME—DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS

BY TIMOTHY W. CRAWFORD, BOSTON COLLEGE

Bob Jervis shaped how I think, write, and teach about international politics. It is hard to exaggerate his influence on my career, but also on other parts of my life. When I reflect on the pathways of his influence I see that although many were large and straightforward, some of them began small and were not direct or intended, but had big effects over time. Perhaps it is not coincidental that Bob stressed the significance of such patterns of causality in his scholarship and no more so than in his work culminating in *System Effects*.¹

That work had a large impact on the kind of research questions to which I gravitate. Before getting to how it influenced the direction of my research, I would like to describe how his *process* of work helped me to learn how to think about and study international politics.

Bob liked to point out that the timing and context in which things happened could determine both the direction and magnitude of their effects.² Between 1995 and 1998, while I was moving from an early to advanced Ph.D. student, I landed in a context that magnified what I was learning from Bob's teaching and scholarship. That "context" was a part-time, work-study job in what is now called the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies (SIWPS).

There I learned something about the manual process of Bob's basic research. The SIWPS work-study job was mostly what you would expect: tending to the coffee maker (which Bob often visited, remarking upon its freshness or lack thereof) and the Xerox machine, sorting mail, taking phone calls, sending faxes, moving boxes, and returning library books. This last task was a larger part of the routine than one might think because Bob churned through library books at a prodigious rate. It was interesting, of course, to see what he was reading and I sometimes paused in the library (with a guilty conscience, because I was "on the clock") to peruse them before dropping them in the return bin. But it was what Bob had us do *before* returning the books that was most eye-opening. They—along with a staggering variety of other materials—usually came with instructions to Xerox certain pages, and often to duplicate the same pages several times. I remember puzzling over this at first and then, after learning what happened to the copies, being deeply impressed.

Let me explain: by then I had read James Rosenau's essay "Thinking Theory Thoroughly," which taught us to ask of political events "of what is this an instance?"³ As an abstract injunction, I got the idea. But it was not until I learned the logic behind Bob's enormous filing system that I began to realize what it meant to do this as a scholarly vocation. You see, Bob's filing cabinets—which covered the better part of a wall outside his famously modest and overstuffed office—were brimming with folders dedicated to the many concepts and phenomena he called to our attention over the years. As long as I worked there, they were always growing as Bob harvested instances of things from his daily reading—of the newspapers, student papers and dissertations, manuscripts under review, new journal issues, declassified documents, the endless stream of library books, and everything else that caught his eye. After scribbling notes on each of the multiple copies he had us make, he would file them away in different folders. Thus, as he once explained to me, he created redundancy in his system that allowed him to return

¹ Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). For precursors see: "Systems and Interaction Effects," in Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., *Coping with Complexity in the International System* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993): 25-46; Jervis, "Systems Effects," in ed. Richard J. Zeckhauser, *Strategy and Choice* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991): 107-129; "Systems Theories and Diplomatic History," in Paul Lauren, ed., *Diplomatic History: New Approaches* (New York: Free Press, 1979): 212-244.

² See, e.g., Jervis, "Timing and Interaction in Politics: A Comment on Pierson," *Studies in American Political Development* 14 (Spring 2000): 93-100, esp. 95-96.

³ See James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), chapter 9.

to items of significance through different pathways of recollection. From this, I also realized that as he digested material he had trained himself to think about how certain events or statements and the like could be instances of several phenomena at once. Like everyone else who has read his work, I marveled at Bob's acute powers of observation and his unmatched ability to supply telling quotes and historical anecdotes. Witnessing his continuous process of reading, sifting, and filing, helped me to understand the scale of disciplined thought and organized effort that went into those qualities of his scholarship.

Bob influenced the *direction* of my research with an initially minor intervention concerning my duties at the SIWPS. When he was still polishing up chapters for *System Effects*, he handed me a side project to do in my office downtime. The job was to identify the presence or absence of patterns of "alignment consistency" in the War of the Austrian Succession. For that he gave me a volume on the history of the war, and portions of his draft chapter on "Alignments and Consistency."⁴ Needless to say, it was the most interesting work-study task I'd ever gotten, and I began working on it at home too. I ended up reading more of what he had already published on system effects and writing something longer than the short memo he had requested.

That deep dive into his work on systems catalyzed my research interests because it came at an opportune moment. I had already waded through the major works in IR theory and had even started teaching them to undergrads as a TA in his Introduction to International Politics course. But I had still not obtained an image of international politics that would stimulate my imagination and point to research puzzles I found interesting. The international milieu he depicted in *System Effects* and related writings provided that mental map.

With his knack for covering both sides of things, Bob's portrait of international politics in that work combines off-setting motifs. On the one hand, we see a system that is bearing down with widespread regularities and structures of interests, alignments, and power, and rife with second-order interactions, feedback cycles, and trapping chain-reactions. On the other hand, there remains considerable agency and contingency at the micro level, with some actors not just going off-the-path but devising ways to buck the system. This perspective grabbed my interest, especially, the intriguing notion that while certain central tendencies in international politics constrain states, states can work deliberately against the grain of general pressures, or try to use indirect interactions and knock-on effects to make "bank shots" that will advance their goals. As Bob showed, such behaviors at the micro level could also have some regularities to them. They could be conceptualized in generic terms, their dynamics and mechanisms theorized, and they could be studied closely in the historical record.

This way of thinking about international politics dovetailed nicely with what had already become my substantive interest at the time—third-party intervention and deterrence.⁵ I knew that I had to conceive of third-party intervention and deterrence as taking place in a strategic environment where the parties acted and reacted in anticipation of how they thought others would. But this was more a jumble of words in my head than a coherent framework. I remember sulking over Warner Schilling's pithy take on my proposed topic ("He who tries to carry water on both shoulders is bound to get wet") and wondering if that was what it all boiled down to. My thinking along these lines improved when Bob provided a recent piece he had written on deterrence and another draft from *System Effects* on "Relations, Alternatives, and Bargaining."⁶ Thus, I found a conceptual footing: though the central tendency of strategic triangles, the standard logic of extended deterrence, and a certain political common sense, all favored a two-against-one pattern, states do still sometimes try to deter from a more central (i.e., "pivotal") one-against-two position. As awkward as it was, this kind of power political bargaining had logics to

⁴ See *System Effects*, chapter 6.

⁵ This thanks to a pair of influential articles on peacekeeping and intervention by two other Columbia professors: Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1994), and John Gerard Ruggie, "Wandering in the Void: Charting the U.N.'s New Strategic Role," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1993): 26-31.

⁶ Jervis, "What Do We Want to Deter and How Do We Deter It?" in L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael Mazarr, eds., *Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy* (Boulder: Westview, 1994); *System Effects*, chapter 5.

be discerned and dynamics to be investigated. When Bob shared (with Glenn Snyder's permission), portions of the forthcoming *Alliance Politics*, still more pieces fell into place.⁷ I was soon on my way from a sketchy proposal to a dissertation and eventually a book.⁸ And out of that work I found myself drawn to another project, on another kind of third-party statecraft (wedge strategies) that also popped up in both Bob's and Glenn's books.⁹ Here, again, although many kinds of larger forces (including incentives for balancing and alignment consistency) may tend to push states' adversaries together, states also often try—sometimes against the odds—to divide those who are aligned or aligning against them.¹⁰ When such efforts work, the results deviate from the larger general tendencies that provoked them in the first place.¹¹

Bob said that choosing a dissertation topic was like choosing a spouse because, for better or worse, it would be with you for many years. It is obvious that his scholarship and mentoring helped lead me to a dissertation “match,” subsequent lines of inquiry, and many other professional opportunities.¹² But in an indirect and unpredictable way, Bob's teaching helped me to find my most important match—my wife! The year *System Effects* was published, Orly and I met because of Bob, though we did not understand this at the time and he had no way of anticipating or designing this result. Orly had been a political science major at Columbia in the early 1990s. (She graduated in 1994 before I arrived for Ph.D. studies). As a freshman, she struggled in Bob's Introduction to International Politics course. That prompted her to hedge with a second major in Economics. In one of her economics courses Orly became friends with a TA who introduced her to a wider circle of graduate students, including a woman in the political science Ph.D. program. After Orly had left Columbia, that woman and I became friends working together in the IWPS. She often invited me to parties at her place and finally, in the fall of 1997, I went to one. She also invited Orly to that party, intending to fix her up with another guy. Things did not go as any of us anticipated, but the results—for me at least—were quite fortunate. Were it not for Bob's tough grade in that Intro course, Orly and I would not have crossed paths. Just another reason, among many others, why it is hard to exaggerate Bob's influence on me.

⁷ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), chapter 2. At a Columbia University Political Science Department reunion in 2005, Bob arranged for me to sit next to Glenn at the lunch and dinner events. I was thrilled, not only because I greatly admired Glenn's work on alliance politics and crisis diplomacy but because he had reviewed and blurbed my book.

⁸ Timothy W. Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

⁹ Jervis, *System Effects*, 188-90, 208, 248-49; Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 194-195, 337-338.

¹⁰ Crawford, *The Power to Divide: Wedge Strategies in Great Power Competition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021).

¹¹ On these themes see Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” *International Security* 35:4 (Spring 2011): 155-189; Crawford, “Powers of Division: From the Anti-Comintern to the Nazi-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet Pacts, 1936-1941,” in Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Steven E. Lobell, eds., *The Challenge of Grand Strategy: The Great Powers and the Broken Balance between the World Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 246-278.

¹² Last summer, Bob Art and Bob Jervis invited me to help them edit the 14th Edition of their *International Politics* reader. Needless to say, I feel very fortunate and excited to be able to do it, and grateful beyond words for the chance to continue a kind of dialogue with both Bobs about teaching IR that started with my first TA gig in Jervis's undergraduate Introduction course.

UNDERSTANDING LIFE AND LIFE'S CHOICES. A TRIBUTE TO ROBERT JERVIS BY JAMES W. DAVIS, UNIVERSITY OF ST. GALLEN

It is perfectly true, as the philosophers say, that life must be understood backwards. But they forget the other proposition, that it must be lived forwards.

Søren Kierkegaard¹

Robert Jervis and I first discussed the Danish theologian's oft-cited journal entry after an undergraduate lecture class for which I was the TA. Bob had used the citation to make a point during a discussion of the diplomacy surrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall and what many referred to as the end of the Cold War, but he didn't remember its provenance. I took some satisfaction from the fact that I could remind him of the source. As we discussed the quotation while walking back to the Institute of War and Peace Studies—it was not yet the Saltzman Institute—I began to understand just how profound he regarded the statement to be. In subsequent years, I came to realize how profoundly his own research as well as his approach to scholarly practice and collegiality were influenced by the manifold implications of Kierkegaard's observation. And only weeks before he died, we returned to Kierkegaard in an email exchange on the article Bob had just finished for the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*.² Commemorating his long overdue election to the National Academy of Sciences, the article would turn out to be his last.

In this brief tribute to my mentor and friend, I necessarily look backwards: at the scholarly legacy of a giant in the field of International Relations and the many doors he opened for me and others. Though modest, Bob was aware of his influence in the field. Yet I suspect he remained uncertain about his legacy, whether anyone would choose to walk through the doors he opened, and if so, where they might end up. For in understanding that life must be lived forwards, he was keenly aware of the ambiguity, uncertainty, and contingency such a predicament entails. Any effort to understand his scholarly legacy (and I suspect in many ways his private life) must recognize how he was not only guided, but also motivated, by this view of the human condition.

In what follows, I highlight how an appreciation for the ambiguity, uncertainty, and contingency of life can be seen in two themes running through Jervis's scholarship: knowing and judging. In doing so, I will revisit some of the questions I explored in my contribution to the *Festschrift* published in honor of his 70th birthday and then conclude with a few personal experiences that confirm the importance of contingency in my own ongoing journey. Though uncertain where I will end up, looking back, all roads lead to Bob.

On Knowing

How do we know that we know something? The straightforward answer, one often provided by Jervis himself, is: "It's complicated!" But though the answer to my question might be straightforward, it reveals little, and little that was of interest to Jervis was straightforward. Indeed, simply to ask an interesting question in IR is to enter a world of complexity.

"Why did the Cold War stay cold?" Jervis posed this question to the undergraduates in that lecture only to deconstruct it. What do we mean by the term "war?" Sustained conflict involving organized forces producing a minimum of 1,000 battle-related fatalities? Probably not. In what sense and for whom was the cold war "cold?" Would our assessment of this period of international relations change if we were to refer to it as "the era of sustained superpower competition?" Calling it the Cold

¹ Søren Kierkegaard, *Journals* JJ:167 (1843), *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* Vol. 18 (Copenhagen: Søren Kierkegaard Research Center, 1997), 306. Customary translation.

² Robert Jervis, "Why Postmortems Fail," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* (forthcoming).

War inevitably led to the search for winners and losers, an exercise that in turn would corrupt our efforts to understand its origins. All this, while in other classes decrying the influence of deconstructivism in the social sciences!

Jervis recognized that making sense of the social world presents particular challenges. Not only because perceptions of our environment are mediated by preexisting concepts and beliefs, some of which will be idiosyncratic, but because we are usually trying to understand others with whom we are engaged in a strategic interaction and who simultaneously are trying to understand (and likely manipulate) us. Jervis regarded the challenge confronting scholars and decisionmakers to be similar. The central theme of *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*³ is that decision-makers tend to assimilate ambiguous information to pre-existing belief structures, a process that often leads to misperceptions and flawed inferences. Armed with theory and knowing how the story ends, Jervis feared that scholars likewise are primed to see some things while overlooking others that might lead to rather different conclusions. Though uncomfortable with language smacking of post-modernism, he recognized that theory and data are interrelated in significant ways. Hence, rather than starting with outcomes and trying to fit developments to our concepts and models—that is, trying to understand outcomes backwards—it might be better to start with the problems decisionmakers confront and then try to “see” the world through their own eyes. Of course, the task is difficult. Often, we lack the necessary data. But even when available, the data is suspect, for not only are decisionmakers often trying to deceive their adversaries, the wise amongst them understand their place in history and may be trying to deceive future scholars.⁴ Jervis was particularly attuned to—and I believe ultimately impressed by—Henry Kissinger’s efforts to influence future scholarship on his actions as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State through careful attention to the documentary record and a clever framing of controversial issues in his memoirs, and he took obvious pleasure in pointing to examples where Kissinger was caught at his game.⁵

Because the task of knowing is so complex, no single tool is adequate to the task. The observation goes a long way in explaining why Jervis not only was open but also contributed to research from a variety of disciplines and theoretical perspectives, with seminal contributions to the fields of political psychology, structural realism, nuclear strategy, arms control, deterrence, regime theory, diplomatic history, intelligence analysis, and complexity theory.

For graduate students affiliated with Columbia University’s Institute of War and Peace Studies, the example was at once inspiring and intimidating. Mastering the debates and methods of political science was daunting enough. But to study with Jervis meant engaging with a coterie of giants from cognate disciplines...in person. Imagine the exhilaration and sense of inadequacy that comes with extended and intense discussions of work-in-progress with the likes of McGeorge Bundy, Paul Schroeder, and Marc Trachtenberg!⁶ Not only was there the challenge of absorbing the substance of their historical arguments, but also the need to come to terms with the historical method and what often was a not-so-subtle critique of the

³Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

⁴Jervis’s interest in deception led to his distinguishing “signals” from “indices,” a distinction that would play a role in Michael Spence’s Nobel Prize winning scholarship on costly signals. See, Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); and A. Michael Spence, “Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets,” *The American Economic Review* 92:3 (2002): 434-459.

⁵A favorite example was Kissinger’s early efforts to deflect and mitigate blame for excluding MIRVs from SALT I. Evidence that these were disingenuous to say the least is provided by Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), 141-150. For a brief overview of the issue, see Michael Krepon, “Retrospectives on MIRVing in the First Nuclear Age,” *Arms Control Wonk* (blog), 5 April 2016, <https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201264/retrospectives-on-mirving-in-the-first-nuclear-age/>.

⁶The eventual publications included McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988); Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

discipline to which many of us had just committed ourselves. For those who chose to walk through this particular door, however, the clash of academic cultures resulted in more creative sparks than intellectual fatalities. Bob was delighted when I suggested that Trachtenberg join my dissertation defense committee,⁷ welcomed Marc's influence on James McAllister's important study of the post-war German Question,⁸ and took satisfaction in the substantive dialogue between political scientists and historians made possible by Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman's edited volume, *Bridges and Boundaries*.⁹

For those of us interested in political psychology, the model was similar. An invitation to join Bob's Political Psychology Workshop was an invitation to engage with the scholarship of the likes of Alexander George, Lucian Pye, Ned Lebow, Janice Stein, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (far before the latter two were socially acceptable in political science or economics). Regulars included established scholars, such as Jack Snyder and Jack Levy but also fellow upstarts, including Barbara Farnham and Rose McDermott. The workshop also provided a forum to discuss ongoing projects of younger scholars. I especially remember the discussions we had of Jon Mercer's pathbreaking dissertation on reputation, a project that critiqued some of the central arguments made popular by Thomas Schelling, a scholar Bob revered.¹⁰

Again, Jervis was opening doors even if he couldn't be certain of the path any of us might take should we choose to pass through them. In my case, the journey led to an application of prospect theory to questions surrounding the use of rewards and assurances in deterrence,¹¹ which in turn had me corresponding with Alexander George, Daniel Kahneman, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, the latter two becoming close friends and mentors. In a study of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's wartime decision-making, Barbara examined the effects of the domestic political context on leaders' efforts to cope with value conflicts in foreign-policy decision-making.¹² Meanwhile, Rose moved beyond prospect theory to engage with a wider range of research in psychology, genetics, and the emerging field of neuroscience, eventually becoming a trail blazer in the development of the experimental method in IR.¹³

The breadth of expertise reflected in the work of the generations of graduate students Jervis mentored is impressive enough. Truly remarkable was the innovative ways that Jervis could apply tools derived from the disparate disciplines, theories, and methods to deliver novel insights that often contradicted his previous commitments. Randall Schweller, himself an accomplished theorist, compared Jervis's virtuosity to that of a jazz musician: "You could see the wheels turning in his head

⁷ I remember well the debate I had with Trachtenberg at my dissertation defense over my critique of Raymond Sontag's interpretation of the War-in-Sight Crisis, a critique I could engage in only because Trachtenberg had taught us the importance of examining for ourselves the primary documents on which historians were basing their claims. See James W. Davis, *Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 81-93.

⁸ James McAllister, *No Exit: American and the German Problem, 1943-1954* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

⁹ Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (eds.), *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).

¹⁰ Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

¹¹ Davis, *Threats and Promises*.

¹² Barbara Reardon Farnham, *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study in Political Decision-Making* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

¹³ Rose McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); and Rose McDermott, "Experimental Methodology in Political Science," *Political Analysis* 10:4 (Autumn 2002): 325-342.

as he set several thematic ideas into motion, partially expounding on one and then moving on to another with the promise to return to this or that idea later.”¹⁴ Trachtenberg’s observation was similar: “[Jervis] looks at a problem in a certain light and he makes certain points about it. The points are often quite striking, but after making a certain argument, you can practically hear him saying to himself: ‘Now wait a minute, isn’t there another way of looking at it?’ The perspective shifts, and soon everything appears in a rather different light.”¹⁵

Some might conclude that such an approach to scholarship reflects a lack of theoretical commitment or some deep-rooted indecisiveness. Precisely the opposite was the case. Because Bob was convinced that the world we study is highly complex, and characterized by multiple connections among the various parts, he felt that unambiguous arguments based on isolating particular cause and effect relationships are likely to lead us to miss much of what is truly of interest.¹⁶

On Judging

Understanding life backwards implies beginning our analysis with the observable results of prior choices, a fact that tends to strongly influence if not determine our assignments of praise or blame. Jervis understood that the approach is often misleading. As realists have long argued, international outcomes do not necessarily follow from intentions, hence we cannot infer the latter from the former. A simple example from what may be Jervis’s most cited work will suffice to underscore the point. Because of the security dilemma, even two peacefully inclined leaders can find themselves in war. And owing to system effects, competition among revisionist states might create a stable balance of power.¹⁷

Elsewhere, I have discussed at length how Jervis’s approach to judging nevertheless fits into realism’s preference for evaluating political decisionmakers on the basis of the consequences of their choices (*Verantwortungsethik*) rather than the values that motivated them (*Gesinnungsethik*).¹⁸ At first glance, the affinity is not readily apparent. For in highlighting how cognitive limitations and the efforts of others to deceive routinely confound decisionmakers’ abilities to accurately perceive their environment, and in stressing the difficulties of predicting the full range of effects caused by acting in complex systems, Jervis’s scholarship would seem to absolve leaders of responsibility for the negative outcomes of their decisions. Perhaps we can dispense with classical realism’s view of political man as essentially evil and instead imagine a world of basically good, if fallible, people trying to cope with difficult situations?¹⁹ Indeed, some have referred to his approach as the “no fault” school.²⁰

¹⁴ Randall Schweller, “Jervis’s Realism,” in James W. Davis, ed., *Psychology, Strategy and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 41.

¹⁵ Trachtenberg, “Robert Jervis and the Nuclear Question,” in Davis, ed., *Psychology, Strategy and Conflict*, 115-116.

¹⁶ Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 73.

¹⁷ Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30:2 (January 1978): 167-214; Jervis, “The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment,” *International Security* 13:2 (Fall 1998), 90; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1979).

¹⁸ Davis, “The (Good) Person and the (Bad) Situation: Recovering Innocence at the Expense of Responsibility?” in Davis, ed., *Psychology, Strategy and Conflict*, 199-219.

¹⁹ For a statement of the classical Realist position, see Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil,” *Ethics* 56:1 (October 1945):1-18.

²⁰ Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 40-43.

Jervis recognized that his theoretical convictions complicated efforts to judge decisionmakers and decision-making. But as both a scholar and a consultant to the US government, he spent decades analyzing foreign policy decision-making to point out not only how things can go awry, but also how to cope with limitations on our ability to know and control the social world. We try to learn from the past so that we might do better in the future. His own approach is exemplified by his conduct of, and reflections on, post-mortem analyses of intelligence failures and the affinity to Kierkegaard is clear.²¹

Most important is the need to separate our judgements about the process of decision-making from our assessments of the quality of the decision itself as reflected in the results it produced. The task is complicated by the fact that post-mortem analyses are conducted at a distance:

The conditions under which people worked fade and become obscure even in their minds and can never be known by the reviewer. Such a person knows what the outcome of the events is, and he cannot fail to be influenced by that knowledge. Moreover, the material that he reads in order to determine what happened, what people knew, and what they wrote about it comes to him in a form much different from the way it comes to the intelligence analyst. The reviewer has the opportunity to read material through in a coherent order. For the analyst working on events as they happened, material or information must be absorbed as it comes in—sometimes in fragments, often not in a timely fashion.²²

Yet empathy for the intelligence analyst does not imply absolution. As Jim Wirtz put it: “estimates written to meet the needs of the day have to withstand the test of time.”²³ A focus on the process that led to conclusions alerts us to the fact that one can be right for the wrong reasons or wrong despite good process. But because we tend to focus our efforts on understanding “bad” results, we are likely to overlook the many positive outcomes that resulted from bad process. All too often we are selecting on the dependent variable.

For Jervis, the remedy is better social science. The comparative method can help establish whether the putative errors in process are unique, or perhaps are common and thus also present in cases where things turned out better. Counterfactual analysis allows us to explore the possibility that the outcome might have been the same even if the decisionmaker had behaved differently. And thinking in terms of alternative explanations not only help us establish where inferential errors occurred, but also whether there was a less ambiguous match between the evidence available and alternative views that were expressed at the time. To argue that one should have done a better job of connecting the dots is banal. The problem confronting foreign policy decisionmakers is that there usually are many ways to do so, especially in complex systems where the relations among variables are multiple, non-linear, and often characterized by complex feedback loops.

In his post-mortem analysis of the US intelligence community’s (IC) erroneous conclusion that Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his program to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), empathy for the challenges confronting analysts combined with good social science method allowed Jervis both to refute popular claims that the IC had succumbed to political pressure and to locate important errors in process that led to flawed inferences.²⁴ Nonetheless, Jervis concluded that even a good process likely would have led to the assessment that Iraq had an active and broadly based WMD

²¹ See Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

²² Jervis and John P. Devlin, “Analysis of NFAC’s Performance on Iran’s Domestic Crisis, Mid-1977-November 1978,” declassified as CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110003-4, as cited in James J. Wirtz, “The Art of the Intelligence Autopsy,” in Davis (ed.), *Psychology, Strategy and Conflict*, 182.

²³ Wirtz, “The Art of the Intelligence Autopsy,” 183.

²⁴ Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails*, 123-155.

program. The conclusion provoked intense discussions among many of Bob's former students. Almost all of us had opposed the war and many feared that letting anyone off the hook would only provide grist for the mills of those whose theories of IR and policy preferences were so obviously at odds with Jervis's own.²⁵

Such impulses were misguided. For if the IC was not guilty of telling politicians what they wanted to hear, Jervis's findings made it difficult for the political branches to absolve themselves of responsibility and scapegoat the IC for the decision to go to war and its consequences. Jervis recognized that the responsibility for the war lay with the Bush administration and an enabling Congress.²⁶ It was likely that they would have manipulated any assessment produced by the IC to fit conclusions reached on other grounds if only to avoid the necessity of acknowledging the value trade-offs implied by any significant foreign policy decision. Though he recognized the psychological impulse to be universal, Jervis nonetheless criticized failures to acknowledge value conflicts and what Max Weber termed the "incidental" costs involved in pursuing political objectives.²⁷ To quote Jervis's favorite IR theorist: "[T]he moral dilemmas with which statesmen and their critics are constantly faced revolve around the question of whether in a given instance the defense or satisfaction of interests other than survival justify the costs in other values."²⁸ Although he recognized the difficulty of predicting the ultimate effects of our actions, Jervis was true to an ethic of consequences in demanding that American decision makers confront their range of choice and weigh the intended benefits of their actions against the potential costs to other values:

The temptation to believe that the environment is so extreme as to compel the most awful actions and the statesmen's hubris of thinking that their acts are beyond judging are terribly strong and must be constantly resisted.... Perhaps as shocking as the calculated violations of moral standards are the many cases in which statesmen do not even think of what their acts will cost in terms of innocent lives, deplorable precedents, and values sullied.²⁹

And yet, once a decision is made, Jervis recognized the virtues of confidence and perseverance for effective leadership. For if our confidence matched our knowledge, it would debilitate political action altogether.³⁰ Life must be led forwards.

On Collegiality

The political mind—more specifically, how political actors think (or sometimes don't)—was a major focus of Jervis's scholarship. Yet, I suspect he found very few decisionmakers whose thought processes he coveted even on those occasions when he did approve of their choices or recognized the virtue of their self-confidence. After all, decisionmakers, by

²⁵ At the time one of the editors of the *EJIR*, I was thrilled when Jervis submitted a critique of the Bush Administration's Iraq policy. See Jervis, "The Confrontation between Iraq and the US: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence," *European Journal of International Relations* 9:2 (June 2003): 315-337. See too, Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," *Political Science Quarterly* 118:3 (Fall 2003): 365-388.

²⁶ But see Eliot Cohen's defense of the policymaker's predicament in his contribution to the roundtable review of *Why Intelligence Fails*, H-Diplo Roundtable XI:32 (9 July 2019), 6-8; <https://issforum.org/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-32.pdf>.

²⁷ Max Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," in E.A. Shils and H.A. Finch (eds.), *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Free Press, 1949), 53.

²⁸ Arnold Wolfers, "Statesmanship and Moral Choice," *World Politics* 1:2 (January 1949), 189-190.

²⁹ Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 133-134.

³⁰ Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails*, 162-165.

definition, have to decide. And although he held strong beliefs, one of the most striking characteristics of Bob's approach to analysis was his reluctance to cast final judgement. As Trachtenberg recognized, his intellectual virtue is found in a driving need to ask whether a given question, problem or puzzle could be viewed from yet another perspective, one that might lead to the identification of different causal processes and assessments of the effectiveness, reasonableness, or perhaps even wisdom of some decisionmaker's choice. Whether in the classroom, the political psychology research seminar, workshops with historians, or his famous lunch groups (which, owing to Covid, were conducted via Zoom during his last year of life), Bob was always probing others in search of novel perspectives.

Suspending final judgment meant eschewing theoretical and methodological trench warfare, mistrust of assertions of authority, openness to new ideas and people, and above all, humility with respect to his own claims to knowledge. These intellectual and personal virtues were fundamental to the collegiality that defined Bob and to the collegial environment he cultivated at Columbia University.

Looking back, I now understand how these virtues facilitated my own journey in the discipline. I came to know Bob Jervis in a chance encounter in the mid-1980s. I was an editorial intern at *Foreign Affairs* and had the opportunity to serve as rapporteur for a Council on Foreign Relations study group Michael Mandelbaum had convened on the Soviet approach to Arms Control. I was a nobody in a room of accomplished scholars and practitioners, but Bob nonetheless approached me during a break and asked about my plans for the future. I told him I was in the process of applying to graduate schools, having been encouraged to do so by Mandelbaum, but allowed that I probably didn't have the undergraduate record to get me into the best programs. In an illegible script he noted my name and told me to apply to Columbia. I followed his advice and have always suspected that something close to divine intervention played a role in my eventual admission.

Looking forward, I realize Bob's intellect will forever be beyond my reach. Yet in tribute to his legacy and in recognition of the many debts I owe, I can recommit myself the many examples he set: as a responsible scholar, committed teacher, respectful colleague, and valued friend.

BOB JERVIS
BY MICHAEL DOYLE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

It is widely agreed in the field of international relations that Bob Jervis was a giant. But views on what made him so may differ amongst us. I think all can agree that he established the study of cognitive psychology as an integral part of foreign policy. But I do not plan to say anything more on that; others are in a better position to weigh in with authority.

I should mention at the outset of this appreciation that he and I differed intellectually more than we cohered. We were at different ends of the world politics “elephant.” He focused on decisions and psychology; I, on domestic structural determinants and political philosophy. Which end of the elephant was which we can leave open.

What made him a giant to me were his practices as a student-focused teacher and as a colleague-focused departmental citizen and his insights into what could make structural realism realistic.

I first met Bob almost fifty years ago when he and Stanley Hoffmann were recruited by the Harvard Government Department to teach an introductory course in international relations. Such a course for some reason had not previously been thought to be an integral part of the international relations curriculum. In his lectures, Stanley invited the students to share the highest reaches of sophisticated global savoir faire. With beautifully crafted, truly inspiring rhetoric he invited students to appreciate a world of primary, secondary, and tertiary forces shaping the changing dynamics of the Cold War and alliance politics. A few weeks into the semester Bob gathered the bewildered “section persons” (teaching assistants, of whom I was one) who were attempting to keep up with Stanley for a locker-room pep talk directed toward how we could fall back on teaching the reading list – since, after all, we were going to test the students on it at the end of the semester.

I observed these practical talents again in the vital role he played in the Columbia Political Science Department, which I joined in 2004. Bob was our unofficial, academic shop steward. He built bridges and opened channels of communication and organized solidarity every week by assembling colleagues to go to lunch. When a community needs to communicate, nothing beats eating and talking. Bob made sure that happened, regularly across fields and with ever-changing combinations of colleagues. Mostly as a result, intellectual diversity became one of Columbia’s academic strong suits.¹

But my most significant engagement with Bob was through his scholarship. Year after year I included Bob’s article “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” as essential reading for IR students at Johns Hopkins and Princeton in the 1980s and 1990s.² The value, for me, of structural realism was established by the insights of Hobbesian anarchy and its “state of war.” But I don’t think we would have paid as much attention as we did were it not for Waltz’s extension explaining bipolar stability³ and Jervis’s explanation of how cooperation could vary while still operating under the core assumptions of the paradigm. Both were remarkably progressive advances in the paradigm, not only for the powerful insights they offered, but also for building so directly on the core assumptions of the paradigm: the number, relative power, and material circumstances of unitary states in systemic anarchy.

Bob’s exploration of cooperation theory stood out for the breadth of the examples it drew upon. They ranged from accounts of Austrian diplomat Klemens von Metternich’s diplomacy to remarks from a nineteenth century Philadelphia newspaper on the non-defensive character of knives and sword canes (which can be so easily used for surprise and are not much use in

¹ One of my Columbia colleagues and a former student of Bob’s, Alex Cooley, suggested to me that in addition to believing in diversity for its own sake, Bob may have thought of its beneficial “systems effects.”

² Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30:2 (January 1978):167-214.

³ Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” *Daedalus* 93:3 (1964): 881-909.

defense). It also reflected a true depth of analysis in discussions of the dilemmas of 1920s and 1930s naval and military strategy and the distinctive implications of ICBMs and SLBMs.

He opened the article, fittingly, with the core, tragic insight of structural realist anarchy:

The lack of an international sovereign not only permits wars to occur, but also makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals that they recognize as being in their common interest. Because there are no institutions or authorities that can make and enforce international laws, the policies of cooperation that will bring mutual rewards if others cooperate may bring disaster if they do not. Because states are aware of this, anarchy encourages behavior that leaves all concerned worse off than they could be, even in the extreme case in which all states would like to freeze the status quo (167).

The absence of an international sovereign then makes stag dilemmas effectively similar to prisoner's dilemmas. In the prisoner's dilemma the felons have an incentive to defect from cooperation (DC) in their hope of cutting a favorable plea bargain with the court. When both do so, both suffer the full weight of conviction (DD) with the incrimination each provided for the other. Rousseau's stag dilemma parable is different. It assumes that the hunters can attain the mutually preferred share of the stag they can capture if all of them remain rationally steadfast in cooperation (CC). In Bob's lucid interpretation of Rousseau's parable, the hunters may share a preference for an equal share of the stag, but, if they cannot trust and be assured of the commitments of the other hunters, they will nonetheless succumb to the temptation of catching the (much less desirable) hare that each can catch on his own (DC). When all then dash for the hare, all wind up with nothing or a small share of the much less meaty hare (DD). Under these circumstances, the security dilemma arises when even efforts to cooperate (improve hunting skills) have the effects of making others less secure (when they are all seizing the hare).

He acknowledged that he has drawn a "gloomy picture, [and] the obvious question is, why are we not all dead? Or, to put it less starkly, what kinds of variables ameliorate the impact of anarchy and the security dilemma?" (170). Rather than a static picture, he next shows how factors can alter the payoffs and thus make the outcomes less preordained. Increasing the value of cooperation (CD and CC) or reducing the value of defection (DC) or communicating accurate intentions in the stag dilemma or iterating the prisoner's dilemma such that the prisoners learn to punish defection as a way to incentivize cooperation: all these can make a difference.

Moreover, understanding the variables that alter incentives become essential determinants of changing the "games" that shape world politics. He argued that "situations vary in the ease or difficulty with which all states can simultaneously achieve a high degree of security. ... [they include] the impact of beliefs, geography, and commitments (many of which can be considered to be modifications of geography, since they bind states to defend areas outside their homelands)" (183). Before World War I, Germany was nearly forced to adopt something like the Schlieffen Plan (which presupposed preemption or at least a quick victory over one rival) because of its central position and the hostility it faced from Russia and France. Defending the empire in India embroiled Britain in defending Egypt or South Africa in order to maintain trade and communications. The two oceans spared the US an extra-"continental commitment" until the Cold War made the security of Western Europe a vital interest.

He concluded with the two additional variables that made the article famous: "Two crucial variables are involved: whether defensive weapons and policies can be distinguished from offensive ones, and whether the offense or the defense has the advantage" (186).

Whether the offense or the defense has the advantage is a matter mostly of geography, technology, and cost. Some terrains are difficult to cross (mountains, thick forests, deserts) and cannons overcame castles in early modern Europe. When it is much more costly to buy the weapons to conquer than to defend against those weapons, defense predominates; and vice versa.

Distinguishing offense from defensive weapons and postures can be more difficult. Bob acknowledges the issue raised by Salvador de Madariaga, the Spanish statesman active in the disarmament negotiations of the interwar years: “A weapon is either offensive or defensive according to which end of it you are looking at” (201). Yet, with cautions, distinctions can be drawn and are acted upon; though not always wisely. The statesman of 1914 anticipated a quick offensive-dominant war led by industrial mobilization and the railroad. Instead, they got the trenches and stalemate. Nuclear weapons overcome any defense, but stability comes from deterrence that is, ironically, most threatened by attempts at defense.

Bob wrapped up the rich argument with a powerfully evocative two-by-two table. It contains a happy quadrant in which weapons are distinguishable and the defense is dominant and a “doubly dangerous” quadrant in which the weapons are not distinguishable and the offense predominates. Then there are two more ambiguous quadrants in which the defense predominates but weapons are not distinguishable leading to a security dilemma mitigated by the capacity to defend and incentives for arms control and then a quadrant in which the offense is superior but weapons are distinguishable, allowing for the identification of aggressors by the weapons they choose.

Altogether, the article is one of the stars in the firmament of international relations scholarship. It neither invented the security dilemma nor the offense-defense balance, but it combined them in a thoroughly coherent manner, explored their implications when combined and demonstrated their powers of insight—and their limitations -- across a truly impressive range of international history.

To say that we will miss his qualities of teaching, citizenship, and scholarship is an understatement.

ROBERT JERVIS AND PERSPECTIVES ON THE SECURITY DILEMMA
BY JAMES D. FEARON, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Bob Jervis pioneered the application of research in cognitive and social psychology to the study of international politics. In the process he developed a theoretical synthesis that continues to structure and drive a great deal of productive research on international cooperation and conflict. His analysis of the dynamics of the “security dilemma” – in which both rational and irrational factors lead to dangerous military escalation – is foundational and has spread to regular employment in foreign policy debates. In his work on how state leaders signal and fail to signal their intentions in international disputes, Bob was one of the first to identify cost as a determinant of credibility, and also to work out how specific psychological biases generate misperceptions of signals in particular conflict contexts. He developed a theoretical framework in which state leaders’ perceptions and misperceptions of other states’ military intentions drive much of the high politics of national security decision-making. This framework has received considerable empirical support; informs policy making; and is the basis for continuing empirical and theoretical research by international relations scholars from remarkably diverse research traditions. Finally, Bob applied his approach to the analysis of nuclear deterrence, nuclear crises, and nuclear weapons policies, creating a body of work that, sad to say, remains highly relevant for the evaluation and critique of US defense policy.

I met Professor Jervis for the first time when I was a graduate student at Berkeley. I think he was on a visiting committee, of a type that I now know tends to be fully booked. He took the time to sit down with me and listen to an incoherent rendition of early or mid-stream dissertation ideas. I don’t remember specifics of the conversation, but I do remember his thoughtfulness, patience, and wry humor.

We had only limited and occasional direct contact over the years, but Jervis’s thinking about international politics has been a constant and hugely influential mental companion. *The Logic of Images in International Relations* was tremendously influential when I was writing my dissertation, and I am still puzzling over the idea of the security dilemma as he laid it out.¹

I have been thinking about Bob’s ideas and arguments even more than usual in the past several months. To what would have been the great surprise of my 2020 self, I am working this year as an advisor in the U.S. Department of Defense, on leave from Stanford. So far I have mainly been involved in matters related to the 2022 National Defense Strategy, a principal theme of which is deterrence. Several times a week I find myself thinking about some of Bob’s contributions, and sometimes attempting to convey them in one way or another in a meeting or memo.²

This is not so surprising, given that the United States’ foreign policy machine is making a hard turn back to the problem of deterrence between nuclear-armed, major power competitors. As most readers of this forum will know, Bob’s 1976 book *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* and his 1978 article “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” theorized about major powers unsure of each other’s preferences over expansion, making decisions about how much to arm and whether to attack, or expand into buffer territory.³ Although he drew on all manner of examples, his central motivation and application, particularly in chapter 3 of the book, was the US-Soviet competition. Should the US arm up and posture forces to deter a Soviet Union bent on expansion and looking for any opportunity? Or would arming up coupled with an aggressive forward posture (and nuclear warfighting doctrines) make things worse by convincing Soviet leaders that the US was itself an aggressive, expansionist type that was out to get them? In the latter case, a “spiral” of hostile beliefs might be

¹ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

² An anecdote: As I used the term “security dilemma” in one conversation, my interlocutor (a highly capable and impressive officer) nodded vigorously in recognition and said “Yes! We need to create security dilemmas for the adversary.”

³ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1976); Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30:2 (January 1978): 167-214.

especially dangerous between nuclear-armed adversaries worried about the other side's hair trigger. And tragically unnecessary.

Although he did not commit to one or the other position for US-Soviet case in *Perception and Misperception*, Bob suggested that in general a common psychological bias favors spirals to unnecessary conflict. To use a topical example, US foreign policy makers can't imagine that Russian leaders would actually feel threatened by NATO expansion and alliance-friendly talk with Ukraine. Surely Russian President Vladimir Putin must realize that NATO would never attack Russia. His concerns regarding Ukraine must therefore be expansionist, or "greedy" in Charles Glaser's terminology, rather than defensive and motivated by security concerns. In this kind of account, then, costly conflict is purely a mistake, on the supposition that Russian motives *are* purely defensive, as are US and NATO motives.⁴

Of course, I don't know exactly how Bob would have applied a security-dilemma analysis to this case. I doubt that he would go all the way to a "pure security seekers in conflict due to a psychological bias" interpretation. One of the great features of his scholarship was his deep appreciation for the complexity of reasons for state leaders' choices in foreign policy. Not either-or but "well, could be some of this, and some of that, or one or the other. And hard to be exact based on the evidence we have."⁵

In an alternative account, Putin *is* "greedy" with respect to Ukraine, the U.S. *is* fundamentally revisionist with respect to both Ukraine and Putin's regime, and each knows this about the other. Due to his own nationalist views and their domestic political utility, Putin would prefer Ukraine under Moscow's thumb and even as part of a greater Russia, wholly independent of external security concerns. Ukrainian leaders know this full well. Subscribing to a different nationalist vision, they want arms and, if possible, alliance support to resist Russian coercion. The US and NATO powers would prefer to see a solidly democratic Ukraine aligned politically and economically with the West, simply on grounds of preferences over types of regimes.

In turn, a more solidly democratic and Western-leaning Ukraine is intrinsically threatening to Putin's dictatorship, independent of military concerns about invasion. US, Ukrainian, and at least some other NATO state leaderships are clearly revisionists from Putin's perspective. They would ideally like to see Putin's authoritarian regime gone. They cannot commit themselves not to support, at the very least verbally, Russian opposition to Putin in the event of a mass uprising. Mass uprisings are a mortal fear of all modern dictatorships, even those that are relatively secure for the moment. For Putin, a democratic Ukraine, even without a formal alliance, is a bad example.

⁴ Charles Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics* (Princeton University Press, 2010). In Jervis, "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?" *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3:1 (Winter 2001): 36-60, Bob ultimately argues that the answer is "No." He says that the Soviets fundamentally wanted to revise the international system. They were "greedy" rather than status quo types, which drove the U.S. to undertake costly policies of deterrence and also to aim to undermine the Soviet Union in order to gain peace and breathing room. I see this as consistent with the alternative model sketched next, and would add that one needs to go further to explain the costly conflict (that is, the existence of conflicting interests is not enough by itself).

⁵ In a March 2014 comment during Putin's intervention in eastern Ukraine, Bob recommended negotiating a deal that would attempt to commit the U.S. and E.U. to a "form of flexible neutrality" for Ukraine, "something akin to Austria during the Cold War," so as to take account of Russian interests and greater military power in the locale. He did not specifically mention the psychological bias argument and treated the problem mainly as a matter of negotiating a compromise between parties with conflicting interests. However, "sleepwalkers" suggests he at least thought that Western diplomats were being unrealistic. Jervis, "The New Sleepwalkers," *The European: Das Debatten-Magazin*, May 9, 2014. Jervis and Mira Rapp-Hooper, "Perception and Misperception on the Korean Peninsula: How Unwanted Wars Begin," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2018), puts more stress on the psychological bias that he linked to the security dilemma. See also Kathy Gilsinan, "North Korean Nukes and the Grand International-Relations Experiment in Asia: The Scholar Robert Jervis Discusses his Theory of the Security Dilemma, and How Trump is Testing It," *The Atlantic* (March 18, 2017); <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/security-dilemma-north-korea/520023/>.

In this account, costly conflict is driven not by misapprehension of essentially defensive intentions, but by commonly known conflicting preferences that are difficult to stably accommodate due to commitment problems that are tricky to resolve in an anarchical environment. Maybe there is some deal where the U.S. agrees to try to limit Ukraine's military capability and, in one way or another, reassures Moscow on the alliance question. But Putin has expressed justified skepticism about the credibility and feasibility of such deals to deliver. Crushing Ukraine's current military before its missile capabilities improve, and/or replacing the regime with one more under his control, with a new constitution more to his liking, could look to him like a surer guarantee, even if it is costly and risky.

I think that this type of account works better than a psychological-bias spiral model interpretation for dangerous contemporary conflicts between the US and some other authoritarian regimes with whom it has major policy disagreements – China (especially in regard to Taiwan), North Korea, and Iran, in particular.⁶

To degrees that surely differ across cases, lack of understanding the other side's perspective might exacerbate the (correct) perception of conflicting interests and adversary malevolence, making deals involving commitments harder to reach. It is probably "both-and" rather than "either-or."

Bob's original treatment in chapter 3 of *Perception and Misperception* suggests this. He says that there is an underlying structural problem that is made worse by the dynamic implications of a psychological bias that is layered on top of it. I am arguing that the underlying structural problem(s) typically depend on conflicting preferences that are not derivative of security concerns or anarchy.⁷ But this does not mean that costly conflict between greedy states is not tragic, or something that needs no explanation. States have disagreements all the time, with sources that are not fundamentally derivative of security concerns. And most of the time they implicitly abide by or explicitly cut deals.

Bob liked Akira Kurosawa's film *Rashomon* as an analogy: Different leaders see and interpret the same events in radically different ways, which can make inter-state communication prone to error and basic misunderstandings. My impression is that one can go much further. Even inside a government, it is all *Rashomon* all the way down. This is not only because of psychological biases, but also because different offices are necessarily and appropriately seeing and attending to different streams of information. By efficient organizational design, they have different responsibilities and thus incentives, which can in turn affect (and impair) communication. Both between states and within them, organizing collective action is incredibly difficult. Bob made foundational contributions in developing one very important class of reasons for why this is so.

⁶ For some elaboration, see James D. Fearon, "Two States, Two Types, Two Actions," *Security Studies* 20:3 (2011): 431-440; Fearon, "The Big Problem with the North Koreans Isn't That We Can't Trust Them. It's That They Can't Trust Us," [not my title] *The Washington Post*, August 16, 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/16/the-big-problem-with-north-korea-isnt-that-we-cant-trust-them-its-that-they-cant-trust-us/>; and Fearon, "Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy," *International Organization* 72:3 (Summer 2018): 524-560. For related analyses, see Lindsay Hundley, "Ideology and International Conflict," unpublished ms., <https://www.lindsayhundley.com/research>; Gideon Rachman, "Russia and China's plans for a new world order," *Financial Times*, January 23, 2022; Elsa Kania, "The regime security dilemma in US-China relations," *The Strategist*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 21, 2019. For developed versions of this kind of account of war to prevent nuclear acquisition, see Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro, "Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War," *International Organization* 68:1 (January 2014), 1-31; Muhammet A. Bas and Andrew J. Coe, "A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War," *International Organization* 70:4 (Fall 2016): 655-685; and Andrew J. Coe, "Containing Rogues," *Journal of Politics* 80:4 (October 2018): 1197-1210.

⁷ Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies* 5:3 (Spring 1996), 90-121; Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," *Security Studies* 7:1 (Autumn 1997), 114-54; and Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) argue similarly.

ROBERT JERVIS: A LETTER BY JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, YALE UNIVERSITY

Most contributors to this memorial will have known Bob Jervis better than I did. We were never colleagues in the same department, or at the same university, or even inhabitants of the same town. We worked in different, if adjacent, disciplines. And his personality was definitely more gentle than my own.

Nevertheless, we corresponded before he moved to Columbia and I to Yale, and after that our meetings became more frequent and our communications more substantive. Most focused on the delicate relationship between historians and political scientists.

At some point in the fall of 1998, I sent Bob a paper I'd delivered somewhere on the impossibility of independent variables. His response, dated November 23rd, was characteristic of him, and I'd like to let it stand as my tribute to him.

He'd found my paper "very interesting," he wrote, with much of it paralleling his own views. What I'd said about causation and explanation, however, made him "uneasy." He'd tried to think about such issues himself, "but after a while my brain hurts and I find something more productive to occupy my mind." But, he added, "you've made me think about [them] again, which is worthwhile if not enjoyable."

That measured point having been made, Bob went on to ask how, in a "democracy of causes," we can judge relative importance. Comparison rarely worked because "it is often not possible to compare two cases with everything except one factor held constant." Counterfactuals could clarify, but never confirm. And in many cases, "a factor often seen as an 'independent variable' could not have changed unless the entire context had been quite different."

Some political scientists, however, were coming around to my position with their stress on "endogeneity," which Bob translated for me as "factors often isolated as independent" that "are, as you say, not so independent." In other instances, "there may be reciprocal causation; in others the apparent connection may be spurious as both the independent and dependent variables are largely driven by other factors; in still other cases 'selection effects' are at work, which is often the case when a policy succeeds because the case was an easy one in which many alternatives would have worked or in which the policy was well-matched to the circumstances."

At that point, my brain was beginning to throb a little. Bob must have anticipated this, because he reassuringly added: "I very much liked your analogy in the last paragraph of p. 4."

"I'm very glad to have had a chance to read the paper," he concluded, "even though it reminds me that several colleagues have pointed out that the ideas I expressed about causation in my recent book are incoherent and inconsistent. Oh well, there is always more thinking that needs to be done."

There is indeed, and it was always a pleasure – if at times slightly bewildering – to think through these things with Bob. He took historians as seriously as he did theorists, and he insisted, with humility, insight, and great energy, that there had to be a way for the two communities to talk to one another – and, even more important, to listen.

Like everyone else who knew him, I shall miss him.

BOB JERVIS'S AWESOME LEGACY

BY CHARLES GLASER, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

My first encounter with Bob Jervis's work was in 1980, when I was a graduate student at Harvard's Kennedy School and was beginning to learn about nuclear strategy. I'd read a couple of articles by Paul Nitze that identified serious shortcomings in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. To my untrained eye, Nitze's arguments made little sense. Then I found Jervis's "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter"¹ and learned that these arguments didn't make sense to a very insightful scholar. In one way or another, most of my work since then has been informed by, engaged with, or motivated by Jervis's work, as the following short remarks make clear.

Before turning to substance, I want to briefly comment on Jervis's contribution to the field. As I am sure many others will attest, Bob's dedication to the field of security studies and international relations was enormous, likely unparalleled. Not only did he build some of the field's key institutions—for example, the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs series—he also provided tremendous support and insight to scholars of security studies and IR theory. I observed him at dozens of research and book workshops over the years; he was always prepared with long lists of comments; he was a tough critic, yet always enthusiastic and constructive. To his great credit, Jervis was fair and even-handed; he provided his insight and guidance not only to scholars with whom he agreed, but also to those with whom he strongly disagreed. His sheer energy and commitment were remarkable. One anecdote helps capture this: a handful of years ago, Jervis took a 5-hour bus trip to a junior scholar's book workshop, arriving just in time for the dinner. The day following the workshop, Bob got up before the crack of dawn to take the bus back to Manhattan. I wondered where he continued to find the energy and was awed that he still had the interest and enthusiasm.

To many scholars and students, Jervis is best known for his work on the role of individuals in states' decisions and the psychology biases that often undermine their decisions. This reputation is obviously well deserved, as his *Logic of Images in International Relations*² and *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*³ broke new ground and launched a multi-decade research agenda in which scores of scholars have participated and contributed.

We should not overlook, however, Jervis's seminal contributions to rational theories of state behavior, which are foundational to much of current IR theory and national security policy. These encompass many of the field's key concepts—including the security dilemma, the spiral and deterrence models, the offense-defense balance, and the nuclear revolution. Jervis's writing on these concepts is theoretically rich and his landmark publications put these arguments front and center in the IR theory literature. Building on this foundation, follow-on research clarified and elaborated these arguments, and substantial debate ensued and continues.

The security dilemma exists when the policies a state pursues to increase its security necessarily decrease its adversary's security (and in which the adversary's response would decrease the state's own security). While not the first to identify the security dilemma,⁴ Jervis's formulation explained that the nature and intensity of the security dilemma could vary, which in

¹ Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," *Political Science Quarterly* 94:4 (Winter 1979-1980): 617-633.

² Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

³ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

⁴ John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2:2 (January 1950): 157-180.

turned influenced the extent of competition and the possibilities for cooperation.⁵ The variation depends on two dimensions—the offense-defense balance and offense-defense differentiability.⁶ Competition will be more intense and war more likely, as the advantage of offense over defense increases. Cooperation, specifically qualitative arms control, is possible when offense and defense are differentiable. The logic here is foreshadowed, in less general terms, by the modern theory of arms control, which identifies ballistic missile defense and MIRVed missiles as types of systems that should be limited.⁷ The security-dilemma framing extends the qualitative arms-control logic to other realms.

Jervis did not explicitly place the security dilemma in the context of structural realism, but his formulation enabled others to make this move. The security dilemma provides the logic by which states that were interested only in security end up engaging in competition. In turn, divergent understandings of the security dilemma play a decisive role in dividing the two key strands of structural realism. Defensive realism essentially accepts Jervis's argument—variation in the security dilemma should lead to variation in the intensity and forms of cooperation and competition.⁸ Offensive realists, in contrast, hold that the security dilemma always drives states into competition, partly because they are driven to maximize their power and partly because states should assume the worst about their adversaries.⁹

Jervis's spiral model builds on and extends the role of the logic of the security dilemma. The security dilemma can be understood primarily in military terms, explaining arms races and the changes in military capabilities that they produce. A richer understanding also explains how the arming interaction that the security dilemma drives can also influence states' political relations, that is, how they understand each other's motives, resulting in a negative political spiral. Jervis emphasized the role of misperception in generating spirals but also noted the possibility of spirals without misperceptions. Others explained more fully how rational spirals are possible, even when the states understand that the opposing state faces a security dilemma that drives their actions.¹⁰

Jervis extracted the deterrence model from historical debates, including the Cold War debate over US policy toward the Soviet Union, and highlighted the key theoretical issues that underpinned it. In contrast to the spiral model, the deterrence model essentially denies that the security dilemma matters, because the adversary knows that the defender is a security seeker; consequently, the defender needs to worry little about provoking the adversary or making it insecure. The deterrence model bundles together a variety of additional assumptions—the adversary is an expansionist/greedy state, credibility is connected across issues, and the states have few shared interests. The argument built on this combination of assumptions calls for highly competitive policies, especially those that demonstrate the defender's resolve and the credibility of its threats. Jervis's

⁵ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Chapter 3; and Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30:2 (January 1978): 167-214.

⁶ Another early developer of offense-defense arguments was George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York: Wiley 1977).

⁷ Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

⁸ Among others see Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security* 19:3 (Winter 1994-1995): 50-90; Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

¹⁰ Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," *World Politics* 50:1 (October 1997): 171-201; and Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," *World Politics* 49:3 (April 1997): 371-400.

work on the evolution of deterrence theory explained how alternatives strands of thought supported or countered the deterrence model.¹¹

Jervis's work also launched a flurry of research and debate about the offense-defense balance—including whether it could be measured and whether states could mold technology to meet their own goals instead of being constrained by it.¹² The debate has theoretical and policy implications. Much of the variation in competition that defensive realism claims to explain is possible only if states are able to measure and understand the offense-defense balance. On the policy side, current as well as Cold-War policies depend on measuring balance. For example, important analyses of the competition between China's anti-area/access denial posture, which is designed to keep U.S. forces far from China's maritime periphery, provide an assessment of the offense-defense balance and policy guidance for the US conventional force posture.¹³ Also, whether cyberattacks favor offense or defense has generated much discussion and analysis, as cyber has become a more important dimension of warfare.¹⁴

The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution is another of Jervis's major contributions. It provides the fullest statement of Cold-War thinking on the implications of nuclear weapons. In addition to clarifying important misunderstandings—for example, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is not a strategy, but instead a condition of mutual vulnerability—Jervis makes some bold predictions about the political implications of MAD: “peace between the superpowers, crises will be rare, neither side will be eager to press bargaining advantages to the limit, the status quo will be relatively easy to maintain, and political outcomes will not be closely related to either the nuclear or the conventional balance.”¹⁵ This book provides the foundation for an emerging debate on the future of nuclear strategy and forces between states that are highly and comparably capable. Critics of the theory of the nuclear revolution are now challenging both whether MAD is immutable as Jervis implies and whether the predictions of the theory are correct.¹⁶

If we focus only on these tremendous scholarly contributions, we'd be overlooking an important dimension of Jervis's work—he was also dedicated to analyzing US policy and contributed substantially here as well. *The Illogic of American*

¹¹ Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” *World Politics* 31:2 (January 1979): 289-324.

¹² Among others see Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It,” *International Security* 22:4 (Spring 1988): 44-82; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and its Critics,” *Security Studies* 4:4 (Summer 1995): 660-691; and Keir A. Lieber, *War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

¹³ Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” *International Security* 41:1 (Summer 2016): 7-48; and Eugene Gholz, Benjamin Friedman, and Enea Gjoza, “Defensive Defense: A Better Way to Protect Allies in Asia,” *The Washington Quarterly* 42:4 (2019): 171-189.

¹⁴ For example, Rebecca Slayton, “What is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment,” *International Security* 41:3 (Winter 2016-2017): 72-109.

¹⁵ Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989): 45.

¹⁶ Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38:1-2 (2015): 38-73; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, *The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power and Politics in the Atomic Age* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020); and Brendon Rittenhouse Green, *The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

*Nuclear Strategy*¹⁷ provides a sustained, searing criticism of US nuclear strategy in the 1970s and early 1980s. We see Jervis's commitment to policy analysis on other topics as well, including the Iran nuclear deal and the Bush doctrine. The desire to contribute to policy debates was not a passing interest for Jervis, but instead a driving force behind much of his more scholarly and abstract research, and his willingness to engage in the specifics of current policy debates.

Jervis was clearly a true giant among scholars. He contributed tremendous energy to building and sustaining the fields of international relations theory and security studies. He made monumental contributions to the ideas and concepts that are at the heart of current theoretical debates. Jervis will be missed but well remembered; his scholarly legacy will live on by continuing to influence our understanding of the most important issues in international relations.

¹⁷ Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).

THE PHILOSOPHER KING

BY BRENDAN RITTENHOUSE GREEN, UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

In January 2009, I had just returned to Cambridge, Massachusetts, where I was attending graduate school at MIT. Out with some friends at a local haunt, I solemnly rose, poured some of my beer onto the floor, and said words to the following effect: “As most of you know, Samuel Huntington died over Christmas. It is with deep regret, then, that I must inform you that the title of Greatest Living Political Scientist has fallen to Robert Jervis. *Le roi est mort. Vive le roi.*”

There followed a spirited discussion where I defended my title for Jervis against other proposals. At the time I did not know Bob Jervis and was mostly just interested in my impromptu parlor game. But in some very rare instances my opinions turn out to be correct, and the ensuing discussion convinced me that I was on to something. I would increasingly refer to Jervis as the Greatest Living Political Scientist, both with my colleagues in the field, and among the students, friends, and other laymen to whom I would occasionally explain his ideas. My propensity to do so only rose after I met Bob, and after I began publishing arguments that criticized some of his ideas about nuclear weapons.

Now it is Jervis who has passed through nature to eternity. Yet I find I no longer have any taste for the parlor game that, in a way, began my relationship with the man; no interest in naming a successor to the invented title I bestowed upon him. Instead, I have only the cold void of grief. For whatever honors, accolades, and laurels men bestow upon each other in life—and Bob received, and deserved, a great many—death reveals their hollowness.

There was only one Bob Jervis; he was not of a type, even if that type is award winner or genius. No title can capture his unique contributions, and certainly not one referencing something so trivial as his acumen in the field of political science. And though our common cause of security studies will force me into some discussion of his ideas, I leave the assessments of his vast intellectual legacy to others. I would remember Bob Jervis, the man.

A Gnat's-Eye View of Bob Jervis

Asking me to offer a eulogy for Bob Jervis is a bit like asking a gnat its opinion of the giant upon which it sits and who it intermittently bites. The only justifications, I suppose, are that the gnat's perch provides it with a close-up view of the giant that others may lack, and that the gnat's continued existence tells us something about the tolerance of the giant.

To wit: I first came to really know Bob when I started publicly arguing that he was wrong about nuclear weapons. Bob, of course, is famously associated with the idea of a “nuclear revolution” in world politics. Very roughly, his argument is that once states obtain secure second-strike arsenals the balance of power becomes stalemated—it is no longer possible for states to be stronger than one another. One of the many results is that arms racing becomes futile, since further investment cannot yield additional political dividends. My critique is roughly that Bob overestimated the stability of nuclear stalemate, which can be undermined by both technological change and perceptual factors. Nuclear arms racing can therefore be rational even under nuclear stalemate, and in some cases, has been. Overall, these points—which were not exactly novel to the progenitor of the offense-defense balance and the author of *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* when I pointed them out—are probably best described as an amendment to Bob's powerful theory of nuclear politics, rather than as a frontal challenge.¹

Alas, I lack Bob's sweet disposition and sense of epistemic modesty, having been raised, in intellectual terms, by wolves at the University of Chicago and MIT. So, the early paper drafts that Bob encountered at various nuclear weapons conferences did not exactly pull their rhetorical punches. The original title of the book I eventually published on the topic was going to be

¹ Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30:2 (January 1978): 167-214; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

The Meaning of the Nuclear Counterrevolution, a clear shot at the title of Bob's famous book on nuclear weapons.² The title I ultimately went with, *The Revolution that Failed*, was hardly less obnoxious. I can only imagine how my bombast must have appeared to him.³

Literally, I can only imagine it. Because Bob's behavior towards me was pretty much the opposite of what one might expect when a kid from nowhere challenges a great man. He made sure to seek me out at conferences, and he showed a genuine interest in my ideas. We would often find ourselves sitting together at meals, where he would question me closely on topics like the Carter administration's nuclear policy and other issues of importance in my research. Moreover, Bob also loved to regale me with tales from his own career, including his not-always-auspicious attempts to work with the government, and to offer his perspective on the evolution of the security studies field. He seemed to find my sometimes-boisterous personality amusing, or at least tolerable enough to avoid redirecting towards more interesting, and polite, dinner companions. In short, Bob treated me as a valued colleague, on both an intellectual and a personal level, in spite of the fact that I came to him as an overly-loud junior scholar he had never heard of who was basically kicking at his shins.

However, Bob's collegiality extended far beyond treating me well in person. He was an incisive discussant at my book conference, where he also delivered fulsome written comments on the entire manuscript, taking special care to include minute descriptions of all the ways he thought I had the Carter administration wrong. Bob wrote me several letters of recommendation, always taking the opportunity to advance my career whenever he could. Above all, he wrote a lengthy and positive tenure letter for me. Needless to say, an octogenarian eminence grise like Bob would have been well within his rights to decline this difficult and time-consuming task. And there are scholars who might have approached the letter with a view towards explaining how my attacks on their work were unconvincing. But Bob chose instead to accept the request as service to the field, carefully read my entire vita, and wrote a letter that—while not concealing his disagreements with me—was full of praise and argued strongly on my behalf.

The stories I have heard from others convince me that Bob often went above and beyond the call of duty like this. My erstwhile co-author Austin Long first made Bob's acquaintance as a graduate student, when he emailed him out of the blue to ask how he might obtain a copy of the just declassified post-mortem Bob had written for the CIA following the fall of the Shah of Iran. Bob responded immediately and mailed him a copy, not the typical or expected response for a busy senior scholar. When my colleague and former classmate Josh Rovner wrote his prize-winning book about intelligence politicization, *Fixing the Facts*, Bob was his editor at Cornell University Press.⁴ Although the conclusion of Rovner's book comes down pretty hard on Bob's view of intelligence politicization during the Iraq war, Bob not only recommended and published it, he wrote Rovner a note praising him for the conclusion.

It is no accident, then, that an email list Bob and I were both on once spawned a thread that nominated him, not facetiously, as "philosopher king" of the discipline. He had a both a pure commitment to finding Truth, however difficult it might be, and all the nobility associated with such a commitment. And that commitment, even more than his ideas, is what has left a lasting impression on me. Bob had a certain intellectual sensibility that made it easier for him to entertain and (I flatter myself) even (partially) accept arguments that cut against his own.

In this regard, I cannot improve upon the words of Marc Trachtenberg, so I will simply conclude by repeating them:

² Cf. Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

³ Brendan Rittenhouse Green, *The Revolution That Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

⁴ Joshua Rovner, *Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

[Jervis's] whole approach is remarkably undogmatic. He looks at a problem in a certain light and he makes certain points about it. The points are often quite striking, but after making a certain argument, you can practically hear him saying to himself: "Now wait a minute, isn't there another way of looking at it?" The perspective shifts, and soon everything appears in a rather different light. Again, the points might be quite perceptive, and indeed they sometimes lead you to rethink your own basic understanding of things. But given his intellectual restlessness, his insistence on looking at things from a variety of angles, his refusal to do what most scholars would do and just wrap things up in a nice [,] neat package, it is not hard to find him saying things that run counter to some of his basic arguments.... [For Jervis], The world is much too complex to focus on just one set of effects, especially since people are inclined to focus on those effects which for one reason or another they happen to find congenial. Given how easy it is to miss so much of the picture, you have to make a real effort to look at things from different angles—to do the kind of analysis that might lead to conclusions that run counter to what you would like to believe.⁵

Bob has now laid down this task. It remains for us to pick it up, and insofar as we are able, to imitate Bob's generosity, collegiality, and selflessness. Rest eternal grant unto him, oh Lord, and may light perpetual shine upon him.

⁵ Marc Trachtenberg, "Robert Jervis and the Nuclear Question," in *Psychology, Strategy, and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations*, ed. James W. Davis (New York: Routledge, 2013), 25-26. These page numbers are from a copy of the essay on Trachtenberg's website: <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/cv.html>.

MEMORIES OF BOB JERVIS

BY HOPE M. HARRISON, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

While pursuing a Ph.D. in political science at Columbia University, I was lucky enough to take classes with Bob Jervis and have him as a member of my dissertation committee. My most vivid memory of him is energetically and enthusiastically pacing the small stage in the classroom as he lectured, rarely referring to his notes. His vast knowledge and sense of humor were a wonderful combination. Even though he was such a famous scholar, you never felt that he was arrogant or too busy for you. He was always open and warm and had a great laugh.

Bob's integration of detailed historical examples into his lectures and his writings inspired me to believe that I could do the same; that getting a degree in political science didn't have to mean focusing on theory and quantitative research. Later experience, however, led to me feel otherwise and I ultimately found a happy home in the department of history at The George Washington University. But with Bob, I never felt that I had to make that choice. He was excited to learn about what I was finding in the German and Russian archives for my dissertation about the process that led to the building of the Berlin Wall. His book *Perception and Misperception in International Affairs* particularly influenced my thinking and writing then and ever since, and I regularly assign parts of the book to my graduate students.¹

For me, Bob Jervis was a model scholar and person. I can only hope that I can have some of the impact on my students that he had on me.

¹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

IN MEMORIAM FOR BOB JERVIS
BY TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA

By the beginning of the 1980s, I completed my historical work on the February Revolution of Russia, on which I had worked many years, and I wanted a change of scenery that was totally different from the Russian Revolution. It was a time when the public was concerned about the possibility of nuclear war. Jonathan Shell's *Fate of the Earth* was a best seller,¹ and huge anti-nuclear demonstrations were staged in New York City and all over the world. I was curious to learn the esoteric secrets of the nuclear issue. I obtained a Ford Foundation Fellowship and decided to retool in the field of nuclear strategy and arms control to study as a post-doc at the Institute of War and Peace Studies under Warner R. Schilling and at the Harriman Institute under Marshall D. Shulman at Columbia University in 1982-83.

As it turned out, that was one of the best experiences I have had in my academic career. I cannot think of a better place than Columbia University to have studied the nuclear issue at that time. During the year I stayed at Columbia, START and INF negotiations were stalled, and President Ronald Reagan delivered his Star Wars speech. I took seminars with Schilling and Shulman and established contact with such luminaries as Seweryn Bialer, Bob Legvold, and others. In addition, we also had the informal arms control workshop, where Bob Jervis and Richard Garwin were regularly members. I was mesmerized by the high-level, stimulating discussions.

That was where I got to know Bob. With his impish eyes and in his raspy voice, he presented his questions and arguments, which were always sharp and to the point. I became curious about this man, and read his magnum opus, *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*.² I was greatly influenced by this book, and this became an important framework for two of my future books, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations*, 2 vols (International and Area Studies Press of UC Berkeley, 1998), and *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan* (Harvard, 2005).³

The arguments Bob presented at the arms control workshop were subsequently incorporated into his book, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Cornell, 1985).⁴ After my post-doc experience at Columbia, I obtained a position at the Slavic Research Center of Hokkaido University in Sapporo, Japan. At that time, discussions on arms control and nuclear strategy were at a dormant stage in Japan. I published numerous articles and contributed essays in newspapers and monthly journals. Jervis's *Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* provided me with important intellectual ammunition to criticize Japanese defense policy, on the right, that uncritically followed American strategy. They also injected the importance of arms control in the left-wing arguments that called for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In other words, thanks to Jervis, I could stake a unique position in the Japanese debate on the nuclear issues.

Perhaps Bob never remembered the Japanese post-doc who hung around him at Columbia for one year. I wish I could have told him that he planted the seeds that grew into some important trees across the ocean.

He was a great scholar and a good man.

¹ Jonathan Shell, *Fate of the Earth* (New York: Knopf, 1982).

² Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017[1976]).

³ Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations*, 2 vols (Berkeley: International and Area Studies Press of UC Berkeley, 1998), and Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

⁴ Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).

ROBERT JERVIS: COLLEAGUE AND FRIEND

BY ROGER HAYDON, CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

Publishing at university presses depends on peer review. Authors and editors see the review system as all too often a chore, a delay, an inconvenience, but properly executed it results in stronger arguments, more reliable evidence, and better books. At its best, it's an expression of selflessness and generosity on the part of the referees, who devote untold hours to improving the work of colleagues, and do so anonymously. As the executive editor of Cornell University Press, I had the privilege of working with Bob Jervis for a quarter of a century. For the press and for me personally, he was author, series editor, adviser, reviewer, and a wonderful friend.

Editors cherish rare reviewers like Bob Jervis who invest wholeheartedly in the enterprise. The combination of virtues he possessed doesn't hold many surprises. The reviewer needs to know the topic area, and Bob knew as much as anyone, and more than almost all, in his various areas of expertise: intelligence, nuclear politics and strategy, political psychology, political history, international relations theory, and many more. The reviewer needs to be engaged, and Bob's reviews were detailed, knowledgeable, and supremely helpful to authors who wanted to improve their work. That he understood so much about so much never ceased to surprise me; many of his reviews ran eight pages or more, and further bibliographical suggestions would often turn up in my email box in the days following receipt of the original review. The reviewer needs to be prompt, and Bob would regularly deliver reviews in ten days or two weeks—his reliability was a boon to nervous authors as well as to the editor who needed to manage often pressing and always time-consuming concerns.

Such reviewers build a strong sense of the community of scholarship, of the mutuality of the enterprise. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, the series Bob and his long-time friend and collaborator Bob Art established at Cornell University Press in the 1980s, is the practical expression of that sense of community, both in the academy and in its wider engagement with topics and arguments of critical public importance. Through demanding and engaged reviews, the two Bobs developed an editorial culture of excellence that continues to shape both an academic field of study and broader conversations about questions of security and international relations.

Bob Jervis in his turn benefited from the expectation of exacting reviews that he established as a community standard. I worked with him on his *Why Intelligence Fails*. A wonderful basic idea: Bob had written a commissioned report on intelligence failure at the CIA around the fall of the Shah of Iran, and combined the declassified document (and internal Agency reactions to it) with his careful reading of the purported evidence that Iraq was working on weapons of mass destruction before the US invasion of 2003. The draft manuscript was intriguing but fragmented. A demanding review from a senior scholar, whose own book had received a Jervis review years earlier, provoked a transformation from a collection of conceptual and archival shards to a strongly event-focused book with a powerful argument about intelligence and its deployment. Bob made no complaint on receiving the review, and he did not gripe about the extra work it demanded. He welcomed the reviewer's smart engagement: he buckled down with his normal diligence and prodigious energy, and produced the book that Cornell published in 2010. The result was a work that has been influential and widely praised.

I had the pleasure of working with Bob Jervis on the series for better than two decades. He was generous with me, as he was with would-be authors, and his modest demeanor and extraordinary insights gave me a model against which to measure scholarly achievement. It was an honor to work with him. With his death the world is a smaller and less interesting place.

ROBERT JERVIS, MY DIPLOMATIC HISTORY BUDDY BY PAUL KENNEDY, YALE UNIVERSITY

Well, I'm only partly joking when I suggest in the title to this brief tribute that the lovely IR political scientist Bob Jervis was really a diplomatic historian *manqué* but, boy, his book collection of works on imperial, military and diplomatic history was staggering, as was the depth of his interest in international history, and his voracious appetite to know more. This was all, of course, to make him an *even better* scholar in the various IR fields in which he distinguished himself (which the many tributes from political science colleagues do now show). But it also made him a very fine history scholar as well.

Had Bob lived into 2022 I would have been able to claim a forty-year-long acquaintanceship, for it was way back then (1982) that I first came into his office, having been invited for a few days to Columbia by Fritz Stern and some others. I knew a bit about Bob's *Perception and Misperception*¹ and his interest in the 1914 controversies among historians, but what I was not anticipating was a lengthy discourse [interrogation, really] upon my recent work, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*:² "was Chancellor Bülow really so ambitious about Morocco?", "why was there no Schlieffen Plan for the Eastern Front?", "did Bismarck...???", and so on. He also wanted to talk about a very recent article of mine in *The International History Review* on the contradictions between strategy and finance in British foreign policy before the two world wars. Lord, he had read a lot.

And so, after I moved to Yale (1983), I would encounter Bob time and again at the many wonderful IR-cum-international-history academic melees of scholars and researchers from Harvard, Columbia, Penn, Yale, and MIT that occurred so frequently from the 1980s onwards – Sam Huntington's annual Wianno Club get-together at Cape Cod, Ernie May's "Knowing One's Enemy" project, the various Military Effectiveness conferences funded by Andy Marshall's Office of Net Assessment. There was Bob, always nodding his head with vigor when a certain point was made in the sessions, chatting with everyone during the informal drinks, and so often being asked to summarize a session's work. He would get on well with everyone, from the intelligence gurus to the newest research assistant. He had this natural warmth.

I didn't interact so much with Bob at this century's turn, where he was deeply involving himself in the study of intelligence and its many failures ["why do we get so many things wrong, so often?," he would ask, and then try to answer], and when I had turned to writing books on the UN and on the Allied problem-solvers of World War Two. But we'd still greet each other warmly at various meetings of historians and political scientists, and I was thrilled whenever Bruce Russett and Nuno Monteiro would bring Bob to Yale. If anything, I thought, his interest in diplomatic history was just growing - the last time I saw him at Columbia itself was when, characteristically, he chaired one of the sessions at the workshop held in honor of Volker Berghahn's 80th birthday: here was the great political scientist enjoying himself being with two German diplomatic historians...

The very last time I interacted with Bob was during this past summer. He had let me know that he had Stage 4 lung cancer which left him "exhausted," but you wouldn't know that from his continued work and correspondence: he was heavily involved with creating H-Diplo/ISSF panels, one [already done] to engage with the work of Paul Schroeder, another [also just done] on Ernie May, and he was now hoping that a third would be set up to offer essays upon my Yale colleague Donald Kagan (N.B. all international historians! "I did not know Don Kagan as well as you did," wrote Bob, "but I greatly enjoyed our conversations, and learned a great deal from his books." Of course.). Doing this H-Diplo work distracted him, so he put it, from his own gloomy health condition, and from the nation's gloomy politics. But he himself was rarely if ever gloomy:

¹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

² Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980).

international relations was too interesting, History was too interesting, there was so much new stuff to read, so much to do. What an example he was, to all of us. I do miss him.

BOB JERVIS

BY WARREN F. KIMBALL, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, EMERITUS

Bob Jervis was, in every good sense of the phrase, a class act. He will be missed. He was one of a rare breed – a political science scholar who openly said that his work was dependent on the well-researched works of historians. Beyond my appreciation of his remarkable overall scholarly contribution, we had three specific intersections; evaluating manuscripts of some of his students, his superb editorial work for H-Diplo/ISSF, and his long and steady support for declassification of the historical record of American foreign policy, an effort that significantly improved the completeness of *the Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes. In all those intersections, Bob revealed himself to have been a persuasive, good humored gentleman and scholar.

Even better, he was a nice guy. A true diplomat who rubbed people the right way!

FROM THE “EDITOR’S NOTE” TO *JCWS* 24:1 (WINTER 2022)
BY MARK KRAMER HARVARD UNIVERSITY

From December 2020 through December 2021, three of the founding members of the *Journal of Cold War Studies* (*JCWS*) Editorial Board—Paul Schroeder, Donald Kagan, and Robert Jervis— died. Their deaths were attributable not to the COVID-19 pandemic but to another scourge of humanity, cancer. Bob Jervis’s death at age 81 on 9 December 2021 came as a particular jolt. Although Bob had mentioned to me in the spring of 2021 that he had been diagnosed with lung cancer, he had remained active and in good spirits until the time of his death. I had almost begun to hope that his cancer would go into remission and that he would escape death for another decade or two. Bob was admired all around the world as an eminent theorist of international relations and a brilliant commentator on US foreign policy. He published several articles and many book reviews in the *JCWS*. In addition to his stellar scholarly reputation, Bob was one of the kindest and most genial people I have known. He was a revered mentor to me and to many others who were 20–30 years younger than Bob, whom he always treated as equals. His death leaves a void not only on the *JCWS* Editorial Board but in numerous academic fields: political science, international relations, and diplomatic history.¹

¹ This tribute appeared in the 24:1 (Winter 2022) issue of *JCWS* as part of the Editor’s note.

REMEMBERING BOB JERVIS
BY STEPHEN KRASNER, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, EMERITUS

Bob Jervis and I were colleagues at Harvard and UCLA. In fact, I am sure that I was at UCLA because of Bob. I saw both him and his wife Kathe a number of times after they moved to Columbia in 1980. After 1990 I didn't see them very much.

I did not know how lucky I was. Bob was a wonderful colleague. It is hard to believe that he is gone. I wish that he were still with us.

One of the things that Bob always did was to have a weekly discussion group or a seminar. We were all sure to attend, even when we did not know the person who was speaking. We attended even when we had never heard of the book.

Bob was always curious. Sometimes we talked about new work. Some of the discussions were very interesting. All of the discussions were worth attending.

Bob was always very generous with his time. He offered guidance to those of us that were younger. If I had understood what was going on, I probably would have followed him to Columbia. But I was too young to grasp everything that was happening.

It is easy for people as successful as Bob to become aloof. Bob Jervis was never aloof. It was wonderful to have him as a colleague. It was wonderful to have him as a friend. I am sorry that he has left us. He will be missed.

LEARNING FROM HISTORY

BY DEBORAH WELCH LARSON, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

On July 8, 2021, during the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, in a testy response to a journalist's question about parallels with the aftermath of the US withdrawal from South Vietnam, President Joe Biden asserted that "there's going to be no circumstance where you see people being lifted off the roof of an embassy," as had happened in 1975 after the North Vietnamese completed their conquest of South Vietnam. While Biden was determined to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan, he surely did not want the chaos and loss of life that occurred when desperate Afghans clung to the wheels of US military aircraft to escape.¹ While much remains to be learned about this US intelligence failure, the American withdrawal from Afghanistan illustrates the inability of policymakers to learn from history, an inadequacy pointed out by Bob Jervis in his famous 1976 book, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*.²

I had the pleasure and privilege of being Bob's colleague at Columbia from 1984-1988. Jervis had many amazing ideas, but I would like to focus here on the contribution of *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Indeed the book changed the IR field. Amazingly, *Perception and Misperception* comprised only one half of his 1968 Ph.D. dissertation at University of California, Berkeley. The other half was published in 1970 as the *Logic of Images in International Relations*—another pathbreaking work, but in a different field of signaling and deception.³

As the title suggests, the focus of the book is on perception rather than beliefs. Previous work applying social psychology to international relations had focused on belief systems, such as the operational code.⁴ The work on belief systems tried to explain foreign policy in terms of beliefs—the need to maintain consistency among beliefs and the role of beliefs as a prism in interpreting experience. Scholars looked for correlation between elite beliefs and state behavior.

Perception used vision as a metaphor for policymakers' interpretation of information. This metaphor was extremely useful because it focused analysis squarely on *accuracy*. Just as there could be optical illusions, so too could there be inaccurate estimates of other states' intentions and behavior—misperception.⁵ The classic work on international relations by Hans J.

¹ "Racing to Get Out as Fear and Desperation Set In," *New York Times*, 17 August 2021; Michael D Shear, David E. Sanger, Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, Julian E. Barnes, and Lara Jakes, "Miscue After Miscue, Exit Plan Unravels," *New York Times*, 22 August 2021, 1.

² Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

³ Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

⁴ Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 6:3 (September 1962): 244-252, <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F002200276200600306>; Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia," in David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard Fagen, eds., *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), 25-96; Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly* 13:2 (1969): 190-122, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013944>. See Deborah Welch Larson, "The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," *Political Psychology* 15:1 (March 1994): 17-33, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3791437>.

⁵ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 7.

Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, and Henry Kissinger had highlighted irrational or misguided state foreign policies, but these were usually due to domestic politics or political culture rather than to policymakers' biases and omissions.⁶

Comparing interpretations of information about the international system to visual perception opened up many new ways of understanding foreign-policy decision making. For example, it became more important to divide up policy-making into stages—the reception, interpretation, and implementation of information. Errors and biases could occur at any of those stages of information processing. On a wider scale, Jervis viewed foreign-policy decision making as embedded in levels of analysis, including the international environment, domestic politics, and the bureaucracy, as well as the individual. It was important to disaggregate causality, to avoid blaming individual policymakers when the problem was poor implementation by bureaucratic actors, for example.⁷

Misperception could account for otherwise puzzling occurrences in international relations and foreign policy, such as the collapse of US-Soviet détente in the 1970s or the Vietnam War. Moreover, Jervis argued that misperceptions were predictable. They could account for patterns in international relations across time periods and situations. Misperception was not just a matter of individual pathology. With knowledge of types of errors, policymakers could learn to make better decisions.

Jervis's book made it possible to connect the psychological study of international relations with the “cognitive revolution” in social psychology. In the book, Jervis expresses frustration that existing work applying social psychology to international relations emphasized emotional causes such as wishful thinking and defense mechanisms over cognitive factors, overlooking uncertainty, complexity and confusion.⁸

The cognitive revolution applied concepts and research methods of cognitive psychology to social interactions.⁹ What made the cognitive revolution possible was the comparison of the human mind to a computer in processing information. The new cognitive social psychology looked at sequential stages of information processing—reception, interpretation, inference, storage in memory, and retrieval.

So did *Perception and Misperception*. Jervis argued that people tend to see what they expect to see and to assimilate new information to preexisting beliefs. One of the examples in the book involves an anthropologist taking a forest dweller to a park where there are grasslands. He discovers that the man perceives the buffalo in the distance as insects, because in the forest, he never made allowances for distance.¹⁰

⁶ Arnold Wolfers, *Britain and France between Two Wars* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1966); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 7th ed., rev. by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2006).

⁷ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 15-19.

⁸ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 3.

⁹ George A. Miller, “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on our Capacity for Processing Information,” *Psychological Review* 63:2 (March 1956), 81-97. DOI: <https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/h0043158>; Ulric Neisser, *Cognitive Psychology* (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1967); Jerome S. Bruner, Jacqueline J. Goodnow, and George A. Austin, *A Study of Thinking* (New York: John Wiley, 1956); Marvin Minsky, “Steps Toward Artificial Intelligence,” *Proceedings of the IRE* 49:1 (January 1969), 8-29. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1109/JRPROC.1961.287775>.

¹⁰ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 148-149; Colin Turnbull, *The Forest People* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), 252-253.

Jervis highlighted the importance of memory. Policymakers store information in memory under the categories and ideas they had at the time. When they try to develop innovative policies, they can't easily recall relevant information because it is stored in memory in a different place.¹¹ Jervis gives the example of the British Navy's difficulty during World War I in comparing the effectiveness of convoying and patrolling as defense against German submarine attacks on British merchant ships. The British Navy had stored information on the destruction of submarines by the types of vessels involved rather than the activities in which they were engaged.¹²

As part of the cognitive revolution, psychologists stressed that errors and biases could result from normal cognitive processes that were accurate and useful most of the time—but which, in a different context, resulted in error.¹³ In his discussion of cognitive consistency theory, Jervis stresses that it is normal and appropriate for foreign-policy decision makers to make inferences and judgments based on their preexisting beliefs. Information is usually ambiguous and susceptible to multiple interpretations. Beliefs that are grounded in experience are useful in understanding new cases.¹⁴

This explains why the release of new evidence after the Cold War has not eliminated debates among historians or political scientists about Soviet motives. The same documents may be interpreted in different ways depending on one's beliefs about the determinants of Soviet foreign policy.¹⁵

Jervis relates consistency seeking by policymakers to scientific epistemology. Scientists as well are prone to interpret the evidence in light of their theories. There are no "facts" independent of preexisting theories. Because evidence is susceptible to differing interpretations, scientists would be unable to carry out their inquiry without having theories. It would be irrational and bad science for scientists to discard well-grounded theories quickly, on the basis of a few pieces of discrepant evidence.¹⁶

We could not function in everyday life if we were constantly testing and reevaluating our beliefs. Consequently, we should not be too quick to condemn past leaders for being too close-minded. In the British debate over appeasement of Adolf Hitler, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and British Permanent Undersecretary Robert Vansittart were both dogmatic, but reached opposite conclusions about Germany's intentions.¹⁷ Those who were right often reasoned no more logically than those who were wrong. That Japan would attack a much more powerful United States at Pearl Harbor or that Hitler would declare war on the United States was highly improbable and is puzzling in hindsight.¹⁸

¹¹ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 162-163.

¹² Arthur J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, vol. 5, *Victory and Aftermath (January 1918-June 1919)* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 99-100.

¹³ Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

¹⁴ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 161-162.

¹⁵ William C. Wohlforth, "New Evidence on Moscow's Cold War: Ambiguity in Search of Theory," *Diplomatic History* 21:2 (Spring 1997): 229-42, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00066>.

¹⁶ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 156-162.

¹⁷ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 175-176.

¹⁸ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 178-181.

But Jervis also provides several tests as to when consistency seeking is excessive and violates reality testing. This would include instances when decision makers fail to look for relevant evidence that is readily available. Or when a leader refuses to read or discuss some information that casts a preferred policy into question.¹⁹

On the other hand, people's belief systems are more sometimes consistent than is warranted, leading to belief-system overkill. People believe that all good things go together and they avoid recognizing that even a favored policy may have some bad side effects. There may be no good option. As Jervis wrote of the test-ban debate in the 1950s,

People who favored a nuclear test-ban believed that testing created a serious medical danger, would not lead to major weapons improvements, and was a source of international tension. Those who opposed the treaty usually took the opposite position on all three issues. Yet neither logic nor experience indicates that there should be any such relationship. The health risks of testing are in no way connected with the military advantages, and a priori we should not expect any correlation between people's views on these questions.²⁰

In short, policymakers avoid recognizing the need to make value trade-offs.²¹ In the Obama administration, those policymakers who favored aiding the moderate opposition in the Syrian civil war were confident that the US could distinguish the moderates from the extremists and that weapons would not fall into the hands of the enemy. Those who opposed US involvement contended that failure to provide aid to the opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would not escalate the situation or result in strengthening terrorist groups.²²

If policymakers recognized that their preferred policy will have costs or side-effects, they might be able to make adjustments in advance to compensate. At least they would not be surprised by unintended consequences, which could exceed the benefits.

One of the Jervis's unique ideas was the idea of the evoked set—that foreign policymakers' interpretation of information could be colored by their current preoccupations and that this could lead to misunderstanding and misperception. For example, before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Washington officials warned Lieutenant General Walter Short to expect "hostile action," meaning "attack on American possessions from without." But General Short, who was concerned about the risk of sabotage, did not interpret the warning as referring to an attack on Pearl Harbor.²³

In chapter 6 on "How Decision-Makers Learn", Jervis anticipated many of the insights of schema theory. Schema theory is about how people use stored knowledge to make sense out of new information.²⁴

¹⁹ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 172-173.

²⁰ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 129.

²¹ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 128-142.

²² Robert M. Gates, *Exercise of Power: American Failures, Successes, and a New Path Forward in the Post-Cold War World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2020), 305-313.

²³ Robert Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 74, cited in Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 206-207.

²⁴ Susan T. Fiske and Patricia W. Linville, "What Does the Schema Concept Buy Us," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 6:4 (December 1980): 543-47; Shelley E. Taylor and Jennifer Crocker, "Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing," in E. Tory Higgins, C. Peter Herman, and Mark P. Zanna, eds., *Social Cognition: The Ontario Symposium* (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1981), 89-

Jervis argued that learning from experience creates perceptual predispositions—tendencies to see the world in certain ways. Decision-makers view current events as analogous to past cases with which they are familiar. Policymakers draw oversimplified lessons from the past—they tend to believe that the most salient aspects of the situation led to the outcome, failing to search more deeply for the causes. Accordingly, decision makers are drawn to repeat policies that succeeded while avoiding those that failed. While seemingly rational, merely copying what worked does not take into consideration contingent conditions that affect outcomes. The past case may be fundamentally different from the present situation. In any case, a successful policy may have turned out well due to chance factors. A failed policy may have achieved the best that could have been expected.²⁵

Not all experience is useful or informative. Leaders are unduly influenced by their firsthand experience. This includes their encounters with foreign leaders after brief summit meetings. As a result of misplaced confidence that they have understood their foreign counterpart, leaders' future judgments may be less accurate. On the other hand, policymakers rarely believe that the similar experiences of other states can offer any useful lessons for their state, even though careful study could help them prevent fiascos and costly failures.²⁶

One insight from the book that I often use in my lectures is that foreign policymakers fail to understand how others could perceive them as a threat. Leaders know that they mean other states no harm—and they assume that their intentions are obvious to others.²⁷ A recent example is the failure of US and NATO leaders to understand how President Vladimir Putin might have felt threatened by increased US military assistance to Ukraine, which is fighting a Russian-supported insurgency by separatists in southeastern Ukraine.

Another widely applicable insight is that we tend to overestimate how centralized and coordinated the other's behavior is—failing to take into consideration the role of internal bureaucratic conflicts, foul-ups, accidents, etc. Many times when analysts worry about the significance of an apparent sudden shift in a state's policy, the cause is a military commander acting independently or competition between bureaucratic agencies rather than attempts to send a signal.²⁸ This can apply to states like China, where the foreign policymaking process is a 'black box.'

Just about every psychological theory relevant to decision making can be found in *Perception and Misperception*—cognitive dissonance theory, attribution theory, cognitive consistency theory, schema theory. By using an eclectic set of social psychological theories, Jervis is able to show broad convergence of findings upon the determinants of perceptions.

One of the reasons that the book had such an impact were the many colorful and vivid examples taken from a variety of disciplines—diplomatic history, but also espionage, the philosophy of science, and literature. Without the historical and other examples, it is difficult to determine whether laboratory findings have any validity in the real world. In the laboratory,

134; David E. Rumelhart and Andrew Ortony, "The Representation of Knowledge in Memory," in Richard C. Anders, Rand J. Spiro, and William Montague, eds., *Schooling and the Acquisition of Knowledge*, (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977), 99-135. For application to international relations, see Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 50-57; Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

²⁵ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 228-232.

²⁶ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 243-246.

²⁷ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 354-355.

²⁸ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 319-321.

the subjects are usually students dealing with simple topics that they care little about. It is another matter to find out that experienced, highly competent foreign policy leaders who are dealing with consequential issues make systematic errors.²⁹

As I have learned from experience, it is difficult to come up with examples of psychological processes. Jervis made it seem effortless, largely because he was a voracious reader. Every time that I would mention a book that I had read to him, he had already read it and a few more. His widespread reading and knowledge of history gave Jervis an intuitive sense for what theories are likely to be correct and a common-sense view of what leaders do.

If policymakers tend to be closed to new information and to see what they expect to see, Jervis demonstrated the opposite. He was remarkably open—to new information, theories, and approaches. Jervis was an intellectual magpie. He generated ideas from many diverse sources—current events, diplomatic history, newspapers, magazines—as well as political science.

Jervis often weighed the opposite point of view to determine when it might be valid. He believed in the hypothetic-deductive method, whereby the researcher should consider what would happen if a hypothesis were correct as well as what might falsify the hypothesis. Perhaps because of his path-breaking work on how policymakers assimilate information to their preexisting beliefs, Jervis was concerned with avoiding confirmation bias. Reality is often contradictory, as he argued in his later book on systems theory. Different paths can lead to the same result.

My last meeting with Jervis was at an April 27, 2021, Zoom meeting sponsored by *Political Science Quarterly* where I summarized an article that I had written on President Donald J. Trump's foreign policy. As discussant, Jervis had many insightful, well-informed comments on Trump's policy toward Russia and China and on Biden's reaction to this legacy. I was struck by Bob's comment that Biden was a gambler, and that he was taking big risks in withdrawing from Afghanistan. Little had been written in the mainstream press about the potential risk that a US withdrawal would lead to the swift collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. But Jervis, as a student of the history of US withdrawal from Vietnam, correctly predicted the outcome.

²⁹ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 4-5.

REMEMBERING BOB JERVIS

BY MELVYN P. LEFFLER, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, EMERITUS

I will let other colleagues and friends comment on the significance of Bob Jervis's scholarly contributions. I want to write a few words about Bob, the man I got to know when we served together for more than fifteen years on the Historical Review Panel for the director of the CIA. Bob chaired the committee when I joined it around the year 2000. It had been through a stormy history, and Bob was seeking to resurrect its legitimacy and demonstrate its efficacy. We met twice a year, usually for two days. Prior to that time I had been acquainted with Bob's scholarly contributions, especially his book on perception and misperception in international politics and his writings on nuclear strategy, deterrence, and the security dilemma.¹ But I don't think I had ever met Bob prior to our work on the advisory committee.

For fifteen years or more we labored with other committee members to do a little good to promote declassification and transparency, and I will talk about that shortly. But for me the highlight of these duties was getting to know Bob, corresponding with him about books and articles, and garnering his comments and insights on my own writings. What I so admired about Bob was his thoughtfulness, judicious disposition, modesty, and honesty. What I so admired about Bob was his open-mindedness, his ability to change his mind, his readiness to acknowledge that he was wrong on a particular matter, and his determination to insist that he was right when the majority thought otherwise. What I so admired about Bob was that he was an IR specialist who truly had a voracious interest in and insatiable appetite for history, who kept abreast of the most recent literature on a myriad of topics, and who was insistent on using historical scholarship carefully and imaginatively to question theoretical generalizations and to extrapolate lessons that might help policymakers. But Bob always recognized that those exercises were fraught with challenges and imponderables.

What attracted Bob to me was his humility in the face of complexity. What he told me privately was what he said publicly: the most important book he ever wrote was *System Effects*.² Significantly, the sub-title to this volume was "Complexity in Political and Social Life." "Very little in social and political life," he concluded, "makes sense except in the light of systemic processes" (295). But the processes themselves, he explained, were inordinately complex: interactions cannot be understood "by explaining each alone; the fate of an actor's policy or strategy depends on those that are adopted by others; behavior alters the environment in ways that affect the trajectory of actors, outcomes, and environments" (60). These types of interactions, he argued, explain much of the puzzling behavior in international politics that capture the attention of scholars: "Intentions and outcomes often are very different, regulation is prone to misfire, and our standard methodologies are not likely to capture the dynamics at work" (60).

Simply stated, Bob articulated and illustrated for me what a lifetime of scholarship also had taught me, and perhaps that is why I felt so attracted to him. Time and again, he reminded me that evidence is provocatively ambiguous, and the tradeoffs that policymakers face are always agonizing. In his last essay, "Why Post-Mortems Fail," he stressed: do not start by blaming policymakers; remember that it is very hard to get inside their heads. Recognize, he emphasized, that hindsight privileges what we think should have been obvious, and that, therefore, "confirmation bias" must be held in check. And keep in mind, he admonished, that people can be right for the wrong reasons, and that people can be wrong for the right reasons.³

¹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 167-215.

² Jervis, *Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

³ Jervis, "Why Post-Mortems Fail," intended for the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*. Bob was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in the spring of 2021 and prepared this essay for its journal. He shared a draft with me in September.

Bob developed these thoughts as he grappled time and again with the failure of intelligence analysts to get things right. Why had they failed to foresee the fall of the Shah of Iran? Why had they failed to grasp that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction? Why had they failed to prepare for the assault on the US capitol on January 6th? I admired Bob because he did not think that analysts and officials were stupid or foolish or cowardly; he knew many of them personally, and by the end of his life he had trained some of them. Faced with the challenge of examining why things went wrong, Bob advised “humility.” Not only is it likely, he wrote, “that the case under consideration will be a difficult one, which means that correct judgments were not likely to have been obvious at the time, but even later conclusions are likely to be disputable. A good post-mortem then recognizes the ambiguities of the case, many of which may remain even after the best retrospective analysis.”

To get things right, Bob believed you needed to adopt good social science methods and you needed to have reliable evidence. Bob really cared about evidence, about historical documentation, about understanding the peculiarities of a particular case – yes, its complexities, even as one tried to formulate generalizations and theoretical propositions. Year after year, Bob steadfastly struggled with CIA officials to accelerate the declassification of critical documents. Sometimes, we met on Sunday nights at an “undisclosed location” near Dulles airport where the CIA rented a building and where we were allowed to read some of the most fascinating and contentious documents that had the CIA (and other agencies) warring with the compilers of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series. Bob loved reading those documents, and so did I and the other committee members. Bob grasped their importance – and sometimes their irrelevance – for the larger subject under discussion.

When we met on subsequent days to talk with intelligence analysts or covert officers and questioned their determination to keep a particular document classified, Bob was uncannily shrewd in explaining why a particular piece of information would not jeopardize sources or methods, and, even more importantly, why it would actually serve the interests of the agency and the government to have the information disclosed. He could illuminate why a particular piece of information would help explain why a seemingly stupid decision actually was not so foolish, given the information that was available. He could explain that a budgetary number that the agency or the government swore could not be disclosed actually was so small that it did not matter and that readers, in fact, would be amazed at how little was spent on a particular piece of a covert operation. I watched Bob tangle with our interlocutors, and along with other committee members I often tried to assist him, but Bob had his own unique manner of engagement. In my opinion, he was never really eloquent, and never really argumentative, but straightforward, honest, self-deprecatory, illuminating, and often persuasive. Most of all, Bob would insist that the agency and the government had an obligation under an act of Congress to disclose all materials that bore on substantive policy decisions. He emphasized that making the information available would help all of us assess policy successes and failures, and understand them in their full complexity so that simplistic and foolish allegations of blame or ineptness would be seen in a larger context.

What was rewarding was that Bob sometimes was successful. He had stature within the CIA because of his previous consulting and because of his gigantic reputation as a scholar and teacher. He had credibility because he was transparently so honest, so unvindictive, and so desirous of helping the agency through transparency. Time and again, year after year, we would meet for lunch with one director of the agency after another, with George Tenet, with General David Petraeus, and with Leon Panetta, and Bob would say to them: you know you really have the ability to enhance the agency’s credibility by being more transparent; or, alternatively, you know you may need to deal with critical legislators or media inquiries if you deny a document that on the face of it should be disclosed because, for example, it already had been published by a foreign government or in a personal memoir. Bob loved making the case for transparency; he was always polite and deferential, but never cowed by authority.

Bob’s approach was always non-polemical, non-political. He talked in common sense terminology. Understanding how systems worked, or did not work, he constantly prodded CIA officials to meet with and collaborate more with the State Department. Over time, he succeeded at getting key officials in some of the agencies and departments actually to talk directly to one another. Over time, he even got the CIA and the State Department Historical Office to appoint a joint historian to examine CIA documents. Over time, he helped push through the declassification of key documents that had held up important volumes of the FRUS series, over time he convinced the CIA that declassifying some early Presidential

Daily Briefs would not compromise the security of the United States government, and over time he helped persuade agency officials to make the CREST system of documents more readily available, to improve the agency's search engine for researchers, and to assess and declassify the oldest and most important documents from the agency's history.

Bob knew very well that the committee's successes were always marginal and incremental. But what amazed me was his commitment and tenacity. After I had served on the committee for five or eight years – I don't really recall – he said he thought it was now time to pass on the chairmanship and inquired if I might take over if others agreed. I explained why I could not, or would not, and Bob just continued in place year after year, long after I departed. Although President Donald Trump and his acolytes temporarily dismantled the committee and then reconstituted it, Bob wrote me in one of his last messages that he was looking forward to seeing the new panel continuing its work and was writing some suggestions about what needed to be done.

Until the last months of his life, Bob remained engaged and enmeshed in scholarly dialogue and debate. He relished his interactions with historians and liked talking about lessons learned. We participated with Chinese and American scholars last June in a forum related to the applicability of the Cold War analogy to contemporary US-Chinese relations. Elected to the National Academy of Sciences in the spring of 2021, Bob produced an essay for the academy's journal that I allude to above on "Why Post-Mortems Fail." To a large extent, the essay summed up conclusions from much of his life's work and conveyed the modesty we all need to feel when confronted with the ambiguities of human behavior and the messiness of national interactions in a complex international system.

Bob had a strong moral compass, deep convictions, and wonderful values coupled with an ability to discuss matters dispassionately and intelligibly. He saw both the flaws and attributes of people and policymakers, and possessed an ability to hold them accountable without attacking them personally. He was a brilliant man who worked prodigiously hard and who contributed invaluable insights to the fields of international history and international relations. He was forever participating in debates and critiquing books and articles, yet he was always fair-minded and levelheaded. He was a scholar I deeply admired, and became a friend whose personal qualities I found exemplary. I will miss him.

REMEMBERING ROBERT JERVIS BY JACK S. LEVY, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

The passing of Robert Jervis is a devastating loss for the profession and a personal loss for so many of us. Jervis touched everyone he met with his kindness, generosity, integrity, and humor as well as the power of his intellect. I was never Bob's student or close colleague at Columbia, but he shaped my thinking in countless ways. I wanted to offer some thoughts on his scholarly impact.

For the last half century Jervis was one of the most influential scholars in the International Relations field – and for many of us *the* most influential. The breadth of Jervis's contributions to the study of international relations and foreign policy is stunning, ranging across all levels of analysis, from individual psychology to organizational politics and processes to the dynamics of international systems.¹ In this essay I limit myself to brief discussions of the interdisciplinary nature of Jervis's scholarly orientation and influence, his role in the development of the subfield of the political psychology of international relations, and to his often neglected contributions to political methodology.

The scope of Jervis's scholarly contributions extend beyond international relations to other fields of political science and to other disciplines as well. In fact, it is hard to think of many political scientists with a stronger interdisciplinary orientation. As Jervis notes in the acknowledgements in his first book, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, the two greatest influences on that study were the economist Thomas Schelling and the sociologist Erving Goffman. In *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Jervis drew on both a wide range of theoretical and experimental research in social psychology to formulate his theoretical arguments, and an unparalleled familiarity with secondary (and often primary) sources in diplomatic history to illustrate and further refine those arguments. This interdisciplinary breadth is also clear to readers of *System Effects*, which drew upon extensive readings in evolutionary biology, ecology, ethology, sociology, organization theory, and other fields.²

Jervis's scholarly work influenced other disciplines as well being informed by them. The important conceptual distinction in *The Logic of Images* between signals (which can easily be manipulated by the sender) and indices (which are not manipulable) was not only central to later work on costly signaling in international relations. It was incorporated by the economist Michael Spence into his formal theory of economic signaling, which led to Spence's 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.³ Jervis also interacted on a regular basis with diplomatic historians and published in history journals, particularly on the history of the Cold War but also on other topics.⁴ Over the years I was repeatedly impressed by Jervis's familiarity with details associated with the outbreak and diplomacy of the First World War. Jervis also wrote several articles on the Concert of Europe, engaging the question of the extent to which the Concert constituted traditional balance of

¹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976; 2nd ed., 2017); Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010); Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

² Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

³ Michael Spence, *Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

⁴ Jervis, "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?" *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3:1 (Winter 2001): 36-60.

power politics or a new kind of security regime.⁵ This work reflected an ongoing dialogue with the influential historian Paul Schroeder and led to Jervis's role as co-editor of a volume of some of Schroeder's most important articles.⁶

The core of *The Logic of Images* involved deductive theorizing about strategic interaction between states in the context of uncertainty and incentives for strategic deceit. The book also included an implicit critique of formal models of signaling, emphasizing that all signals, costly and otherwise, are infused with meaning and interpreted through different analytic lenses by different receivers with different world views and different formative experiences. Jervis developed this line of argument more fully in his subsequent research on the psychology of signaling, beginning with his 1976 book.

Perception and Misperception in International Politics is one of the most influential publications in the International Relations field in the last half century. Before the 1960s, the study of psychology and foreign policy was mainly the province of social psychologists and personality theorists.⁷ Jervis's 1976 book synthesized many disparate propositions and findings in social psychology into a more integrated theoretical framework. It marked the birth of the systematic study of the psychology of foreign policy and international relations. *Perception and Misperception* also marked an important advance in the relatively new field of foreign policy analysis, where early efforts to develop theoretical frameworks gave relatively little role to psychological factors.⁸ The study of the psychology of foreign policy and international interactions has subsequently occupied an increasingly important place in IR field, accelerating significantly in the last decade. Jervis's theoretical insights continue to be central as research has shifted in a more experimental direction. Jervis contributed further to the broader study of political psychology in both Political Science and Social Psychology through his role as co-editor of the first edition of the *Handbook of Political Psychology*.⁹

Although Jervis is widely regarded as one of the leading theoreticians of international relations, the methodological sophistication of much of his work is often overlooked. Social scientists define methodology in different ways, but if we define the concept broadly to include issues of research design and philosophy of science, Jervis was a political methodologist as well as a theoretician. One of the distinguishing things about *Perception and Misperception* is its explicit recognition of alternative explanations for observed behavior, and its attention to the question of what kinds of evidence were most useful in validating one explanation or interpretation over another. This concern with alternative interpretations runs throughout the book, beginning with Jervis's comment in the Introduction that the neglect of structural explanations leads to "over-psychologizing" behavior that can be better explained by political variables.¹⁰ Chapter 6 on "How Decision-Makers Learn from History" includes several major sections with subheadings of "Alternative Interpretations." In that chapter Jervis also engages the question of how the analyst might empirically distinguish between genuine historical learning, the strategic or

⁵ Jervis, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert." *American Historical Review* 97:3 (June 1992): 716-724.

⁶ Paul W. Schroeder, *Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe*, edited by David Wetzel, Jervis, and Jack S. Levy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

⁷ A useful summary that influenced Jervis is Joseph de Rivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1968).

⁸ Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (New York: Palgrave, 1962); Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971).

⁹ David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

¹⁰ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 4.

rhetorical use of history to bolster one's preexisting policy preferences, and situations in which a third variable shapes both historical lessons and current preferences.

This concern for social science methodology is evident in many of Jervis's other writings. In essays on the different approaches taken by diplomatic historians and international relations scholars in their studies of essentially the same phenomena, Jervis emphasizes themes relating to the importance of negative cases, avoiding selecting on the dependent variable, looking for evidence bearing on the logical implications of theoretical arguments, the advantages and disadvantages of parsimony, and other social science concerns.¹¹ Jervis also notes particular aspects of historical methodology that IR scholars would do well to emulate. This includes greater attention to the importance of chronology, and particularly the impact of events on subsequent perceptions and events. Jervis contrasts the central role of chronology in historical narratives with the common practice among IR scholars of conducting comparative cases studies based on the assumption that sequential cases are independent.¹² IR scholars need to pay more attention to the interdependence of sequential historical episodes and ask how much one set of events influences subsequent perceptions and behavior, and through what mechanisms.

This commitment to social science methodology is also evident at the more practical level of policy, where Jervis hoped his scholarship would have an impact. Jervis had a more direct involvement in policy through his consulting work with the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly on the question of the sources of intelligence failure. He conducted detailed studies of U.S intelligence failures associated with the 1979 Iranian revolution and the 2003 Iraq War. One of his central conclusions was that a major cause of intelligence failure is that intelligence analysts do not think like social scientists – and that they should be trained to do so. Jervis writes that

...intelligence and postmortems on failures can benefit from using standard social science methods.... in many cases both intelligence and criticisms of it have only a weak understanding of the links between evidence and inferences ... they do not formulate testable hypotheses and so often rely on beliefs that cannot be falsified, leave crucial assumptions unexplicated and unexamined, fail to ask what evidence should be present if their arguments are correct, ignore the diagnostic value of absent evidence, and fail to employ the comparative method and so assert causation without looking at instances in which the supposed causal factor was absent as well as at cases in which it is present.¹³

With respect to erroneous conclusions regarding the Iraqi development of weapons of mass destruction, Jervis argued that the problem was not so much intelligence analysts' initial estimate that Iraq had an ongoing WMD program, but their failure to ask the question "how would we know if we were wrong," and to actively search for information that might contradict their initial estimate.

One should not infer from Jervis's commitment to social science methodology that he was excessively optimistic that following proper methods would always lead to accurate conclusions about the nature of cause and effect in international politics. The theoretical insights developed in *System Effects*, which Jervis regarded as his most important book,¹⁴ have

¹¹ Jervis, "International History and International Politics: Why Are They Studied Differently," in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 385-402.

¹² Jervis, "International History and International Politics," 401.

¹³ Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails*, 3.

¹⁴ Jervis, "How I Got Here," *H-Diplo* Essay 198 on Learning the Scholar's Craft: Reflections of Historians and International Relations, 4 March 2020, 7, <https://hdiplo.org/to/E198>.

enormously important methodological implications. Building on theories of complexity, Jervis emphasized that everything is connected to everything else; that “we can never do merely one thing”; that causal relationships are often interactive; that non-linear relationships, third-party behavior, and negative and positive feedback generate unintended consequences; and that actors co-evolve with their environments.¹⁵ All of this can make it difficult to trace causation, especially when actors are guided in part by their own theories of how the world works. These considerations led Jervis to recognize the limitations of knowledge, and to be cautious in his own claims. This epistemological stance, along with personal attributes, helps to explain the quality of humility in Jervis that many have noted in their remembrances.¹⁶

Let me end on a personal note. My intellectual development as an IR scholar has probably been influenced more by the work of Robert Jervis than by that of any other scholar. To mention a few examples, it was Jervis’s occasional references to prospect theory in the early 1980s that initially sparked my research program on that and related topics in behavioral decision theory; his work on learning from history that got me thinking about that subject; and his invitation to participate on a roundtable on the historiography of Paul Schroeder that led to my work on Schroeder. Jervis influenced my career in other ways as well. When I arrived at Rutgers in 1989 (even before, actually) Jervis invited me to his faculty seminars in IR and also in political psychology. He asked me to teach a Ph.D. seminar in the Department a couple times in the 1990s, which I have recently been doing on a regular basis. This has helped to make me feel more integrated into the IR community at Columbia and has made my intellectual life far more interesting and rewarding. In these and other ways Bob Jervis shaped my intellectual development and career, and I will always be grateful.

¹⁵ It is worth emphasizing that the recognition that everything is connected to everything else did not push Jervis in the direction of prioritizing a full description of all of these interconnections in particular historical cases. He always maintained what I regard as a balanced view of the costs and benefits of parsimonious theory. As he wrote in the first chapter of his first book, “one of the best routes to international relations theory does not lie in an attempt to deal with all the significant variables operating in any case, but rather in the attempt to see what the world would look like if only a few dominant influences were at work.” Jervis, *Logic of Images*, 15-16.

¹⁶ I am struck by Jervis’s description of the evolution of his thinking about the deterrence model and the spiral model, in “How I Got Here,” 4. Jervis wrote that he began his analysis of the two models as alternative descriptions of and prescriptions for the Cold War “with a strong bias toward deterrence.” But after further theoretical reflection, writing *Perception and Misperception*, and immersion in many historical cases, he gained “more sympathy for the spiral model.” He concluded “In the end, while I continue to study and teach about the Cold War, my conclusions remain fluid.” Jervis was always eager to push his arguments as far as theory, logic, and evidence would allow, but not beyond.

BOB JERVIS: AN APPRECIATION BY JAMES MCALLISTER, WILLIAMS COLLEGE

Undoubtedly like many others in the community of political scientists and international historians, I have spent much of the last few weeks revisiting the scholarship of Bob Jervis. Even for those who have long known that he was one of the true intellectual giants of political science and international relations, it is simply awe inspiring to systematically go through his CV and appreciate how much scholarship he produced on so many different topics for over five decades. Future intellectual historians trying to understand the disciplines of political science and international relations in the post-Vietnam War era will spend much of their time grappling with Bob's contributions and all of the related research projects he inspired others to pursue. Of course, the wide range of Bob's scholarship will present a difficult challenge to anyone who takes on the project because of the sheer number of the areas of inquiry they will have to master in order to fully appreciate his seminal contributions to everything from political psychology to the nuclear revolution to systems theory.

Without the abundant evidence of his generosity and kindness that will be presented in forums such as this one and the many others that will appear in the years to come, a future historian would surely have been forgiven for assuming that Bob must have been singularly focused on his own individual scholarship, indifferent to teaching and the mentoring of graduate students, or unconcerned with providing collective goods to wider academic communities. If Bob had displayed any of those qualities, it would have been completely understandable and would not have diminished the greatness of his scholarship at all. But what is truly remarkable when considering Bob's life and legacy is how much time and energy he devoted to his students and colleagues, the strong intellectual communities he fostered and created, and how he used his influence to build essential connections between international relations theorists and historians of American foreign policy and world politics. It is not at all an accident that this forum is being organized by two historians and that it is appearing on H-Diplo/ISSF, a venue that he founded in partnership with H-Diplo and one that would not have existed or flourished without his leadership.

I first met Bob in the fall of 1988 when I enrolled as a graduate student in the Columbia Department of Political Science. The department, then as now, was one of the very best in the world, and it admitted many highly intelligent, intellectually combative, and remarkably confident graduate students. Of course, it also admitted a few students like myself who lacked all of these qualities and had no business being in a graduate program that contained brilliant students like Randy Schweller, Tom Christensen, Victor Cha, Jon Mercer, and far too many others to mention. I took two lecture courses with Bob that semester, his intro to IR theory course and his course on nuclear strategy. What I remember most about both courses, in addition to the extensive and often quirky reading lists, was Bob's unique teaching style. Lectures never proceeded in a chronological or formulaic manner and many of his most insightful remarks flowed from complex questions posed to him by students. Although only a very small portion of the fairly large class could actively participate, Bob always held the entire audience in a state of rapt attention that made the classes feel like intimate seminars. Needless to say, it was also impossible for anyone in those classes not to appreciate how privileged they were to have the opportunity to study these topics with Bob Jervis.

Despite my own appreciation for the great courses I took with Bob and the other superb faculty members at Columbia, I ended my first year highly doubtful that I would continue in the program. I did not even enroll for the fall semester. Leaving aside purely personal factors, it increasingly dawned on me that my passion for studying the history of American foreign policy and the Cold War was far more intense than my interest in the theoretical concerns of political science at this time. Although I recognized their importance, discussions of methodology and research design always left me uninterested. Indeed, I would not have argued with anyone who told me that I had no business at all being in a political science department; in fact, I had already privately come to that conclusion myself. It was at that moment of complete resignation that I signed up for a seminar course in the spring of 1990 that Bob was co-teaching with Marc Trachtenberg, who at the time was in the History Department at the University of Pennsylvania.

It is impossible to overestimate the impact that seminar had on my life. Being in a classroom with two tremendous scholars from different disciplines examining the fundamental issues of war and peace in the twentieth century was a transformative

experience. In a course filled almost entirely with aspiring political scientists, we had insightful and passionate debates over the origins of the First World War, the strengths and weaknesses of A.J.P. Taylor's *The Origins of the Second World War*, and several key moments and crises of the Cold War.¹ The point of the course was not to learn the historiography of crucial events, but to understand how much historical arguments like Taylor's were rooted in implicit theories of world politics, as well as to demonstrate how theoretical debates in IR often turned on historical interpretations that were false, misleading, or incomplete. Perhaps most importantly, working with primary documents made it clear that there was absolutely no reason why students of international relations in political science departments should be content with being passive consumers of secondary historical accounts. IR theorists could approach history with their own disciplinary concerns and also immerse themselves in the same documentary sources and archives utilized by historians. While Marc's influential book *History and Strategy* was not published until the following year, the concluding sentences of that book captured exactly the atmosphere that was present throughout the semester: "A process of cross-fertilization and intellectual interaction is just beginning to get off the ground, but already the people involved have the sense that this sort of thing is tremendously valuable. It may be odd for a historian to predict the future, but even now you can feel a certain momentum: clearly something important is taking shape on that border area where history and political science meet."²

Bob obviously thought as insightfully as anyone about the nature of the "border area" where the fields of history and political science meet. In a lecture he delivered at Williams College in 2009 to a distinguished group of scholars, one almost equally composed of historians and political scientists, Bob began by noting what brought everyone together: "For all of our differences, we share a fascination with the patterns, idiosyncrasies, and changes in cross-border relations." The body of the lecture then proceeded to expertly lay out in an informal manner all of the deep philosophical differences that constituted the border area that separated the two disciplines. It would have been easy for Bob to minimize or obscure how fundamental those differences were, but his concluding message was that the border between the two disciplines could not and should not be expected to dissolve: "These differences produce tensions between political scientists and international historians that we should not expect to be resolved. Indeed, they should not be because the diversity of perspectives benefits us all. The point is not to convert others to our viewpoint, but to understand theirs."³

If borders between intellectual disciplines were in some sense inevitable and even desirable, what exactly could be done to increase the frequency and fruitfulness of encounters between historians and political scientists? Always a pluralist who valued innovative scholarship from all theoretical and historical perspectives, Bob characteristically did not offer a simple answer to a complex issue. However, while the philosophical divide between the two disciplines could not be resolved or wished away, Bob did many significant and practical things to make those borders more porous throughout his career. For example, along with Bob Art (and later joined by Stephen Walt), Bob founded the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs in the early 1980s. It is hard to exaggerate the role that the prestigious series has played and continues to play in fostering the careers of political scientists, including my own, whose research is more historical and less quantitative than has long been the norm in political science departments.

Of course, one of Bob's enduring legacies will surely be H-Diplo/ISSF, which he founded and guided from 2009 to his passing. The creation of a community for international relations scholars that would be comparable to the role that H-Diplo had long played for historians was and is a remarkable achievement. Bob often illustrated debates between structural and contingent explanations of events by citing McGeorge Bundy's famous Vietnam era line that "Pleikus are like streetcars," which suggested that the bombing of an American military installation by Vietcong forces in February 1965 was merely a rationale rather than a cause of the subsequent military escalation by the Johnson administration. However, in the case of

¹ A.J.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (New York: Atheneum, 1962).

² Marc Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 286.

³ Robert Jervis, "International Politics and Diplomatic History: Fruitful Differences," *H-Diplo/ISSF* Essay 1 (March 12, 2010), <https://issforum.org/essays/essay-1-jervis-inagural>.

ISSF, it is very hard to construct a plausible counterfactual that the forum would have either come into being or flourished in the way it has without Bob's vision and leadership. I had the great privilege of working with him in the early years of ISSF as a managing editor and can attest to the active role he played in guiding all of its activities. It also did not take me long to discover that the most effective way to garner participation from very busy scholars was to start every invitation with some form of the sentence, "I am working with Bob Jervis on..." Over the past decade, and particularly after the election of Donald Trump, ISSF has developed into the most vital online scholarly community for informed theoretical, historical, and policy relevant discussions of America's role in the world. The border between IR scholars and historians is still there, but Bob's vision of ISSF has made it much easier for everyone to cross over and to familiarize themselves with the latest research and disciplinary debates on both sides.

Political scientists and international historians have suffered a great loss with the passing of Bob Jervis, but his pathbreaking scholarship, his intellectual values and integrity, and the kindness and generosity he displayed to so many will never be forgotten.

ROBERT JERVIS: SCHOLARLY SILVERBACK BY ROSE McDERMOTT, BROWN UNIVERSITY

This is a tribute that I desperately hoped I would never have to write. I am heartbroken over the loss of my mentor, Bob Jervis. In a world driven by social media, grief too often feels performative, displaying a theatricality so at odds with the feeling of authentic loss. By contrast, the experience of real grief, however painful, constitutes a kind of sacred honor, proof of a relationship of real depth, value, and meaning in a world captivated by trivial shiny things. Robert Jervis forged me; he so deeply formed my intellect, and in many ways my character, that I would have to forget my very self in order to overlook his formative impact on me.

Bob Jervis was the first one to bring me to H-Diplo, as he invited me to so many other things, offering articles in journals that came with stipends when he knew I needed “real money,” as well as introductions to other communities such as the STTL list administered by his friend Bob Art. As a published but admittedly armchair anthropologist (albeit of the biological persuasion), I often noticed the interactions on that list to follow a certain pattern: more often than not, Bob Jervis would start a thread, throwing a shot across the bow to see what others thought or how they might react. Frequently, it seemed like the responses were designed as much to get his attention and validation as to actually discuss the substance of the issue.

Among those who study primates, an individual like this in the gorilla community is called a “silverback.” This is usually an older gorilla who manages to keep everyone else in line. The silverback organizes a given group; he is the one who protects the group, even if he is killed in the process. The silverback naturally captures everyone’s attention, but his role is much larger and wider than being the organizing force of a group. He helps resolve conflicts among members of the troop, dictates movement and provides guidance and direction to feeding sites, and is the one designated to ensure the welfare of every member of the group. In the area of international relations, and particularly in the subfield of security studies, Bob was a silverback in all the ways that count.

Bob functioned as a silverback for the wider international relations community in myriad ways. He created community by bringing together people who might not otherwise have spent time together. In this way, he provided the cement by which everyone remained connected to others through their mutual attachment to him. Over the course of the last 14 months, he organized weekly Zoom lunches that brought together a disparate group of individuals from different backgrounds to talk about current events. In this, as in so many other ways, he was the glue that held the group together.

Bob’s reach was much broader than his immediate students and colleagues; he had widespread connections in the intelligence, government, and military communities. Bob did not just create community. He established an entire field of study, and the depth and quality of his work in the area of political psychology gave it legitimacy.¹ Without question, he shaped the direction of the field in powerful ways, most significantly by giving credibility to the study of the role individuals play in directing large-scale outcomes. He taught, and offered advice and guidance, both intellectual and professional, to generations of students, who themselves have gone on to pass his lessons on to their students. In addition, he protected junior scholars, helping them with their work, passing along opportunities for jobs and fellowships, offering advice and guidance, and providing reassurance and encouragement. I admit I feel very sad for the students to come who will only know of Bob through his written work and videos of his presentations on YouTube. Yet his incredible support was not restricted only to junior scholars.

Rather, his advice and support came with a lifetime guarantee. Long after I finished my degree, and even after I got tenure, I relied on Bob for help and advice. Indeed, although I originally felt a bit embarrassed at doing so, every time I had a problem I couldn’t figure out or solve, particularly hard ethical quandaries (and this would happen at least two or three times a year

¹ There are many examples of this but perhaps the most influential was Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

for the last 25 years), I would call him up and ask for his help. Without fail, Bob would provide unique insight as well as comfort and help me figure out what to do to or how to begin to address the concern. Remarkably, he never once led me astray. This is not to say that I never disagreed with him; I continue to think there was more motivated bias in the George W. Bush administration's assessment of weapons of mass destruction going into the war in Iraq than Bob believed. But it is to say that his professional advice never steered me wrong. The one time I went against his advice (and he understood why and accepted it without question or argument) was a disaster and I never did it again. I admit I now feel like a bit of an orphan, having nowhere to turn when presented with challenges I am not able to resolve. Above and beyond the call of any reasonable expectation, Bob Jervis remained my dependable lender of last resort until the day he died. I remain bereft.

In all these kinds of ways, Bob Jervis was a true silverback: strong, protective, loyal, dependable, and possessing flawless instincts. In nature, once a silverback dies, the group tends to break up, with individuals going their own way, dissipating into smaller collectives. Significantly, it raises the rate of infanticide as in-group members kill their young. It is incumbent on all of us, as a community, to make sure that Jervis's legacy includes the kind of decency and kindness to each other and our students that he embodied throughout his long and influential career.

One of the first posts to STTL after Jervis died was appropriately titled "WWJD: What would Jervis do?" And, indeed, now without him, each of us has to make our own decisions about what to think and how to manage our careers without his sage advice and encouragement, although luckily we can still be inspired by his writings and talks on YouTube.

Bob was not one given to sentiment, but my primary, and often overwhelming, feeling since Bob died is one of profound, even breathtaking, gratitude. There really are no words adequate to describe the depth of my gratitude to him and for him. I am so grateful I knew him, so grateful I was able to study with him and benefit from his wisdom and generosity for so many years. I feel so privileged and so fortunate to have crossed his orbit; the trajectory of my own career in political psychology would simply not have been possible without his.

In short, there is absolutely no way I would be the person I am now without his work, influence, and mentorship. It is not an overstatement to say that he not only pioneered but also legitimated the use of psychology in the study of politics. While others before him used psychology to understand mass political behavior, Bob was really the first one to systematically extract theories and ideas from psychology to help illuminate leader behavior, judgment, and decision making in an integrated deductive fashion. Earlier work that relied on psychology to help explain political outcomes tended either to rely on case studies from a psychoanalytic perspective, such as Alexander and Juliette George's magisterial *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*,² or they focused primarily on the study of mass political behavior, such as the work of Lazarsfeld.³ Bob was among the first to provide a more systematic deductive application of models of social and cognitive psychology to international politics.

When I started graduate school, every single person I spoke to in the field told me I would be "crazy" to do political psychology; I was repeatedly told that there was no future in the field. As an aside, those same people would point to Jervis as the exception that proved the rule, but each one made clear that the field only had room for one person doing psychology. Anyone else would be superfluous. But Bob himself was more inclusive, welcoming, and hopeful, believing that political science in general, and political psychology in particular, could become a bigger tent, encompassing work on individuals and elites as readily as research on mass public opinion, and examining judgment and decision making as well as regime type or other structural factors.

² Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (Lexington: Plunkett Lake Press, 2019).

³ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Robert King Merton. *Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, College Division, 1948).

When my other dissertation adviser, Amos Tversky, died in 1996, a number of us asked him before he died, “what will we do without you?” His answer was as simple as it was eloquent and instructive: “Trust your memory of me.” And so it is with Bob Jervis; we will have to trust our memory of him, which is decidedly poorer than his actual presence. One of the things that I noticed about this tendency with Amos is how tricky memory can be. It elides and transforms over time, shifting shape as the edges meld with our own thoughts and experiences that occur afterwards until it is not entirely clear what we actually remember and what thoughts we have infused with the power of reflection and the weight of emotion. But this is also the beauty and genius of Amos’s instruction: he knew that. He knew that part of what memory is, and part of what it does, is to integrate what we know with what we want. It is not, indeed, that time heals all wounds, for it most definitely does not always do that. Rather, time softens memory so that the associations between thoughts and feelings and experiences broaden and deepen, and it becomes more difficult to know where the memory ends and where it simply becomes inextricably interwoven into the fabric of our consciousness. The memory of the other becomes less distinct as it becomes incorporated into how we think about and approach the world. In this way, the other simply becomes part of who we are over time.

I am not sure I was ever able to trust my memory of Amos, but what I have been able to do, and which I still often do, is ask myself how Amos would have approached a particular question or problem. Just shifting that perspective often opens new ideas and avenues of inquiry for me. Similarly, I am sure will not be able to trust my memory of Bob because he was so much more than my experience of him. I always felt like I was trying to understand the next version of the software but I hadn’t quite gotten the necessary upgrade yet. So at windows X, I was not fully capable of understanding Windows X + 1. Indeed, part of what is so ineffably sad about Bob’s loss is how much knowledge went with him. Ironically, what I do feel I can trust is not so much the thoughts and ideas that Bob so continually and seemingly effortlessly generated, but the feeling his work has always given me. For someone, whose early work almost completely eschewed emotion, I nonetheless always found his work exciting, inspiring, and motivating. Bob always provided a unique and interesting take on whatever he was working on, even if it appeared to be well trodden ground. Without ego, he remained well aware of the importance his work might have in the wider world, whether through policy circles or as a result his critical work with the Historical Review Committee for the CIA. The sense of passion, devotion, and commitment to issues that matter, as well as the work itself, remain central to my sense of Bob’s character.

Bob is the last person who would have wanted a hagiographic remembrance. Like any other human, he was not perfect. He could be socially awkward and he did not suffer fools lightly, if at all. He applied his high standards to others as well as himself, and it was an impossible order to strive to achieve such heights of productivity, much less quality. But he provided an exemplary model of how to live a life of authenticity, serving others while following his own interests. He taught me a great deal about how to think, how to work, and how to treat others. One of the things he modeled was the importance of honesty, even when the information may not be positive or pleasant. In that regard, I feel very fortunate that I was not left with important things unsaid; he knew how grateful I was to him for all he did for me. What I did not tell him, but what I suspect he knew, is how much I will miss him for the rest of my life.

HOMAGE TO BOB JERVIS

BY JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

I cannot remember when I first met Bob, but it was about 40 years ago, sometime in the early 1980s. Of course, I knew of him for a good ten years before that meeting through his writings. He was an impressive person in many ways. I don't think I know anyone who was as well read about international politics as Bob. One wondered when he had time to write, and he did write a lot. He was also a genuinely nice person who rarely had anything bad to say about others in the field. Even when he did not like what someone had written, his critical comments were invariably measured and designed to be helpful. Relatedly, he helped lots of young scholars along the way – not just his own graduate students or close friends. He was almost always willing to read other people's drafts and offer smart comments – even if the author was directly challenging his core beliefs. He was a field leader for sure. Most importantly, however, his scholarship was hugely influential in the international relations field throughout the past half century. Few scholars have had such a large impact on their discipline.

Although Bob and I invariably get labelled as realists, we had quite different views about the workings of the international system, especially when it came to great-power politics. Nevertheless, my thinking about these matters was markedly influenced by Bob's writings. Indeed, I believe that virtually all the international relations scholars in my cohort – those who began Ph.D. programs in the mid-1970s – were influenced in truly important ways by his scholarship, particularly the work that he produced between 1968 and 1979. But that influence was not just a result of the high quality of his scholarship; it also had much to do with the context in which that work appeared. Let me explain.

Bob emerged on the academic scene during the Vietnam War. He started graduate school at Berkeley in 1962 and received his Ph.D. in 1968. He was an untenured faculty member in the Harvard Government from 1968 to 1974. The Vietnam War ran from 1965 to 1975. Those were remarkably tumultuous years in the United States, especially on college and university campuses. In fact, anti-war sentiment was so strong that hardly any Ph.Ds on international security were produced during that conflict. It would be hard to argue that there was even a community of security scholars by the time the war ended in 1975. Those were the hollow years, a period that is hard to fathom today, where dissertations on security topics are produced in assembly-line fashion, and the literature is so large that even Bob Jervis admitted in his later years that he could not keep up with it.

That dire situation caused by the Vietnam War began changing in the mid-1970s when a new crop of graduate students began studying security issues at elite universities. That cohort included Barry Posen, Jack Snyder, Steve Rosen, Steve Walt, Scott Sagan, Steve Van Evera, Aaron Friedberg, Charlie Glaser, and me, among others. *International Security*, I might note, published its first issue in 1976. Bob Jervis, of course, was not a member of that post-Vietnam cohort, as he had started graduate school more than a decade before the renaissance of security studies began, and indeed he was taking up a tenured position at UCLA in 1974, just as it was beginning.

The problem this new cohort of security-oriented scholars faced in the late 1970s and early 1980s was that there was not much relevant literature to read, because not much had been produced after 1965. And much of what was produced before 1965 dealt with nuclear strategy, a fascinating subject, but one where it appeared there was little new to be said. Bob Jervis was a conspicuous exception, as he published four significant works after 1965. In 1968, "Hypotheses on Misperception" appeared in *World Politics*, and then two years later in 1970 he published his first book, *Logic of Images in International Relations*.¹ In 1976, he published his most important book, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, followed

¹ Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics* 20:3 (April 1968): 454-479; Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970; rev. ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

in 1979 by his most important article, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” which also appeared in *World Politics*.² These four works together had an enormous influence on the post-Vietnam cohort. They all dealt with big subjects, offered lots of fascinating insights, and provided abundant food for thought.

Graduate students and young scholars have a deep need for a rich literature to help guide their thinking and help them generate their own ideas about how the world works. We all stand on the shoulders of scholars who came before us. As Bob often said, he was deeply indebted to Tom Schelling, Glenn Snyder, and Ken Waltz, among others. The problem that young scholars in my cohort faced was that there were not many important articles and books dealing with international security being published when we were working our way through graduate school and post-doctoral fellowships. Bob was an important exception in that regard and unsurprisingly his writings were widely read – devoured might be a good word – by the post-Vietnam security cohort. And naturally, his writings helped shape how the members of that cohort think about international politics.

Of course, some of those “youngsters” took an idea from Bob and ran with it, while others challenged his thinking on different issues. Regardless, he influenced all of us and did so in profound ways, in good part because of timing. He burst on the scene when the security field desperately needed first-rate scholarship to help bring it back from the dead; and he provided it. The post-Vietnam cohort and indeed all the follow-on cohorts owe Bob a great debt of gratitude for playing such a critical role in laying the foundation for the rich and robust security field that exists today.

² Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017 [1976]); Jervis “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30:2 (January 1978): 167-214.

“RATIONAL SIGNALING”¹

BY JONATHAN MERCER, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Bob Jervis's approach to international relations was social, psychological, and rational. Not rational the way economists usually think about it, or rational the way psychologists used to think about it. For Bob, like for Daniel Kahneman, proving that policymakers were not rational (as commonly defined) was somewhat like proving people didn't have fur.² The challenge was to understand how people think and behave, and then use that understanding to provide insight into how people should think and behave, especially in strategic settings. In a passage that Bob highlighted, Thomas Schelling wrote that “the principles relevant to *successful* play, the *strategic* principles, the propositions of a *normative* theory, cannot be derived by purely analytical means from a priori considerations.”³ Any theory that is useful in strategic settings must be based on how people reason.

Much of Bob's research stems from this simple and radical insight, which he first developed in *The Logic of Images in International Relations*: A rational approach to signaling cannot exclude beliefs and theories because effective signaling depends on beliefs and theories. Bob identified two principles. First, analysts must distinguish between behavior that is known to be an attempt at persuasion (that is, a signal) and behavior that is telling because it is not an attempt at persuasion (that is, an index). Second, a rational approach to signaling depends on understanding the logic of inference.⁴

Signals and Indices

Nobel Laureate Michael Spence hailed Bob's introduction of the distinction between ‘indices’ and ‘signals.’⁵ My first meeting with Bob demonstrated the utility of this distinction beyond economics and international politics. Hoping for a letter of recommendation, I expressed how pleased I was that I got an A- in his course. Bob responded that it was indeed an A-, but barely. That was a signal. An intersubjectively understood shot across the bow. It was textbook. Clear, unambiguous, and credible. Several years later, Elizabeth Kier and I were writing an article on precedents and Bob FedExed a large package stuffed with xeroxed newspaper articles that were in some way connected to precedents. I wasn't surprised that he had a file of newspaper clippings on precedents, but his generosity in sending them was revealing. That was an index.

Signals depend on intersubjective beliefs. A signal is a known attempt at persuasion. Diplomats agree that certain words or actions carry certain meanings: “Signals are not natural; they are conventional. That is, they consist of statements and actions that the sender and receiver have endowed with meaning in order to accomplish certain goals.”⁶ When confronting

¹ I thank Elizabeth Kier for her comments, and James Davis for organizing a Festschrift for Bob, from which this essay is drawn. See James Davis, ed., *Psychology, Strategy and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations*, ed. James Davis (London: Routledge, 2012).

² Michael Lewis, *The Undoing Project* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2017), 286.

³ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 162-163. Also see Robert Jervis, “Signaling and Perception,” in K. R. Monroe, ed., *Political Psychology* (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002): 293-314, quote on 293.

⁴ Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Reprinted with a new preface, Columbia University Press, 1989.

⁵ A. Michael Spence, “Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets,” *The American Economic Review* 92:3 (2002): 434-459, see 434.

⁶ Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, 139.

the prospect of a nuclear war, the dispersal of one's long-range bombers has no military significance - that's why the United States has ICBMs and submarines. Yet the dispersal of aircraft is accepted as a signal that the United States is preparing for nuclear war. Jervis suggested that in principle one could simply raise a flag with an image of a mushroom cloud on it to convey the same meaning.⁷ But conventions change slowly. One could announce that raising a flag carries the meaning of a dispersal of bombers, but the success of the signal depends on others accepting that meaning.

Signals that depend on common historical interpretations - no matter how obvious they seem to the sender - provide more room for error than diplomatic code. What is obvious to the sender of a signal may not be obvious to its recipient, "especially when he does not share your history, values, norms, and theories ..."⁸ The belief that obviousness is natural and that one's signal must be clear to the other can be attributed, in part, to our difficulty in not seeing something we have already seen. The amount of time one devotes to one's own plans or the more one has thought about how to signal a message, the more likely one will think the pattern is obvious to others.⁹ People overestimate the ease with which a tune they tap with their fingers will be understood by others; once the song is in your head, it's hard to imagine not hearing it.¹⁰ The clues predicting a crime become obvious once one knows who committed it.¹¹ The reason diplomats use archaic, formal expressions is because they are archaic, formal, and therefore come with precise meanings.

Indices depend on subjective beliefs. An index is behavior that one believes either cannot be manipulated to project an image or is not being manipulated: "Indices are statements or actions that carry some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct because they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actor's capabilities or intentions."¹² Spence captures Jervis's distinction between signals and indices as having two parts: "The primary distinction is between manipulable and nonmanipulable characteristics or attributes or activities. A second is between activities of which the sender is aware and those of which he is not."¹³ One can be aware of an activity that others recognize as an index but be unable to influence it. Spence notes that "Unalterable attributes are called indices. The perspiration on the forehead of the nervous job applicant is an index."¹⁴ The distinction is not rooted in "words" versus "deeds" and it stands independent of cost. Instead, indices capture a type of behavior that observers believe reliably distinguishes the characteristics of actors.

Whereas signals depend on intersubjective beliefs, indices depend on subjective beliefs. One might use domestic political systems as indices.¹⁵ If one believes dictatorships link to peace or that democracies link to war, then these political systems provide an index of one's likely foreign policy. If one believes that an actor's past behavior reveals its future behavior, so that

⁷ Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, 229.

⁸ Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, 141.

⁹ Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics* 20:3 (1968): 454-79.

¹⁰ Elizabeth Newton, *Overconfidence in the Communication of Intent: Heard and Unheard Melodies*, Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1990.

¹¹ Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29:1 (2006): 3-52.

¹² Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, 18.

¹³ A. Michael Spence, *Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 10.

¹⁴ Spence, *Market Signaling*, 11.

¹⁵ Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, 34.

past retreats anticipate future retreats or conversely, and that past retreats anticipate future resolution, then past behavior is an index. In each case, an observer's beliefs and theories mediate between behavior and interpretation. Observers might also use a diplomat's alcohol-induced behavior as an index.¹⁶ Statements that one thinks were not calculated to influence or were intended to influence one audience but not another, might be seen as especially revealing. Eavesdropping on private communications or secretly watching another's behavior might be interpreted as revealing the true beliefs, preferences, or characteristics of an actor.

Actors know that they can probably project the image they desire by becoming that image. A state wishing to project an image of a peaceful state can abolish its military or a state wishing to project an image of resolve can start a major war. Behavior that is too costly or too important to be a signal is an index. Jervis assumes rational actors will attend to the costs and benefits of projecting images: "to engage in a major war merely to show that one has a great deal of resolve is unusual because the costs are apt to outweigh the gains."¹⁷ If one begins a major war to project the false image of resolution, then the image is no longer false. Jervis captures this idea when he notes that cost does not merely reflect characteristics of an actor, it can change that actor. The growth of neo-isolationism in response to the Vietnam War suggested to Jervis that even victory there would be Pyrrhic if other states concluded that the US public would not again accept fighting such a war.¹⁸

Indices are influential because they are thought to be beyond manipulation, not because they are beyond manipulation. If an actor knows what the other side is using or is likely to use as an index - and this might be the uncontrollable temper of a decision-maker, information based on secret wiretaps, or information obtained by torturing prisoners - then one can deceive an enemy. Tempers can be faked, wiretaps can be discovered, and operatives who will be captured and tortured can be given false information.¹⁹ Rational actors fool other rational actors by knowing what they believe, not by knowing what they ought to believe. Indices depend on subjective understanding of how behavior and beliefs link to policies.

Cost does not distinguish an index from a signal. Indices can be costly (starting a war reveals one's resolve) or cheap (personality or regime type reveals preferences). What is intended as a signal may be read as an index. The late 2008 public absence of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il prompted speculation that he was dead or sick, which led the North Koreans to issue several photographs intending to show that he was still in control. It was a signal, but analysts also used the information to draw conclusions at odds with what the North Koreans intended. One analyst remarked: "The fact that the North is going to such lengths to demonstrate that Kim Jong-il is O.K. is, ironically, a sign that his health is not normal."²⁰ Other analysts interpreted the photographs to suggest that Kim suffered from a stroke: his left hand appeared immobile, he was not wearing his shoes that made him taller.²¹ Jervis's distinction depends on the intentions of the sender as well as the beliefs and theories of the audience. The sender and the receiver are two sides of the same coin and a rational approach to signaling must address both the logic of signaling and the logic of inference.

Logic of Inference

¹⁶ Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, 32-36.

¹⁷ Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, 28-29.

¹⁸ Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, 271.

¹⁹ Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, 43-49.

²⁰ Ryoo Kihl-jae quoted in Choe Sang-Hun, "North Korea Tries to Show its Leader is Healthy and in Control," *New York Times*, 7 November 2008, A6.

²¹ Choe, "North Korea Tries to Show its Leader is Healthy and in Control," *New York Times*,

Assuming that another person thinks what you think or shares the same theories is not sensible: “Perception is laden with interpretation and theory. Almost no inferences - perhaps none at all - are self-evident in the sense that all people under all circumstances looking at the information would draw the same conclusion. Thus, knowing how theorists read a signal does not tell us how the perceiver does.”²² Naïve actors assume that everyone thinks the same way and holds the same beliefs; rational actors know that beliefs and theories necessarily influence interpretations of evidence. Because my best move depends on your move, and your move depends on your beliefs about me, a rational approach to signaling must address how actors make inferences.

Beliefs and interpretations. People necessarily use beliefs, theories, and expectations to determine what counts as evidence and how to interpret that evidence. For example, Jervis’s assessment of the CIA’s failure to predict the 1979 Iranian revolution focused on the US view that a fundamentalist religion could not be a serious political force. CIA analysts and academics understood opposition to the Shah “in terms of a liberal, modernizing, middle class” that was consistent with “prevailing social science theories.”²³ The influence that beliefs and theories have on the interpretation of evidence is also evident in the CIA’s failure to recognize that in 2003 Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. These were failures, but one can pick any success and show how beliefs and theories made possible the correct interpretations.

Beliefs can create reality. Schelling’s discussion of coordination games and various bargaining strategies captures the central role beliefs and manipulation of beliefs play in signaling.²⁴ Schelling imagined the brink of war as a curved slope, where the further down the slope one goes, the steeper it becomes and the greater the risk of a mutually undesirable outcome so that diplomacy becomes a competition in risk taking. Whereas Schelling implies that the environment is natural and thus actors are able to manipulate the level of acceptable risk, Jervis emphasizes that actors’ beliefs construct their environment. Beliefs matter not simply in the sense that actors must know that they are bargaining over a specific issue or that they risk a mutually undesirable outcome. Beliefs determine the slope of the curve. Do they think it is relatively flat or very steep? Do they think conditions are stable or do they expect an ice storm? And what do they think the other thinks: “If each stares at the slope for a long time, and knows that others are also staring at it, its shape will change.”²⁵ Beliefs can create reality.

The influence of beliefs on reality varies. If two states believe that a limited nuclear war is impossible, then it probably is.²⁶ A belief that nuclear war can be kept limited is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for doing so. Because beliefs can shape reality, actors have incentives to influence the beliefs of others. If I have premised my force posture on the ability to fight (and win) a limited nuclear war, then I need to persuade you that such a war is possible. If I believe that you believe that nuclear war cannot be limited, then your belief governs.

Disbelieving another’s belief is always possible, but not always practical. Jervis found the arguments for nuclear superiority to be illogical: what matters is the number of cities one can annihilate, not the number of times the same city can be struck.²⁷ Because nuclear weapons are absolute, it makes no difference whether one has one thousand or ten thousand. The difficulty with this argument, as Jervis acknowledges, is that if people believe that nuclear weapons give one a bargaining advantage,

²² Jervis, “Signaling and Perception, 297-298.

²³ Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 23.

²⁴ Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict*.

²⁵ Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, 242.

²⁶ Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).

²⁷ Jervis, *Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*.

then they do. Conversely, if I believe that nuclear weapons convey no bargaining leverage, and you believe that I believe this, then you gain no advantage from having more weapons. Just as one can change the slope of a curve by staring at it, Jervis notes that one's beliefs change the value of nuclear weapons: "By changing actors' beliefs about the utility of 'superiority,' strategic analysis can actually change this utility."²⁸ Utility is not deduced from objective properties. A rational approach to signaling depends on calculations about costs and benefits, but one cannot assess the benefits of nuclear superiority, the value of a reputation, the importance of a precedent, or the cost of violating international law without considering actors' beliefs. Beliefs create utility.

Returning to cost. The emphasis that rationalists place on cost is appropriate—cost is one way that actors assess a signal's credibility. But assessments of cost are not objective; they typically depend on beliefs. What one analyst views as a cost, another analyst might view as a benefit. If an actor believes, as did Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, that spending vast amounts on defense is good for business, then massive defense spending is an index of capitalist greed, and not of resolve.²⁹ During the Vietnam War, John McNaughton advanced the "good doctor" theory: as long as US leaders made a good faith effort to defend South Vietnam and accepted many casualties, then defeat would not harm the reputation of the US.³⁰ While the Soviets were impressed that Americans would sacrifice so much for something the Soviets viewed as tangential to US interests, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein apparently drew the opposite conclusion.³¹

Accurately assessing cost independent of beliefs is impossible. Different assessments of cost mean different assessments of credibility. If I think dictatorships can bluff without suffering any domestic political consequences, and you think they risk political consequences if they bluff, then our assessments of cost and of credibility will differ.

Even when observers agree that a signal is costly, they can still disagree over the signal's meaning. Roberta Wohlstetter noted that even the clearest signal, such as the attack on Pearl Harbor, led to different interpretations among General Douglas MacArthur's officers over what it meant for the US position in the Philippines: they all read the Pearl Harbor signal, they debated with each other, they had time to prepare, and yet the Japanese attack on MacArthur's forces still surprised them.³² Costly behavior might reveal *something* about an actor, but Jervis notes that "often it is not clear exactly what is being revealed, what is intended to be revealed, and what others will think is being revealed."³³ And of course, the possibility of deception is ever present. Actors know that cost can impart credibility, which is why one actor will attempt to persuade others that it views its behavior as costly.³⁴

Rationality and Signaling

²⁸ Jervis, *Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*, 231-232.

²⁹ Jervis, "Signaling and Perception," 301.

³⁰ Quoted in Benjamin T. Harrison and Christopher L. Mosher, "John T. McNaughton and Vietnam: The Early Years as Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1964-1965," *History* 92:38 (2007): 496-514, 503.

³¹ Ted Hopf, *Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Kevin M. Woods, *Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership* (Norfolk: U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2006), viii.

³² Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).

³³ Jervis, "Signaling and Perception," 298.

³⁴ Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, 47.

Bob understood that one cannot develop a theory of rational signaling - if by that one means a way in which one should always send or read a signal - for the same reason one cannot develop a rational theory of chess. Unless one assumes the conditions that allow that theory to work - I know what my chess opponent thinks and I know what inference they will draw from my moves - the best one can do is to understand the game's principles. This insight seems so obvious now that many of us take it for granted – and though it represents only part of Bob's scholarship, it also captures part of his brilliance.

MEMORIAL TO ROBERT JERVIS BY HELEN V. MILNER, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Bob Jervis and I were colleagues at Columbia University for many years, from 1986 to 2004. We were in the same department, had offices nearby, taught together, and had many lunches together with the political science gang over those years. Bob and I taught the main international relations graduate seminar for a number of years. It was a huge privilege and great learning experience to spend so much time with one of the greats in social science. Bob was immensely open to and curious about all topics. He read and wrote widely. He considered many approaches and was flexible enough to see different sides of issues. He explored new areas over time and came back to old ones with fresh ideas. He combined a life-long interest in history and psychology to better understand international relations. And later on, he delved into complexity theory and systems-level thinking to open new panoramas on global politics. He was an ideas person, not a data one so much. He had a preference for the telling example, especially historical, over a statistically driven insight. He was eminently reasonable and rational, but didn't think that reason or rationality were what motivated a lot of foreign policy decisions. He saw the value in new theories of international politics, but also wanted to help everyday foreign-policy makers arrive at better decisions. He hoped for peace, but studied war and conflict.

Bob and I had distinctly different views on international relations and to some extent on social science. He was much more interested in human cognition and psychology, while I preferred the rational choice approach that is common to economics and political economy. He found his evidence in history and decision-making, while my thoughts turned more to who gets what, when, and how. Domestic politics seemed to me the place to look for many outcomes in world politics, while he initially turned to individual psychology and later to system-level pressures. Were policy makers falling prey to cognitive mistakes as Bob would have it, or were they just optimizing their domestic political situations when they made foreign policy choices, especially ones that turned out poorly? We debated these topics endlessly. Teaching graduate students together was fun and educational because our views differed so much, but we respected each other's views greatly. Having a great sense of humor, Bob got the best jokes in, which often served to open my and students' minds to other possibilities. It also meant we covered lots of intellectual territory in our classes. Students could more easily see the range of issues that made international relations fascinating and difficult.

One of Bob's favorite points was the unintended consequences of decisions and actions. He often raised this in his teaching. This was somewhat difficult to square with his focus on decision-making but more neatly fit with his later attention to international system-level effects, mostly complexity theory. I think he found this approach more and more compelling after being involved in various postmortems on US foreign policy failures. Smart, well-intentioned people time and again seemed to make decisions that had bad, at least unintended, outcomes. The recent failure of the US in Afghanistan would further contribute to this view. Bob wanted to use his social science to help make the world a better place. His work on nuclear politics certainly aimed at this. And so did his book and papers on the psychology of decision making. I think after a time, however, he saw that policymakers kept making choices that didn't work out and that it could not be because they didn't understand the problems. Something more had to be at play. And for him it was the international system. I tried to convince him that it was often a function of domestic politics but that was not a realm he wanted to explore. The ways in which a simple decision here reverberated throughout the complex international system led to these unintended effects, which seemed to dominate outcomes in politics in his view.

Bob loved his research and writing. He came to the office every day and worked tirelessly. He read everything. He was and is the only person I know who would read key journals from cover to cover each time they appeared. His knowledge and bank of examples were enormous. He took notes on his readings, literally writing all over the text. Then he would Xerox the pages and his notes on them and place them in multiple subject files so he could find them later. This meant he had a ready supply of anecdotes and sources for all of his ideas. He also dictated most or all of his writings. He would mumble into a tape recorder and then have his complete sentences and paragraphs transcribed into letters, chapters, and papers. It was incredible to watch this process. Seeing how he could speak fully-formed ideas and have them come out as coherent sentences and paragraphs was amazing. It also meant that he could write an enormous amount in a short time. He honed his work style into a very productive method.

Bob was also very sociable and enjoyed bringing all sorts of people together. He brought the international relations faculty together for a monthly brown bag lunch seminar focused on a recent article (always published by someone beside the Columbia faculty) that he was interested in. We debated what the author meant and how to improve the article; it was productive since Bob never let the seminar degenerate into a purely negative session. It was a wonderful way for the international politics group to better get to know each other's thinking. Bob also quietly organized a rotating group of faculty to have informal lunches together for years at Columbia University. An ever-changing group of political science faculty would walk over to the faculty club and grab a cafeteria-style lunch and sit and talk for 45 minutes. We tried to visit various restaurants, but Bob always preferred the faculty club. The group that came together tended to be younger faculty but not necessarily from IR. Many Americanists and comparatists joined in as well; Bob, of course, wanted to keep things open and wide-ranging. The lunch conversation usually concerned current political topics and especially articles in the *New York Times*. We debated many issues of the day, mostly about the US. Bob enjoyed taking unconventional positions on them-as he did in his scholarship- and seeing how others reacted. Other members of the group enjoyed doing the same thing so it became a fun way to think outside the box. While animated, the conversations were never angry or tense. Bob's curious and open mien made sure of that. The lunches were a very special part of the day, and Bob made them so.

Bob also loved academic politics. From the day I arrived at Columbia, he was endlessly involved in university politics, and he wanted others including me to be as well. He was part of the faculty's Arts and Sciences governance committee and enlisted me as well to be part of this. We talked university politics for many years. Sadly, it often remained the same topics again and again. Budgets, debts, overspending, salary cuts and freezes, hiring freezes, the relationship of the college to the university, the size of the college, the relationship of the graduate school to the rest of the university, etc. Because of Bob and others, Columbia's faculty were quite involved in the university's governance. Whether this improved things or not can be debated. But it certainly was a keen interest of his. Although Bob never wanted to actually hold a political position in the university-not even as department chair, he did love being involved and in the know. Even during his last few months he kept talking about many of these same issues, and they certainly animated him throughout his entire time at the university. He didn't solve any of them, but he contributed to clearer thinking about them.

Bob disliked exercise and openly disdained those of us who ran around and worked out. Nevertheless, he walked every day to and from work. This meant he traversed a lot of New York City each day, crossing Central Park from the east side to get up to Columbia University on the Upper West Side. He walked miles each day. But he hated exercise!!! I think he only got mugged twice in all his years of walking, and he carried just enough money to satisfy the robbers. A good decision.

After I left Columbia University, Bob and his wife Kathe and my husband, David, and I regularly got together. First, it was to see opera at the Metropolitan Opera together. Opera was a passion of his and Kathe's. He was never pedantic about it, but had seen many, many operas over the years. We talked about the things we enjoyed in the performances and which ones were our favorites, but it was never a competitive sport. But coordinating a schedule over operas we liked proved too constraining, and so over time we defaulted into dinners. Kathe, even though an accomplished scholar in her own right, is also a marvelous cook, and she provided many wonderful and fun dinners for us all. I think though that Bob liked best the chocolates we brought him each time. Thin always, he nibbled on a few of them only. Moderation in all things, but work, seemed to be his way.

Bob also loved to help the US government. He served on numerous boards to investigate what went wrong in various US foreign policy missions, among other projects. I think in part he loved the secrecy and being in the know. But another motivation was surely to actively test the ideas derived from his research. Were policy makers making the mistakes that he wrote about? Could he provide input that lessened the chances of such mistakes? Both teaching policymakers about the types of cognitive problems that complex decisions like those in foreign policy entailed and diagnosing if indeed those problems did infect American decisions were strong motivations. He hoped to help the world by making sure American government choices, which affected many around the globe, brought better results and inclined toward peace. In the end, Bob and his research surely made the world a safer and a more peaceful place.

REMEMBERING BOB JERVIS

BY DIANNE PFUNDSTEIN CHAMBERLAIN, INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

I did not fully appreciate how lucky I was when I arrived at Columbia in 2006 at the tender age of twenty-two. I first encountered Bob Jervis's work in an undergraduate class on the Cold War taught by James McAllister (a former student of Bob's) at Williams College. I enrolled in Bob's (in)famous survey of International Relations in my first semester of the Ph.D. program. It was in this class that an awareness of Bob's standing in the field finally broke over me, a slow-moving wave that increased my terror of the advisor to which I had been assigned. I can still see him pacing at the front of the class, rolling a pen emblazoned with the word "Bitch" back and forth in his hands as he unpacked the major theories of international politics. I later found out that the pen referenced the title of his daughter's magazine, which only served to deepen my reverence.

When I think of Bob now and his impact on my career and personal development, what stands out most is his ability to deliver criticism kindly. Bob's critiques were often cutting, but they were never cruel. In the years I served as Bob's teaching assistant, submitted chapter drafts for his review, sat with him in the audience at talks, and watched him speak before conference crowds, I never once saw him talk down to someone or fail to take a question seriously. Nor did he use his feedback as an opportunity to show off his formidable intelligence or to assert his place in the intellectual hierarchy. If you showed up for a lunchtime seminar and did not know that Bob was a world-famous scholar, you might have assumed he was there for the free sandwiches (as I suspect he often was). I did not realize how unusual this was until I left the warm bosom of Columbia to engage with the wider field of political science and the policy community in D.C.

I can now appreciate that the willingness to offer honest, straightforward feedback is itself a form of kindness. The first idea I came up with for my dissertation flopped (and rightly so). I can still remember the pained smile on Bob's face as he politely but firmly informed me that the idea was not up to snuff and he would not be willing to advise the project. When I finally hit on a more promising idea about crisis signaling, my dissertation proposal failed the first defense. Bob was relatively unconcerned by this and assured me that it would pass the second review when I had a fleshed-out version of the formal model I was proposing. As usual, he was correct. Even as he pushed me to be my best, I still felt supported during the darkest periods of my own intellectual journey. When I passed my dissertation defense, Bob shared a celebratory glass of champagne with my friends on the thirteenth floor of the International Affairs Building. In that moment, I could not decide which was harder to believe: that I had finally completed my doctorate, or that I had been invited to call my mentor "Bob." Eventually I came to understand the former, but I still struggled to accept the latter nearly ten years later.

Mostly I will remember chatting with Bob in his cave-like office lined floor to ceiling with shelves bursting with books, manuscripts, and mysterious piles of papers. I will remember discussing current events (and failing to match Bob's familiarity with the most intimate details of the news of the day), cringing a bit as we turned our attention to the latest work I had submitted for his review, and waiting for him to pull out a book related to whatever topic I was working on, no matter how arcane or obscure. When I think of it now, it seems to me that being admitted to Bob's office was a bit like being admitted to the vast library of his amazing mind. I will forever be grateful for the opportunity to have known Bob and been admitted to that space, however briefly.

REMEMBRANCE OF BOB JERVIS BY TONYA L. PUTNAM, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Many contributors to this forum will undoubtedly detail Bob Jervis's profound and wide-ranging contributions to international relations theory, signals and intelligence theory and policy, diplomatic history, and related areas of security studies. I would like to reflect instead on one of Bob's contributions that is perhaps less well known outside Columbia and its neighboring institutions—his decades-long practice of using lunch hours to bring together, and build community, among scholars with a wide range of interests in political science, public policy, and related fields. The hundreds of hours I spent with Bob in these settings contain some of the best memories I have of my time at Columbia. And I am far from alone in this sentiment, as several colleagues have indicated, both directly with me, and on social media.

The more organized of these gatherings was an "IR reading group" that Bob convened three or four times each semester. He would select two recent or forthcoming journal articles or book chapters that were linked in some way, and everyone would come prepared to discuss them over catered sandwiches and cookies. These meetings drew a mainly IR crowd of scholars from Columbia and Barnard, but also from other political science departments in the New York/New Jersey area. These were occasions to dig deep as a peer group into cutting-edge research on a variety of security-related topics. The discussions combined critical evaluation of the qualitative and historical elements of the pieces Bob selected, together with discussion of social science methods. Bob frequently chose at least one piece each meeting that used methods outside his own wheelhouse. He was keen to hear the opinions of more formally, quantitatively, and (increasingly) experimentally-trained colleagues about specific multi-method research designs. He was likewise curious about possible quirks and embedded biases of applied statistical models and datasets, and pushed to know what the group considered to be best practices.

This past fall, Keren Yarhi-Milo, the Director of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies (SIWPS), petitioned to have Bob's IR reading group designated a University Seminar at Columbia to be led, going forward, by a committee of senior IR faculty members. Bob was able to participate in two of these seminars. At the beginning of the first, Bob recounted to attendees that this reading group was one of long line that he started back when he was a junior faculty member at UCLA. During that time, and for years thereafter, Bob convened several such reading groups simultaneously -- not just with IR scholars, but also with historians and with specialists in cognitive and political psychology. In short, this was one of the ways he engaged in active reading and stretching the boundaries of his own training and knowledge while also building collegial relationships. That his last long-running group is now formally institutionalized at Columbia is thus a fitting tribute.

Bob's more frequent, and less formal, lunchtime gatherings were 'brown bag' affairs known locally as "Jervis lunches." These lunches became a Columbia institution in the 1980s during Bob's first decade on the faculty. For those of us lucky enough to have been proximate colleagues of Bob's (which I was from 2007 to 2019), these lunches were occasions to collectively hash over events pulled from the day's news headlines, to dissect important new academic findings, and to hear informed opinions on arts and cultural events in New York. Jervis lunches were also a setting where one could raise questions about university-related policies and processes. In this regard they served as a site for mentoring junior colleagues and new arrivals at Columbia, and as a clearinghouse of institutional history and guidance about how to navigate university politics and the discipline more generally.

Importantly, all faculty and senior scholars -- not just experts on IR and diplomacy -- were welcome at Jervis lunches. Among the regular and periodically cycling attendees in my era were several American politics faculty members, a few political theorists and comparativists, and several professors of practice from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia. Former students and colleagues of Bob's who had stopped by to visit would occasionally also be invited. Some years a baby or toddler might show up from time to time—and leave behind less mess than some of the participants. The

main tickets for entry were, to borrow an apt phrase from Nolan McCarty,¹ “intellectual curiosity and epistemological modesty,” as well as a willingness to check any inflated sense of hierarchy at the door.

There were few major developments in international affairs or US and New York politics that were not thoroughly dissected and debated at Jervis lunches. Whatever the main topic of the day ended up being – a newly reported political maneuver on the part of the Russia or China, the debatable wisdom of a planned military surge in Iraq or Afghanistan, the failings of public opinion polling in a recent election, revelations from a new presidential biography, the historical accuracy of a popular new spy movie, or the expected highs and lows of the Met’s (or the Mets’) upcoming season – chances were good that there were experts in the room. And, failing this, there was a seemingly bottomless supply of social science theory and historical analogy to help bridge any substantive gaps.

Bob clearly thrived on these interactions with colleagues. Jervis lunches were generally lively. Occasionally they were outright jocular, producing roars of laughter that would elicit questioning looks from Institute RAs when the conference room door opened and everyone spilled out to return to their offices. On rare occasions discussions could become a bit heated – though Bob himself was never a protagonist in such instances. Indeed, he was a master at pushing back on ideas he disagreed with without triggering defensiveness in others, and adept at defusing tensions among colleagues. He was kind but far from uncritical. He was wry and pointedly funny without being malicious. Although Bob was always among the smartest, most well-informed people in any discussion, he never came across as overbearing or paternalistic. Indeed, it was Bob’s intellect, wit, and the instinctive collegiality that he cultivated that prompted so many of us to make time for so many of these conversations.

During especially busy parts of the academic year, Jervis lunches might happen only once every two weeks or so. On semester breaks and in the summer weeks when Bob wasn’t in D.C., or in Colorado, or traveling in Europe, he would gather a group almost daily. With these informal lunches, there was generally little outward sign of prior scheduling. At some point during the morning, if Bob had no meetings, or if there were no conflicting Institute or department events, he would walk around SIWPS knocking on everyone’s door with the one-word query: “Lunch?” Thus, plans were set. (In recent decades Bob used an email notification list for faculty whose offices were on different floors of the International Affairs Building, but he maintained the ritual of the in-person survey for those of us at SIWPS.) After COVID-related university closures started, Jervis lunches moved to Zoom. Although shifting things online had clear drawbacks, this venue also allowed Bob to widen the lunch circle to include a few additional non-Columbia colleagues from time to time. It also permitted Bob to continue to participate from his apartment study until almost the very end.

Jervis lunches were not only a unique and nerdy brand of fun, they were a public service to Columbia and to the discipline. Regular attendees were richly rewarded by getting to know Bob – through his questions, insights, and countless anecdotes from his storied life and career – and likewise one another. Over the decades, these interactions enabled ties across subfields and specializations with people whom we otherwise might not have gotten to know well, either as scholars or as individuals. Not only did Bob’s gatherings make us more knowledgeable and open-minded political scientists, they also undoubtedly made us better colleagues, teachers, and mentors. Their legacy will continue every time one of the scholars who participated, for example, pauses to listen – I mean really *listen* – to an unconventional argument from a colleague (especially a junior one), or whenever a healthy skepticism kicks in about the purportedly unprecedented nature of some new finding of one’s own, or of another scholar.

On a more personal note, over the years I knew Bob he and I had many discussions about international law and other legal topics – sometimes in the context of these lunchtime gatherings, and at other times when he would come by my office to chat about an issue that had caught his eye that he thought I might have some insight about. This continued occasionally by email after I left Columbia. My last round of correspondence with Bob was in late November concerning questions he had

¹ Susan Dod Brown Professor of Politics and Public Affairs Princeton School of Public and International Affairs Princeton University, https://twitter.com/Nolan_Mc/status/1469489384705642502?ext=HHwWjMCyiemz1uQoAAAA.

about the wording of jury instructions in the trial of Kyle Rittenhouse in Wisconsin, and of the three men charged with killing Ahmaud Arbery in Georgia. He was curious about the nature of the reasonableness standard(s) in play in legal claims of self-defense, and in my and another colleague's take how defendants' own assessments of threat are evaluated, especially where there is evidence that a defendant directly contributed to manufacturing a deadly confrontation. It was (as one would expect from Bob) an interesting and incisive question -- and one with clear through lines to his own career-spanning intellectual preoccupation with threat perception and misperception.

The fact that Bob was still so engaged with unlocking the operative logics of the world around him, even as his prognosis dimmed and his treatments were leaving him increasingly weak, struck me as both inspiring and deeply endearing. Like so many others, I will immensely miss Bob's inquisitiveness, generous spirit, and brilliance.

REMEMBERING BOB JERVIS

BY MIRA RAPP-HOOPER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

This remembrance of Bob Jervis will definitionally fall short. Bob was my dissertation advisor, mentor, and a beloved friend. He was an intellectual deity whose brainpower was rivaled or surpassed by his kindness and integrity. Bob transformed the way I think about international politics, and just as importantly, showed me who I wanted to be as I found my own little place in its study and practice. And while I hold numerous sterling Jervis memories that will be with me always, I am floored when I reflect on the legions of others who were equally transformed by his role in their lives. I would find it impossible to take measure of Bob's intellectual measure and will not try. Instead, I will reflect briefly on what I believe to be Bob's greatest gift – the multiplicative power of his humanity.

Like so many students, I became enamored at a young age of Bob's work on political psychology and nuclear weapons. But the piece that convinced me I could study with no one else was "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures," which would later become part of his book, *Why Intelligence Fails*.¹ I had already applied to a few Ph.D. programs and was awaiting decisions while enrolled in a course on intelligence. I was assigned to take the con position in an end-of-term debate resolving that the George W. Bush administration had politicized intelligence over Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program. I based my argument largely on Jervis's assessment that Iraq intelligence itself had been badly flawed, riddled as it was with methodological errors and collective psychological biases. Jervis's conclusions were implicitly quite forgiving and therefore starkly at odds with my political beliefs (and, I strongly suspected, Professor Jervis's own). His analysis was also analytically rigorous, highly persuasive, and as Keren Yarhi-Milo and Tom Christensen recently wrote, undeniably brave.² I handily won the classroom debate and became thoroughly persuaded that Jervis's analytic approach was the most powerful form of thought I had encountered. By the time my Columbia acceptance arrived, I had no decision to make at all.

No longer in prospective student mode and thoroughly intimidated as to how I should begin to approach a towering intellectual giant, I came to our first meeting with a list of questions about nuclear weapons but found there was nowhere I could place my notebook. There was not a single clear surface in Professor Jervis's office, which was packed floor-to-ceiling with books and journals, the locations of which were precisely catalogued in his mind. I watched with amusement as he leapt onto chairs and even the desk, selecting volumes to hand to me, and our allotted 20-minute session melted into an hour. My only modest disappointment came when I posed to Professor Jervis a question whose answer I already knew: did he ever coauthor with students? "No," he replied quickly, he absolutely did not. In fact, he rarely coauthored at all – his most recent such endeavor was with one of his daughters, and progeny was not a category easily breached. I was nonetheless still reasonably certain that I had struck gold.

Still, the relationship I would form with Professor Jervis had to be earned – as a student in his classes, as a teaching assistant, and through the choices I would make throughout graduate school. His gaze on me sharpened when I came to him before my second year and told him that I did not wish to minor in a second subfield of political science, but instead wanted to pursue a minor in diplomatic history. It was rarely done, he advised, and others would tell me that it would hurt my chances on the academic job market. I assured him that I knew all this and was undeterred. In that case, he agreed, it was a most excellent choice, and he would support it fully.

Professor Jervis soon became my dissertation advisor and intellectual guide. The image of the towering giant, I realized, had been a caricature, because Professor Jervis possessed far too little ego to hold himself above others and would exhibit totally self-effacing embarrassment if we craned our necks. Instead, Jervis was illuminating the pathway of inquiry – one that would

¹ Robert Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29:1 (2006): 3-52; Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

² Thomas J. Christensen and Keren Yarhi-Milo "The Human Factor: How Robert Jervis Reshaped our Understanding of International Politics," *Foreign Affairs*, (January 7, 2022).

branch, wind, and occasionally feel quite treacherous, but on which I was never alone. Our conversations about the role of nuclear weapons in American alliances got longer, the subject I thought I knew well grew more complex, and I would occasionally feel overwhelmed as I emerged from his office with far more questions than answers. Nevertheless, I do believe I had a great deal more fun during this period than any Ph.D. student should ever expect. Bob was a voracious consumer of political and policy gossip, had a devilish sense of humor, and on several occasions caused me to stifle a snort or to choke back tears of laughter in his office. But Bob was also a guide in life's more painful moments, as when he helped me prepare to say goodbye to our beloved Ken Waltz.

When I told Bob that I did not intend to go on the academic job market, he displayed not an ounce of disappointment, minimal surprise, and perhaps a glimmer of pride. The latter grew more visible as I began to chart a course for myself in Washington that was decidedly policy-facing, still turning to Bob frequently for advice on questions substantive and professional. But my prospective-student nerves returned when the editors of *Foreign Affairs* approached me in 2018 about coauthoring a piece with him on North Korea. "You'd better ask Bob," I responded, "and prepare for him to decline." When Bob called me to let me know that he'd enthusiastically accepted the proposition, I was more than a bit surprised, and teased him that this appeared to be a breach of policy – "You don't coauthor with students." His response was pure Jervis: "Then I suppose we'll take this little adventure as a sign that you've found yourself in another category entirely. Let's get to work."³

I joined the U.S. government in January, first at the State Department and now at NSC, and was reintroduced anew to Bob's influence. While structural approaches to international politics certainly helped to explain some broad contours of the world in which foreign policy was being made in 2021, Bob's thinking is relevant almost daily. I find myself reaching for his work on international signaling and on psychology in decision-making not because it offers a clean explanation for the problem of the day, but because it elucidates the sources of its intractable messiness. Muddled messages, individual biases, and bureaucratic pathologies are realities that must be understood and even embraced for diplomacy to succeed. Foreign policy is, tragically, comically, and relentlessly, a human endeavor.

I had the privilege of seeing Bob for the last time scarcely more than a week before he died. In the prior months, he had written to me that he was learning to live with the previously unthinkable much more easily than he ever would have thought possible. Somehow, I was still not prepared for him to be entirely himself -- absolutely unchanged in mind and spirit. We spoke about nearly every major foreign policy issue of the day as he peppered me with questions about my role, contemporary bureaucratic politics, and the health of our foreign policy-making institutions. We talked through an idea he had for an article, which he promised to write and send for my comments in short order. If I had requested a citation, he very well may have scaled a desk. When I hugged him goodbye, I told him that I was doing exactly the work I'd always hoped and that this was because of him. "I will always be grateful to you and you will always be with me." Shortly after he died, I recounted the visit to a close friend and told him I would hold it tightly. "An unstoppable mind," he commented, and I agreed. What I shall miss the very most, however, is the utterly relentless human being.

³ Jervis and Mira Rapp-Hooper "Perception and Misperception on the Korean Peninsula: How Unwanted Wars Begin," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2018).

BOOKS, BASEBALL, AND BOB JERVIS BY SCOTT D. SAGAN, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Since Robert Jervis's death in December 2021, many former students have written about his extraordinary teaching and mentoring skills and even more scholars have praised his brilliant use of history and psychology in his political science scholarship. In this brief note I tell two different personal stories about Bob Jervis that illustrate his extraordinary mentorship of even non-students (like me) and illuminate his brilliant ability to bring important observations from daily life, not just from dusty books and diplomatic documents, to understand international politics.

I had only met Bob once, at a conference, before he wrote a readers' report on the manuscript that eventually became my first book, *Moving Targets*.¹ Luckily for me, he recommended publication and offered a list of very good suggestions to make the book better, but left it up to me to choose whether or not to accept his suggestions. (I, of course, accepted virtually all of them.)

But then Bob did something extraordinary. He wrote me a private note advising that I get this book done right away and move to a second project. He said that although he very much liked the manuscript, simply it lacked the theoretical heft to provide me with a good shot at tenure at Stanford. That was hard to hear at first, but Bob was absolutely right. And I came to greatly admire how Bob took the time and effort (and had the generosity and courage) to write that kind of 'tough love' note to a young scholar who was not his student. And, of course, I took that advice as well. I quickly put *Moving Targets* to bed and started the research that eventually became *The Limits of Safety*.²

I wondered at the time why Bob did that. I believe it was primarily out of a desire to help a young scholar do better work and thus improve the international relations literature and hopefully make some small improvement the real world. But then I also remembered an exchange that I had had with him at the conference where I first met him and realized that we had also bonded a bit over baseball.

Jervis had been speaking about the difference between *signals* (deliberate actions or communications which could reflect genuine intent or could be a bluff) and *indices* ("statements or actions that carry some *inherent evidence* that the image projected is correct because they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actors capabilities or intent").³ I, shockingly, had not read *The Logic of Images* and went up to him after his talk and gave alternative interpretations of some of his historical examples to show statesmen manipulating what appeared to be indices. Are there really examples of inherent evidence of intent that are not easily manipulatable by the actor? I asked. Jervis laughed and with a twinkle in his eye, asked me if I had heard about pitcher "tipping his pitches" in a baseball game.⁴ (This is when a pitcher has acquired a bad habit, like keeping his mitt lower when starting a fastball and higher when starting a curveball, inadvertently tipping off the batter about what to expect.⁵) Now I finally understood the difference between signals and indices.

¹ Scott D. Sagan, *Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security* (Princeton University Press, 1989).

² Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton University Press, 1993).

³ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton University Press, 1970), 18 (emphasis added).

⁴ He used this example in *The Logic of Images*, p. 19.

⁵ See Jason Turbow, "The Complete Guide to Tipping Pitches in Baseball," <https://thebaseballcodes.com/2021/01/27/the-complete-guide-to-tipping-pitches-in-baseball/>

Rose McDermott recently wrote that Bob “understood human nature in an intuitive fashion, and often used everyday examples from life, such as parenting, teaching, or dating practices, to illustrate various phenomena in great-power politics because he realized that these phenomena were not all that different in nature, even if they differed in consequence.”⁶ Rose didn’t mention Bob’s use of an analogy from his beloved baseball. But that is the everyday example from life that I will remember when I think about Bob Jervis.

⁶ Rose McDermott, “Bob Jervis: A Remembrance,” *War on the Rocks*, January 12, 2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/robert-jervis-a-remembrance/>

THOUGHTS ON ROBERT JERVIS¹

BY RANDALL L. SCHWELLER, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

The definition of “insight” is the act or outcome of grasping the inward or hidden nature of things or of perceiving in an intuitive manner the true nature of a situation. I can think of no better way to describe the mind of Robert Jervis. Nor can I think of any international relations theorist who has produced anywhere near as many sentences, paragraphs, and pages of indispensable theoretical insights, of complex logics lucidly and intelligently explained, of analytical brilliance packaged in pithy, quotable phrases as Robert Jervis has over the past almost six decades. Like a great artist, Jervis possessed a distinct and singular voice driven by counterintuitive ideas and novel ways of perceiving complex problems. As such, he consistently cast new light on matters we thought were familiar. His writings all follow the same pattern: one good idea after another good idea after another until the subject has been exhausted to the point where little of worth remains to be said about it.

Consider his thoughts about the balance of power. One of the most significant and unappreciated points that Jervis ever made was his “fourth” crucial assumption for the operation of a balance-of-power system: “war must be a legitimate instrument of statecraft.”² So much confusion in the literature could have been avoided if everyone who has ever written about balance of power and the supposedly competing theory of power transition (or power preponderance) had been forced beforehand to read this line and fully grasp its implications.

Contrary to the standard claim that has become a staple of quantitative statistical studies generated by the peace-science wing of the field, balance-of-power and power transition theory do not make competing predictions regarding which distribution of power, an even or unbalanced one, best promotes peace. Balance-of-power theory is not about war or peace but rather the survival of great powers as politically autonomous actors. When this is understood, the two theories appear entirely complementary. Power concentrated in the hands of one state makes peace *plentiful*, while making the political autonomy and influence of everyone except the hegemon *scarce*. Because great powers seek to maximize their power and influence, peer competitors eventually rise to challenge the hegemon and its existing order. These dissatisfied rising challengers serve as catalysts for balancing behaviors (building arms and forming alliances) among rival camps. Balancing behaviors are preparations for war, not peace. If major-power war eventually breaks out, as it did in 1914 and 1939, there is no reason to conclude that the balance of power failed to operate properly. Quite the opposite: balance of power requires that war be a legitimate tool of statecraft, and so its presence does not refute but rather supports the theory.

As Harold Lasswell observed in 1935, the balancing of power rests on the expectation that states will settle their differences by fighting.³ This expectation of violence exercises a profound influence on the types of behaviors exhibited by states and on the system as a whole. It was more than just the prospect of war that triggered the basic dynamics of past multipolar and bipolar systems, however. It was the anticipation that powerful states sought to, and would, if given the right odds, embark on territorial conquests that shaped and shoved actors in ways which are consistent with the predictions of Waltzian balance-of-power theory. When war is unthinkable among the great powers, it is hard to see how polarity exerts the constraints predicted by structural balance-of-power theory.

According to Jervis, this is precisely the world that exists today. His Presidential Address at the 2001 American Political Science Association meetings called attention to the unprecedented development of a Security Community among the leading states – the United States, Western Europe, and Japan (curiously from today’s standpoint, China was left off the list)

¹ See also Randall Schweller, “Jervis’s Realism,” in James W. Davis, ed., *Psychology, Strategy and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2013): 25-46, which contains a few similar arguments.

² Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation under Anarchy* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986), 60.

³ Harold D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York, The Free Press, [1935] 1965), ch. 3.

– as the defining feature of today’s world politics, a “change of spectacular proportions, perhaps the single most striking discontinuity that the history of international politics has anywhere provided.”⁴ Among members of the Community, war had become unthinkable, and bandwagoning and balancing “will not map on the classical form of the balance of power.”⁵ Of course, as Jervis pointed out, international politics can change rapidly; even so, it is difficult to see how major-power war could become thinkable again, given the intolerably high costs of war and the obvious destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the benefits of peace grounded in the perceived decoupling of territorial conquest from national prosperity, and the shared values and beliefs about how the world works among the leading states.

Next, consider Jervis’s thoughts on misperception caused by structural uncertainty in the actor’s external environment, and how these thoughts undermine the bargaining model of international conflict and its resolution. For Jervis, a core problem with the formal bargaining literature is its central premise – that rational people with the same information cannot reach conflicting estimates of uncertain events. Such a claim is almost certainly wrong in the real world—wrong to the point where it becomes a rather dubious core assumption to construct “useful” theories of international relations. It is no mystery, if one reads Jervis’s work on information processing, why leaders with the same information might reach different estimates about the utility of war. Given the many difficulties in estimating the probable costs and benefits of war (the shortage of reliable data, the excess of “unknowable” information, the large number of decision points, leaders’ different risk propensities), it would be truly puzzling if leaders tended to reach the same estimates about its utility. Yet, employing the “people-with-the-same- information-will-reach-the-same-estimates-of-uncertain-events” assumption, the bargaining model proposes that, *ceteris paribus*, as two sides reveal information about their capabilities and intentions, a bargaining space will open to permit a war-avoiding bargain. Jervis’s work on signaling and misperception casts grave doubts on this proposition. It suggests, instead, that new information, though not entirely useless, may be ineffective in avoiding war. Specifically, the notion that “costly signaling” solves the problem of incomplete information ignores Jervis’s considerable body of work on the difficulties states encounter in both sending and receiving signals. The link between actions and images is rarely firm and immutable. As Jervis put it: “Few actions are unambiguous. They rarely provide anything like proof of how the state plans to act in the future.”⁶ Both signals and indices can be manipulated by the sender for purposes of deception or, conversely, misperceived by the observer when they are meant to convey the truth.

Regarding the latter, cognitive theory has advanced many hypotheses about how motivated biases and the need for cognitive economy limit people’s ability to process information in purely rational and efficient ways. We are all cognitive misers to some degree. Our perceptions of others’ intentions, resolve, trustworthiness, and capabilities, therefore, often persevere in the face of credible evidence and costly signals to the contrary. Yet, the core assumption that drives most formal theories is that costly signaling, usually in the form of tied hands or sunk costs, eliminates uncertainty by separating the wheat (trustworthy) from the chaff (untrustworthy “cheap talkers”), turning pooling equilibria into separating ones. For Jervis and those who appreciate his work on misperception, this straightforward, unproblematic approach to signaling is no way to run a railroad.

As his student, I was riveted by Jervis’s lectures. He approached the materials in a semi-structured manner, like a jazz musician riffing on a theme. You could see the wheels turning in his head as he set several thematic ideas in motion, partially expounding on one and then moving on to another with the promise to return to this or that idea later. When it was over, it all came together or not. But even when it didn’t cohere into a tightly packaged whole, we left intellectually satisfied and more curious than when we entered the lecture hall.

⁴ Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace,” *American Political Science Review* 96:1 (March 2002), 1.

⁵ Jervis, *American Foreign Policy in a New Era* (New York, Routledge, 2005), 31.

⁶ Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1970), 9.

Having never known the field without Jervis's large presence, I can only imagine how much poorer its development would have been if he had decided to do something else with his life. As one of the grateful salmon at Columbia that made it upstream, I am certain that my own scholarly development would have been immeasurably poorer if not for the great fortune of meeting Robert Jervis and having been mentored by him. More important, he was funny in a playful, good-natured way. There was no snark or nastiness to his jokes. He was old school, Marx Brothers funny—which nicely segues into a story about the only time he seemed genuinely peeved at me.

One Sunday morning in the summer of 1989, I wanted to enter the locked International Affairs Building (which was literally across the street from my apartment on the first floor). I didn't have a key, so I waited for someone (anyone) to come down the elevator and open the door. Finally, Robert Jervis of all people showed up. Rather than open the door, he asked me: "What's the magic word?" I responded, "Abracadabra?" He repeated, "What's the magic word?" I tried again: "Open sesame?" After several minutes of this, he finally broke down and opened the door, saying: "Swordfish! What's the matter with young people today? You don't watch Marx Brothers movies?" Now that I'm older than Jervis was back then, I find myself similarly frustrated about young people's ignorance of famous lines from Woody Allen movies. "What's the world coming to? What do they teach people these days?" The world will never see the likes of Robert Jervis again. It is a far poorer place without him.

IN MEMORIAM
BY MARK S. SHEETZ, COLLEGE OF EUROPE

Robert Jervis was a great scholar, of course. His impact on international relations theory was enormous. He pioneered the formal use of psychology in the study of international relations. He famously elaborated on the concept of the security dilemma and postulated vital differences between the “spiral model” and the “deterrence model.”¹ And his insights into the nuclear revolution were, well, revolutionary. Jervis pointed out that if war is waged for political objectives, as Carl von Clausewitz reminds us, then nuclear war is a contradiction in terms, because nuclear weapons are so destructive that they can achieve no political purpose. To dramatize this, at the very beginning of *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* he quoted French President Charles de Gaulle. “After such a war,” de Gaulle observed, “there would be on both sides neither powers, nor laws, nor cities, nor cultures, nor cradles, nor tombs.”²

Jervis was also a great teacher. His encouragement and support for his graduate students was legendary. Indeed, as my dissertation advisor, he gave me all the encouragement, guidance and support I could ask for. His generosity went so far as to cite my work, that of an obscure graduate student, in his *Presidential Address* to the American Political Science Association (2001). This address appeared later as “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace,” a high-profile article in *The American Political Science Review* (March 2002).³

But I will remember him most for two qualities he possessed to an exceptional degree -- his extraordinary intellectual curiosity and his remarkably open mind. His enthusiasm for knowledge in broad areas of research was inspiring, as was his passion for finding solutions to problems without regard to ideological or methodological purity. Jervis took an interest in a great variety of topics in the field of international politics, from the origins of World War I to the intricacies of nuclear strategy, from game theory to prospect theory, from the problems of individual decision making to the unintended consequences of systems effects. It is rare for so accomplished a scholar to have such wide-ranging interests. An authority in one field usually sticks to his bailiwick and, like a good prospector, mines its seams until they run dry. In this respect, Jervis was truly a *rara avis*. He was fascinated with logic and theory, but unlike most theorists, he was also attentive to the practical concerns of diplomats and decision makers. His most abiding interest, it seemed to me, was the problem of achieving cooperation in anarchy. How could sovereign states manage to cooperate when, in a world without a governing authority, even status quo states with no conflicts of interest might be motivated to go to war with one another? Or, as he famously put it, “Why are we not all dead?”⁴ This Gordian Knot of international relations theory would preoccupy him throughout his career.

In terms of methodology, Jervis was non-denominational. Although he generally belonged to the camp of defensive realists, he did not rule out any approach to the study of international politics. This was again rare for an academic of such distinction, since most scholars are true believers in their methodological faith and look disapprovingly on apostates. In contrast, Jervis was receptive to any argument, as long as it was presented with sufficient logic and evidence. He was interested in solving problems, and if the best solution came in the form of a mathematical formula or a constructivist hypothesis, that was fine with him. Nor were other academic disciplines out of bounds. Because of his own work on the irrational effects of psychological biases, for instance, he was quick to spot and adapt the path-breaking work of Tversky and

¹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 58-113.

² Charles de Gaulle, Televised address, 31 May 1960, *Discours et Messages* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1970).

³ Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace,” *The American Political Science Review* 96:1 (March 2002): 1-14.

⁴ Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30:2 (January 1978): 167-214, here 170.

Kahneman in behavioral economics to the study of international politics.⁵ If decision makers take more risks to avoid loss than to achieve gains, wars will last longer than they should due to the belief that victory is just around the corner, that there is light at the end of the tunnel, and that defeat spells disaster at the polls.

While Jervis was anything but doctrinaire in his approach to international relations, he most often relied on historical evidence to make his points. He was a great fan of history and had great respect for historians, especially those who made the effort to acquaint themselves with international relations theory, such as Paul Schroeder, Melvyn Leffler, John Lewis Gaddis, and Marc Trachtenberg. Historians, he reminded us, supplied political scientists with their raw materials and deserved our appreciation. But there were limits. Discussing the role of theory in political science, for instance, he would caution us against being too rigorous or not rigorous enough. As political scientists, we were to avoid the twin dangers of Scylla and Charybdis. If we employed too little theory, we were in danger of becoming historians. If we employed too much theory on the other hand, we were in danger of becoming (God forbid!) economists.

Jervis always seemed to me to embody the perfect stereotype of a professor. Perhaps it was the goatee. Perhaps it was because he sometimes seemed absent-minded. When deep in thought, he would draw squiggly lines on the blackboard to illustrate his point. These squiggles were, however, indecipherable and served only to reinforce the image of an intellectual with his head in the clouds. Perhaps it was due to his uncanny resemblance to the East German physics professor in the Alfred Hitchcock film, *Torn Curtain*. In this movie Paul Newman plays the (not remotely convincing) role of an American rocket scientist who is tasked by the CIA with the job of prying out Soviet nuclear secrets behind the Iron Curtain. His quarry is a renowned physicist, played by Viennese actor Ludwig Donath, who is sequestered in his laboratory at Karl Marx University in Leipzig. At the climax of the movie, Donath engages in a furious debate over esoteric equations as the secret slips out. Jervis was the very image of this eccentric genius down to the signature goatee. (See <https://i.ytimg.com/vi/z2TlfRvNh8M/sddefault.jpg> for the resemblance.)

He was also the model of integrity and professionalism and a lifelong inspiration for me. I will miss him.

⁵ Jervis, "Political Implications of Loss Aversion," *Political Psychology* 13:2 (June 1992): 187-204; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," *Econometrica* 47:2 (March 1979): 263-292.

BOB JERVIS AT UCLA: A REMEMBRANCE

BY ARTHUR A. STEIN, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

The field has lost a towering intellectual giant and an incredible human being, one whose warmth, humor, generosity and humanity radiated to those around him—a true mensch.

I had the great fortune to be Bob's junior colleague for three years at UCLA. He modeled what a commitment to academic life, to an intellectual community, and to family were all about.

When I arrived on campus in the autumn of 1977, I realized Bob was a creator of community—for himself and for his colleagues, for the department and the university. He made sure people got to know one another, rounding colleagues up for lunch and discussions of politics and ideas. It was immensely important in integrating a far-flung department and, for me, finding my place in it.

Whenever Bob became interested in something, he collected a group of scholars to work through the issue. When he was thinking about the role of the Korean War in the development of the Cold War,¹ he put together a lunch group that met for months and included the University of Southern California's diplomatic historian Roger Dingman, UCLA's diplomatic historian Robert Dallek, and such scholars of international relations and East Asia as Richard Baum.

He read voraciously and followed scholarship broadly, and not just in international relations, psychology, and diplomatic history. Recognizing the importance of the intellectual developments being made by political scientists at Cal Tech, he created a joint seminar between faculty members at the two universities, one that would, for example, see Bob Bates coming to present his work at UCLA and sent some of us east to hear presentations by Mo Fiorina and John Ferejohn. It soon became a regular seminar on American Politics (somewhere along the line it was given the moniker *the Running Dog*) and was sustained for years after Bob left UCLA.

Bob was also an institution builder. He was deeply committed to transforming the department. He ran recruitment even when he wasn't on the official committee and even when a position was not in international relations. He worked assiduously on hiring in both American and comparative politics. A great department needed strength in all areas, he said, and having a weak group in any subfield simply hurt everyone. Although he walked the halls pitching candidates, he was always open to listening to opposing assessments and could be persuaded by good arguments.

Bob had a strong belief that departments should appoint people on the basis of their written work and not that of a job talk. He recognized the impact of the recency, immediacy, and vividness of a job interview, not to mention the distorted image it provided. He knew that great scholars did not necessarily make great impressions in an interview.

Just as he played a key role in building the department as a whole, Bob was pivotal to the institutional development of international relations at UCLA. The university's National Security Studies program was defunct by the time Bob arrived in 1974. He set about applying for funding for a new program. The Ford Foundation provided a three-year grant used to establish the UCLA Center for Arms Control and International Security (ACIS). That was followed by a larger Ford grant (one of McGeorge Bundy's parting gifts to international relations as he stepped down from the presidency of the foundation) to set up the Center for International and Strategic Affairs (CISA), which subsequently became the Burkle

¹ What would become Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24:4 (1980): 563-592.

Center for International Relations. Bob was never interested in running the center, but he was the key person in initiating and shepherding the process that led to its creation and development.

Bob was encouraging and protective of young scholars. I saw this first when I interviewed at UCLA. He worked assiduously to protect me from his own colleagues. At one lunch, two who had not heard my talk perched themselves next to me and bombarded me with questions about my thesis. Wanting me to have the chance to eat, Bob fought them off. His and Steve Krasner's handling of the visit were key to my view of the department, and I came to recognize that he had an ability to recognize, and be sensitive to, how others saw and experienced a situation.

Bob made certain that I did not have any committee assignments during those years, yet I was always incorporated in discussions of visions and plans. He always filled me in and asked for my reactions to a variety of issues. And he took my assessments seriously. Again, protecting me from being dragged into administrative work, he advised me to say no when I was asked to be CISA's Associate Director.

Unlike some colleagues, Bob never pressed me about the status of my book manuscript. Absurdly, I had come to UCLA with the Yale mindset that held quality to be all that mattered, that cream always rises. The notion of having a colleague or mentor intercede with an editor or pave the way for a book submission never occurred to me. Belatedly, I went to my colleagues for advice. Along with Steve Krasner and Ezra Suleiman, Bob advised me about navigating the process of getting one's thesis published and the importance of networks. All three were annoyed that I had simply submitted my manuscript without first coming to them for advice. They laid out for me the nature of an editor's incentives and the strategic interaction between editor and author, as well as the role of introductions and networks. These lessons became part what I have tried to pass on to graduate students and younger colleagues. Eventually, I asked Bob to look at my manuscript and tell me what it needed. His wry wit came through in his answer: "you write sparely, this needs more rococo."

Bob had a clear sense of the work being done in the field, and it was a great pleasure to discuss this with him. Once we disagreed about a book of which he thought well (he gave it a 3 on a 4-point scale). I retorted that the theory made no sense, was internally contradictory, and was not substantiated by the case studies it offered as evidence. Bob agreed, but he liked the way the book presented historical material. He had learned something from those chapters, he said, so they had "heuristic value" (a phrase he often used), and so he appreciated the book. Since he saw me as a quantitative scholar, he brought up the relative merits of historical case materials and quantitative analyses, arguing he could learn from the former even if a theory was problematic or completely wrong. In contrast, he learned literally nothing if he read a quantitative piece with poor data or a misspecified estimation. It was a sobering observation.

Bob's work was always full of historical illustrations and detailed substantive footnotes. If he came across an anecdote that illustrated some analytic point, it would find its way into his manuscripts. I told him he never met a notecard worthy of being discarded. He read very widely and was aware not only of what he might one day find useful but also what might help others with their own research. I sometimes found pages copied from books or articles he thought would be of interest to me or to my wife, who was writing her dissertation for another university and in another field.

One day he showed me how he went about compiling and organizing the incredibly wide range of information he accumulated. He drew me over to the side of his office desk and opened a drawer. He pointed to the files and explained each one was associated with a concept or argument drawn from psychology, and that as he read historical works, he noted the pages with illustrative material and had them copied. He then placed them in the relevant folder, and when it was thick enough, he had the material with which to craft a paper.

It is easy to see his brilliant analytic abilities in his published work. Those skills extended to everything, including his letters of recommendation, which contained fine mini reviews of literatures and how a particular work, even if still unpublished, contributed to the literature. Even if redacted, a letter from Bob was discernible as his. It was thoughtful and judicious,

assessing rather than advocating. Regardless of how well he knew the candidate, the letter came across as independent and unbiased. He never pointed out how often something had been cited, and often not even where it was published. He outlined the nature of the scholar's argument and why it was important. He provided a judgment—a piece was described as minor, undervalued or underappreciated, not successful, and so on. Never was there a sense of animus, favoritism, or bias, or an axe being ground.

As I began to teach and to think about a post-dissertation project, I read works I had set aside while working on my thesis. They included Bob's great work on misperception.² Two core implications emerge clearly from the book. First, that contexts, situations, and circumstances matter. Competing universal assessments are only contingently true. Second, that international politics is a strategic domain, states are necessarily affected both by the actions of other actors and their assessments of them, but they have to be simultaneously aware of how they and their actions are themselves seen. Those implications would suffuse my subsequent work. I teased Bob, though, about how striking it was to read his more than 400-page study and arrive at a concluding chapter called, "In Lieu of Conclusions." How could one write a magisterial assessment of the range of possibilities and not come to any conclusions? What seemed necessary was some sense of how misperception mattered and in which situations.³

Bob's working style was unusual and required accommodation. He was hooked on dictating letters and papers. When he came back from vacation there would always be a set of tapes. The department established a system just for Bob, the only person to come in with tapes to be transcribed.

Unlike many others, Bob came to the office every day. And every day, he wore a different color Lacoste polo shirt, one of those his wife Kathe bought for him at the beginning of every academic year. This led to speculation on what he would wear to the university memorial service for Bernard Brodie. He arrived in a white alligator shirt with a sports coat over it. I only saw him wearing a suit on campus once. When I asked the occasion, he answered: "CIA." All he could explain was that he had been asked to analyze the reasons for the agency's intelligence failures during the Iranian Revolution.⁴

If Bob played down the importance of clothing, he was always most committed to his family, to Kathe and his two girls, Alexa and Lisa. He protected family time and didn't, for example, attend regular departmental social dinners at which one member of the department made an informal presentation of work in progress or offering observations made during a recent overseas trip. Evenings were for dinner with the family and then their sitting in the living room reading with opera playing at the same time.

On the other hand (this phrase also a favorite Jervisism), family time could intrude on work, as when the girls called in the afternoon and asked him to come home and play. Unless he absolutely could not reschedule something on campus, he left to join them. And if the two youngest readers in the house saw his love of Dodger baseball as an intrusion, they coped by reading in the stands while the adults watched the game. Two very young girls, their heads bowed over books, created a great picture.

Their lovely house, with an interior courtyard, was within walking distance of campus. Bob related that when his in-laws first visited them in their new house in Los Angeles, they were appalled at the price Bob and Kathe had paid. Bob laughed at

² Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

³ Something I addressed in Arthur A. Stein. "When Misperception Matters," *World Politics* 34:4 (1982): 505-526.

⁴ He was finally able to publish a declassified version as Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

how people tried to extrapolate from their own experience across locations. It later amused him that the house his in-laws thought too expensive had more than quadrupled in value in the six years he spent at UCLA.

In the fall of 1979, Bob came to my office to tell me that he was going to Columbia for a job interview. Although he loved Los Angeles, he explained, he also loved New York, and although Kathe also loved Los Angeles, she would not be happy knowing he had turned down an opportunity that might bring her back to New York, which she loved even more. The conversation was extraordinary on so many counts. I had never before, or since, had a colleague tell me about a job opportunity prior to a visit to another campus. At the same time, Bob was reassuring me that he was in no way unhappy with Los Angeles, the university, or the department.

He later came back to tell me about his trip to Columbia. He wanted to reassure me that he was certain they were not going to hire him. Indeed, he had recommended to them that they hire Ken Waltz.⁵ I told him that of course they were going to hire him. Given our relationship, and Bob being Bob, even as I congratulated him, I felt comfortable pointing out that Columbia had once been one of the great universities in the country but had undergone a substantial and sustained decline. I argued that Columbia was to American universities what Britain was to the world economy. He said he had been shown an assessment done for Columbia's president that had reached a similar conclusion but developed a plan to reverse the trend. He turned out to be as good an evaluator of university long-term planning as of the needs of individuals.

Subsequently, he came to tell me that he had gotten the offer and was going to accept it. He told me that he could be equally happy at both universities and there would be less dissonance reduction for him if he left than for Kathe if they stayed. He was demonstrating again that family came first. I deeply appreciated his way of saying his departure implied nothing about UCLA. This so set him apart from others I have seen leave, ones whose jabs at UCLA resulted in their being treated like the walking dead the moment they announced their departure and then left with such animus in their wake that their colleagues would not rehire them a moment after they were gone. In contrast, Bob remained a beloved colleague who would always be welcomed back and who could play a role in suggesting scholars who might fill his slot. It also showed the degree to which Bob used his understanding of the psychology he studied. He could always see a situation from another's perspective, understood the bases of dissonance and the means for its reduction, and used that to minimize bad feelings and misunderstandings—protecting the community he was leaving as well as his family.

After he left, Bob was immediately in recruitment mode for Columbia. He told me that just as he had brought Steve Krasner from Harvard to UCLA, he intended to come for Steve as soon as he got to Columbia. And indeed, he tried.

After Bob's departure, we saw each other at conferences and workshops. In February 1981, Steve Krasner convened a set of authors and discussants to discuss, for a second time, the set of papers we were preparing on international regimes for a special issue of *International Organization*.⁶ Bob grabbed me during a break, rubbed his hands together with an impish grin, and said, "now that you have tenure, let me tell you the story of your hiring." What might have once been a source of stress had become funny. Like a great comedian, Bob's sense of timing was never off.

⁵ Ken was at Berkeley and had just published Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1978).

⁶ Spring 1982 issue. Reprinted as Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

Whenever we got together at conferences and workshops, we fell into conversation as though no time had passed. But for me there was always a degree of melancholy mixed with the joy of seeing him, the sense of how much I missed having him as a colleague. I miss him greatly, and I mourn.

BOB JERVIS IN THE POLICY WORLD: THE ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE FAILURES BY JANICE GROSS STEIN, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Bob Jervis was that rarest of academics, a field maker. With the publication of *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* in 1976, he brought the cognitive revolution in psychology into the analysis of decision making and strategy in international politics.¹ Political psychology had a long-standing and rich tradition in international politics, but Bob's disciplined empirical study of how decision makers think about the world, frame problems, and process information began a fertile program of research that continues to produce new and important results. Like so many others, I have been influenced again and again by Bob's work and by his unfailingly generous commentary on mine. Many colleagues who are remembering Bob's contribution will write about his extraordinary contribution to the analysis of how foreign policy decision makers think.²

A lesser known but seminal area of Bob's work is his scholarly contribution to the analysis of intelligence. This was a field of inquiry where he not only analyzed but actively engaged for decades. He contributed not only as a scholar but also as an expert who worked to improve the performance and accountability of the intelligence community. Bob chaired the CIA's Historical Review Panel, wrote a post-mortem for the agency on why it was slow to see that the Shah of Iran might fall – that report identified a number of errors that recurred in 2002-2003 – and then led a small team that analyzed the overestimation of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.³ He pushed hard to improve processes of declassification and for higher standards of transparency. Much of the improvement over the last two decades in the declassification of documents is the result of Bob's persistent efforts.

Intelligence was an obvious area of study for Bob, given his deep interest in processes of perception and inference, the impact of beliefs on the interpretation of signals in a context of uncertainty and ambiguity, and the high costs of error.⁴ Intelligence services, he argued, “are unusual in that their major errors are believed to be so consequential.”⁵ Bob published seminal studies of the intelligence estimates from 2002-2003 of whether or not Iraq's President Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and of the National Intelligence Estimate of Iran's nuclear program in 2007.⁶

One of the core controversies that erupted almost immediately after the war in 2003 was whether intelligence had been politicized by the Bush Administration in the run-up to the invasion and whether that was the central cause of the failure. The allegation was fueled not only by the failure after the fighting had stopped to find any unconventional weapons, but also

¹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

² Appropriately, this is the title of one of his recent books. Jervis, *How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

³ Bob summarized these activities in his “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29:1 (2006): 3-52, n. 1. His report on the failure to anticipate the Shah of Iran was declassified as CIA-RDP86B00269R00110011003-4.

⁴ Jervis, “Understanding Beliefs,” *Political Psychology* 27:5(2006): 641-663.

⁵ Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq,” 6.

⁶ Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010); “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq,” The November 2007 Iran Nuclear NIE: Immediate Aftermath, *Intelligence and National Security* 36:2 (2021): 222-225.

by the processes used by the administration in the period before the war. The governments of the United Kingdom and the United States established commissions of inquiry, but these inquiries only fueled the controversy.⁷

In his review of all these post-mortems, Bob made the important theoretical and methodological point that intelligence failures are ordinary. They are ordinary, he said, because intelligence is “a game between hiders and finders, and the former usually have the easier job.”⁸ Failures are as old, he noted, as the reports by the spies that Moses sent to the Land of Israel that overestimated the strengths of their adversaries.⁹ The ordinariness of intelligence failures, an artifact of cognitive and institutional processes, should sound a cautionary note. Decision makers, he concluded, should make their strategies less sensitive to accurate intelligence.¹⁰

How routine are intelligence failures? For scholars or anyone else to answer this question, we would need a careful coding of all intelligence investigations as either successes or failures before we could make that inference.¹¹ The obstacles to doing that kind of analysis are quickly obvious. Intelligence agencies rarely release any information about their successes, often because they do not wish to discuss either sources or methods of operation that can be inadvertently exposed. Review panels and scholars alike consequently draw heavily on a set of cases that is biased toward failure. As a result, they cannot systematically discriminate whether the patterns they find in intelligence failure are also present when intelligence analysis succeeds, and whether or not intelligence analysts engaged in what Bob called “blameworthy errors.”¹²

Bob made a second counter-intuitive argument that made political scientists instinctively uncomfortable. Inaccurate conclusions are not necessarily the result of flawed process. Reasoning backward from an incorrect analysis to a flawed process is a pervasive challenge not only in scholarly research but in the findings of review panels as well.¹³ Throughout all the streams of his work, Bob would point again and again to the strong bias that relying only on cases of failure and reasoning back from outcome to process introduce into the scholarly assessment of intelligence.

Bob nevertheless identified important flaws in the processes of intelligence in 2002-2003. He found that many of the judgments of the intelligence community were stated with excessive certainty and that they failed to consider alternative

⁷ For official reviews, see Department of Defence Inspector-General, *Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*, February 9, 2007; <http://www.dodig.mil/fo/Foia/pre-iraqi.htm>; Report of a Committee of Privy Counselors, *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction* (London: The Stationary Office, 2004, hereafter the Butler Report); The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005. <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/>. Hereafter The WMD Report. Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 9, 2004. Hereafter the SSCI Report. <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialsecretreports/ira.html>. See also David Kay, “Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *Miller Center Report* 20 (Spring/Summer 2004) and *Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, with Addendums* (Duelfer Report), <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-DUELFERREPORT>

⁸ Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 11.

⁹ Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 10.

¹⁰ Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 12.

¹¹ There are a few exceptions when intelligence successes are celebrated. David Robarge, “Getting it Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War,” *Studies in Intelligence* 49:1 (2005): 1-8.

¹² Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 14.

¹³ Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 19. As he noted with some acerbity, “Oxygen is not a cause of intelligence failure despite its being present in all such cases.”

explanations.¹⁴ He remained unpersuaded, however, that better processes would have produced such a significant difference in the estimates that the policy outcome would have changed, and traced the failure to deeply embedded cognitive beliefs grounded in the past experience of intelligence analysts.

All the major review panels rejected the proposition that intelligence failed because the analysts were subject to political pressure by leaders who had already made up their minds to go to war. Some scholars disagreed strongly. The most compelling challenge came from Joshua Rovner who systematically reviewed alternative explanations, looked carefully at the evidence, and rejected the alternatives to polarization as unconvincing.¹⁵

In *Fixing the Facts*, Josh argued that neither changes in the evidence or time pressures, nor routine bureaucratic politics or psychological biases are sufficient explanations of the failure to assess Saddam's unconventional weapons more accurately. He traced the increasing alarm in the intelligence estimates in the summer of 2002 to the politicization of the relationship with the intelligence community by the White House. The most senior administration officials – Vice-President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice – all spoke with increasing frequency about Saddam as a threat and warned that he was pursuing unconventional capabilities.¹⁶ Behind closed doors, policy makers repeatedly questioned analysts, subtly signaling their displeasure at what they were hearing and hinting that they wanted different answers.

In London as well as in Washington, already committed political leaders and their advisers used intelligence information to persuade skeptical political opponents and doubting publics. By bringing intelligence evidence into the public debate, Josh concluded, both governments were able to forge a policy consensus and overcome domestic opposition. The two governments politicized intelligence by downplaying dissent within their agencies, exaggerating the certainty of threats, and claiming that intelligence overwhelming supported their preferred policy options.¹⁷

Bob disagreed, but only to a degree. In the arguments that he developed, he paid scrupulous attention to alternative explanations and disconfirming evidence. Rereading his analysis, it is impossible not to be struck by how carefully he qualified his conclusions and how actively he searched for evidence that would challenge his own interpretation. He ultimately concluded that politicization was not the primary driver of failure, "...although definitive judgments are impossible because of the multiple and subtle effects that can be at work."¹⁸

Bob began his analysis with a detailed summary of the arguments *in favor* of the politicization of intelligence. He disentangled the different forms that politicization could take and agreed that leaders in London and Washington distorted intelligence estimates to garner public support. Senior intelligence officials, he acknowledged, also engaged in questionable behavior: "... officials in the US and the UK engaged in 'cherry picking' and 'stove piping,'" highlighting supportive evidence and the delivery of selected raw intelligence directly to policy makers, bypassing analysts who could evaluate the

¹⁴ Jervis, Reports, *Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 14-15.

¹⁵ Joshua Rovner, *Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011): 156-162.

¹⁶ Secretary of State Colin Powell became more important in early 2003 when he testified at the United Nations.

¹⁷ Rovner, *Facing the Facts*, *SSCI Report*, 160-161, 94.

¹⁸ Jervis, Reports, *Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 33

information.¹⁹ This was politicization, Bob affirmed, although not the more “insidious” kind of pressure from political leaders on intelligence officials to provide analyses that support their decisions.²⁰

He then provided additional evidence that the review panels missed, evidence that challenged his disagreement with the argument of politicization. He noted, for example, that the failure of US forces to search for WMD as they moved through Iraq during the attack was troubling. Had these weapons been stockpiled, they could have fallen into the hands of adversaries. He concludes: “I cannot explain this failure, but the rest of the US occupation points to incompetence.”²¹ The evidence he cited is clearly inconsistent with his preferred interpretation, and he was candid in acknowledging that he could not explain the anomaly.

In support of his preferred interpretation, Bob then cited confidential interviews that he had done with analysts who did not blame the errors they made on political pressure.²² He observed as well that agencies in all the major countries, even those that actively opposed the war, concluded that Iraq had active WMD programs, yet there was no evidence of political pressure in several of the countries that reached the same conclusion.²³ Moreover, the CIA was able to resist political pressure throughout 2002 and into 2003 right up to the attack when it consistently denied that there was significant evidence that Saddam might turn over WMD to al-Qaeda. There was consistent pressure, Bob argued, but it was not the principal factor that drove intelligence estimates of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

Bob then went on to qualify his own conclusion. That he rejected a general explanation of the politicization of intelligence did not mean, he concluded, that political pressure played no role. At the very least, “it created...an atmosphere that was not conducive to critical analysis and that encouraged judgments of excessive certainty...”²⁴ Using counter-factual reasoning as a key methodological tool, he then concluded that “the best evidence of politicization has not been noted by the reports...probably because it was something that did not happen: it appears that the ICs did not make any [re]assessments once UN Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) inspections resumed and found no traces of WMD.”²⁵ They failed to do so, Bob reasoned, because it was then obvious that both governments were bent on war and would dismiss any revisions to the estimates.

In November of 2020, my colleague Jon Lindsay and I were teaching an undergraduate course on intelligence, and we invited Josh and Bob to join the virtual class to reconsider their debate on the politicization of intelligence. Both graciously accepted and what followed was remarkable modelling by both scholars of what they had each urged the intelligence community to do. They both asked themselves what kind of evidence would convince them that their original analyses needed to be revised. When it was his turn, Bob carefully reviewed evidence that had come out in the ensuing decade and concluded that, yes, that “late in the fall of 2002, when it became clear that that the White House was going to war, the

¹⁹ Jervis, *Reports, Politics and Intelligence Failures*, 33, n. 7.

²⁰ Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 34.

²¹ Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 33, n. 57.

²² Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence*, 35.

²³ There were some discrepancies among allied services. See Alan Barnes, “Getting it Right: Canadian Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 2002-2003,” *Intelligence and National Security* 35:7 (2020): 925-953. Canadian intelligence did not get it quite as “right” as Barnes suggests. I think Bob got this more right than wrong.

²⁴ Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 36.

²⁵ Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 37.

intelligence community felt that the ship had sailed, that they could have no influence, and they gave up. In the last period, intelligence was politicized.”²⁶

Politicization, Bob still maintained, was not the basic cause of the flawed estimates. The fundamental drivers of error were the fear of repeating the mistake they had made in the past when intelligence analysts had missed Saddam’s programs – “overlearning” from their earlier error – and the strength of the belief that Saddam “was consistent, coherent and unchanging” in his determination to acquire WMD. That belief was so strong and so embedded that it led to confirmation bias.²⁷ Both of these led to the minimizing of the uncertainty that characterized the estimates.²⁸ These were classic errors that Bob had identified in his earlier scholarship and that all the principal review panels found as well.²⁹ And, as he had noted as long as three decades ago and yet again in reviewing these estimates, there is no easy fix for this problem: “There is no such thing as ‘letting the facts speak for themselves’ or drawing inferences without using beliefs about the world; it is inevitable that the perception and interpretation of new information will be influenced by established ideas.”³⁰

The controversy continued, when the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear program was released in November 2007. This NIE was seen by its critics as a mirror image of the NIE on Iraq that was released in October 2002. As Bob observed, critics argued that the key judgments were both incompetent and politicized: incompetent because they implied that the Iran nuclear program had halted, even though a footnote made clear that the halt only applied to warhead design and manufacture³¹; and politicized because the intelligence community was trying to thwart a misguided policy that might lead to war.

Again, Bob rejected the argument that the estimate was politicized and drew on his “personal experiences and discussions,” evidence that he acknowledges was far from fully acceptable but necessary because he worried that it would be years before the relevant documents were released. He carefully walked through the anomalies and alternative arguments that challenged his own and marshalled the strongest possible case against his own interpretation. Then he drew on the evidence that he did have. The people who wrote the estimate were sufficiently “low down the food chain,” he claimed, “that they would not push the evidence around.” Nor was the estimate altered by people “high enough up to take a broad political view.” The estimate was changed when startling evidence came in that Iran had halted part of its program.³²

²⁶ Virtual discussion with Joshua Rovner, Jon Lindsay and Janice Gross Stein, November 9, 2020.

²⁷ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, chapter 6.

²⁸ Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 22, 23. The Butler Report in particular concluded that analysts leaned toward worst-case analysis because they feared underestimating more than they feared overestimating the threat. *Butler Report*, 139.

²⁹ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, chapter 4. With varying degrees of emphasis, the SSCI, the WMD, and the Butler reports agree. They all cite systematic bias against underestimation of the threat, the expression of judgments with excessive certainty, a failure to report continuing dissent and disagreement as spring turned to summer and fall in 2002, and lack of care in reporting levels of certainty to policy makers. *The Butler Report*, 13, makes an especially strong argument about the sloppy language of likelihood. The SSCI found that the NIE “layered” assessments on top of earlier judgments without bringing forward the uncertainties, a basic violation of the calculation of cumulative probabilities. *SSCI*, 22.

³⁰ Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 23-24.

³¹ Jervis, *The November 2007 Iran Nuclear NIE: Immediate Aftermath*, 222.

³² Jervis, *The November 2007 Iran Nuclear NIE: Immediate Aftermath*, 222.

The intelligence community, Bob concluded, “had written an estimate in secret, taking great care to vet the sources, and to ‘red team’ the conclusions and to see that nothing leaked only to have the White House break [Senator Mitch] McConnell’s promise and leave them defenceless against attacks to which they could not publicly respond.”³³ Charges of politicization apparently flew both ways as analysts complained to Bob that the White House had deliberately laid a trap, while policy makers complained to him that they had been set up. Both groups told Bob how naïve he was when he defended one to the other. He acknowledged that the relationship between the two was “poisonous,” a sequelae of the original allegation that the White House had politicized the relationship five years earlier.

Bob drew two general conclusions from these interlinked episodes, conclusions that speak more generally to some of the most important themes in his scholarship that will stand the test of time. Both relate to psychology and politics in the policy world. The first is how challenging it is to draw inferences when evidence is incomplete. “This underscores what all analysts know... intelligence requires inferences and subjective if informed judgments. Errors are always possible.”

The second is even more challenging – and sobering – for those who propose simple solutions to complex policy and institutional problems. “The fundamental reason for the intelligence failures in Iraq,” Bob argued, “was that the assumptions [about Saddam’s intentions] and inferences were reasonable, much more so than the alternatives.”³⁴ They were reasonable, since Saddam had vigorously pursued WMD in the past, had significant incentives to build the programs, and had skilled technicians and a good procurement network. Saddam’s goals were contradictory, his beliefs difficult to for US analysts to imagine, and his need to achieve relief from sanctions was not consistent with his need to maintain a strategic deterrent against Iran.³⁵ Bob reasoned that “Saddam’s policy was foolish and self-defeating, and this goes a long way to explaining the intelligence failure. When the situation is this bizarre, it is not likely to be understood. No conceivable fix would have led to the correct judgment...”³⁶ More than a decade later and with access to the full Saddam archive, Bob concluded that Saddam remained an enigma that we understand even less well now than we did then.³⁷

Bob spent his academic career thinking hard about how people who were responsible for national security thought, how they processed information, how they dealt with evidence, and how they made inferences. Steeped in history, and worried about the serious consequences of error, he tested his ideas again and again against historical evidence and, in many ways, was his own fiercest critic. In the field of intelligence, he could test what he knew in something approaching real time and try to improve both process and outcome. And so when the opportunity came along, he took it. His writing about intelligence is granular, detailed, at times uncharacteristically personal, sophisticated, deep, and some of his finest scholarship in what was an extraordinary scholarly career. What shines through his scholarship is the recognition that almost every solution to a problem creates another, often unforeseen problem. I carefully qualified that last sentence because that is exactly what Bob would have done.

³³ Jervis, *The November 2007 Iran Nuclear NIE: Immediate Aftermath*, 224.

³⁴ Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 42.

³⁵ *Duelfer Report*, 34.

³⁶ Jervis, *Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures*, 44, 46.

³⁷ Virtual discussion with Joshua Rovner, Jon Lindsay, and Janice Gross Stein, November 9, 2020.

REMEMBERING ROBERT JERVIS

BY MARC TRACHTENBERG, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

Bob Jervis's death still does not seem real to me. He certainly remains very much alive in my mind. His impact on the way I have come to understand international politics was enormous, but that was not the only way he made a difference in my life.

I got to know him more or less by accident. In 1982 or so, when I was teaching history at the University of Pennsylvania, I was asked to organize a conference on military history. The department there wanted to curry favor with a wealthy potential donor who happened to be interested in that field. I could scarcely refuse to take on that job, but I had no idea who to invite. As it turned out, at about that time an archivist at the National Archives in Washington put me in touch with David Rosenberg, whom I asked for advice. David suggested that I arrange to meet Steve Van Evera, then at Princeton, and it was Steve who told me about Bob Jervis.

So I got in touch with Bob, and he invited me to attend a workshop he was running at Columbia. It was there that I learned the little I know about cognitive psychology, and especially about how the ideas developed by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman could throw light on how international politics works. I eventually got to know Bob quite well. He and I taught a couple of graduate classes together at Columbia around 1989. In those classes, we tried to bring the historical and political science perspectives together—to try to understand the differences between the two fields, the limitations of each approach, and what each could learn from the other. Those classes—“King Kong meets Godzilla” classes, I used to call them—were among the best and most interesting classes I ever got to teach.

What struck me the most as I came to know Bob better was the way he approached history. My personal experience with political scientists over the years had not been very positive. As a general rule, I did not like the way they used history. They didn't seem to have much feel for history as a field with an intellectual personality of its own. Their assumption seemed to be that history might have a certain importance as a source of information about the past, but digging up the facts was not to their mind an intellectually challenging process. When it came to doing the real thinking—to getting at the deeper questions about why things worked the way they did—the historians, it was tacitly assumed, did not have a major role to play. And of course we historians reacted more or less as you would expect and did not have a particularly high regard for the political scientists. In the eight years I spent as a graduate student in history at Berkeley, I had had practically nothing to do with them.

But Bob followed his own drummer, in this regard as in so many other ways, and his approach to history was very different. He actually understood that historians were concerned, in their own way, with basic “theoretical” issues, although few historians would actually use that word. He understood, that is, that historical analysis was concerned not just with the facts but with larger questions—in the case of our own field, with the fundamental question of what makes for war or for a stable international system, but also, albeit in an even more indirect way, with the great question of how in general policy should be conducted.

That respect for history as a discipline, it seems to me today, might have had something to do with Bob's basic view that our understanding of reality is very much a product of the way evidence about the world is processed in our minds, so that in interpreting historical reality, the *thinking* the historian does is of fundamental importance. Or as Bob himself put it, in a really wonderful sentence: “there is no reality to be described that is independent of people's beliefs about it.”¹ That approach, of course, is very much at odds with the positivist view that dominates so much of what passes for “social

¹ Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 38.

science”—at odds, this is, with the generally unexamined but intellectually untenable assumption that “the facts” have a kind of elemental quality and can be made to “speak for themselves.”²

You can hardly imagine how gratifying it was for me to deal with someone from another field who seemed to understand and appreciate what people like me were doing—especially someone who, I soon learned, was a giant in his own field. In fact, when I began to get some sense of Bob’s standing in political science, I was kind of amazed. It was quite extraordinary that someone of his stature could be so unassuming and so easy to relate to. Top people in any field tend to be corrupted by their own success; they tend to be a little too full of themselves, a little too convinced that they already have all the answers. But Bob was not cut from that cloth at all—quite the opposite, in fact.

It is hard to separate his intellectual persona from what he was like as a human being. The two blend together in my mind. His scholarly style—open-ended, not just undogmatic but anti-dogmatic, developing ideas which he well knew could at best capture only part of the truth—was of a piece with his personal modesty and approachability. The ideas he came up with had little to do with any strongly held set of beliefs about how international politics worked. Instead, he read widely—amazingly widely, in fact (and to this day I don’t know where he found the time to do everything he did)—and what he read would often spark certain thoughts. He would then create file folders for particular ideas, and when he came across some new piece of evidence that related to that particular idea he would put it in the corresponding folder. (He once showed me those folders in a filing cabinet in his office.) When dealing with a particular issue when writing a book or article, he would pull the corresponding folder and was ready to go.³ The stimulus came not just from works of history, which he read avidly, but from works in many other fields (psychology, economics, even evolutionary biology). You can probably see that method in action most clearly in his *System Effects* book.⁴

For Bob, the ideas came so easily that he would often just stick them into something he was writing, without making a big deal over them. The most striking example here is a point he made in a footnote in his first book, *The Logic of Images in International Politics*: “As will be discussed later, high costs are often involved if it is later discovered that the actor’s signals were designed to be misleading. *Indeed, if there were no such costs associated with issuing misleading signals, there would be no reason for receivers to place any faith in them.*”⁵ The point he made in that italicized sentence was quite extraordinary. This was the first time, I believe, that any international relations scholar had made this point—and I spent some time looking into this issue. Even Thomas Schelling had not gone quite that far. And that argument about what we would now call “costly signaling” would go on to play a very fundamental role in contemporary international relations theory. But my real point here is not just that this was a very important idea. My more basic point has to do with the very casual way in which Bob introduced it—that it was presented in a *footnote*. The ideas came so easily to him that he could scarcely bring himself to trumpet their importance.⁶

² For Jervis’s own take on this issue, see his essay “International Politics and Diplomatic History: Fruitful Differences,” H-Diplo/International Security Studies Forum [ISSF], 12 March 2010, <https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Jervis-InaguralAddress.pdf>. This was based on a talk he gave at Williams College in 2009 and was the very first essay published in the ISSF.

³ He describes this method in Jervis, “Change, Surprise, and the Hiding Hand,” Joseph Kruzel and James Rosenau, eds., *Journeys Through World Politics: Autobiographical Reflections of Thirty-Four Academic Travelers* (Boston: Lexington Books, 1989), 394.

⁴ Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

⁵ Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 18 n. 2; emphasis added. He went on to develop that point in the text. See especially 19-20.

⁶ Compare, for example, what Schelling wrote about the originality of Bob’s first book with what Bob said about the same subject. “I tend to think,” Schelling wrote, “that *The Logic of Images in International Relations* has had more influence on me than anything else Bob has written. That’s partly because the ideas were absolutely new to me. The analysis focused on something I hadn’t

And one of his key ideas was that it is much harder to interpret reality than people think—that the process of understanding the world is anything but straightforward. For him that point applied not just to political actors, but to scholars as well. And it carried over into a certain skepticism about theorizing. His view, of course, was not that theoretical work was worthless, but that in doing that kind of work scholars were on much thinner ice than they realized. And that helps explain why he thought historical work was so important. There are some political scientists who think that getting the history right did not matter all that much. I remember Alex George once telling me, “I know this will shock you, Marc, but for me as a theorist what’s important is that an interpretation of the past be plausible. It’s less important that it be accurate.” I am not sure whether that was his real view or if he was just trying to be provocative. But a number of theorists, even the most famous ones (like Schelling), did seem to take the view that historical accuracy did not matter all that much.⁷ Bob, however, was different. For him it *was* very important to understand what had actually happened. And it was for that reason that he went into the historical sources so deeply—not just the accounts written by professional historians but even the documents like those published in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series. The historical sources provided a kind of intellectual ballast; they helped keep the theorizing down to earth and in touch with political reality.

All this carried over to the way he related to students, especially graduate students. For me, it was always a pleasure to meet with his group at Columbia, intellectually serious but more relaxed and friendlier than similar groups elsewhere, and I think that had a lot to do with what Bob was like as a person. Although he is gone now, you can still get a sense for what he was like—and for why so many of us feel about him the way we do—by watching videos of him in action. A number of them have been posted on YouTube.⁸ If you watch him give a talk or have a conversation with someone, you’ll understand why so many of us feel that our intellectual world seems so much colder and emptier now that he’s gone.

thought about.” Thomas Schelling, Foreword to James W. Davis, ed., *Psychology, Strategy and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations* (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), xi. But Bob’s view was very different. The *Logic of Images* book, he said, had simply “combined Tom’s ideas with those of Erving Goffman’s *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*.” It was true, he noted, that Schelling “later said that he thought my book was entirely original and could not see where the thoughts came from, but the answer was largely in his own work.” Jervis, “Thomas C. Schelling: A Reminiscence,” *War on the Rocks*, 28 December 2016, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/thomas-c-schelling-a-reminiscence/>. He made the same point in his ISSF essay in the “Learning the Scholar’s Craft” series. Robert Jervis, “How I Got Here,” H-Diplo/ISSF, 4 March 2020, 4, <https://hdiplo.org/to/E198>. I personally agree with Schelling about the extraordinary originality of that book, but this was not a case of false modesty on Jervis’s part. Given the almost effortless way in which ideas took shape in his mind, my guess is that it was hard for him to see them as particularly impressive or original.

⁷ See Marc Trachtenberg, “The Accidental War Question” (unpublished), 17-20, <https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/inadvertent.pdf>. Note also Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), xxiii.

⁸ See, for example, three of his lectures: “How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics,” Woodrow Wilson Center, April 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XLLcoTe5Olc>; “Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War,” Duke University Law School, September 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QmPy91_AkEc; and “Why We Get Things Wrong” (with Paul Pillar), Georgetown University Center for Security Studies, April 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W1zow5yFS7w>. Note also his conversations with Harry Kreisler (University of California, Berkeley, November 2005), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tmmXaSDFcSI>, and Gideon Rose, *Foreign Affairs* (March 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g50OL_a3ZfA.

BOB JERVIS
BY STEPHEN M. WALT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Bob Jervis was a gentle giant of modern international relations theory and security studies. His analytical powers were exceptional, his knowledge of military and diplomatic history astounding, and his work ethic extraordinary. These talents were married to a level of generosity, cheerfulness, and sanity that is rare among academics. I am sure there were moments when he was frustrated and perhaps even angry, but most people who knew him will find it hard to imagine him being anything but gracious, calm, and supportive, even toward those with whom he might disagree.

I was not a student of Bob's and I never taught in the same department with him. Yet he was influencing how I thought about international relations well before my own career got started. His article "Hypotheses on Misperception" was required reading for the introductory IR class I took during my junior year in college and I found it utterly fascinating.¹ Reading the book version—the classic *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (1976)—the following year helped convince me to eschew law school and get a Ph.D. instead.²

Bob's writings have appeared on my course syllabi every year since I began teaching thirty-seven years ago. Why? Because they consistently address central questions in our field, and the answers he provides are novel, interesting, sometimes profound, and always well-informed. Teaching IR without including his work would be an act of educational malpractice.

The common thread running through much of his scholarship was an effort to explain why it is so hard for states to understand each other. That concern for signaling, communication, and perception informed his subsequent work on deterrence theory, nuclear strategy, security regimes, and intelligence. Although he never constructed a grand macro theory of his own, he was still very much a theorist who developed general explanations for recurring phenomena and gave us new ways to see them. Think about his distinction between "signals" and "indices" in *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, his adroit application of key findings from social and cognitive psychology to the problem of misperception, his elegant explanation for how second-strike nuclear capabilities could mitigate the "security dilemma" and foster greater cooperation, or his subtle and closely-reasoned exploration of how systems effects shaped outcomes in a wide variety of social settings.³

I first met Bob when I was a graduate student, shortly after he had left UCLA for Columbia. He came to Berkeley to give a talk at a moment when I was struggling to formulate a dissertation topic, and I somehow arranged to meet with him one-on-one and talk about some ideas I had for a thesis on alliances. I don't remember what either of us said at that first encounter, but what I do remember was that he was friendly, unpretentious, encouraging, and above all willing to devote an hour of his day to a student he'd never laid eyes on before. I am sure there are countless other people who could tell a similar story.

Apart from various encounters at conferences and workshops, my main association with him began in the early 1990s, when he and Bob Art invited me to join them as a co-editor of the *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs*, the book series they founded in the early 1980s. By giving younger scholars a prestigious outlet for dissertations and monographs, their decision to create the series helped launch dozens of successful careers and played a major role in rebuilding the subfield of security studies. It

¹ Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics* 20:3 (April 1968): 454-479.

² Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976; new edition, 2017).

³ Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970; rev. edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*; Jervis "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30: 2 (January 1978): 167-214; and Jervis, *Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

reminds us that great scholars leave their mark not only in what they write but also by providing collective goods and field leadership.

Working with the two Bobs on the Cornell Series has been an honor and an education. As an editor Bob was tough but fair-minded and a fount of wisdom and common sense. His editorial instincts and encyclopedic knowledge of the scholarly literature saved countless authors from careless errors, and the easy working relationship among our editorial troika owed much to his and Bob Art's generosity of spirit, integrity, and absence of ego.

Bob Jervis made the rest of us smarter, and he left the field of security studies in better shape than he found it. No scholar could ask for a better legacy.

TUESDAYS WITH BOB

BY JAMES J. WIRTZ, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

While not exactly drawn from the pages of *Tuesdays with Morrie*,¹ Bob Jervis and I had a scheduled phone or Facetime call every week for the last twenty months of his life.² No one was clairvoyant; the calls started the way one would expect. In early March 2020, I asked Bob if Columbia University might host me for a sabbatical in the coming academic year. Bob was amenable, but my timing was not propitious. In the COVID lockdowns that followed almost immediately, Bob had a ringside seat to watch the activities of the emergency medical facility operated by the group Samaritan's Purse on the grounds of Mount Sinai Hospital, which was visible from his apartment. When he mentioned that he and his wife Kathe were engaged in a running debate about which tent held the makeshift morgue, I thought he could use a distraction, or at least a less dreary view of things from sunny California. He agreed and we made plans to talk again the next week.

I had met Bob, aka, Professor Jervis, in the fall of 1983 as an incoming Ph.D. student at Columbia University. I already had a Master's degree, which gave me credit for a year's worth of courses. Nevertheless, Columbia was a test of human endurance in those days. It involved three years of coursework, shortened to two for me, a diplomatic history exam, two language exams, a two-day comprehensive exam, an approved dissertation proposal, and then a dissertation. On the first day the Department Chair grimly told the incoming graduate students, "look to the person to the left and to the right, two out of three of you are not going to make it through this." The upside was that I was able to learn about guns and bombs from Warner Schilling and Dick Betts, Soviet foreign and defense policy from Marshall Shulman, Robert Legvold, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, bureaucratic politics from Morton Halperin, international organization from John Ruggie, quantitative methods with Bob Shapiro, and IR theory from Bob Jervis and Jack Snyder. In 1983, Bob was the rising star in this group – I could tell by the way that my academic advisor Schilling suggested during our first meeting that "you probably want to take a course with him."

When it came time for the dissertation proposal I simply walked into Bob's office one day and casually informed him that I had to write a dissertation and that I wanted him to head my committee. He looked up from what he was doing and he agreed, which I learned later was not always the case. He then asked me what I wanted to write about. I told him I hadn't gotten that far yet. I asked him if he had any ideas,³ prompting him to respond that "he would rather pick my spouse than my dissertation topic." Three months later, I came back with some sort of US-Russia-China trilateral deterrence outline that we both agreed was not very good. I eventually produced an intelligence topic nestled in the Vietnam War, although at the time I did not know that Bob had an interest in both intelligence and the history of the conflict.⁴ When the dissertation was finally completed and defended in 1989, I asked Bob if he had any final words of advice for me. He replied, "write your ass off."

In the ensuing years, we stayed in touch mostly on work issues. The highlight had to be when he invited me to join Dick Betts and Mel Leffler to participate in a postmortem for the Central Intelligence Agency that addressed the 2002 Iraq National Intelligence Estimate. I think Bob brought me along to help him understand the "analysts' workplace" – the amalgam of formal and informal rules and expectations that shape life in the US government. In any event, I edited Bob's

¹ Mitch Albom, *Tuesdays with Morrie: An Old Man, A Young Man and Life's Greatest Lesson* (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1997).

² Professor Rose McDermott of Brown University also was in close contact with Bob Jervis in the final months of his life. See Rose McDermott, "Robert Jervis: A Remembrance," *War on the Rocks*, January 12, 2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/robert-jervis-a-remembrance>.

³ Asking this question would have immediately led to your ejection from Warner Schilling's office.

⁴ James J. Wirtz, *The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

sixty-page report, which still is controlled by the CIA. Indeed, gaining the release of the postmortem was one of the first issues we discussed when we began to talk regularly in March 2020.⁵ I will have to retrace Bob's steps and follow up on that now.

During our conversations throughout the spring and summer of 2020, we mostly speculated like everyone else about the course and consequences of the ongoing plague. By early September 2020, however, Bob had fallen ill with a persistent cough. He mentioned that he coughed his way through an online class, and he began to miss our weekly calls because he simply did not have the breath to talk on the phone. By October, he was undergoing diagnostic testing and by the end of the month it was confirmed -- he had lung cancer. Bob was a bit surprised with this diagnosis because he never smoked. He never really drank much either for that matter. He was soon enrolled in an experimental drug treatment, and his doctors were optimistic. I think Bob was optimistic too. I told him that just as long as he avoided the "sorry we can't help you" diagnosis he had a fighting chance and that in any event, he should forget about the cancer since COVID would probably get us all first anyway. The experimental drugs worked -- within a few weeks of starting treatment, the tumor in his lungs was shrinking.

I witnessed the burst of activity that followed, although I have to admit that the more I learn about Bob's achievements in the last year of his life the more I am amazed about what he accomplished. For those who knew him as a friend and for those who knew him through his work, a few reflections follow.

Bob cared about his colleagues; he probably was generous to a fault. To offer a few examples, in 2021 I wrote a less than glowing review of Francis J. Gavin's *Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy* in part because it was dismissive of how international relations theory dealt with nuclear weapons in general and *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* in particular.⁶ Bob had read a draft of Gavin's manuscript and he would have none of it. He insisted that Gavin's economic history was of the highest caliber, that he learned a great deal from his work, and that he always enjoyed his company. On another occasion, he reminded me of my promise to help him nominate Robert Powell for the Security Studies lifetime achievement award given by the International Studies Association. I crafted the nomination based on previous letters Bob had in his files. Bob knew that Powell had been struggling with cancer and that time was not on Powell's side. When I had the letter ready to send to the committee, Bob wanted me to co-sign it. I don't think he wanted to take credit for something that he did not do, or maybe he did not want to hurt my feelings by implying my opinion was not important. I assured him that the committee would be more interested in his thoughts -- not mine -- about our surfer friend from the Bay area. The letter went out under his name alone.⁷

Although it is cliché, our colleagues continue to bemoan the academic-policy divide, offering ways to bridge the gap that often betray little more than ignorance of policymakers and the policy-making process. By contrast, Bob bridged that gap with policymakers both intellectually and personally. Bob empathized completely with officials and was fascinated with their struggle to achieve their objectives and avoid what was sometimes catastrophic failure. This all came together in his longstanding collaboration with the intelligence community to improve the quality of their analysis and forecasts. Maybe it was the history he knew so well coming to life before his eyes, but he was continually drawn not to partisan politics but to

⁵ The postmortem experience influenced several publications Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Jervis, "Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 29:1 (2006):3-52; and James J. Wirtz, "The Art of the Intelligence Autopsy," *Intelligence and National Security* 29:1 (2014): 1-18.

⁶ James J. Wirtz review of Francis J. Gavin's *Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy*, *International Affairs* 97:5 (September 2021): 1635-1336, <https://doi.org/10.1093.is.iab153l>; and Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

⁷ Sadly, Robert Powell passed away a few days after Bob on 13 December 2021.

the study of why policymaking or intelligence analysis is so hard and to devising ways to increase the prospects of success. He also saw officials as a primary source of sorts who had real insights to share.

For instance, he organized a symposium that was published in January 2021 in the journal *Intelligence and National Security*.⁸ It addressed the controversy surrounding the release of the key findings of the 2007 Iran National Intelligence Estimate, giving a group of former leading intelligence officials the opportunity to tell their side of the story. Bob believed that their story was important despite the fact that its telling was not theoretical and failed to address current academic fashion. Bob always tried to give policymakers an outside view of things in the hopes they would find these insights helpful. He shared a memo he provided to “friends and former students in the USG,” a satirical essay on Chinese foreign policy that was apparently intended to lift spirits of these insiders and to cast ongoing commentary in the “blogosphere” in a new light.

During the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, Bob reluctantly admitted during a Facetime call with Tom Bruneau, a Berkeley classmate from the 1960s,⁹ and me that the episode did not reflect “the best tradition of the diplomatic or military profession,” which only seemed to motivate him in the wake of this disaster. In his essay written in celebration of his election to the National Academy of Sciences, Bob revisited the topic of “intelligence postmortems” by identifying a hidden bias that might sidetrack future investigations into the ragged withdrawal from Kabul. In other words, inherently difficult policies might fail not because of policy failures of omission or commission, but because they are in fact, inherently difficult to undertake in the first place. Clearly, he was thinking about the problems encountered by the Biden administration in Afghanistan.

One might attribute Bob’s great success to his brilliance, demographics (his timing on the job market), first-mover advantage, or luck, and he would have agreed that all of these factors influenced his career.¹⁰ In fact, Bob was usually self-effacing. Noteworthy was his reaction to election to the National Academy – “I never knew that I was a scientist.” In any event, all of these considerations took a back seat to Bob’s incredible capacity for work and he was in fact very proud of the fact that he worked harder than you did. The concept of “time off” was not in Bob’s lexicon – Rose McDermott, in her deeply moving remembrance, notes how Bob suggested she take an *afternoon* off after she received tenure.¹¹ He measured the severity of his disease by the degree to which it impeded his work and complained that the chronic fatigue caused by his illness often limited his workday. Even relatively late in the game when Tom Bruneau and Bob would mostly reminisce on Facetime about their kids and their days together at Berkeley, Bob always welcomed “work” questions. He always smiled when I turned the conversation back to some theoretical or methodological issue. One time I thought I would have some fun. I casually mentioned that I was working on a paper about military accidents in the South China Sea. I was going to reference a late Cold War incident. I asked him, “Bob, do you remember the one where that guy got shot looking at tanks? What was his name?” Bob knew what I was up to, and he hesitated for just a moment. Then he smiled and said, “It was Nicholson wasn’t it?”¹² After the call ended, I turned to Tom and said, “how the hell does he do that?” Tom shrugged and said “incredible, isn’t it.”

⁸ “Anatomy of a Controversy: The 2007 Iran Nuclear NIE Revisited,” *Intelligence and National Security* 26:2 (11 January 2021).

⁹ Tom Bruneau and Bob were roommates for a year at Berkeley and had remained in close contact ever since. Tom also is one of my colleagues who retired from the Naval Postgraduate School a few years ago.

¹⁰ Jervis, “H-Diplo Essay 198 – Robert Jervis on Learning the Scholar Craft,” *H-Diplo* March 4, 2020, <https://hdiplo.org/to/E198>.

¹¹ McDermott, “Robert Jervis: A Remembrance.”

¹² Major Arthur D. Nicholson Jr, a member of the American military liaison mission, which had operated out of Potsdam, East Germany since 1947 with a mandate to observe military activities in the Soviet occupation zone, was killed while looking inside a tank shed. The incident occurred on Sunday March 24, 1985, see James M. Markham, “American Officer Killed by Russia and in East

Things took a turn for the worse in October 2021. The experimental drug was not working, the tumor was again growing, and Bob now faced a round of chemotherapy. Bob often spoke about his hope to avoid chemo; he worried about its debilitating side effects. What I really think he was worried about was that those side effects would prevent him from working. He also was not too happy about the odds that the treatment would produce a meaningful effect; the oncologist estimated there was a 50/50 chance of success. No amount of happy talk was going to alter the meaning of that number. Bob understood statistics; he understood that he might be looking at his last days. But he accepted the situation with a bravery that was almost embarrassing to behold. He never complained about getting a raw deal. He never looked for sympathy. He never wanted to talk about the elephant in the room. Rose McDermott put it best, “he accepted his diagnosis with a kind of grace I would not be able to muster.”

Mercifully, as Bob might say, the side effects of the six-week course of chemo were mild. Bob had the strength for a couple of Facetime calls during the treatment, and on good days he could still manage to get in about three or four hours of work. He actually was his normal self, and we even had a good laugh when I told him I was surprised to see that he still had all of his hair. But on “scan day” there was no news, which obviously meant the news was bad. Tom Bruneau and I waited about a week and then reached out. We set a date for our next phone call on 30 November, the day Bob would begin his second round of chemo. 30 November came, but the chemo knocked him out, so we agreed to try again the following week.

I remember there was a real mai tai sunset on Carmel Beach on 7 December. I was walking up the dunes back to the car when Tom Bruneau called me. He told me that Kathe had reached out to us and wanted us to know that Bob was not responding well to the second round of chemo. I was dismissive, saying something to Tom about getting Bob “back on the blower.” Tom said that I didn’t understand what he was driving at, and then he read what Kathe had written about Bob’s condition:

Here’s the situation: Bob had chemo with low odds last Tuesday. Odds were not in his favor and he is still knocked out from the chemo, so much so that we are beginning home hospice. The oncologist calculates that it is a week to a month of life expectancy—at the outside two months. Lisa [one of Bob’s daughters] has arrived. Bob is in no pain. We have 24/7 aide coverage. Bob spent what might have been his working hours yesterday in some delirium (expected by the oncologist) dictating—just as he has for his entire life—opinions to editorial boards and job search committees, including all the punctuation. Today he is quiet.¹³

Epilogue

Cris Matei, a colleague of mine who happens to be the book review editor at the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* mentioned to me that Bob had sent the journal a referee report just days before he died. I contacted the editor, Jan Goldman, with what I admitted was an odd request. Could I take a look at the review my fellow editorial board member had submitted? Jan forwarded the correspondence. In his email to Jan that accompanied the review, which was dated 1 December 2021, Bob provided probably his last words on his situation: “Here is my review. I may not be able to do any more reviews because my lung cancer is proving resistant to all treatments and I am not in good shape.”

After reading Bob’s comment, all I could muster in reply was “incredible, isn’t it?” Jan answered, “Yes, incredible indeed.”

Germany” *The New York Times*, March 26, 1985, <https://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/26/world/american-officer-killed-by-russian-in-east-germany.html>.

¹³ I would like to thank Kathe Jervis for allowing me to share this personal communication. Bob would want me to tell you that I edited it slightly for clarity, but that these changes did not alter it in a significant way.

“TO MY FELLOW PERCEIVER” BY KEREN YARHI-MILO, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

It goes without saying that Bob Jervis was a giant in the field. He was a one-of-a-kind scholar whose work will forever shape how we think about international politics. But for me, he was a rare gift of a person who changed my life profoundly over the past twenty years. As a freshman at Columbia, I took my very first class in international relations with Bob as my professor. Later on, he became one of my dissertation advisors even though I completed my Ph.D. at the University of Pennsylvania while he taught at Columbia. Since then, he has read at least one draft of every paper that I have ever published. I even had the rare honor of co-authoring a paper with him shortly before he was diagnosed with cancer. Most recently, he was my colleague at Columbia and a core member of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, of which I became the Director in 2020. More than these titles, however, Bob was mentor, advocate, and a second father to me.

I could write a book-length manuscript just on how Bob influenced the field of international relations and my own work in particular. Thomas Christensen and I tried to summarize some of his key contributions in a recent *Foreign Affairs* piece.¹ Instead, in this tribute I would like to highlight the aspects of Bob’s unparalleled personality that I believe will resonate with everyone who was fortunate enough to know him, work with him, and be his student. For the readers who did not have the chance to get to know Bob, I have no doubt that learning about what made him so special as a person will shed light on what made him such a brilliant scholar.

I’ll start at the beginning, which was my first semester as an undergraduate student at Columbia. As I sat in the International Affairs Building, eagerly anticipating the start of my first session of Introduction to International Politics, Bob began the class by going through newspaper articles, one of which was about the Arab-Israeli conflict. Using the article as a launching point, he kicked off a discussion about whether or not the conflict was a security dilemma. Admittedly, at this point in time I had no idea who Bob was, but the way that he spoke about the topic with so much passion and sensitivity sparked something that made me want to approach him and discuss the subject further. So, although I was only a freshman, I joined the line of students waiting for a chance to chat with him during office hours. When I made it into his office, he asked me about my background. When I told him that I had served in Israeli intelligence, his eyes lit up and he grinned. Intrigued by one another, we started talking about biases in intelligence analysis, the role of intelligence in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and international relations more broadly. I left his office over an hour later and the rest was history. In reflecting back on the treasure trove of conversations that I had with Bob each week during his office hours, I am reminded why I always tell my students to make an effort to get to know their professors.

For the next twenty years, Bob would follow up every conversation we had by sending me something he had found useful or interesting in his prolific reading. I was not the only beneficiary of his rare and immense thoughtfulness. In fact, Bob was known for this: looking through his office, which was filled with piles of books and papers strewn about, and finding something relevant to the topic at hand. Despite the seeming disorganization, he always knew exactly what he was looking for and would scan the document right there and then, handing you a copy at the close of the conversation, or attach it in an email a few days later. Other times, he would send you thoughtful and brilliant emails out of the blue, recalling an old conversation or referencing your work. How remarkable that in all of his nonstop reading Bob would think not just about his own work but also how what he was reading could help his students, colleagues, and research in general. To take one example, just a week before he passed, Bob sent me an email with a piece about British cabinet deliberations in the interwar period, something that I wrote about extensively in my first book.

Beyond his genuine interest in helping others do their research, Bob’s unfailing ability to find something relevant to every conversation was borne out of his voracious reading. Bob was up to date with every journal and every book -- I really do not know any other scholar who read as much as he did. He read anything and everything that he thought could potentially be

¹ Thomas J. Christensen and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “The Human Factor: How Robert Jervis Reshaped our Understanding of International Politics,” *Foreign Affairs* (January 7, 2022), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-01-07/human-factor>

interesting. He even read articles he suspected to be awful and browsed through journals he did not think very highly of. Bob would carve out time every other day to sit with his legs up on the chair, like a schoolboy, and jot down notes in the margins of whatever book or journal he had set out to read. (His handwriting is nearly impossible to decipher, but having these journals in my office now, I continue trying to figure out what his notes mean, knowing that each annotated scribble is an invaluable gem). Impressively, he would also remember what he read, and was able to recall the exact article and the details of an author's argument up until his very last day.

Though his field was political science, Bob was passionate about diplomatic history as well as work in political science that seriously engaged with historical case studies. In fact, this is one of the interests that the two of us bonded over. In combination with his avid curiosity, it should be no surprise that he loved to talk about the archives. Bob's singular passion for historical documents (at least among political scientists) is also why he agreed to head the CIA declassification board, knowing how important it was for scholars to access files that could enable the building and testing of new theories in IR. He would spend hours listening to students share about the archival jewels they had found. Any time that a document was declassified, he immediately and eagerly wanted to know everything about it. I will never forget Bob's reaction when I first showed him the documents I collected from Carter's Presidential Library, where one can still see Carter's handwritten notes in the margins on the weekly reports he received from his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Upon seeing the documents, Bob's face lit up like a kid in a candy store and with a huge grin on his face he exclaimed, "This is just marvelous!!!" I hold this memory of Bob most dearly because it captures his fantastic inquisitiveness and unquenchable thirst for knowledge.

Put simply, Bob was unmatched as a mentor. He was there for me during the ups and downs of my career (and they were many of those). When I told him during graduate school that I did not think I was cut out for academia, he unflinchingly sympathized with me, telling me he did not blame me for feeling this way. When I told him that I might have to quit my tenure-track job at Princeton due to my son's developmental delays, he could not have been more compassionate, sensitive, and supportive. At that time, we spoke every week as he helped me navigate the situation. When I decided to return to my work, he threw himself into helping me get back on track professionally. In addition to being an unparalleled advisor, Bob was my number one advocate -- most senior people in the field probably first heard of me or my work thanks to Bob and his many shout outs. There is no doubt in my mind that I would not be where I am today without him having been there every step of the way.

Just before he was diagnosed, I had the rare privilege of coauthoring a piece with him. I call this a rare privilege because you can count on one hand the number of people he coauthored with during his illustrious career. I feel lucky to have written a review piece in *World Politics* with him and Don Casler² precisely because it gave us a glimpse into Bob's unique writing process -- the output of which discerning readers will recognize as the "Jervisian" style -- that was not easily shared. Indeed, part of Bob's aversion to coauthoring stemmed from the difficulty of matching his idiosyncratic habits to others' styles. Thus, Don and I were elated to be invited behind the curtain, and we learned so much from the honor of observing the process up close.

Bob began every piece by collecting newspaper clips on items with a common theme. When a file got thick or heavy enough, he would decide that it was time to write about that topic. For him, these clippings were more than anecdotes -- they were pieces of evidence that together painted a picture and hinted at a larger theoretical or empirical story. After examining his clippings, he would dictate his thoughts, recording himself as he talked through his ideas. The resulting transcript would already contain incredibly rich examples (because he had already collected them and based his argument on them) and a clean, well-articulated argument. That initial draft would then go through a very long process of editing until it was refined

² Robert Jervis, Yarhi-Milo, and Don Casler, "Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security: Promises and Limits of New Scholarship," *World Politics* 73:1 (2021): 167-203, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887120000246>.

into publishable work. It was not just the dictation (rare in and of itself) that made his style so interesting, but also the peculiar way in which his process of research and writing resembled piecing together a jigsaw puzzle.

Considering that his remarkable writing was based on his dictation, it should come as no surprise that Bob was also an exceedingly skilled communicator. Moreover, given his scholarly focus, he was very sensitive to the dynamics of perception and misperception. The way that he carried himself and interacted with others in professional settings reflected this sensitivity. Bob knew that it was not only what you argued for or against, but also how your words or actions were perceived (or misperceived) by others that mattered. Whenever Bob spoke, everyone understood exactly the message he intended to get across, because he had already factored in the myriad ways in which others might misunderstand him. Among Bob's superpowers was his uncanny ability and instinct to think critically about his audience (and many times it was not just one audience but multiple audiences). I sat with Bob in countless meetings during which sensitive issues came up, or the audience was especially divided. While always honest and sincere, he knew how to craft an argument diplomatically and sensibly so that no one could possibly take his idea the wrong way. Not too long ago, in a particularly tense Arts and Sciences meeting, Bob raised his hand, and I thought to myself, "what is he doing?" In that environment, I anticipated that there would be a huge blowback to whatever he might say (and especially to the particular suggestion that I suspected he would offer). Advocating for this bold course of action, Bob spoke elegantly and empathically. Much to my surprise, when he finished speaking every single person in the previously polarized environment was nodding in agreement. Dazzled, I thought to myself, "How brilliant. Watch and learn, Keren." If his scholarship talked the talk about signaling and perception, then in his interpersonal interactions and communications, Bob walked the walk.

As talented a writer as he was a communicator, Bob was also a community builder and expert convener -- he absolutely loved bringing people together in both the field and across the university. Bob did not care about what methodology or subject matter expertise one had -- he was enthusiastic to learn from everybody and saw the value in every piece of good scholarship. It did not matter to him whether you were an international relations scholar, historian, or political theorist; everyone was welcome at the infamous brown bag lunches that he hosted as often as twice a week. For Bob, it was not enough to simply email an invitation. He would go around collecting faculty members by knocking on their doors and asking them if they were coming to lunch -- no one could or would say no to Bob, and so everyone came. Before the pandemic, room 1302 in IAB would be filled with people from all different backgrounds and subfields discussing current events. During the pandemic, this tradition continued on Zoom all the way up until his very last week.

Bob cared profoundly about the community he helped build at Columbia -- about the Political Science Department, the School of International and Public Affairs, the Saltzman Institute, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, and Columbia University at large. Even as he was undergoing chemotherapy treatments, he was still attending faculty meetings and job talks -- a true testament for how important Columbia was to him. Just as he was an expert in international relations, he was also a connoisseur in everything to do with the university; Bob knew everything one possibly could in terms of budgeting, strategic planning, and internal politics. He put great effort into protecting the faculty and the students by making sure that Columbia maintained a high quality of education. He and I spent hours during his last months talking over Zoom about the university's plans to expand and restructure the college, two issues about which Bob cared deeply and wanted to make sure were done right. He poured similar energy into caregiving for the field of political science as a whole, serving as a leader not just through his writing but also as president of the American Political Science Association, a board member of many journals, founder of the H-Diplo/International Security Studies Section, and editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs at Cornell University Press for many years (to name but a few roles). Most of what he did was to pave the way for younger scholars and give them the opportunity to get their work reviewed. Remarkably, he did it all for free, out of pure passion and devotion. Just as he was always going out of his way to help scholars along with their research, he also expended immense effort into creating a structural environment that would allow them to thrive.

Bob and I were attracted to the same puzzles and patterns in world politics. Perhaps this was because I was his student after all, or maybe this is what brought us together to begin with. I remember many instances of us sitting at conferences, talks, or faculty meetings when another participant said something that caused us to look at each other and smile, each knowing that the other was thinking the exact same thing in reaction. "To my fellow perceiver," is how he signed my copy of *Perceptions and Misperception*. In sum, Bob Jervis was my go-to person. He was the first one I called or emailed with everything from a

question about research to advice about my career to help with deliberating about what opportunities to say yes to or no to. My biggest joy was coming full circle and joining him at Columbia as a colleague -- if we were not close enough before, this made us closer than ever.

When Bob told me confidentially that he was diagnosed with Stage 4 cancer, it was a déjà-vu moment for me, as my father had been diagnosed with cancer eight years ago. It was a truly devastating blow. Bob was generally brutally honest about his prognosis, but despite our own expertise on biases, we were both a bit guilty of false optimism at times. Knowing I only had a limited time left to enjoy Bob's brilliance, wisdom, humor, and advice, I cherished every Zoom call and email correspondence, and I was delighted to see him in person when it was safe. He celebrated what turned out to be his last birthday in Central Park during spring 2021, surrounded by colleagues who adored him. I looked at him and how happy he was. I then turned to look around at the many faces that surrounded him, all of them filled with immense admiration layered with tears of both joy and sadness. On December 9th, 2021, the world lost its biggest mensch and the most astute observer of world politics. I lost a rare mentor and a father figure who profoundly shaped, and will forever continue to influence, my life and career.

A BAD POEM FOR A GREAT AND GOOD MAN: DOGGEREL FOR BOB JERVIS
BY PAGE FORTNA, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

There is a long tradition in my family of writing doggerel for those we love and respect. I had planned to write such a poem (if one can call it that) for Bob's retirement. But as I should have known, in fact as I always predicted, he never did retire. He was still at work, and still emailing us about intellectual ideas and university politics a week before he died. So I never had a chance to write this and share it with him. I think he'd get a kick out of it. I hope you do too. And remember, bad rhymes are always best read out loud.

There once was a scholar named Jervis
teacher, mentor, and scion of professional service

For years on his advice, we've been reliant
but he's known most of all – though he wasn't that tall
as a true intellectual giant

The weight of his impact on the theory of IR
was massive, sayin' otherwise would make me a liar

For big and important ideas, he had the best antenna
on perceptual defects – and system effects
and not least, the workings of the security dilemma

He loved him some good diplomatic histories
Smiled when the archives yielded up their mysteries

Loved to pore over files of old letters and cables
when a politico flails – or intelligence fails

Didn't love, but would tolerate statistical tables

Bob cared about interesting theoretical prisms
but didn't get mired in the wars of the "isms"
Was open to others' methods, whether qualitative or quant
Even an experiment – he saw as no detriment
If that's what the question might warrant

In the Department, and at Saltzman, he built our community
we could stop by his office anytime with impunity
to discuss new findings, or cases, or a theoretical hunch

And when time to sup – he'd round us all up
Pop his head in our doors with a smile to ask: "Lunch?"
Brown bags at faculty house, then later in thirteen-oh-two
On the politics of the day we'd sit and spew
He'd regale us with tales of Zbigniew Brzezinski

Oh my, oh dear – I'm in a pickle I fear
Any rhyme I make here will be wince-ski

Reading his journals, he'd often be pensive
But I never met a man who was less defensive

What should give us mere mortal academics vertigo
when thinking of Bob – and what he did in his job
is the size of his contribution-to-ego ratio

Bob was mentor to many a colleague and student
To heed his advice, we all knew to be prudent
Grawemeyer winners have a right to be imperious

But in it for the joy – for politics were his toy
he just never took himself that serious

Well known for his humor mischiev-ee-ous
“Jervis plans” could be downright devious

To thin the ranks of senior faculty, by default?
To open up apartments – and slots in departments?
(With more than a wrinkle – he could say with a twinkle)
“Columbia ought to stop spreading its sidewalks with salt!”

He cared more to be known for his decisions editorial
than he did for his daily choices sartorial
To trends of fashion he was definitely no lackey
Ever the same specs – with polos or turtlenecks
and he always wore pants that were khaki

Of the things we love him for, this is a mere sample

I’ll close with a reference to his favorite example

A crisis on the Nile between the Brits and the French
(On the case of Fashoda – he’s kind of a yoda)

But for much more than this, he’ll be sorely missed

For he was the dictionary definition of a mensch

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APPENDIX I: ROBERT JERVIS, “HOW I GOT HERE,” ESSAY FROM THE *LEARNING THE SCHOLAR’S CRAFT* ESSAY SERIES

[Originally published as “How I Got Here,” H-Diplo Essay 198, 4 March 2020, <https://hdiplo.org/to/E198>].

For as long as I can remember—and long before I knew there was a field called Political Science with a specialization in International Politics—I was intrigued by politics. This was due to a combination of what must have been my in-born nature, the strongly political atmosphere of New York in the 1940’s and 1950’s, and, perhaps most of all, “events, dear boy, events,” in the words that Prime Minister Harold Macmillan used to explain to an interviewer why his policies had changed.¹ Since I was born in 1940, my first memories were of World War II and then the Cold War. The early years of the latter led me to the question I would grapple with later in exploring deterrence and the spiral model as explanations of and prescriptions for conflict.² In fact, I remember pestering my parents about what they thought the U.S. should do in response to the Soviet Union shooting down what I thought were innocent American airplanes in the late 1940’s (I would have been shocked had I been told that the Soviets were correct to label these spy missions). Needless to say, this question recurs not only in my scholarship, but, more importantly, in world politics. When I started writing this essay in late January 2020, the newspapers carried a story about the American strikes against Iranian backed militias in Syria and Iraq in retaliation for a rocket barrage that killed an American contractor. “The key question” according to the American reporter, “is whether the American counter attack can end the cycle of violence of escalate it.”³

In fifth grade I organized a few classmates to produce a current-events newsletter. A strange hobby, perhaps, but it was not out of sync with the spirit of the times, at least not in New York liberal circles. McCarthyism and the Korean War heightened our worries, and because friends of my parents were called before various Congressional committees, the issues were more than abstract.

Two other influences were important. My older brother, with whom I am now quite close, beat me up quite regularly, including once knocking out a (loose) tooth. From this I developed a healthy respect for the use of force, paired with an understanding that it made sense to avoid conflict if possible. The other influence was my fierce loyalty to the Brooklyn Dodgers, who in this period would often come close to the holy grail of the World Series, only to falter at the end. This torment was compounded by the fact that almost everyone else in my school rooted for the New York Yankees, and the result was a sympathy for the underdog. Perhaps the most crushing memory, and the last time I cried over anything other than a death, was Bobby Thompson’s home run that defeated the Dodgers in the 1951 playoffs. Given my later interest in deception in international politics, I was glad when the story came out that he managed this not only because of the short left field fence in the Polo Grounds but because the Giants had stolen the sign and knew he was getting a fastball.

Being a good liberal, I did my bit by handing out leaflets for Adlai Stevenson in 1952 and 1956 (not that this mattered much in Manhattan). While I later learned from political scientist Fred Greenstein and many historians that Dwight D. Eisenhower was very skilled, and was perhaps a better president than Stevenson would have been,⁴ I still have great admiration for him and so was gratified many years later when I was given the Adlai Stevenson chair at my university. As

¹ In fact, although the saying is well known, it may be apocryphal: Robert Harris, “As Macmillan Never Said,” *The Telegraph*, 4 June 2002, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3577416/As-Macmillan-never-said-thats-enough-quotations.html>.

² Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017 [1976]), ch. 3.

³ Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Attacks Iranian-Backed Forces in Iraq and Syria in Retaliatory Strikes,” *New York Times*, 30 December 2019.

⁴ Fred Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1962).

documents from the Eisenhower Administration became available and I was able to compare my contemporary views with a less biased and more accurate understanding, I learned (a bit of) humility and an appreciation of the importance of preserving and studying the historical record.

Until my junior year at Oberlin College my interests were much more driven by current events than by scholarship. This is not to say that my high school and college courses in history and political science were bad—I had one marvelous course in early modern European History in high school and great courses in American politics and European History at Oberlin—but they did not give me powerful analytical tools for understanding what was happening. But the Oberlin library put new books on display, and in quick succession I stumbled upon Thomas Schelling's *Strategy of Conflict* and Glenn Snyder's *Deterrence and Defense*.⁵ I had already been deeply interested in nuclear strategy, or rather in the raging debates about the “missile gap,” the commonly-believed ‘fact’ that the Soviets had a great advantage over the U.S in this domain, and its consequences. Indeed, for my own benefit I had written a paper on this subject in 1959. The theoretical structure it lacked was supplied by the Schelling and Snyder books, which are now recognized as classics. Among their foundational ideas is the importance of strategic interaction, i.e., that when rational states act, they do so anticipating how others will respond, knowing that the others are similarly anticipating what the actor will do. This and the other tools that were developed in these books led me to a much deeper understanding not only of nuclear strategy, but of a wide range of international politics, both current and past.

Schelling and Snyder became very important figures later in my life. Serendipitously, Berkeley had given Snyder a two-year visiting appointment, and so I enthusiastically took his field survey course in the fall of 1962. He was a very good instructor, but in the classroom as in his writings he was not flashy or self-promoting. This low-key stance did not fit with the Berkeley department's drive to get to the top of the professional ladder, and so it foolishly let him go, thereby missing out on his two later milestone books, *Conflict among Nations* (co-authored with Paul Diesing) and *Alliance Politics*.⁶ Not only did I learn a great deal from Snyder's lectures, but his reading list included chapters from Arnold Wolfers's *Discord and Collaboration*.⁷ Here I discovered the work of a founder of American Realism (although of course he and the others were European emigres) that made analytical sense to me. I had been assigned Hans Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations*,⁸ and while at the time I found it discursive and vague, I have revised my critical judgement of some of Morgenthau's other writings, my evaluation of his textbook remains the same. Wolfers's essays, on the other hand, were clean, clear, and incisive. I think they can be read today to great advantage. I was also deeply impressed with Snyder as a person. Unassuming, he always listened carefully to students, many of whom did not deserve this attention, would spend time mulling over ideas, and greatly encouraged me to pursue my own. I was able to return the favor many years later when I urged my colleagues at the University of North Carolina to consider Glenn for their opening—he had been in for a talk but his low-key manner had not impressed.

I also audited a course by the great European diplomatic historian, Raymond Sontag. His lectures were marvelous, and I still turn to his *European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932*,⁹ but I looked in vain for the sort of probing for explanations and causes that I had grown accustomed to from Snyder and the readings he had assigned. I was fascinated by the events Sontag

⁵ Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

⁶ Glenn Herald Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

⁷ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965).

⁸ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 2nd ed., revised and enlarged (New York: Knopf, 1959).

⁹ Raymond Sontag, *European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1933).

recounted and his ability to make sense of them, but frustrated by the narrative's blurring of the line between description and explanation and the lack of focus on bringing evidence to bear on theoretical propositions. This was simply a different way of approaching the material.¹⁰ He, like Snyder, cared deeply about his students, however, and when I went to visit him in his office hours was struck by the fact that he wrote my name and interests on a card which he placed in his massive file. But he also indicated that much as he appreciated the interests of political scientists like myself in European diplomatic history, he did not think that they could shed much light on the subject.

My view of the history discipline was very much as an outsider, and I missed most of the fascinating cross-currents that David Hollinger saw as a history graduate student.¹¹ As he notes, Sontag was of the older school and the emerging trends in intellectual, social, and cultural history that caught the imagination of the younger faculty and students did not enter in.

Two episodes at Berkeley embodied the interaction of doing and studying politics. Given my commitment to civil liberties and civil rights, I was an active participant in the Free Speech Movement (FSM). The right to speak and organize that we were defending in the FSM was intended to combat racial discrimination in various commercial establishments in San Francisco. Although I had been active in student government in high school and college (and had chosen Berkeley partly because of its students' role in the protests against the House Un-American Activities Committee meeting in San Francisco), the FSM was on a larger stage and played for more serious stakes. While I can't say that I had much influence, I was struck by the importance of dedication and commitment, the large role for folly and error, the significance of accidents and luck, and the difficulty of any one actor of understanding the whole picture; as a prime example of this point, almost none of us understood the political pressures Clark Kerr, the reviled president of the university, was under. I also saw that my own political instincts and calculations often proved flawed if not entirely wrong, which offered a nice lesson in humility. Unlike many of my colleagues, neither the FSM experience nor my opposition to the Vietnam War (see below) moved my general political views. These were already deeply anchored. Those with much less political experience were more strongly buffeted by these winds.

The second instance involved the reverse flow from studying to changing a policy position. In the spring of 1963, I took a course on revolutions from Chalmers Johnson, the brilliant scholar of Japan, whose own political position moved from the right to the far left without pausing in between, and I wrote a paper on what was then called internal war and what we would now call insurgency and counter-insurgency. This study of past cases and relevant theories convinced me that the U.S. could not win the war in South Vietnam, at least at a reasonable price, as long as the border with North Vietnam remained unsealed. Unlike many of my liberal colleagues, however, I did not think that the war was immoral, that the North Vietnamese regime was benign, or that the marvelous solution of neutralization was available. My later research was to study the propensity of people to avoid difficult value trade-offs and the prevalence of rationalizations to ease the burdens of choice, but even then I saw that a negotiated solution, nice as it would be, was simply beyond reach. Like many in my generation, however, I am drawn back to the Vietnam War, teach about it, and have written a bit on it.¹² Here too the

¹⁰ For my own discussions of difference between IR scholars and international historians, see "Diplomatic History and International Relations: Why are they Studied So Differently?" in Miriam Fendius Elman and Colin Elman, eds., *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001) and "International Politics and Diplomatic History: Fruitful Differences," H-Diplo, June 2009, <https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Jervis-InaguralAddress.pdf>.

¹¹ David Hollinger, "Between Samuel Flagg Bemis and Perry Miller," 8 February 2020, <https://hdiplo.org/to/E189>.

¹² Jervis, "The Politics of Troop Withdrawal: Salted Peanuts, the Commitment Trap, and Buying Time," *Diplomatic History* 34:3 (June 2010); "Audience Costs and Vietnam: A Comment on Lewis and Trachtenberg," H-Diplo/ISSF Forum 3(November 2014), <http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Forum-3.pdf>

documents, first in the *Pentagon Papers* and later in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes, tell us how much of the story we could not see at the time.¹³

As an aside I should mention that although the Vietnam War did not have much impact on the political science discipline, my sense is that it did strongly affect the field of diplomatic history. On the positive side, it induced a more critical perspective on American foreign policy and a refusal to take official justifications at face value. So far, so good; but in my view much of the field went too far in seeing American blundering as either uniquely American or the product of capitalism (with the implication that other economic and social systems would behave differently) and, relatedly, by transmuting moral condemnation into cheap moralism, with the implication that we academics not only know more than the policy-makers at the time but are morally superior to them. Vietnam also contributed to the flight of the historians from international political history.

Academic study, perhaps also combined with Vietnam, also affected my political views on the question that had preoccupied me from the beginning—whether, when, and how conflicts are best dealt with by threats or by conciliation, or, of course, how these approaches can be sequenced and interwoven. I started working on deterrence and the spiral model as alternative descriptions of and prescriptions for the Cold War with a strong bias toward deterrence. But immersion in the relevant theories, the analysis of perception and misperception, and a wide range of historical cases led me to have more sympathy for the spiral model. In the end, while I continue to study and teach about the Cold War, my conclusions remain fluid.¹⁴

As I continued to read history, I became more convinced that not only was chess a wildly inaccurate model for international politics (the rules are established and all play is open), but even poker (with its role for deception) is inadequate. In fact, actors often live in very different worlds, fail to perceive each other accurately, and, even more, do not appreciate this. The best picture is then provided by the Japanese short story and movie *Rashomon*, which reveals that each actor sees the situation very differently, and usually in a self-serving manner.

It was thanks to Schelling, to whom I had sent my early work on signaling, that I owe the two years of research at Harvard's Center for International Affairs (CFIA) that was so important for my later career. To digress, I want to note that without disclaiming the virtues of the papers I had sent Schelling, getting this position involved a good bit of luck. Without it my research and career would not have been nearly as successful. In those two years I was able to complete my first book on signaling and deception (in retrospect, this would have been a much better title than *The Logic of Images in International Relations*¹⁵), which was built on the scholarship of Schelling and the imaginative sociologist Erving Goffman¹⁶ and was a combination of rational choice and constructivism, both *avant la lettre*. Not surprisingly, it did not fit any of the categories in the field, but did spark the interest of a Ph.D. student of Schelling's in economics, Michael Spence, who went on to win a Nobel Prize for his approach to signaling.

¹³ Just to mention one fascinating study I draw on for my thinking and teaching about on diplomacy, see James Hershberg, *Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

¹⁴ Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24:4 (December 1980): 563-92; Jervis, "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?" *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3:1 (Winter 2001): 36-60; Jervis, "Identity and the Cold War," in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 22-43.

¹⁵ Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970; New York: Columbia University Press, 2nd ed., 1989).

¹⁶ Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959).

An additional benefit of these years was meeting life-long friends of my generation in political science and coming into close contact with three others. Schelling had brought me to Harvard, his written work was and remains a lodestar for mine, and we established a friendship that ended only with his death. The second was Kenneth Waltz, who, on his sabbatical year, had the office next to me at the CFIA. We talked literally every day, often for several hours (it got to the point where when his wife wanted to reach him, she phoned my office first). Talking to Waltz allowed me to pick up where I had left off with Glenn Snyder (the two of them were also good friends), and I realized in a combination of delight and horror how little of the field I had learned at Berkeley. Guided by Ken, and having the gift of being free of teaching and administration, I read and thought much more than I had before. His approach to rigorous social science theorizing and to the analysis of systems served me well in the rest of my career. I was overjoyed when, after retiring from Berkeley, Ken and his wife moved back to New York and he became an affiliate of the institute that had been founded by his mentor, Bill Fox.

The third friendship was with Samuel Williamson, an assistant professor in the History department. He taught me a great deal about the origins of World War I, pointed me to other important books in his field, and helped start the dialogue with history and historians that I have sought to maintain ever since. Williamson himself sank to becoming a university president, but fortunately did not abandon scholarship and anyone in early twentieth-century international politics should read his books and articles.¹⁷

Much of the rest of my career can be read in my CV, so here I just want to pick up a couple of themes. First is the continuing involvement with the field of history. Although I have not plumbed cases and trends to the depth of some of my colleagues and students,¹⁸ continuing conversations with historians, especially Robert Dallek, John Gaddis, Mel Leffler, Paul Kennedy, Paul Schroeder, and Marc Trachtenberg have enriched my life, my teaching, and my own writings. Rather than trying to summarize what I have learned from each, I will be content to say that in addition to developing a deep appreciation for the historian's craft, I have thought more about the contrast between the typical political science method of comparing cases in order to try to establish the causal efficacy of various factors (an approach which usually assumes that cases are independent of each other) and the historian's sensibility that the backbone of understand is chronology, and that events, trends, and 'cases' (a term that historians would not use) are not independent but rather are strongly influenced by what has preceded them.

Throughout the rest of my career, academic scholarship and current politics continued to intersect and enrich each other.¹⁹ Three instances stand out. First, when I became a consultant to the CIA in the fall of 1978, I rekindled my interest in nuclear strategy, which was then a subject to raging debates centering on the state of the nuclear balance and whether the Soviet leaders believed, to take part of the title of one influential article that grew out of an official study, that they "Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War."²⁰ I not only closely followed the public debates, (and listened to, without being persuaded

¹⁷ See, for example, Samuel Williamson, *The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914* (London: Ashfield Press, 1990); Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War* (London: Macmillan, 1991); Williamson and Ernest May, "An Identity of Opinion: Historians and July 1914," *Journal of Modern History* 79:2 (June 2007): 335-387.

¹⁸ See, for example, Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Affairs* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Jack Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983) and articles too numerous to cite; James McAllister, *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

¹⁹ For more on this, see my "Politics and Political Science," *Annual Review of Political Science* 21 (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, 2018), 1-19.

²⁰ Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary*, July 1977.

by, the hawkish arguments of the famed nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter),²¹ but was now able to read many of the classified studies. These convinced me that official thinking was superficial and failed to come to grips with the insights of theorists like my UCLA colleague Bernard Brodie and the clear thinking of Tom Schelling. Instead, they viewed nuclear weapons within the intellectual framework of earlier eras in which military victory was possible, an error that Hans Morgenthau labeled “conventionalization,”²² rather than grasping the implications of what I and others called the nuclear revolution.²³ This led me to think more deeply about the subject, culminating in two books in which I sought to both intervene in the policy debate and lay out fairly rigorous analytical arguments. Their validity is of course subject to debate, as is their relevance for contemporary politics.²⁴ I cannot do justice to the issues here, but just want to note that I would not have gotten deeply into these questions were it not for having to confront how they were playing out within the government.²⁵ This involvement not only carries the obvious risk that policy preferences will drive analysis, but also brings out the tensions between the descriptive and the normative aspects of many of our theories.²⁶ As I was working at the CIA it became apparent that, contrary to what had been foreseen, Iran was entering the throes of a revolution. Because Deputy CIA Director Robert Bowie was a former colleague who knew of my work on misperception, I was asked to write a post-mortem. This was a fascinating experience that taught me quite a bit about how the government worked, and led me to propose a similar study of the Iraq intelligence failure a generation later. Although the former had only a slight impact on the way the U.S. did its intelligence business, the latter, combined with internal studies, did I think make a positive contribution, and I was able to mine both cases for insights into how individuals and organizations processed information under difficult circumstances.²⁷

This pattern continued even without exposure to inside information. The election of President Donald Trump was not only an unpleasant surprise, but led me to think about how his term in office would test various IR theories. A few weeks after Rex Tillerson was appointed Secretary of State, lecturing to my introductory undergraduate course led me to think that the arguments of Richard Neustadt on presidential power pointed to the likelihood that Tillerson would be extraordinarily weak.²⁸

²¹ See my contribution to the Roundtable review of Ron Robin’s biography of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, *The Cold War They Made* <http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Roundtable-10-17.pdf>.

²² Hans Morgenthau, “The Fallacy of Thinking Conventionally about Nuclear Weapons,” in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., *Arms Control and Technological Innovation* (New York: Wiley, 1976), 256-264.

²³ For my own thinking, see *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984) and *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). I have updated and extended some of these ideas in “The Nuclear Age: During and After the Cold War,” in a forthcoming volume edited by Nuno Monteiro and Fritz Bartel.

²⁴ See the Symposium on the twentieth anniversary of the publication of *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, forthcoming in the *Texas National Security Review*, forthcoming.

²⁵ My own experience is far from unique; in fact, the field of nuclear strategy developed through close contact with pressing policy issues, as I have explained in “Security Studies: Ideas, Policy, and Politics,” in Edward Mansfield and Richard Sisson, eds., *The Evolution of Political Knowledge* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2004), 100-126.

²⁶ I discussed this further in “International Politics and Diplomatic History: Fruitful Differences.”

²⁷ Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

²⁸ Jervis, “President Trump and IR Theory,” International Security Studies Forum Policy Series, American and the World—2017 and Beyond,” 2 January 2017. <http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/Policy-Roundtable-1-5B.pdf>; Jervis, “Rex Tillerson Might Be the

In light of the discussion of the gap between IR social science and policy relevance,²⁹ it is worth noting that my slight entrée into the policy world and even slighter influence has come much less through my writings on policy than by the fact that a range of middle-level officials are familiar with my academic writings (and also that a number of my students have gone into the government either at the working levels or for short-term political assignments).

Not all my research was sparked by policy concerns, however. My work on the dynamics of systems was not. Initially spawned by an invitation to contribute to Tom Schelling's festschrift, it built on ideas of strategic interaction and Schelling's collection of marvelous essays explicating how collective outcomes could diverge from individual desires and actions,³⁰ to discuss selection effects and other ways in which the anticipations of how others would respond were central to a wide range of political and social patterns.³¹ I later expanded this into *System Effects*, which I think is my most important book because it applies to so much of human (and animal) life.³² Drawing not only on Schelling, but also on psychology and, especially, ecology and evolution, I tried to elucidate the mechanisms that arise when multiple actors and influences are interconnected, often in ways that make tracing causation impossible before the fact and difficult afterwards, confounding many of our standard notions about causation that are derived from the belief that we can compare cases holding all but one variable constant.³³ We then often see unintended consequences, nonlinearities, various forms of feedbacks, and co-evolution of actors and their environments (to the extent that these can be meaningfully distinguished). All of this is further complicated when the actors have their own ideas about the workings of the system. This perspective has parallels to historians' sense of the ironies of history, and to the view that John Gaddis developed in his *Landscape of History*.³⁴ Not being anchored in pressing political science debates, this book has received less attention in the discipline than others I have written, but it has gained readers in other fields and been assigned in at least one medical school class. Its contribution is to expand our ways of thinking to deal with complexity; those who are intrigued can read the quotation that begins the book and do not have to read further if they see the dangerous oversimplification that it embodies.

Reading in the diverse fields that constituted my research and writing the book were great fun and led me to see the world in a different way. This enjoyment and stimulation that we hope leads to a collective better understanding of the world is of course the point of our shared enterprise.

Robert Jervis was Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University and Founding Editor of ISSF. His most recent book was *How Statesmen Think* (Princeton University Press, 2017). He was President of the

Weakest Secretary of State Ever," *Foreign Policy*, 2017. Neustadt's path-breaking and still relevant book is *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: New American Library, 1960).

²⁹ See, for example, Michael Desch, *Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019); also see the review essay on this book by Lawrence Freedman in *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42:7 (December 2019): 1027-1037.

³⁰ Thomas Schelling, *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006).

³¹ Jervis, "Systems Effects," in Richard Zeckhauser, ed., *Strategy and Choice* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 107-130.

³² Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

³³ I discussed this further in "Causation and Responsibility in a Complex World," in Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein, eds, *Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 313-338.

³⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

American Political Science Association in 2000-01 and was the founding editor of the International Security Studies Forum. He has received career achievement awards from the International Society of Political Psychology and ISA's Security Studies Section, the Grawemeyer Award for the book with the Best Ideas for Improving World Order, and the National Academy of Science's tri-annual award for behavioral sciences contributions to avoiding nuclear war.

APPENDIX II: ROBERT JERVIS'S C.V.

CURRICULUM VITAE, Robert Jervis (rlj1@columbia.edu)

EDUCATION:

B.A., Oberlin College, 1962
M.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1963
Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley, 1968

PRESENT POSITION:

Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics, Columbia University.

PREVIOUS POSITIONS:

- Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, 1974-1980
- Lady Davis Visiting Professor, Hebrew University, Spring 1977
- Visiting Associate Professor, Yale University, 1973-1974.
- International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, 1971-1972
- Assistant (1968-1972) and Associate (1972-1974) Professor of Government, Harvard University

PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS:

- President, American Political Science Association, 2000-2001
- Co-editor, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, Cornell University Press
- Founding Editor, International Security Studies Forum
- Member of ten editorial boards
- Co-chairman of the 1980 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association
- Program Chair, APSA Annual Meeting, 1987
- APSA Governing Council, 1980-1982, 1987-1989
- Vice President, APSA, 1988-1989
- Member, NSF Political Science Panel, 1983-1985
- Chair, working group on security studies, Committee on Basic Research in the Behavioral and Social Sciences, National Research Council, 1986
- Member, Committee on Contributions of Behavioral and Social Science to the Prevention of Nuclear War, National Academy of Sciences, 1984-1990
- Conference Chair, 1988 meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology
- Program co-chair, ISPP, 1990
- Governing Council, ISPP, 1988-1990

OUTSIDE PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

- Chair, CIA's Historical Review Panel, 1998-2018
- Intelligence Community Associate

PROFESSIONAL HONORS:

- Honorary degree, University Piraeus (ceremony delayed due to the pandemic)
- Honorary degree, Università Ca' Foscari, Venice
- Honorary degree, Oberlin College

- Fellow, American Association for the Advancement of Science
- Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences
- Fellow, American Academy of Political and Social Science
- Member, American Philosophical Society
- Corresponding Fellow, British Academy
- Member, Council on Foreign Relations
- Guggenheim Fellow, 1978-1979
- President, APSA, 2000-2001
- Invited Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences
- Grawemeyer Award for the book with the Best Ideas for Improving World Order, (*The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*) 1990
- Nevitt Sanford Award for Distinguished Professional Contribution to Political Psychology, 1992
- Career Achievement Award, Security Studies Section, International Studies Association, 1996
- Lasswell Award for lifetime achievement, International Society of Political Psychology, 2004
- *System Effects* received: Honorable mention, American Association of Publishers, Professional and Scholarly Publishing Division for Political Science; Lionel Trilling Award for best book by a Columbia faculty member; best book award, Political Psychology Section, APSA
- National Academy of Science award for contributions on behavioral science to preventing nuclear war, 2006.
- Inaugural Distinguished Scholar Award, Foreign Policy Section, APSA, 2016

PUBLICATIONS:

Authored Books

The Logic of Images in International Relations, Princeton University Press, 1970; 2nd ed., Columbia University Press, 1989.

Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Press, 1976; 2nd ed. with new preface, 2017.

The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, Cornell University Press, 1984.

Co-author with Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.

The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, Cornell University Press, 1989.

System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, Princeton University Press, 1997.

American Foreign Policy in a New Era, Routledge, 2005.

Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War, Cornell University Press, 2010.

How Statesmen Think: The Political Psychology of International Politics, Princeton University Press, 2017.

Edited Books

Co-editor with Robert Art, *International Politics*, multiple editions.

Co-editor with Paul Stern, Robert Axelrod, and Roy Radnor, *Perspectives on Deterrence*, Oxford University Press, 1989.

Co-editor with Philip Tetlock, Jo Husbands, Paul Stern, and Charles Tilly, *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, 3 vols., Oxford University Press, 1990-1993.

Co-editor with Jack Snyder, *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Superpower Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, Oxford University Press, 1991.

Co-editor with Seweryn Bialer, *Soviet-American Relations After the Cold War*, Duke University Press, 1991.

Co-editor with Jack Snyder, *Coping with Complexity in the International System*, Westview Press, 1993.

Co-editor with David Sears and Leonie Huddy, *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, Oxford University Press, 2003.

Co-editor with David Wetzle and Jack Levy, *Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays by Paul Schroeder*, Palgrave, 2004.

Co-editor with Francis Gavin, Diane Labrosse, and Joshua Rovner, *Chaos in the Liberal Order*, Columbia University Press, 2018.

Co-editor with Diane Labrosse, Stacie Goddard, and Joshua Rovner, *The Liberal Order Strikes Back? Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and the Future of International Politics* Columbia University Press, forthcoming, 2022.

Articles

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APPENDIX III: ROBERT JERVIS'S H-DIPLO/ISSF WRITINGS

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APPENDIX IV: ARTICLES IN WHICH ROBERT JERVIS DISCUSSES HIS CAREER

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