

Interdependencies between short-term electricity markets

Karl Frauendorfer¹⁾, Dietmar Graeber²⁾, Michael Schürle^{1), 3)}

¹⁾ formerly Institute for Operations Research and Computational Finance, University of St. Gallen

²⁾ Technische Hochschule Ulm, Professur für Energiewirtschaft

³⁾ School of Finance, University of St. Gallen

Climate, Energy and Finance Workshop
Essen, 25 – 26 March 2026

Overview (1)

- Motivation: Comparison of revenue potential of flexible capacities on intraday (IDM) and balancing energy (BEM) markets for Germany
- Modelling distributions of the German intraday price in the last 30 min before delivery (SDAT phase)
 - Literature focusses mainly on ID3 / ID1 window
 - Market is treated as one integrated pool
- SDAT phase largely ignored:
 - Structural break 30 min before delivery
 - Trading becomes control-area specific → no longer single market
 - Liquidity fragments heavily, very different in individual area
 - Possibly zero-trade intervals, no observable price at all

Overview (2)

- But: Absence of trades $\neq$ absence of executable price
- Move analysis from realized transaction prices to executable prices derived from the order book
- Extract volume-weighted executable prices from bid and ask sides of reconstructed order book
- Concentrate on 15 min products; bid sizes 1 MW, 2 MW, ...
- Model capacity as financial option (strike = variable generation costs)
 - Generation: Sell to bid
 - Consumption: Buy at ask
- Model revenues from BE activation

Context: Project DigIPlat

- DigIPlat = Digital Solutions for Interoperability of Flexibility Platforms
- Consortium of research institutions and transmission system operators (funded by ERA-Net, see footer)
 - Development of new digital approaches for interoperability along the ICT, process-related, and economic dimensions
 - Standardized framework for interoperable platforms and flexibility requirements
 - Use cases for cross-border and cross-platform coordination of flexibility for redispatch, balancing energy, and intraday markets (focus on DACH region)

DigIPlat: Economic Evaluation of Use Cases



- Aspect of interoperability: "All-rounder product"
 - Coordinated procurement of balancing power and redispatch (Zobernig et al., 2025)
 - Integration of bids for 15' products from the intraday market (IDM) order book into the bid list on the balancing energy market (BEM) before its gate closure
→ our focus for market area DE (liquidity, data availability)
- Bids on the IDM & BEM are not fully compatible from an economic perspective:
 - Will a bid on the BEM be accepted and then actually activated?
 - Different energy deliveries and compensation (IDM: traded quantity over a full 15 minutes; BEM: activation duration uncertain)
- Questions:
 - Supplier perspective: Are additional incentives needed (e.g., premiums) so that qualified suppliers allow the transfer of ID bids to the BEM?
 - Transmission system operator (TSO) perspective: Potential increase in the volume of available bids on the BEM?

Short-term markets for flexibility

- Intraday Market (IDM):
 - Allows trading based on new information after the closing of the day-ahead market; 60' and 15' products
 - DE: Continuous trading from 3:00 PM (D – 1) until 5 minutes before delivery begins; SIDC until T – 60, trading within DE until T – 30, then only within the respective control area (SDAT)
 - Each transaction has its own price
- Balancing Energy Market (BEM) for Automatic Frequency Restoration Reserve (aFRR):
 - 15' product time slices each for positive & negative aFRR
 - Gate Closure at T – 25 (Auction): Awarded suppliers on the balancing capacity market must submit a bid; additional free bids are possible
 - Since June 2022: Bids are forwarded to the European PICASSO platform (December 2022: no release of unapproved bids), activation after merit order
 - Settlement of the delivered energy at the uniform price (CBMP)

Trading volumes IDM (15 min products)

- Trading volume varies depending on the product and tends to increase significantly towards the end of the trading session.
- Three different trading phases:
 - (1) SIDC
 - (2) Trading within DE and
 - (3) own balancing area (SDAT)
- Significantly different liquidity depending on the balancing area (trading volume, bid-ask spreads)
- In "illiquid" area possibly no transaction in last 30 min




Transaction volume per minute for a 15-minute product with delivery at night (00:00 – 00:15, left) and during the day (11:45 – 12:00, right) in the last six hours of trading. Colors correspond to the respective areas.


Short-term markets for flexibility

- Intraday Market (IDM):
 - Allows trading based on new information after the closing of the day-ahead market; 60' and 15' products
 - DE: Continuous trading from 3:00 PM (D – 1) until 5 minutes before delivery begins; SIDC until T – 60, trading within DE until T – 30, then only within the respective control area (SDAT)
 - Each transaction has its own price
- Balancing Energy Market (BEM) for Automatic Frequency Restoration Reserve (aFRR):
 - 15' product time slices each for positive & negative aFRR
 - Gate Closure at T – 25 (Auction): Awarded suppliers on the balancing capacity market must submit a bid; additional free bids are possible
 - Since June 2022: Bids are forwarded to the European PICASSO platform (December 2022: no release of unapproved bids), activation after merit order
 - Settlement of the delivered energy at the uniform price (CBMP)

Use Case: Integration of IDM and BEM




Bids BEM (aFRR) after go-live PICASSO




Currently, for positive and negative reserve energy, the maximum price of $\pm 15,000$ EUR/MWh is practically always offered in the last considered bid, i.e., every lower bid is automatically considered.
 $\Rightarrow$ No option from the release of unsuccessful bids from the IDM.

Market liquidity and order book depth: DE




- Order book snapshots in 1' intervals were constructed from all bids in 2023 for the market area DE (42 GB data); this resulted for the SDAT phase in 43 million data points
- Order book depth = cumulated volume of buy or sell orders
- Relevant for buying and selling of a certain amount X
- An effective transaction price results from the volume-weighted ask- or bid prices of those "best" bids whose cumulated volume equals X

Market liquidity and order book depth: DE



- Order book snapshots in 1' intervals were constructed from all bids in 2023 for the market area DE (42 GB data); this resulted for the SDAT phase in 43 million data points
- Order book depth = cumulated volume of buy or sell orders
- Relevant for buying and selling of a certain amount X
- An effective transaction price results from the volume-weighted ask- or bid prices of those "best" bids whose cumulated volume equals X

Market liquidity and order book depth: TNG



- Order book snapshots in 1' intervals were constructed from all bids in 2023 for the market area DE (42 GB data); this resulted for the SDAT phase in 43 million data points
- Order book depth = cumulated volume of buy or sell orders
- Relevant for buying and selling of a certain amount X
- An effective transaction price results from the volume-weighted ask- or bid prices of those "best" bids whose cumulated volume equals X

Bid-Ask-Spreads [EUR/MWh] in $[T - 25, T - 5]$

Tennet/TNT control area (2023)

time to delivery (min)	Time of day (hours)			
	[0,6)	[6,12)	[12,18)	[18,24)
25	16.32	15.45	16.42	21.79
24	16.40	17.00	17.76	22.82
23	16.50	18.09	18.29	22.26
22	14.66	17.91	16.98	21.07
21	14.62	17.82	16.80	20.43
20	15.22	19.39	17.60	21.94
19	21.14	24.88	23.72	28.38
18	21.27	24.05	24.65	27.90
17	19.66	20.49	22.20	26.25
16	20.22	21.07	22.85	27.20
15	20.93	20.92	22.09	26.32
14	14.92	14.38	15.55	17.82
13	13.79	13.54	14.30	15.35
12	11.70	11.58	11.85	11.97
11	11.80	11.56	12.29	13.37
10	11.67	13.37	14.03	14.65
9	16.17	17.83	19.33	18.68
8	15.78	18.24	17.68	19.06
7	14.20	18.00	18.04	16.78
6	21.32	26.44	27.52	27.54


TransnetBW/TNG control area (2023)

time to delivery (min)	Time of day (hours)			
	[0,6)	[6,12)	[12,18)	[18,24)
25	81.28	61.36	67.86	96.09
24	87.86	70.47	75.82	104.92
23	87.84	66.31	70.09	105.40
22	77.79	57.81	63.46	86.27
21	70.56	53.87	60.12	83.16
20	67.62	53.34	57.39	82.07
19	186.19	141.02	155.05	213.73
18	187.52	136.54	154.89	213.84
17	162.89	117.09	126.39	182.67
16	160.02	114.01	124.56	173.37
15	157.66	111.70	123.02	167.90
14	285.40	210.46	218.22	296.05
13	264.99	191.05	198.67	269.10
12	198.56	142.91	151.70	195.63
11	183.37	134.69	139.86	178.65
10	183.84	135.27	141.09	179.06
9	247.01	172.44	185.05	244.73
8	188.15	131.80	143.15	186.91
7	171.36	114.58	126.59	164.93
6	170.55	116.73	129.18	166.24

Comparison revenues IDM vs. BEM


- Flexible capacity offered in the last 25' before delivery at IDM or BEM at variable costs (assumption: gas-fired plant)
- Trading volume 1 MW (increase or decrease of generation)
- Different market liquidity in SDAT phase depending on balancing area implies different revenue potential at IDM
- Ex-post calculation of potentially realizable revenues from volume-weighted bid- and ask-prices of derived order books (historic data for 2nd half of 2023):
 - Selling, if ID price (bid) > variable costs
 - Buying, if ID price (ask) < variable costs
- Comparison with revenues from aFRR activations:
 - Provision of positive balancing energy, if CBMP > variable costs
 - Provision of negative balancing energy, if CBMP < variable costs

Comparison revenues IDM vs. BEM



- A limit order / bid is placed in the last 25' either at the IDM or the BEM
- Potentially realizable revenues in both markets comparable (exception: illiquid TransnetBW area)
- IDM and BEM similarly attractive
- Providers would have been indifferent in which market they place a bid (or if a bid is transferred to the BEM or remains in the IDM)
- What if a provider bids in the market that appears *currently* more attractive?
- Model-based approach (valuation of both alternatives as financial options)

Comparison revenues IDM vs. BEM



- A limit order / bid is placed in the last 25' either at the IDM or the BEM
- Potentially realizable revenues in both markets comparable (exception: illiquid TransnetBW area)
- IDM and BEM similarly attractive
- Providers would have been indifferent in which market they place a bid (or if a bid is transferred to the BEM or remains in the IDM)
- What if a provider bids in the market that appears *currently* more attractive?
- Model-based approach (valuation of both alternatives as financial options)

Valuation as financial options

- Idea: Flexible capacity is comparable to a financial option that is "in the money" when the market price exceeds the strike price X (= variable generation cost) for a call option (the opposite for a put option).
 - Value the 15-minute option product on the intraday market (IDM).
 - Expected value (μ) = VWAP of previous 15' trading period, adjusted for historical spreads.
 - Compare with the option value on the balancing energy market (BEM): 225 options with delivery over 4-second intervals (frequency of activation signals).
 - Expected prices (μ) = last known mean CBMP values at activation of POS or NEG (publication with a 15-minute delay).
- If a bid at the BEM is not awarded, one would receive a short-term option on the IDM; this is disregarded (all bids better than $\pm 15,000$ EUR/MWh are accepted).
- Offer in the market with the higher option value.

Valuation as financial option (IDM and BEM)

- Normally distributed prices imply use of Bachelier-type formula¹⁾

- Call option: Sale of energy from increased production when the market price exceeds marginal costs (strike X):

$$V_C = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \max(p - X, 0) f_p(p) dp = \dots = \sigma(d\Phi(d) + \phi(d))$$

- Put option: Repurchase of energy and reduction of production when the market price is below marginal costs (strike X):


$$V_P = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \max(X - p, 0) f_p(p) dp = \dots = \sigma(\phi(d) - d\Phi(-d))$$

- $d = \frac{\mu - X}{\sigma}$; Φ, ϕ cdf. /pdf. standard normal distribution

¹⁾ See also Weber (2015) and BDEW guidelines for the remuneration of redispatch (2018) with opportunity costs from the ID1 price

Compensation balancing energy

- Due to the respective ramps, the providers follow the activation signal of the PICASSO platform with a delay (within predefined tolerance bands).
- Only provided energy is compensated at the maximum of cross-border marginal price (CBMP) of the PICASSO platform and the bid price.



Assumptions for calculating option values:


- Provider can adjust performance immediately (according to the Activation Optimization Function, AOF).
- Only CBMP at the time of an activation in German control areas is considered for evaluation.
- A new signal is calculated by the AOF every 4 seconds.
- Volatility is derived from the fluctuation of CBMP around the mean of the corresponding interval.

Assumptions for modelling BE option


- We need a forecast model for the duration of activation (percentage of the 225 options that are exercised during the 15 min period):

$$P_T^{act,+} = c^+ + a^+ \cdot P_{T-60}^{act,-} + b_1^+ \cdot P_{T-60}^{act,+} + b_2^+ \cdot P_{T-120}^{act,+}$$
$$P_T^{act,-} = c^- + a^- \cdot P_{T-60}^{act,+} + b_1^- \cdot P_{T-60}^{act,-} + b_2^- \cdot P_{T-120}^{act,-}$$

- Low coefficient of determination ($\approx 12\%$)



Revenues combined strategy IDM & BEM



- Bid in market with higher option value
- Model parameters from historical data, 1st half of 2023
- Determination of revenues with realized prices for 2nd half of the year (volume-weighted bid/ask prices IDM; CBMP for balancing energy)
- Figures above the bars show change compared to ID trading only
- Improvement in generation (selling at IDM, positive BE) and consumption (buying at IDM, negative BE), in particular in "illiquid" region

Summary

- Model-based approach for deciding which market to offer
- Value of flexibility is modeled analogously to a financial option
- Concentration on SDAT phase with trading in individual control areas
 - Realized transaction prices often unavailable
 - Use of executable prices derived from order book
→ synthetic prices at which 1 MW, 2 MW, ... could be traded
 - Economically more relevant for power plant to monetarize output is not an observed midpoint price, but price at which a certain volume can be bought or sold, conditioned on area, prevailing order book depth and bid-ask spread

Outlook

- Combined bidding leads to higher revenues than acting in one market only → model is economically meaningful despite its simplicity
- Normality assumption as convenient start, but optimistic in fragmented markets with large spreads (skewness, fat tails, ...)
- Ad-hoc approach for volatility estimation intraday price:
For each product, variation of executable prices around adjusted VWAP during calibration period
- Volatility may depend on level of liquidity, fundamental factors, ...
- Choice of test period 2023 due to availability of order book data, extension to other periods outstanding

Thank you!


Appendix: Assessment of use-case

- Use case: Integration of IDM bids into the BEM bid list, considered from the perspective of providers and grid operators
- Revenue opportunities in both markets are comparable; suppliers should be indifferent as to whether their bid is passed on to the BEM or remains in the IDM
- By transferring bids from the ID order book to the BEM, its merit order would shift to the right, thus potentially reducing the costs of balancing power
- Potentially available volume is lower than available bids on the RAM; the assumption that all bids $\geq 1\text{MW}$ are prequalified is rather unrealistic
- The attractiveness of the RAM would decrease due to lower compensation for activations; likewise, the liquidity of the IDM would decline

Appendix: Fundamental model ID price – variables


- ID prices: aggregated to 1 min time steps (volume-weighted averages)
- Distinction between time to delivery, not products!
- aFRR activation: second-based values from regelleistung.net, aggregated to 1 min
- mFRR activation: sum of values reported by all TSOs (assumption: signal comes 12.5' before 15' delivery period)
- aFRR publication: known 9' after end of 15' delivery period
- mFRR publication: known 0' after end of 15' delivery period
- Control area balance (TSO publication): known 15' after end of 15' delivery period
- Symmetric imbalance price (TSO publication): known 15' after end of 15' delivery period (NEW)
- Solar/wind generation (TSO publication): known 60' after end of 15' period
- Load (TSO publication): known 45' after end of 15' period
- Errors for solar/wind/load are differences to day-ahead forecasts
- Intraday-updated forecasts of wind & solar generation unavailable for 2023

Appendix: Comparison of model specifications



Minutes to delivery

- All data, symmetric errors & infeed
- as (1) w/o aFRR/mFRR activation
- as (1) w/o control area balance
- Full model, asymmetric errors & infeed
- Only aFRR activation
- as (1) w/o aFRR/mFRR publication
- as (1) w/o solar/wind/load errors
- as (1) w/o imbalance price
- Only imbalance price



- Overall lower explanatory power in 2023, also for the model versions aFRR activation is left away
- New variable "imbalance price" alone had higher explanatory power in 2021, but it seems to contribute more than control area balance in 2023

Appendix: Comparison of model specifications

- 15 min products: Higher explanatory power for front products. Their price is more sensitive to new information on the "system state"
- Higher explanatory power in 2021 than 2023, this holds also for model variants where aFRR/mFRR activation are removed and only the publicly available variables are used
- Removing aFRR/mFRR publication does generally not reduce R^2 much
- Removing control area balance reduces R^2 for front products in 2021, but not in 2023. Vice versa for the imbalance price


Appendix: Background

- 2021 and 2023 show similar control area balance deviations, which can be seen as proxy for reserve energy demand
- However, the activated reserve energy volumes activated reported by German TSOs have decreased significantly


	2021		2023	
	POS	NEG	POS	NEG
Total annual aFRR activation [MWh]	850'715	834'019	624'360	763'708
Total annual mFRR activation [MWh]	105'782	54'717	44'483	16'366
Avg. absolute control area balance [MW]	339.64		364.86	

- Effect of more efficient netting and cross-border exchange?
- Given the initial hypotheses, less activations mean also that (large) market participants receive fewer price signals

Appendix: Estimated coefficients (15' products)





- Large sensitivity w.r.t. aFRR activation (POS), e.g., a coefficient of 0.27 means that an activation of 1500 MW increases the ID price ≈ 400 EUR/MWh



- Also, large impact for mFRR activation (POS)
- Price sensitivities for NEG activation much smaller
- Note: Coefficients of front product more than twice larger then for hourly products



Appendix: Estimated coefficients (15' products)



- In 2021 much smaller sensitivities w.r.t. publication of aFRR/mFRR activation (POS)
- NEG activation insignificant (aFRR) or inconclusive sign (mFRR), but large errors!

- In 2023 enormous increase of sensitivity w.r.t. publication of mFRR activation (POS)

Appendix: Estimated coefficients (15' products)



- Overall smaller impact of TSO publications
- Largest for control area balance (no distinction between direction, magnitudes would be similar)
- Behavior of imbalance price coefficient not conclusive in 2021

- Impact of errors of wind and PV infeed not changed, load error insignificant
- In 2023, much higher sensitivity w.r.t. imbalance price, see also adj. R^2 s

Appendix: First interpretation

- Reduction in R^2 from 2021 to 2023 because considered factors from use of reserve energy contribute less to the explained variation
- After the introduction of PICASSO, German market participants receive less price signals from reserve energy activations as also foreign BSPs entered the market, less reserve energy is activated overall
- The higher sensitivities w.r.t. reserve energy use mean that if there is an activation, then the system is "more unbalanced" in 2023 than it was in 2021 for a comparable activation
- This applies in particular to mFRR, because if less aFRR is needed, then activations of mFRR occur even more rarely and in "more extreme" situations
- The calculation of control area has changed in 2023; possibly therefore the imbalance price provides better signals on deviations in the system

Appendix: Concentration at BEM

