"Ye shall know them by their fruits":

Corruption, Competitiveness, and Christianity in Europe and the Americas

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The President:

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Ehrenzeller

"Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.

Ye shall know them by their fruits.

Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire.

Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them.

Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven. Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name have cast out devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works? And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from me, ye that work iniquity."

(Matthew 7:15–23, King James Version)[1]

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Abstract

Background: High corruption and low competitiveness are common denominators in countries with pervasive Roman Catholic traditions. In contrast, historically Protestant countries, both in the Americas and in Europe, tend to have higher levels of transparency, education, social progress, and competitiveness. According to the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus Christ declared that "*Ye shall know them by their fruits."* He was referring to the true and false prophets who would come on his behalf. This parable inspires this study, which examines the relationship between religious systems ("prophets") and social prosperity ("fruits"). Its main question is*: How does Protestantism influence competitiveness and transparency compared to Roman Catholicism in Europe and the Americas?*

Methodology: I applied a comprehensive methodological framework consisting of different epistemological approaches (Mixed Methods). The correlational (quantitative) part established the interrelations between the investigated variables, while the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) further inferred causal relations for 65 countries in Europe and the Americas. The qualitative part used Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine four case studies (Switzerland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Colombia).

Results: Combining three main factors accounted for uneven socio-economic and institutional performance in Europe and the Americas. These factors are: 1. *Religion*: 1.1) Historical Protestantism and its positive influence on law, institutions and language (highest performance); 1.2) anti-clericalism (medium-high performance); 1.3) Roman Catholicism or Orthodoxy (medium-low performance); 1.4) Syncretism (low performance). 2. *Political non-religious influences*: 2.1) Communism (low performance). *3. Geography and environment*, which modulate overall performance.

Conclusion: This study contributes to existing research in this field by demonstrating for the first time the effect of the mutually reinforcing configuration of multiple prosperity triggers (religion–political–environment). Historical Protestantism largely influenced prosperity by promoting education, by secularising institutions and by stabilising democracy. Protestantism has also proven highly influential in the successive historical law revolutions that gradually mitigated the power of pervasive feudal institutions and of papalist medieval canon law. In contrast, traditionally Roman Catholic countries have generally upheld a medieval model of extractivist institutions until anti-clerical (non-communist) movements were able to weaken this influence in some countries.

Keywords: *Religion, corruption, prosperity, Roman Catholicism, Protestant Reformation, Church-State relations, competitiveness in Europe and the Americas, Switzerland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Colombia.*

Zusammenfassung

Hintergrund: Hohe Korruption und geringe Wettbewerbsfähigkeit kennzeichnen Länder mit einer fortwährenden römisch-katholischen Tradition. Im Gegensatz dazu weisen historisch protestantische Länder in Europa und dem amerikanischen Kontinent im Allgemeinen ein höheres Maß an Transparenz, Bildung, sozialem Fortschritt und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit aus. Jesus Christus verkündete: *"An ihren Früchten sollt ihr sie erkennen.*" Damit nahm er Bezug auf die wahren und falschen Propheten, die in seinem Namen kommen würden. Dieses Gleichnis hat die vorliegende Studie inspiriert, insbesondere die Untersuchung des Zusammenhangs zwischen religiösen Systemen ("Propheten") und sozialem Wohlstand ("Früchten"). Die Forschungsfrage lautet: *Wie beeinflusst der Protestantismus Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Transparenz im Vergleich zum römischen Katholizismus in Europa und den amerikanischen Kontinent?*

Methodik: Diese Forschung stützt sich auf einen umfassenden methodologischen Rahmen, der in verschiedene erkenntnistheoretische Ansätze *(Mixed Methods)* unterteilt ist. Der korrelationale (quantitative) Teil zeigt, wie sich die Variablen zueinander verhalten während die *Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)* die kausalen Beziehungen in 65 Ländern in Europa und den amerikanischen Kontinenten aufzeigt. Im qualitativen Teil wird die Kritische Diskursanalyse *(CDA)* auf vier Fallstudien angewendet: Schweiz, Uruguay, Kuba und Kolumbien.

Ergebnisse: Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie weisen auf eine Kombination von drei Hauptfaktoren hin, welche die ungleichen sozioökonomischen und institutionellen Leistungen in Europa und dem amerikanischen Kontinent verdeutlichen: 1. *Religion*: 1.1) Historischer Protestantismus in Bezug auf Recht / Institutionen / Sprache (höchste Leistungsfähigkeit); 1.2) Antiklerikalismus (mittel-hohe Leistungsfähigkeit); 1.3) Römischer Katholizismus oder Orthodoxie (mittel-niedrige Leistungsfähigkeit); 1.4) Synkretismus (tiefe Leistungsfähigkeit). 2. *Politische, nichtreligiöse Einflüsse*: 2.1) Kommunismus (geringe Einflussgrösse). 3. *Geographie und Umwelt* zur Modulierung der Gesamtleistung.

Fazit: Der Beitrag dieser Studie zur Forschung besteht in der Herausarbeitung der Tatsache, dass mehrere Wohlstandsauslöser (Religion – polititische Verhältnisse – Umwelt) sich gegenseitig verstärken und dadurch den Grad der Korruption bzw. des Wohlstands in einem Land bestimmen. Der historische Protestantismus förderte das Wohlstandsniveau durch seinen Einfluss auf die Bildung, die Säkularisierung von Institutionen und die Stabilisierung der Demokratie. Der Protestantismus erwies sich auch in den aufeinanderfolgenden historischen Gesetzesrevolutionen, welche die Gesellschaft allmählich von den durchdringenden feudalen Institutionen und einem mittelalterlichen päpstlichen Kirchengesetz trennten, als sehr einflussreich. Im Gegensatz dazu haben Länder der römisch-katholischen Tradition im Allgemeinen ein mittelalterliches Modell extrahierender Institutionen beibehalten, bis antiklerikale (nichtkommunistische) Bewegungen diesen Einfluss in einigen Ländern gemindert haben.

Schlüsselwörter: Religion, Korruption und Wohlstand, römischer Katholizismus, protestantische Reformation, Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Kirche, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit in Europa und den amerikanischen Kontinenten, Schweiz, Uruguay, Kuba, und Kolumbien.

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List of Abbreviations

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis

CPI: Corruption Perception Index

DP: Dialectical Pluralism

EPI: Environment Performance Index

GCI: Global Competitiveness Index

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GT: Grounded Theory

MM: Mixed Methods

NT: New Testament

OT: Old Testament

PDI: Power Distance Index

PG: Prosperity Gospel

PRI: Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency

QCA: Qualitative Comparative Analysis

SPI: Social Progress Index

TI: Transparency International

UK: United Kingdom

US: United States

VIF: Variance Inflation Factor

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"And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free"

(John 8:32, King James Version).

St. Gallen, August 2020 Jason Garcia Portilla

Introduction

This study seeks to understand the prosperity differences between countries in Europe and the Americas by elucidating the hegemonic and emancipatory religious factors leading to these dissimilarities. One key question in this respect is why Roman Catholic societies are different from Protestant ones although both are considered Christian.

This introduction is divided into four sections. Section 1 sets the historical stage and provides relevant background information. Section 2 presents the main research question. Section 3 describes the intended outcome of this study, its contributions to the literature and its limitations. Section 4 provides an overview of this study.

1. A Historical Challenge Inspiring this Study

About two thousand years ago, Jesus Christ described the true and false prophets coming on his behalf as follows: “Ye shall know them by their fruits” (Matthew 7:16). He also directly challenged the moral authority of the Jewish authorities, who were under Roman rule at that time. His teachings were perceived as a threat to the conflicted Jewish and Roman establishments. These convened to agree his crucifixion (one of the cruellest Roman death penalties) under a legal deal.

The Roman Empire, together with the Jewish authorities, not only executed Jesus and most of his disciples but also brutally persecuted their early followers (Bruce, 2007), who were considered a “sect” (e.g. Acts 24: 5). Although many suffered cruel deaths, the “Christian sect” attracted an increasing number of followers.

After combatting this “sect” for around four centuries, the Romans eventually embraced Christianity as their official religion under Emperor Constantine. This political move would, however, compromise Jesus’s original teachings, as preserved in the Holy Scriptures. The new Roman syncretic religion thus rejected and at the same time adopted biblical principles to purportedly uphold Christianity while in fact perpetuating pagan Roman rituals and traditions (i.e. veneration of icons instead of the God from Israel; Sun-Day worshipping instead of the Sabbath) (Bacchiocchi, 1977). Yet Constantine soon witnessed the decline of the Roman Empire. Nevertheless, his “Christian universal religion-state” began to flourish, thus prolonging the political, legal and cultural heritage of the Roman Empire (Agnew, 2010, p. 41; Pirenne, 1936, p. 397; Hofstede, 2001, p. 109). The Roman Church-State (Catholic) succeeded and extended the Roman Empire’s heritage ironically speaking on behalf of Jesus, the same crucified under the Roman law.

History has shown that forgery became a widespread method through which the Roman imperial system accumulated considerable power to extend the supremacy of the popery beyond the duchy of Rome. These fabrications included the Donation of Pepin in 756 (Peter’s supposedly gold letter written in heaven, which enabled him to claim that he was the first Pope); the false Donation of Constantine (for which the Roman Catholic Church inherited the lands of the Roman Empire); and other deceptive decretals (i.e. decrees) issued to grant canon law immunity against any secular institution (Heussi, 1991; Merryman & Pérez, 2007). Moreover, the Catholic Church imposed Roman traditions on Jesus’ teachings, banned the Holy Scriptures and continued the cruel persecution of dissenters.

The Roman Church-State also enforced various forms of tyranny during the subsequent Dark Ages to perpetuate its institutional hegemony. These violent measures included crusades, inquisitions and the maintenance of people’s ignorance. Only translations of the Scriptures into Latin were permitted, thus preserving the monopoly of keeping and interpreting the Bible. Christian groups, like the Waldensians, which sought to keep alive Jesus’ legacy were oppressed as “heretic sects” to maintain the Roman monopoly over faith. Consequently, the Inquisition murdered countless victims, making the Roman Church-State

that institution that has caused most human suffering in history. The Church-State had legal control over monarchies and exerted political power across Europe and beyond.

In 1492, the Spanish Roman Catholic Monarchy "discovered" a new continent to expand its dominion: the Americas. Vast territories were brutally conquered and forced to adopt the Roman Catholic faith. Over time, a new syncretism — of Native American, African, and Roman beliefs — was enforced in Latin America while the medieval, extractive, and hierarchical model of society was perpetuated.

In Europe, various dissenters such as Jan Hus or William Tyndale dared to challenge the supremacy of the Roman Church-State. Like many others, they were convicted of heresy and cruelly executed. It was, however, not until the 16th century that Martin Luther succeeded in translating the Scriptures into the German vernacular from original Greek (Erasmus' *Textus Receptus*) and Hebrew texts (instead of Latin) (Burger, 2014). This advancement, along with Johannes Gutenberg's invention of the printing press made the Bible more accessible for ordinary German-speaking people. These and other favourable developments, initiated the Protestant Reformation (after attempts to transform the Roman Church from within had failed). The movement was based on returning to the original teachings of Jesus Christ (under the *Sola Scriptura* principle). It gradually expanded its influence, first in Northern Europe and later in North America.

By keeping people ignorant of such and other historical facts, the Roman Catholic Church-State has managed to control Western civilisation for over a thousand years. Today, with more than a billion followers, the Roman Catholic Church-State is still the most extensive centralised global organisation ever seen in the world. However, popular belief now seems to accept the impression of a symbolic (that is, almost nonexistent) Roman Catholic State. Just as modern secular society seems to embrace the idea of a weakened Roman Church, which seems to have renewed its discourse and continues to exercise an influence comparable to that of any other world religion.

Yet the discourse of Roman Catholicism shifted only recently. Over the past few decades, the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) has promoted democracy and human rights (Anderson, 2007; Levine, 1981). However, descending from Aristotelian and Aquinian

principles, the Roman Church-State had always considered democracy the least favourable social order. When having to decide between communist (i.e. atheist) and democratic ideologies in the mid-20th century, the Roman Church-State supported the latter as "the lesser of two evils" (Cook, 2012, pp. 24-25).

Currently, intransigent conservative ideologies still prevail (i.e. corporatism in Latin America) after the inertia of long-standing Roman Catholic hegemony (Figueroa, 2016; Beltrán, 2008). Also, Romanism still rejects personal interpretations of the Scriptures as only the clergy's reading and understanding is deemed legitimate.

The following chapters show that the effects of the Protestant Reformation in the political, education and legal institutions and systems of those countries in which it gained influence are far-reaching and well documented. Yet evidence exists that the shift in Roman Catholic discourse reflects its attempt to perpetuate its hegemony against Protestant "competition" (Gill, 1998, pp. 7, 48; Anderson, 2007, p. 394; Cook, 2012). Moreover, Roman Catholicism still exercises an important institutional dominion in countries under its influence, including most Latin American countries. The Iberian conquerors first imposed Roman Catholicism in Latin America while tradition and established institutions have since perpetuated its hegemony — to this day. Protestantism, on the other hand, has more often emerged from voluntary persuasion contrasting Roman Catholicism's seemingly global corporate strategy.

Table 1 summarises the historical rationale underlying this study.

State/Church legal scheme	Roman Empire (Roman law)		Papal Church Monarchy; "Holy" Roman Empire; Middle Ages (Canon law)				Modern democracies. Overthrow or weaken monarchies and feudal powers
		Early Christian Free Church (denominated "sect")					Separation of Church and State, and adoption of civil laws in several countries.
Year	BC	1 AD 300	600	900	1200	1500	1800 Present-Future
Some key events		c.a 4 Jesus Christ born 312 Constantine converts to Christianity 391 Theodosius makes Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire	476 Fall of the Western Roman Empire 590 Papal supremacy (Gregory the Great)	1054 Schism between East and West c.a 1000 Conversion of Europe complete	Supremacy of the popery over other monarchies Crusades	1517 The Reformation. Martin Luther, among others (1545–1563) Counter-Reformation. Council of Trent	1787 United States Constitution 1789 French Revolution ca. 1800 Industrial Revolution
						Except for Protestant North America, medieval extractive institutions (i.e. feudalism) have persisted in the New World (Latin America) until today. Such extractive institutions have remained in place, despite the later influence of the counter-reformation, the legal codes introduced in the wake of the French Revolution and the II Vatican Council's promotion of democracy and ecumenism.	

Table 1: Historical timeline of religious-political trigger events in Christendom (Source: Author's collection). Based on the theoretical framework of this study. Among others, sources include Woodberry (2012), Miller (2012), Acemoglu et al. (2011), Snyder (2011), Bruce (2007), Berman (2003), Witte (2002), Heussi (1961), D'Aubigne (1862), and Eusebius of Caesarea (ca. 340 AD).

This study emerged in the context of the five-hundred-year anniversary of Martin Luther preparing and publishing his 95 theses in the German town of Wittenberg. The theses

exposed the rampant corruption and tyranny of the Roman Catholic Church and initiated the Protestant Reformation.

2. Research Question

A direct relation between political power and the power of the Roman Catholic Church-State has persisted throughout Latin America since the Conquest (Munevar, 2008; Levine, 1981; Gill, 1998; Gill, 2013). These institutional relations can be traced back the European colonisers (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002a; Woodberry, 2012).

Consequently, this study explores the influence of Protestantism and Roman Catholicism on corruption and competitiveness in present-day Europe and the Americas. Previous scholarship has already highlighted the relevance of this topic. For instance, Hjelm (2014) observed:

> If ever there was a time for a critical, engaged sociology of religion, this would be it. Yet, the paradigmatic discussions (as represented by textbook knowledge) still revolve around the question of disappearance versus resurgence of religion, with little or no attention paid to religions' role in reproducing and transforming inequality (Hjelm, 2014, p. 856).

Corruption and competitiveness are so-called prosperity indicators. Reviewing these indicators in Europe and the Americas (Section 4 and Appendices 7–11) reveals that historically Protestant countries generally perform better than predominantly Roman Catholic ones. Based on this evidence, the main question of this study is: *How does Protestantism influence competitiveness and transparency compared to Roman Catholicism in Europe and the Americas?*

3. Intended Outcome and Contributions

This subsection describes the relevance of this research. It explains its aims and the theoretical and methodological gaps that it seeks to close.

3.1. Research Aim and Focus

This study applies grounded theory to expand existing understanding of the relation between two of the world's main Christian religious systems — Roman Catholicism and Protestantism — and two key prosperity indicators (corruption and competitiveness). It also explores the intrinsic factors potentially enabling this relation to be established and perpetuated.

To achieve these aims, I adopt a hybrid (combined) approach involving Grounded Theory (GT) and four case studies from a mixed-methods (MM) perspective. In fact, "MM-GT works well in connecting theory generation with theory testing, linking theory and practice" (Johnson, McGowan, & Turner, 2010). The resultant theory pursues an "emancipatory 'knowledge interest'" (Habermas, 1972; Fairclough, 2001, p. 230) and thus challenges established approaches to prosperity problems (Section 5 and Appendices 2 and 4).

3.2. Theoretical Gaps: What Makes This Research Different?

This study may be justified as follows: "[t]he route to good theory leads not through gaps in the literature but through an engagement with problems in the world that you find personally interesting" (Kilduff, 2006, p. 252). Beyond that, it addresses and seeks to close several theoretical and methodological gaps.

First, it identifies a lack of a systemic (and complex) prosperity theory across countries (Section 5 and Appendix 4). What becomes apparent is that even prominent authors

explicitly neglect the influence of other factors and theories than those they have defined themselves (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Diamond, 1997; Sachs, 2001).

However, several empirical studies have suggested that various factors common to different countries (i.e. institutions, religion, geography) should work together, in reality, to produce different possible prosperity outcomes (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Paldam, 2001; Treisman, 2000). My model (Figure 2) and research build upon these previous results and expand understanding in five ways: 1) by adopting a QCA causal approach; 2) by placing greater emphasis on the institutional influence of religion; 3) by considering other proxy variables (e.g. GCI as a prosperity proxy instead of GDP; concordats with the Roman See as a proxy of the institutional influence of Romanism in a given country); 4) by providing more theological, legal and historical information; and 5) by examining a comparative set of European and Latin American cases.

This study adopts multiple causality approaches, in order to test variables from different theoretical fields (e.g. culture, environment) instead of relying on monocausal explanations. It investigates these variables (or conditions, factors and prosperity theories) from a systemic perspective and using different methods (i.e. quantitative and QCA).

This systemic approach comprises several components: a) *Dialectic Pluralism* (DP) as a metaparadigm (Section 13 and Appendix 2); b) a multi-theoretical perspective (i.e. considering divergent theories one at a time); c) multi-lingual analysis (Spanish, English, French and German) of the literature or primary data (i.e. interviews), which provides greater aggregated, comparative value than monolingual research; d) a multi-cultural perspective when analysing and comparing different cultures and values in Europe and the Americas; e) a transdisciplinary methodology, given the researcher's background and the different theories analysed (these stem from various disciplines, including environmental studies, geography, sociology, cultural studies, political science, law, economics, linguistics and theology).

Therefore, this research rejects neither the mechanicist paradigm nor the systemic one. On the contrary, it brings these paradigms into dialogue under the "complexity paradigm" (Section 13 and Appendix 2).

The second theoretical and methodological gap that this study strives to close is the hegemony gap in the sociology of religion. Typically, a large gap exists between scientific knowledge and lived reality (Orlikowski, 2010). Moreover, an obvious hiatus is evident in the sociology of religion, in particular regarding *critical* approaches to religion, that is, the ones that take "issues of domination and inequality seriously" (Hjelm, 2014, p. 857). Much recent scholarship in the field "seems to descend almost exclusively from Durkheim and Weber" (Hjelm, 2014, p. 855). Consequently, existing approaches tend to confine themselves to the influence of specific religious denominations and their followers rather than investigating the institutional power of religion over society.

Max Weber (1905) made a significant contribution to understanding the work ethic and its role in building trust and prosperity in Protestant societies. Hjelm observes, however, that Weber's contribution lay not in discerning the hegemony and domination of a political-religious institution (such as the Roman Catholic Church-State). In moving beyond Weber's traditional, culture-only approach, this study aims to fill the various theoretical gaps left by his work. It therefore seeks to establish a historical understanding of the means and methods that were used to perpetuate the hegemony of the Roman Church-State for over a thousand years during the Dark Ages. This hegemony has been inherited and remains predominant in most Latin American countries to this day. Here, this study helps to understand not only the decline of this hegemony in Europe and the Americas but also the potential emancipatory influence of the Protestant Reformation.

The third theoretical and methodological gap that this study seeks to close concerns the institutional and cultural dimensions of religion. At least two dimensions of the influence of religion need to be taken seriously: institutional and cultural (adherents) (Manow, 2002, p. 9). However, most empirical works considering religion as a prosperity determinant pay little attention to the institutional effects of religion. Instead, they concentrate mainly on religious affiliation (by using the proportion of adherents as the only indicator of religion) (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; La Porta et al., 1999; Hofstede, 2001).

Such traditional research paradigms have focused on the *cultural* influence of religion (*à la* Weber) and have neglected the *institutional* impact of religion. Typically, cross-country

empirical approaches have ignored the decisive power relations or the historical agreements (concordats) between individual countries and the Roman Catholic Church-State. More recently, however, Barro & McCleary (2005) and Barrett, Kurian, & Johnson (2001) have made essential contributions to establishing the relation between the population affiliated to a given religion and the adoption of a *state religion.* The association between state religion and the proportion of religious adherents gives rise to an inertia that may persist for decades if not centuries (Barro & McCleary, 2005).

Similarly, only very few studies in so-called new economic history have focused on the *institutional impact of religion* on prosperity. This is not surprising as inter-disciplinary approaches in this field are relatively young (a couple of decades) (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2017).

Insights from disciplines such as political science (Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009), international relations (Snyder, 2011) or law (Witte, 2002; Berman, 2003) have been crucial to understanding the institutional influence of religion on prosperity/institutional patterns. Yet these findings have often not been integrated into the array of explanations provided by empirical studies associating religion and prosperity. It is therefore necessary to build a comprehensive transdisciplinary theory based on the findings of different disciplines. This in turn will enhance their explanatory power.

This study pursues such "synthesised coherence" by connecting "together work that previously had been considered unrelated" (Golden-Biddle, 2007, p. 33). Thus, it considers cultural *and* institutional approaches to religion, both theoretically and empirically, and argues that both are necessary and complementary. It empirically investigates the relation between corruption/competitiveness and religious adherents (as a cultural proxy) in quantitative analysis. It subsequently adds complexity by studying associated institutional religious factors and further conditions in QCA.

3.3. Methodological Gaps

Most empirical studies lead from theory to data (Eisenhardt 1989). This is particularly the case for the vast empirical information supporting the prosperity theories explained briefly in Section 5 and Appendix 4.

Eisenhardt encourages researchers to complete the research cycle (see Figure 1) by conducting research "in the less common direction from data to theory" (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 549). This study runs the entire research cycle from compiling information in a general model of prosperity theories to further triangulating empirical data and theorising (Sections 2 and 5; see also Part III).




Figure 1: Theory generation cycle (adapted from Johnson, 2016).

The starting point of this study can be located anywhere on the cycle (Johnson, 2016). For instance, the prosperity theories in Section 5 and Appendix 4 lead to the hypothesis (Section 1). The data collection methods (mixed) (see Part IV and methodology subsections in Part

V) follow the hypothesis. Subsequently, data analysis leads to describing the patterns needed to continue the theory building cycle.

I have not found any studies that combine a Mixed Methods Approach (MM), Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and the sociology of religion. This study is the first of its type and possesses the inherent *strengths of typical mixed research*, among others: a) generating and tested a grounded theory; b) harnessing the strengths of additional methods to overcome the weaknesses of other methods by applying both; c) providing stronger evidence for conclusions reached through converging and corroborating findings; d) adding insights and understanding that might be missed when using only a single method; e) increasing the generalisability of the results; f) combining qualitative and quantitative research to generate more comprehensive knowledge, an important condition for informing theory and practice (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 21).

In sum, two arguments justify the theory building process in this study: 1) the lack of a comprehensive model capable of synthesising, testing and explaining corruption and prosperity based on previously unrelated theories; and 2) the need for a critical theory of the role of religion, institutions and social domination in Europe and the Americas.

3.4. Limitations

On the theoretical level, I do not discuss each of its various topics in-depth. Vast amounts of information have already been produced, in what is in effect an immeasurable field of investigation. Instead, this study is systemic in that the relations and ramifications are more important than the depth of each topic and case. Although the sociology of religion is central to this research, the concepts and findings of other disciplines are also drawn upon. Consistent with its systemic approach, this dissertation emphasises the relations between fields. Thus, it offers no detailed analysis of various influences — environment and geography, language and ethnicities — on prosperity. This study explores neither Western evangelical movements nor liberation theology or ecumenism in-depth even if these topics

are addressed. Finally, this research considers neither the recent rise of Islam in Europe due to the migration crisis nor the Jewish influence in Europe and the Americas.

Methodologically, this dissertation exhibits the typical and inherent *weaknesses of mixed research* (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 21). Among others, it is more time consuming, is a greater drain on resources, and is more challenging as it involves a single researcher learning about and carrying out both qualitative and quantitative research concurrently.

Last but far from least, the research topic is highly sensitive and apt to generate controversy. Its research design is ambitious, which required delicately balancing surface and depth when analysing the results and writing these up. This study favours comparing different sources and cases, which at times meant sacrificing analytical depth. The biases inherent in this research are explained in Appendix 3.

4. Structure

This dissertation is divided into seven main parts, which are subdivided into 25 sections:

Part I: Hypotheses and Research Model

Section 1 formulates the general hypotheses. Section 2 presents the research model, which synthesises understanding and serves as a rationale for the entire dissertation. The model exhibits the main exogenous theoretical determinants of corruption and prosperity, which are tested empirically. Exogenous long-term factors include culture, religion and environment. Given the aim of this research, particular emphasis is placed on religion (Catholic and Protestant; institutional and adherents).

The following sections develop the research model. Therefore, when numbers or capital letters appear *in italics* between parentheses in headings and subheadings, please refer to the research model components and relations (Figure 2).

Part II: The Outcome of the Model *(A)*: Concepts of Corruption and Prosperity

Part II characterises the outcome of the research model (transparency/prosperity) in three sections. The conceptual framework (Section 3) defines corruption and prosperity from different perspectives, including moral and theological ones. Transparency and prosperity are linked as part of the same outcome. Prosperity equals competitiveness and competitiveness includes transparency. Further definitions (or codes) can be found in Appendix 6.

Section 4 briefly surveys prosperity and transparency in Europe and the Americas and shows, roughly, that historically Protestant countries perform higher than Roman Catholic ones. Section 5 touches on some influential theories that have sought to explain prosperity differences between countries from diverse disciplinary perspectives. Appendix 4 elaborates on each of these theories.

Part III: Theoretical Foundations (Amplifying the Conditions of the Research Model)

Part III explains and interconnects the relevant factors (or variables and conditions) used to determine corruption and prosperity in the research model. It consists of six sections: Section 6 explores relevant empirical studies and provides possible explanations for the robust associations between corruption and religion. Section 7 discusses the prosperity-religion link and reviews some prominent empirical studies refuting and confirming Weber's thesis and balancing the evidence gathered. It also emphasises the importance of seriously considering the institutional (and hegemonic) influence of religion in addition to the cultural influence (of religious adherents). Section 8, the most comprehensive in Part 3, characterises the relations between religion, institutions and the transparency-prosperity nexus. It explains how economic prosperity, democracy and transparency are part of a feedback loop that constitutes a single phenomenon. More importantly, this section deepens the institutional analysis by concentrating on the particular historical influence of religion on the different

legal traditions in Europe and the Americas. It is the cornerstone of Part 3 and, as such, of the entire study.

Section 9 demonstrates the influential association of Protestantism and prosperity by explaining its historical focus on education and human capital building. On this basis, Section 10 characterises the relations between culture, religion and corruption/prosperity. It advances the explanations of the prosperity-religion nexus from the perspective of cultural attributes (e.g. trust, individualism, *familialism*) by comparing Roman Catholic and Protestant theologies. Section 11 briefly explores the influence of religion and hegemony on language by concentrating on English, German and the Romance languages widely spoken in Europe and the Americas. Section 12 discusses the influence of the environment and geography on prosperity and corruption and reviews some leading empirical works.

Part IV: Research Paradigms, Methodology and Research Design

Part IV has two sections. The first (Section 13) discusses the research paradigms underpinning this study. Appendices 2 and 3 contain detailed information on the various paradigms and biases. Section 14 introduces the methodology and research design. It explains the mixed method approach of this study (quantitative, qualitative and QCA). Each of the sections in Part V (Empirical results) includes methodological protocols.

Part V: Empirical Results (Macro & Meso Components)

This Part is divided into two components: macro and meso. Section 15 corresponds to the macro-quantitative component. It discusses how competitiveness and corruption were modelled, how the methods were applied in the correlation analysis and which empirical results were achieved. Section 16 contains the meso component (Qualitative Comparative Analysis, QCA). It discusses the QCA research model, the QCA methodology and the analysis of the QCA results.

Part VI: Component 3 (Micro): Case Studies

This part is organised into six sections. Section 17 examines the criteria for selecting the cases analysed in this study. It explains the application of critical discourse analysis (CDA) as its principal empirical method. It discusses CDA methods and data treatment as well as the empirical analysis of CDA results. Finally, it compares and summarises the case selection criteria.

Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 offer in-depth discussions of the case studies (Switzerland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Colombia). Switzerland provides more information than the other cases: It is an extremely positive case in the world and the only European country discussed here. Section 22 presents a summary overview of the four cases.

Part VII: Discussion and Conclusions

Part VII has three sections. Section 23 presents general conclusions based on integrating the theory and the results obtained from all methods. It also offers seven specific conclusions for each of the prosperity determinants considered. Section 24 examines further considerations derived from the research while Section 25 provides some brief concluding remarks.

Note: Some subsections along the document contain empirical expectations since they correspond to variables or conditions tested in the study. Further, subsections treating Latin America appear throughout the study. Historically, this region has been an outlier in the Christian world (Europe and the Americas), with high corruption and low prosperity levels. It provides rich material for analysis and hence three of the four case studies deal explicitly with Latin America. Generally, each section starts with a brief outline or a short introduction. The various subsections further structure the corresponding main sections and parts.

Part I: Hypotheses and Research Model

1. Hypotheses

This section presents the general hypotheses of this study. Specific configurational empirical expectations are introduced in Part III.

Christianity has been central to Western civilisation. Yet the diverse historical trajectories of the various Christian denominations have first established and subsequently determined different sets of societal norms and institutions. This study explores *the influence of Christianity on prosperity in present-day Europe and the Americas.*

It posits two main hypotheses:

> Hypothesis 1: Roman Catholicism has negatively impacted prosperity (competitiveness and transparency) in Europe and the Americas.
>
> Hypothesis 2: The Protestant Reformation has positively impacted prosperity (competitiveness and transparency) in Europe and the Americas.

The general assumption, however, is that religion might work in combination with other long-term persistence factors triggering prosperity, i.e. the desired outcome (see research model, Figure 2). Other prominent theoretical triggers of prosperity are institutions and legal traditions, which are also implicitly linked to my hypotheses on religion (i.e. state religion, see Section 8). However, environmental factors (theory) are exogenous (i.e. not directly related to the first two hypotheses) and therefore require a separate hypothesis:

> Hypothesis 3: Environmental performance positively impacts prosperity in Europe and the Americas (i.e. moderating or moderated by the impact of religion).

This study investigates the influence of Christianity on prosperity within the framework of the sociology of religion. It therefore focuses mainly on the first two hypotheses.

2. Research Model

Figure 2 (see below) synthesises the logic underlying this study by interrelating the variables of interest (i.e. conditions in QCA). It is general and thus does not include all research variables. Some of the variables or conditions are embedded within others and vice versa (see Appendices 7–12 for details). The figure also represents the research model structuring this study:




Figure 2: Research model (Source: Author's figure).

Note: Arrows and numbers indicate potential causal relations, which are explored in the following sections (see the corresponding capital letters and the numbers between parenthesis in the headings and subheadings referring to the relations in this figure).

The research model considers the variables and factors discussed in this study to be interdependent. I take the model entirely and not residually and attach theoretical and empirical importance to all the variables (theories). Generally, the same factors (theories) that are associated with prosperity as a whole (i.e. GCI) are also associated with corruption in the literature (see Sections 3, 6 and 7).

Parts II and III (conceptual and theoretical background) break down the research model (Figure 2) and explain its components and relations in different sections. These explain some of the complex relations theoretically and concentrate on my principal variables of interest: religion and prosperity/corruption (see the subsections concentrating on Latin America). Some relations are not covered since they are less relevant to the purposes of this study (e.g. environmental influences on culture and vice-versa).

Part II: Conceptual Framework

(Concepts, Diagnostics, and Explanations)

This part details the *outcome* and *conditions* elements of this research (Figure 2). Further definitions, codes, and concepts applied in this study can be found in Appendix 6.

3. The Outcome (Criterion Variables)

(A): Corruption and Prosperity

This chapter defines *corruption* and *prosperity* based on various underlying perspectives.

3.1. Definitions of Corruption *(A)*

Corruption is a widely used term. Dozens of definitions exist in the literature (Paldam, 2001; Treisman, 2000; Gingerich, 2013; Rose-Ackerman, 2006). However, one standard definition identifies "corruption" as "illegal private gains" (Paldam, 2001, p. 389). Another highlights the abuse of public authority or resources for the purpose of pursuing political goals or financial advantages at the expense of others (Gingerich, 2013, p. 10).

According to the Cambridge University Dictionary (2014), corruption is "illegal, bad, or dishonest behaviour, especially by people in positions of power." One common antonym is "transparency." In the world of business, this refers to activities performed openly, i.e. "without secrets, so that people can trust that they are fair and honest" (Cambridge University Dictionary, 2014).

Moreover, corruption is a scourge associated with economic failure that nations have long tried to remove, albeit with little success (Chase, 2010). Corruption is symptomatic of state-society relations. It involves undermining the fairness and legitimacy of the state and leads to wasting and poorly targeting public funds (Rose-Ackerman, 2006, p. xvi). Corruption

occurs when private wealth and public power overlap (Rose-Ackerman, 2006, p. xvii). Whereas corruption subverts human rights, high transparency levels are also associated with guaranteeing human rights (OHCHR, 2019; Gebeye, 2012).

Corruption may also be understood more broadly. As a moral category, it denotes rot and putrefaction (Rose-Ackerman, 2006, p. xiv). This is its common meaning since the Old Testament. Leviticus (22:25) identifies corruption as a deficient inner state: "*Neither from a stranger's hand shall ye offer the bread of your God of any of these; because their corruption is in them […]*." However, one of its most important uses in the Holy Scriptures is its reference to Jesus Christ as the Holy One, as the one who did not corrupt (Psalms 16: 10; Psalms 49: 9; Acts 2: 27-32; Acts 13: 34-37).

In the Gospel of Matthew, the word "corrupt" refers to the warning that Jesus gave about false prophets coming on his behalf (as the title of this study indicates). Jesus compares the false prophets with the corrupt fruits of corrupt trees (Matthew 7: 15–23). A similar reference occurs in Luke (6: 43-45) and in Matthew (12: 33): "*Either make the tree good, and his fruit good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt: for the tree is known by his fruit.*"

Among Protestants, Matthew 7 is perhaps the most common of several scriptural warnings as it provides a basis for demonising the Roman Catholic clergy (Johnstone, 2006, p. 47). Roman Catholic clerics were depicted as "deceitful workers [that] fashion themselves like unto the apostles of Christ" and as Satan's servants, who were instructed to use the scriptures in their deceits (Becon, 1844, p. 405 as cited in Johnstone, 2006, p. 47). Therefore, reformers like William Tyndale also employed the same scriptural reference ("false prophets") to denounce the Roman Catholic Church-State in the 16th-century (Tyndale, 1849, pp. 121–8; Johnstone, 2006, p. 47) (see also Section 10.4.2.1).

Yet, historical Protestants have broadly understood "corruption" as being a phenomenon associated with a demonic influence which, therefore, permeates all humankind, not just state churches or governments (see also Section 10.4.2.1). As Johnstone (2006) observes:

> Godly writings give evidence of an in-depth knowledge of the conventions of Protestant demonism, particularly the defining nature of man's corruption through the fall of Adam for his constant persecution by the Devil, and his reliance on God for protection. 'Sin and corruption conceived in the heart of man is the spawn of the devil'…(p. 109)

The term corruption is central to this dissertation. It is discussed in detail in Section 4.1 and in Parts III and V. Those subsections explore the different theoretical and empirical outcomes of corruption and prosperity in those two religious systems claiming to follow the teachings of Jesus Christ: Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. Applying Jesus' parable of "false prophets" (Matthew 7: 15–23; Luke 6: 43-45; Matthew 12: 33) extends beyond the clergy to *a corrupt religious-political system, one that uses the name of Jesus (like a false prophet's) and thus produces corruption and a lack of prosperity in the respective countries under its influence (corrupt fruits).*

3.1.1. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as an Outcome (or Criterion Variable)

Corruption is difficult to study empirically (Treisman, 2000). Actual corruption is hard to measure, and standardising perceptions may prove challenging. Thus, for instance, if a society has high ethical standards, its citizens may perceive small infractions as outright corrupt, whereas a society with different standards may be perceived as less corrupt even if objectively measured as more corrupt. Therefore, corruption is culture sensitive.

However, expertise and subjective perceptions are the only information on corruption levels widely available for cross-country empirical research (i.e. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI); World Bank; see (Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 3; Gingerich, 2013). The coverage of such aggregate indicators (i.e. CPI) makes them the most empirically researched corruption measures, provided one assumes they correlate with real corruption levels (Lambsdorff, 1999, 2003, 2006; Mauro 1995, 1997; Habib and Zurawicki 2002 as cited in Gingerich, 2013). The different cross-national corruption ratings established by diverse organisations

using various techniques are highly correlated, both with each other and across time (Treisman, 2000, p. 400).

Some studies at the individual (i.e. national) micro-level employ more objective data (i.e. convictions for corruption) and higher conceptual precision than cross-country research using aggregate indicators (Gingerich, 2013). Nevertheless, such micro-level data is unavailable and not standardised across countries. Furthermore, it suffers from validity issues (Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 3).

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI) (2016) is a composite index. It draws on the corruption indices of 11 independent institutions (including the World Economic Forum, the European Intelligence Unit, and the World Bank). The index summarises perceptions of business people and country experts around the world, both residents and expatriates. CPI values range from 0 to 10. Lower values indicate a higher degree of corruption (i.e. a lesser degree of transparency).

The empirical part of this study focuses on 65 countries in the Americas and Europe. I selected the *CPI*-aggregated measure on account of its comprehensive coverage and ideal availability to perform a cross-country analysis and to compare the findings with previous studies.

3.2. The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) as a Prosperity Proxy (Outcome or Criterion Variable) *(A')*

I define prosperity in its broader sense — of being successful — rather than restricted to economic terms (*i.e.* GDP). On this basis, I link the concepts of "prosperity" and "competitiveness" (GCI), which both result from related identical conditions. The World Economic Forum developed the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) as a comprehensive proxy of prosperity to track the performance of nearly 140 countries in terms of twelve categories: institutions, technological readiness, innovation, higher education and training, health and primary education, business sophistication, infrastructure, macro-economic environment, labour market efficiency, market size, financial market development, and

goods market efficiency. Through empirical and theoretical research, the World Economic Forum identified such categories as determinants of productivity, which in turn is the primary determinant of economic growth and prosperity (World Economic Forum, 2016).

Thus, the World Economic Forum defines competitiveness as "the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine a country's level of productivity, which in turn, sets the level of *prosperity* that the economy can achieve" (World Economic Forum, 2016, p.11). Accordingly, I often use prosperity and competitiveness (GCI) indiscriminately.

The GCI is a highly comprehensive measure and ranks countries on a prosperity scale. The existence of institutions, education, transparency, and other factors already included within the GCI (or prosperity) means a significant advantage for the purposes of this study. First, these variables are closely related, theoretically and empirically, and thus belong to the same "prosperity phenomenon" (GCI). Consequently, their causality need not be discussed, as they are not isolated but aggregated in the GCI. Second, such aggregated factors (GCI) allow focusing on other background (i.e. exogenous) causes determining the "competitiveness phenomenon." Therefore, I focus on potential (i.e. theoretically conceivable) exogenous variables not included in the GCI. These, for example, include religion and culture, legal origin and state religion (as background proxies for institutions), or environment and geography.

The GCI (and its drivers) also correlate with indicators of equality (i.e. Inclusive Growth Performance, Gini coefficient) and environmental sustainability, exhibiting win-win synergies (rather than trade-offs) between these factors (World Economic Forum, 2012; World Economic Forum, 2019; World Economic Forum & European Investment Bank, 2017).

By way of illustration, throughout the Holy Scriptures, "prosperity" is often associated with following the moral commandments of the law (see Table 6 and Appendix 15). For instance, "Keep therefore the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may *prosper* in all that ye do" (Deuteronomy 29:9). In turn, the Bible links short- or long-term misfortunes as both being consequences of rebellion:

> if thou wilt not hearken unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to observe to do all his commandments and his statutes which I command thee this day; that all these curses shall come upon thee, and overtake thee (Deuteronomy 28:15).

This principle refers exclusively to the free-will moral observance of the law in the Bible and is not to be confused with the blind obedience of hierarchical structures. Obedience of hierarchies often enforces coercion instead of a rational internalisation of values, and has, in turn, a negative influence on prosperity (Tabellini 2005; Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwarz, 2007, Guiso et al., 2006), (see Sections 8.1.1 and 10.3). Protestant countries have applied the biblical moral principles of the Decalogue in their legal systems (Table 6). In contrast, Catholic countries have mostly based their legal systems on the hierarchical Roman and Canon law, which mostly derives from the Catholic Sacraments and Greek philosophy rather than from the biblical commandments (Table 5).

Section 4 and Appendices 9 and 10 indicate clear distribution patterns for competitiveness and corruption in the countries studied here: high competitiveness and low corruption in traditionally Protestant countries; lower competitiveness and higher corruption in traditional Roman Catholic or Orthodox countries.

3.3. Competitiveness and Transparency as Prosperity Proxies

The lack of competitiveness, corruption, income inequality, and policy distortions are strongly associated empirically (Rose-Ackerman, 2006); (Lambsdorff, 1999). However, deriving clear causality arguments from these features is problematic: While corruption, for instance, may cause the other variables, it is at the same time also likely to result from these (Lambsdorff, 1999). Thus, the causes and the consequences of prosperity (and corruption) are difficult to distinguish by considering these variables.

3.3.1. Economic Indicators and Corruption

Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is the most robust variable related to corruption across empirical studies as wealthier countries tend to exhibit less corruption (Paldam, 2001); (Treisman, 2000). Goldsmith's (1999) sample of 66 countries found a negative correlation between corruption and different indicators of economic freedom. Paldam's (2002) study of 77 countries reached similar results, including more explanatory variables.

No apparent doubt exists about a robust negative correlation between GDP per capita and corruption. However, similar agreement exists that no clear causality can be derived from that correlation (Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 24). Causation may run from low economic growth to corruption or from corruption to low growth or, and this is more likely, in both directions, thus creating virtuous or vicious loops. However, assuming economic growth as the primary cure for corruption amounts to simplistic and misleading "wishful thinking" (Rose-Ackerman, 2006, p. xvi).

Although various scholars have attempted to establish a causal link between corruption and prosperity (or vice versa) (e.g. Treisman 2000, 430), causal associations suffer from pressing endogeneity issues (Lambsdorff, 2006). In practice, both variables should be interrelated in both directions (Lambsdorff, 1999); (Morris, 2003); (Uildriks, 2009). Therefore, I consider the two variables complimentarily (as a whole outcome), since their causal separation might be neither useful nor desirable for the specific purposes of this study (see Figure 2).

In fact, the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) as a prosperity proxy usefully includes the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (World Economic Forum, 2016). Consequently, I subsume both competitiveness and corruption under the prosperity umbrella.

4. Diagnosing Corruption and Prosperity in Europe and the Americas *(A)*

This section diagnoses prosperity in Europe and the Americas based on three indicators: Corruption (CPI), Social Progress (SPI), and Competitiveness (GCI). GCI and CPI have already been introduced and correspond to the outcome that is modelled empirically (Parts V and VI). SPI will be introduced in Section 4.2.

4.1. Corruption in Europe and the Americas (CPI)

Figure 3 displays a clear distinction between two trends: On the one hand, the United States, Canada, Australia and Northern Europe tend to be perceived as the most transparent regions in the world. In contrast, with few exceptions, Latin America and the rest of the world are perceived as corrupt to highly corrupt.




Figure 3: Corruption Perception Index (adapted from Transparency International [TI], 2016). Used with permission).

Countries in Northern Europe, including the UK (which colonised North America), rank along the same values as the United States and Canada (see green circles in the map). In contrast, southern Europe (Greece, Italy and especially Spain and Portugal, the colonisers of

Central and South America), exhibit higher corruption. Interestingly, Uruguay and Chile have unusually lower CPI levels than the rest of Latin America. Parts V and VI further analyse this situation based on empirical observations and case studies.

Pervasive mistrust and corruption mar the social and public sphere in most Latin American countries (Uildriks, 2009, p. 6). Corruption and mistrust profoundly hamper social prosperity in different regions (North, 1998; Fukuyama, 1995). Both factors seriously affect coexistence and contribute to social fragmentation (Mockus, Murraín, & Villa, 2012, p. 6).

Similarly, Luzani (2002) observed that cultural acceptance of bribery in Latin America makes public administration work more smoothly in this region, along with "Latin America's generalized irreverence to the rule of law" (Luzani, 2002, p. 168). His conclusions coincide with Mockus (2001), who found that openly illegal and frequently even morally reprehensible behaviour is culturally accepted or tolerated in specific contexts in Latin America (p. 3).

Thus, rather than being a problem solely of political institutions, corruption is deeply ingrained in the cultural background of societies. Uildriks (2009) diagnoses corruption in Latin America as follows:

> In most of the continent, corruption is endemic, not just within state institutions but equally within wider society, constituting an integral part of 'how things are done'. […] most sectors of public life in Latin America in general are notorious for being corrupt (Uildriks, 2009, p. 8).

Equally, for Diament "corruption in Latin America is not merely a social deviation, it is a way of life" (as cited in Little & Posada-Carbó, 1996, p. 10).

Within Europe and the Americas, Latin America ranks highest on the Corruption Perception Index, followed by Southern Europe (Figure 3). Historically, the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Church-States have dominated the institutions and culture of those areas of the world (Inglehart & Baker, 2000); (Gill, 1998). Is this a coincidence or not?

Exploring the moral, cultural, and legal roots of the Latin American ethos calls for reference to the continent's religious origins. Political power and the hegemony of the Roman Catholic Church have been directly related across Latin America since the Conquest (Munevar, 2008). The closely intertwined connections between religion and politics since the Conquest and before are "[…] central to the historical ethos of Latin American institutions and social processes […]." Church and state have provided "ideological, material, and institutional support and legitimation to one another" (Levine, 1981, p. 3).

In Latin America, these institutional relations can be traced back to their European (i.e. Iberian) colonial roots (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002a). Ever since the Middle Ages, the Spanish and Portuguese conquerors implemented a hierarchical, elitist, and corporatist model of Christendom that was sanctioned by the Church (Levine, 1981; Figueroa, 2016; Beltrán, 2008).

Although far from monolithic, historically the Roman Catholic Church-State has gained a widespread controversial reputation, partly due to medieval institutions such as the Inquisition or the indulgences. Systematic examples such as the abuse perpetrated by the conquerors and legitimated by the Church in Latin America (Navarro, 2016), or the current children abuse scandals, are well-known worldwide. Although indulgences may no longer be valid as initially promulgated by Pope Leo X in 1517 in the *Taxa Camarae*, the Jesuit Jorge Bergoglio, also known as "Pope Francis", employed this concept in his papal Bull *Misericordiae Vultus* (2015): "A Jubilee also entails the granting of *indulgences*" (Bull of Indiction of the Extraordinary Jubilee of Mercy, n. 22). Bergoglio has also used the concept of indulgences to promote events like the Catholic World Youth Day in 2013 (Kington, 2013). Similarly, the Vatican has recently issued a "Decree of the Apostolic Penitentiary on the granting of special Indulgences to the faithful in the current pandemic, 20.03.2020" (COVID-19).

Religion is an essential underlying driver of corruption (or transparency) in the state and society (Rose-Ackerman, 2006; Lambsdorff, 2006). Exploring the influence of the Roman Catholic tradition on corruption and prosperity in Latin America "remains an urgent priority

for future research" (Treisman, 2000, p. 442). This study follows this call by broadly comparing prosperity and corruption in Europe and the Americas.

4.2. Social Progress in Europe and the Americas (SPI)

The Social Progress Index (SPI) is a comprehensive framework for measuring social progress independently and complementarily to GDP. Economic performance alone (GDP) does not fully explain social progress (variables have a correlation of 0,78) (Porter, Stern, & Green, 2015). The SPI is a robust and holistic measurement framework for national social and environmental performance. Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland have the highest SPI scores in the world (around 88 each). Mediterranean countries score around 80. All Latin America countries rank in the middle range of world distribution (from Uruguay, 79, to Guyana, 60) (Porter, Stern, & Green, 2015).

Figure 4 shows the different SPI scores in the Americas. Following the historical trend, Canada and the United States have better prosperity conditions (i.e. SPI and GCI) than all Latin American countries. Uruguay has the highest SPI value in Latin America (and is therefore one of the cases studied in detail below).




Figure 4: Social Progress Index in the Americas (2015) (adapted from Porter, Stern, & Green, 2015).

Note: The SPI is not modelled empirically as it contains information about environmental performance that would allow inducing endogeneity in the models when including the EPI. Competitiveness (GCI) has a similar trend as SPI. GCI is modelled empirically as this index is comprehensive and does not directly include "environmental performance."

4.3. Competitiveness in Europe and the Americas (GCI)

Switzerland has the highest GCI score worldwide. The "advanced economies" (United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Northern Europe) follow in the top 90–100% of the most competitive countries. The next group (70–80% of the most competitive countries) includes Italy, Spain, Portugal, Austria, and Ireland. Latin America and the Caribbean rank among the 40–80% most competitive regions (World Economic Forum, 2016; GCI differences are compared in Appendices 9 and 10).

Except for some countries (e.g. Uruguay and Chile), the CPI, GCI, and SPI confirm a long-established trend: "…Latin America is, after all, the only part of the world which is both Christian *and* underdeveloped" (Levine, 1981, p. 35; Grier, 1997). The next section briefly presents several approaches to explaining prosperity differences across countries.

5. Conditions (Predictor Variables): Theories Explaining Prosperity Differences *(B), (C), (D), (E)*

Numerous theories attempt to explain cross-country prosperity and corruption differences, which are empirically associated with a broad range of highly correlated factors (Rose-Ackerman, 2006; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; La Porta et al., 1999; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2017), (for details, see Appendix 4). The main problem consists in isolating the underlying triggers of prosperity and corruption, as causes are often also consequences operating simultaneously in feedback loops (Lambsdorff, 2006). Essentially, potential prosperity factors can be clustered into three groups: 1) cultural and religious values; 2) institutions and economic growth; 3) environment and geography (Figure 2, Table 2, and Appendices 4, 7, 8, and 12 explain the theories, categories, variables, and sources used here in greater detail). This section will be limited to defining the conceptual scope of each of these groups of theories for this study (i.e. predictor variables–see Figure 2). Part III (Theoretical Foundations) will further explain the relationships (arrows–see Figure 2) between these groups of theories (predictor variables or conditions) and prosperity (criterion variables or outcome).

Culture and institutions are comprehensive, interdependent concepts and religion interacts as a subset within them both (see Figure 2 and Section 10). Institutions and culture have evolved and interacted with mutual feedback effects, thus determining the prosperity of nations. Empirical evidence supports the claim that causality exists in both directions. Culture may change in different ways depending on the type of institutions, while institutions may work differently depending on the cultural context (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015, p. 938).

5.1.Culture *(C)*

Abundant empirical research demonstrates that cultural variables determine several economic choices (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2006; Volonté, 2015). Cultural variables "play an important role in corporate governance practices around the world" (Volonté, 2015, p. 78) and "they even affect the speed of development and the wealth of nations" (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015, p. 898). However, culture is a vague concept with no agreed-upon definition. Moreover, culture is "a nebulous concept defying quantification" (Paldam, 2001, p. 383), and "difficult to operationalize" (Volonté, 2015, p. 80). Similarly, Alesina & Giuliano contend that defining "culture is an arduous task" since theoretical and empirical definitions of culture are often not easily related (p. 899).

Theoretically, culture "has been defined in many ways, but most often with reference to customs, traditions, ways of life…" (Droogers, 2004, p. 217). The author also observes the empirical challenges of culture as a concept:

> …anthropology has focused on culture as a universal capacity, understanding human beings as meaning-makers (Crick 1976). Culture can then be defined as the [human] capacity to generate meaning. […] meaning is bestowed upon an invisible, not empirically verifiable, supernatural reality" (p. 218).

Comparably, other definitions of culture exhibit similar empirical challenges. For instance, Geertz (1973) defines culture as "a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols" (p. 89), while Greif (1994) observes:

> Cultural beliefs are the ideas and thoughts common to several people that govern interaction—between these people and among them, their gods, and other groups—and differ from knowledge in that they are not empirically discovered or analytically proved (Greif as cited in Alesina & Giuliano, 2015, p. 900).

In turn, Alesina & Giuliano refer to "culture as values and beliefs", but they argue that the theoretical literature on culture has also been ambiguous in this regard. On the empirical

(quantitative) side that links culture to economic/institutional outcomes, the authors observe that

> …most papers (if not all) follow the definition adopted by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006), where culture is defined as "those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation." Empirical papers, therefore, combine values and beliefs in the same definition. (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015, p. 900).

Nevertheless, there is no agreement on the empirical constitutive elements/variables of culture. For instance, Alesina & Giuliano explain the following "cultural traits": *trust*, *family ties*, *individualism*, *generalised morality*, *work attitudes*, while Herskovits (1966, 1952) describes, among others, the following cultural elements: *technology, economic and social organisation, religion, magic, art, folklore, music, and language*. Meanwhile, GLOBE and the Centre for Creative Leadership (2014) further develop the proposal of Hofstede (2001), presenting the following "cultural dimensions": *power distance, uncertainty avoidance, human orientation, collectivism, assertiveness, gender egalitarianism, future orientation, performance orientation.* Yet, measurements of cultural variables (e.g. GLOBE and the Centre for Creative Leadership, 2014; Hofstede, 2001) often overlap with institutions (Volonté, 2015, p. 79) and lack data in many countries in Europe and the Americas. Therefore, this study has excluded GLOBE and Hofstede datasets from the empirical (quantitative and QCA) settings (see Appendix 4.5 for a discussion of these quantitative approaches in cultural studies).

For Volonté (2015), attempts to measure culture face two challenges: First, it is problematic to isolate analytically cultural-specific effects given their identification with other national formal institutional characteristics (e.g. law). Intra-country cultural heterogeneity is thus often ignored. Second, no clearly observable variables constituting culture exist.

However, several empirical studies have identified three proxies of culture as appropriate: *religion* (the most prominent in the literature) (Volonté, 2015; Mazar, 2008; Alesina et al., 2003; Stulz & Williamson, 2003; Guiso et al., 2006; Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson,

2001; Paldam, 2001; Granato et al., 1996), *language* (Volonté, 2015; Mazar, 2008; Alesina et al., 2003), and *ethnic measures* (Guiso et al., 2006; Alesina et al., 2003). Of course, other extraneous elements can also be present, but these three are the most operational. In fact, the combination of these three cultural proxies is consistent with the historical "cultural project" promoted by the Roman Catholic Church (i.e. Hispanicism in Latin America). This "cultural weapon" has specifically consisted of the triad "religion, language, and race" (Figueroa, 2016); (see section 21). Thus, the integration of these three predominant proxies can empirically (quantitatively) define *culture* in this study. This empirical definition of culture is practical for this research since it can be easily operationalised (e.g. data availability) and does not directly overlap with institutions. Furthermore, this narrow approach has the advantage of reducing the risks of reverse causality (thus focusing on the causal arrow where culture affects prosperity, rather than the contrary) (Guiso et al., 2006, p. 25). Therefore, two thirds of the empirical setting (correlations and QCA) include the proportion of the population that belongs to the main ethnicities, languages, and religions in each country in Europe and the Americas. Qualitatively, however, culture may be referred to in a broader sense in this study, to include other elements such as values (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015) or power distance (Hofstede, 2001).

5.2.Institutions and Economic Growth *(D)*

Theoretically, institutions are "the rules of the game in a society" (North, 1990, p. 3). Institutions can be either formal, i.e. official and openly codified (e.g. constitutional laws), or informal, i.e. as an unwritten rule and socially shared values (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). Informal institutions are frequently more persistent than formal ones (North, 1997) and pertain to how laws are enforced (Woodruff, 2006). Empirically, North (1990); Alesina & Giuliano (2015); and Volonté (2015) have defined *informal institutions* as a synonym of *culture* given the practical overlaps of these concepts. Consequently, isolating *institutions* empirically "would be possible only if one counts formal institutions (formal legal systems, formal regulation) as institutions" (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015, p. 902). In turn, Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson (2006) refer to political and economic institutions in their definition,

considering institutions as mechanisms through which social choices are determined and implemented.

Institutional theory and other related approaches such as economic theory provide the most robust empirical and theoretical explanations of why some countries are more prosperous than others. For North, the radically different evolution of Anglo- and Latin America reflects the imposition of distinct metropolitan institutions on each colony (North, 1990). The main argument advanced by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) is that institutions are decisive when explaining the differences and inequality among nations. For the authors, geographical or cultural theories can be influential, but they are useless in terms of clarifying why countries ultimately fail or thrive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Other economists such as Preston (2012) have also developed extensive theoretical approaches on this issue. Yet, different controversies remain regarding which, where, and how institutions matter for economic prosperity (Woodruff, 2006; Glaeser et al., 2004; Alesina & Giuliano, 2015), (for details, see Appendix 4 and Section 8).

Colonialism as an overarching explanation and as the overlapping of cultural proxies

The attributes of the colonising countries have greatly determined present-day institutions in the former colonies, both informally (i.e. culture) and formally (i.e. laws) (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001, p. 21; North, 1990; Volonté, 2015). Therefore, the colonial legacy of such countries is associated with various factors (e.g. religion, language, and legislation). Typically, Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries are historically Catholic and apply French civil law, whereas English-speaking countries are historically Protestant and apply common law (Volonté, 2015); (Mazar, 2008) (see Sections 8-10).

Furthermore, most countries in Europe and the Americas were colonies themselves: Most Latin American countries are former Spanish and Portuguese colonies, while the US and Canada are former British colonies. At the same time, European colonisers (e.g. Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, or Holland) were colonies of the Roman Empire. This colonial (rather than the indigenous) heritage has substantially shaped institutions in

most of the colonised countries. Colonisers often transferred or imposed their solid institutions and *status quo* to their colonies. Thus, when "the conquerors colonised much of the world, they brought with them their culture (laws and institutions); they settled and shaped the present public administration" (Mazar, 2008, p. 176). While many former colonies revised their legislation after independence, only few have shifted far away from the original code (World Bank, International Finance Corporation, & Oxford University Press, 2004; Mazar, 2008; Merryman & Pérez, 2015).

The Protestant Reformation led to an institutional deviation of the medieval *status quo* in its countries of influence (see below). Such deviation was transposed to the colonies. In turn, Spanish and Portuguese colonialism upheld the medieval *status quo* by emphasising the authoritarian and feudal-hierarchical roles of the Roman Church and the states (Andreski 1969, as cited in Grier 1997, p.47; Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001).

Religion and the state were united for the majority of colonial history. The state enforced religion, meaning that it was mostly not a matter of individual choice. However, the modern sovereign state system emerged from the Thirty Year War waged by Protestants against the imposition of Roman Catholicism by Ferdinand II (leading to The Peace of Westphalia in 1648). The separation of church and state occurred first and foremost in Protestant territories since the Reformation (Snyder, 2011; Wilson, 2009; Witte, 2002). This separation established itself as a driving force of prosperity (Grier, 1997); (Fanfani 1936).

Nonetheless, colonialism has largely been treated separately from religion (or even as a competing explanation). This conceptual error has led scholars to empirically test endogenous variables. On the one hand, religion is typically reduced to its proportion of adherents (which can normally result from the effect of historical institutions and more recent trends, such as Pentecostalism or Agnosticism (Section 10.4.3). On the other, colonial institutions include the historical and institutional influence of religion (which is more important than the number of adherents) (e.g. Protestant British colonies as against Roman Catholic Spanish/Portuguese colonies). Therefore, it is not surprising that empirical studies such as Grier (1997) find that Protestantism (adherents) does not significantly lessen the gap between the economic performance of former colonies notwithstanding an overwhelming

correlation between Protestantism and economic growth (GDP). Thus, the weight of British colonial institutions (including Protestantism) in historically Protestant countries ought to be more decisive than the current Protestant (mostly Pentecostal) adherents within historically Catholic countries, for instance.

Furthermore, Woodberry's (2012) empirical findings also help better understand that religion and colonialism have been intervening and complementary mechanisms rather than competing explanations. Colonial institutions, including religion transported from Europe, were highly influential in the New World (Woodberry, 2012, p. 244). Thus, North America, for instance, inherited the same institutional outcomes that distinguished Great Britain from Spain or Portugal as far back as the Protestant Reformation (Sections 8.2.2 and 8.3.4).

5.3.Religion (Cultural and Institutional Influences) *(B)*

The Institutional Influence of Religion has been More Decisive to Prosperity than the Cultural Effect of Religious Affiliation (Adherents)

Religion is mostly considered as an important expression of culture (Guiso et al., 2006; Volonté, 2015; Mazar, 2008). For Anderson (2007), "culture was historically shaped in large part by religion and because most religious traditions sat uneasily with democratic ideas and practices, it was hard to see democracy thriving outside the Anglo-Protestant world" (p.383).

Furthermore, "religion is generally viewed as a possible fundamental determinant of economic growth" (Becker & Woessmann, 2009, p. 533). Thus, many empirical studies associating cultural variables with economic outcomes widely follow the Protestant ethics-based theory proposed by Max Weber. The work ethics Weberian theory is considered "…the most famous link between culture and economic development" (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2006, p. 401).

Accordingly, most empirical studies linking religion and economics associate variables of religious adherence and economic performance. The dominant research paradigm has centred on the influence of *the proportion of believers* (so-called "market share" or "cultural

influence of religion") on prosperity/corruption, but has mostly disregarded the institutional influence of religion. Consequently, sociological explanations of the prosperity-religion nexus are often either solely Weberian (work ethic) or sheer hypothesis. This means that they have not further developed or been related to other disciplines and historical sources.

Studies such as La Porta, et al. (1999) and Barro (1997) have effectively isolated the effects of religion adherence (yet, not of religiosity) on political, economic and legal outcomes (McCleary & Barro, 2006). However, the Weberian cultural argument that the beliefs of individual Protestants led to higher productivity has failed to work in several other cases (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; 2006; Delacroix & Nielsen, 2001; Cantoni, 2015). Quantitative studies analysing the influence of institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; 2006) or cultural determinants (Hofstede, 2001) on prosperity have also reduced religion to its adherents' influence on institutions, culture or prosperity. For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) dedicate an entire chapter to criticising Weberian Protestant ethics as a theory that is unable to explain prosperity differences across countries. Likewise, Hofstede (2001) states that industrialisation is what brings people to believe in more "inclusive" religious systems such as Protestantism, rather than vice versa. Such assertions result from empirically analysing the proportion of believers while disregarding the historical and institutional influence of religion. Thus, considering religion only as a cultural factor (i.e. adherents) results in trivialised or misunderstood relations between religion, institutions, and prosperity/transparency. Moreover, the difficulty of separating the effect of religious adherents from other possible (and varying) causes of prosperity (e.g. institutions and geography) adds endogeneity to cross-country studies (Becker & Wößmann, 2009, p. 533).

Nevertheless, the relationship between religious institutions and the state is identified as being the most important explanatory variable in the theory of Religious Competition (based on Rational Choice Theory; see Section 7.b) (Chaves & Cann 1992; Wilde et al., 2010). Yet, the effect of religious institutions has been largely ignored, favouring religious pluralism as a means to measure competition (Olson 1999; Wilde et al., 2010).

Undoubtedly, robust statistical data exists for nominal religion adherents in cross-country studies. Hence, most of the literature on religion as a corruption/prosperity determinant has only considered the proportion of adherents, even if religion cannot be reduced to this sole indicator. The ample data available on religious adherents may partly explain why most empirical literature utilises this variable as a proxy of the cultural effects of religion on prosperity/corruption.

The objective of this section (and dissertation) is not to critique the mostly studied *cultural influence of religion* but to concentrate on the *institutional path of religion*, which the author believes is more crucial to prosperity in the long term. Indeed, the historical effect of religious institutions (i.e. state–church, law, education) is more lasting and pervasive than current individual religious choices based on "freewill" (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Becker & Woessmann, 2009; Merryman & Pérez, 2007; Witte, 2002). Guiso, et al., (2006) observed in this regard,

> …people choose neither their parents nor the religion of their parents […], parents have a natural tendency to teach their children what they have learned from their own parents, without a full reassessment of the current optimality of those beliefs… (p. 32, 25)

In fact, the individual's religious orientations are largely the resultant heritage of the historical institutional interactions of state and church. As Vallier (1970) observed:

> It is not so much a question of the individual's religious orientations, but the kinds of implications corporate structures of religious control hold for the functioning of the secular power structures, for the integration of social groups, and for the stability of the general ground rules that impinge on everyday exchange and role systems (Vallier, 1970, pp. 157-58 as cited in Levine, 1981, p. 132).

In the end, religion and politics were quite evidently integrated until the Protestant Reformation. Thus, institutional religion preceded and gave rise to the state (Snyder, 2011). Certainly, a key feature of various relevant studies (e.g. Becker & Woessmann, 2009;

Becker et al., 2016; Woodberry, 2012; Gill, 1998) has been the identification of Protestantism as a destabilising element of institutional Roman Catholic hegemony. Such an element has proven more important than the effects of religious believers *per se*. The influence of institutional religion is pervasive to this day, both in Europe and in the Americas (Tables 1 and 3; Figure 5). Furthermore, the crucial element that determines the dominant religion in a country or region has been how the state has supported that religion. As Nexon (2011) observes:

> The decisions of rulers about which confession to adopt, which movements to support, and how far to crack down on the spread of heterodox beliefs arguably determined the fate of the Reformations. How important were these decisions? In the absence of external or state support, *not a single conflict* centering around a Protestant-Catholic struggle resulted in a Protestant victory. Territories with a significant Protestant population that remained under the control of Catholic rulers—such as Bohemia, Hungary, and parts of France—ultimately succumbed to counter-reformation (Brake as cited in Nexon, 2011, p. 152).

However, it is not always easy to empirically differentiate between cultural and institutional influences of religion as they are well connected (Barro & McCleary, 2005). Barro and McCleary (2005) developed a close empirical approach to institutional religion in their classification of "*State religion*" (an independent indicator considered in the QCA analysis in Section 16). "*State religion*" is, however, mostly also related to population adherence and does not account, for instance, for the international agreements (concordats) between the Roman See and individual countries. My study brackets those indicators and thus lends theoretical and empirical weight both to the institutional (e.g. including concordats) and, to a lesser extent, the cultural (mainly operationalised as adherents) influences of religion.

Therefore, in this study, *religion* contains "institutional variables" (e.g. state religion, concordats) as a subset of institutions, and "cultural variables" (e.g. nominal religion adherents) as a subset of culture.

5.3.1.Definitions of Protestantism and Roman Catholicism

Engelhardt (2007) observes that Protestantism and Roman Catholicism have historically defined themselves as being set against each other in a "mutually defining dialectic" (p.28). The Protestants first defined themselves "in their protest against the heresies of Rome" (e.g. papal universal jurisdiction, purgatory, and indulgences) (p. 37) (see Section 10.4.1.3). The author continues, "[b]y default, Protestants thought themselves constrained to put the Bible in the place the church had traditionally held" (p. 37). In turn, the "Roman Church then defined itself against the Protestants in the Council of Trent (1545–1563) and through the Counter Reformation" (p. 29).

Definition of Protestantism

Protestants are defined as being members or followers "of any of the Western Christian Churches separated from the Roman Catholic Church under the principles of the Reformation, including the Baptist, Presbyterian, and Lutheran Churches" (Oxford University Press 2016). Likewise, in this study "'Protestants' is broadly used to refer to members of historical Protestant churches (e.g., Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, Lutherans or Presbyterians)" (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 7). The Protestant Reformation is defined as a "16th-century movement for the reform of abuses in the Roman Church ending in the establishment of the historical Reformed and Protestant Churches" (Oxford University Press 2016).

For his part, Köhrsen (2017) distinguishes three streams of Protestantism: 1) Historical Protestantism; 2) Non-charismatic forms of evangelicalism; and 3) Charismatic forms of evangelicalism (Pentecostalism). For Köhrsen, many historical and non-charismatic Protestant communities have undergone a charismatic turn, thus moving them closer to the Pentecostal movement today (pp. 3-5).

Although this dissertation refers to the Pentecostal movements, this research often emphasises the historical streams of Protestantism, given their accumulated institutional influence (see Sections 8.3 and 9). Therefore, historically Protestant countries are so defined

according to their traditional religious heritage (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), (see Appendix 6–Fig 1), which does not necessarily reflect whether the majority of their current population are Protestant adherents.

Definition of Roman Catholicism

The Roman Catholic Church-State (Roman Catholicism or Romanism) is defined as the "part of the Christian Church, which acknowledges the Pope as its head, especially as it has developed since the Reformation" (Oxford University Press, 2016). Evidently, the Roman Church-State is not a monolithic entity, but differentiation exists within it (e.g. the Latin Rite and the Eastern Rites; or contrasting ideologies such as the extreme right (Opus Dei) and left (liberation theology) (Werz, 2008; Figueroa, 2016), (see Section 10.4.1.4). The Roman Church-State is a complex and diverse organisation (Gill, 1998). As Agnew (2010) observes:

> The Roman Catholic Church is perhaps an extreme case of a faith tradition with a highly organised hierarchical structure that operates worldwide but must adjust itself to local and world-regional contexts that can challenge and subvert its central doctrines, operational principles, and political compromises with secular authorities (p. 43).

However, regardless of the internal differentiation, Canon Law has defined the papacy as the "Supreme Authority of the Church" since the Middle Ages (i.e. including post-Vatican II) (Molano, 1983). As the author observed:

> The "Supreme Authority of the Church" is the head of both the individual Churches and of their congregations, namely the Universal Church structured as a communion of Churches or "Corpus Ecclesiarum" (Molano, 1983, p. 20)[2].

Furthermore, the "Vatican is a centralized bureaucracy that oversees the various aspects of the international Church related to people, theology, education, law, missions, and ecumenism" (O'Reilly, & Chalmers, 2014, p. 196). Since the Vatican State was created through the Lateran Treaty with Mussolini's National Fascist Party, "the Church has, if anything expanded its presence as a unique 'church-state'" (Agnew, 2010, p. 46). For instance, the number of states entertaining diplomatic relations with the Roman See almost quadrupled after Vatican II (from 46 to 177) (Ragazzi, 2009; The Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the United Nations, 2020).

Therefore, this study considers the Roman Catholic Church not merely as a religious organisation, but as the oldest state that "inherited the mantle of the Roman Empire and its imperial territoriality" (Agnew, 2010, p. 41). As the author explains, "…when the Roman Empire collapsed in Western Europe, only the Church represented institutionally in perpetuity what little was left of the *pax romana*" (Ibid).

Although this dissertation highlights the existence of less intransigent sectors, the research often emphasises the most conservative and intolerant wing of Roman Catholicism (which has been historically dominant, institutionally) (Figueroa, 2016). Thus, by focusing primarily on an institutional level, there is a risk of labelling the Roman Church-State a "black box". However, as Gill (1998) observes:

> …there are a number of justifiable reasons for assuming that the [Catholic] Church can be studied as a unitary actor. First, the hierarchical nature of the Catholic Church tends to mute internal conflict. While there may be ongoing debate within the Church regarding the direction of policy, there is a general deference to

[2] Author's translation of the original Spanish text.

> authority when it comes to taking action. For instance, certain bishops may disagree with the decision to maintain a celibate clergy, but rarely do they start ordaining married priests in their diocese. Second, leaders of the Catholic Church have a strong interest in presenting a unified front, especially as pertains to major policy decisions. A divided Church is a Church that lacks bargaining power and moral authority. Significant policy positions (e.g., publicly opposing a military government) will surely be debated among the hierarchy, but when action is taken bishops typically put aside differences and support the final decision (pp. 9-10).

5.4. Environment and Geography *(E)*: The Environmental Performance Index *(EPI)*

Vast empirical information supports a strong association between environment/geography and prosperity. The theoretical explanations also make sense (see Section 12 and Appendix 4.4).

The *Environmental Performance Index (EPI)* is expressed in percentages and aggregates more than 20 indicators reflecting national-level environmental data (Hsu, Alexandre, Cohen, Jao, & Khusainova, 2016, p. 27). It comprises nine categories: health impacts, air quality, water and sanitation, water resources, agriculture, forests, fisheries, biodiversity and habitat, and climate and energy (Ibid). The EPI is a comprehensive index and results from the transformation of "raw datasets into comparable performance indicators, which requires standardizing raw values according to population, land area, gross domestic product, and other common units of measurement" (Hsu, Alexandre, Cohen, Jao, & Khusainova, 2016, p. 28).

Previous studies have already found robust correlations between environment (EPI) and competitiveness (GCI), suggesting that the most competitive countries also have the best environmental conditions and performance (dos Santos & Siqueira Brandi, 2014; Kasimovskaya & Didenko, 2014). Moreover,

> …there is no necessary trade-off between being competitive and being sustainable. On the contrary, many countries at the top of the competitiveness rankings are also the best performers in many areas of sustainability (World Economic Forum, 2012).

In Part V, the EPI is incorporated into regression analysis and QCA models on account of its precise and comprehensive nature. Such incorporation reflects the abundant empirical literature linking countries' prosperity indicators to environmental and geographical variables (see Section 12 and Appendix 4.4).

5.5.Summary of Theories Explaining Differences in Prosperity and Insights from New Economic History

Table 2 summarises the leading prosperity theories, which are based on empirical (i.e. quantitative) research. The table shows postulates, issues, and authors in diverse fields approaching the difference of prosperity across countries.

Leading Determinist Theories (based on quantitative empirical research)	Main Postulates		Critical issues not addressed explicitly by the theory in question			Main advocates	Data Restrictions or issues to model (this research)
Dependence; world-systems	Divides the world into core countries (hegemons), semi-peripheral countries, and peripheral countries (former colonies)	Hegemons are exploiters; the role of the former colonies in the world economy is restricted to being primary product exporters.	Why do the colonisers of Latin America (Spain and Portugal) face prosperity issues until today? Why could the United States achieve prosperity levels that the other colonies could not achieve? Why is a former British colony considered a hegemon?			(Wallerstein, 2006); (ECLA, 1950); (Prebisch; Singer; Furtado; Pinto; Baran; Gunder); (Preston, 2012); Liberation theologians.	Only around one-fourth of the countries in the database provide data on colonial power (binomial)
Institutions*:	Institutional feedback loops explain prosperity and inequality among nations.	Although geographical or cultural theories can be compelling, they are useless.	Who has the power to mould institutions?	Which ethical and moral principles are able to establish trustworthy institutions?	These theories often provide anecdotal explanations that illumine changes in different institutions/legal systems.	(North, 1990); (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012)	Endogeneity. GCI index already includes institutional indicators.
Legal Origin**	"The economic consequences of legal origins are pervasive." The differences between legal origins are profound enough for them to manifest themselves in different strategies for exercising social control over economic life, "even after centuries of legal and regulatory evolution."		Who has the power to develop the legal codes?	Which ethical and moral principles are able to establish trustworthy legal codes?		(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008)	No issues (full access to comprehensive databases for all countries).
Culture:	Similarities and differences in norms, values, beliefs and practices among societies may determine the prosperity of nations.		It is impossible to define a "national culture." Quantitative approaches to culture underestimate sub-national levels.		Cultural theory fails to explain outliers (e.g. Nogales (US-Mexico) or North-South Korea).	(Hofstede, 2001); GLOBE 2014	Less than 20 countries in the database provide data for Europe and the Americas. Weak representativeness of the samples and categories utilised.

Leading Determinist Theories (based on quantitative empirical research)	Main Postulates	Critical issues not addressed explicitly by the theory in question	Main advocates	Data Restrictions or issues to model (this research)
Religion and Values**	The Protestant Reformation ended the millennium-old hegemony of the Catholic Church in Western Europe and established the basis for prosperity, thus changing political and economic fortunes.	Failing the context of other theories (e.g. legal origin, environment), prosperity theory based on religion and values is unable to explain outliers. For example, why are Ireland or Austria, or subnationally (e.g. Bavaria in Germany, Lucerne in Switzerland) prosperous despite being predominantly Roman Catholic regions?	(Weber 1905); (Huntington, 2004); (Fukuyama, 1995); (Becker et al., 2016)	No issues (full access to comprehensive databases for all countries).
Environment and Geography*	Geography directly impacts prosperity. Favourable environmental and climate factors enabled European states to develop and conquer other lands.	Neither geography nor the environment are able to explain historical "reversals of fortune" (e.g. prosperity on the American continent before and after European colonisation), or why cases such as Russia, or Argentina are outliers in a large continental trend. Climate theory has been criticised since the 19th century.	(Diamond, 1997); (Sachs, 2001); (Brown & Lall, 2006)	No issues (full access to comprehensive databases for all countries).

* One model linking postulates of both theories is "Factor Endowments" (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002a)

** Legal origin might be considered part of institutional theory and as such is also related to institutional religion (Section 8). However, its data is not directly included in the GCI, and thus resolves the endogeneity problem of institutional indices. Religion and values can be part of cultural theory; however, the respective datasets differ (i.e. neither the GLOBE nor Hofstede's database contains such data).

Table 2: Prosperity theories in different fields (Author's figure).

Table 2 presents a non-exhaustive list of perspectives that shows why some countries are more prosperous than others. However, the listed theories do not address the prosperity phenomenon from a holistic perspective (i.e. in all its complexity). Likewise, this table mainly presents theories (and advocates) that base their empirical research on quantitative data and methods.

Appendix 4 contains a deeper discussion and further information on these theories of prosperity.

In contrast to the above theories, I approach the prosperity/corruption phenomenon holistically. This means that rather than excluding theoretical approaches (cultural, institutional, environmental), I regard those approaches as intervening triggers (not as competing explanations) from diverse disciplines. Therefore, all the theories listed here are considered valid and complementary. The next sections complement the identified prosperity triggers and interrelations with empirical and theoretical evidence from different disciplines (see research model, Figure 2).

Insights from New Economic History

New Economic History is an interdisciplinary approach dedicated to analysing the causes of prosperity through integrating historical and other social sciences with mathematical models and econometric techniques. Such integration reconciles previously exclusivist disciplinary approaches through combining factors, theories, and disciplines, rather than offering mono-causal explanations. In contrast, the neo-classic economic approach considered history, geography/ecology, and culture (including religion and social norms) as 'residuals'. The neo-classical approach left little room to explicitly model "residuals," which has long been the dominant approach in the literature (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2017).

Moreover, separate mono-causal prosperity theories tend to refute advances made in other research fields. For instance, Sachs (2001, 2003) claimed that environment and geography alone thoroughly explain prosperity variations among countries. Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) made the same case for institutions.

However, each of these distinct theories may contain "a grain of truth" about understanding prosperity imbalances between countries (Moran, et al., 2007, p. 3). Ideally, prosperity theories should be complementary instead of competing explanations. For example, geography and environmental theories explain how seasonal lands can provide a society and its economy better conditions to prosper (Diamond, 1997); (Sachs, 2001). Institutional theory helps explain how institutions model social prosperity by perpetuating equality loops or by concentrating wealth (North, 1990; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Cultural theory contributes to the understanding of the influence of cultural variables, such as religious

beliefs and values, on prosperity (Landes, 1999; Hofstede, 2001; Volonté, 2015; Alesina & Giuliano, 2015). Some scholars, among others La Porta et al. (1999), Treisman (2000), and Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2017), have therefore taken a systemic approach to prosperity theories.

The relations among environment/geography, culture, institutions, and prosperity are highly complex and involve the "grand historical dynamics" normally far exceeding "empirical research possibilities" (Paldam, 2001, p. 384). Nonetheless, La Porta et al.'s (1999) comprehensive study significantly advance research by examining potential determinants of government performance in up to 152 countries. The authors concluded that countries exhibiting inferior government performance are (1) poor, (2) close to the equator, (3) ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, (4) use French or socialist laws, or (5) have high proportions of Catholics or Muslims (La Porta et al., 1999).

In a similarly ambitious empirical study, Treisman (2000) reached comparable conclusions: Prosperous economies are less corrupt countries with Protestant traditions, histories of British rule, and with prolonged exposure to democracy (short, present-day democracies are not statistically significant) (Treisman, 2000, p. 399).

Part III: Theoretical Foundations

This is the largest and also the central part of this study. The six sections below are theoretical amplifications of the variables and relation arrows displayed in the research model (Figure 2). The structure of this part responds to the order of relevance of the relations and components constituting this study.

6. Corruption and Religion *(A), (B), (1)*

This section reviews some prominent empirical studies and possible explanations of the corruption-religion nexus. It concentrates on the analysis of Roman Catholic and Protestant adherents.

6.1.Religious Affiliation and Corruption

Numerous empirical (quantitative) studies exist on the relationships between corruption indicators and the proportion of religious adherents. These studies, undertaken at different levels (cross-country, national, sub-national), are rigorous and have mostly reached comparable conclusions regardless of their publication dates, methods, and variables:

Protestantism curbs corruption, in contrast to Roman Catholicism, which tends to increase the perceived corruption: (La Porta R., Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Lipset & Lenz, 2000; Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000; Paldam, 2001; Gerring & Thacker, 2004; Arruñada, 2010; Chase, 2010; Woodberry, 2012). Some of the key findings will be examined.

La Porta et al. (1997) found a significant correlation between corruption and the percentage of adherents to a hierarchical religion (Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodox, Islam) in a sample of 33 countries. Hierarchical religions have adverse effects on civic engagement, and

therefore on corruption (La Porta et al., 1999); (Lambsdorff, 2006). La Porta et al. (1999) found a robust predictor of transparency (lower corruption) in the percentage of Protestants.

Chase's (2010) study of 180 countries with 11 independent variables corroborated these findings. Thus, a country's dominant religion explains its level of corruption better than GDP and other economic indicators (Chase, 2010). Protestantism tends to reduce the level of perceived corruption within a nation. In contrast, Orthodoxy or Catholicism, when dominant, tend to increase the level of perceived corruption. Treisman (2000) also observed a significant correlation between transparency and the percentage of Protestants in a sample of 64 countries. Lipset and Lenz (2000), and Gerring and Thacker (2005) corroborated that result. Paldam (2001) analysed 11 groups of religions, finding lower corruption in countries with a significant proportion of Protestants and tribal religions. Higher corruption appears in countries where Roman Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism exert considerable influence.

Possible Explanations of the Robust Associations between Corruption and Religion

This phenomenon has attracted broad scholarly attention. Some of the many valid explanations, supported empirically and theoretically, include:

On the negative influence of Roman Catholicism:

1. Hierarchical religions promote corruption (Lambsdorff, 2006); (La Porta et al., 1999, 1997). This insight further develops arguments first presented by Olson (1993) and Husted (1999). Societies with low accessibility to the higher echelons must accept authoritarian rules and thus also high levels of corruption and inequality (Husted 1999).

2. Catholic and Muslim countries perform lower in education and learning than Protestant ones (Becker & Woessmann, 2009); (Landes, 1999). Lower education means that public officials are questioned less about their actions (Landes, 1999). The majority of people are thus more prone to manipulation and to accepting hierarchical relations. Therefore, "The maintenance of ignorance" has been one of

the most potent institutional strategies of the Catholic Church to influence people's behaviour (Head-König, 2017, pp. 46-47), (see Section 18.4). Other denominations and sects also influence people's behaviour by maintaining their ignorance, but these groups do not reach secular levels of legal and political influence on the scale of the Roman Church-State (Martin, 1999; Helmsdorff, 1996; Schäfer, 2006; Fumagalli, 2011).

On the positive influence of Protestantism:

3. Robust historical and statistical evidence demonstrates that Protestant missionaries profoundly influenced the rise and spread of stable democracy worldwide (Woodberry, 2012).

4. Historically and statistically, Protestantism led to better education and human capital, and thus also to higher economic prosperity and a wide range of innovations (Becker & Woessmann, 2009); (Becker, Pfaff, & Rubin, 2016). Such mechanisms empirically support a more comprehensive explanation than traditional Weberian theory and its postulate of a "Protestant work ethics" (Becker et al., 2016); (Woodberry, 2012). For instance, Protestant institutions competing with state-sponsored religions are more likely to scrutinise abuses by public officials (Svensson 2005).

Empirical expectation:

1) I expect the overwhelming empirical evidence available to confirm higher corruption rates in historically Roman Catholic countries than in historically Protestant countries (consistent with the title of this study, articulated in Matthew 7: 15–23).

7. Prosperity and Religion *(A), (B), (1)*

The link between prosperity[3] and religion is uncontestable. In the United States, for instance (the second most competitive country worldwide; World Economic Forum, 2016), religion contributes almost one-third of the national GDP per annum (USD 4.8 trillion). The revenues of US faith-based organisations (USD 378 billion annually) exceed the global annual revenues of Apple and Microsoft combined (Grim & Grim, 2016).

Yet, the relations between prosperity and religion are reciprocal and highly complex (Berger 1990; McCleary & Barro, 2006). In the first causal arrow, religion is a predictor (independent) variable that affects prosperity. This arrow represents a school of thought (i.e. idealism) that descends from Weber (1905), with the so-called "cultural argument" that the beliefs of individual Protestants led to higher prosperity. This study argues that the institutional influence of religion has been more decisive than the "cultural path" of this causal relation. The second causal arrow moves in the opposite direction, with religion as a criterion (dependent) variable (i.e. prosperity affects religion) and stems from Marx (1859 [1913]) (i.e. materialism). Conclusively, both arrows of causality do not compete, but reinforce each other (dialecticism) (Berger, 1990; Koch, 2009; McCleary & Barro, 2006; Guiso et al., 2006) (see Figure 2).

This subsection offers no exhaustive review of the studies published on the prosperity-religion nexus. There are three reasons for limiting the following account to the most significant works. First, the research is too voluminous to be discussed here in full. Second, such a discussion is not the primary purpose of this study. Third, some studies have already performed this task most efficiently. For instance, Becker et al. (2016) have provided the most comprehensive review of studies on the causes and consequences of the Protestant Reformation (compared to business-as-usual Roman Catholicism; see Appendix 5). The authors cover previous empirical studies, which have used different variables at individual,

[3] This section addresses the theoretical background of the relation prosperity-religion. Please refer to Section 10.4.2.3.1 for a discussion on the "Prosperity Gospel" or "Theology of Prosperity" as a typical Pentecostal phenomenon.

city, regional, and cross-country levels. The reviewed studies come from the fields of economics, sociology, and political science.

The next subsections synthesise the heated debate on prosperity and Christian religion in Europe and the Americas. The following subsection (a) analyses religion as a predictor (independent) variable that affects prosperity (first causal arrow), whereas subsection (b) examines the second causal arrow in the opposite direction (i.e. prosperity affects religion).

a. Religion as a Predictor (Independent) Variable that Affects Prosperity

Key issues in this interaction are how the institution of religion influences the institutions of law and state, and therefore, prosperity (institutional influence of religion) (see Section 5.3). On the cultural influence of religion (Weberian), central questions are "how religiosity affects individual characteristics, such as work ethic, honesty and thrift, and thereby influences economic performance" (McCleary & Barro, 2006, p. 49).

7.1. The Weberian "Cultural" Argument on Christianity and Prosperity *(1)*

Max Weber linked religion and economic performance arguing that the Protestant Reformation initiated modern capitalism, with Protestant societies outpacing Catholic ones economically (Weber, 1905). Weber's classic thesis illustrated prosperity differences between diverse religious affiliations using taxable capital available in Baden in 1895. He found that tax returns from financial capital totalled over four millions marks per 1,000 Jews; 954,000 marks per 1,000 Protestants and 589,000 marks per 1,000 Catholics (Weber, 1905, p. 133). Based on this evidence, Weber advanced a Protestant work ethic-based theory of prosperity. Accordingly, Protestant beliefs (e.g. Calvinist, Puritans) would enhance the economy "by fostering traits such as work ethic, honesty (and hence trust), thrift, charity, hospitality to strangers and so on" (McCleary & Barro, 2006, p. 51).

Following Weber (1905), numerous quantitative studies have analysed the empirical relationships between prosperity indicators (mainly GDP) and religious affiliation (mostly the proportion of adherents). Thousands of articles and hundreds of books have discussed (and continue to discuss) Weber's thesis. Some works widely accept his claim as one of the most valid explanations of the rise of Western Civilisation while others criticise particular points (Ferguson, 2011); (Berman, 2003, p. 24); (Becker et al., 2016).

However, empirical research on prosperity determinants typically — and blindly — neglects the influence of religion (Barro & McCleary, 2003, p. 760). Religion as a determinant suffers from similar mainstream disregards in other disciplines such as law (Berman, 2003; Witte, 2002), international relations (Snyder, 2011), or political science (Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009).

7.1.1. Some empirical studies refuting Weber's thesis

The results and conclusions of several empirical studies associating religion and prosperity vary depending on the type of prosperity proxy variables chosen. Also, the spatial (cross-country, national, or subnational) and temporal configurations of these studies influence the different outcomes.

Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2006) found no effect of religion (adherents) on economic growth in cross-country settings. As shown, concentrating only on religious adherents is problematic (Section 7.1), yet Delacroix and Nielsen (2001) reported mixed results from comparing different historical periods and proxy variables. Other empirical studies refuting Weber's thesis have been performed at a subnational level. Cantoni (2015), for instance, found no effects of Protestantism on population figures used as proxies of economic growth. He used a dataset comprising 272 cities in the period 1300–1900 in the German Lands of the so-called "Holy Roman Empire." The main problem of Cantoni's approach lies in accepting city size as a proxy of prosperity. Thus, the city-size argument might lead one to consider Sao Paulo or Mexico DC as far more prosperous than Bern or Brussels today, for instance. Moreover, while Cantoni's finding might be accurate at a

subnational level, it cannot account for the historical performance of Germany as a whole compared to other countries with a Catholic tradition (e.g. Portugal or Spain).

7.1.2. Most empirical studies confirm Weber's thesis (although for different reasons)

Based on their comparative examination and systematic, state-of-the-art synthesis, Becker et al. (2016) concluded that historical Protestantism encouraged a wide range of societal developments. Balancing the empirical evidence, most studies have confirmed a positive impact of Protestantism on prosperity using different variables as well as diverse spatial and temporal configurations. On the whole, most empirical studies examining the consequences of the Reformation associate them with positive developments of governance and the economy (Becker et al., 2016; Appendix 5).

Economic prosperity has also been robustly linked with secularisation and declining levels of religiosity (Barro & McCleary, 2003; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Secularisation precedes economic growth, which means that prosperity did not cause secularisation in the past (Ruck, Bentley, & Lawson, 2018). Historically, Protestantism is a well-established precursor of secularism (Snyder, 2011); (Agnew, 2010); (Shah & Philpott, 2011); (Woodberry, 2012); (Berger, 1990); Section 8.3.4.4). Therefore, the causal arrows seem to run from historical Protestantism (anti-clericalism) to secularisation, to economic prosperity and security, and to postmaterialist values (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Granato, Inglehart, & Leblang, 1996).

Hence, the effects of Protestantism may not be immediate (i.e. considering the previously explained causal arrows). Capitalism emerged during the three centuries after the Reformation, mainly in the Protestant regions of Europe and the New World, and among Protestant minorities in Catholic countries. In contrast, pre-industrial societies were "zero-sum systems" where little or no economic growth took place (Granato et al., 1996). Consequently, Granato et al. (1996) argued that Protestantism has been decisive as it "undermines a set of religious norms that inhibit economic achievement and are common to most preindustrial societies." Therefore, the authors explain that "Weber is correct in

arguing that the rise of Protestantism is a crucial event in the modernization of Europe" (pp. 609-610).

Furthermore, historically Protestant countries still differ considerably in their values and attitudes today compared with Roman Catholic, Orthodox, or Islamic societies. Such enduring effects influence prosperity in the *longue durée,* although few people are still religious in present-day Protestant Europe, for instance (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 49; see also Section 10). It is therefore hardly surprising that influential works link empirically good economic outcomes to Protestantism in different sets of countries. However, such studies recognise the effect of historical Protestantism as a pivotal precursor of prosperity pillars rather than as a direct prosperity trigger in a classical Weberian sense. Thus, for instance, the robust empirical associations of Protestantism with prosperity relate to the development of democratic institutions (Woodberry, 2012), the rise of education and printing (Becker & Woessmann, 2009), and the weakening of hierarchical structures (La Porta et al., 1999; Volonté, 2015).

b. Religion as a Criterion (Dependent) Variable that is Affected by Prosperity

A crucial question in this interaction is how prosperity and political institutions affect religious participation and beliefs (McCleary & Barro, 2006, p. 49). Hence, theories of secularisation originate from the understanding of this interaction. Two complementary perspectives are identifiable:

1) The supply-side or "top-down" factors of religion. This literature focuses on the strategic role of religious organisations and leaders in the religious markets. Accordingly, competition among providers of religion affects "the nature of the religion product" (e.g. when governments impose state religions and limit entry). This strand descends from Adam Smith (1791) and was developed by Finke & Stark (1992) and Finke & Iannaccone (1993), among others (McCleary & Barro, 2006, p. 50; Norris & Inglehart, 2004, p. 7). This approach has been related to *Rational Choice Theory*, which contends that individuals and organisations

act based on the maxmimisation of utility (i.e. cost-benefit calculations) (Wilde et al., 2010; Young, 1997). Accordingly, the *Religious Competition Theory* argues that "religious institutions that feel more competition work harder to attract and to keep members, generally being more flexible and open to change than institutions in monopolistic environments" (Wilde et al., 2010, p. 589; Finke & Stark, 1992, p. 19). In response to the models of rational choice, the *Neo-Institutional Theory* contends "that institutional settings shape actors' preferences and actions" (Immergut 1998; Ingram & Clay cited in Wilde et al., 2010, p. 590), (see Sections 8.2; 8.3.4; 9; 10.4.1.2; and 10.4.1.3).

2) The demand-side or "bottom-up" model, which emphasises the mass public preferences alongside indsustrialisation, "modernisation", and prosperity. In this model, prosperity gradually erodes religious habits, thereby also diminishing the influence of organised religion on politics and governance. This perspective stems from John Wesley (1760), the founder of Methodism; and was further developed by Marx (1859 [1913]), Weber (1905), Hume (1757 [1993]), and Freud (1927), among others. Berger (1990), Norris and Inglehart (2004), among several others, have extended this idea (McCleary & Barro, 2006, p. 50; Norris & Inglehart, 2004, p. 7). Although Weber (1905) dedicates most of his attention to religion as an independent variable, he also recognises that religion can be a dependent variable (Koch 2009 pp. 12-13).

7.2.Influence of Prosperity on Religion: The Theory of Existential Security

While previous sections concentrated on the influence of religion on prosperity, this subsection analyses the other direction of the arrow (i.e. the influence of prosperity on religion). Norris and Inglehart (2004) theorised that a sense of existential security (i.e. the feeling that survival and prosperity are secure enough that they can be taken for granted) usually weakens transcendent religion. Accordingly, the theory of existential security contends that "…religious values remain strong in many developing societies, which also have rapidly growing populations, yet secularization is occurring in most advanced industrial societies" (Norris & Inglehart, 2010, p. 2). The authors explain that "religiosity

persists most strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing personal survival-threatening risks" (Norris & Inglehart, 2010, p. 5). In contrast, with rising levels of existential security (e.g. the emergence of the welfare states and economic prosperity), "the publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies are more secular in their orientations than those living in poorer developing nations" (Norris & Inglehart, 2010, p. 15).

Furthermore, feelings of vulnerability drive religiosity, even in rich nations, when comparing levels of economic inequality within their societies. For example, religiosity is strongest among the poorest and least secure sectors of US-American society (Norris & Inglehart, 2010, p. 12).

Additionally, Norris and Inglehart (2004) theorise that, currently, "post-Christian forms of spirituality" (e.g., yoga, astrology, or other "New Age" alternative beliefs and practices) are widespread in Western societies. Apparently, these post-Christian beliefs and practices may provide alleviation from the anxiety and stress that the secular world poses in industrial societies (Norris & Inglehart, 2010; Houtman & Aupers, 2007; Silver, 2006; Pike, 2006).

The theory of existential security constitutes a robust and revised version of the secularisation theory with empirical (quantitative) data from the World Values Survey (WVS) of 1981-2001. The WVS project conducted representative national surveys of the basic values and beliefs of the publics in all six continents (in more than 90 independent countries, containing more than 85% of the world's population). Norris and Inglehart (2004) provide significant correlations linking consistently "multiple objective macro-level indices of human development, societal modernization and economic inequality with the strength of religious values and practices in any society". Moreover, a large body of secondary empirical findings from diverse methods, approaches, and disciplines such as welfare studies, health care, and social psychology, is consistent with the existential security thesis (Norris & Inglehart, 2010, p. 6).

The sermon on "The Use of Money" by John Wesley (1760) constitutes an early empirical example of the theories of secularisation and existential security. Wesley preached, "gain all

you can, save all you can, give all you can" but he regretted the fact that, as his congregants became wealthier, they also became less religious (McCleary & Barro, 2006, p. 49-50).

Yet, existential security as a "detrimental" principle of faith seems to have been intuitively recognised, even in more ancient times. The book of Proverbs in the Bible registers the following assertion:

> …give me neither poverty nor riches; feed me with food convenient for me: lest I be full, and deny thee, and say, Who is the Lord? or lest I be poor, and steal, and take the name of my God in vain (Proverbs 30: 8-9).

The author of this proverb requests a sober measure of wealth. He recognises that too much prosperity and existential security will lead him to lose his faith in God (i.e. deteriorate his religiosity), but that too little will lead him to sin (i.e. steal).

Similarly, a Protestant stakeholder interviewed in this study referred to the book of Judges in the Bible, which narrates several cycles of struggle and suffering during which the Jews sought the God of Israel (See Section 21.7).

> This principle comes down to us historically and repetitively, for example, from the book of Judges […] the more Israel obeyed God's law in the Bible, the better [they] got, whereas whenever they strayed far from God's commandments, they faced the worst crisis. […] this pattern is repeated cyclically over and over again in history, leading to social failure and oppression whenever people disobeyed God (Independent Protestant believer, Appendix 16).

The previous stakeholder's statement would appear to contradict the theory of existential security at first sight. However, according to the book of Judges, Israel prospered during numerous generations after obeying God's commandments. Yet, after prospering (i.e. after gaining existential security), the Jews turned away from the God of Israel (i.e. diminished their religiosity). Afterwards, they started worshipping other gods and idols (i.e. post-Judaism), and the entire nation fell into disgrace once more, as a consequence. In the new crises, they repented and restored their obedience to the God of Israel, and subsequently, the Jewish nation achieved prosperity again, only to then take it for granted once more after a few generations and begin a new crisis. This cycle repeats several times; therefore, the

narration of the book of Judges relates a cyclical feature that demonstrates consistency with the theory of existential security.

Sections 18-21 (case studies) will show that the theory of existential security is the most prominent principle identified after analysing the qualitative data (case studies). This study applies Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a qualitative method in the case studies (Section 17.6). Interestingly, CDA draws from Marxist theory (Hjelm, 2014, p. 856), which this study also links empirically with the theory of existential security.

7.3. Summary

The relationships of prosperity vis-à-vis religion as a predictor (independent) variable (e.g. Weber) or as a criterion (dependent) variable (e.g. Marx) reinforce each other and produced a vast body of theories and empirical studies. In the first causal arrow, Weber's explanations and findings in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* has attracted much criticism over the last century. The debate remains polarised. Thus, numerous quantitative studies link the relations between Christian religions and prosperity indicators. The corresponding empirical conclusions either support Weber's central thesis (mainly at cross-country levels, e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; Granato et al., 1996) or refute it (mainly selective regional examples or sub-national levels; see, for instance, Cantoni, 2015; Delacroix & Nielsen, 2001; Iannaccone, 1998).

In any event, the effects of Christianity on prosperity seem to vary depending on the leading religious denomination influencing a given society. Recent research largely confirms that the Reformation played a vital role in Europe's economic and political trajectory, although for different reasons than those advanced by Weber (Woodberry, 2012; Becker et al., 2016, p. 11). Consequently, a Protestant "work ethic" might oversimplify the intricate process that makes Protestant societies more prosperous than Roman Catholics or Orthodox ones. A particular work ethic is no more than one of many underlying mechanisms and contributing factors.

For instance, education and hierarchy are two decisive prosperity mechanisms related to religious denominations. The historical Protestant focus on education has positively influenced societal and prosperity outcomes (Becker & Woessmann, 2009). Likewise, the hierarchical power relations in Orthodoxy, Islam, or Roman Catholicism have had unfavourable long-term effects on social progress and prosperity (La Porta et al., 1997). Sections 7–11 will elaborate on these issues.

The historical institutional influence of religion has been the crucial factor with regard to prosperity/transparency (more than the current proportion of adherents). Thus, most empirical findings contradict the prevailing Roman Catholic ideology, which has insisted (without, however, providing much empirical evidence) on restoring what it considers a "prosperous and peaceful medieval society" (see, for instance, (Restrepo, 1939; Ratzinger & Pera, 2006). The Middle Ages allowed the Roman Church-State to create a theocratical order in which the papacy established a hierarchical society and in which spiritual power prevailed over temporal power. This Roman Catholic ideal meant (and still means) that the ecclesiastical hierarchy determines the legal principles and the basic norms of collective life (Figueroa, 2016, p. 155).

The second causal arrow (religion as a dependent variable vis-à-vis prosperity) resulted in, among others, secularisation theories focusing on either the supply or demand-side of religion. The theory of existential security (Norris & Inglehart, 2004) is an influential model that empirically focuses on the variations of the demand-side and revises the secularisation theory.

While cultural and institutional proxies delineate the quantitative and QCA empirical settings (2/3 of the results of this study), the theory of existential security is particularly relevant in the application of grounded theory in the qualitative part of the research (1/3 of the results). In other words, the empirical focus of the quantitative and QCA parts is the relationship of religion, as a predictor (independent) variable, to prosperity. Yet, after coding and applying grounded theory in the qualitative part, the second arrow of relation (religion as a dependent variable) appeared relevant.

Empirical expectation:

2) *I expect the empirical evidence to corroborate a trend towards higher prosperity (competitiveness) in historically Protestant countries and lower competitiveness in historically Catholic countries. This expectation is based on abundant empirical studies linking higher prosperity outcomes with Protestantism at a cross-country level.*

The next sections further explain the close corruption/prosperity–religion nexus from an institutional-legal and from a theological perspective.

8. Institutions, Corruption/Prosperity, and Religion
(A), (B), (D), (1), (3), (6)

This comprehensive section addresses the most crucial aspect of this study: institutions and the institutional influence of religion.

It is divided into four subsections. Subsection 1 discusses the importance of institutions concerning transparency/prosperity and the difficulty of differentiating institutions empirically. It also explores other critical issues related to prosperity such as democracy versus hierarchy. Subsection 2 examines the religion-institution nexus and considers the contributions of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. Subsection 3 analyses the law, the most formal and persistent institution that shapes societies. Referring to the legal traditions in Europe and the Americas, it discusses the pervasive influence of Roman civil and canon law and the role of subsequent Protestant revolutions that sought to counteract that predominance. Finally, subsection 4 discusses the *longue durée* effect of religion on education and analyses the uneven contributions of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism in this respect.

8.1. Institutions as Triggers of Corruption/Prosperity *(3)*

The quality of institutions has been theoretically and empirically linked to prosperity (and thus also to transparency) outcomes (North, 1990; La Porta et al., 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Williamson, 2000). Such studies have credibly associated empirical evidence and theory. Institutions are therefore widely accepted as playing a determinant (causal) role in the prosperity of societies even if alternative interpretations may exist (Woodruff, 2006).

However, several problems arise when considering institutions *inter alia* as triggers of corruption (and prosperity):

1. Scant agreement exists on how to measure formal or informal institutions empirically. Different studies measuring institutions with varied methods measure different things. Sometimes even gauging the outcome in isolation from other factors is challenging (Woodruff, 2006).
2. Endogeneity issues plague the causal approaches of institutions to prosperity, although to a lesser extent the effect of political institutions on corruption. Previous treatments of endogeneity, however, have not been convincing (Persson & Tabellini, 2003; Woodruff, 2006; Kunicová, 2006).
3. It is not entirely clear which institutions are fundamental to prosperity/transparency processes (Woodruff, 2006, p. 106).
4. Formal institutions have little effect on broad prosperity outcomes. However, informal institutions matter and have a more significant effect (Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004; Woodruff, 2006; Treisman, 2000).
5. Although quite strong associations often exist, the causal arrow may point in both directions (from corruption to institutional choice and from institutions to corruption) (Rose-Ackerman, 2006, p. xxv).
6. Informal institutions are the most difficult to measure (and change) since they are largely determined by history (Woodruff, 2006, p. 121).

Thus, research on institutions and prosperity/corruption has so far not provided conclusive evidence of causality. The strongest evidence relates to the impact of underlying social structures (informal institutions), which is highly difficult to address, both in prospective and in policy terms (Lambsdorff, 2006; Woodruff, 2006; Rose-Ackerman, 2006).

In practical terms, institutions and transparency/trust may all have coincided with prosperity, as empirical evidence exists for arguing causality in both directions (Fukuyama, 1995; Uildriks, 2009; Morris, 2003; Armony, 2004). Therefore, prosperity, corruption (or its opposite transparency), trust, and institutions are inseparable concepts. One causal cyclical logic that might be expected would be that ethical transparency/trust values promote institutional stability and prosperity (Fukuyama, 1995).

History and culture have shaped current institutional structures (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Rose-Ackerman, 2006). At the same time, empirical evidence

also shows that institutional structures shape cultural values (i.e. trust and civic norms) (Uildriks, 2009, p. 7); (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015). In any event, religion has played a crucial role in corroborating both cultural values and institutions (Arruñada, 2010; Manow, 2002; Paldam, 2001; Treisman, 2000; Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) have explained how inclusive institutions create inclusive markets, incentives and opportunities for prosperity. Inclusive institutions create positive feedback loops, which prevent an elite's efforts to undermine them. Throughout its history, Latin America has, however, experienced a negative institutional feedback loop, which has perpetuated corruption, mistrust, and elitist/extractive institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Uildriks, 2009).

If political institutions are key (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012), who creates them? Lawyers and policy makers have moral and religious backgrounds (i.e. historically, these are predominantly Protestant in North America and Roman Catholic in Latin America). However, Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) neglect the influence of religious values on ruling elites. More importantly, the authors disregard the institutional influence of religion and instead suggest critical historical junctures (e.g. the death of political leaders, weather conditions). However, citing Robert Michels's "iron law of oligarchy," Acemoglu & Robinson (2012, 2008) list countless examples of radical movements and revolutions that simply replaced one tyranny with another.

On this evidence, it is therefore essential to recognise *which* revolutions created better institutions. We also need to ask which triggers changed an old regime into a new *status quo.* Thus, countries that had not fully adopted the principles of such revolutions preserved elements of the old regime. These notions are explored below (see especially 8.3).

8.1.1. Institutions, Hierarchy, and Democracy vis-à-vis Prosperity/Transparency

This subsection first considers the relation of democracy, hierarchy and corruption/prosperity and second their significant correlation with religion.

Weak institutions may cause mistrust and thus impair the quality of democratic institutions (Putnam, 1993). At the same time, robust empirical evidence suggests that stable democracies (democracies older than those that have emerged in the last 70 years) reduce corruption in the long term (Treisman, 2000). In other words, weak and recent democracies with little electoral participation and little competition for office tend to have little or no influence on reducing corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 2006); (Lambsdorff, 2006) (Treisman, 2000).

Other studies have also found significant linkages between democracy and transparency (Persson et al. 2003; Paldam 2002; Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000; Goldsmith 1999). However, they also report the waning significance of democracy when GDP per capita is included in the models. Sections 3 and 8.1 have already discussed the highly intertwined relationship between prosperity and transparency and have suggested that both may be part of the prosperity phenomenon.

Making the case for causal relations between corruption, prosperity, and democracy has proven problematic, theoretically and empirically. The strong associations among these factors, along with unclear directions of causality, suggest that they form part of the same, reinforcing feedback loop. Overcoming such unproductive factor segregation, my research model considers transparency, prosperity, and stable democracy as part of the same reinforcing feedback phenomenon (Figures 2 and 5).

Autocratic rulers (and leaders of highly hierarchical organisations) have incentives to extract the maximum possible revenues to satisfy their self-interest as abundant examples and historical evidence show (Olson, 1993). Hierarchical, centralised bureaucracies corrode interpersonal trust, whereas horizontal, locally led organisations induce interpersonal trust

(Putnam, 1993). Historically, the Roman Catholic Church-State has epitomised the hierarchical, centralised institution, whereas decentralisation and local control generally characterise Protestant movements (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 35).

Using different methodologies and datasets, La Porta et al. (1999) and Husted (1999) empirically confirmed that hierarchies contribute to corruption. Adserà et al. (2003) estimated the impact of the level of democracy on corruption in a cross-country study. They highlighted the importance of political instability as encouraging actors to appropriate maximum rents in the short term, leading to increased corruption.

In contrast, stable democratic societies usually reflect greater openness and expanded freedom of choice. More competition for political positions should lead societies to oust poorly performing leaders, at least in theory. Thus, politicians focusing solely on increasing private rents would be voted out of power, and opposition candidates would win elections by promising improvements (Rose-Ackerman, 1978).

However, ample evidence suggests that the Latin American experience is quite the opposite. Notwithstanding advancing democratisation in the last century, the relationships between government stakeholders and civil society have largely remained clientelistic. Moreover, democratisation has generally gone hand in hand with low public trust in state institutions and a "generalized irreverence to the rule of law" by either state actors or civil society (Luzani as cited in Uildriks, 2009, p. 6). Furthermore, a "democratization of violence" has also accompanied the rise of democracy in Latin America (Kruijt and Koonings as cited in Uildriks, 2009, p. 2).

In line with Olson (1993), La Porta et al. (1999) and Husted (1999), I argue that one of the critical triggers of corruption (and inequality) in Latin America is the continent's strongly hierarchical (and elitist) societal structure. This structure is part of the legacy of the Roman Catholic Church-State, which has exercised a pervasive influence on formal and informal institutions throughout the region (Levine, 1981).

Empirical expectation:

3) *Given that economic prosperity, democracy, and transparency are part of the same phenomenon, I expect these factors to be highly correlated. My quantitative model on corruption (Section 15.3.4) considers proxy variables for all of these variables.*

8.2. Religion and Institutions *(6)*

8.2.1. The Roman Catholic Influence on Institutions, Democracy, and Prosperity

The introductory considerations and the following subsections show how the Roman Empire and its inheritor, the Roman Catholic Church-State, have exerted a pervasive historical influence in Europe and the Americas. However, the last five decades have witnessed a reformed discourse in Roman Catholicism following the Second Vatican Council. The following subsections explore the relevant background and issues in greater detail.

8.2.1.1. Roman Catholic Political Philosophy

Historically, Roman Catholicism has favoured a monarchical state order as an absolute form of governance ideally suited to governing a large mass of people with a single religion (Cook, 2012, p. 23). This political philosophy descends from Aristotle, who considered the monarchy one of the desirable forms of government, contrary to democracy, one of the worst in his eyes (see his *Politics*). Thomas Aquinas, the single most important philosopher of Catholicism, adopted many Aristotelian political principles and synthesised these with the medieval Catholic ideal of society: “The best regime of a community is government by one

person, […] unity is more congruently the effect of one than of many" (Thomas Aquinas, *C. G.* iv. 76, (fn. 4) as cited in Cook, 2012 p. 23).

Therefore, the Roman Church-State and papal authority saw the monarchical constitution as a model for the constitution of the secular state. Such an archaic model of government is still evident in the Vatican's monarchical structure (i.e. Roman Catholic Church-State). Only recently has Catholicism begun to support democracy abroad, strategically and discriminately. Democracy, for Romanism, is a "lesser evil" since monarchical governments are no longer dominant worldwide and also given the threats of secularism and Marxism (Cook, 2012, p. 83); (Anderson, 2007).

8.2.1.2. Change of Discourse Towards Democracy after Vatican II

The Roman Church-State, which avoids democratic forms for internal Church governance, is best suited to either monarchical or a mixed form of secular government. Thus, Romanism rejects democratic constitution and popular sovereignty principles as ideals both for the Church-State and for ecclesiastical states (Rommen, 1945 p. 490); (Cook, 2012, p. 24). As *Civiltà Cattolica*, the Jesuit periodical in Rome, stated in the late 1930s: "Fascism is the regime that corresponds most closely to the concepts of the Church of Rome" (as cited in van Paassen, 1939, p. 465).

However, Vatican II (1962–1965) brought about a myriad of transformations. As Agnew (2010) observed:

> The Second Vatican Council, while it may not have marked a huge disruption in the beliefs and practices of the Church, did involve the adoption of a novel set of more latitudinarian attitudes towards other religions (not least towards other Christians) and the reinvigoration of an epideictic language emphasising reconciliation rather than the previously dominant patristic form accentuating confrontation and judgement (p. 48).

Vatican II affirmed the religious freedom of the Church and cooperation between Church and State as guiding principles (Ragazzi, 2009, p. 118). It ended the requirement of a Latin

mass, relaxed confessional obligations and restrictions, and abandoned the Roman Church's claims to power in secular states (Wilde et al., 2010). There is also empirical evidence that "Catholics brought up after Vatican II are indeed more trusting and tolerant" than before (Guiso et al., 2006). However, the Roman See has increased its political activity by signing more than 30 concordats with new states after Vatican II (Fumagalli, 2011; Corral 2014). Therefore, theological change alone falls short of explaining the post-1965 shift of the Roman Church from its traditional hostile stance towards democracy (Anderson, 2007). Anderson (2007) explained this shift in terms of the Church's efforts to maintain its ideological, political, and social hegemony and to preserve its position in ideological, political, religious, and social markets.

Cook (2012) analysed Catholic hegemony after 1965 (Vatican II) in Spain, Croatia, Germany, the United States, Mexico, and the Philippines. He found that hegemony involves maintaining the preeminent place of Roman Catholicism among other religious denominations in pluralistic societies grounded in constitutional democracies. He concluded that depending on the political and religious conditions existing in a particular country, the Roman Church-State either maintains or establishes its hegemony over time (Cook, 2012, p. 345).

Wilde et al. (2010) examined the bishops' openness to reform and ecumenical affairs in their votes (i.e. to vote progressively) while at Vatican II. Using data from more than 100 countries obtained from the Vatican Secret Archive, the authors ran logistic regression analyses and tested the Rational Choice (Religious Competition) and Neo-Institutional theories. Wilde et al. found evidence substantiating both theories and concluded:

> Bishops from religiously free environments were much more likely [to vote progressively] than bishops from countries where the RCC [Roman Catholic Church] was the state Church… (Wilde et al., 2010, p. 599).

In countries where the Roman Catholic Church was the state religion, the probability that a bishop voted progressively at Vatican II decreases drastically, from .95 to .21, as the percentage of Catholic population increases from 75 to 100. However, the effect of the proportion of Catholics varies substantially with different state-church relations. In countries

with formal religious freedom, the proportion of Catholics "has virtually no effect on the bishops' votes". In turn, bishops "become more conservative as the Church's market share increases in countries where the RCC or another religion was established" (Wilde et al., 2010, pp. 593-594). These findings confirm the higher importance of the religious institutional settings vis-à-vis the proportion of adherents and, equally importantly, the decisive influence of religious competition in the configuration of the Vatican II outcomes.

Similarly, Gill (1998) studied the contribution of Roman Catholicism to political change in Latin America. He explained why after Vatican II some Catholic hierarchies supported political reform, while others supported authoritarian regimes or stood aside, in order to preserve the *status quo*. He proposed a market explanation based on quantitative and qualitative data analysis (i.e. cross-country comparisons and twelve case studies). After analysing historical and statistical evidence, Gill concluded:

> In places where evangelical Protestantism and "spiritist" sects made inroads among poor Catholics, Church leaders championed the rights of the poor and turned against authoritarian regimes to retain parishioners. Where competition was minimal, bishops maintained good relations with military rulers. … [I]n five of the six antiauthoritarian cases—Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama—relatively high religious competition (i.e., above the median level of 4.5 percent) preceded the episcopacy's decision to oppose the military. Likewise, five of the neutral or proauthoritarian Churches—Argentina, Bolivia, Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay—faced comparatively little competition and did not implement progressive pastoral strategies on an extensive basis. Although small progressive sectors were attacked in these countries, pastoral agents received little support from the hierarchy… (Gill, 1998, pp. 106, 270).

Gill's results are supported by other studies in cases such as Argentina, where the Catholic Church (as a monopolistic player) was supportive of and cooperative with military dictatorships. In turn, the Chilean Catholic hierarchy responded critically and unsupportively towards the dictatorship in the presence of religious pluralism (i.e. the significant presence of Protestantism) (Waldmann, 2012; Zilla, 2020).

Gill also argues that "monopoly churches are like monopoly firms in that they do not meet the quality and quantity demands of their customers" (Gill, p. 85). He illustrates this market strategy in the Roman Church by comparing the number of priests per 10,000 Catholics across countries after Vatican II (in the 1970s). Whereas a typical Latin American country had only around two priests per 10,000 Catholics, Protestant countries such as the United States, Great Britain, Australia, or Sweden had nearly five times the number (around ten priests per 10,000 Catholics). Germany, the birthplace of the Reformation, had almost 46 priests per 10,000 Catholics (Barret cited in Gill, 1998). Gill found then a strong inverse correlation between religious monopoly and Catholic clergy per 10,000 Catholics ($r = -.75$) (Gill, 1998, pp. 85-87). Accordingly, in the presence of religious competition, more clergy per Catholic population typically means a better provision of religious and social services. Therefore, Woodberry observes:

> …the Catholic Church provided far more education and created more organizational civil society in countries where it competed with CPs [conversionary Protestants] (e.g., the United States, Ireland, and India), than in places it historically could block competition (e.g., Mexico, Spain, and Italy) (Woodberry, 2012, p. 269).

Thus, Roman Catholic hierarchies have often defended the interests of the poor (e.g. promoting democracy) when facing greater competition from Protestantism (Gill, 1998; Anderson, 2007; Woodberry, 2012). Competition compels the Roman Church-State to break traditional alliances with the ruling elites. Protestant missions have often catalysed Roman Catholic mobilisation, thus expanding education and political resources in Latin America (Trejo, 2009; Smith, 1991; Woodberry, 2012). In Mexico, for instance, Woodberry observes:

> in areas with successful Protestant missions, both conservative and liberal bishops expanded education and organized indigenous communities politically; elsewhere they did not. Because the Catholic Church has far more resources and personnel in Mexico than do Protestants, Catholics provided more educational and political

> resources than Protestants did—but Protestant missions were the catalyst (Trejo, 2009 as cited in Woodberry, 2012, p. 269).

Conversely, in the absence of competition, Catholic hierarchy can easily ignore people's needs and continue its allegiance with abusive political elites (Gill 1998, 7, 48); (Anderson, 2007, p. 394). Evidently, competition with Protestantism has not been the only factor affecting bishops' decisions to oppose dictatorships, but is, nevertheless, a key component in explaining the variation in institutional responses (Gill, 1998, p. 120).

Nevertheless, a tendency exists to disregard or consider past scholarship as outdated or as non-applicable after the Second Vatican Council. The allegedly altruistic change after millennia of Roman Catholic intransigence has even led the dominant literature to explain modern welfare states as a manifestation of Catholic social doctrine (Wilensky, 1981; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Boswell, 1993). Some authors, however, have found this approach historically inadequate, since it distorts the decisive causes of institutional variance (Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009). In Europe, Manow (2002) notably observes:

> "…in some of the allegedly 'Catholic' regimes Christian [Catholic] Democracy never emerged as a political party (Spain, Portugal, France), or early welfare state legislation had an explicitly anti-clerical motivation (Italy, France, Belgium)" (Manow, 2002, p. 3).

Political Catholicism has typically led to the formation of Catholic Democratic parties in countries where it has faced competition with Protestant or anti-clerical movements (e.g. Switzerland, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy) (Manow, 2002; Ercolessi & Hägg, 2012). Similarly, Gill (1998) observes that in Latin America:

> …Christian Democracy was principally a lay movement that received little or no official organizational support from the Church hierarchy. True, the bishops sometimes publicly endorsed the objectives of the Christian Democrats, but Vatican prohibitions on direct political involvement in partisan politics limited the support they could give (p. 206).

Such evidence presented by Manow (2002), Ercolessi & Hägg (2012), and Gill (1998) also supports the Religious Competition and Neo-Institutional theories (Section 7.b). Having clarified the influence of Roman Catholic ideology on institutions, below I briefly consider the influence of historical Protestantism on institutions.

8.2.2. Protestant Influence on Institutions and Democracy

Protestantism not only broke the political (as well as institutional and economic) hegemony of the Roman Catholic Church but also interrupted the growing influence of this belief system in Europe. From these processes emerged the modern state and secular institution (which later also influenced democracy, the American Constitution, and the French and Industrial Revolutions) (Snyder, 2011; Woodberry, 2012; Becker et al., 2016; Witte, 2002) (Figure 5).

Becker et al. (2016) have provided a comprehensive and conclusive synthesis of the literature on the causes and consequences of the Reformation, including its positive and "dark shadow" (negative) effects (see Appendix 5 for a list of the relevant studies). The authors conclude that the Protestant Reformation "ended the ancient hegemony of the Catholic Church in Western Europe" (p.1). Also, they observed that the Reformation connects to positive institutional and economic outcomes in a myriad of empirical studies in which Protestantism encourages:

> …a host of variables that are important for economic growth, including human capital, governance, entrepreneurship, social ethic, social networks, and missionary work. […] Where the Reformation took hold, it fundamentally altered political, legal, and social institutions. This ultimately resulted in the ascendancy of parliaments, the secularization of law, increased emphasis on education, and the precursors of the welfare state (Becker et al., 2016, p. 21).

Becker et al. (2016) found a mostly "positive picture" of "the effects of the Reformation on education, work ethic, and economic development" (Becker et al., p. 20). However, the authors also found a "dark side" of Protestantism in their review of empirical studies. They

traced the negative effect of Protestantism back to Weber (1905), who had already noted sinister consequences of the Reformation, as "an "iron cage" of secularization, alienating materialism and narrowly instrumental thinking" (Becker et al., 2016, p. 20). Also, Durkheim (1899) found a higher propensity of Protestants to commit *suicide* than Roman Catholics and Jews across regions and countries. Yet, Roman Catholics exhibit a higher tendency to commit *homicides* than Protestants (Durkheim, 1899, pp. 353-354). The higher suicide likelihood of Protestants in Germany and Switzerland has been corroborated empirically by Becker & Woessmann (2015) and Torgler & Schaltegger (2014), respectively.

Furthermore, the Protestant share of the population also correlates with the rise of anti-Semitism and Nazism in Germany during the Weimar Republic. For instance, Protestants were ultimately polarised, especially where they supported the right ends of the political spectrum in Germany, since Catholics were rooted in the political centre with their own party, the *Zentrumspartei* (Spenkuch as cited in Becker et al., 2016, p. 21). However, other authors (Goldhagen, 1996 and Browning, 1998 as cited in Becker et al., 2016) state that German anti-Semitism might be traced back to "Luther's nationalism and obsession with the failed effort to convert the Jews to Protestantism" (p. 20). Yet, these and other similar historical claims that link Luther's ethics and nationalism with Germany being predisposed toward intolerance and authoritarianism "suffer from being over-generalized, poorly construed and rarely tested using systematic evidence" (Becker et al., 2016, pp. 20-21), (see Section 8.3.4.1).

8.2.2.1. Protestantism and Democracy

In historical Protestantism, neither a priest, bishop, or pope dictates morality but every Protestant believer does so based on reading and interpreting the Bible. This, in brief, is Luther's democratising "universal priesthood of all believers' principle" (Witte, 2002).

Woodberry's (2012) influential study demonstrated a consistent linkage between Protestantism and democracy. The latter, as other authors have established, is also firmly associated with prosperity (Morton, Siegle, & Weinstein, 2005; World Economic Forum,

2016). Woodberry (2012) provided robust historical and statistical evidence that Protestant missionaries profoundly influenced the rise and spread of stable democracy around the world:

1) Historically, Protestants have spread religious liberty, mass education, mass printing, newspapers, voluntary organisations, and colonial reforms, and thus helped to create the conditions for stable democracies.

2) Statistically, "Protestant missions are significantly and robustly associated with higher levels of printing, education, economic development, organizational civil society, protection of private property, and rule of law and with lower levels of corruption" (Woodberry 2004a; 2004c; 2006c; 2011b; 2011c; as cited in Woodberry, 2012, p. 268). The statistical evidence "demonstrates that the historic prevalence of Protestant missionaries explains the variation in democracy better than either the prevalence of the nonreligious or of generic Protestants. Moreover, Protestant missions predict democracy, whereas Catholic missions do not" (Woodberry p. 247).

Consequently, Protestantism is strongly associated with stable, representative democracy in Western Europe. Also, statistically, "the historic prevalence of Protestant missionaries strongly predicts democracy in 142 non-European societies" (Woodberry 2012, p. 245). Furthermore, Woodberry (2012) found such a consistent association also among European-settler colonies:

> "Protestant-based" United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have been more democratic than "Catholic-based" Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. Both sets of countries had similar precolonial conditions (i.e. temperate climates, communal landholding, and small indigenous populations), which weakens theories that climate or pre-Protestant class conditions caused the Protestantism–democracy association (p. 244).

Woodberry's conclusions also weaken theories claiming that secularisation causes democracy (e.g. the United States is far more religious than Uruguay). In this respect, the historical prevalence of Protestant missionaries explains about half the statistical variation in

democracy in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Oceania (Woodberry, 2012, p. 244). The robust controls and consistent analyses performed by Woodberry leave little room for an alternative explanation to Protestantism as a democracy trigger.

On this historical and empirical evidence, Woodberry seriously challenges traditional modernisation theory. For instance, traditionally associated factors of democracy and social developments are often endogenous (and not necessarily direct determinants) (i.e. secular rationality, economic growth, urbanisation, industrialisation, the expansion of the state, and the development of new class structures) (Woodberry, 2012, p. 244). Anderson (2007) reached similar conclusions, in particular that the greater the proportion of the Protestant population, the higher the level of democracy (p. 385).

However, on the "dark side", it is clear that "missionaries committed their own abuses, and some were even racist", or they often ignored abuses given their concentration on conversion as a primary goal (Woodberry, 2012, p. 255). Also, the typical Protestant translation of texts and education in the vernacular, "may have accentuated ethnic heterogeneity and sometimes fostered violence" (Posner, 2003 and Ranger, 1999 as cited in Woodberry, 2012, p. 245). However, as Bradbury (2014) concluded in his study in this regard,

> In the past, missionaries have been too often lampooned and pilloried as agents of imperialism, destroyers of indigenous cultures, ideologically driven manipulators of vulnerable natives. While there were a few to whom such descriptions might legitimately be attached, such generalizations wither under the scrutiny of more detailed historical study (Bradbury, 2014, p. 427).

Figure 5 shows the historical relations between the religious and institutional factors giving rise to prosperity, transparency, and democracy; or instead to hegemonic oppression and corruption.




Figure 5: Relationships among variables of interest or conditions (Quantitative and QCA) (In red). Factors giving rise to prosperity, transparency, and democracy; or conversely to hegemonic oppression and corruption (Source: Author's collection) Based on this study's theoretical framework (among others: Woodberry 2012; Miller 2012; Acemoglu et al. 2011; Snyder 2011; Berman, 2003,; Witte, 2002; Johnson, McGowan, & Turner, 2010; Heussi 1961. Note: This figure does not include the Orthodox hegemony nor the Marxist Revolution.

8.2.3.Traditional Institutional Influence of Religion in Latin America

The Roman Catholic Church-State legitimated Latin American territories as either Spanish or Portuguese colonies from the 15th to the early 19th century. Equally, Spanish and Portuguese settlement guaranteed a Catholic monopoly from 1500 to the early 1900s, thus securing the Church's hegemony and a feudalist-like economy (Gill, 2013, p. 117). In essence, the conquest was a religious, political, and military endeavour actively supported by the Church. It made Latin America a unique cultural entity in the world, one largely possessing the same language (Spanish or Portuguese) and the same religion (Roman Catholicism) as solid, unifying elements (Navarro, 2016, p. 111).

By the onset of the colonial period, the Iberian Peninsula had established its hegemony in Europe, which enabled it to bring under its rule the richest territories in the Americas (South and Central). The British took what the Spaniards and Portuguese "left over" (North America). North American lands were desert-poor and inhabited by modest aborigines. Importantly, these territories lacked the abundance of gold and jewels found in their South and Central American counterparts (i.e. attested to by the Aztec, Maya and Inca civilisations) (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 21).

A positive institutional loop inherited from Great Britain allowed a "reversal of fortune," in which the poorest lands of the Americas (North) became the most powerful country in the world (Prados de la Escosura, 2004; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) explain that inclusive institutions permit goods and wealth to be shared more equally. This enabled the British to establish the United States, from the "left-overs" of the Spaniards, and to build the British Empire.

By contrast, the Spaniards took advantage of the indigenous population and built extractive institutions, such as *la mita* ("tax or common service paid by Indians") or *la encomienda* ("enslavement or Spanish labour system"). These were designed to extract wealth from the people and to perpetuate a powerful elite during the colonial period. This situation persisted after the independence of the Latin American states, whose present-day institutions descend from *la mita* or *la encomienda*. Such social inequality has bred corruption, violence, and political instability (ibid).

Even after independence, the Catholic Church-State has been instrumental to securing a population loyal to government, thus perpetuating the *status quo*, i.e. the hegemony of the Church-State. Protestantism was officially banned, including government prohibitions of Bible distributions and Protestant services in Spanish, among others (Gill, 2013, p. 119). In the mid-20th century, the Catholic Church continued to secure for itself favourable positions in countries such as Colombia or Argentina (Gill, 2013; Munevar, 2008; Gill, 1998; Levine, 1981).

The colonial legacy that Latin American institutions received from religion is characterised by three facts: first, the religious monopoly of the Roman Catholic Church, i.e. the banning of other religious expressions; second, the replacement of indigenous beliefs for Roman Catholicism giving form to syncretic practices persisting to this date; and third, royal patronage (*Patronato Real*), a quasi-perfect fusion of church and state allowing the Spanish King to appoint bishops in the New World, who would also hold government posts, and to preserve the hierarchy Pope-King-Bishop (Navarro, 2016, p. 112).

Since colonisation, the material and symbolic influence of the Roman Catholic Church has reinforced social arrangements in Latin America (Levine, 1981, p. 29). For Levine, the pervasive fusion of Roman Catholicism and politics in Latin America can assume several forms:

> it may be expressed in the form and content of law; in the structures of education; in the nature of approved sanctions and mechanisms for resolving social conflict; and, of course, in the accepted processes for legitimating authority. All these manifestations and others are expressions of a belief that the values which orient individuals and inform the structure of institutions cannot be separated from those which relate individuals to the transcendental or divine (Levine, 1981, p. 20).

Notwithstanding the imposed restrictions, Protestant missionaries slowly introduced Reformed forms of faith until Protestantism could no longer be ignored in 20th-century Latin America (Gill, 2013). As Gill observed,

> …Protestant missionaries were able to make their way slowly into various societies and begin converting individuals, including indigenous folk who would then become pastors for these new churches. Once Protestants began indigenizing their churches, it became difficult for governments to prevent their growth. It was one thing to deport foreign missionaries; it was just not possible to deport one's own citizens. Moreover most of these new churches provided valuable social services to communities (e.g., literacy training, food banks for the poor)… (Gill, 2013, p. 119).

Protestant churches also provided the poor with access to medical assistance and other services (Gill, 2013; Gill, 1998; Woodberry, 2012). Growing Protestant competition forced many Catholic dignitaries to rethink their strategy with a new "preferential option for the poor" (Gill, 2013; Gill, 1998). The Catholic Church promulgated a new social strategy (i.e. *Rerum Novarum* of 1891); Catholic Action; Second Vatican Council of 1965); Medellin Episcopal Conference of 1968). These developments also gave rise to "Liberation Theology" (Büschges, 2018), (see Section 10.4.1.4). Regardless of such advances, the Roman Catholic Church still exercises great hegemony in most Latin American countries and traditional intransigent paradigms continue to prevail (Figueroa, 2016; Munevar, 2008; Martin, 1999; Levine, 1981).

The inertia of such institutional legacies and the prevalence of corporatist ideologies (pre-Vatican II) have perpetuated an elitist model of society in Latin America, which continues to be by far the most unequal continent in the world to date (World Bank, 2014).

8.2.4. Summarising the Core Messages

Regardless of the advances made by Roman Catholicism in the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II: 1962-1965), corporatist ideologies remain prevalent, mostly in Latin America (Figueroa, 2016; Munevar, 2008; Martin, 1999; Levine, 1981). But while Roman Catholic discourse has shifted, the institutional inertia persists and maintains the hierarchical *status quo* and longstanding feudal structures (i.e. concordats).

The Reformation brought forth a wide range of modern institutions. Among these, education and democracy are the most crucial ones for ensuring prosperity/transparency outcomes. Likewise, Protestantism has impacted the secularisation of the state in Protestant countries (and also in Roman Catholics, albeit to a lesser, more indirect extent). Protestantism fosters horizontal power relations and secular–rational attitudes towards authority (Becker et al., 2016; Woodberry, 2012; Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009; Witte, 2002; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Treisman, 2000). Thus, such egalitarian and secular attitudes are linked to greater transparency and prosperity (Lambsdorff, 2006).

State institutions in Latin America have been closely linked with Roman Catholicism in that they continue feudal-medieval structures. The Protestant Reformation has not been allowed to directly influence institutions in Latin America as it did in North America or in northern Europe. The following subsections expand on these historical relations and concentrate on religion and formal institutions (law) in Europe and the Americas.

Note: The *GCI* index includes an institutional indicator. Therefore, no results of institutions are analysed in the empirical setting, in order to exclude endogeneity (i.e. institutions explaining institutions). However, the next section considers the legal tradition, which may serve as an exogenous proxy of the historical institutional influence of religion (or non-religion).

8.3. Law, Religion, Revolutions, and State Models *(B), (D), (6)*

8.3.1. Legal Traditions in Europe and the Americas

Countries in Europe and the Americas have either transplanted or developed their legal systems based on some few legal traditions rather than writing new systems of their own (Watson, 1974; La Porta et al., 1998, p. 1115). Thus, the different legal rules, procedures, and institutions at the national and sub-national levels share traditional characteristics that allow classification into groups or families. Along these lines, a legal tradition can be defined as a

> set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught. The legal tradition relates the legal system to the culture of which it is a partial expression (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, p. 2).

Consequently, the most widespread legal traditions worldwide are: first, *Roman civil law,* which includes French and other European and Latin American systems; second, *common law*, which includes most Anglo-Saxon systems; and third, *socialist law,* which comes from former and current socialist countries (including China and Cuba). The historical dominance of Roman law resulted from Roman imperialism and conquest. Likewise, the current dominance of Roman civil law and of the common law traditions in the modern world "is the direct result of European imperialism in earlier centuries" (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, p. 5) (Table 3). Additionally, such traditions have also spread across the world through borrowing or imitation (e.g. Japan voluntarily adopted the German legal tradition) (La Porta et al., 1998, p. 1115). Within the first group of legal traditions (Roman civil law), only three significant families currently exist as its heirs: French, German, and Scandinavian (ibid) (Tables 3 and 4).

Typically, Southern (Mediterranean) Europe and Latin America have French law. Northern Europe has mostly German, Scandinavian, or English common law. North America inherited English common law. Post-Soviet states have a socialist legal tradition, but most of

them returned to French civil law after the fall of the Berlin Wall (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008, p. 289).

Table 3 presents the most important legal traditions in Europe and the Americas from the Middle Ages to the present. From left to right, Roman and canonical legal traditions chronologically progressed through the centuries. They did not abruptly end after the 16th to 19th centuries, but percolated down after the various revolutions. All legal traditions incorporate Roman law in some form. From bottom to top, a colour gradient represents the closeness to Roman and canon law traditions (ranging to purple). Those legal traditions that are more distant from Roman and canon law (ranging to green) are shown towards the bottom of the table.




Table 3: Legal traditions in Europe and the Americas (Amended from Witte, 2002; Berman, 2003; Merryman & Pérez, 2007; La Porta et al., 2008).

Roman and Roman Catholic canon law traditions have defined the institutional *status quo* or the *ancien régime* in Europe and the Americas. Violent national revolutions directed against the existing legal system gradually interrupted this hegemony in favour of more transcendental views of justice (above all in the last five centuries). Successive national revolutions have reformed and renewed the legal traditions (in some countries more than in others) of the still pervasive and surviving Roman and the Catholic canon law regime. Every country in Europe and the Americas traces its legal system back to a revolution (Berman, 2003, pp. 16-17). The following sections explain each of these traditions chronologically.

8.3.2.Legal Traditions and Current Institutional Performance *(3)*

The long-term persistence of legal traditions affects institutional performance and therefore also prosperity (Volonté, 2015). Table 4 summarises some performance indicators of otherwise distinct legal traditions. French, German, and Scandinavian legal systems belong to the tradition of Roman Civil law (Merryman & Pérez, 2007). And yet they are all different. Germanic, and in particular the Scandinavian, legal systems descend less from Roman law than the French one (Zweigert and Kotz as cited in La Porta et al., 1998, p. 1119). German and especially Scandinavian legal systems were influenced by the Lutheran Reformation, which, to a certain extent, modified the foundational principles of Roman (and particularly of canon) law.

French civil law comes from the French Revolution, which also intended to transform the influence of Roman and canon law. This transformation, however, was not always possible due to the inertia of the tradition of Roman law for French Revolution jurists. Moreover, the transformation of canon law, for example, was not automatically transplanted to most Latin American countries, which adopted French legal principles after gaining independence (Berman, 2003; Merryman & Pérez, 2007). Several Latin American countries signed concordats with the Roman Church-State after their independence, thus subordinating their civil law to canon law and granting explicit privileges to the Church-State (Salinas Araneda, 2013).

As explained in further detail below, countries with French legal origins also have Roman Catholicism as their dominant religion, historically. Likewise, countries with a socialist legal origin are more likely to exhibit a significant historical presence of Orthodox religions. French and socialist legal origins are consistently associated with burdensome regulations and lower incomes. In contrast, countries of English, German, or Scandinavian legal origin have been historically linked to Protestantism, regulate less, and are the most prosperous (La Porta et al., 1999, p. 244; World Bank, International Finance Corporation, & Oxford University Press, 2004) (See Table 4).

	Socialist Soviet law tradition	Roman Civil law tradition			Common-law tradition
		French-civil-law	German-civil- law	Scandinavian-law	
			Protestant-influenced legal origins		
Examples of countries **Institutional performance item**	Russia, Ukraine (until the 1990s), Cuba	Most Latin America, parts of Europe, Africa, and Asia	Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Japan	Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden	United Kingdom, Ireland, United States, Canada
Quality of law enforcement	Low	Lowest	Highest	Highest	High
Protection of property rights and propensity to market	Lowest	Low	High	High	Highest
Government interventionism (intrusive regulation, high tax rates)	Highest	High	Low	High	Low
Overall government efficiency; political freedom; provision of basic goods	Lowest (except for education attainment)	Low	High	Highest	High
Corruption	Highest	High	Low	Lowest	Low
Competitiveness	Lowest	Low	Highest	Highest	High

Table 4: Comparison of institutional performance between different legal traditions (Amended from La Porta et al., 1999; 1998; 2008; (World Economic Forum, 2016); Transparency International, 2016; Berman, 2003; Merryman & Pérez, 2007).

The countries that regulate the most (i.e. those of socialist or French legal origins) typically exhibit more corruption, more poverty, greater inefficiency of public institutions, and lower quality of private or public goods. Heavier regulation is associated with inequality, fewer checks and balances, and less enforcement capacity. A large amount of heavy regulation

descends from the Roman legal tradition (La Porta et al., 1999; World Bank, International Finance Corporation, & Oxford University Press, 2004).

8.3.3. The Roman Civil Law Tradition

The civil law tradition can be traced as far back as the Twelve Tables in ancient Rome (450 B.C). Tables 3 and 4 show that mostly modern French law and, to a lesser extent, German and Scandinavian law currently represent the tradition of Roman civil law. Today, French civil law is both the most influential and also the most widely distributed system across the world (i.e. it is predominant in Latin America, Southern Europe, and across Asia and Africa). It precedes international law (i.e. the legal developments of the European Union and UN) and even prevails in a few enclaves of the "common law world" (Louisiana, Quebec, and Puerto Rico) (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, pp. 2-3; La Porta et al., 2008, p. 289). La Porta et al. (2008) characterise French civil law as follows:

> […] originates in Roman law, uses statutes and comprehensive codes as a primary means of ordering legal material […]. Dispute resolution tends to be inquisitorial rather than adversarial. Roman law was rediscovered in the Middle Ages in Italy, adopted by the Catholic Church for its purposes, and from there formed the basis of secular laws in many European countries (La Porta et al., 2008, p. 289).

Different historical successive subtraditions constitute modern civil law: 1) Roman civil law (from the Roman Empire); 2) Canon law (from the Roman Catholic Church-State); 3) Commercial law (where pragmatic Italian merchants serve as judges); 4) the influence of revolutions (i.e. German, French, American); and 5) legal science (descending from the various revolutions) (Merryman & Pérez, 2007); (Berman, 2003).

The first three subtraditions (Roman, canon, and commercial law) are the fundamental historical sources of institutions, concepts, and procedures in "civil law countries." In such countries, these three subtraditions embody the essential modern codes (typically: civil, commercial, and penal; civil and criminal procedure) (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, p. 14).

Roman and canon law have the highest historical relevance and are directly related to religion, institutions, and prosperity. Below I explain these two crucial subtraditions.

8.3.3.1. Roman Civil Law

Roman law can be considered as

> the greatest contribution that Rome has made to the Western civilization, and Roman ways of thinking have certainly percolated into every Western legal system. In this sense, all Western lawyers are Roman lawyers. In civil law nations, however, the influence of Roman civil law is much more pervasive, direct, and concrete than it is in the common law world (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, p. 11).

Roman law was compiled and codified in the 6th century A.D under Justinian in the *Corpus Juris Civilis*. It is the most fundamental part both of the European legal tradition (especially in the Mediterranean Region) and of Latin America's. Today the civil codes of these countries demonstrate "the influence of Roman law and its medieval and modern revival" (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, pp. 10-11). Weber (1905) also observed that Roman law "has always retained its supremacy in the Catholic countries of Southern Europe", while countries such as England were able to overcome it (p. 37-38).

8.3.3.2. Roman Catholic Jurisprudence (Canon Law) (6)

The pan-European Roman Church-State became the first modern state. It established a body of law that was systematised and compiled in Gratian's *Decretum* (1140), entitled "A Concordance of Discordant Canons" (Berman, 2003, p. 4).

The canonical law of the Roman Catholic Church-State has strongly influenced civil law. For instance, canon law influenced the *jus commune* that the European states received (it was the law generally applicable in Europe). Notably, Roman Catholic canon law includes various "forged documents treated for centuries as though they were genuine" (Merryman &

Pérez, 2007, pp. 11-12). O'Reilly and Chalmers (2014) notably explain that canon law is a legal system that has always governed the Catholic Church and "had once been used to govern nations". However, canon law "is often unfamiliar to those from common law jurisdictions" (p. 316). The authors further observe:

> The Catholic Church has its own code of laws worldwide. Those laws are found in the Code of Canon Law as well as in the particular laws created by internal, local, and national Church legislation. While church entities are bound to follow the laws of the civil jurisdiction, where these exist, all members of the Catholic Church, including laity and clergy, are also bound to follow the laws of the Church, or face internal penalties. […] To understand the Church's process, one must always keep in mind that the institution does not view itself as some sort of religious corporation; its self-understanding and judicial model is akin to being a state. Thus its disciplinary processes are more akin to the law of a government or state rather than a corporate disciplinary model (O'Reilly & Chalmers, 2014, pp. 7-8; 316-317).

Roman Catholic sacraments inspired medieval Catholic canonists and moralists to devise entire legal systems. The sacraments provided the framework for organising some of the legal institutions of the Church and society in the Middle Ages (Table 5). However, not all canon law can be subsumed under the sacraments (Witte, 2002, pp. 169-170).

Catholic Sacrament	Associated Laws
Baptism and the Eucharist	Liturgy, religious doctrine, catechesis, and discipline
Ordination	Law of the clergy and Church life
Marriage	Law of sex, marriage, and family life
Extreme unction	Law of wills, inheritance, and trusts
Penance	Law of crime, tort, and moral obligation

Table 5: Examples of medieval canon laws supported by Catholic Sacraments (Amended from Witte, 2002, pp. 169-170).

Moreover, the development of natural law is central to Roman Catholic theology. It was influenced in particular by Greek philosophy and Roman law rather than by the Scriptures

(Gula, 2002, pp. 120-121; Selling, 2018, p. 9). Importantly, it is through natural law that the Catholic Church-State claims the rightness or wrongness of human conduct. The Catholic Church-State bases such claims on its trust in the human capacity to discern and to choose between right or wrong regardless of religious affiliation (Gula, 2002, pp. 120-121). Natural law is, for Roman Catholicism, a reflection of divine law and immediately accessible to human reason through the traditions of the Church and sacred texts (Berman, 2003, p. 73). The Roman Church-State "has appealed to natural law as the basis for its teachings pertaining to a just society, sexual behaviour, medical practice, human life, religious freedom, and the relationship between morality and civil law..." (Gula, 2002, pp. 120-121).

Contrary to Gula's (2002) idealistic appreciation, the application of natural law and the Code of Canon Law have led, among others, to "the very public failures of the Church to listen to victims and to get rid of abusive priests" (O'Reilly & Chalmers, 2014, p. 397). The authors observe, "the canonical penal process is clunky, vague, and inefficient" (p. 269). Among the several reasons that explain the inadequacy of the Canon Law system of justice, O'Reilly and Chalmers mention:

1. The canon law trial processes are slow, hierarchical, and inquisitional. While traditional criminal procedures in common law countries (e.g. the United States) may take a matter of days, the canonical process can take several years. For instance, a canonical tribunal hears a case then "sends it up to an appeal panel, and Vatican review is likely" (p. 353).

2. "'Due process' is not a standard term with a recognized content in canon law" (Orsy as cited in O'Reilly & Chalmers, 2014, p. 354). Therefore, canonical procedures do not recognise rights such as the presumption of innocence, trial by an independent court, or the right to confront witnesses (p. 354).

3. No separation of powers (i.e. checks and balances) exists in canon law (canon 331). While the Code of Canon Law distinguishes between executive, legislative, and judicial powers, the authority resides internationally in the pope, who is the supreme executive and primary legislator for the Roman Church-State. Locally,

the authority resides with the bishop, who is subordinate to the pope (pp. 208-209).

4. Vatican officials and the pope enjoy sovereign immunity as the Vatican is recognised as a sovereign nation. Sovereign immunity defeats any effort of domestic plaintiff lawyers unless they appeal to specific international law instruments (pp. 163-164).

5. No cross-examination exists in canon law, for which only auditors or judges are allowed to ask questions. Also, "only having clerics judging clerics is patently biased because clearly the notion of solidarity among the brotherhood of priests trumped finding a fellow priest guilty" (pp. 264, 268).

6. Secrecy and the avoidance of scandal are mentioned in 24 different canons of the Code (p. 224). The principle of avoiding scandal to the Church explains, among others, the unwillingness of bishops and clerics to interact and cooperate with secular enforcement authorities. Consequently, "turning the accusations over to the civil authorities was never considered a viable option" (p.277). Numerous examples exist in which the Vatican curia encourages bishops not to cooperate with civil investigations over clergy sexual abuse scandals. For instance, "the Vatican blocked the Irish bishops from adopting a policy of "mandatory reporting" of suspect abusers to the police" (p. 79). Likewise, the Colombian Cardinal Darío Castrillón issued several letters congratulating bishops for not releasing information about the sexual abuse of minors to civil authorities (p. 199).

Therefore, the application of the Code of Canon Law has resulted in a cover-up, whereby the Roman Church-State has left most of the sexual abuse committed by Catholic priests unpunished and uncompensated (Grand Jury of Pennsylvania, 2018). In the United States, O'Reilly and Chalmers (2014) document the quite cumbersome bureaucratic procedure under Catholic Canon Law to suing known or suspected clerics for having committed child abuse:

> Offentimes this process literally took years to complete—particularly if the case was appealed to Rome. […] When an appeal was filed, it went to one of the

> Vatican courts. The National Review Board [for the Protection of Children and Young People] reports that bishops knew that "the Vatican courts tended to err on the side of protecting a priest because of a concern that bishops could seek to use canon law to rid themselves of a priest whom they did not like or with whom they disagreed." […] American Bishops were very concerned that even if there was a "conviction" in an internal diocesan penal trial that the judgment would eventually get overturned by a Vatican appeals court on a technicality. Then the case would either be sent back to be done correctly, or dismissed completely. Bishops had heard of cases that were overturned by Rome on technicalities, with the appeal being sent back with an order to reinstate the priest—even after a criminal conviction in the local civil jurisdiction (O'Reilly & Chalmers, 2014, p. 262).

Furthermore, some priests and bishops who are abusers, have also invoked the "seal of confessional" under the claim of religious freedom "to refuse to report sex abuse and to rebut the prosecutors' demand for disclosures" (O'Reilly & Chalmers, 2014, p. 122). In Pennsylvania (United States), thousands of sexual abuse complaints have been kept in "secret archives" that only the responsible bishop could access under the Code of Canon Law. The FBI analysed Diocesan files and found that the Roman-Catholic hierarchy followed the same script-like method to "conceal the truth": 1) uses euphemisms rather than concrete language to describe sexual assaults; 2) does not conduct genuine investigations with properly trained staff; 3) sends priests for "evaluation" at church-run psychiatric treatment centres to create a semblance of integrity; 4) fails to disclose why a priest needs to be removed, or tells his parishioners that he is on "sick leave" or suffering from "nervous exhaustion"; 5) keeps covering the priest's housing and living expenses even if he continues to abuse children; 6) transfers the priest "to a new location where no one will know he is a child abuser"; and finally and most significantly 7) fails to notify the police (Grand Jury of Pennsylvania, 2018, pp. 2-3).

Evidently, the canonical and civil procedures are entirely separate processes that do not naturally interrelate, although there can be some overlaps. However, the Canon Law system has interfered with civil prosecution processes, so that most cases of abusive clergy remain in impunity (Grand Jury of Pennsylvania, 2018). The Canon Law system has proven to use

cumbersome, archaic processes with excessive formalities that make "the removal and punishment process exceedingly difficult to manage" (O'Reilly & Chalmers, 2014, p. 253). Even in prosperous countries such as the United States, the canonical penal system is "unwieldy, inefficient, and almost impossible for many dioceses to maintain the personnel and processes as they are required in the Code". O'Reilly and Chalmers appropriately ask the question of where the canonical system can possibly run properly, if not in the United States (p. 401). As the Report of the Grand Jury of Pennsylvania (2011) states:

> The canonical process does not make the internal investigations any less biased in favor of protecting the institution, or the people who conduct them any more competent at arriving at the truth, or the victims feel any less re-victimized (supra, 86–87).

O'Reilly and Chalmers (2014) also emphasise the pervasiveness of the clergy's sexual abuse problem, with varied outcomes among virtually all religious organisations, including Protestant faiths. Yet, these denominations do not cover up their cases with a historical state legal shield such as the Code of Canon Law. Several denominations (e.g. Methodist, Nazarene, Protestant Episcopal Church) have concurred that religious doctrines need not be considered in criminal cases such as clergy abuse. However, denominations such as the Presbyterians claim that the presbytery functions as an ecclesiastical court alternate, which is not analogous to civil law (i.e. a similar claim as in the Catholic Canon Law). Mormons and The Jehovah's Witnesses "are noted for their secrecy and intra-faith methods", which "makes it difficult to accurately assess the scope of sexual abuse" (O'Reilly & Chalmers, 2014, p. 406). In any case, secular authorities investigate and prosecute ordinary citizens, including Protestant ministers, who commit sexual abuse or any other crimes, in regular legal processes.

Finally, in common law countries, (which are also historically Protestant, such as the United States) the conflict between Catholic Canon Law and the law of the state is more visible because the latter has pre-eminence. In turn, that conflict is less visible in most Catholic countries, in which Canon Law has often prevailed over civil norms. Furthermore, legal

instruments such as concordats have been typically enforced to accept the force of Canon Law in several Catholic countries.

8.3.4.Protestantism, Revolutions, and Law *(6')*

Despite the critical impact of Protestant reformations on the law and on institutions, the influence of religion has been largely neglected or obscured in the mainstream literature[4] (Doe & Sandberg, 2010, p. 9; Berman, 2003, p. 71; Witte, 2002, p. 28; Anderson, 2009, p. 210). As Witte observed, "…some social historians today have dismissed the "Reformation" altogether as a historian's fiction and a historical failure" (pp. 28-29). Thus, a conventional interpretation of the influence of the early Reformers is that:

> …they inspired no real reformation. Their ideas had little impact on the beliefs and behaviors of common people. Their policies perpetuated elitism and chauvinism more than they cultivated equality and liberty. Their reforms tended to obstruct nascent movements for democracy and market economy and to inspire new excesses in the patriarchies of family, Church, and state. As the editors of the *Handbook of European History 1400–1600* put it, "the Reformation" must now be viewed as an ideological category of "nineteenth century Protestant historical belief," which served more to defend the self-identity of modern mainline Protestants than to define a cardinal turning point in Western history. Recent historiography, the editors continue, has brought "changes of sensibility" that have now "robbed" the term "Reformation" of any utility and veracity (Witte, 2002, p. 29).

[4] It does not refer to the Weberian (cultural) influence of Protestantism on the development of capitalism, about which thousands of articles and hundreds of books have been written (see Section 7.1). Rather, it refers particularly to the influence of religion on law and institutions as an established research paradigm. Berman (2003) has observed, regarding the latter, "Conventional accounts of the history of Western legal thought have obscured the important contribution made by Lutheran legal philosophers of the sixteenth century" (p.71). Likewise, Doe & Sandberg (2010) note, "…the study of the interaction between law and religion has been a neglected area in Law Schools…" (p. 9).

However, Witte runs "counter to traditional lines of historical analysis" by demonstrating that the theology and law of the Reformation are "sources of ideas and institutions that were much more than simply the totems of the elite of the bludgeons of the powerful". When viewed through the binocular of law and theology, the author continues, "the Lutheran Reformation is hardly the ideological concept or idle category that some recent historiography suggests" (pp. 29-30).

This section reviews the historical influence of Protestantism, and of the various revolutions that followed in its wake, on the different legal traditions.

8.3.4.1. The 16th-Century German-European Revolution

In 1517, Martin Luther and other Reformers initiated a process that culminated in the abolition of Roman Catholic ecclesiastical jurisdiction in future Protestant countries (i.e. England, Scandinavian countries) (Berman, 2003, p. 6). Luther, a canon law expert, condemned Aquinas's Aristotelian theology and most of the Catholic sacraments due to their lack of biblical foundations (Berman, 2003); (Witte, 2002). Berman portrayed Martin Luther's attributes as follows:

> …Luther in his own life and work represented with integrity the doctrines which he preached. […] Luther was seen in his own time as the long-awaited divinely ordained prophet, a new Moses or Elijah or Daniel or John the Baptist, sent by God to save the German people. […] His fame and influence were due in part to his intellectual powers; he was perhaps the most brilliant and certainly the most original theologian of his time. […] [His fame and influence] were due to the intense passion with which he was driven by forces that seemed—both to him and to others—to be outside himself. This passion, it must be added, led him to vitriolic denunciations of those with whom he strongly disagreed. In such denunciations he did not hesitate to resort to scatological language. His bigoted verbal assaults on Jews who refused to convert to Christianity, written in his later

> years, are matched by his similar assaults on papists, Anabaptists, Turks, and others (Berman, 2003, p. 47).

In Luther's Ninety-five Theses of 1517, and in subsequent debates, he exposed a long list of injustices inherent in canon laws. He also unmasked the "fallacious legal foundation" of papal authority and the "myriad inconsistencies" between the "human laws and traditions" of the Roman Church-State versus the Scriptures (Berman, 2003, p. 74). Luther said that the Roman Church should not be a lawmaking institution and emphasised:

> In the entire canon law of the pope there are not even two lines which could instruct a devout Christian, (…) it would be a good thing if canon law were completely blotted out, from the first letter to the last, especially the [papal] decretals. More than enough is written in the Bible about how we should behave in all circumstances. Unless they abolish their laws and ordinances and restore to Christ's churches their liberty and have it taught among them, they are to blame for all the souls that perish under this miserable captivity, and *the papacy is truly the kingdom of Babylon and of the very Antichrist* (LW 44:179, 202-3 as cited in Witte, 2002, p. 55) (author's italics).

Moreover, Luther directly attacked the moral authority of the Roman law (and its lawyers) as part of the same Babylonian system:

> Jurists are bad Christians (WA TR 3, No. 2809b). Every jurist is an enemy of Christ (WA TR 3, Nos. 2837, 3027). I shit on the law of the pope and of the emperor, and on the law of the jurists as well (WA 49:302 as cited in Witte, 2002, p. 2).

Therefore, what began as a reformation of the Church and theology rapidly expanded into a reformation of the law and the state, in Germany and beyond (i.e. in Northern Europe, and later in North America). The key was to deconstruct canon law for the sake of the Gospel and, on this basis, to reconstruct "civil law on the strength of the Gospel" (Witte, 2002, p. 3).

Accordingly, the Lutheran Reformation initially removed medieval Roman and canon laws in 16th-century Germany. Luther considered this process imperative for various reasons: Roman and canon laws fostered papal tyranny and thus enjoyed unbridled powers of legislation, adjudication, and administration. Second, it was abusive and self-serving, and thereby granted the clergy special benefits, privileges, exemptions, and immunities that elevated it above the laity. Third, it served as an instrument of greed and exploitation to support the luxury and bureaucracy of the Roman Church (LW 31:341 as cited in Witte, 2002, pp. 55-56).[5] Moreover, since Roman Catholic natural law is founded on the human ability to discern good and evil (Selling, 2018); (Gula, 2002), its refutation by Protestantism also had a biblical foundation:

> The heart is deceitful above all *things*, and desperately wicked: Who can know it? (Jeremiah 17:9);
>
> Why should ye be stricken any more? ye will revolt more and more: the whole head is sick, and the whole heart faint (Isaiah 1:5);
>
> For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but *how* to perform that which is good I find not. For the good that I would, I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do (Romans 7:18-19).

Given the explicit scriptural claims of the human inability to discern good from evil, Protestant jurists, therefore, considered the Gospel the best source of natural knowledge (Witte, 2002, p. 169). Luther, but most especially his followers, Melanchthon, Eisermann, and Oldendorp considered the Bible the supreme source of law for earthly life. Accordingly, they produced a new jurisprudence, one theologically based on biblical moral principles, upon which they interpreted subordinate species of legal rules (Berman, 2003, p. 8). Consequently, Lutheran jurists laid particular emphasis on the biblical Ten Commandments

[5] *D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, 78 vols. (Weimar, 1883–1987).

to ground their jurisprudence, which thus contrasted with the Catholic canonists' focus on the seven sacraments (Berman, 2003); (Witte, 2002) (compare Tables 5 and 6).

However, Lutheran jurists also had to adapt traditional canon laws, which subsequently fell under the control of civil authorities (Witte, 2002, pp. 83-84). Therefore, not all Protestant, positive law can be subsumed under the Ten Commandments, but can also have other biblical, as well as Roman or canonical origins (Witte, 2002, p. 170). However, "self-serving papalist accretions" were eradicated, and canon law in Germany now returned "to its core interpretations and applications of biblical and natural norms" (ibid). In this way, German law was transformed and still largely influences modern Western laws of education, social welfare, and marriage, for instance (Witte, 2002, p. 295). Moreover, "the Ten Commandments provided the Evangelical jurists with a useful framework for organising some of the legal institutions of the state" (Witte, 2002, p. 170) (Table 6).

Successively, all Europe (and later also other regions) felt the repercussions of the Protestant revolt against the canon-law-based and hierarchical Roman Church-State. The 16th-century German Lutheran Revolution of theology, law, and institutions took diverse forms in several European countries. It facilitated the creation of "national legal systems, covering the entire spectrum of jurisdictions" (Berman, 2003, p. 8) and generally exalted monarchies over the Roman Church-State (Berman, 2003, pp. 72, 208). In fact, after the Lutheran Reformation,

> the idea of the Pope and Emperor as parallel and universal powers disappears, and the independent jurisdictions of the *sacerdotium* are handed over to the secular authorities' (Skinner, 1978, p. 353).

Consequently, the Lutheran Reformation extended across Europe. Even in the remaining Roman Catholic countries, such as Spain, France, or Austria, royal powers significantly increased over the Roman Church-State within the kingdoms (Berman, 2003, p. 8).

However, as with any revolution, the German Reformation also had a "dark side". Witte notes the acute crisis that reigned in Germany following the rapid deconstruction of law, politics, and society immediately after the Reformation. The bloody peasants' revolt in Germany in 1525, and the widespread confusion over sacraments, preaching, funerals,

prayers, holidays, and pastoral duties, exemplifies the chaos at the time. Also, the excesses that occurred at the dawn of the Reformation are well known, as Witte observes:

> They [the Reformers] simply took over hundreds of Church properties, endowments, foundations, charities, almshouses, schools, cathedrals, cemeteries, Church courts, and other properties and institutions that were part of the canon law administration–often ostracizing and occasionally killing former occupants in the process (although Luther repeatedly counselled against violent ejection of monks and nuns, preferring instead to prohibit the enrolment of any new monks…) (Witte, 2002, p. 84)

8.3.4.1.1.Lutheran Influence on Scandinavian Countries

The Lutheran Reformation influenced in particular the Scandinavian pattern of church-state relations (Anderson, 2009, p. 211). The Lutheran influence was more intense and took hold faster in Scandinavian countries than in Germany, which remained partly Roman Catholic. The monarchies of Denmark (and countries under its influence, i.e. Norway and Iceland) and Sweden (and thus also Finland) firmly embraced Lutheranism already in the 1520s. These countries also imposed severe criminal penalties on openly non-Lutheran adherents (Berman, 2003, p. 58).

Swedish and Danish monarchs seized the influence and wealth of the Catholic Church-State and assumed the welfare functions previously performed by the Church (e.g. hospital care and relief of the poor) (Anderson, 2009, p. 211). As such, Lutheran state churches "positively contributed to the early introduction of social protection programs and to subsequent welfare state development" (Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009, p. 4).

8.3.4.2. The 17th-Century English-European Revolution

Under the influence of the German 16th-century revolution, England also instituted a Protestant state-church to which all citizens had to belong and fell under the authority of the monarch. Later, dissenting Calvinists and other oppressed classes initiated the English or Glorious Revolution (1640–1689), which curbed the influence of the state-church, and established the supremacy of Parliament over the Crown. Subsequently, the "English Revolution produced a body of law that reflected a Calvinist belief system" (Berman, 2003, p. 10). This *"reformation of the Reformation"* fundamentally and lastingly transformed the English legal system, including checks and balances of political power. Likewise, the English Revolution also became a European revolution, succeeding the previous one in Germany (Berman, 2003, p. 201).

Akin to the German Lutheran Reformation, the Ten Commandments are the foundation for a plural system of law in England (Doe & Sandberg, 2010). Notably, the general principle *"Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself"* (second part of the Decalogue that Jesus summarised in Matthew 22:37-39) is a touchstone of civil behaviour (p.163) (See Table 6).

Likewise, the Protestant Reformation in England and Wales banned the teaching of canon law at universities (Doe & Sandberg, 2010, p. 9). Equally, in the courts of Westminster Hall, invoking canon law was increasingly deplored (Helmoz, 1987); (Pearce, 2010). As Wilcox and Field wrote in their Admonition to Parliament in 1572: "the Canon law is Antichristian and devilishe, and contrarye to the scriptures" (p. 39). However, similarly to Germany, not all canon law was eliminated as an authoritative source. In fact, some ordinances were adapted to ongoing developments in English common law.

The expansion of the British Empire resulted in a wide distribution of common law in the British colonies. This law is therefore still in force in Great Britain, Ireland, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, p. 4).

8.3.4.3. The 18th-Century United States Revolution

The successive Protestant Reformations brought along progressive legal steps towards democracy and thus increasingly distanced societies from the power of the Roman Church. Each dissenting Protestant revolution built on the developments and achievements of the previous one. The 16th-century German-European Reformation had generally increased the royal powers as a means of overthrowing the Roman Church-State. The 17th-century English-European Revolution then made further advances by introducing checks and balances for monarchical powers and by limiting the power of the Church-States. Such developments paved the way for the world's first-ever democratic constitution: the 18th century American Bill of Rights. In the United States, once again, a dissenting Protestant view based on the previous reformatory advances became dominant and denied the establishment of a State-Church.

Furthermore, the American constitution expanded the democratic rights and liberties of citizens (thus advancing English legislation, which had already guaranteed rights to the aristocracy over the monarchy) (Miller, 2012); (Berman, 2003); (Witte, 2002).

The 18th-century French-European revolution also helped to nurture its counterpart in the United States. However, the latter implemented a different system of checks and balances in government powers than those proposed by the French Revolution, for instance (Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo, 2007); (Berman, 2003)

Moral Biblical Law (King James Version KJV Bible)					**Some Lutherian and positive laws under the Ten Commandments*** (Witte, 2002); (Berman, 2003).
Great Commandment in the New Testament (NT)	**Old Testament (OT)**		**Some curses of disobedience (OT & NT)**	**Some blessings of obedience (OT & NT)**	
	The Great Commandment in OT terms	**The Ten Commandments (Exodus 20, 1-17)**			
Matthew 22, 34-40 **The Great Commandment** Master, which is the great commandment in the law? Jesus said unto him, **Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.** This is the first and great commandment.	Deuteronomy 6, 4-5 Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord: and **thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might.**	And God spake all these words, saying, I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. **1. Thou shalt have no other gods before me.** **2. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image,** or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth: thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me; and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments. **3. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain:** for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain. **4. Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.** Six days shalt thou labor, and do all thy work: but the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy manservant, nor thy maidservant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates: for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day, and hallowed it.	Deuteronomy 28 [Verses 15-68 are dedicated to "*The Consequences of Disobedience*", for example:] 15: But it shall come to pass, if thou wilt not hearken unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to observe to do all his commandments and his statutes which I command thee this day; that all these curses shall come upon thee, and overtake thee: 33: The fruit of thy land, and all thy labors, shall a nation which thou knowest not eat up; *and thou shalt be only oppressed and crushed alway*:" Revelation 21,8 But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and	Deuteronomy 29, 9 Keep therefore the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may prosper in all that ye do. "Deuteronomy 28, 1-2 *The Blessings of Obedience* And it shall come to pass, if thou shalt hearken diligently unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to observe and to do all his commandments which I command thee this day, that *the Lord thy God will set thee on high above all nations of the earth:* and all these blessings shall come on thee, and overtake thee, if thou shalt hearken unto the voice of the Lord thy God. Deuteronomy 30, 16 in that I command thee this day to love the Lord thy God, to walk in his ways, and to keep his commandments, and his statutes, and his judgments,	Religious laws of Lutheran communities. Laws governing orthodox doctrine and liturgy, ecclesiastical polity and property, local clergy and Church administrators.

			murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone: which is the second death.	that thou mayest live and multiply: and *the Lord thy God shall bless thee in the land whither thou goest to possess it*. Revelation 22, 14: Blessed are they that do his commandments, that they may have right to the tree of life, and may enter in through the gates into the city.	Ibid
Matthew 22, 39–40 And the second is like unto it, **Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.** **On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.**	Leviticus 19, 17-18 Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart: thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbor, and not suffer sin upon him. Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but **thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself:** I am the Lord.	**5. Honor thy father and thy mother:** that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.			Civil law of sex, marriage, and family
		6. Thou shalt not kill.			Criminal law
		7.Thou shalt not commit adultery.			Civil law of sex, marriage, and family
		8.Thou shalt not steal.			Law of property, criminal law
		9.Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.			Law of contract and delict. Law of civil procedure, evidence, and defamation
		10. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbor's.			Law of contract and delict. Laws of crimes and civil offences

* Legislation influencing Protestant countries (e.g. the United States, United Kingdom, Scandinavian countries)

Note: Author's italics and emphases

Table 6: Moral biblical law associated with prosperity (when obeyed) or with misfortunes (when disobeyed) and its legal application in Protestant countries (Amended from The Holy Bible (King James Version); Witte, 2002; Berman, 2003).

8.3.4.4. The Influence of Protestant Revolutions on Secularism

The Protestant reformations initiated a rapid secularisation process, which decreased the public role of the Roman Church-State and broke down the imperial hierarchy (Philpott, 2001; Snyder, 2011). Moreover, the Protestant reformations and their associated progressive weakening of the Roman Church-State ultimately resulted in the modern sovereign state system in the 17th-century (i.e. the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) (Snyder, 2011; Agnew, 2010; Shah & Philpott, 2011; Philpott, 2001).

Much liberal Enlightenment thought was grounded in Protestant secularism (Snyder, 2011, p. 17). Therefore, the laic rejection of Roman Catholicism in revolutionary France resulted from the influence of Protestantism, in particular Calvinism. Most Enlightenment democratic theorists came from a Calvinist background, even if they were not religious (e.g. Locke, Rousseau, Grotius, Franklin, Adams, Henry, Madison, and Hamilton) (Woodberry, 2012, p. 248). Enlightenment theorists secularised ideas previously expressed by Calvinist jurists and theologians (e.g. Nonconformist and Puritan covenants formed the basis of the secular Hobbes's and Locke's social contracts) (Hutson 1998; Lutz 1980; 1988; Nelson 2010; Witte 2007; as cited in Woodberry, 2012, p. 248).

Furthermore, Locke's principle of equality for all people descends explicitly from Protestant ideals (Waldron; Woodberry and Shah; as cited in Woodberry, 2012, p. 248). Moreover, Protestant dissenters in Protestant liberal democracies spearheaded egalitarian movements such as the abolition of slavery, free trade, and peace (Woodberry, 2012; Snyder, 2011; Kaufmann & Pape, 1999). In this sense, the motto was "no Reformation, no liberal peace" (Snyder, 2011, p. 17).

Consequently, Protestantism "served as the historically decisive prelude to secularization" (Berger, 1990, p. 113). In its wake, religion has since lost much of its past influence (Norris & Inglehart, 2004) in specific contexts (e.g. Europe, the academia). However, the rest of the world is as religious as ever, and some regions (e.g. the Middle East) are even more religious than before (Berger, 1999).

8.3.4.5. The 18th and 19th-Century French-European Revolution

The successive Protestant reformations inspired or initiated transformations from which arose secular, anti-clerical revolutions, which further decreased the power of the Roman Church-State and expanded civil power. The most notable revolution, the French Revolution, utterly suppressed the monarchy in France and extended to most papal states (e.g. Pope Pius VI was taken prisoner until his eventual death). Some of these states were, however, later restored. The Italian nationalism and anti-clericalism remaining after the French Revolution resulted in the 19th-century annexation of Rome and the papal states to the former Italian Kingdom. It was not until 1929 that the current Vatican State was created through the Lateran Treaty with Mussolini's National Fascist Party (Gross, 2004; Hanlon, 2008; Roessler & Miklos, 2003).

Rousseau's *Social Contract* (1762) and the French Revolution (1789) openly identified Roman Catholicism (and Christianity in general) as opposed to any free republic. In such a Manichean conflict between the Church and the Republican state, the Republic ended up radically subordinating the Church. Consequently, the French Republic eliminated the Church's control over education, its ownership of large estates and its right to perform marriage ceremonies (Shah & Philpott, 2011, p. 38).

The new French legal philosophy of rationalism, individualism, utilitarianism, as well as the rejection of orthodox Christian doctrines, were also linked to deism (the belief in a Creator's gift of reason and freewill in exercising that gift (Berman, 2003, p. 10).

French rationalist natural secular jurists considered it possible to abolish the old (i.e. Roman-canonical) legal system altogether and to create an entirely new one. However, the jurists drafting the new system were trained in the old one, of which a significant part was preserved as a result (Merryman & Pérez, 2015).

18th and 19th-century revolutions (i.e. the French and American revolutions, the Italian *Risorgimento* and Latin American independence wars) gave rise to administrative and constitutional law under civil law. Equally important was that the French Revolution also brought forth "secular natural law" (based on deism). Montesquieu and Rousseau promoted the importance of separating government powers (judicial, executive, and legislative), as

initiated by the French Revolution. After the 19th century, the authority of Roman (and canonical) laws gradually declined. The Revolution meant that nationalist ideologies replaced religious ideologies. Feudal institutions were incompatible with such developments (Merryman & Pérez, 2015).

The French imposed civil codes, abolished guilds and feudal remnants, and undermined aristocratic privileges, thus boosting prosperity in the territories they conquered in Europe (Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson, & Robinson, 2011). Consequently, the principal states of Western Europe adopted civil codes, whose archetype is the French Code Napoléon of 1804 (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, p. 10).

An especially explosive revolutionary development occurred in education. French republicans and liberals repeatedly pushed for a state-supervised, compulsory, educational system. In Belgium, the Liberal Party implemented a programme in the 1870s to significantly restrict the role of the Roman Catholic Church in education (Shah & Philpott, 2011, pp. 39-40).

However, even after an age determined by reason and revolution, feudalism survived in Latin America and certain parts of Europe (especially in the South). Feudalism has kept alive the social injustices inherent in its origins. This is understandable because when

> the French exported their system, they did not include the information that it really does not work that way and failed to include the blueprint of how it actually does work (Merryman, 1996, p. 116).

For example, the *laïcité* or separation of church and state rooted in the French Revolution was not automatically transplanted to Latin America. In contrast, feudal legal institutions in the British colonies of North America were deprived of their pernicious socio-economic influence already early on (Merryman & Pérez, 2015).

8.3.4.6. Maintaining the Roman Catholic *Status Quo* after Independence

8.3.4.6.1. The Adoption of French Civil Law in Latin American Countries

Most Latin American countries bypassed the (Protestant) European revolutionary processes and directly adopted the French Revolution's legal tradition (Merryman & Pérez, 2015; La Porta et al., 2008). Therefore, the French legal tradition profoundly influenced all former Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin America. The exception to this rule is Cuba, which adopted a socialist legal tradition in the 1960s. Some former British colonies in the Caribbean also have English common law (La Porta et al., 2008).

The influence of the Protestant Reformation on the law and on institutions in Latin America has been minimal or indirect, and has resulted from US-American influence for instance (i.e. constitutionalism) (Merryman & Pérez, 2015). More importantly, the pervasive influence of the Roman Catholic Church-State meant that Latin American countries adopted the legal tradition of the French Revolution without, however, embracing anti-clerical movements (or with fragile anti-clerical components) (Salinas Araneda, 2013; La Porta et al., 2008). Exceptions include Uruguay, Chile and Cuba, as these countries have had successful anti-clerical or laic movements and because their legal systems have long reflected a clear separation of Church and State. Moreover, these three countries have never signed a concordat with the Roman Church-State (Da Costa, 2009; Salinas, 2013; Ramírez, 2009).

8.3.4.6.2. Concordats with the Roman Catholic Church-State

Concordats are international treaties between the Roman See (the so-called "Holy See") and the states. In the past, concordats have been criticised as mutual concessions of privileges between Church and State. The three most important and controversial concordats signed by the Catholic Church in the 20th century were with the Nazi *Reich* in Germany, with Franco in Spain, and with Fascist Italy (Fumagalli, 2011, pp. 438-439).

The term "concordat" refers to the more comprehensive agreements between the states and the Roman See but also identifies a wide variety of instruments (e.g. treaty, convention,

accord, protocol, exchange of notes, modus vivendi) (Ragazzi, 2009, 114). A historical treaty-making power allows the Roman Church to sign concordats and ensures its accession to major multilateral treaties (Ryngaert, 2011, 844).

Eleven Latin-American countries have in force a concordat with the Roman Catholic Church-State (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela). Such states are called "concordatarian" and the extent to which those agreements grant privileges to the Roman Church varies from country to country (Corral, 2014). The scope of these rights and privileges depends on the negotiating power of the Roman See *vis-à-vis* the contracting state (Ryngaert, 2011, 845). The other Latin American countries maintain fewer diplomatic relations with the Vatican (some less, some more), for instance, through formal agreements or the exchange of letters (Corral, 2014). Concordats may cover diverse affairs, ranging from tax exemptions for the Roman Church to permitting its intervention in military, educational and real estate issues (Corral & Petschen, 2004; Forrest, Schnably, Wilson, Simon, & Tushnet, 2006; Brownlie, 1979; Levine, 1981; Figueroa, 2016).

The template used by the Vatican in most concordats with Latin American countries was introduced by Pope Pio IX (1846–1878) (Salinas, 2013). It accords extraordinarily extensive rights to the Catholic Church-State, for instance, in educational affairs:

> Education in universities, public and private schools and further educational establishments should be under the doctrine of the Catholic Religion. […] the bishops and other local ordinaries would have the free direction of the theology chairs, of canon law, [and] of all the branches of ecclesiastical teaching. […] in addition to the influence they will exert through the strength of their ministry over the religious education of youth, they will ensure that in the teaching of any other branch there is nothing contrary to [the Roman Catholic] religion and morality (article 2). Besides, the bishops retain their right of censure over all books and

writings related to dogma and discipline of the Church and public morals (Bolivian concordat model, cited in Salinas, 2013, p. 217).[6]

These concordats are all similar (or in many cases identical) in Latin America. As such, they attest to the Vatican's influence on their wording rather than to the interests of the various diverse states (Salinas, 2013).

As a rule, the concordats ensure religious education in public schools. The conference of bishops, in agreement with the responsible government authorities, approves the curriculum for the teaching of Roman Catholic religion in schools (Schanda, 2004).

The concordats also imply state recognition of the sovereignty of the Roman Catholic Church-State. Consequently, Roman Catholicism is the only religion to possess legal personality under international public law. The other religious denominations are only entitled to have agreements under domestic public law as they have no international legal personality. This privilege of the Roman Catholic Church-State has sometimes been used to the detriment of other religious denominations (Fumagalli, 2011, p. 444).

Therefore, EU institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights, have indirectly challenged Roman Catholic concordats for introducing legislation not aligned with international standards into domestic law (Fumagalli, 2011, pp. 445-446). In Europe, at least two objections have been levelled at concordats (or treaties and bilateral relations with the Roman Church-State): first, they limit the sovereignty of the state; and second, they promote the denominational inequality due to the privileges of the Roman Catholic Church-State (Schanda, 2004; Cook, 2012).

8.3.4.7. The 20th-Century Russian Revolution

In the 11th and 12th centuries, Eastern Orthodox Russia opposed the papal Roman Church-State and canon law and established its own hierarchy and canon law. However, Russia

[6] Author's translation of the original Spanish text.

maintained its tsarish autocracy and its supreme secular and spiritual authority until 1917. The successive Lutheran, Calvinist, dissenting Protestant and deist revolutions all bypassed Russia. Thus, Russia never experienced an evolutive process from an autocracy to a monarchical high magistracy, to an aristocratic Parliament, and then to a democratic separation of powers. Instead, Russia underwent abrupt transformation through the Bolshevik revolution, inspired in part by the 18th-century French Enlightenment, and later proclaimed atheism. Moreover, the Russian Revolution ended up in a totalitarian state that distorted the ideals of social democracy (Berman, 2003, p. 18); (Miller, 2012).

One of the ideal postulates of the atheistic foundations of Soviet law is the "goodness of humankind." This involves the acceptance of an inherent human nature, which is itself capable of establishing a fair and just society (Berman, 2003, p. 18). Such a postulate is opposed to the biblical principle that "nothing good can be found in humankind," which forms the basis of the Protestant Revolutions (see Section 8.3.4 and Table 6). The atheistic, Soviet legal principle of the "goodness of humankind" resembles Roman Catholic natural law in that it trusts the human capacity to discern good from evil (Selling, 2018, p. 9; Gula, 2002, pp. 120-121). In fact, socialist legal traditions only ever became apparent in countries with an Orthodox or Roman Catholic background but never in countries under Protestant influence. As Andreski (as cited in Grier, 1997) has argued, "Protestantism, by promoting prosperity [and equality], prevents the emergence of a social environment propitious to the spread of ideologies preaching violent subversion" (p. 49).







Significant differences exist between Soviet, Western European, and American legal systems. Features differentiating Soviet law from other systems include the dictatorship of the Communist Party and the absence of a law higher than that of the state; the repression of basic civil liberties such as the freedom of religion, speech, and press; and the absence of private land ownership (Berman, 2003, p. 19). However, the Russian Revolution's elevation of the parental role of the law, and of the social and economic role of the state, have had repercussions throughout the world (ibid). Interestingly, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, most former Soviet countries reinstated the legal tradition of the French Revolution (Merryman & Pérez, 2015); (La Porta et al., 2008).

8.3.5. Religion, Law, and State Models

Significant differences exist between the legal systems (and thus, the state models) of countries in Europe and in the Americas. National legal systems have persisted for decades or even centuries while legal traditions have prevailed for centuries or even millennia. In contrast, political discourses may last for merely a few years or decades. Therefore, the influence of the different legal traditions tends to cluster countries into groups exhibiting affinities between their legal origins and institutional performance. Table 7 summarises the various legal revolutions and traditions along with their models of state-church-citizen relations.

The church-state-citizen relationships in Table 7 delineate the historical progression from the original medieval model of the *Corpus Christianum*, which was based entirely on Roman and Catholic canon law traditions (Model 1), to modern legal systems.

1. The *Corpus Christianum* is the model of the medieval Pan-European Roman Catholic Church-State. In it, the Roman Church-State is the highest power. As such, it alone may access and interpret the divine and guide its small secular arm: the state. In this conception, both

Legal System	Religious Source	Fundamental Moral Beliefs Inspiring Law	Main Influencer	Model of Church–State and Citizen Relations in Each Legal System *
1. Roman and Catholic canon law (from before Christ to the present)	Roman Paganism and Roman Catholicism	The sacraments, scholasticism, tradition, selected sacred texts	Thomas Aquinas	
2. German Revolution (from the 16th century)	Lutheranism	Initially, only the Holy Scriptures (*Sola Scriptura*); conceptualism; later also tradition	Martin Luther	
3. English Revolution (from the 17th century)	Anglo-Calvinism Puritanism	The Holy Scriptures (i.e., the Ten Commandments); empiricism; historical tradition	John Calvin	
4. United States Revolution (from the 18th century)	Dissenting Protestantism	The Holy Scriptures; the core principles of religious freedom and Church–State separationism (i.e., disestablishment of a national religion, liberty of conscience, free exercise of religion, equality of a plurality of faiths before the law)	Milton; Locke	
5. French Revolution (from the 18th and 19th centuries)	Deism	A Creator's gift of reason and people's freewill of exercising this. Reason-based natural law and the supremacy of public opinion. Rationalism	Rousseau	
6. Russian Revolution (20th century)	Atheism	Soviet Marxist-Leninist atheism advocating a classless society. Altruistic idealism	Marx; Engels	

*The arrows indicate the direction and relations of coercion

Table 7: Moral and religious beliefs and models of state-church-citizen relations in the main legal systems (Europe and the Americas) (Amended from Witte, 2002; Berman, 2003; Miller, 2012; Cook, 2012; Merryman & Pérez, 2007)

Church and State control and coerce the individual. The individual may access the divine exclusively through the Church and never directly. The entire system of moral and legal codes emanates from the Roman Catholic Church-State in the figure of the pope. Legally speaking, the model is currently valid for the Roman Church-State; minor changes were made after the Second Vatican Council (Cook, 2012; Agnew, 2010).

2. The second model (German Revolution) enhances the power of the secular authorities (monarchical states), and thereby substantially reduces the influence of the Church. The State provides universal education. The individual has direct access to the Scriptures and enjoys direct communion with God (Berman, 2003; Witte, 2002; Becker & Woessmann, 2009).

3. In the third model (English Revolution), oppressed groups and other dissenting forms of Protestantism (e.g. Calvinism, Puritanism) decreased the power of the state-church and thus of the monarchy. Such a process pushed towards the separation of Church and State and sought to empower the individual, in a large-scale development towards modern democracy based on the advances of the Lutheran Reformation in Germany and northern Europe (Berman, 2003); (Doe & Sandberg, 2010).

4. The fourth model (United States Revolution) further progressed the clear separation of Church and State through a Protestant, dissenting process initiated earlier in England (and even before). The resulting democratisation process progressively and continuously further empowered the individual (Berman, 2003); (Miller, 2012).

5. The French Revolution (fifth model) almost coincided with that in the United States and both informed each other. However, unlike the previous revolutions, Protestantism played no direct (and merely an indirect) role in France. Liberal anti-clericalism fiercely opposed Roman Catholicism but was also hostile to Protestantism (e.g. ironically, it destroyed bibles just as Roman Catholicism did). Therefore, the French Revolution encouraged individual, relative truths (instead of Catholic dogmas or Protestant, biblical moral foundations) by promoting deism and reason. In this conception, the individual and the democratic state are also strengthened, like in the model of the United States Revolution. Here, however, the

state coerces and controls the churches (Berman, 2003; Miller, 2012; Merryman & Pérez, 2007).

6. The sixth model (the Russian Revolution) goes beyond the principles learned of the French Revolution. The state becomes the most powerful entity and hopes to liberate individuals from religious, "opiate-like" beliefs and from economic, class-based exploitation. Consequently, the state significantly coerces religion and enhances both the parental role of the law and the social and economic role of the state (Berman, 2003; Merryman & Pérez, 2007).

8.3.6. Summary and Conclusions

Even if most revolutions were defeated, the influence of the various legal traditions has long persisted. For instance, Eastern schism and in particular the German, English, American and French Revolutions ended the monopoly of Roman canon law. The Thirty Year War ended the German Revolution, the English Revolution suffered defeat in the early 1800s, the French Revolution in 1870, and the Russian Revolution in the 1990s (Berman, 2003).

And yet, all these revolutions influenced the different legal traditions. Several elements of those revolutions still coexist in some countries more than others. Roman and canon law percolated into the legal systems of those countries that underwent revolutions to a greater or lesser degree. For instance, the French and German revolutions made the jurists re-adopt and adapt principles of the old regime in order to build on the respective basis (Witte, 2002; Berman, 2003; Merryman & Pérez, 2007). However, Roman and canon law exercised less influence in common law countries (e.g after the English and United States revolutions) (Doe & Sandberg, 2010; Merryman & Pérez, 2007; Berman, 2003).

The Lutheran German Revolution formed the basis of the various later Protestant, dissenting revolutions and legal traditions (i.e. British and American). Some of its concepts (e.g. separation of state functions from the church; state-sponsored education) permeate all modern legal systems to this day (Witte, 2002; Berman, 2003). The English Revolution marked a crucial step towards modern democracy and limited the power of the monarchies

in Europe. Moreover, the British Empire spread common law throughout its colonies across the world (Berman, 2003; Merryman & Pérez, 2007; La Porta et al., 2008).

The revolution in the United States inspired modern constitutionalism and democratic rights all over the world. The French Revolution also transferred its legal model to its colonies and countries under its influence. For example, the United States exerted constitutional influence on Latin American countries while the French Revolution inspired the independence and the creation of the modern Latin American republics. However, the anti-clericalism of those revolutions was not always assimilated. Instead, along with the French code, Roman and Catholic (i.e. canonical) law has been the predominant legal tradition in most Latin American countries to this day. This attests to the pervasive presence (and power) of Roman Catholicism (i.e. concordats, corporatist states, Catholicism as a state religion) (Berman, 2003; Merryman & Pérez, 2007; La Porta et al., 2008; Barro & McCleary, 2005; Salinas, 2013).

Thus, the basic model of church-state-citizen relations in most Latin American countries more closely resembles the medieval *Corpus Christianum*, i.e. a model based on Roman and Catholic canon law traditions (Model 1). This happened although Latin American countries adopted several elements from the French legal tradition. Examples of corporatist states in which concordats are effective include Colombia, Venezuela and Honduras.

On the other hand, Chile and Uruguay are liberal democracies with explicit anti-clerical movements that never allowed concordats to be signed with the Roman Church-State. Consequently, their basic model of church-state-citizen relations is closer to that of the French Revolution (Model 5). After its revolution, Cuba adopted the Russian model (Model 6).

In Europe, Switzerland (following the 1848 Constitution) was influenced by dissenting Protestantism and by US federalism and constitutionalism, along with French liberalism (Obinger, 2009). The Swiss Confederation has never signed a concordat with the Roman Church-State, even if agreements exist at the cantonal level.

The anti-clerical, anti-Roman, and anti-canon law sentiments that influenced 16th-century Lutheran Germany resembled those of 18th- and 19th-century post-revolutionary France. In

both cases, jurists sought to eliminate the references to Roman and canonical law. Therefore, Germany and France represent the most atypical legal systems in the "civil law world." Their models have assumed intellectual leadership and have been implemented in several other countries (Merryman & Pérez, 2015).

Nonetheless, in both cases, jurists ended up readapting and reincorporating Roman and canon law to suit their new purposes (e.g. the adoption of biblical principles in Lutheranism and of rationalist deism in the French Revolution) (Merryman & Pérez, 2015; Witte, 2002). Consequently, the Roman influence is still highly significant in both cases notwithstanding the substantial legal contributions of the respective revolutions (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, p. 13).

Common law is a different case because British jurists managed to adapt a legal system after the Reformation with precious little influence of Roman and canon law (Doe & Sandberg, 2010). Thus, common law has no hierarchical source of law and is less rigid, less rigorous, and less systematic than civil law. Likewise, common law jurisprudence is less influenced by the rationalist dogmas of the French Revolution (Merryman & Pérez, 2015).

Legal origins associated with Protestant influence (e.g. English common law, German and Scandinavian legal systems) have proven more sustainable. They also exhibit higher institutional performance and prosperity than legal origins associated with a laic rejection of religion (La Porta et al., 2008). Dissenting Protestant religions paved the way for the Enlightenment and for social emancipation (Snyder, 2011; Woodberry, 2012; Miller, 2012).

In contrast, legal origins associated with a laic rejection of religion (e.g. Soviet) have not proven sustainable over time or the elements crucial to their functioning could not be transferred (e.g. French Revolution). For instance, while French legal origins transmitted anti-clerical sentiments to Southern European countries, they were not automatically transferred to most Latin American countries (Merryman & Pérez, 2007). As a result, Southern European countries materialised the sovereignty of their states over the Roman Church-State and thereby attained certain levels of prosperity and institutional performance (higher than in most Latin American countries, but lower than in historically Protestant countries).

For these reasons, Latin American countries with successful anti-clerical movements (e.g. Uruguay, Chile) reached similar prosperity levels as Southern European countries (e.g. Italy,

Spain). However, most Latin American countries have been unable to implement anti-clerical laws and to overcome feudal structures, among other reasons, due to concordats and other political and legal commitments towards the Roman Church-State. As a result, their prosperity and institutional performance are lower.

Therefore, when comparing prosperity and institutional performance ("fruits"), it can be argued: 1) the "people's opium" described by Marx in the Russian Revolution applies more to specific types of hierarchical state religions (i.e. Orthodox, Roman Catholicism, Muslim). 2) However, the Marxists' total rejection of any religious expression eventually replaced one type of tyranny (and opium) for another. 3) In contrast, historically dissenting Protestant religions and anti-clerical movements have proven to be the precursors of social emancipation and the "antidote against the opiate" (Merryman & Pérez, 2007; La Porta et al., 2008; Berman, 2003).

The next section explores the relationship between religion, education, and prosperity. Before that, however, I introduce various associated empirical expectations:

4) *I expect higher transparency/prosperity levels in countries with Protestant-influenced legal origins (i.e. German, English, or Scandinavian) than in non-Protestant countries. The Protestant Reformation introduced the Sola Scriptura principle reflected in Protestant-influenced legal origins.*

5) *I expect lower prosperity/transparency levels in countries that have been influenced by the French legal system, in particular when they have strong clerical ties, and thus have been significantly influenced by Roman and canon law (as in Latin America).*

6) *Given the tradition of controversial and restrictive concordats, I expect a negative influence on transparency and prosperity in the respective concordatarian countries.*

7) *I expect a negative influence on prosperity/transparency in countries rooted in Socialist legal origins, in particular on account of the Soviet legal principle of the "goodness of humankind" (similar to Roman Catholic and Orthodox natural law).*

9. Education, Religion, and Corruption/Prosperity *(A), (B), (C), (1), (2)*

9.1.The Influence of Religion on Education and Human Capital (Prosperity Pillar Mechanism) *(A), (B), (C), (D), (1), (2), (3), (5), (6)*

Historically, acquiring education and accumulating human capital have been persistent human endeavours for centuries. They have also constituted a more primary source of prosperity than economic institutions (Glaeser et al., 2004; Easterlin, 1981; Goldin, 2001; Lindert, 2003; Galor, 2005; Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008; Becker & Woessmann, 2009). Religious factors have both driven and determined unequal education outcomes in Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. Becker and Woessmann have found a high correlation coefficient (.78) between Protestantism and literacy across countries. The authors observe, "Protestantism led to substantially higher literacy, which in turn led to economic progress" (p. 582). They further explain in their empirical study:

> … religion was important for economic success in the sense that without intention it resulted in an uneven accumulation of human capital. The denominational differences originating in the Reformation affected economic outcomes even after several centuries. […] all countries with Protestant majorities had nearly universal literacy in 1900, whereas no Catholic country reached full literacy, and many Catholic countries fell far short of it. […] Existing within-country data provide a similar pattern. […] Even today in Germany, Protestants have 0.8 years of education more than Catholics (with an average of 12.4 years of education… (Becker & Woessmann, 2009, pp, 534, 544).

Before the Reformation, roughly only 1% of the population (i.e. a small elite) were literate in Germany (Engelsing as cited in Becker & Woessmann, 2009). In the passage of time, the Reformation has turned out to be a primary driver of schooling. Thus, in Germany, "Protestants have 5.4% higher income and 0.8 years more education than Catholics even

today. These associations are confirmed in a standard regression framework" (Becker & Woessmann, 2009, pp. 578). The perpetuation of this educational gap between Protestants and Catholics over time allows the authors to conclude that:

> Even after more than a hundred years of a public school system that provides equal access to schooling independent of religious affiliation, Protestants are still better educated. The results suggest that Luther's educational postulations may have had very long-term repercussions (Becker & Woessmann, 2009, pp. 578-581).

The authors cite several sources showing that similar trends or even wider schooling differences between Protestants and Catholics have existed in other countries such as the United States, Ireland, or Finland. For instance, in Finland in 1880, illiteracy among Catholics was 54.4%, compared with only 1.3% among Lutherans (Markussen as cited in Becker & Woessmann, 2009, p. 544). The following subsections explain the differences between Roman Catholic education and Protestant education that can lead to markedly different outcomes.

9.1.1.Roman Catholic Education

Greek philosophy and various other cultural traditions have influenced Roman Catholic theology more strongly than the Holy Scriptures (Selling, 2018, p. 9; Gula, 2002, pp. 120-121; Gruner, 1977, p. 117). For example, Aristotle had a greater influence on Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica than the entire Old Testament. Moreover, Catholicism's extended allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures stems from Origen, and ultimately from Plato. The Roman Catholic Church, therefore, places its traditions and hierarchical authority over the Scriptures. This explains the significant disparity between Roman Catholicism and essential biblical foundations (Section 10.4.1). Furthermore, the Roman system has long suppressed the Scriptures, thus preventing believers from engaging directly with them. Up until the last century, prohibition or persecution were the norm for those who owned, translated, read, or taught the Scriptures without the sanction of the Church (Cook, 2012; Heussi, 1991).

In turn, the most widespread Roman Catholic teaching practices have been the repetition and memorising of dogmatic texts so as to recite them without much understanding (Plata Quezada, 2008; Heussi, 1991; D'Aubigne, 1862). Therefore, such texts, as well as selected parts of the Gospel, were taught in Latin scholarly language to mostly illiterate peasants even after the Middle Ages in Europe (Androne, 2014; Becker & Woessmann, 2009). Such teaching practices suppressed any critical thinking and demanded absolute obedience to unilateral dogmatic discourses, thus enhancing and perpetuating the hegemony of the Church-State. In fact, "The maintenance of ignorance" has been one of the most effective strategies deployed by the Catholic Church-State to influence people's behaviour (Head-König, 2017, pp. 46-47). Similar practices have been in force until recently, especially in rural areas in some Latin American countries (Appendix 16). Similarly, regarding Catholic education in Latin America, Gill (1998) observed:

> Although the Catholic Church operated schools, the episcopacy diverted most educational resources to the upper class. Moreover, the Church downplayed the connection between literacy and reading the Bible, fearing it would produce another Protestant Reformation. In fact, the importation of the Bible was banned for most of Latin American history (p. 89).

Moreover, the Roman Church-State has provided far more education in countries where it has had to compete with Protestantism (e.g. United States, India, Ireland) than in countries where it has managed to prevent competition (e.g. Mexico, Spain, Italy). (Woodberry, 2012, p. 269).

9.1.1.1.Jesuitical Education

As with Protestantism, Roman Catholicism cannot be reduced to black and white generalisations. The Catholic Church initiated the Counter-Reformation process in the Council of Trent (1534–1549) and thus contested the advancement of Protestantism. Consequently, the Roman Church-State created new religious orders, among which the Jesuits were the most prominent (Heussi, 1991). Seemingly contradictorily, yet importantly,

the Jesuits, despite their loyalty to the pope, were secular before the word was coined (Roy, 2010). One of the novelties introduced by the Jesuits is the focus on analytical skills and higher education through applying the *Ratio Studiorum* (Pavur, 2005). Competing with Protestant education, which enhanced methodical skills by studying the Scriptures (Becker & Woessmann, 2009), the Jesuits' *Ratio Studiorum* advanced Aquinian and Aristotelian teachings. Therefore, Jesuit education had always focused, among others, on the liberal arts, medieval scholasticism, Renaissance humanism, and ethics, thus attaching less importance to any exegetical understanding of the Scriptures (Lukàcs, 1986).

The Oxford Dictionary (2016) defines the term *Jesuitical* as of "or concerning the Jesuits. Dissembling or equivocating, in the manner once associated with Jesuits"; "*Dissemble*: Conceal or disguise one's true feelings or beliefs" (Oxford University Press 2016). Similar definitions can be found in Spanish (RAE), German (Duden), or other English dictionaries.

In 19th-century Switzerland, "Liberals considered the Jesuit order 'an anathema, as the apotheosis of Catholic obscurantism, intrigue, and subversion'" (Gould, 1999 as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 181). Therefore, the Swiss "constitution of 1874 banned the pope-loyal Jesuit order…" (Obinger, 2009, p. 181). Beyond Switzerland, Schwarz-Herion, (2015) observes the following, regarding the historical influence of the Jesuits:

> the activities of the Jesuits as personal educators of young people from influential families and as confessors at courts (Goerlitz et al. 1982; Fülöp-Miller 1929) gave them the opportunity to manipulate influential persons and potential blackmailing leverage other monarchs and Princes. […] After some Sovereigns started to get suspicious towards the Jesuits, the Jesuits started to hide behind 1,000 masks, pretending to be Brahmans among Brahmans, protestants among protestants, scholars among scholars, etc., always adapting to the circles they were infiltrating (Fülöp-Miller 1929). […] Since the Jesuits were perceived as a threat, the Order of the Jesuits got prohibited in 1773 by Pope Clemens XIV due to pressure from several monarchs (Paris and Fülöp-Miller as cited in Schwarz-Herion, 2015, p. 77).

Notwithstanding the bad reputation formerly acquired by the Jesuits, Schwarz-Herion (2015) further observes that their global influence has increased, and the author states his concern in this regard:

> the influence of the Jesuits (SJ) on politics seems to remain unbroken until today. […] Modern Jesuits do not only play an essential role in the Vatican, but are also firmly rooted in international politics: the EU council president Hermann Rompuy said in public: 'We are all Jesuits', pointing out that he was "developing the architecture for the future Europe" (Eppink 2012). […] The political networks of these hierarchically structured religious orders, organized in a military way and boasting with their medieval legacy of the cursaders, might pose a serious obstacle to the Great Transition to sustainable global democracy and thus should not be taken lightly by a vigilant enlightened civil society consisting of many humans who have grown up in modern democratic and laical states (Schwarz-Herion, 2015, p. 112).

In South America, some Jesuit missions have had a lasting, positive impact on modern-day human capital and incomes (10–15% higher compared to the surrounding Roman Catholic population in Southern Paraguay and Northern Argentina) (Valencia, 2017). These missions also advanced education among the Catholic population in different places at a subnational level even if they were largely elitist (Woodberry, 2012) and far less encompassing than the traditional Protestant urge for education (Becker & Woessmann, 2009).

9.1.2. Protestant Education

"Faith rests not on ignorance, but on knowledge"

(John Calvin, 1559, *Institutio Christianae religionis*)

Historically, and empirically, education is the most crucial feature that Protestantism influenced and through which it promoted economic prosperity. Statistically, the "Protestant lead in literacy is large enough to account for practically the entire Protestant lead in economic outcomes" (Becker & Woessmann, 2009, p. 532).

Several Reformers, including Martin Luther, were university professors and writers who promoted the *Sola Scriptura* principle. For this purpose, Luther and other Reformers translated the Scriptures into vernacular languages and taught illiterate people to read (Becker & Woessmann, 2009; Berman, 2003, Witte, 2002). They believed that proper education enables the individual to distinguish right from wrong, truth from falsehood, and to accurately understand "the essentials of the Christian faith" (Green, 2009; Hillerbrand, 1968, as cited in Androne, 2014, p. 81). This explains the Reformatory emphasis on teaching and studying the Scriptures, and thus on establishing elementary schools for ordinary people (Becker & Woessmann, 2009). As the Bible itself states:

> All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works (2 Timothy 3:16 King James Version).

Similarly, the Scriptures also assert that "Blessed is he that readeth […]" (Revelation 1:3). Therefore, the Reformers (as well as other early Christians) focused on developing literacy, to enable the reading and teaching of the Gospel (i.e. exegesis). Over time, this enabled Protestants to further utilise these skills in other, non-religious domains (e.g. trade and

commerce). As a result, “Protestant economies prospered because instruction in reading the Bible generated the human capital crucial to economic prosperity” (Becker & Woessmann, 2009, p. 531).

Furthermore, in Protestant countries, education became accessible to (and often mandatory for) all. It combined the study of the Scriptures (instead of Latin scholastic texts) with vocational training. Consequently, the Lutheran Reformation transformed the elitist monopoly of Roman Church-based education into state-based education (initially, locally and nationally in Germany, and later also in other countries). The Reformers’ introduction of a public, “secular” education system with public officials, civic concerns, and laicisation opposed Rome’s one-sided, distorted religious and humanistic learning (Witte, 2002, pp. 290-291). With the Reformation, education remained inherently religious, but over time it became progressively secularised by being harnessed to civic purposes and broader political control (Ibid). Consequently, the study of the Gospel has been of fundamental importance in Protestant countries (e.g. at universities such as Harvard, Yale, Cambridge, Oxford, Geneva, and Zürich).

The Protestant nurturing of the educated middle classes was the precursor of the politics of popular accountability in government (Snyder, 2011); (Spruyt, 1994). However, while Protestants have perhaps not always provided the majority of resources (e.g. education, book printing), Protestantism has nevertheless compelled governments to establish schools (Woodberry, 2012, p. 246). Likewise, when facing greater competition with Protestantism, Roman Catholic hierarchies have also defended the interests of the poor (e.g. education for non-elites, democracy) (Gill, 1998; Anderson, 2007; Woodberry, 2012).

Historical Protestantism has also favoured mobilisation “from below.” It has pursued this goal through the early development of literacy at all social levels, and has thus encouraged wider participation in politics. Conversely, the supra-national influence of Roman Catholicism has favoured mobilisation “from above,” leading to a late development of literacy and thus limiting the political participation of the lower social strata (Flora & Heidenheimer, 1981).

In Latin America, in order to spread the Gospel, Protestants also introduced literacy campaigns long before Roman Catholicism (Gill, 1998, p. 89). As the Jesuit Jeffrey Klaiber noted:

> "It is not merely a present-day ecumenical joke that today the Catholic missionary in Latin America must carefully explain to his faithful that the Bible was not written by Protestants and that it is not heretical to read it. The Bible came to Latin America as popular literature virtually with the Protestant missionaries. Even today the best and most readable translations of the New Testament in Latin American Spanish are done by Protestants (Klaiber, 1970, p. 99).

9.1.3. Summary

Historically (and statistically), one key mechanism driving prosperity/transparency has been the Protestant emphasis on literacy so as to promote reading and understanding the Bible among wider circles (Becker & Woessmann, 2009); (Woodberry, 2012). This contrasted starkly with the Roman Catholic practice of reciting parts of the Gospel in Latin scholarly language to mostly illiterate peasants (Androne, 2014); (Becker & Woessmann, 2009). The teaching of God's Word in vernacular languages created linguistic and methodical skills (i.e. exegetical understanding) that proved valuable beyond the religious realm (Becker & Woessmann, 2009, p. 542). This practice also led to the accumulation of human capital, and thereby opened and perpetuated an important educational (and hence prosperity) gap between Protestants and Roman Catholics over time.

As part of the Catholic Counter-Reformation, the Jesuits have competed with Protestant education but attaching less importance to the Scriptures in their schooling. Some South American areas influenced by Jesuit missions exhibit 10–15% higher human capital and income than the surrounding Catholic populations. Yet, Jesuit instruction has been largely elitist and far less encompassing than Protestant educational coverage and accomplishment.

10. Culture, Religion, and Corruption/Prosperity *(A), (B), (C), (1), (2)*

Several empirical studies have considered three proxies of culture: religion (Volonté, 2015; Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Paldam, 2001; Granato et al., 1996); language (Volonté, 2015); and ethnic measures (Alesina et al., 2003). However, cultural proxies often overlap with cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2001), as well as with countries and their institutions (Volonté, 2015). The triad "Protestantism, English, and common law" is a typical example of interrelated overlapping characteristics associated with similar governance regimes (Volonté, 2015) and lower corruption (La Porta et al.,1999). The first three subsections below elucidate some of these relationships. The fourth identifies those elements of Roman Catholic and Protestant theologies that may help clarify cultural differences.

10.1. Culture and Corruption *(2)*

Cultural determinants may drive corruption and its associated variables (i.e. GDP, institutions, democracy) at the same time (Lambsdorff, 1999, p. 14). Now, however, the causality arrow runs theoretically and empirically from culture to corruption, rather than vice versa (Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 17).

The most important cultural characteristics defining the level of corruption in a country are generalised trust, religion, and acceptance of hierarchy (Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 17). These factors are interrelated (La Porta et al., 1999). Hence, high levels of generalised trust, a large share of Protestants, and low acceptance of hierarchy mean less perceived corruption in a country (Lambsdorff, 2006).

Several studies have shown that corruption is more frequent in countries with a high degree of ethnic fragmentation (see, among others, Mauro 1995; La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 2000, Alesina et al., 2003). However, neither Serra (2006) nor Elbahnasawy and Revier (2012) found any significant effect of fractionalisation on corruption. One possible

explanation for these dissimilar conclusions might be related to the embedding of all ethnicities in a single indicator of fragmentation across different samples.

My empirical models (Part V) also include linguistically and ethnically aggregated and disaggregated measures as cultural proxies. Thus:

Empirical expectation:

8) *I expect no conclusive results for ethnic fractionalisation given the possible overlapping of cultural proxies (Volonté, 2015) with other variables and given the varied conclusions of previous empirical results with aggregated measures.*

10.2. Culture and Institutions/Prosperity *(2), (3), (5)*

Various cultural aspects have direct empirical relations with institutional/prosperity/transparency outcomes: 1) *trust* (i.e. a higher level of trust implies less litigation). Education also favours trust; 2) *family ties. Familialism* (a significant reliance on family ties) is linked with lower civic sense and less trust. Thus, medieval corporations that were established based on such nuclear families underperformed; 3) *individualism* encourages personal accomplishments and innovation, contrary to collectivism; 4) *generalised morality*, which is limited to small circles in hierarchical societies; and 5) *work attitudes,* in the classical Weberian sense of the Protestant work ethic (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015, pp. 902-910).

10.3. Culture and Religion *(B), (C)*

The relationship between culture and religion is complex and subject to ongoing debate. Globalisation has "de-cultured" and "de-territorialised" world religions from their cultural and geographical origins (Roy, 2010). Likewise, secularisation, most of all in Europe or in specific political contexts (e.g. Communism) has partially driven religion out of the cultural sphere (Berger, 1999; Roy, 2010). Conversely, religion may represent most cultural values depending on context (e.g. for Orthodox Jews, Christian Pentecostalists, or Muslim Salafists), or a minor part of such values (e.g. for Jewish atheists, secular Protestants, or Catholic nonbelievers).

Alesina & Giuliano (2015) leave unmentioned the relation between religion and the cultural traits mentioned above (Section 10.2, with the exception of the fifth aspect). However, religion is a decisive institutional and cultural expression, and as such governs social relationships (Volonté, 2015; Stulz & Williamson, 2003; La Porta et al., 1997). Consequently, the cultural and institutional influence of religion underlies the phenomenon that prosperity, transparency, and institutions reinforce each other (Lambsdorff, 2006; Treisman, 2000).

Trust

Regarding *trust*, sufficient empirical evidence links values, attitudes, and beliefs (including trust) with religion and prosperity outcomes (Arruñada, 2010; Barro & McCleary, 2003; Guiso et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1997). Arruñada (2010) compared the values and personal outcomes of Protestants and Catholics in a 32-country sample, based on data form the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Survey. The author analysed differences in the theology, church organisation, and social practice of Protestantism and Catholicism. Different indices and indicators of social ethic (e.g. social control, the rule of law, and homogeneous values) and work ethic (e.g. positive working hours) were examined. Some significant findings of Arruñada can be summarised as follows:

- Compared with Roman Catholics, "Protestant values shape individuals to be more active in mutual social control, more supportive of institutions, less bound to close circles of family and friends and to hold more homogeneous values" (Arruñada, 2010, p. 891).

- Arruñada (2010) and Guiso et al. (2003) found statistical evidence for the fact that Roman Catholics are significantly more tolerant of tax fraud than Protestants. Roman Catholics are statistically less supportive of political and legal institutions and are more willing to cover for their delinquent friends when dealing with the police (Arruñada, 2010, p. 907).

- Protestants hold more homogeneous values than Catholics. Greater homogeneity reduces exchange and transaction costs and promotes impersonal trading and markets (e.g. those in commerce, finance, and industry) (p. 907-908). In turn, "Catholicism is more conducive to developing personalised trade […] to the detriment of impersonal exchange" (p. 890, 908) (e.g. in medieval times or in most rural areas in Latin America).

- Better-educated Protestants trust churches and religious organisations more, whereas better-educated Catholics trust them less. Thus, the Roman Catholic Church has greater conflict with its educated laity. Education tends to substitute

> for religion in Roman Catholicism, whereas it complements religion in Protestantism (p. 906).

Similarly, after surveying prominent empirical works linking trust and religion, Volonté (2015) observed:

> Protestants exhibit a higher level of trust in contrast to Catholics, which promotes trade and thereby economic development (La Porta et al. 1997; Glaeser and Glendon 1998; Guiso et al. 2006). […] Religion and trust are therefore also related to organizational issues. Stulz and Williamson (2003) contend that the Calvinist Reformation promoted decentralization and the creation of multiple churches, and aimed to guard against concentrations of power. In contrast, Roman Catholicism, which is recognized as a religion whose congregations place their trust in people ‘‘who know more’’, has a centralized hierarchical structure with the Pope as its authoritative head (Levine 1979; La Porta et al. 1999b; Stulz and Williamson 2003, p. 319) (p. 84).

The veneration of the pope as the authoritative head of a hierarchical, centralised structure is the archetypical example of *vertical trust* (Volonté, 2015, p. 84). In turn, Protestants tend to be sceptical of hierarchies. The reformations historically promoted decentralisation (i.e. multiple churches) and democratisation (i.e. priesthood of all believers), and thus protected ordinary people against concentrations of power (*horizontal trust*) (Woodberry, 2012; Witte, 2002; La Porta et al. 1999; Stulz and Williamson 2003; Levine 1979 as cited in Volonté, 2015, p. 84).

A typical example of horizontal trust refers to common goods (e.g. milk or fruit) left on display for customers to buy using open cash bowls (without supervising cashiers). For Mangalwadi (2011), such traditions exist mostly in historically Protestant countries and derive from applying the moral principles of the Biblical Decalogue. Consequently, regardless of a higher authority (e.g. a priest or a government) overseeing farm produce, God always watches (over) humans (producers and customers). Such a simple principle has profound reinforcing implications for the value-creating and value-adding chain (Mangalwadi, 2011, pp. 251-254). In non-Protestant societies, following Mangalwadi’s

example, low trust (or vertical trust) implies hiring a cashier, adulterated milk, inspectors accepting bribes, and a higher price for a lower quality item. Accordingly, such economies are less competitive than Protestant economies. But the distinct values persisting through the present owe more to the historical and institutional weight of religion (than to its contemporary influence), even regardless of the secularisation of societies (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). As Glaeser & Glendon (1998) observed, "current social norms may still be the legacy of prior religious beliefs" (p. 431). Likewise, Inglehart & Baker (2000) assert:

> While the majority of individuals have little or no contact with the church today, the impact of living in a society that was historically shaped by once-powerful Catholic or Protestant institutions persists today, shaping everyone—Protestant, Catholic, or other…(p. 36).

Familialism

Familialism and *low generalised morality* characterise Roman Catholicism as discussed (Section 10.4.1) (Esping-Andersen, 1996; Van Kersbergen, 1995; Arruñada, 2010; La Porta et al., 1999). In turn, individualism stems from the French Revolution and secularism was indirectly influenced by the Protestant Revolutions (Section 8.3.4.4). Arruñada (2010) found statistically, and consistent with the argument of Putnam (1993) that Catholics give more importance than Protestants to family ties. Arruñada observed:

> "This greater importance of the family tallies with the propensity shown by Catholics to take occupational choices that favour 'production' within the family and might hinder the functioning of institutions, for example through nepotism" (Arruñada, 2010, p. 908).

Investigating these cultural features, various empirical studies (e.g. Granato et al., 1996) have found robust practical interrelations between GDP growth and Protestantism based on cultural measurements (World Values Survey of a 25 cross-country sample). Likewise, Hayward & Kemmelmeier (2011), combining individual and national levels using cross-

national panel data, reported that Protestantism persistently fosters capitalism but independently of active religiosity (cultural Protestantism).

Religion has shaped culture to a significant extent in Europe and the Americas (Anderson, 2007; Paldam, 2001; Huntington, 1991). Therefore, my research model places religion inside the "culture box" and maintains that it has manifold relations with variables beyond culture (e.g. institutions; Figure 2). The next subsections further analyse the implications of cultural factors, religion, and corruption in Latin America.

10.3.1. The Cultural Influence of Religion in Latin America

10.3.1.1. Corruption in Latin America

Some Latin American cultural characteristics prone to corruption are corporatism, authoritarianism, centralism, formalism (double standards), particularism (allegiance within an inner circle), and the dispensing of favours expected of certain roles (Nef, 2001, pp. 159-174). Therefore, corruption and culture are associated "as an ethical issue emerging from the moral weakness of society of the persistence of traditional values" (Uildriks, 2009, p. 9).

Hofstede (2001) reached similar conclusions after making a first empirical, quantitative approach to exploring the differences in thinking and social behaviours across 72 countries (using 116,000 questionnaires distributed across IBM, the multinational enterprise). Notwithstanding fierce criticism of the representativeness of the samples and of the categories utilised for analysis, Hofstede's pioneering work provides a numerical glimpse of cultural variables in relation to institutions and prosperity. The author's results were extrapolated, then generalised in six "cultural dimensions" (Hofstede, 2001).

One of the six dimensions used by Hofstede is the "Power Distance Index" (PDI). He defined this as "the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally" (Hofstede, 2014). According to the PDI index, most Latin American countries present high scores, contrary to the low PDI scores in North

American and North European countries. Among others, the following table summarises the consequences of different PDI scores for political systems, religious life, and organisations (Hofstede, 2001).

	High PDI scores (Latin American countries)	Low PDI scores (North American and North European countries)
Type of government	Autocratic or oligarchic	Pluralist governments based on the outcome of majority votes
Government stability	Sudden changes (instability)	Stable governments stressing equality
Political spectrum	Polarisation between left and right with a weak centre	Political parties tend to occupy the centre
Tax system	Tax system protects the wealthy	Tax system aims to redistribute wealth
Religion	Success of religions stresses stratification (hierarchical)	Success of religions stresses equality
Theories about society	Elitist (Machiavelli, Mosca, Pareto)	Pluralist (More, Marx, Weber)

Table 8: Different Power Distance Index (PDI) and its consequences for social and political systems, religious life, and organisations (adapted from Hofstede, 2001).[7]

As shown, institutionalised religion and the state have established hierarchical power relations in Latin America, thus a high-power distance may be expected on this continent. In contrast, after the Reformation, the institutional disbanding of Roman Catholicism in Northern Europe and the non-institutionalisation of religion in North America led to more social equality.

[7] Note: PDI provided information for only less than 20 observations for the 65 countries analysed here. Furthermore, PDI overlaps with other proxies of culture and institutions (Volonté, 2015). Therefore, I excluded the PDI index from analysis due to lack of data and risk of endogeneity, and no results were obtained from this variable.

10.3.1.2. The Divorce between Law, Social Norms, and Morals in Latin America

Various factors — corruption, crime, violence, and institutions' loss of prestige — account for the systematic divorce between law, social norms, and morals in most Latin American countries (Mockus, Murraín, & Villa, 2012). Table 9 shows the respective regulatory systems (divorced in most Latin American countries):

Carrots and sticks	Laws +	Social norms ++	Personal moral standards +++
(+) Incentive (carrots)	Admiration or respect for the law (or recognising the importance of fulfilling it)	Admiration and social recognition (trust - reputation)	Spiritual or self-gratification of conscience (peace of mind)
(-) Penalty (sticks)	Fear of legal sanction	Fear of shame or social rejection	Fear of damnation or guilt

Table 9: Behaviour regulation mechanisms (adapted from Mockus et al., 2012, p. 7).

The three columns frame the three regulatory systems (law, social norms, and personal morals). The behavioural motivation mechanisms are deployed in the two rows, depending on whether they are positive (above), or associated with negative reasons or punishments (below). Mockus' (2012) conceptual proposal shows that rather than abiding by a single regulatory system, humans are subject to three interacting systems. Such interplay can be harmonic (e.g. in northern Europe) or may generate multiple shocks (as in Latin America) (Mockus et al., 2012, p. 7). Arruñada (2010) coincides with a similar distinction of these three regulatory systems, which he refers to as "enforcement mechanisms" (parties), and describes in reverse order compared with Table 9:

> Under 'first party' enforcement, the obliged individuals evaluate their own conduct in relation to their own reading of a moral code, a code that includes many

> economically-relevant preferences, towards effort, thriftiness and so on. In accordance with this evaluation, individuals sanction themselves with some psychological compensation, which in Christianity is related to the idea of 'salvation' and eternal life in heaven. 'Second party' enforcement is based on verification and sanction by the party suffering the consequences of breach. In addition to partners in a standard economic exchange, peers in groups are also second parties to the extent that they exert pressure on non-compliant members through diverse means, from shaming to ostracising or even killing them. Lastly, under 'third party' enforcement, more or less specialised agents, such as political rulers, judges and police forces, verify the behaviour of group members and punish those who do not follow the rules (Arruñada, 2010, p. 892).

For Arruñada, religion directly influences personal moral standards, as well as less clearly influencing social norms and law. For Mockus, law, culture, and morality tend to be congruent in ideal democratic societies. Culture is more demanding than law, and morality is more demanding than culture. The behaviours valid in light of individual morality usually enjoy social approval, although the opposite is not always true. In turn, what is culturally approved is usually legally allowed, although some acceptable legal behaviour is rejected for cultural reasons (Mockus, 2001, p. 3).

In contrast, the divorce from these normative systems occurs in most Latin American countries and applies to corruption and all forms of illegal behaviour (at times even extending to violence). A typical and extreme example is that the right to life is a fundamental right upheld in all Latin American constitutions. However, social organisations (or cultural groups) intent on eradicating the fundamental respect for another person's life have proliferated in Latin America. For such groups, it often becomes even necessary to demonstrate that "you are capable" or "brave enough" to take another person's life so as to gain greater respect or stronger group affiliation. This thinking needs to be understood in terms of the divorce of law and culture. It can, however, also be analysed in terms of a divorce between morality and culture. It is also possible that due to fear, recognition, or shame an individual ends up accepting certain group rules even if these go against one's

conscience (e.g. “I prefer not to be considered a ‘snitch’ even though I know I am doing something with which I morally disagree”) (Mockus et al., 2012, p. 6).

In sum, individuals not only respond to the coercive power of the law but, much more stalwartly, they also obey their cultural and moral principles (Mockus et al., 2012, p. 7). Historically, the Roman Catholic Church has influenced the three regulatory systems in Latin America. Thus, a negative influence on the coherence of these systems may be expected when considering Catholic “relativist morals” (Section 10.4.1) and restrictive concordats and corporatist legal instruments (Section 8.3.4.6).[8] The previous discussion justifies reviewing the distinct theologies of historical Protestantism and Roman Catholicism as the root-cause of their differences (see below).

[8] Note: I do not define specific variables for this divorce of mechanisms, neither in regression analysis nor in QCA models. However, *legal origin, concordats,* and *population adherents* may serve as proxies, and are therefore included in the empirical setting (Section 16 and Part VI).

10.4. Roman Catholic and Protestant Theologies, and Corruption / Prosperity *(1), (3), (6)*

The following subsections examine the influence of religion in terms of theological approaches within Roman Catholicism, then explore the same within Protestantism.

10.4.1. Roman Catholic Theology and Political Culture

10.4.1.1. Roman Catholic Theology

Selling (2018) explains Roman Catholic theological ethics in terms of personal intention, that is, good ("virtues") versus evil ("vices"). This Roman Catholic notion derives from its traditional recognition of four "cardinal virtues" established by Greek philosophy and by the three "theological virtues" of Paul's Epistles. Thus, Greek philosophy (especially Aristotelian) once again carries more weight than Scriptural "virtues," of which there are only three (as formulated in the New Testament), (see Sections 8.2.1.1; 8.3.4.1; 8.3.5 and 9.1.1). Therefore, Roman Catholicism acknowledges as "virtue" the Aristotelian "non-absolute" and "mean" relative point between two extremes (Selling, 2018, p. 9). As such, "good and evil" depend on analysing specific acts, circumstances, and intentions as harmful or beneficial for each person. Accordingly, no "ruling" moral standard would be adequate (not even the Scriptures):

> Even clear commandments, such as "thou shalt not kill" admit of exceptions that have been enshrined in [Catholic] church teaching for centuries (Selling, 2018, p. 8)[9].

[9] Joseph Selling is Emeritus Professor of Moral Theology at Catholic University Leuven. He is also the author of the book "Reframing Catholic Theological Ethics" (Oxford University Press, 2016).

Selling (2018) acknowledges that Roman Catholicism "does not subscribe to the vast majority" of the laws of Judaism (p.10). In other words, Roman Catholicism does not endorse most Old Testament laws that Jesus and the Apostles, as Jews, followed (Bruce, 2007). Moreover, the moral law that Catholicism explicitly teaches from the Old Testament's Decalogue is elaborated with the help of supplementary meanings through a "natural law reasoning" (Selling, 2018, p. 10). Consequently, the Catholic Decalogue diverges from the original books (Exodus 20; Deuteronomy 5), which were "written with the finger of God" (Exodus 31: 18; Deuteronomy 9: 10). The wording of the Ten Commandments, moreover, even varies in Catholic Catechisms of different languages beyond their translation (Table 10).

Table 10 shows the pronounced differences between the Decalogue of the Holy Scriptures (A) and the Roman Catholic Catechism in Spanish (C). The Decalogue of the Roman Catholic Catechism in English (B) stands between the Scriptures and the Spanish Catechism. The Roman Catholic Catechism contains fundamental alterations in the First Table of the Commandments (the first four Commandments relative to loving God; see and compare with Table 6). The Second Table (concerning loving one's neighbour) remains relatively similar with some minor changes.

	A	B	C
	The Ten Commandments (Exodus 20, 1-17)	**Catholic Catechetical Formula in English**	**Roman Catholic Catechism in Spanish** (author's translation)
1	And God spake all these words, saying, I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. **Thou shalt have no other gods before me.**	1. I am the LORD your God: you shall not have strange Gods before me.	1. You shall love God above all things. *(Amarás a Dios sobre todas las cosas).*
2	**Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image,** or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth: thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me; and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments.	**…?** *(Commandment eliminated from the Roman Catholic Catechism)*	**…?** *(Commandment eliminated from the Roman Catholic Catechism)*
3	**Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain:** for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain.	2. You shall not take the name of the LORD your God in vain.	2. You shall not take God's name in vain. *(No tomarás el nombre de Dios en vano).*
4	**Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.** Six days shalt thou labor, and do all thy work: but the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy manservant, nor thy maidservant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates: for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day, and hallowed it.	3. Remember to keep holy the LORD'S Day.	3. You shall sanctify the feasts (holidays). *(Santificarás las fiestas).*
5	**Honor thy father and thy mother:** that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.	4. Honor your father and your mother.	4. Honor your father and your mother. *(Honrarás a tu padre y a tu madre).*
6	**Thou shalt not kill.**	5. You shall not kill.	5. You shall not kill. *(No matarás).*
7	**Thou shalt not commit adultery.**	6. You shall not commit adultery.	6. You shall not commit impure acts. *(No cometerás actos impuros).*
8	**Thou shalt not steal.**	7. You shall not steal.	7. You shall not steal. *(No hurtarás)*
9	**Thou shalt not bear false witness** against thy neighbor.	8. You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor.	8. You shall not say false testimony or lie. *(No dirás falso testimonio ni mentirás).*
10	**Thou shalt not covet** thy neighbor's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbor's.	9. You shall not covet your neighbor's wife.	9. You shall not consent impure thoughts or desires. *(No consentirás pensamientos ni deseos impuros).*
--	--	10. You shall not covet your neighbor's goods.	10. You shall not covet the property of others. *(No codiciarás los bienes ajenos).*

Note: Author's highlighting and emphases

Table 10: The Bible's Decalogue compared with the Decalogue of Roman Catechism (English and Spanish) (adapted from A) The Holy Bible. The Authorized (King James) Version. Cambridge Edition: (1769); B) Catechism of the Catholic Church - The Ten Commandments (Vatican 2018); C) Catecismo de la Doctrina Cristiana (Comisión Episcopal de Enseñanza de Madrid, 1962, pp. 6-7)).

While the First Commandment concerns monotheism (A and B), in (C) the wording is completely different, bringing into play other related Biblical ordinance but not the original (Tables 6 and 10). Similarly, the Second Commandment of the Decalogue (to make no graven image) is arbitrarily removed from the Roman Catechism (B and C). This makes sense when considering the core practice of venerating images and icons in Roman Catholicism. Such reverence is common to different religious systems (e.g. Babylon, Egypt, Rome); in contrast, however, the Holy Bible condemns it as idolatry (Table 6 and Appendix 15).

While the Third Commandment remains relatively similar, the Fourth Commandment varies significantly in A, B, and C. In A, it mentions keeping the Sabbath (Saturday). In B, it refers to the LORD's Day (which is open to interpretation, i.e. Sunday Mass), and in C to "sanctifying the festivals." The three variants differ noticeably, as a result of the interplay between Jewish (Sabbath) and pagan factors (sun worshipping: Sunday) in early Christianity (Bacchiocchi, 1977).

The wording of the other commandments has remained similar, some minor changes aside. Nonetheless, the Roman Catechism contains several articles that further relativise the application of the Commandments, for instance:

Regarding the Ninth Commandment:

> The gravity of a lie is measured against the nature of the truth it deforms, the circumstances, the intentions of the one who lies, and the harm suffered by its victims. If a lie in itself only constitutes a venial sin, it becomes mortal when it does grave injury to the virtues of justice and charity (2484, Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vatican, 2018).

However, the Holy Bible does not mention the existence of "venial sins" such as "soft lies." On the contrary, Jesus said:

> But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil (Matthew 5:37).

Here is another example of the relativisation of the Sixth Commandment in the Roman Catechism:

> The prohibition of murder does not abrogate the right to render an unjust aggressor unable to inflict harm. Legitimate defense is a grave duty for whoever is responsible for the lives of others or the common good (2321, Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vatican, 2018).

Here, too, the Scriptures state that Jesus commanded the opposite:

> but I say unto you, *That ye resist not evil*: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain. Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away. Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, *Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you* (Matthew 5:39-44; my italics).

Furthermore, meaningful variations on content and wording are also evident in the English and Spanish versions of the Roman Catechism. The Roman Church-State is Catholic. Although this means it is "universal," its Commandments are taught differently in English-speaking (predominantly Protestant) contexts than in Spanish-speaking (predominantly Roman Catholic) ones. Similar differences in wording can also be found in the Catechism's version of the Decalogue in other languages (e.g. compare German with Portuguese or French versions). Since the Catechism eliminated the Second Commandment, the Ninth Commandment was divided in two (thus creating two new Commandments).

10.4.1.1.1. Roman Catholic Theology in Practice

According to Arruñada (2010), Roman Catholic practices favour "diverse moral standards because of both the contents and its moral code and, mainly, its enforcement mechanisms"

(p. 895). The double or "diverse moral standards" in Roman Catholicism encourage a "selective charity," thus favouring friends and relatives (*familialism*) over strangers. Regarding enforcement, the "salvation by works" and "purgatory-based" theologies, along with the private confession of sins to a priest, imply heterogeneous subjective moral standards for judging individuals according to the clergy's subjectivity and individual circumstances. In other words, "moral standards are adjusted to specific circumstances," and descend from medieval "casuistry" (Arruñada, 2010, p. 895). Moreover, this concurs entirely with the Aristotelian "non-absolute" and "mean" relative point defining "good" or "bad." Therefore, the various predicted statistical results could be expected (see Section 10.3).

Another widespread moral tradition refers to the duality between official Catholic discourse and *de facto* practice. Examples include the constant scandalous abuse of children by priests. For instance, the recent exhaustive Pennsylvania report found that the Roman Catholic hierarchy covered-up for more than 300 priests who had abused over 1,000 children in Pennsylvania alone. Although the leaders of the Catholic Church publicly condemn child abuse, in practice the Church hierarchy systematically covers up such scandals (Grand Jury of Pennsylvania, 2018).

10.4.1.2. Roman Catholic Political Culture

Political culture is a "system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place" (Verba 1965, p. 513). *Familialism* and the predominance of the male breadwinner model are two values propagated by Catholic political parties (Esping-Andersen, 1996; Van Kersbergen, 1995). Catholic political culture "[…] is transmitted mainly through nationwide institutions, to the population of a society as a whole—even to those who have little or no contact to religious institutions" (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 36; Emmenegger, 2011, p. 339). Therefore, the social effect of Roman Catholicism does not depend on religiosity (Esping-Andersen, 1996, p. 66; Figueroa, 2016).

Various scholars, including Arruñada (2010), Lambsdorff (2006), and Treisman (2000), have analysed the adverse consequences of *familialism* on corruption. Societies are

perceived as less corrupt when impersonal values are more important than particularistic or family values (Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 19). Thus, the adverse impact of Roman Catholicism on corruption stems mainly from the institution. The Roman Church-State transmits values such as the acceptance of hierarchy, *familialism,* double standards, and relativism to the population via education, for instance. Moreover, the pressure to compete with Protestantism has often forced the Catholic Church to strategically adopt more pro-social and more democratic postures in several countries (Gill, 2013; 1998; Anderson, 2007; Woodberry, 2012; Wilde et al., 2010), (see Section 8.2.1.2). The next two sections briefly consider two current aspects of Roman Catholic theology: ecumenism and liberation theology.

10.4.1.3. Ecumenism: All Roads Lead to Rome

Ecumenism is the "principle or aim of promoting unity among the world's Christian Churches" (Oxford University Press, 2016). Etymologically, the term derives from Greek *Oikos*, "home." This root is the same for concepts such as *Oikos-logos:* ecology (the study of home), or *Oikos-nomos:* economy (the administration of home). 16th-century late Latin understood "oecumenical or ecumenical" as "belonging to the universal [Catholic] Church." One Roman Catholic deacon and university professor interviewed for this study termed ecumenism as "a process of bringing the separated brethren from the Catholic Church (Protestants, among others) back 'home'" (Appendix 16–796).

However, as Engelhardt (2007) has noted:

> Contemporary Christians are separated by foundationally disparate understandings of Christianity itself. Christians do not share one theology, much less a common understanding of the significance of sin, suffering, disease, and death. These foundational disagreements not only stand as impediments to an intellectually defensible ecumenism, but they also form the underpinnings of major disputes in the culture wars…(p. 25).

Yet, the "ecumenical movement" fosters unity among Christians according to opportune occasions and the needs of the Roman Church-State. These include efforts to eliminate words that complicate mutual relations between denominations and to promote dialogue between competent experts from different churches and communities (Abbott, 1989). This process means that

> little by little, as the obstacles to perfect ecclesiastical communion are overcome, all Christians will be gathered, in a common celebration of the Eucharist, into that unity of the one and only Church which Christ bestowed on His Church from the beginning. This unity, we believe, dwells in the Catholic Church as something she can never lose, and we hope that it will continue to increase until the end of time (Abbott, 1989, pp. 347-348).

The Christian desire for unity is indeed founded on the Scriptures (John 17:11). However, the downscaling to a Christendom centred exclusively on the Roman Catholic Church-State reflects a nostalgia for a monopolistic medieval Church (Agnew, 2010). This notion was expressed by Joseph Ratzinger (the former Pope Benedict XVI) when he referred to the medieval continuum from the Roman Empire to the "Holy" Roman Empire as "European identity" (Ratzinger & Pera, 2006 cited in Agnew, 2010). For Ratzinger, the Christendom *crisis* began with what he calls "Germanic Protestantism." Hence, the Protestant Reformation forcefully broke the continuity of the (Catholic) European identity and subordinated the power of the Church to the state, thus creating unholy/Catholic nation-states (Ibid). The Roman Church-State, longing to return to the monopolistic medieval Church, has therefore incessantly sought to bring back "home" the "separated brethren."

The efforts of Roman Catholicism to initiate and maintain such an ecumenical enterprise have been undeniably successful worldwide. The Encyclical *Dignitatis Humanae* has fostered ecumenical relations after Vatican II (Cook, 2012, p. 33). Although Vatican II has promoted reconciliation attitudes towards other religions, it has not "marked a huge disruption in the beliefs and practices of the [Catholic] Church" (Agnew, 2010, p. 48). In turn, historical principles (i.e. *Sola Scriptura*, *Sola Gratia* and *Sola Fide*) that initially gave rise to Protestantism—meaning literally to *Protest* against Rome's tyranny and demagogy—have

evidently capitulated today in many Protestant denominations. The following cases exemplify this phenomenon that has facilitated ecumenical relations.

Lutheranism

Roman Catholicism and the Lutheran Church have publicly and progressively agreed on several critical issues in numerous documents (i.e. Joint Declarations) with statements such as:

> This Declaration on the Way (In Via) to unity seeks to make more visible the unity we share by gathering together agreements reached on issues of church, ministry, and eucharist. This Declaration, […] is neither at the beginning nor the end of the journey toward unity (Committee on Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs, 2015, p. 1).

Particularly remarkable is the Report of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Commission on Unity — "From Conflict to Communion" — on the occasion of the Lutheran-Catholic Common Commemoration of 500 years of the Reformation in 2017. Through this joint official report, the Lutheran Church has relinquished various fundamental principles that originated five centuries ago with Martin Luther, among others the *Sola Scriptura*. Lutherans now accept statements previously inconceivable such as "The Bishop of Rome by virtue of his office is 'pastor of the whole Church'" (LG 22 as cited in LWF & PCPCU, 2013, p. 69). Likewise, in the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (June 1998), Roman Catholic and Lutheran scholars reached a consensus on the question: How is one saved? This formerly dissenting view was crucial to the Protestant Reformation—i.e. salvation by grace alone through faith in Jesus Christ alone (*Sola Gratia* and *Sola Fide*), instead of "salvation by the works" of Catholicism (Cook, 2012, p. 34; Arruñada, 2010). Furthermore, Bergoglio's (aka "Pope Francis") visit to Sweden in 2016, to commemorate the 499th anniversary of the Lutheran Reformation (Sweden, once a strongly Lutheran country and now secularised), was far more than simply a milestone in Catholicism's efforts to regain its "separated brethren."

Anglicanism

The Anglican Church's frequent reference to "the middle way between Protestantism and Catholicism" is another important example of the Protestant "homecoming." Anglican theology and practices have moved ever closer to Roman Catholicism (Abram, 2018; Doe, 2010, p. 243; Doe & Sandberg, 2010). In 2011, for instance, the Roman Catholic Church-State received seven Anglican priests and 300 members from six congregations. Several others are rapidly progressing towards full communion with Rome (Cook, 2012, p. 33).

Pentecostalism

The ecumenical contacts between the Neo-Pentecostal movement and the charismatic Catholic movement are surprisingly close. In Latin America and beyond, the classical topics of controversial theology between Catholicism and Protestantism, and between liberalism and fundamentalism, are no longer obstacles for theological re-annexation. In fact, confessional boundaries are no longer obeyed (especially in Protestantism) in practising its faith (Schäfer, 1997).

Mainline Protestantism

Mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics now share common denominators and jointly oppose secularism. Issues such "as homosexual marriages, abortion, and religion in the public square have proved to be common ground for both groups" (Cook, 2012 p.34; Miller, 2012; 2017; Colson & Neuhaus, 1995).

Mainline Protestantism (and in general, secular societies) are "amnesiac societies" (Hervieu-Léger, 1993) since "they are less and less capable of maintaining the memory that lies at the heart of their religious existence" (Hervieu-Léger, 1999, p. 80). These features are such neither because societies are increasingly rational, nor because they have "found satisfactory alternatives to the traditional forms of religion so crucial in their historical formation" (Hervieu-Léger, 1999, p. 80).

Engelhardt (2007) explains the capitulation of principles in Protestantism as a result of the secularising forces of surrounding societies. For the author, secularisation has debilitated "the historic, zealous commitment of the particular faiths to their particular founding doctrines, thus undermining the theological barriers to intercommunion" (p. 26). Popovich, an Orthodox author, has described this blend of secular thought and religious authority in the following terms:

> Ecumenism is the common name for the pseudo-Christianity of the pseudo-Churches of Western Europe. Within it is the heart of European humanism, with Papism as its head (Popovich, 1994, p. 169).

Ecumenism and Religious Freedom

The name "Protestants" derives from the protestation against the papal proposition that its hierarchy and *status quo* should be reestablished in areas where the Edict of Speyer (1526) had already enforced religious freedom. The papacy at the Diet of Speyer II (1529) postulated, among others, the majority rule in matters of faith, the banishment of the Zwinglians, and death-punishment to Anabaptists. The opposition of the reformed princes to the papal proposals was crucial to the success of the Reformation, the liberties of Germany, and the rights of conscience (Wolgast, 1996; Cook, 2012; D'Aubigne, 1862). As Wolgast (1996) noted,

> The protestation received legal status through the appeal that the Protestant princes and imperial cities lodged before two notaries in Speyer on 25 April, 1529. […] in 1529 the individual conscience was established for the first time as a norm of decisions not to be outvoted in political negotiations. Against the positive law was set the conformity of the evangelical teachings to the scriptures; the legal act of protestation presupposed a religious decision (Wolgast, 1996, 4: p. 104).

Table 11 presents parallels between Roman Catholic concepts of religious freedom at Diet of Speyer II (1529) and *Dignitatis Humanae* of Vatican II (1965), as well as the Protestant definition at the protestation of Speyer.

Catholic Definition of Religious Freedom	**Diet of Speyer II, 1529**	Protestants not forced to renounce faith	No propagation of non-Catholic teachings	Catholic juris-dictional authority retained	Celebration of Mass in Lutheran territory	No Catholic allowed to convert	Suspension of force or coercion
	***Dignitatis Humanae* of Vatican II (1965)**	Does not deny or endorse religious plurality	Does not authorise erroneous teaching	Catholic juris-dictional authority implicit	*Libertas ecclesiastica* to fulfill [Catholic] mission	No Catholic conversions allowed	Immunity from coercion as civil right
Protestant Definition of Religious Freedom	**Protestation of Speyer, 1529**	Liberty to follow one's convictions	Convictions based on God's Word	Majority not to rule over minorities	Each is to respect the other	Rights of all guaranteed by law	No coercion

Table 11: Differences between Protestant and Catholic concepts of religious freedom (adapted from Cook, 2012, pp. 158-159).

After analysing several case studies and comparing Catholic concepts of religious freedom of Diet of Speyer II (1529) and *Dignitatis Humanae* of Vatican II (1965) (See Table 11), Cook concluded:

> ... the Catholic Church has not changed its hegemonic nature, only its method of achieving hegemony. Additionally, it strongly suggests that the [Catholic] Church's efforts to arrest and counteract the Protestant Reformation (and any other religion) are far from buried in the past (Cook, 2012, p. 159).

The Protestant definition at the protestation of Speyer concurs with Martin Luther's assertion: "I will preach it, teach it, write it, but I will constrain no man by force, for faith must come freely without compulsion".[10] However, not all strands of Protestantism had equally advocated this principle of religious freedom, especially when they acted as state religions and became dominant, magisterial, and conformist. Thus, Protestant dissenters

[10] Martin Luther, "The First Sermon, March 9, 1522, Incovait Sunday," (as cited in Tappert, 2017, p. 234).

(e.g. Anabaptists) have historically suffered persecution from both Roman Catholic and magisterial Protestant churches (Miller, 2012). As a 19th-century Protestant wrote:

> Whenever the church has obtained secular power, she has employed it to punish dissent from her doctrines. Protestant churches that have followed in the steps of Rome by forming alliance with worldly powers have manifested a similar desire to restrict liberty of conscience. An example of this is given in the long-continued persecution of dissenters by the Church of England. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, thousands of nonconformist ministers were forced to flee from their churches, and many, both of pastors and people, were subjected to fine, imprisonment, torture, and martyrdom (White, 1888, p. 443).

Yet, "the dissenting Protestant view of a separated church and state, always a minority position in England and the rest of Europe, and even in early colonial America, became the dominant position in the early [American] republic" (Miller, 2012, p. xviii). Nevertheless, barriers once erected by Protestantism against ecumenism have fallen in light of Roman Catholicism advocating religious freedom for all groups in pluralistic (Protestant) societies (Cook, 2012, p. 50). However, the same religious freedom is denied to "non-Catholics in political communities where Catholics are in the majority" (Pavan, 1989, pp. 4,51). As Gill observed, regarding these variations in the pastoral strategy of the Roman Catholic Church worldwide:

> In Asia, Russia, and parts of Africa, where Catholics are a minority and relatively unencumbered by established Church bureaucracies, clergy lobby heavily for religious freedom. […] Contrast this with the Catholic Church's position in Latin America and Poland, where bishops lobby intensively for laws restricting freedom of worship […]. Consistent with the assumption of parishioner maximization, where a church is expanding rapidly it will seek laws that enhance religious liberty. Where that church is on the defensive, its leaders will try to restrict such freedom (Gill, 2013, pp. 59, 227).

Similarly, Dowling, referring to such a Machiavelism, observed nearly two centuries ago:

> There is one kind of Romanism to be exhibited in Protestant lands, and another and a widely different in Italy, Spain and other popish lands, where it reigns in its glory (Dowling, 1853, p. 626).

Consequently, it is not surprising that despite ecumenical discussions, tension still exists between Protestants and Catholics (Cook, 2012). On the one side, the Roman Catholic claim to absoluteness "has always been considered an offense and a scandal" (Pauwels, 1963, p. 585). On the other, some small dissenting Protestant denominations (so-called "sects") are reluctant to accept Roman Catholic hegemony (see the biblical reasons discussed in Section 10.4.2.1) (Miller, 2012; Miller, 2017; Cook, 2012; Taggart, 1998). After all, scepticism towards Rome is evident, as:

> Historically, the [Catholic] Church has sought to expand its resources and power in many countries. It has sought to maximize its wealth and resources and to enact laws and policies that protect it against competitors such as Protestant Christianity and other faiths (Manuel, Reardon, & Wilcox, 2006, p. 4).

Peace among religious denominations is something which is undeniably desirable. However, there is a need for caution when considering that Protestant denominations have mostly relinquished their founding principles, while "Rome never changes" as per the Italian saying. Despite the progress after Vatican II (see Section 8.2.1.2), Roman Catholicism has not markedly altered its beliefs and practices (Agnew, 2010, p. 48), or its institutional founding principles (i.e. Canon Law) since medieval times (O'Reilly & Chalmers, 2014). The political repercussions of an ecumenism in "Rome terms" are beyond its theological or religious implications. History warns of the long medieval tyranny of a fused state and Church under the Aristotelian "government by one person" and its relativistic morals, keeping the masses ignorant. Breaking such a *status quo* carried a cost of countless wars and human lives (e.g. the Thirty Years' War that led to Westphalian order) (Snyder, 2011; Agnew, 2010; Cook, 2012; Witte, 2002; Berman, 2003). Evidently, since Vatican II Roman Catholicism has become more tolerant, and thus "Europe has become ever more pluralistic religiously and thus ever less likely to be squeezed back into a singular Catholic mold" (Agnew, 2010, p. 52). Yet, the author warns:

> Surely the trend towards a medieval Church redux is something about which we all should be concerned, not least because states and other agencies will undoubtedly find themselves recruited into one side or another in new "religious wars," both rhetorical and actual (Agnew, 2010, p. 56).

10.4.1.4. Liberation Theology: A Top-Down Movement

Among others, Protestantism, modernity, secular unions, and left-wing political groups increasingly began to threaten the hegemony of the Roman Church-State in Latin America and beyond. These developments made the Roman Church-State realise (at the beginning of the 20th century) that it had overestimated its strong popular influence. Accordingly, it has endeavoured to build a "New Christendom" in Latin America since the early 1930s (Dussel 1976; Carroll 1987; Vekemans 1976 as cited in Smith, 1991). Throughout, the "New Christendom" has served as a strategy to reassure the establishment of Roman Catholicism as the major cultural and institutional influence in modernising Latin America (Smith, 1991). As part of this strategy, the Roman Church-State took the side of "modernity," 'science," and "progress" for the first time in history (Richard 1987 as cited in Smith, 1991).

Accordingly, "Catholic social teachings" and the innovations of Vatican II in the 1960s have concurred with this strategy. Other insurgent developments, including the rise of Marxism, the experience of Camilo Torres, and the Cuban revolution, brought forth a "progressive wing" of Roman Catholicism (Levine, 1981). Catholic theologians, such as Gutiérrez (1973), identified dependency theory, which emerged in the second half of the 20th century in Latin America (see Appendix 4 and Table 2), as key to understanding the region's socio-economic situation (Drexler-Dreis, 2017). Accordingly, Catholic liberation theologians came to believe that the Latin America's main problem was its dependency on dominant capitalistic oppressors, which would be solved through "liberation" rather than more "development" (Smith, 1991, p. 237). The foundational episode of liberation theology took place during the Second General Conference of the Latin American Episcopal Council (CELAM), held in Medellín, Colombia in 1968. This theology is an "elite-initiated"

revitalisation movement aiming to force "redirections in the strategies and resources" within established institutions (Smith, 1991, p. 234).

Gutiérrez is considered the "father of the Liberation Theology". He stated that its "goal is not only better living conditions, a radical change of structures, a social revolution; it is much more: the continuous creation, never ending, of a new way to be a man, a permanent cultural revolution" (Gutiérrez, 1973, p. 880). Gutiérrez tried to reconcile the Marxist ideal of an earthly, egalitarian society through revolution or insurgence with the heavenly salvation of the soul in Christian terms. These two notions are exegetically incompatible when comparing the use of violence as a means to achieve social ends with the application of biblical principles, such as those contained in the Ten Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount (see Sections 8.3.4 and 10.4.1). Furthermore, a hypothetical communist synthesis has proven not to produce desirable social results (see Section 8.3.2, Tables 4 and 7, Figure 11, Appendix 13.2, Truth Table 11). However, regarding the impact of liberation theology in Latin America, Scheper-Hughes & Scheper (2015) observe:

> Although liberation theology was never the dominant or hegemonic Catholic theology in Latin America, it was a strong and visible social movement that realigned clergy and nuns in support of the poor and those who spoke on their behalf during civil wars in Central America and military dictatorships in South America in the 1970s and 1980s. At the 1968 Medellín Conference of Latin American bishops, liberation theologians took their message further into what this might mean in terms of everyday pastoral practice. The bishops pledged themselves to a new spiritual/social contract called a "preferential option for the poor," which required the Latin American Church to detach itself from its colonial moorings and its favoritism toward the power elites, the landowning and industrial classes (Scheper-Hughes & Scheper, 2015, pp. 13-14).

As liberation theology has not been dominant in the Latin American Roman Church, its institutional impact is even less pronounced in the global Catholic Church-State. It is of particular importance that liberation theology has not produced changes in the principles of canon law (although it could have influenced its interpretation) (C. Salinas, personal

communication, April 27, 2020; J. Müller, personal communication, March 27, 2020). As Gill (1998) notes: "the presence of Catholic intellectuals proclaiming a new theology of liberation also alarmed the higher echelons of the Church" (p. 177). Likewise, Scheper-Hughes & Scheper's observation on the pledges of the Catholic hierarchy is subtly different from Gill (1998)'s mixed-methods empirical analysis based on several Latin American cases:

> In Latin America, over four centuries of monopoly rule by the Roman Catholic Church resulted in a lack of attention to pastoral concerns and a strong desire to accommodate the political elite in return for patronage and legislative support for Church teachings. When religious competitors began making significant gains among the poorest sectors of society as early as the 1930s in some countries, Church leaders had to reevaluate their traditional pastoral and political strategies. Where competition for the souls the popular classes was fierce, a pastoral strategy of a preferential option for the poor was adopted. Under authoritarian regimes that pursued policies inimical to the poor, the Church's new pastoral strategy conflicted with the interests of the military government. In order to maintain a credible commitment to serving the poor in the face of growing religious competition, Church leaders broke their traditional alliance with the political elite and opposed authoritarianism as a system of rule. Often, this opposition attracted financial contributions from human-rights organizations, which reduced the episcopacy's reliance on the state. Where competition was minimal, bishops downplayed the preferential option for the poor and sought to maintain cordial relations with military rulers so as to preserve traditional perquisites (Gill, 1998, p.71).

10.4.1.4.1. Marxism and Hegelian Dialectics in Liberation Theology

Catholic-Marxist alliances developed within the liberation theology movement quickly expanded across Latin America and beyond (Levine, 1981). Partly, due to such associations, the recalcitrant ultramontane Catholic wing (Rome, conservative bishops, and right-wing Latin American governments) have opposed liberation theology (Smith, 1991, p. 236).

To a large extent, liberation theology emerges from "Marxism's influence" (Gutiérrez, 1973, p. 9). Fierro (1977) corroborated Gutiérrez's views by arguing that this political theology results from "the incorporation of dialectical reasoning and historical materialism into Western thought" (Fierro, 1977, p. 2). Such Marxist dialectical materialism derives from Hegelian dialectics and idealism, which are based on the synthesis of opposites or contradictions (thesis–antithesis–synthesis) (Johnson, 2017, p. 157). Unconventionally applying Hegelian logic to understand the emergence of an "elite-initiated" movement like liberation theology might work as follows:

(1). Thesis. *Status quo.* The corporatist, conservative hierarchies of the Roman Church-State join forces with right-wing governments to keep society oppressed (e.g. *Opus Dei*).

(2). Antithesis. Liberation theologists use dependency theories to explain Latin America's problems in terms of external causes (e.g. by blaming industrialised, Protestant countries). The "Option for the poor" is associated with left-wing stakeholders (e.g. some Jesuit priests — consistently loyal to the pope — or Dominicans involved in the insurgency).

(3). Synthesis. The polarisation of society and escalating cycles of armed conflict (wars) are followed by peace negotiations in which the Roman Catholic Church-State serves as a mediator. *Final outcome: Maintenance of the status quo in any case (Roman Church-State hegemony).*

This example applies quite well to countries (e.g. Colombia) whose institutions are characterised by strong corporatist ideologies. In Colombia, the government has traditionally been associated with right-wing conservative forces and intransigent Roman Catholic ideologies (i.e. Vice-President Ramírez and former President Uribe among other high-ranking government officers have ties with *Opus Dei*). On the other hand, some Catholic priests were involved in the insurgency, for example, Camilo Torres and Manuel Pérez Martínez (in liberation theology-guerrilla groups like ELN). However, the Roman Catholic Church has also been directly involved as a mediator or conciliator in the Colombian armed conflict (i.e. priests like Dario Echeverri and Gabriel Izquierdo, and bishops like Augusto Castro and Nel Beltrán). In the end, the Roman Catholic Church has been directly and

indirectly involved on both sides of the conflict. As a result, the *status quo* has been maintained.

This example helps to understand that liberation theology is one strand of Roman Catholicism albeit not the principal one. In Latin America, mostly orthodox old pre-Vatican II views still prevail (Martin, 1999; Figueroa, 2016). Moreover, both wings of Roman Catholicism (right-wing corporatist and left-wing liberation theologians) conform to the Roman Church-State hierarchy (i.e. the papacy). For example, Gutiérrez was invited to the Vatican in 2015, despite Ratzinger's threat to excommunicate him in 1984 (Lamola, 2018).

The dialectic illustrated above suggests that it is doubtful whether liberation theology could lastingly affect Roman Catholic Canon law, for instance. At a practical level, the analyses proposed by liberation theologians (e.g. Gutiérrez, 1973; Boff, 1989) do not apply to everyday Catholic practice. Instead, its main triggers are mostly personal and local concerns (Martin, 1999, p. 41).

10.4.1.4.2. Liberation Theology and Protestantism

Religions evolve, and "denominations are (normatively) imagined to emerge from doctrinal disagreements" (Webster, 2019, p. 1125). Contrasting Scriptural interpretations, diverse paradigms, meanings, and other discrepancies have been the common denominator (Engelhardt, 2007) of "the ethnographic reality of Protestant schismogenesis" (Webster, 2019, p. 1125). Furthermore, Christian traditions have changed over time and vary among denominations, while the Scriptural texts have remained largely unaffected by time for centuries (i.e. King James or Martin Luther versions). Engelhardt (2007) observed a decisive influence of philosophy and secularism in this respect:

> The mainline Christian churches of the West through importing philosophical rationality into their doing of theology over time transformed their theologies in terms of the demands of the secular culture. After all, if one borrows the logic or rationality of one's theology from philosophy, one will incrementally transform theology into the image and likeness of the surrounding secular culture, since

philosophy always carries the mark of a particular age and culture (Engelhardt, 2007, p. 29).

Consequently, liberation theology has influenced Protestant theologians (e.g. Bonino, 1976) and especially some Pentecostal movements (Sepúlveda, 2009). Moreover, the religious experiences of Pentecostals and Catholic Charismatics are very similar (Self, 2009). Table 12 presents the similarities and differences between some features of reading the Bible in historical and present-day currents of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.

Current features of reading the Bible	**1. Traditional Roman Catholicism (i.e. pre-Vatican II views valid until today)**	**2. Roman Catholic Liberation Theologians (i.e. CEC [Catholic ecclesial communities]). (1960s – today)**	**3. 16th-19th century mainline Protestantism (i.e. Lutheranism, Calvinism), and some current dissenting Protestant "sects".**	**4. Current strand of most contemporary Protestants (e.g. Pentecostals, Neo-Pentecostals)[11]**
Theological understanding	Excessive sacralisation of some selected parts of the Gospel and complete disregard of others.	No exegesis but "eisegesis" (seeking a theological justification for social struggle).	Theological-scientific rationalist reading of the Scriptures.	Literal, uncritical, and commonly superficial exegesis.
Human capital building	Ordinary people receive no education to study the Scriptures.	Ordinary people receive little or no education to study the Scriptures.	Ordinary people receive proper education to study the Scriptures (i.e. commonly required for in-depth intertextual exegesis).	Ordinary people receive little or no education to study the Scriptures.
Bearers of the message	- Only enlightened clergy are able to read the Scriptures. - Common people are prevented direct access to the Scriptures.	Mainly priests and deacons.	"Priesthood of all believers."	Mainly preachers, pastors, apostles.
Social emancipation objective	Maintainance of the political-religious *status quo* (e.g. Middle Ages)	Social revolution against oppressive political structures (e.g. government, capital) generally maintaining deference for the	Liberation from the Roman Catholic Church-State and popish tyranny (regarded as "diabolical"). Generally, deference	Mostly apolitical or indifferent

[11] This strand of Protestantism is typical of the 20th century onwards and currently constitutes the majority of Protestants worldwide (Todd & Zurlo, 2016; Sharpe, 2014; Bowler, 2010), (see Section 10.4.3).

		Roman Catholic hierarchy.	to government institutions.	
Sources of understanding the Scriptures	Origenes, Aristotle, Aquinas	Origenes, Aristotle, Aquinas, Marx	*Sola Scriptura* intertextuality (i.e. Luther, Calvin)	Depends on denomination (i.e. some can adopt Origenes' allegorical interpretations in combination with Lutheran principles)
Direction and impact of reading the Bible in the "earthly kingdom."	No reading. Biblical message exclusively supports established dogmas.	Politicisation of the biblical message (from life to the Bible).	Transformational, cyclical (personal and social). Bidirectional (from the Bible to life and from life to the Bible).	Spiritualisation of the biblical message (from the Bible to life).

Table 12: Ways of reading the Bible in traditional Roman Catholicism, Liberation Theology (post-Vatican II), historical Protestantism, and Pentecostalism (adapted from Sepúlveda, 2009; Becker & Woessmann, 2009; Becker, Pfaff, & Rubin, 2016; McCleary, 2013; Witte, 2002; Woodberry, 2012).

The religious currents shown in Table 12 coexist today. However, each has prevailed more than others in different historical periods. For example, currents 1 and 3 (traditional Roman Catholicism and historical Protestantism) have been antagonists and dominant since the 16th century (even earlier in the case of Roman Catholicism). Currents 2 and 4 (Catholic Liberation theologians and Pentecostals) appeared in the second half of the 20th century and share various features of understanding the Bible.

For many Catholic ecclesial and Pentecostal communities in Latin America, the Bible has long been the first contact with the printed word. Many people have even learned to read with the Bible, which has a deep meaning for those trapped in social and cultural exclusion (Sepúlveda, 2009).

However, vast differences exist when comparing Catholic ecclesial and Pentecostal communities with historical Protestantism (Köhrsen, 2017). First, what Catholic authors call "critical" Bible reading (Gutierrez 1973, p. 13) follows the same interpretative principles of traditional Roman Catholicism (i.e. the allegorical interpretation passed on by Origenes, Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas). Thus, the Old Catholic dogmas are maintained based on superficial reading without either exegesis or proper consideration of intertextual factors.

The so-called "critical" reading of the Bible, advocated by liberation theologians, favours direct social and political revolution (including insurgence) (Gutiérrez, 1973, p. 69; Levine, 1981, p. 35). Saying that, revolution or insurgence illustrates the rejection of Christian Scriptural principles, such as the "love of one's enemies" proclaimed by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5: 38-48). In turn, the Scriptural principles rejected by liberation theologians formed the basis of Protestant legal revolutions in the past (e.g. German, Scandinavian, American; see Section 8.3.4 and Table 6). Therefore, the principles that Liberation theology seeks to implement in society concur more with the communist law tradition (in societies like Cuba) than with the Protestant revolutions (i.e. common law, German law, Scandinavian law) (see Section 8.3.2 and Tables 4 and 7).

Another critical issue of comparison is the "liberation of what" proposed by the different currents. Liberation theologians advocate freeing societies from "sinful" "oppressive social, economic, and political structures" (Levine, 1981, p. 39). In light of dependency theory, this would mean, among others, liberation from colonial exploitation in Latin America (formerly from the Spanish crown and later from the foreign capital of Protestant countries (e.g. England, United States; see Gutierrez, 1973, Galeano, 1971, and Appendix 4). However, dependency analysis disregards the hegemonic relations between the Roman Catholic Church-State and the states, or upholds these, or even praises them as positive (Galeano, 1971, p. 247).

On balance, liberation theology is ahistorical (Lamola, 2018). It began as a top-down approach within the Roman Catholic hierarchy rather than a bottom-up initiative from the communities. It applies dependency theory to direct attention away from two millennia of Roman (and Catholic) hegemony towards Iberian imperialism, and especially of Protestant countries (e.g. US, UK). Moreover, it inspires the use of violence or rebellion as a means of resolving social inequality based on dubious and relativistic moral principles consistent with Number 2321 of the Roman Catholic Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vatican, 2018; see also Section 10.4.1).

In contrast, the ideology of historical Protestantism allowed the Reformers to identify the papacy as "the Man of Sin" (see Section 10.4.2.1 and 2 Thessalonians). Such identification was based on in-depth exegesis by historic Protestants, who applied the *Sola Scriptura*

principle. Thus, only Jesus sets humankind free from bondage (John 8: 31-38). Rebellious means against governments should be avoided (1 Timothy 2:1-2; 1 Peter 2:17; Romans 13:1). Therefore, the successive Protestant revolutions sought to eliminate the pervasive influence of the Roman Church-State in favour of power independent from Rome (at first by empowering the monarchies and then gradually also citizens; Section 8.3.4).

10.4.2. Protestant Theology

When acknowledging the robust systematic evidence on the underlying effect of religion on corruption, authors refer to this as "unfortunate" from a policy perspective (Woodruff, 2006, p. 121) or that it provides "little inspiration to reform" (Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 17). However, when Martin Luther formulated his 95 theses, he was protesting against the rampant corruption and tyranny of the Roman Catholic Church five centuries ago. The resultant movement resumed and advanced the discontent for which the Waldensians, Wycliffe, Tyndale, Hus, and many others had previously been condemned, often sacrificing their lives. The Protestant Reformation sought to return and democratise the original teachings of the Bible, which rested on the *Sola Scriptura* principle, throughout Europe and beyond (Witte, 2002, Doe & Sandberg, 2010; Becker et al., 2016). As shown (Sections 8.2.2 and 8.3.4), the Protestant reformations had various spillover effects, including the spread of democracy, liberalism, secularisation, and the formation of the modern sovereign state (Woodberry, 2012; Snyder, 2011; Agnew, 2010; Shah & Philpott, 2011; Philpott, 2001; Hurd, 2011; Berger, 1990; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Treisman, 2000).

Sola Scriptura implies that the Bible alone is a sufficient and infallible rule of life. Consequently, "Protestants generally stress one's personal relationship with God, while the Catholic Church emphasizes priestly mediation" (Gill, 1998, p. 90). *Sola Scriptura* means that the Holy Scriptures are the only and absolute standardising moral source of Christian principles (historical Protestantism), in contrast to Roman Catholic relativism (see 10.4.1). Therefore, Arruñada (2010) found that Protestants statistically "display a stronger 'social ethic' that would lead them to monitor each other's conduct, support political and legal institutions and hold more homogeneous values" (p. 890). Specifically, the *Sola Scriptura*

principle enabled historical Protestants to hold more homogenous values, including a universal charity descending from the Gospel (instead of a selective one) (Arruñada, 2010). As Elisha Williams, the 18th-century American theologian and founder of Yale University, observed:

> That the sacred scriptures are the alone rule of faith and practice to a Christian, all Protestants are agreed in, and must therefore inviolably maintain, that every Christian has a right of judging for himself what he is to believe and practice in religion according to that rule (Williams, 1998, p. 55).

The very Protestant characteristic of the freedom of conscience initiated several reformations in different countries (Berman, 2003), thus creating a broad range of successive diverse denominations (Sections 8.3.4, 10.4.1.4.2, 10.4.2, and 10.4.3).

10.4.2.1. Theological Reasons for Traditional Protestant Anti-clericalism

"My dear brothers never forget, when you hear the progress of the Enlightenment praised, that the Devil's cleverest ploy is to persuade you that he does not exist"

(Charles Baudelaire, 1862, *Le Spleen de Paris*)

Historical Protestants sincerely believed that the Roman Church-State is the "synagogue of Satan"[12] based on an intertextual historicist interpretation of the Bible (see Table 13). Some Protestant denominations still adhere to intertextual historicist biblical interpretation and hold the belief that the papacy continues to be "Satan's synagogue" today (see Section 10.4.2.2).

Their historicist study of the Book of Revelation provided the Reformers with an influential picture of the history of the Church. This interpretation had consistently allowed Reformers from different epochs and countries to discern "the hidden diabolism of the Roman faith" (Johnstone, 2006, p. 50).

Protestants have long interpreted the Book of Revelation (especially Chapter 13) along with the Book of Daniel in the Old Testament (especially Chapters 7–8) (Boxall & Tresley, 2016, p. 4). Such a historicist study has allowed Protestant eschatologists to identify the pope as the Antichrist. This view arises from symbolically associating a persecutory political-religious power (the Roman Church-State) with the beast whom the dragon (Satan) gives his power, seat, and great authority in Revelation 13 (Boxall & Tresley, 2016, p. 4; Johnstone, 2006, p. 55).

Table 13 shows examples of prominent Protestant thinkers who shared similar theological conclusions. The interpretation of the popery (Roman Church-State) as the deceiving power from Satan on earth (Babylon-Beast-Harlot) was practically universal among Protestants.

[12] Derived from the Book of Revelation. "It expressed the insidious subversion Protestants believed to lie behind Catholic false doctrine and empty piety – a church that appeared Christian was in fact its opposite" (Johnstone, 2006, p. 4).

This interpretation was prevalent regardless of the historical and political contexts in which Protestants lived until the 19th century (Gregg, 1997).

	Biblical text	
"Man of Sin" or "Antichrist" (2 Thessalonians 2); or	"Let no man deceive you by any means: for *that day shall not come*, except there come a falling away first, and that *man of sin* be revealed, the son of perdition; who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; so that he as God sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God" (2 Thessalonians 2: 3-4).	
"the beast" (Revelation 13)	"And *the beast* which I saw was like unto a leopard, and his feet were as the feet of a bear, and his mouth as the mouth of a lion: *and the dragon gave him his power, and his seat, and great authority*. And I saw one of his heads as it were wounded to death; and his deadly wound was healed: and all the world wondered after the beast" (Revelation 13: 2-3).	
or "The great harlot" (Revelation 17)	"[…] and I saw a woman sit upon a scarlet-colored beast, full of names of blasphemy, having seven heads and ten horns. And the woman was arrayed in purple and scarlet color, and decked with gold and precious stones and pearls, having a golden cup in her hand full of abominations and filthiness of her fornication: and upon her forehead was a name written, MYSTERY, BABYLON THE GREAT, THE MOTHER OF HARLOTS AND ABOMINATIONS OF THE EARTH. And I saw the woman drunken with the blood of the saints, and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus" (Revelation 17: 3-5). "And the woman which thou sawest is that great city, which reigneth over the kings of the earth" (Revelation 17: 18).	
Eschatological Interpretation	**Papacy/ Roman Catholic Church**	
Interpreted by	**Martin Luther (1517 onwards)**	German Reformer and theologian
	Huldrych Zwingli (1519 onwards)	Swiss Reformer and theologian
	John Calvin (1536 onwards)	French Reformer and founder of the University of Geneva
	Roger Williams (1644 onwards)	American promoter of the separation of church and state
	John Wesley (1728 onwards)	English theologian and co-founder of Methodism
	Isaac Newton (1733 onwards)	English Mathematician, physical scientist, philosopher
	Elisha Williams (1744 onwards)	American theologian and founder of Yale University

Note: Author's italics

Table 13: Typical association of the papacy with the "Man of Sin," the Antichrist, beast and harlot according to biblical interpretations of notable Protestant intellectuals (1500-1800) (adapted from Boxall & Tresley, 2016; Hoffmann, 2015; Hartman, Böcher, Benrath, Seebaß, & et al., 2002; Stefanovic, 2009; Taggart, 1998; Williams, 1998; Newton, 1733; Luther, 1532).

The identification of the Roman Church-State as the Antichrist (or the papacy, in the interpretation of the two beasts in Revelation 13) was widespread among Protestants of different denominations (Table 13). The Geneva Bible attests to the interpretation of the

Revelation in the early Calvinist tradition and offers a typical example of historicist interpretation. Furthermore, the extensive use of this particular interpretation of the books of Revelation and Daniel is evident in Protestant writings, especially until the 19th century (Boxall & Tresley, 2016, p. 9).

The first generation of Reformers (and other Protestants) were disillusioned Roman Catholics who converted and admitted "that Catholicism was a very convincing fake" (Johnstone, 2006, p. 41). The Protestant understanding of the diabolical character of Roman Catholicism thus also resulted from the notion that the popery embodies a direct (but hidden) inversion of Christianity (p.41). For example, Roman Catholic worship involves disguising pagan rituals and hence, covering "them with the 'manners' of Christianity" (Calfhill as cited in Johnstone, 2006, p. 48). The veneration of icons explicitly forbidden in the Decalogue (Tables 6 and 10) illustrates this point, as it ultimately constitutes idolatry. However, Roman Catholicism still promotes this practice, thus suppressing this Commandment in the Catechism (Table 10). Johnstone described "Protestant attempts to comprehend the corruption of traditional Catholicism" (p. 27) during the English Reformation in these terms:

> [Protestants] adopted a long-established heretical association of the Pope with Antichrist, and behind Antichrist lay the Devil, the guiding hand of apocalyptic subversion. […] In effect Catholicism might be a parody, a contradiction of everything sacred to the true faith. But this was hidden behind a pious gloss which had hoodwinked millions into their own eternal destruction. Nor were its victims naive or ignorant; many learned and zealous Christians continued to believe in the veracity of the Roman church (Johnstone, 2006, p. 27).

Furthermore, dissenting and nonconformist Protestants "took reformist arguments a stage further by claiming that de facto Satanism was inherent in *any* national church" and "at the heart of government" (Johnstone, 2006, pp. 254, 188). As an 18th-century Protestant wrote:

> There is no reason to consider the antichristian spirit and practices to be confined to that which is now called the Church of Rome. The Protestant churches have

> much of antichrist in them, and are far from being wholly reformed from […] corruptions and wickedness (Hopkins, 1972 [1794], p. 328)

The Reformers' belief that Roman Catholicism was the Church of Satan also relied on recognising "the Devil's power to disguise himself within Christian piety" (Johnstone, 2006, p. 41). This is evident in the following Bible verses:

> And the great dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world: he was cast out into the earth, and his angels were cast out with him (Revelation 12: 9);

> And no marvel; for Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light (2 Corinthians 11: 14).

The Old Testament Book of Isaiah contains a complementary reference to the intertextual references to the successive kingdoms (beasts) and Satan (Lucifer) in the books of Revelation (NT) and Daniel (OT):

> that thou shalt take up this proverb against the king of Babylon, and say, How hath the oppressor ceased! the golden city ceased! (Isaiah 14: 4);

> How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning! how art thou cut down to the ground, which didst weaken the nations! (Isaiah 14: 12).

The Prophet Isaiah associates the king of Babylon with an oppressive power and a golden city. Later, Isaiah links this system to Lucifer, who *weakens the nations* (a statement that touches on the core of this study). The Book of Daniel (in parallel to the Book Revelation) also interrelates (symbolically as beasts or as a statue) the successive, Satanic powers of Babylon, Medo-Persia, Greece, and finally Rome. The latter inherited parts of the preceding civilisations (e.g. Greek philosophy, Babylonian rituals) (Radmacher, Allen, & House, 1999; Taggart, 1998). The power of Rome persists to this day through its influence on all legal systems worldwide (Section 8.3) and through the Roman Church-State (i.e. the weakening of nations).

For William Tyndale, the papacy had accepted Satan's temptation: "The kingdoms of the earth and the glory of them, which Christ refused" in the desert (Tyndale, The Practice of Prelates, pp. 274–5 as cited in Johnstone, 2006, p. 54). As a result of this arrangement, the papacy shall worship the devil by adopting his role as "Satan's vicar," who corrupts religion. Therefore, the papacy "took up in the like manner all Christendom on high, and brought them from the meekness of the Christ unto the high hill of the pride of Lucifer" (p. 54).

10.4.2.2. Current Protestant Views on the Papacy

The Roman Catholic counter-reformation had attempted to shift attention away from intertextual historicist biblical prophecy since the 16th century. Spaniard Jesuits developed a Futurist School (e.g. Francisco de Ribera) and a Preterist School (e.g. Luisz de Alcasar) as alternatives to historicist eschatology. Both schools removed any reference to Rome from prophecy and contradicted the Reformers' linking of the Antichrist with the papacy and with Babylon as the Roman Church-State. The Futurist view stands for a biblical prophecy to be fulfilled in the future, while the Preterists advocate a prophecy already fulfiled in the 1st century (Johnson, 1981).

Consequently, since the 16th century, neither a monolithic nor a unified explanation for biblical prophecy has existed in Roman Catholicism but contrasting opposites (Futurism versus Preterism). However, neither view makes any reference whatsoever to the papacy in biblical prophecy, as opposed to historical Protestantism. This constitutes a Hegelian dialectical strategy common among Jesuits (similar to the one described in section 10.4.1.4).

Preterist views have gained much scholarly attention even among modern Protestant writers. The suppression of the Papal states in the 19th century and Roman Catholicism's loss of power (Section 8.3.4.5) have ushered in Preterist views even more vehemently (Johnson, 1981; Taggart, 1998). Thus, the Reformers' *intertextual historicist interpretation* has only few followers today. However, for some remaining Protestant intertextual historicist interpreters, the apparent weakening of Roman Catholicism after the French Revolution (i.e. as a deadly wound) has partially fulfiled the Revelation (Cook, 2012); (Taggart, 1998):

> And I saw one of his heads as it were wounded to death; and his deadly wound was healed: and all the world wondered after the beast (Revelation 13: 3).

Therefore, even after the successful introduction of the counter-reformation dialectic (Futurism and Preterism), some Protestant denominations still adhere to intertextual historicist interpretation today. Examples of this small group include conservative Lutherans (Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 2018), historical and Restorationist denominations, and the Seventh-day Adventists (SDA) (Taggart, 1998; Bacchiocchi, 2002).

10.4.3. Pentecostalism

The broad diversity of Protestant denominations and sects today makes it difficult to generalise their separate contributions, let alone capture these in a single study. However, distinct Protestant theologies and organisational forms have led to distinct outcomes (Manow, 2002; Woodberry, 2012). For example, while Lutherans pioneered the development of the welfare state, some other currents of Protestantism (e.g. Calvinists, Baptists) slowed this down (Manow, 2002). Another clear example is the asymmetrical emphases on higher education: Calvinists typically make greater educational efforts than other Protestant missionaries, and Pentecostals even less than other Protestant missionaries. Therefore, new forms of Protestantism (i.e. Pentecostalism) placing less emphasis on education are less likely to have a positive social impact than previous Protestant versions (Woodberry, 2012, pp. 251-269).

Pentecostalism "has always been a distinctively African strand of Christianity, mediated through African American culture" (MacRobert, cited in Sharpe 2014, p. 173). Likewise, Pentecostalism partly originated "as one of the ways that Africans responded to the missionary structures and appropriated the message" (Kalu, 2008, p. viii).

The next figures show the growth trends of Protestantism worldwide. Pentecostalism has been the fast-growing and most influential "movement" in recent decades and now includes the majority of Protestants:




Figure 6: Protestants by continent and the share of the largest Protestant movements in the world today (Todd & Zurlo 2016). Used with permission of the authors.

Africa, Asia, and Latin America have the largest Protestant populations today. However, Protestantism is a relatively young phenomenon in those continents, where the influence of Pentecostal and Neo-Pentecostal denominations dominates. The Edinburgh World Missionary Conference of 1910 marked a milestone in the spreading of Protestantism through missionary work on those continents (Figure 6) (Todd & Zurlo, 2016).

Today, Pentecostal movements focus their efforts on the eschatological urgency of conversion and invest little in developing human capital (McCleary, 2013); (Becker et al., 2016, p. 11). Moreover, Pentecostal theologies are often removed from the historical tradition of the Bible, unlike historical Protestantism. However, Pentecostal movements are extremely varied, making generalisation difficult (Spittler, 2009, p. 66). Nonetheless, the positive

social impact of Pentecostalism compared to historical Protestantism is small. For example, Pentecostalism invests little in human development and thus achieves merely low institutional impact (e.g. educational and medical facilities) (McCleary, 2013); (Woodberry, 2012); (Becker et al., 2016).

10.4.3.1.The Influence of Pentecostalism in Latin America

The increasing number of Protestant denominations from a wide range of currents affects every country differently. Schäfer (2006) devised a comprehensive model and various typologies to classify large Christian groups and their ideologies in Latin America (pp. 58-60). Until 1970, more than 90 per cent of the total population in Latin America were still Roman Catholics. By 2014, this share had decreased to nearly 70 per cent (Protestants: 19%; unaffiliated: 8% in 2014) (Pew Research Center, 2014) Currently, almost one out of five Latin Americans is Protestant (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 62). As stated, the presence of Protestantism has been crucial in creating competition with the Roman Catholic Church-State and has thus initiated democratic and human capital processes (see Sections 7.b, 8.2.1.2, and 9) (Gill, 2013; Gill, 1998; Woodberry, 2012; Becker et al., 2016). As Gill observed in his mixed-methods empirical analysis:

> At a minimum, competitive pressure by Protestants from below persuaded bishops to rethink their traditional neglect of the popular classes. In many cases, Protestant influences actually helped shape the Church's new preferential option for the poor. Given the Church's major presence in the Latin American political arena, this shift in pastoral method had important political ramifications, notably a growing opposition to policies and regimes that hurt the interests of the popular classes (Gill, 1998, p. 80).

However, nearly two-thirds of Protestants in Latin America are now Pentecostal (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 62). The Pentecostal and Evangelical experience has not been as favourable in Latin America compared to the influence of historical Protestantism after the Reformation (e.g. in Germany, England, and the rest of Northern Europe and North

America) (Witte, 2002; Woodberry, 2012; Becker et al., 2016; Berman, 2003; Snyder, 2011; Martin, 1999).

In Latin America, no body of legal norms exists "to promote as the basis for an Evangelical society" (Martin, 1999, p. 41). In contrast with Roman Catholicism, Evangelicals are not very influential politically and "are highly unlikely to acquire serious influence in Latin America" (Martin, 1999, p. 40). Most Evangelical parties could not achieve visible political relevance, although more recently, the civic engagement of Evangelicals has increased in Latin America (Zilla, 2020). Recent examples of heads of state who have either been Evangelicals or supported by Evangelical movements include Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Jimmy Morales in Guatemala, and Manuel López Obrador in Mexico (Zilla, 2020).

Yet, Latin American Protestants have no recourse to historical norms that have been worked out over centuries of experience in politics and law and that may thus serve them as guides (unless they consider German, English, Scandinavian, or North American Protestant experiences). Instead, what Protestants have followed in Latin America "are the established practices of corporatism and clientage" (p. 40). As a result, they have often fallen into the same corrupt behaviour as traditional politicians (Helmsdorff, 1996; Schäfer, 2006). Moreover, in Latin America "…the contrast between Evangelicals and Catholics is really not so great" (Martin, 1999, p. 41). Due to the absence of high-status ecclesiastics and religious intellectuals, who might, moreover, deploy sophisticated norms, Latin American Protestants are "equipped with little more than native good sense and the limited inferences they can draw from the Bible" (Martin, 1999, p. 40).

10.4.3.2. The Prosperity Gospel (PG) as a mainly Pentecostal contemporary phenomenon

While previous subsections have analysed the influence of historical Christian denominations on prosperity, this subsection considers a more contemporary phenomenon that is widespread: the Prosperity Gospel (PG).

The Theology of Prosperity or Prosperity Gospel (PG) is a trans-denominational, transnational doctrine, which is closely linked to the Charismatic Movement and Pentecostal Christianity. PG teachings spread the idea that "wealth is a sign of God's blessing and is compensation for prayer and for giving beyond the minimum tithe to one's church, televangelists, or other religious causes" (Koch, 2009, p. 1).

Likewise, Harrison (2005), defines PG as "a relational community of believers, voluntary organizations, fellowships, conferences, and ministries loosely defined by a shared doctrine, a network without definite leader or governing body" (p. 14). Key features of PG are its alignment with growing numbers of churches and megachurches in urban centres and the embracement of mass media and postmodern, consumerist capitalist values. The founding moment of the PG movement has been identified in the "healing revivals" of the post-World War II period in the United States. Subsequently, PG expanded as a doctrine to multiple denominations in different countries, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Sharpe, 2014; Bowler, 2010).

10.4.3.2.1. PG origins: syncretism with African rituals and New Thought movement

Syncretic origins of PG in the USA

PG is a mainly Protestant movement comprising three distinct though intersecting streams: Pentecostalism, New Thought, and African American religion (Bowler, 2010). The following paragraphs describe each of these three streams of the PG amalgamation.

Strand 1: Pentecostalism and preceding forms of Protestantism

PG has been the fastest-growing strand of Pentecostalism since the 1980s. However, it also has deeper roots in the longer history of Protestant promotion of capitalistic ideas stemming from the 19th-century (e.g. Wesleyan Methodism) (Towns, 2008; Sharpe 2014; Bowler, 2010). Yet, unlike previous Protestant forms that elevated capitalist accumulation and asceticism (e.g. Calvinism), PG more strongly emphasises the consumption and immodest achievement of economic goods (Lingenthal, 2012, p. 55; Sharpe, 2014, p. 166; Miller, 2007).

Strand 2: New Thought and white Protestantism

PG has also been significantly influenced by "white Protestant amalgamations of magical-religious practices" (Bowler, 2010, p. 46), which include a miasma of mental magic, bursting with Transcendentalism, Spiritualism, Free Masonry, and New Thought (Bowler, 2010, p. 28). Concurrently, Butler (2009) asserts that PG is a "hybrid" of religious capitalism "that has its roots in 19th century thinkers like E.W. Kenyon and 20th century purveyors like Norman Vincent Peale, and Oral Roberts" (p.2).

McConnell (1988) also claims that Kenneth Hagin (one of the recognised founding fathers of the PG in the United States) is directly indebted to the ideas of Essek William Kenyon. Likewise, other leading PG preachers and televangelists, such as Kenneth Copeland, Frederick Price, Don Gassett, and others have been linked with Kenyon's teachings. Kenyon is, in turn, closely associated with the 19th-century American New Thought movement, which leans heavily on parapsychology (Sharpe, 2014, p. 169). Therefore, McConnell presents PG as a cult-like sect, with deeply non-Christian roots (Sharpe, 2014, pp. 168-169). Equally, Koch (2009) argues that PG proponents "universally admit that the principles they set forth work for Christians and non-Christians alike" (p. 8). For Koch, PG teachings are more closely connected with the secular self-help movement than with those of traditional orthodox Christianity.

The metaphysical New Thought movement emphasises the power of the individual's mind to transform thought and speech into tangible blessings (i.e. wealth, health, happiness). This positive thinking stream found "a comfortable home inside mainline Protestantism" engendering the recognisable Gospels of wealth (PG) and health (Bowler, 2010, pp. 27, 52).

Strand 3: African American Protestantism

PG also found a comfortable home within black Protestantism (especially in congregations of Methodists and Baptists) in the first half of the 20th century in the United States. This amalgamation can also be seen as a historical recapitulation of pervasive and persistent Pentecostal and New Thought combinations in African American Protestantism (Bowler, 2010, p. 46).

This time, however, early PG combined with African-derived traditions (e.g. hoodoo, voodoo) that resulted in cross-pollination and "black appropriation of predominately white metaphysical religion". Black theologies, thus, further spread Spiritualism, focusing on the importance of material blessings (Bowler, 2010, p. 50).

The previous paragraphs have shown the syncretic origins of PG, especially with African American roots and New Thought in the United States. Yet, when PG globalised, the movement continued its syncretism with indigenous traditions of other regions, such as Latin America (Miller, 2007, pp. 24-5). However, it is also important to highlight that Pentecostalism tends to preserve but also demonise the beliefs in indigenous traditions and "spirits" as "representatives of the devil" (Robbins, 2004, pp. 128-9; Sharpe, 2014, p. 173)

10.4.3.2.2.General Criticisms of PG

Nearly all aspects of PG's teachings and practices have been intensely criticised. The most obvious concern that critical social scientists express is that PG "exploits growing numbers amongst the world's most vulnerable populations, taking in tithes from the poorest and offering in exchange only false hope and inflated promises of miracle healings and untold economic abundance" (Sharpe, 2014, p. 174). Other criticisms depict PG as an "evangelical-neoliberal machine" (Connolly, 2009), where PG is the spiritual articulation that promotes and reinforces neoliberalism (Wrenn, 2019). This neoliberal portray of PG describes the invisible forces of the market as "evidence" of God's hand (Wrenn, 2019, p. 430). Others describe PG as a US American-led conspiracy to propagate capitalism and consumerism and ruin traditional forms of life in the global South (Robbins, 2004; Coleman, 2002; Kyle, 2006; Sharpe, 2014). However, all these criticisms need to be balanced against the empirical evidence.

The following subsections will analyse some of the most contentious issues that increase criticism of PG.

Corruption

Leading figures of the PG movement have been repeatedly questioned or charged with financial misconduct and mismanagement. Thus, PG is also known through a series of scandals in different countries, including the USA, Brazil, and other Latin American and African nations (Zilla, 2020, p. 19-20; Lingenthal, 2012, p. 22; Sharpe, 2014, p. 168; Jenkins, 2006, p. 106;).

Political engagement

PG, and Pentecostal churches in particular, have been notably linked with having supported right-wing political forces (e.g. Bolsonaro in Brazil, Uribe in Colombia, Trump in the USA) or even oppressive political regimes, such as Pinochet in Chile (Zilla, 2020; Sharpe; Bastian, 1993; Martin, 1990). However, several empirical studies do not show a necessary association between far-right conservative parties and Pentecostals in different contexts. Instead, the empirical findings point to church adherents tending to vote in parallel with other members of their social classes (Koch 2009; Sharpe 2014; Martin, 1990; Robbins, 2004).

10.4.3.2.3.Theological criticisms of PG

No theological consensus exists regarding the genealogy of PG. However, theologians and other critics, often from within Pentecostalism and other Christian groups, describe PG as an idolatry of money with heretical teachings that deviate from the central sense of the Gospel (i.e. salvation and love) (Harrison, 2005; Sharpe, 2014). Yet, PG preachers often contend that "Jesus' death and resurrection abolished not only sin and disease, but also poverty" (Bowler, 2010, p. 104).

Indeed, several reasons permit critics to consider PG as "a betrayal of the cross". The most obvious question is how Christians can openly pursue economic wealth if the Bible depicts

Christ as a "…despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief…" (Isaiah 53:3), who announced that "It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God" (Matthew 19:24).

Yet, PG preachers provide several arguments in defence of wealth, often relying on "proof-texting" biblical passages removed from their textual and historical context (i.e. superficial exegesis) (Barron, 1987; Koch, 2009; Sharpe, 2014). For instance, PG believers often portray Jesus as a rich—rather than an ascetic—figure by using as arguments passages such as the following:

- The visit of the wise men would imply that Jesus attracted prosperity from the day he was born (Dollar, cited in Bowler, 2010, p. 105): "…they saw the young child with Mary his mother, and fell down, and worshipped him: and when they had opened their treasures, they presented unto him gifts; gold, and frankincense, and myrrh" (Matthew 2:11).
- The dividing of Jesus' garments among the soldiers at his crucifixion could suggest that they were valuable (Dollar, cited in Bowler, 2010, p. 105): "Then the soldiers, when they had crucified Jesus, took his garments, and made four parts, to every soldier a part; and also his coat: now the coat was without seam, woven from the top throughout" (John 19:23).
- The ability to travel and feed the multitudes on several occasions (e.g. John 6), and even having Judas as treasurer (e.g. John 13:29), would attest to Jesus' wealth (Blake, cited in Sharpe 2014, p. 165; Koch 2009 p.1).

PG believers often claim that the traditional austere portrayals of the suffering Christ are incorrect or outdated. However, Christian theologians of differing denominations have criticised PG literalist interpretations as "faulty, over-simplistic readings of scripture" (Sharpe, 2014, p. 168), or as "twisting Bible verses out of context to suit their own self-help philosophy" (Horton, 2009, p. 4). A lack of a deep exegesis often excludes or minimises the importance of other conflicting passages for the PG beliefs that clearly indicate Christ's ascetic life, *inter alia*:

> And Jesus said unto him, Foxes have holes, and birds of the air *have* nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay *his* head (Luke 9:58; original emphases);
>
> Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary…? (Mark 6:3);
>
> Jesus answered, My kingdom is not of this world… (John 18:36)

As critic theologians have observed,

> "There is much in the Bible that connects the right relation with God to prosperity" (Cobb, 2009). "Yet there is little equivocation in its [the Bible's] core message that the good life is not one dened by material acquisition and ostentatious consumption but by purposeful acts motivated by generosity and concern for others" (Dillon, 2009).

In this sense, one of the most contentious theological issues that raise controversy is related to the tithes and offerings that the faithful contribute to their congregations:

Tithes

Tithing is a practice that involves giving at least 10% of one's gross income to the believer's Church, or related charities. The promise is that believers will get a hundredfold return from unexpected sources (Butler, 2009; Sharpe, 2014). Thus, the faithful see tithing "as an investment that pays off" (Zilla, 2020, p. 18).

PG believers base tithing in a myriad of biblical passages that certainly support giving in diverse contexts. However, the practice has been associated with PG preachers' misuse and corruption scandals (Sharpe, 2014). In the United States, PG churches, such as Creflo Dollar's World Changers, for instance, even verify that members have paid their full tithes by asking them to submit tax records and keep detailed financial reports (Bowler, 2010, p. 115). In Brazil, surveys show that 52% of PG adherents (Evangelicals) tithe to their congregations vis-à-vis 34% of Catholics that contribute in some way to their Church (Corrêa, 2013). However, the Roman Catholic Church still receives subsidies or financial benefits from the Brazilian state ("institutional tithes") despite "the principle of equality laid down in the Brazilian Constitution" (Zilla 2020, p. 21).

Nevertheless, tithing is not new or exclusive of the PG movement, but this principle has been applied in diverse ways, in virtually all Judeo-Christian traditions, since ancient times (e.g. Plumptre, 1818). Surprisingly, the systematic study of tithing has received little scholarly attention, as Murray (2011) observes,

> Almost absent from this smooth and rapid transition of tithing from the established churches to the free churches is any careful examination of the history of tithing, any reflection on the persistent complaints about the injustice of the tithing system within that history, and any critical engagement with historical attempts to interpret the biblical and theological foundations upon which tithing supposedly rests (p. 5).

The role of giving and tithing in the Scriptures is too voluminous to be considered in its full extent in this study. However, Budiselić (2015) has advanced in the systematic

understanding of biblical and theological foundations of the tithing system. PG and other Christians claim a biblical obligation to tithe to their churches/pastors. Budiselić's contribution is crucial in order to understand and criticise such an assertion and practice. He examines Old Testament examples and all the references to tithing in the New Testament to present arguments for and against claims that Christians should tithe.

Budiselić concludes that Christians have a responsibility to give (e.g. to support those in need and to proclaim the Gospel). However, church tithing can in no way be considered a literal commandment for Christians today. Yet, it was a commandment with specific content and form for the Jews. For instance, the Israelites contributed up to 20% of their goods or more in support of the Levites and the temple, for helping the poor and foreigners, and for the festivals. Nonetheless, the New Testament raises the standard of voluntary giving with abundant principles that include offering to up to 100% of one's capital, with rewarding promises (Budiselić, 2015, p. 44). The following biblical passages illustrate this principle:

> Then Peter began to say unto him, Lo, we have left all, and have followed thee. And Jesus answered and said, Verily I say unto you, There is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my sake, and the gospel's, but he shall receive a hundredfold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world to come eternal life (Mark 10:28-30).
>
> give, and it shall be given unto you; good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom. For with the same measure that ye mete withal it shall be measured to you again (Luke 6:38).
>
> Sell that ye have, and give alms; provide yourselves bags which wax not old, a treasure in the heavens that faileth not, where no thief approacheth, neither moth corrupteth (Luke 12:33).
>
> I have showed you all things, how that so laboring ye ought to support the weak, and to remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he said, It is more blessed to give than to receive (Acts 20:35).

Consequently, Christians are encouraged in the Scriptures to give to the weak, to all in need, *and* to the Gospel. However, following Budiselić's reasoning, PG believers would tithe to their churches/pastors based on two faulty assumptions: 1) Christians *must not* give at least 10% of the income to their church/pastor (but they should instead give as much as they can to voluntarily support those in need and to proclaim the Gospel); 2) not all Jews were giving 10% (and their contributions were not only addressed to the priesthood) (Budiselić, p. 44). Certainly, the New Testament does encourage giving to support the preachers, but it does not require a defined percentage:

> Even so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel (1 Corinthians 9:14).
>
> …for the laborer is worthy of his hire (Luke 10:7).

Accordingly, tithing/offering to one's church/pastor is just one of the ways of practising giving. However, the Scriptures do not exhort giving in order to make a single church/pastor millionaire. Furthermore, church tithing cannot be considered as an imperative way of giving because, among others, the conditions defined in the Old Testament are not entirely applicable today (e.g. the Levites and the temple are physically absent[13]) (Budiselić, 2015). Therefore, the imperative urge of PG and other preachers' requesting tithes seems biblically inconsistent in light of these considerations, and has led in many cases to its misuse and corruption. Equally inconsistent would be the subsidies or "institutional tithes" some governments pay to the official established churches as they are not "voluntary" contributions anymore; rather, they act like taxes (sometimes paid by believers and non-believers alike).

[13] Yet, the New Testament refers to the temple as a type of the coming Messiah (Jesus Christ): "Jesus answered and said unto them, Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up. Then said the Jews, Forty and six years was this temple in building, and wilt thou rear it up in three days? But he spake of the temple of his body. When therefore he was risen from the dead, his disciples remembered that he had said this unto them; and they believed the Scripture, and the word which Jesus had said" (John 2:19-22).

10.4.3.2.4. Is PG a poor people's movement? Empirical results from studies

There is anything but consensus regarding PG and class. Scholars of religion often consider PG a typical "poor people's movement" that offers the needy the "opiate" of upward mobility (Bowler, 2010; Koch, 2009; Cox, 2001; Gifford, 1990; Hollinger, 1991). However, studies show that PG attracts converts from all social classes, including well-educated, middle-class Latin Americans and Africans (Miller, 2007, p. 21; Sharpe, 2014, p. 173).

Others contend that the PG justifies the affluence of those who have been upwardly mobile by arguing that this is spiritually deserved and derived (Koch, 2009; Gifford, 1990; Bruce 1990). However, a theological test of PG's supernatural claims does not exist, nor does it appear feasible. Furthermore, measuring the income levels of PG believers has proven challenging, and few studies are available (mostly performed in the USA). Among other challenges, PG constituents often resist to disclose members' income, church budgets, and pastors' salaries (Bowler, 2010).

Nonetheless, Koch studied PG in the United States by analysing more than a thousand telephone surveys. He determined that income does not affect adherence to PG. However, "blacks, the "born-again" or "evangelical," and those who are less educated are more likely to seek out Prosperity messages" (Koch, 2009, p. v). Surprisingly, PG adherence does not affect the believers' generosity to religious and non-religious causes. The author concludes that members of PG are not overrepresented among those with higher or lower incomes. Instead, PG adherents are "between blessings", which neither allows for the inference of the evident success, nor the sheer failure of the overt PG claims (Koch, 2009, p.81). Comparably, Bowler suggests in her study "the evidence leaves numerous clues that American prosperity believers enjoyed a comfortable living" (p.229).

Finally, PG critics document several cases of economic exploitation and disappointed hopes. However, studies also confirm that large numbers of PG converts have decisively improved their lives by joining the movement (e.g. by learning financial management and entrepreneurship) (Robbins, 2004, p. 136; Sharpe 2014, p. 176; Miller, 2007, p. 176). Therefore, empirical studies on PG and class render mixed evidence.

10.4.3.2.5. Summary

The world-expanding PG contemporary movement that claims believers will prosper by tithing and declaring affirmations has syncretic roots in Pentecostalism, New Thought, and African American religion. Critics have disproven virtually all PG's teachings and practices, including corruption of ministers, exploitation of the poor, support of far-right parties, and controversial theological claims. This section balances and analyses such criticisms, finding mixed evidence for those claims:

- Corruption scandals related to PG mismanagement have occurred in virtually all countries where the movement has reached (Sharpe, 2014).
- No necessary association exists between PG and far-right political parties, although notable examples exist.
- Although PG approaches the Scriptures literalistically, it does not apply an interlinear exegesis. A lack of interlinear exegesis renders out-of-context interpretations of the Bible.
- Tithing is an ancient biblical practice that the PG movement has misconstrued to make it imperative. According to the Bible, Christians should give as much as they can to support the needy and to proclaim the Gospel, but not to maintain the wealth of a preacher or a church.
- Critics often depict PG as a movement of unscrupulous preachers who economically exploit the poor. The empirical evidence shows that PG is composed mainly of middle classes and blacks, but faithful from all social classes belong to PG. Likewise, although PG cases of exploitation exist, studies also document positive experiences of PG conversions.

Empirical expectations:

9) *I expect prosperity/transparency levels to be directly (positively) related to the proportion of Protestants and inversely (negatively) related to the proportion of Roman Catholics. This expectation is valid for the cross-country sample of Europe and the Americas, as confirmed by empirical studies (e.g. La Porta et al., 1997; Chase, 2010).*

10) *However, I do not expect a significant positive influence of the Protestant population on prosperity/transparency in Latin America. Firstly, Protestantism in Latin America has been relatively recent compared to its five-hundred-year history of asserting the Reformation in Europe. In Latin America, Protestantism is a recent phenomenon. It dates back no more than fifty years, and its proportion has not surpassed 20 per cent (Todd & Zurlo, 2016). Secondly, most of the Protestant growth in Latin America comes from Pentecostal currents, whose positive impact has been far weaker than historical Protestant denominations (McCleary, 2013); (Woodberry, 2012); (Becker et al., 2016).*

10.5. Syncretism

The concept of syncretism is related to the concept of culture and thus, has no-agreed upon definition. The inconsistent etymology and complex history of the term make it problematic to define (Leopold & Jensen, 2004, p. 14). As Droogers (2004) observes:

> …the category of syncretism is replete with definitional controversies […] the task of defining syncretism is an ambiguous affair […] there is disagreement between the normality of the phenomenon, the fact that all religions are syncretic formations, and the complexity of the notion which largely derives from the reluctance to accept the normality of the phenomenon" (p. 376).

Pakkanen (1996) even claims that syncretism is an impractical "theoretical invention" as it refers to explaining "syncretism with syncretism" (Pakkanen, 1996, pp. 86-87). Yet, for Stewart & Shaw (1994), syncretism "refers to the synthesis of different religious forms. It is a contentious and contested term which has undergone many historical transformations in meaning. Some see it as a disparaging, ethnocentric label for religious traditions…" (p. i). Leopold & Jensen (2004) explain that the traditional definition of syncretism wrongly assumes that "religion, culture and ethnicity are pure entities" (p. 2). However, most syncretistic formations are "unconscious" as a natural result of social interactions, while others are consequences of cultural domination (Leopold & Jensen, 2004, p. 4).

Kraemer (1962) argued that non-Christian religions are intrinsically syncretistic and thus, syncretism is predominantly non-Christian. For the author, syncretism is also inevitable in Christianity, but it has occurred here as an illegitimate fusion rather than doing so innately. Therefore, the principal criticism against syncretism as a concept is that it implies pejorative references to non-Christian religions. Likewise, the term is "historically linked to theological disputes in Christianity" (Leopold & Jensen, 2004, p. 8).

10.5.1.Syncretism and Christianity

The Gospels and the Book of the Acts of the Apostles relate that the first Christians were almost entirely converted Jews. Kippenberg (2004) observes that "Jews rejected the pagan cults as idolatry" (p. 35). Judaism has been naturally anti-syncretic as the Scriptures forbid mingling with foreign religious elements (Table 6 and Appendix 15). The New Testament relates, however, that the Gospel was also spread to the Gentiles soon afterwards. Examples of this are the conversion and baptism of Cornelius, the Italian centurion (Acts 10); the Ethiopian Eunuch (Acts 8); and the mission of the Apostle Paul to the heathens in Greece and Asia. Consequently, Rudolph (2004) notes that the "mission and spread of a religion necessarily leads to syncretism, as shown in St Paul's Aeropagus Speech (Acts 17)" (p. 71). Likewise, the Book of Acts of the Apostles records that tension occurred among "Christian Jews" and "Christian Gentiles" on issues such as circumcision (e.g. Acts 11). Therefore, Kippenberg (2004) states that "[e]arly Christianity was a syncretistic religion" (p. 29). However, the syncretic process of Christianity skyrocketed when it became the official religion of the Roman Empire. As Benavides (2004) observes:

> In Constantine's case, the Christian god functioned initially as a typical Roman god of victory: one of those divinities ritually acclaimed before the battle and then honored after victory (Wardman 1982, 137-39). We must also remember that as a result of the ambiguous relationship between the god of the Christians and the *Sol invictus*, when the Christian god finally emerged as the official god of the state, the new divinity has already incorporated some of the characteristics of the god worshipped by Heliogabalus and the priests of Emessa (Benavides, 2004, p. 202).

Consequently, the Roman (Catholic) Christianity adopted pantheistic components coming, among others, from the Roman Empire and Greece. As Leopold & Jensen note "the Roman Catholic Church has, as result of a longer tradition of mission, developed a wider frame for adapting new or foreign elements within the frame of Church theology and policy" (p. 18). Therefore, the authors explain that Jesuits, Franciscans, and Dominicans, for instance, have "regarded syncretism as a means to expand their mission" in different parts of the world, including the east and Latin America (p. 16). Hence, among others, the effects of Catholic

mission have produced "blends between, for example, Catholic saints and indigenous gods" (p.18).

However, the Protestant Reformation has been a typical anti-syncretistic movement (Spica, 2018; Leopold & Jensen, 2004). Spica observes: "The Reformers criticized the fact that the Christian message had been lost from its original purity, and this was the reason for reforming the church" (p. 241). The "original purity" refers to the *Sola Scriptura* principle defended by the Reformers (see Section 10.4.1.3). Therefore, the failed ecumenical attempts of Erasmus and Calixt in the 16th century are partly explained, in that they "saw in the pagan literature, especially in Aristotelian philosophy, the rational proof of the truth in Christianity" (Engel, 1976 as cited in Leopold & Jensen, 2004, p. 15). However, the initial anti-syncretistic attitude of Protestantism partly succumbed with the advent of Pentecostalism (see following subsection and Section 10.4.3).

10.5.1.1.Syncretism and Christianity in Latin America

In Latin America, another "syncretism with syncretism" instance has occurred in Pakkanen (1996)'s terms. Johnson et al. (2016) have defined "*Christopagans"* as the "Roman Catholics of Latin background, chiefly in Latin America, who combine traditional pre-Columbian ethnoreligion with popular Roman Catholic religiosity (images, shamans, incense, idols, nomenclature)". As Spica observes:

> Even when we say that Latin America is mostly Christian or Catholic, the notions of this Christianity or Catholicity are very different from typical European Catholicity. Here, popular Catholicity assumes the diverse beliefs and practices of African and native peoples, modifying and adapting the original beliefs of European Catholicism to the ways of life, challenges and worldviews of the Latin American people. […] This differentiated religiosity, though, still calls itself Catholic despite evidence of mergers with prehispanic religiosity. […] In addition to Catholicity, we are now seeing many neo-Pentecostal religions emerging in Latin America. Although they often try to deny syncretism and defend a certain purity of faith, they are extremely syncretic, especially in ritual matters. This is

> clear, for example, in their use of popular music in worship, in their dances of praise and in their way of understanding Christian belief (Spica, 2018, pp. 236-237).

Benavides (2004) documents the syncretic processes that occurred during the expansion of Roman Catholicism among Andean, Aztec, and Mayan populations. Herskovits (1966) also noted that native and African gods are identified with saints of the Catholic Church in the New World. However, the author adds, "in Protestant areas the religious associations are more subtle, and African cultural retentions (e.g., mourning and shouting) less intense" (Herskovits as cited in Apter, 2004. p. 165). Nevertheless, most of the current Protestant denominations worldwide have a strong Pentecostal influence, which highly syncretises African and native rituals (see Section 10.4.3). Furthermore, the Pentecostal influence has also been pervasive in Roman Catholicism. As an interviewee noted in this research:

> It's very difficult to distinguish among Catholic Charismatics, Renewed Pentecostals, and Neo-Pentecostals as their rituals are almost the same. You have to get deep background information to distinguish them. Hermeneutically, it's difficult to differentiate them; all of them clap hands and rite and preach the same, but they want to be differentiated: Catholics as Catholics and Pentecostals as Pentecostals, as such, as they don't congregate together (Ecumenical academic theologian, Appendix 16).

However, the process of syncretism with indigenous or African rituals varies within different Latin American countries and subregions, depending on the historical presence of these ethnicities. The following cases, coupled with primary information from this study (interviews), show this pattern.

10.5.1.1.1.Colombia

Uribe (2006) refers to Colombia as a territory that has been full of magic and witchcraft for centuries. The arrival of the Spaniards, with the rigid bastion of Catholicism, not only

provoked a displacement of the indigenous people but an uprooting of the black slaves from their places of origin. This uprooting was the first cause of the magical-religious conformation in Colombia. The colonial society gradually became a space in which African fetishisms, indigenous gods, and the exaggerated belief in saints and miraculous medals found their convergence point in relationships of domination. The social organisation was mediated by race, where the Catholic Spaniards occupied the hegemonic tip of the pyramid, and the Blacks and Indians were at the base. Thus, the beliefs and traditions of the Indians and Blacks were presented as barbaric and diabolic in the face of Catholic superiority. However, these traditions continued to be practised, mingled with Catholicism, and survived the Colony and the Enlightenment, remaining intact when Protestantism emerged in Colombia. The association of indigenous and black beliefs with the demonic was prolonged and intensified with the advent of the Evangelicals and Pentecostals[14], thus creating a new syncretic platform (Lozano, 2009).

A Colombian Roman Catholic Theologian partly coincides with Lozano's account:

> When the Spaniards arrived, they came to catechise instead to evangelise. They [natives] were taught to cross themselves, to recite the creed and some prayers by memory. And then it was assumed that "Christians", sons of God were made, and then they proceeded to baptise them. But there was never an Evangelisation process; the term Jesus or the Word never came; the Word was not taught directly, and this is another reason why the Bible is almost not read…(Roman Catholic Theologian, Appendix 16)

A Colombian Protestant interviewee in this study also concurs with the assertion about syncretism in Protestantism:

[14] For Robbins (2004), the process of demonisation in Pentecostalism "makes indigenous spirits representatives of the devil […] then leads people to devote much of their energy to struggling against it, an activity that has the effect of further proving its existence and demonstrating its relevance to post-conversion life" (pp. 128-9).

> The problem is that there is a syncretism between Protestant Christianity and necromancy. […] Many of the rites of this African culture and ceremonies have been passed on to the Protestant Church. The clapping and the dancing in the churches have its roots in Africa where people worship in that manner. Claps, drums, and dance. You can see it in the Protestant world, and it is even being practised today in the United States. "I clap and dance because I feel good," they say. I call them Epicurian Christians (Independent, free Protestant believer–academic, Appendix 16).

10.5.1.1.2.Cuba

In Cuba, the syncretic connection is even more evident (see Section 20.3). The massive influx of African slaves as cheap labour to cultivate sugar since colonial times contributed to the emergence of spiritism, voodooism, and syncretised forms with Roman Catholicism (e.g. Santería) (Contreras, 2013, p. 177; Ramírez Calzadilla, 2009, p. 167; Sánchez, 1992, pp. 90-91). In practice, an amalgamation of rituals is evident. A priest of the Afro-Cuban religion (a spiritistic religion) expressed the singular importance of Roman Catholicism in their rituals:

> We have respect and veneration for the Catholic Church as a mother and centre. Our saints [icons] must receive light in Catholic rituals, for example with holy water. It is an essential requirement for our ordination as Babalawo or “Santo” [a spiritistic saint] to be baptised in the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church knows and is aware of this requirement for sanctification, but never acknowledges this publicly. […] Francis [pope Jorge Bergoglio] met with Yoruba and Protestants when he came to Cuba. He is simple, but he has a higher rank than any country or president, as Rome is the centre of the world (Cuban Babalawo priest, Appendix 16–441).

Complementing the words of the Babalawo priest, a Cuban Roman Catholic Theologian explains the relationship of Afro-Cuban rituals with Roman Catholicism:

> The Afro-Cuban religion did not have its own rite, so they adopted the Roman Catholic rituals. The Roman Catholic Church did not commit to this, but as for the priests, it is a convenient way to fill the Church with adherents. The Priests are happy with that, although they know they are making a theological mistake. This means that the Roman Catholic Church has accepted syncretism for convenience (Cuban Roman Catholic Theologian, Appendix 16).

A representative of the Cuban National Council of Churches partly confirmed the claim of the previous two interviewees: "…one can count more Roman Catholics as many Babalawos are baptised as Roman Catholics".

10.5.1.1.3.Uruguay

In Uruguay, at least two aspects mediate the relative low prominence of syncretism compared with the previous cases: the low Afro-descendant and indigenous populations, and the high secularisation of the society (see Section 19). Here, the interviewees have only referred to the introduced Brazilian influence of syncretic rituals:

> In Uruguay, syncretic rituals come by transfer from Brazil, especially Umbanda and spiritist rites. But they come by contact with Brazil since the Afro-descendant presence in Uruguay is low (Uruguayan Roman Catholic Priest, Appendix 16).

An ecumenical academic theologian shares a similar perception:

> Here the cult of Yemanjá has increased a lot. That is santería, and it comes from people of African ancestry from Brazil. We have the Candomblé, music with which black slaves were pressured in Montevideo; that music has been declared cultural heritage of humanity and is what identifies Uruguay. However, as an Uruguayan, I do not feel identified with the Candomblé. It's because of the cultural difference we have. […] And I do not know what the Catholic Church thinks. I haven't heard any comments in favour or against it.

10.5.2.Conclusion

Syncretism as a concept suffers from many problems with its definition, which is historically linked to theological disagreements in Christianity. While syncretism has been a natural process in all religions, Jews and historical Protestants have tended to be more anti-syncretic given their Scriptural base of beliefs. In turn, the importance of traditions, in Roman Catholicism for instance, has led to include more non-orthodox rituals in its practice. In Pentecostalism, the syncretic practices are apparent, partly due to its marked African influence. In Latin America, "syncretism with syncretism" has occurred with the expansion of Roman Catholicism and contemporary Protestantism (mostly Pentecostalism) with indigenous and African practices. Latin American syncretism with indigenous or African rituals varies depending on the presence of these ethnicities. Therefore, the empirical (quantitative and QCA) part of this study includes measurements of ethnicities as cultural proxies of syncretism.

Finally, the syncretic process in Latin America has blended religions, music, languages, and cuisine, among other cultural expressions. As Wilson (2004) observes:

> The mixing of indigenous, European, and African languages in Caribbean Spanish, and other developments such as the Palenquero spoken in San Basilio de Palenque in Colombia, the Palenquero spoken among the descendants of maroon runaway Congo slaves of Portobelo in Panama, and the Papiamento spoken in Curasao, are very much like the religious syncretisms of Santeria, Regia, Abakua, Palo Mayombe, Naniguismo, Baquine, Voodoo, Macumba, Candomble, as well as the musical syncretisms of Rumba, Samba, Plena, Bomba, Mambo, Bamba, Huapango, Bamboula, Cumacos, Chibangueles, Quichimba, Carangano, Quitiplas, Tango, Milonga, Beguine, Merengue, Cumbia, and Tamborito. They are also like the mixing that takes place in food: rice with chickpeas, ajiaco, mondongo with lima beans (p.186).

11. Language and Religion

> In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made (John, 1:1-3, King James Bible).

The importance of studying language in order to understand social phenomena is not new. The last decades have witnessed a growing academic interest in the study of language and of discourse analysis in the social sciences (Heracleous, 2006). Consequently, "…language (and language use) is increasingly being understood as the most important phenomenon, accessible for empirical investigation, in social and organizational research" (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000, p. 1126).

In this sense, studying language in practice has played an important role since ancient times. The biblical citation at the beginning of this section, first written thousands of years ago, directly links language to the Creation and the divine. This notion is currently recognised in systemic approaches to language, where "language is action" and "creates realities" (Echavarria, 2006, pp. 34-36).

Austin (1962) also challenged the traditional notion of "to say something is just to state something" and instead posited that "to say something…is to do something" (p. 12). Likewise, 'language is not a medium for representing the world, but for intervening in it" (Argyris et al. as cited in Romme, 2003, p. 563). These notions have led to recognising the prominent role of language as a means of shaping institutions and society. Furthermore, ample theoretical and empirical evidence points to language as a suitable proxy for culture (Stulz & Williamson, 2003; Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001; Ronen & Shenkar, 1985; Hofstede, 1980 as cited in Volonté, 2015, p. 83). Language, religion, and legal origins are all highly correlated and associated with particular institutional performances (Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, & Jayaraman, 2008); (Volonté, 2015); (Mazar 2008).

11.1. The Role of the Bible in Shaping Language and Societies

The Bible has been translated into numerous vernacular languages:

11.1.1. German

Several studies have discussed the profound influence of the Reformation on the spread and standardisation of the German language through Luther's translation of the Bible (Volz & Greenslide, 1963; Besch, 1999; Greenslade, 1963). It was mainly through the vernacular translation of the Bible that people learned to read and that human capital was enhanced (Becker & Woessmann, 2009). This process has resulted in higher literacy rates among Protestants to this day (Ibid). Consequently, the language of Luther's translation became more than part of German national heritage, first for Protestants, and later penetrating every German-speaking home (Ritter, 1963).

11.1.2. English

Similarly to German, the English language had almost no prestige before the Protestant Reformation. Later, different dialects and different Bible translations challenging the unity of the English kingdom motivated King James to commission a scholarly and reputable translation of the Scriptures. The Authorised (King James) Version (KJV) has served ever since as a unifier and dominant cultural conditioner in English-speaking thought, language, and literature (Lewis, 1969); (McGrath, 2001); (Daniell, 2003).

11.1.3. Other Native Languages

Bible translations have helped to keep alive native languages otherwise threatened with extinction across the world (Moor & Voinov, 2015).

11.1.4. Latin, Roman Empire, and Roman Catholicism

The Roman Empire spread Latin. Celtic speakers, for example, adopted the Latin imperial language and thus gave birth to French (Moor & Voinov, 2015). Moreover, Latin never died but evolved into Roman languages descending from Vulgar Latin (e.g. Spanish, French, Italian, Portuguese, Rumanian, Catalan, Romansh) (Wright, 1988). Further, the Roman Church-State inherited Latin as its official language. However, the Vulgate Latin translation of the Bible became official for Roman Catholicism at the Council of Trent (1545-1563), which was held in the same century during which the Reformation took its course. The Latin translation was intended only for the clergy and theologians (Lampe, 1969).

Consequently, the Roman Church-State condemned — and sought to impede — any effort to bring the Holy Scriptures within reach of common people, in order to prevent what happened in Germany and England. The fate suffered by those Reformers who translated the Bible into Spanish (Reina and Valera) was a common one: They were persecuted and exiled from Spain (Hauben, 1967).

To uphold the Catholic Church-State, the governments of several Latin American countries banned Protestant services and the printing of the Bible in Spanish until the last century (Gill, 1998). Thus, the influence of the Bible on Latin languages has been limited. Table 10 illustrates one example: The Roman Catholic Catechism contains the Decalogue in "Catholic" languages (e.g. Spanish and Portuguese) differs from that in "Protestant" languages (e.g. English and German).

Empirical expectation:

11) I expect German and English-speaking countries to be more competitive/transparent than those speaking Roman languages. German and English are associated with the Reformation, whereas Roman languages are associated with the status quo of the Roman Empire, i.e. Roman Church-State.

12. Environment/Geography and Prosperity/Transparency *(E), (4), (7)*

This section analyses the prosperity-environment/geography nexus, the corruption-environment/geography nexus, and the Environmental Performance Index. It concludes the theoretical review of this study.

12.1. Prosperity and Environment/Geography *(4), (7)*

A direct empirical relationship exists between the environment/geography and the prosperity of nations (Diamond, 1997); (Sachs, 2001). Diamond (1997) found that several environmental factors enabled European states to prosper and conquer other continents. Such aspects include the availability of docile animals for domestication, access to a storable vegetal protein, or a favourable climate and environment (Diamond, 1997). Similarly, Sachs (2001) observes:

> Perhaps the strongest empirical relationship in the wealth and poverty of nations is the one between ecological zones and per capita income. Economies in tropical ecozones are nearly everywhere poor, while those in temperate ecozones are generally rich. And when temperate economies are not rich there is tipically a straightforward explanation, such as decades under communism or extreme geographical isolation (Sachs, 2001, p. 1).

After controlling for the quality of institutions, Sachs (2003) empirically explains cross-country patterns of national income. The author claims that geography and environment affect per capita income even more directly than institutions. Furthermore, Sachs (2003) observes that empirical studies:

> have demonstrated that levels of per capita income, economic growth, and other economic and demographic dimensions are strongly correlated with geographical and ecological variables such as climate zone, disease ecology, and distance from the coast. … [T]here is a systematic gradation of average per capita income, with

high latitudes both North and South showing higher per capita income than low, tropical latitudes (Sachs, 2003, pp. 1, 4; Gallup, Sachs, & Mellinger, 1998; Mellinger, Sachs, & Gallup 2000; Gallup & Sachs, 2001; Sachs & Malaney, 2002).

Latitude "impacts economic activity through insolation, precipitation, and other climatic factors" (Sachs, 2003, p. 4). Consequently, countries located in the inter-tropical or equatorial zone tend to be poorer than those located in temperate zones. Sachs argued that lower agricultural yields and greater mortality due to tropical diseases, for example, explain lower prosperity levels near the equator. For instance, lower food productivity in the equatorial zone is well documented due to factors such as: 1) the fragility and poverty of the intertropical soils, which lose their fertility rapidly; 2) a high prevalence of parasites and pests associated with the high biodiversity of the equatorial zone; 3) high costs on net photosynthesis due to high respiration and metabolic processes; and 4) enormous fluctuations in water availability (Gallup & Sachs, 2001; Sachs, 2003; Garcia, 2012, 2003). Therefore, Brown and Lall (2006) explained 60% of per capita GDP variance across countries in terms of rainfall statistics and a binary variable accounting for war.

The relationship between latitude and savings provides another example of this association. Ecosystem dynamics in the equatorial zone include high biodiversity and rapid nutrient cycling due to high temperatures, with low nutrient accumulation in soil (e.g. the Amazon forest). In contrast, seasonal dynamics and lower temperatures in temperate zones account for slow nutrient cycling and biomass accumulation. Temperate seasonal ecosystems, therefore, tend to accumulate more biomass in less biodiversity. Examples of this phenomenon include big sequoias in forests, the proliferation of large algae in the oceans, and big fat mammals. In comparison, equatorial ecosystems are highly biodiverse, but their individuals are much smaller than their temperate counterparts. Temperature and speed differences in nutrient cycles greatly determine the ethology of organisms. For example, temperate species must "save" fat and energy for winter (in order to prevent death). In contrast, equatorial species tend to consume the available resources immediately due to high competition (MacArthur, 1972; Garcia, 2003).

A similar dynamics may have encouraged human beings in temperate zones to store goods (e.g. grains, cheese, jam) for winter, and later to accumulate and reinvest the excess capital. In contrast, the permanent availability of natural resources (in the absence of seasons) means that humans in the equatorial zone tend to consume rather than store and invest.

This example might lead one to easily accept that countries in the northern hemisphere are all prosperous and thus less corrupt than those on the equator. However, Russia and other former Soviet Union countries, located in the northern hemisphere, would be exceptions to this rule. This is exactly where institutions (including religion) and other historical factors contribute to formulating feasible explanations.

12.2. Corruption and Environment/Geography *(4), (7)*

The trajectories by which geographical and environmental factors might affect corruption are mainly indirect and occur via economic development (Treisman, 2000, p. 430). In this respect, an abundance of natural resources (i.e. fuels and minerals) tends to generate conditions for rent-seeking and corruption (Leite & Weidemann, 1999); (Ades & Di Tella, 1999). Specifically, an abundance of oil is found to increase the level of corruption in a country (Montinola and Jackman as cited in Lambsdorff, 2006, pp. 21-22). Venezuela, Nigeria, or Arab countries are examples of countries located on the equator characterised by an abundance of natural resources and by high levels of corruption.

Moreover, more natural resources (e.g. fuel) does not necessarily mean better environment quality (e.g. climate). Environment quality indicators are what Brown & Lall (2006), Sachs (2001), Diamond (1997), and others have associated with prosperity, and thus with transparency (Treisman, 2000). The *Environmental Performance Index (EPI)* aggregates some of those indicators besides others.

Empirical expectation:

12) *I expect a robust positive relationship between the EPI and prosperity/transparency. However, I do not expect the EPI to explain the entire variability of GCI/CPI.*

This section closes the theoretical description of the most prominent corruption/prosperity determinants referred to in Figure 2. The next sections explain the research paradigms, design, and methodology of this study.

Part IV: Research Paradigms, Methodology, and Research Design

This part provides a general methodological overview of the study. However, specific protocols for each research component are included at the beginning of each chapter. Before describing the various methods, what follows introduces the paradigms underpinning this study.

13. Applied Research Paradigms

The paradigms and biases underlying this study reflect its dialectical pluralism (DP) (mixed-methods research) and a complex thinking perspective (see Appendix 2 for detailed explanations of each paradigm). Below I briefly describe the researcher's scientific and personal paradigm biases.

13.1.Scientific

In order of importance, according to the Philosophy of Social Sciences Inventory (PSSI) scoring test, the scientific paradigms guiding this study are: Mixed research methods: 6.0; Idealism: 5.3; Quantitative research methods: 4.5; Nomothetic methods: 4.5; Rationalism: 4.0; Empiricism: 4.0; Fallibilism: 3.6; Ethical realism: 3.5; Qualitative research methods: 3.5; Humanism: 3.5; Ontological relativism: 3.5.

13.1.1.Biases

Several types of bias can threaten the validity of any meta-study (e.g. language, location, time, outcome, funding) (Hussain, Hassali, Patel, & Babar, 2019). Publication bias can be a salient issue that occurs when the researcher is favourably oriented towards studies with statistically significant results, while rejecting those that are contrary to expectations.

Publication bias could also lead to an overestimation of effects in meta-analysis. Likewise, confirmatory bias "is the tendency to emphasize and believe experiences which support one's views and to ignore or discredit those which do not" (Mahoney, 1977, p. 161). To counter these threats and limitations, this study applied some of the strategies recommended by Brown, Mehta, & Allison (2017) and Hussain et al. (2019):

- A systematic review of empirical studies in journals of multiple electronic databases (Hussain et al., 2019).
- Triangulation for crosschecking information through multiple sources and procedures (see Section 17.6.3.3)
- Peer review processes as a source through which quality checks can be improved (Brown et al., 2017). This research was submitted to peer reviewers and critical friends (see Appendices 1 and 17).
- Publication in Open Access Journals. Online, "open access journals improve the readability and reduce publication bias" (Hussain et al., 2019, p. 59; Brown et al., 2017). Some sections of this study were published in an open access peer-reviewed journal (Published: 1 June 2019; Views: 1526, Downloads: 1006: 10 July 2020) (see Appendix 17).
- Sharing the data and making it publically available would reduce the probability of publication bias (Brown et al., 2017; Hussain et al., 2019). Some sections and appendices of this study have been publically available on the website of the open access peer-reviewed journal since June 2019 (see Appendix 17).
- Multi-lingual analysis (Spanish, English, French, and German) of the literature and primary data (i.e. interviews) instead of ignoring studies that are not published in the researcher's mother tongue (Egger, Zellweger-Zähner, Schneider, Junker, Lengeler, & Antes 1997; Hussain et al., 2019).

13.2. Personal

Maxwell's textbook "Qualitative Research Design" states:

> Traditionally, what you bring to the research from your own background and identity has been treated as "bias," something whose influence needs to be *eliminated* from the design, rather than a valuable component of it. This has been true to some extent even in qualitative research, despite the fact that qualitative researchers have long recognized that in this field, the researcher *is* the instrument of the research. In opposition to the traditional view, …[s]eparating your research from other aspects of your life cuts you off from a major source of insights, hypotheses, and validity checks (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 37-38).

Therefore, the explicit incorporation of the researcher's personal identity and experience has gained extensive theoretical and philosophical support (e.g. Berg & Smith, 1988; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Jansen & Peshkin, 1992 as cited in Maxwell, 2013, p. 38). In fact,

> …the most admirable scholars within the scholarly community … do not split their work from their lives. They seem to take both too seriously to allow such dissociation, and they want to use each for the enrichment of the other (Wright Mills as cited in Maxwell, 2013, p. 38).

Studies identifying their author's personal positions are praised, among others, as follows: "Seen as virtuous, subjectivity is something to capitalize on rather than to exorcise" (Glesne & Peshkin as cited in Maxwell, 2013, p. 38). Or "mine your experience, there is potential gold there!" (Strauss as cited in Maxwell, 2013, p. 38). Maxwell (2013) therefore proposes a particular technique for incorporating the researcher's subjectivity and experience in a study: "researcher identity memo." This acknowledges the researcher's personal perspective and stance. Taking Maxwell's cue, I have included a positionality memo in Appendix 3 to ensure that my perspective does not unduly influence the analysis and coding, in particular in the qualitative part. Among others, Appendix 3 includes the strategies for objective data treatment, and amplifies the following personal information about the researcher:

13.2.1. Personal Experiences from Each Belief System

Roman Catholicism:

• I grew up in a Roman Catholic family in a strongly Roman Catholic country;

• I was educated for 12 years in Roman Catholic schools and received Catholic religious instruction;

• I studied for five years at a Pontifical Jesuit university.

Atheism (after being a firm Catholic believer):

• I spent ten years living as a self-confessed atheist who embraced atheistic values;

• I socialised in and applied the paradigm of scientific materialism (positivism).

Dissenting Protestantism (after being a convinced atheist):

• I spent 12 years living as converted, free Christian and I have studied the Bible on my own;

• I have lived and studied in the United Kingdom and Switzerland (two historically Protestant countries) (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

13.2.2.Strategies for Objective Data Treatment:

The following strategies were employed to ensure objective data treatment: 1. Two independent quantitative researchers were engaged to select the variables using solely quantitative criteria (e.g. cross-validation) in regressions and QCA. 2. Two independent qualitative researchers were engaged to impartially validate the qualitative coding (a total of four independent researchers) (see Appendices 1 and 3). 3. The selected variables (chosen from a pool of more than 70 indicators) were associated with qualitative codes to prioritise them from a mixed methods perspective. 4. The quantitative and qualitative (QCA) database is available for inspection (Appendices 7–14). The interviews conducted as part of this study will not be made publicly available to protect the interviewees' identities.

14. Methodology

This study applies a "mixed methods approach to grounded theory" (MM-GT) and combines qualitative and quantitative elements in several phases of the research process (i.e. data collection, analysis, inference). Such an approach serves to achieve "broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration" (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner as cited in Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017, p. 108).

Equally, MM-GT works well for research questions focusing on *why* and *how* the investigated phenomena function (including their qualitative and quantitative aspects). Consequently, MM-GT is appropriate here, since it concerns "meanings and processes or explanatory relationships" (and thus also causation) (Johnson, McGowan, & Turner, 2010, p. 72).

Mixed methods, such as those applied here, have proven useful for studying religious and secular milieus. One of their main advantages is that they ensure an increased validity of descriptions and explanations (Stolz, 2017).

This study is driven by an *equal-status mixed methods research* approach (Johnson, 2016). Thus, qualitative and quantitative components have equal value and weight. Figure 7 presents the research design:




Figure 7: Research design (Source: Author's).

This flowchart also shows the integrated sequential methods used in this research: each method informs the application of the other methods.

As will be explained, different research components, each corresponding to different yet complementary epistemological approaches, provide complementary results at different levels of analysis. In other words:

- The "macro" approach is that quantitative component that exhibits general trends for countries and variables at a continental scale with minimum inferencing of causal relations. *Correlations* are used to test whether variables are related at a cross-country level (i.e. whether a population's religious affiliation is linked to corruption).

- QCA is the "meso" approach used to analyse both quantitative and qualitative data, and thus enabling inferences about causality. QCA clusters countries into groups of affinity and is used here to trace causal mechanisms (i.e. whether the adoption of Protestantism as a state religion is a necessary and sufficient condition for high levels of prosperity and transparency). QCA also allows briefly explaining each country situation in the dataset (around 60 countries). QCA analysis includes four case studies (the same cases are analysed in the "micro approach"– i.e. the next method).

- The most detailed approach ("micro") used in this study corresponds to the qualitative case studies on four selected countries for the purpose of specific analysis aimed at substantiating causal explanations. *Case studies* facilitate understanding differences and similarities, as well as causal mechanisms, from a qualitative perspective. This study includes four case studies on countries with (1) diverse geographical backgrounds, (2) different composition and dominance of Christian denominations, and (3) legal systems rooted in different origins.

In sum, the regression analysis of this study quantitatively explores the relations among factors/variables. QCA adds causality considerations and bridges quantitative relations and qualitative analysis. The four case studies are purely qualitative.

Part V: Empirical Results (Macro & Meso Components)

Part V consists of two main sections: [15]

1. The quantitative part of this study (Section 15) corresponds to regression analysis, where the relationship between variables is used to test some prominent prosperity/corruption theories. This part does not seek to prove causation, but instead empirically explores whether a population's religious affiliation is related to competitiveness/transparency. Its empirical investigation also extends to studying the traditional paradigm of some common determinants of corruption that are related to *religious adherents*. Among others, the corruption model applied here tests the interrelations between *GDP*, *political liberties* (democracy proxy), and *language* and *ethnic fractionalisation*.

2. The second part (Section 16) advances the understanding of corruption and competitiveness with a more complex causal approach (QCA). Compared to the regression analysis, this approach expands on three aspects: first, qualitative proxy conditions for the institutional influence of religion (i.e. concordats); second, split measures of language and ethnic variables (instead of packed indices of fractionalised measurements); and third, the analysis of four short cases.

Recapitulation of hypotheses and empirical expectations:

Sections 15 and 16 will empirically test the hypotheses and expectations advanced in Parts I and III. To facilitate the analysis, the hypotheses and empirical expectations are briefly restated here.

[15] *Note:* In the following sections, italics are used to identify variables or parameters.

Hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Roman Catholicism has negatively impacted prosperity (competitiveness and transparency) in Europe and the Americas.

Hypothesis 2: The Protestant Reformation has positively impacted prosperity (competitiveness and transparency) in Europe and the Americas.

Hypothesis 3: Environmental performance positively impacts prosperity in Europe and the Americas (i.e. moderating or moderated by the impact of religion).

Empirical expectations:

1 I expect the overwhelming empirical evidence available to confirm higher corruption rates in historically Roman Catholic countries than in historically Protestant countries (consistent with the title of this study articulated in Matthew 7: 15–23).

2 I expect the empirical evidence to corroborate a trend towards higher prosperity (competitiveness) in historically Protestant countries and lower competitiveness in historically Catholic countries. This expectation is based on abundant empirical studies linking higher prosperity outcomes with Protestantism at a cross-country level.

3 Given that economic prosperity, democracy, and transparency are part of the same phenomenon, I expect these factors to be highly correlated. My quantitative model on corruption (Section 15.3.4) considers proxy variables for all of these variables.

4 I expect higher transparency/prosperity levels in countries with Protestant-influenced legal origins (i.e. German, English, or Scandinavian) than in non-Protestant countries. The Protestant Reformation introduced the Sola Scriptura principle reflected in Protestant-influenced legal origins.

5 I expect lower prosperity/transparency levels in countries that have been influenced by the French legal system, in particular when they have strong clerical

ties, and thus have been markedly influenced by Roman and canon law (as in Latin America).

6 Given the tradition of controversial and restrictive concordats, I expect a negative influence on transparency and prosperity in the respective concordatarian countries.

7 I expect a negative influence on prosperity/transparency in countries rooted in Socialist legal origins, in particular on account of the Soviet legal principle of the "goodness of humankind" (similar to Roman Catholic and Orthodox natural law).

8 I expect no conclusive results for ethnic fractionalisation given the possible overlapping of cultural proxies (Volonté, 2015) with other variables and given the varied conclusions of previous empirical results with aggregated measures.

9 I expect prosperity/transparency levels to be directly (positively) related to the proportion of Protestants and inversely (negatively) related to the proportion of Roman Catholics. This expectation is valid for the cross-country sample of Europe and the Americas, as confirmed by empirical studies (e.g. La Porta et al., 1997; Chase, 2010).

10 However, I do not expect a significant positive influence of the Protestant population on prosperity/transparency in Latin America. Firstly, Protestantism in Latin America has been relatively recent compared to its five-hundred-year history of asserting the Reformation in Europe. In Latin America, Protestantism is a recent phenomenon. It dates back no more than fifty years, and its proportion has not surpassed 20 per cent (Todd & Zurlo, 2016). Secondly, most of the Protestant growth in Latin America comes from Pentecostal currents, whose positive impact has been far weaker than historical Protestant denominations (McCleary, 2013); (Woodberry, 2012); (Becker, Pfaff , & Rubin , 2016).

11 I expect German and English-speaking countries to be more competitive/transparent than those speaking Roman languages. German and English are associated with the Reformation, whereas Roman languages are associated with the status quo of the Roman Empire, i.e. Roman Church-State.

12 I expect a robust positive relationship between the EPI and prosperity/transparency. However, I do not expect the EPI to explain the entire variability of GCI/CPI.

15.Component 1 (Macro): Quantitative (Regression) Analysis

Several analyses were conducted to reach different explanatory models and thereby to determine the most critical variables in the datasets. This quantitative part is correlational, not experimental (causal). Therefore, the importance of a variable is based on its explanatory power, not on causal relations.

The *competitiveness GCI* index contains numerous sub-indices, which are aggregated into 12 different categories (Appendix 7). Among the sub-indices, GCI comprises *corruption (CPI)* (or its opposite, *transparency perception*), as well as some of its determinants. However, the interactions between the variables of interest and *corruption*, on the one hand, and between the variables of interest and *competitiveness*, on the other, were analysed and modelled separately.[16]

This section has three subsections. The first overviews the process of modelling competitiveness (GCI) and corruption (CPI). The second corresponds to the methodological protocols and limitations. The third presents the empirical results of the regression analysis for GCI and CPI.

15.1. Modelling Competitiveness and Corruption

15.1.1. Modelling Competitiveness (GCI) (Stages 1 and 2)

I modelled several variables associated with theories of prosperity (see Section 5 and Appendices 4, 7, and 8) as possible exogenous determinants of competitiveness in most countries worldwide. For example, the *Environment Performance Index (EPI)*, is linked to

[16] Please refer to Appendices 7–9 for a detailed description of the variables and their interactions in the general research model. Also included in these appendices is a summary of the theories, indicators and sources utilised in the models.

geographical and environmental determinants, while *religion* (adherents) is related to cultural and Weberian theory. *State religion* and *legal origins* are proxies of the institutional influence of religion. I tested the possible different contributions of those variables to explain the variation in *competitiveness (GCI)*.

The next generation of models focused on countries in Europe and the Americas, i.e. those two continents under study here. Finally, the subsequent generation of models isolated the influence of variables such as *state religion* and *share of population adherents* on different religious affiliations. Such isolation ought to benefit the model fitness as these variables are related (Barro & McCleary, 2005) and might overfit the model.

15.1.2. Modelling Corruption (CPI Stage 3)

Analysing *corruption* as a criterion variable (stage 3) associates several common predictor variables frequently used in the literature to explain corruption: *GDP per capita, religion, or political liberties* (Rose-Ackerman, 2006) (see Part III, Section 6, and Appendix 8). The modelling of *corruption* focused on Europe and the Americas. However, unlike the modelling of *competitiveness*, it bypassed the first generation of models (worldwide).

15.2. Methods of Regression Analysis

15.2.1. Methodological Limitations

15.2.1.1.1. Latest Available Data Measured at Different Time Periods

To draw the most accurate picture of existing reality, this study is based on the latest data available for all the investigated variables (most data come from 2016 reports). However, 2016 data were not available for all variables (care was taken to ensure that data were not older than 20 years). Saying this, slightly older data would not amount to a significant limitation. The prosperity performance of most Western countries exhibits comparatively long-term persistence (of a century or more) and thus indicates historical inertia

(Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2017; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). The same applies to some environmental variables such as geography, latitude (Diamond, 1997), or state religion (Barro & McCleary, 2005).

15.2.1.1.2. Regression Analysis is not a Causal Approach

A significant correlation "does not necessarily imply causation" (Arruñada, 2010, p. 908). Moreover, causal approaches to the present dataset and research design (i.e. based on the latest available data) might not be desirable for two reasons: First, this would lead to endogeneity problems. Testing plain variables as evident in the model would render regression results inconsistent due to the likely presence of endogeneity (i.e. because of simultaneous causality). Reverse causality is a widespread issue in regression models. Likewise, testing variable causality blindly (i.e. merely statistically, without any historical or theoretical consideration) would not be appropriate either. Thus, the historical approach to the variables under investigation is explained and addressed in detail (Table 1, Figure 5; Sections 6–12). Second, adopting a causal approach would require Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation, a complex experimental design, and a definition of independent, dependent, and control variables. It would also need instrumental variables, which might not exist in reality (or might be highly challenging to identify and define). While a time series approach would partially resolve the issues arising from a causal quantitative approach, it is not addressed in this study (see below). However, one other method in this research (QCA) uses a causality approach.

15.2.1.1.3. This Regression Analysis excludes a Time Series Approach

A time series would be an ideal approach to test whether variables are related over short or rather over long periods. This approach would allow identifying whether relationship patterns between variables exist over time. Conceptually, it would make sense to relate performance in a period t with explanatory factors measured in period t-1. One example would be if increasing or decreasing religiosity or the influence of a Christian denomination

coincided with a prosperity variable (i.e. whether changes in a population's religious affiliation relates to changes in corruption).

The relationship between prosperity and religion in Protestant versus Catholic societies could be tested in time and space. Regarding time, for example, countries that were Roman Catholic before the Protestant Reformation (e.g. England, Germany or Switzerland) were pre-industrial (mainly primary sector economies) in the Middle Ages. In geographical space, for instance, countries currently under pervasive Roman Catholic influence (e.g. Spain or Latin America) tend to exhibit lower performance than Protestant ones.

Analysing Christian religion reveals that the Reformation initiated gradual changes, including its slow institutionalisation and influence on democracy, literacy and the state (Becker et al., 2016; Woodberry, 2012; Witte, 2002). Consequently, a time series approach ought to cover longer periods (at least several centuries) based on the assumption that the prosperity of most Western countries maintains almost the same relative position over long-term time periods (a century or more) (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2017; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008).

A time series approach might also alleviate endogeneity issues, as current performance cannot (directly) influence past conditions. Still, relevant reverse causality might exist via indirect correlation. Nevertheless, a time series also has the disadvantage that the same available data does not exist for all variables. Some variables are measured yearly, some every five years, and some every 50 years (most have only been measured during the last 50 years or less). For some essential variables, no information and proxies exist, thus making it necessary to create new databases to cover particular periods (e.g. Pre-Reformation and Reformation). Undoubtedly, the time series approach is promising, yet requires considerable time and resources (which, however, exceed the scope of the present study). Notwithstanding this reservation, future research might consider applying this approach.

The current approach uses "legal origin" (La Porta et al., 1999) and "state religion" (Barro & McCleary, 2005) to capture some variable relationships over long periods. Barro & McCleary (2005) proved that a growing fraction of adherents to a country's main religion

increases the probability of a "state religion." This gradual process means that few Western countries changed their status of having a "state religion" in the 20th century.

15.2.2. Data and Empirical Strategy

Population

The countries studied here were selected based on data availability (the same consideration applies to QCA, see Section 16). Data stem from constructed and from secondary (existing) data available in public databases. Further, the data consist of censuses of currently available indicators for the following cross-country analyses:


Stage 1. Worldwide (107 countries): The database comprises data series available on competitiveness, corruption, social inequality, as well as other social, environmental, and economic indicators. It also includes indicators of denominational tradition and religious background for most of the surveyed countries.

Stages 2 and 3. Europe and the Americas (66 countries – competitiveness; 61 countries – corruption): Cases with straightforward data access for most variables in Europe and the Americas.[17] Unlike in other regions, Christianity has been the dominant religion for at least the past two centuries in Europe and the Americas. The populations of these continents currently adhere largely to Roman Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant churches of various denominations (Johnson & Zurlo, 2016).

[17] Due to data availability issues, some countries were excluded (e.g. most of the small island states in the Caribbean). However, most countries in Europe and the Americas provide rich data. See Appendix 9 for detailed information on countries, sources and main variables.

15.2.3. Protocol

I followed an eleven-step protocol (summarised below):



Step 1 aimed to include as many countries as possible in the database. However, not all the variables had the same data available for all the observations. Variables such as the *GLOBE* cultural index were excluded from the analysis as the corresponding data were only available for a sample of three dozen countries. If less than 25% of values were still missing in the remaining dataset, they were imputed using Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations in R (mice).

Step 2 involved using automated functions to help select from a high number of variables (see diagram above) from different theoretical backgrounds (see Appendix 7). Although the results of one automated model search may be arbitrary, about 40 of these models were created using different approaches to eliminate path-dependence and bias.


Step 3 concentrated on meeting linear regression assumptions in all the models. Assumptions were tested in a continuous process whenever a new model was created. Among other assumptions, I tested for multicollinearity by checking the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and the correlation value. VIF results refused multicollinearity and, along with low correlation value, suggest that these variables are orthogonal. Likewise, all significant correlations among the predictor and criterion variables were controlled for.

Step 4 involved using cross-validation based on the prediction quality of shuffled groups of observations. Those model and variables exhibiting the best prediction ability were selected. "Step" is an automatic method based on the R function step (), which is also used to perform variable selection. These methods are useful when the number of explanatory variables is large, and when fitting all possible models proves unfeasible (University of Columbia, 2017).

Step 5 used Beta standardisation, which is necessary for comparing influence among variables. This indicates the significance of each variable in the context of others (and thus facilitates comparison). The goal, however, is not to test significance. Nor can Beta standardisation be computed for interaction variables (see second column "Standardised" in the Results).

In Step 4, Model 1 (see Results), two selected variables that might potentially outshine each other were analysed: religious denomination (proportion in population) and state religion. Consequently, I isolated these variables and ran separate models (see Step 6).


Stage 2: Modelling for Europe and the Americas (*competitiveness*).



Europe and the Americas exhibited higher data quality and availability. Consequently, there was no need to impute data as in the world models (Stage 1: Models 1, 2 and 3). Therefore, stable regional models with higher reliability (i.e. avoiding data imputation and thus reducing bias) were created (Stage 2: Models 4 and 5).

Step 7. Due to data availability issues, some countries were excluded (e.g. most of the small island states in the Caribbean). Step 8 was similar to steps 2, 3 and 4 while step 9 was similar to step 5.

Stage 3: Modelling for Europe and the Americas (*corruption*).



The competitiveness index (GCI) includes corruption (or its opposite, *transparency*) perception (*CPI*). However, to analyse whether transparency has the same direction as competitiveness, I ran a model that considers corruption as a criterion variable applicable to both Europe and the Americas.

Step 10. The corruption index (*CPI*) lacks data in several observations; therefore, fewer countries were selected from the dataset than in stage 2 (Step 7: Competitiveness).

Step 11. Regression trees are used for classification purposes or to predict outcomes when the response variable is numerical or continuous as in this situation (Morgan, 2014).

15.3.Empirical Results of Regression Analysis

Appendices 7–9 provide a detailed description of the variables, theories, categories, and sources used here, as well as of the interactions between the variables in the general research model. Presented below are the results for competitiveness (Models 1 to 5 and conclusions) and for corruption (Model 6 and conclusions).

a. Competitiveness

15.3.1. Stage 1: Competitiveness in the World

The analysis of competitiveness as a criterion variable associates different predictor variables usually corresponding to theories of prosperity. Model 1 was chosen from more than 30 other models as it has the highest cross-validations and satisfactorily explains GCI variability.

15.3.1.1.Model 1

$$GCI_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{EPI}_i + \beta_2 Mulatto_i + \beta_3 Asian_i + \beta_4 \text{Protestant_St.Rel}_i + \beta_5 \text{Catholic_pop}_i + \beta_6 Orthodox_pop_i + \beta_7 \text{Protestant_pop}_i + \beta_8 \text{Muslim_pop}_i + \beta_9 \text{German_LO}_i + \varepsilon i$$

Coefficients:

	Estimate	**Standardised**	**Std. Error**	**t Value**	**Pr(>|t|)**	
(Intercept)	2.74106	0	0.274644	9.98	2.25×10^{-16}	***
EPI	0.026048	0.586	0.002671	9.752	6.86×10^{-16}	***
Mulatto (ethn)	−0.443397	−0.117	0.172934	−2.564	0.011951	*
Asian (ethn)	−1.880652	−0.194	0.434192	−4.331	3.74×10^{-5}	***
PROTESTANT (S.R)	0.577261	0.223	0.168104	3.434	0.00089	***
Catholics (%)	−0.574504	−0.273	0.220611	−2.604	0.010722	*
Orthodox (%)	−0.78216	−0.27	0.23189	−3.373	0.001085	**
Protestants (%)	−0.541959	−0.146	0.310636	−1.745	0.084344	.
Muslims (%)	−0.472164	−0.203	0.234843	−2.011	0.047269	*
GERMAN (L.O.)	0.942412	0.229	0.1817	5.187	1.25×10^{-6}	***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' **0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '** 1. Residual standard error: 0.2961 on 97 degrees of freedom. Multiple R-squared: 0.8355, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8142. F-statistic: 39.35 on 12 and 93 DF, *p*-value: $< 2.2 \times 10^{-16}$.

Table 14: Model 1. Competitiveness in the world (Source: Author's collection).

15.3.1.1.1. Positive Correlations

The most significant variable is the *Environment Performance Index (EPI)*, which is highly positively correlated with competitiveness *GCI* (0.72). If *EPI* were removed from the model, R squared would drop by 17%. However, the same model without *EPI* exhibits similar results to Model 1 (Table 14) for the remaining variables. Here, an increase of *EPI* by one point is associated with a *GCI* growth of 0.026 points. *EPI* occupies larger units (mean value 70) than *GCI* (mean value 4) (The scale is standardised, meaning that these values refer to the non-standardised ranges; see Appendix 7).

A second important variable positively related to *competitiveness (GCI)* is the German legal origin: "*GERMAN (LO)*." Such countries have on average a higher *GCI* by 0.229.

Third, if Protestantism were the state religion "*PROTESTANT (S.R)*" (e.g. UK, Sweden, Denmark), then the overall effect would be positive on *GCI*. Establishing Protestantism as a state religion leads to a GCI increase of 0.223, which is far greater (almost double) than for a highly Protestant population. This confirms the higher importance of the institutional influence of religion compared with that of the proportion of adherents (in line with Section 7.1.)[18]

15.3.1.1.2. Negative Correlations

All variables related to *religion distribution in a population —Catholics (%), Orthodox (%), Protestants (%), Muslims (%)*) — are negatively correlated with *GCI*, although these correlations are only marginally significant. Nonetheless, the *Orthodox population* causes the most substantial negative effect. An increase by one percentage point of the *Orthodox population* leads to a decrease of 0.0078 units in GCI. The same goes for changes in the *Roman Catholic population*, where an increase in one percentage point of their population would mean a *GCI* decrease by 0.0057. Likewise, if the share of the *Protestant population* increased by one percentage point, *GCI* would decrease by 0.0054 units. Finally, if the share of the *Muslim population* increased by one percentage point, *GCI* would decrease by 0.0047 units.

On the other hand, *Mulatto* and *Asian ethnical* values both have a negative effect. A growth of one percentage point in the mulatto/Asian population means a 0.00117/0.00194 decrease in *GCI* respectively.

Models Analysing Major Religious Population Groups or State Religions Separately

Model 1 has shown a differential influence of the *religion distribution in a population* and of *state religion* on *GCI*. Models 2 and 3 were run to separate any potential differential

[18] Exceptionally, while "*Agnostic*" and "*Independent*" variables of religion distribution in a population positively affected GCI, they were not significant enough to be included in the model.

influence. Separate analysis of the two variables eliminates the possibility that a religious population distribution and a state religion would "overfit" the model.

15.3.1.2. Model 2 with Population Percentage

Model 2 shows the relation between the *percentage of religious adherents* and *competitiveness* while excluding *state religion* variables.

$$GCI_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{EPI}_i + \beta_2 \text{Caucasian}_i + \beta_3 Mulatto_i + \beta_4 Asian_i + \beta_5 Dogmas_i + \beta_6 Socialist_i + \beta_7 \text{German}_i + \beta_8 \text{Catholic_pop}_i + \beta_9 \text{Muslim_pop}_i + \beta_{10} Orthodox_pop_i + \varepsilon i$$

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Standardised	Std. Error	t Value	Pr(>|t|)	
(Intercept)	2.68713	0	0.411929	6.523	3.22×10^{-9}	***
EPI	0.031948	0.718076	0.003588	8.904	3.35×10^{-14}	***
Caucasian (ethn)	0.3062	0.182286	0.137576	2.226	2.84×10^{-2}	*
Mulatto (ethn)	−0.49164	−0.129827	0.212469	−2.314	0.022804	*
Asian (ethn)	−2.262534	−0.233818	0.607969	−3.721	0.000334	***
Dogmas	−0.06555	−0.161069	0.033539	−1.954	5.36×10^{-2}	.
SOCIALIST (L.O.)	−0.223811	−0.125531	0.111884	−2	0.048283	*
GERMAN (L.O.)	0.608521	0.147437	0.221393	2.749	0.007151	**
Catholics (%)	−0.435477	−0.217661	0.131934	−3.301	0.001355	**
Muslims (%)	−0.349915	−0.155187	0.191688	−1.825	0.071044	.
Orthodox (%)	−0.742669	−0.235604	0.192192	−3.864	0.000203	***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' **0.01** '*' **0.05** '.' **0.1** ' ' 1. Residual standard error: 0.3554 on 96 degrees of freedom. Multiple R-squared: 0.7559, Adjusted R-squared: 0.7304. F-statistic: 29.72 on 10 and 96 DF, p-value: $< 2.2 \times 10^{-16}$.

Table 15: Model 2. Competitiveness in the world including the percentage of *religious adherents* and excluding *State religion* variables (Source: Author's collection).

This model (Table 15) confirms the findings of Model 1 (Table 14) in the same order:

1. *EPI* is the most significant variable.

2. Increasing *Orthodox, Catholic,* and *Muslim* populations negatively influence *GCI*. However, the *Protestant population* and *other Christian adherents* are not significant in Model 2.

3. Model 2 confirms the direction and influence of most other variables in Model 1. However, in Model 2, *Caucasian* ethnic values positively influence GCI. Likewise, *Dogmas* and *Socialist* legal origin negatively impact GCI.

15.3.1.3. Model 3 (including State Religion)

Model 3 (Table 16) excludes the *percentage of religion adherents* variables. *State religion* variables alone explain most of the variability otherwise explained by religious population.

$$GCI_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{EPI}_i + \beta_2 \text{Caucasian}_i + \beta_3 Mulatto_i + \beta_4 Asian_i + \beta_5 \text{Catholic}_i + \beta_6 \text{Protestant}_i + \beta_7 Socialist_i + \beta_8 \text{German}_i + \varepsilon i$$

Coefficients:

	Estimate	**Standardised**	**Std. Error**	**t Value**	**Pr(>|t|)**	
(Intercept)	1.94889	0	0.205025	9.506	1.57×10^{-15}	***
EPI	0.032097	0.721417	0.003403	9.433	2.25×10^{-15}	***
Caucasian (ethn)	0.233095	0.138765	0.137925	1.69	9.42×10^{-2}	.
Mulatto (ethn)	−0.432751	−0.114276	0.197873	−2.187	0.03115	*
Asian (ethn)	−1.41671	−0.146408	0.503625	−2.813	0.00594	**
CATHOLIC (S.R)	−0.245126	−0.156268	0.091698	−2.673	8.82×10^{-3}	**
PROTESTANT (S.R)	0.307335	0.118639	0.147376	2.085	0.03966	*
SOCIALIST (L.O.)	−0.232813	−0.130581	0.113454	−2.052	0.04286	*
GERMAN (L.O.)	0.60705	0.147081	0.231532	2.622	0.01015	*

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' **0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '** 1. Residual standard error: 0.3552 on 98 degrees of freedom. Multiple R-squared: 0.7536, Adjusted R-squared: 0.7307. F-statistic: 32.96 on 9 and 97 DF, *p*-value: $< 2.2 \times 10^{-16}$.

Table 16: Model 3. Competitiveness in the world including *state religion* and excluding the percentage of *religion adherents* (Source: Author's collection).

The results of Model 3 (Table 16) ratify those of the previous models. The most significant positive influence on *GCI* comes from *EPI, Protestant state religion, Caucasian ethnicity,*

and *German legal origin*. In contrast, *Asian* and *Mulatto ethnicities, Roman Catholic state religion,* and *Socialist legal origin* would negatively affect *GCI*.

15.3.2. Stage 2: Modelling Competitiveness (Europe and the Americas)

The following models were produced explicitly for Europe and the Americas, excluding the noise existing in the world database. Likewise, Models 4 and 5 serve to compare whether the same variables chosen in the previous "world" models are still significant in Europe and the Americas.

15.3.2.1. Model 4. Results of Cross-Validation

$$GCI_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Hostilities_i + \beta_2 \text{German_lan}_i + \beta_3 \text{Catholic_pop}_i + \beta_4 \text{Orthodox_pop}_i + \beta_5 \text{EPI}_i + \varepsilon i$$

Coefficients:

	Estimate	**Standardised**	**Std. Error**	**t Value**	**Pr(>|t|)**	
(Intercept)	1.583	0	0.48642	3.254	0.00188	**
Hostilities	0.07461	0.18955	0.03368	2.215	0.03063	*
German (lang)	0.82223	0.24086	0.26625	3.088	0.00307	**
Catholics (%)	−0.49853	−0.29507	0.15608	−3.194	0.00225	**
Orthodox (%)	−1.04274	−0.44616	0.21537	−4.842	9.66×10^{-6}	***
EPI	0.03829	0.52268	0.00596	6.424	2.53×10^{-8}	***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' **0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '** 1. Residual standard error: 0.3771 on 59 degrees of freedom. Multiple R-squared: 0.6556, Adjusted R-squared: 0.6264. F-statistic: 22.46 on 5 and 59 DF, *p*-value: 1.54×10^{-12}.

Table 17: Model 4. Competitiveness in Europe and the Americas (cross-validation method) (Source: Author's collection).

This result shows the high robustness of this model (Table 17), in that it explains almost 66% of *GCI* variability with four significant variables at a 99% confidence level:

1. *EPI* is the most important variable because it accounts for most of the *GCI* variability. The increase in *EPI* by one percentage point is related to a "GCI" growth of approximately 0.038 percentage points.

2. The second most important variable is the *Orthodox population*, which exerts the most substantial negative effect in the model. If the *Orthodox population* increased by one percentage point, *GCI* would decrease by approximately 0.010 percentage points.

3. Similarly, the effect of the *Roman Catholic population* also negatively influences competitiveness. If the *Roman Catholic population* increased by one percentage point, *GCI* would drop by approximately 0.005 percentage points. This finding, along with the previous one (2), is consistent with La Porta et al.'s (1999) conclusions about the negative influence of hierarchical religions on prosperity.

4. Finally, the proportion of the *German-speaking population* positively affects *GCI*. An increase of 1 percentage point in *the German-speaking population* would mean a *GCI* increase by approximately 0.008 percentage points. This finding would confirm a positive relationship (as outlined in Section 11.1).

15.3.2.2. Model 5. Results with Step

$$GCI_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Hostilities_i + \beta_2 \text{GERMAN_LEGAL}_i + \beta_3 \text{Catholic_pop}_i + \beta_4 \text{Orthodox_pop}_i + \beta_5 \text{EPI}_i + \varepsilon i$$

Coefficients:

	Estimate	**Standardised**	**Std. Error**	**t Value**	**Pr(>|t|)**	
(Intercept)	1.606434	0	0.479997	3.347	0.00143	**
Hostilities	0.075303	0.191317	0.033201	2.268	0.027	*
GERMAN (L.O.)	0.759773	0.260367	0.224315	3.387	0.00126	**
Catholic_pop	−0.499403	−0.295584	0.153919	−3.245	0.00194	**
Orthodox_pop	−1.04258	−0.446087	0.212236	−4.912	7.49×10^{-6}	***
EPI	0.037974	0.518342	0.005882	6.456	2.24×10^{-8}	***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' **0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '** 1. Residual standard error: 0.3719 on 59 degrees of freedom. Multiple R-squared: 0.6651, Adjusted R-squared: 0.6367. F-statistic: 23.43 on 5 and 59 DF, *p*-value: 6.91×10^{-13}.

Table 18: Model 5. Competitiveness in Europe and the Americas (Step method) (Source: Author's collection).

"Step" is a fundamentally different method, yet mostly exhibits the same results as those of cross-validation. Step analysis further confirms the choice of the right variables (based on reality, not on random data effects). Here, the only difference is that Step analysis chose *GERMAN (legal origin)* instead of *German language* (percentage of German-speaking population) with 99% confidence. The chapters discussing the theoretical framework and conclusions further discuss these variables and findings.

GERMAN (legal origin) is a binomial variable, meaning that if a country is of *German legal origin*, then its *GCI* is 0.759 higher. If it is not of *German legal origin*, then the variable does not affect *GCI*. Only these two extremes exist.

On the other hand, the variable *Social Hostilities due to religion* also appears in Models 4 (Table 17) and 5 (Table 18). It exhibits the lowest value of standardised beta and also low values. More importantly, this variable appeared only at 90% confidence value (all other results had a 99% confidence value). Therefore, this variable is not sufficiently significant.

Finally, standard deviation confirmed the results of both cross-validation (Model 4) and Step (Model 5) and found the same, most robust coefficients. Consequently, only four variables in the models had statistical significance.

15.3.3. Conclusions for Competitiveness

15.3.3.1. Conclusions for Competitiveness in the World (All Models)

The consistent results of the five previous models are:

1) A positive influence of *EPI* on *GCI*;
2) A positive influence of a *German legal origin* (or *German language*) on *GCI*;
3) A negative influence of an *Orthodox population* on *GCI*;
4) A negative influence of a *Roman Catholic population* (or *Roman Catholic State Religion*) on *GCI*.

These results are valid for the world (Models 1, 2 and 3) as well as for Europe and the Americas (Models 4 and 5).

Partially conclusive findings:

Ethnic influence appeared with some degree of importance in the world models but disappeared in Europe and the Americas.

Socialist legal origin (Models 2 and 3) negative influenced *GCI*.

The influence of the share of *Protestants in the population* is not conclusive. In Model 1, Protestants negatively affected *GCI*, after *Orthodox and Roman Catholics*, but disappeared in Model 2 (religious population).

Neither *Protestant population* (1) nor *Protestant State Religion* (2) are significant variables for competitiveness in Europe and the Americas (Models 4 and 5). Hypothetical reasons for such findings include (1) the high influence of Pentecostalism in the Protestant population today might neutralise the possible positive effect of historical Protestantism. Pentecostalism impacts little on human capital and institutions (Becker et al., 2016; McCleary, 2013;

Woodberry, 2012) and has often fallen into established practices "of corporatism and clientage" (Martin, 1999, p. 40; Schäfer 1997), (Section 10.4.3). (2) While Switzerland and the United States are the most competitive (*GCI*) countries, they do not have Protestantism as their state religion, despite being historically Protestant (Barro & McCleary, 2005; Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

Nonetheless, *Protestant State Religion* exhibited a positive significance on Model 3 (State Religion). This suggests that *Protestant State Religion* is more important for *GCI* than the proportion of *Protestants in the population*. The effect of *Protestant State Religion* on higher *GCI* might also be related to its influence in diminishing the institutional power of the Roman Church (Section 8.3.4). The latter conclusions both confirm Fanfani's claim as early as 1936 (as cited in Grier, 1997) that the separation of state and church is the critical prosperity trigger. Such a separation occurred mainly in Protestant countries for anti-clerical reasons. Fanfani argued that religion *per se* harms prosperity unless it leads to the separation of ecclesiastical and political/economic powers in a country (as historical Protestantism did).

15.3.3.2. Conclusions for Competitiveness in Europe and the Americas

In Europe and the Americas, Models 4 and 5 discover a combination of variables that largely explains *GCI* variability in the following order of importance:

Environmental Performance Index (EPI)

I found a high correlation of EPI with competitiveness *(GCI)*, as suggested by the environment-and-geography theory of prosperity (Diamond, 1997; Sachs, 2001; Brown & Lall, 2006). This index has by far the highest positive influence on *GCI* of all the variables considered and explains most of the *GCI* diversity. Higher *EPI* strongly implies higher *GCI*.

Legal Origin

As predicted in the variables description section, I found a highly positive relation of *German legal origin* and *German language* with *GCI*. The influence of the Reformation on

the German legal system has been widely discussed (Witte, 2002; Berman, 2003) (Section 8.3.4). Likewise, several studies (Besch, 1999; Greenslade, 1963) have discussed the influence of the Reformation on the dissemination and standardisation of the German language (Section 11.1).

b. Corruption

15.3.4. Proxy Predictor Variables for the Regression Model of Corruption

The quantitative model used here tested some proxy variables of selected main determinants of corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 2006; Alesina et al., 2003). Such predictor variables are:

1. Proxies of economic prosperity: the *log GDP per capita* ($GDPPC$) and the *Index of Economic Freedom* (IEF);

2. Proxies of democracy: the *Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index* ($PRCL$) and the *Political Stability Index* ($STABIL$).

3. Proxies of culture: the *percentage of Roman Catholics* ($CATH$), and *Protestants* ($PROT$) in the population. This also includes *ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalisation* measures ($ETHF$, $LING$ and $RELF$ respectively).

For each variable, the latest available data were used (one observation per country). Please refer to Annex 1 for details on the variables and sources.[19]

[19] *Note:* I have previously explained the essential theoretical variables and clarified that prosperity, democracy, and transparency are all part of the same outcome in terms of my research aims. Therefore, the variables researched in this regression model do not show causal effects. Finding causality between corruption and GDP, PRCL, IEF, or STABIL is problematic due to endogeneity issues (Lambsdorff, 2006) (i.e. in reality, they might all form part of the same phenomenon or syndrome and all belong to the GCI index) (World Economic Forum, 2016). Further, correlations only exhibit relations but no causalities (Section 15.2.1).

15.3.4.1. Regression Results for Corruption in Europe and the Americas

Data analysis includes a regression tree (see Figure 8). The *Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index (PRCL)* is the most critical factor in determining the *Corruption Perception Index (CPI)*. Lower corruption levels (CPI = 81.5) are evident in countries with a ($PRCL$) ≥44 and that also have a higher log GDP per capita ($GDPPC$ > 10.6). Such results are entirely consistent with the respective theoretical predictions (Sections 3.1, 3.3 and 8.1 indicate that these variables are part of the same phenomenon). In line with theory (Section 6.1), transparency increases even more if the country in question also has a high proportion of *Protestants* ($PROT$> 0.24) in its population (CPI = 84.75).




Figure 8: Regression tree, with the mean value of *CPI*, the number of observations and percentage deviance.

The minimum number of observations per node for a split to be attempted is set to 15. Any split not decreasing the overall lack of fit by a factor of 0.005 is not attempted. (Source: Author's collection).

This regression tree confirms that $PRCL$; $GDPPC$ and $PROT$ are all positively related to transparency (or vice versa, negatively related to corruption). $GDPPC$ and $PROT$ do not seem to play an essential role in countries with low PRCL (democracy). This result is also in

line with theory. For instance, Treisman (2000) found that only stable democracy (before 1950) reduces corruption. Most of the Protestant upsurge in the developing world has stemmed from Pentecostalism after 1950 (Johnson & Zurlo, 2016), which only marginally impacts human capital and institutions (Becker et al., 2016); (McCleary, 2013); (Woodberry, 2012).

$$CPI_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GDPPC_i + \beta_2 IEF_i + \beta_3 PRCL_i + \beta_4 STABIL_i + \beta_5 PROT_i + \beta_6 CATH_i + \beta_7 ETHF_i + \beta_8 LINGF_i + \beta_9 RELF_i + \varepsilon i$$

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)	
(Intercept)	-95.7267	22.615	-4.233	0.0000962	***
GDPPC	10.5639	2.1555	4.901	0.0000101	***
IEF	0.2921	0.1499	1.949	0.05686	.
PRCL	0.546	0.1721	3.173	0.00256	**
STABIL	4.0372	2.7122	1.489	0.14276	
PROT	17.9297	6.2714	2.859	0.00614	**
CATH	-2.242	4.2163	-0.532	0.59721	
ETHF	-10.4336	6.4496	-1.618	0.11189	
LING	13.9763	6.6231	2.11	0.03976	*
RELF	-1.1927	5.9927	-0.199	0.84303	

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' **0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '** 1 Residual standard error: 7.503 on 51 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.8848,Adjusted R-squared: 0.8645. F-statistic: 43.54 on 9 and 51 DF, p-value: $< 2.2 \times 10^{-16}$

Table 19: Model 6. Corruption in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author's collection).

The estimates in Table 19 corroborate the relation between lower *corruption* (or higher transparency) and a high proportion of Protestants in the population. Similarly, other predictor variables, above all $GDPPC, PRCL, LING$, correlate with lower corruption levels (i.e. higher CPI). The negative impact of the share of Catholics in the population is less visible, with a lower coefficient in magnitude. These results are entirely compatible with theory, in particular with Treisman (2000).

As indicated by the positive coefficients for $LING$, linguistic fractionalisation tends to imply lower corruption. This trend is illustrated by countries (e.g. Luxembourg, Canada, or Switzerland) facing low corruption and featuring in the top ten countries of the present sample regarding language fractionalisation. Conversely, a higher level of ethnic fractionalisation ($ETHF$) tends to be associated with higher levels of corruption, as established by other empirical studies (Section 10.1). This observation confirms that linguistic heterogeneity does not necessarily coincide with ethnic heterogeneity. For

instance, most Latin American countries are relatively homogenous concerning language but less so regarding “ethnicity” or “race.”

The regressions do not display any significant relation between religion fractionalisation *RELF* and corruption. Consequently, low corruption is present in both multicultural, free societies with high measured religious fractionalisation (e.g. United States, United Kingdom, Canada), and countries with low religious fractionalisation (e.g. Luxembourg or Belgium). A “packed” index of fractionalisation measures works like a “black box” as analysing interactions between the components (i.e. each language or ethnicity) is impossible.

15.3.4.2. Conclusions for Corruption in Europe and the Americas

Generally speaking, the conclusions reached here about the selected variables resemble those of previous research (Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2001; Arruñada, 2010; Chase, 2010; and to a less extent La Porta et al., 1999). Results were validated using different databases and methods.

15.3.4.2.1.Proportion of Protestants

The findings confirm my hypothesis that corruption levels are directly (i.e. negatively) related to the proportion of Protestants in countries in Europe and the Americas. Thus, the share of the Protestant population might play an essential role in reducing corruption. This result is consistent throughout the regressions and the regression tree and confirms previous empirical studies (e.g. La Porta et al., 1997; Treisman, 2000; and Chase, 2010). The influence of Protestantism is further explored using the QCA method, which enables one to consider other variables also playing an essential role besides population share.

15.3.4.2.2. Proportion of Roman Catholics

Much of the previous empirical literature reports that Roman Catholicism, Orthodox and Islam religions correlate negatively with transparency (high corruption or low *CPI*) (Paldam, 2001; La Porta *et al.*, 1997; Chase, 2010). However, the negative relation between *Roman Catholics adherents* in the population and corruption (*CPI)* is not conclusive in my results.

While *Roman Catholics adherents* are present with a negative yet not particularly significant coefficient in the regression model, they are absent in the regression tree. Treisman (2000) reported comparable results when including proxy measurements for democracy and economic development in the model similar to mine. Those factors are, as discussed, interrelated rather than competing explanations.

As stated in the theoretical part (Sections 3.3 and 8.1), prosperity, democracy, and transparency might all be part of the same phenomenon. When regressing all those variables together, the model might dull the influence of other variables (e.g. *Proportion of Roman Catholics*). QCA further analyses this issue along with different variables.

15.3.4.2.3. Fractionalisation Measurements

No clear pattern exists in ethnic, linguistic or religious fractionalisation. Only linguistic fractionalisation is significant in the regression analysis, but no fractionalisation measurement appears in the regression tree analysis. Fractionalisation indices express "how diverse" countries are regarding language, religion and ethnicities. Further, the indices aggregate and "pack" such diversity into one figure (Alesina et al., 2003). Consequently, fractionalisation measurements prevent analysing the interactions of each specific religion, language, or ethnicity units using criterion (prosperity) variables. Such aggregation constitutes the main limitation of fractionalisation measurements. Therefore, the QCA section uses a disaggregated value to reflect the shares of the main ethnicities and languages spoken in a given country or region (Central Intelligence Agency of the United States [CIA], 2016).

15.3.4.2.4. Political Rights and Civil Liberties

As observed in the regression tree analysis, the political rights and civil liberties (*PRCL*) variable is the most significant factor relative to CPI. This finding was expected, on account of its theoretical relation with Protestantism. Woodberry (2012) and Becker et al. (2016) have provided ample empirical and historical evidence for the essential role of Protestantism (i.e. Protestant missionaries) in the rise and spread of stable democracies around the world.

15.3.4.2.5. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita

As explained, *GDP* per head was expected to be a significant predictor variable and is negatively related to corruption in the tree regression method.

15.3.5. General Conclusion: Models of Religious Population (Competitiveness and Corruption)

Generally, the models presented here suggest that Orthodox and Roman Catholic populations correlate negatively with competitiveness in Europe and the Americas. However, their role in corruption appears less evident in the corruption model. In contrast, a Protestant population might play an essential role in reducing corruption. Nevertheless, the role of the Protestant population in competitiveness is less clear. The next component (QCA) expands on the understanding of these variables along with other proxies.

16. Component 2 (Meso): Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

This section comprises three subsections. The first explains the QCA research model logic after a brief introduction. The second introduces the QCA methodology. The third presents the QCA results for competitiveness and corruption and focuses on the four case studies discussed here.

QCA: A brief introduction

QCA is a causal approach situated between qualitative and quantitative methods (Giugni & Yamasaki 2009; Ragin 1987; Rihoux 2003). QCA is appropriate for studies involving small (5 to 55) observations or samples (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). However, studies with a large number of samples also exist (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).

Unlike regression analyses, QCA is *not* a statistical technique that focuses on the likelihood of the relations among variables. Instead, it is a method based on Boolean logic, rooted in set theory, and founded on the notions of sufficiency, the necessity of conditions, and conjunctural causation (Bara, 2014, p. 707; Ragin, 2000). The *necessary* conditions for an outcome are more the exception than the rule in the social sciences. Therefore, alternative combinations of conditions, which are jointly *sufficient* to explain the outcome, can be more significant (Ragin, 2000).

QCA assumes combinatorial and multiple causalities. It means that in QCA an outcome results from factors that react simultaneously with other conditions through several possible paths (Giugni & Yamasaki 2009; Ragin 1987). As Giugni & Yamasaki (2009) observe:

> First, it [QCA] assumes that causality is plural, and that there exist several "paths" which lead to a given outcome. In other words, a phenomenon does not need to have only one cause or set of causes. Second, causality is conjunctural, meaning that factors react in a "chemical" way or "in concert" with other factors (Mill 1967; Becker 1998: 65). Thus, causality is not additive, it is combinatory (p. 471).

Therefore, QCA enables distinguishing paths to success from paths to failure, which do not necessarily mirror each other (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 8). Likewise, QCA allows identifying configurations of factors (conditions—in this case, theories explaining prosperity differences—see Section 5 and Appendix 4) leading to an outcome (e.g. *transparency* and *competitiveness*).

Furthermore, QCA bases its logic on set memberships. Whether a country experiences high levels of corruption, for instance, can be expressed as a question of set membership: Is country X a member of those states that remain transparent/competitive or not? QCA clusters countries into affinity groups and enables nested case studies to be conducted. It also allows the explanation of actual circumstances in the investigated countries. QCA facilitates understanding differences and similarities, as well as causal mechanisms, through within-case and inter-case comparisons (Ragin, 2003).

Moreover, this study applies the fuzzy-set variant of QCA (fsQCA), which allows cases "to have gradations of their set membership" (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 13). It means that fsQCA capture empirically "different shades of grey" instead of "dividing the world into black and non-black" to inform the analysis and interpretation of results (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 13). As the authors explain:

> A case does not necessarily have to be a full member or a full non-member of a set, but can also be a partial member. The membership scores can fall anywhere between the two extremes of full membership value of 1 and full non-membership value of 0 (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, pp. 13-14).

In sum, QCA helps to find explanations for outcomes based on associations of necessity and sufficiency. It therefore allows comparing and analysing different indicators associated with theories of prosperity and their causal effect on the outcome.

I apply QCA to examine which combinations of conditions (for example, of different variables linked to prosperity theories) associate regularly with transparency/competitiveness or, on the contrary, with corruption. The analysis covers 65 countries in Europe and the Americas (see Appendices 10–12).

16.1. QCA Research Model

Appendix 12 contains a detailed model and definitions of the conditions, outcome, sources, and qualitative anchors. Below, I merely briefly explain the underlying rationale. I followed a mixed-methods research approach (quantitative and qualitative) and based the variables selection on the primary prosperity determinants identified quantitatively by theories from different fields (Table 20).

The database with prosperity variables in different countries constitutes the outcome (*Competitiveness: GCI and Corruption: CPI*). On the other hand, the data of the various theories of prosperity (*Environment Performance (EPI), Religion population, State Religion Legal Origin, Institutions, Ethnicities*) constitute the causal conditions (for the conditions and outcomes of this study, see Table 20 or Appendix 12).

Extensive empirical research supports the entire set of theories interrelated here (see Part III; Table 20, Appendix 12). Further, the whole set of theories robustly explains the prosperity differences in the examined countries. Indicators were chosen to consider the theoretical discussions related in Part III and Table 20. These were derived from a diverse range of publicly available sources. The latest available data for the indicators provided a picture of present-day reality (2016 reports; this is analogous to the quantitative part, i.e. regressions). However, not all the variables were available in 2016 (none, however, were older than 20 years). Appendix 12 contains the databases and sources used, as well as a more detailed explanation of each indicator.

The different years of publication of the original data sources are not a significant problem here. I have previously discussed the issue of long-term persistence (centuries) of countries' relative prosperity performance as well as religious and environment variables (Sections 8 and 15.2.1.1). Besides providing theoretical support, the previous quantitative component of this research (regressions) used cross-validation, trees, and an automated method of variables selection. This confirmed the crucial variables, thus making data selection more objective.

	Category (prosperity theory associated)	Subcategory / (Results group)	Main Theoretical discussion related to outcome		
Conditions	Religion	Christian denomination (proportion in population) / (1)	From Weber (1905) to Becker et al. (2016)	The three following works analyse all the categories: 1. La Porta, et al. (1999); 2. Acemoglu & Robinson, (2012); 3. Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, (2017): However, they consider institutions and outcomes mainly from an economic perspective (i.e. excluding Concordats with the Vatican as institutions). Likewise, these three works analyse culture in its narrow form of religious determinism on culture (adherents).	* Religion and Institutions overlap at this point
	Institutions	Agreements with the Vatican / (all 5)	Witte (2002); Miller (2012); Cook (2012)		
		State religion / (2)	(Barro and McCleary, 2005)		
		Legal origin / (3)	(La Porta et al., 1999); (Merryman & Pérez, 2007)		
	Environment and geography / (all 5)		(Diamond, 1997); (Sachs, 2001; 2003)		
	Cultural determinants (other than religion)	Main Languages fractionalisation / (4)	(Hofstede, 2001); (Alesina et al., 2003)		
		Main Ethnical fractionalisation / (5)	(Alesina et al., 2003)		
Outcome	Competitiveness / (all 5)		(Grim, Clark , & Snyder , 2014)		
	Corruption / (all 5)		(Rose-Ackerman, 2006); (Chase, 2010)		

Table 20: Categories of conditions and outcome and principal theoretical works (Source: Author's figure).

Below, I explain how outcomes and causal conditions were calibrated.

16.2. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) Methodology

QCA is used to analyse both quantitative and qualitative data, thus enabling causal inferences. The QCA methodology allows for up to seven variables to be tested for their impact on an outcome variable. A truth table is built from qualitative, quantitative, or both kinds of data to show all possible configurations of those variables. The truth table is then analysed algebraically (rather than statistically) to generate one or more statements identifying various conjunctions of sufficient conditions for the outcome to have occurred (Bazeley, 2012, p. 823).

16.2.1. Calibration of Outcome and Causal Conditions

Outcome requiring explanation: The corruption and competitiveness of different countries.

Relevant causal conditions: Theories discussed in the theoretical framework (Appendix 12 discusses calibration in detail).

The calibration process followed the strategy described by Schneider & Wagemann (2012):

> The calibration of fuzzy-set membership scores has to be based on theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence. Obvious facts, accepted social scientific knowledge, and the researchers' own data collection process all inform the calibration process. Statistical distributions and parameters of underlying quantitative data can provide useful information for calibration (p. 41).

Accordingly, the following aspects informed the calibration of the fuzzy-set membership scores: relevant theoretical and social scientific knowledge, and obvious facts (see Parts II, III, and Appendix 4); empirical evidence and the researcher's data collection (see Appendices 7-10, 16); statistical distributions and parameters of quantitative data (see Section 15). However, the quantitative scales and statistical parameters (Appendices 7-9 and Section 15) were *not* automatically transformed to calibrate the fuzzy-sets by default. Such an automatic transformation "is strongly discouraged, as this does not fulfill the requirement

of using calibration criteria that are external to the data and is thus unlikely to lead to set-membership scores that reflect the meaning of the concept that is meant to be captured" (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, pp. 41).

First, all relevant conditions were divided into five groups 1: predominant religion (population), 2: state religion, 3: legal origin, 4: languages, and 5: ethnicities). Conditions were combined according to their theoretical relevance. Subsequently, data were calibrated with two goals in mind: to reflect reality as much as possible while striking a balance (i.e. excluding two cases where the condition is met out of 50).

Conditions were calibrated using the "direct method," i.e. focusing on qualitative anchors (Ragin, 2000). Anchors were chosen to reflect reality based on the distribution of each condition in the data. At the same time, to understand the effects and interaction of each condition, they required sufficient presence. Many possible anchor configurations were tested to find the optimal solution for each condition. Appendix 12 includes all the conditions and qualitative anchors, as well as a description of indicators.

16.2.1.1.1. EPI and Concordats Present in All Groups (Along with the Outcome)

The only subcategories exhibiting merely one indicator were the *Environment Performance Index* (*EPI*) and *Concordats* (Agreements with the Vatican). This made including these subcategories in all the result groups feasible.

Concordats are a new qualitative indicator, established here based on Corral & Petschen (2004). This indicator accounts for the international agreements signed by countries with the Roman Catholic Church.

The Roman Catholic Church-State is the inheritor of the Roman Empire and its imperial territoriality (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, Romanism is the only religious system that, at one and the same time, is a state exercising political (and not only symbolic) functions in today's geopolitical order (Agnew, 2010). Therefore, "Agreements with the Vatican: *Concordats*" is an essential proxy of the legal, institutional, and political closeness of a state with the

Roman See (see Appendix 12 for details on the calibration and thresholds of the other indicators).

16.2.2. Truth Tables

After calibration, truth tables were created for each of the five condition groups to measure both competitiveness and corruption. Each of the groups contains one truth table for a positive outcome and another for a negation of the outcome (i.e. its opposite). Accordingly, 20 truth tables were created in total (see Appendix 13).

Inclusion cut-off (incl.cut) was between 0.85 and 0.9 in all cases. Venn diagrams were created to facilitate orientation in truth tables. Sufficiency and necessity analysis was conducted. As the last step, all truth tables and analyses were interpreted both column-wise and row-wise.

Truth tables involve mixed-origin data analyses (quantitative, i.e. *EPI, CPI*; qualitative, i.e. *Concordats*). Conclusions were drawn only from configurations displaying high consistency and high coverage scores.

Consistency thresholds (incl.) were defined by a gap between truth table rows with higher and lower consistency scores (see Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 128). Generally, scores below 0.75 should be avoided. Analysis strictly disregarded consistency scores lower than 0.9, thus producing even more reliable results.

16.2.3. Venn Diagrams

Venn diagrams visualise truth tables to facilitate analysis and the presentation of results. However, truth tables contain more detailed information, for instance, which countries belong to each combination of conditions and measures of belonging (e.g. PRI and incl; see Appendix 13 for conventions and actual truth tables. Section 16.3 presents Venn diagrams for competitiveness. For reasons of space, please refer to Appendix 14 for the Venn diagrams of *corruption*).

16.2.3.1. Colours in Venn Diagrams:

Green = outcome 1 in the truth table. Green sections indicate that an outcome exists for a specific condition.

Orange = outcome 0 in the truth table. Orange sections indicate that no outcome exists. In other words, such a combination does not lead to the outcome (e.g. low corruption).

White = logical remainder in the truth table (empty row). White sections indicate that logical remainders exist (no cases exist for this combination of conditions).

16.2.3.2. Background Colours in Venn Diagrams

Background colours in Venn diagrams denote what happens if no condition is present. Attention to green is called for as this means that if no condition is present, then the outcome is high (it suffices to have one such case to cause a change in colours in Venn diagrams, but not in interpretation). A white background means that no cases exist where no condition is present. An orange background means that when no condition is present, the outcome is not present, and at least one case exists to support this. A blue background indicates a logical contradiction between cases, thus probably indicating a problem.

16.3. Analysis of QCA Results

Five different models and their opposites were tested. Together, they addressed the most significant variables identified in the literature review and in the quantitative section of this study (regressions). Furthermore, the indicators identified in the literature review were included, yet not considered in the quantitative section (i.e. *Concordats*, due to their qualitative origin).

Given that QCA seeks to establish causal conditions, the present models identify pathways to *competitiveness* and *transparency* and their opposite (i.e. *low competitiveness* and *corruption*). No necessary conditions were found and merely a few conditions with sufficient coverage. The truth tables cluster the countries as close to reality as possible. The analyses are based on coverage (cov.r ~0.5) and consistency (incl. = or > 0.9) (For a guide to interpretation and to the conventions used in the truth tables, see Appendix 13. See Appendices 13–14 for truth tables, Venn diagrams, and QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm). The Venn diagrams below summarise the most important findings for *competitiveness* for all the groups of conditions. The Venn diagrams for *corruption* can be consulted in Appendix 14).

16.3.1. Competitiveness:

16.3.1.1. Predominant Religion (Proportion of Adherents) and Competitiveness.

For high *competitiveness*, high *EPI* suffices if *Concordats* with the Vatican are low and if the *Roman Catholic* and *Orthodox* population is low.



Positive outcome	Negative outcome
	
EPI and Protestant religion in the population positively impact competitiveness.	A combination of Concordats and Roman Catholic religion in the population decreases competitiveness. Orthodox religion in the population also has a weak adverse effect.

Figure 9: Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for *Competitiveness* with *Predominant Religion adherence* in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author's figure).

Sufficiency analysis determined with enough coverage (Cov.r) that low *Concordats*, low *Roman Catholic*, and low *Orthodox* religions in the population are sufficient for high competitiveness. Therefore, high competitiveness always occurs if these conditions are met (but this may also happen in other cases).

Note: *Agnostic and atheistic categories are not sufficiently present to affect the model as results remain unchanged. Consequently, to simplify the model, these categories were removed.*

16.3.1.2. State Religion and Competitiveness

No *State Religion* positively affects *competitiveness*. Having *Concordats* with the Vatican negatively influences competitiveness.



Positive outcome	Negative outcome
	
A strong positive influence of *EPI* is clearly visible. Both *Protestant* and *Catholic State religions* have a neutral effect in this analysis. Not enough *Muslim State* countries exist in the dataset to judge the effect of Islam.	*Concordats* negatively influence competitiveness.

Figure 10: Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for *Competitiveness* with *State Religion* in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author's figure).

The truth table "State Religion and Competitiveness" (Appendix 13.2, Truth Table 7) shows a cluster of Latin American countries with perfect coverage and consistency for the negative outcome. Such Latin American cluster presents substantial evidence for the negative outcome of competitiveness with high *Concordats*, low *EPI*, and the presence of *Catholic State religion*.

Regression model 1 ("Competitiveness in the world," Section 15.3.1) shows a positive effect of Protestant state religion, which disappeared in the models of Europe and the Americas. Cluster 11 in truth table 5 (Appendix 13.2) displays those countries that produce the positive outcome with Protestant state religion (DNK, FIN, GBR, ISL, NOR, SWE). Section 8.3.4

has shown that these countries established their state religions under the influence of the Protestant 16th-century revolution in Germany. The United States went one step further and removed state religion.

Note: Albania, the only *Muslim state* country in the dataset, also presents perfect coverage and consistency for the negative outcome of "State Religion and Competitiveness" (Appendix 13.2, Truth Table 7). However, Albania is not that interesting, because it is only one country, which is not enough to draw any definitive conclusions. Probably, if more *Muslim States* were included in the dataset, such analysis would be useful. In contrast, Latin American countries provide robust evidence since ten of them are present in the outcome.

16.3.1.3. Legal Origin and Competitiveness

The most important factor for high competitiveness is EPI. Additionally, factors like German, English, and Scandinavian legal origin help to increase competitiveness.



Positive outcome	Negative outcome
	
Countries with *German legal origin* (both with or without concordats) are highly competitive. *English legal origin* also helps to increase competitiveness but only in combination with high *EPI*. *English and Scandinavian legal origins* also enhance competitiveness (but it is not possible to determine their relationship to *EPI* and concordats due to lack of diversity).	A large number of cases (12) support the claim that a combination of French legal origin, Concordats, and low EPI, is associated with low competitiveness. This trend is robust and demonstrated mainly by countries from Latin America. Also, countries with a socialist legal origin tend to have low competitiveness if they have low *EPI*. No group with high *EPI* exhibits low competitiveness. Conditions leading to low competitiveness are the same as those leading to high corruption (Appendices 13–14).

Figure 11: Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for *Competitiveness* with *Legal Origin* in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author's figure).

The positive outcome for *Legal Origin* and *Competitiveness* in the previous figure (see also Appendix 13.2, Truth Table 9) shows that countries having high competitiveness are those influenced by the Protestant Reformation (Barro & McCleary, 2005; Johnson & Zurlo, 2016; Woodberry, 2012; Obinger, 2009).

However, two countries are the exception to the previous rule in the present clusters (Appendix 13.2, Truth Table 9). The first is Ireland, a country with *Catholic State Religion* (Barro & McCleary, 2005; Barrett, Kurian, & Johnson, 2001). The second is Austria, a historically Catholic country (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 36), whose population has mostly been Roman Catholic (Johnson & Zurlo, 2016). Moreover, Ireland and Austria are the only outliers in the group of traditional Roman Catholic countries, which typically have *French Legal Origin* (La Porta et al., 1999). Ireland adopted *English Legal Origin* (common law). Similarly, *German Legal Origin* profoundly influenced Austrian jurisprudence (ibid).

Regression analysis also confirmed that German Legal Origin has a consistently positive influence on competitiveness (Section 15.3.2.2). The theoretical framework corroborates this result (Section 8.3.4.1) (Witte, 2002; Berman, 2003). Further, *German Legal Origin* leads to high competitiveness despite the presence of high *Concordats*. This applies to Austria and Germany, where Adolf Hitler signed the *Reichskonkordat* with the Roman See in 1933 (valid to date). In sum, competitiveness seems to follow the same pattern as corruption with regard to *Legal Origin* (Appendix 14).

16.3.1.4.Languages and Competitiveness

The analysis of languages and competitiveness delivered no important results. However, it confirmed the result of the previous analyses, for which the combination of low *EPI*, *high Concordats*, and *Roman languages* are associated with low competitiveness.



Positive outcome:	Negative outcome:
	
QCA did not identify enough groups to conclusively establish a positive outcome. However, *EPI* is again crucial for high competitiveness. Likewise, all countries with high *competitiveness* have low *Concordats,* excepting Germany and Austria.	Truth table 15 (Appendix 13) shows a cluster of 11 South American countries having low competitiveness. These countries have low *EPI*, high *Concordats* and speak *Roman languages*. Hence, a combination of these conditions leads to low competitiveness, but none of these conditions alone does. It seems that the Russian language is not an essential condition for low or high competitiveness. The Russian language is present in the cases of Ukraine and Moldavia (low EPI) and Lithuania (high EPI).

Figure 12: Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for *Competitiveness* with *Languages* in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author's figure).

In this group, coverage is not high enough to formally establish sufficient conditions. Clusters created by languages are not as accurate as the groups differentiated in the previous three analyses.

16.3.1.5. Ethnicities and Competitiveness

Sufficiency analysis suggests that if a country has high *EPI* and both high and low *white ethnicities*, and if all other conditions are low (*Concordats, Latino, Mestizo,* and *other non-white ethnicities*), then it always exhibits high *competitiveness*.



Positive outcome	Negative outcome
	
Many (18) countries have *white ethnicity*, high *EPI* conditions and have high *competitiveness*. It seems that the combination of *white*, high *EPI* and high *Concordats* does not lead to high *competitiveness*, while *white*, high *EPI* and low *Concordats* does.	To attain a negative outcome (low *competitiveness*), a country should have high *Concordats*, low *EPI*, predominantly no *white ethnicities*, but predominantly other *non-white ethnicities* (Truth Table 19; Appendix 13).

Figure 13: Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for *Competitiveness* with *Ethnicities* in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author's figure).

Many combinations of conditions in this group (Ethnicities and Competitiveness) have low PRI. The evidence supporting these findings is not robust (Truth tables 17 and 19 in Appendix 13.2).

The next table summarises the QCA results for *corruption*. Venn diagram analyses of corruption often resemble those of *competitiveness* (Appendix 14).

16.3.2. QCA Results for Outcome Corruption

	Group (condition)	Positive outcome	Negative outcome
1	**Predominant religion in population (proportion of adherents)**	High *EPI* and *Protestant religion adherence* are associated with lower *corruption*, especially if both are present.	*Concordats* in combination with *Roman Catholic religion adherence* increase corruption. *Orthodox religion* has a similar negative effect.
2	**State Religion**	*EPI* and *Protestant State religion* again have a positive effect, i.e. decrease corruption. The difference is that *Concordats* might also have a positive effect only in the absence of *State Religion*.	Groups of countries with high *corruption* indicate the substantial adverse effect of *Concordats* in combination with *Roman Catholic State religion*. *Concordats* combined with *Roman Catholic or Muslim state religion* have a negative effect, i.e. increase corruption.
3	**Legal Origin**	*German* and *English legal origin* help reduce corruption, while *French* and *Socialist legal origins* and *Concordats* tend to increase corruption. All countries belonging to groups with *Scandinavian, German* and *English legal origins* have low *corruption* (and always high *EPI*). Countries with *Socialist legal origin* in combination with *Concordats* and high *EPI* tend to have low corruption.	Most countries with high corruption are of *French legal origin* and have high *Concordats*. This trend is robust (mainly caused by 13 Latin American countries). No group with high *EPI* has high corruption. Also, countries with *Socialist legal origin* combined with low *EPI* tend to have higher *corruption*. The adverse effect of French and Socialist legal origins and Concordats disappears if a country has high EPI.
4	**Languages**	Every country with low corruption has high *EPI*. The *German language* always leads to low corruption. Some *German*-speaking countries have high *concordats*. No country belonging to a group of *Roman language* has low corruption.	All countries belonging to groups with high *corruption* have low *EPI* (except for some Russian- speaking countries). In general, the *Russian language* tends to lead to higher *corruption*. *German* and *English*-speaking countries, in general, do not have high *corruption*. High *EPI*, low *Roman*, low *English* and low *Russian* language is a sufficient condition for low *corruption* (in this combination, *corruption* is undoubtedly low, although low *corruption* may be achieved in other ways).
5	**Ethnicities**	High *EPI* and high *white* ethnicities in combination with both high and low Concordats leads to low corruption. A sufficient path to low corruption is high *EPI*, high *white*, low *Latino*, low *mestizo*, and low other *non-white* ethnicities. Low *corruption* may happen in other ways, but always occurs in this configuration.	Countries with high *corruption* almost never have predominantly *white* ethnicities, are often *non-white,* and always have low *EPI*. All predominantly *mestizo* countries have high corruption. The effect of other conditions is not evident.

Table 21: Main QCA results for the five groups of conditions (Source: Author's figure). See Appendix 13.4 for truth tables and Appendix 14 for Venn diagrams of corruption.

The results in Table 21 are generally in line with the different theories explaining corruption/prosperity (Sections 5–6). Thus, factors associated with Protestantism as a rule denote paths to low *corruption* (or high transparency), such as Protestant adherents, Protestant State religion, German and English legal origin, and the German and English language. In contrast, factors associated with Roman Catholicism (or also Eastern Orthodoxy) involve paths to high *corruption*, such as Catholic adherents and Catholic State Religion, French legal origin, or Roman/Russian languages.

The various truth tables (Appendix 13) show that countries with similar conditions often belong to the same clusters. All these results substantiate Volonté's (2015) finding, namely the overlapping of different cultural and institutional factors towards the outcome. Thus, countries with similar conditions often appear in the same groups. Clusters and group selections have therefore proven to work well. While each path and condition could be analysed in-depth further to establish an even broader theoretical understanding of the results, I analyse only four cases in detail. These cases are the same case studies further considered in more detail in Part VI.

16.3.3. QCA Cases

This subsection analyses four qualitative cases (Switzerland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Colombia) from a QCA perspective (Please refer to chapter 14 for further information on the criteria for case selection and more detailed case analyses).

Regarding configurations that indicate enough coverage, high consistency, and an actual outcome, only Colombia and Switzerland (the two extreme cases) exhibited several consistent results. The other two cases (Cuba and Uruguay) only revealed one or two consistent outcomes (see below). The respective outcomes for Colombia and Switzerland are summarised in tabular form below. The extreme cases have either positive outcomes without negative ones (Switzerland) or negative outcomes without positive ones (Colombia) for both *competitiveness* and *corruption*.

16.3.3.1. Switzerland

16.3.3.1.1. Competitiveness

The combination of the following factors explains (highly consistently) Switzerland's high *Competitiveness*:

1) High Environment Performance (*EPI*);
2) Absence of *State Religion*;
3) Absence of a *Concordat* between the Swiss Confederation and the Vatican/Roman Catholic Church-State;
4) High relative adherence to *Protestant religion*;
5) *German legal origin*;
6) High proportion of *German-speaking population* (Swiss);
7) High proportion of *white ethnicity*.

Regarding *legal origin* and *languages* (groups 3 and 4), Switzerland stands alone in its corresponding clusters. In group 3, this is probably because the other two countries belonging to *German legal origin* (Germany and Austria) have high *Concordats*. In group 4, Switzerland probably stands alone due to its multilingual background (French, Italian, Romansh, and predominant (Swiss) *German*). The other German-speaking countries exhibit no such condition.

Switzerland	Conditions for Competitiveness	Solution	Cluster	Consistency (incl. = or > 0.9).
Positive outcome (high competitiveness)		**The positive outcome for competitiveness is associated with the following factor combination:**		
	(1) Christian denomination (share of population)	High EPI and adherence to the Protestant religion	CAN,DNK,FIN,GBR,CHE,ISL,NLD,NOR,SWE	0.975
	(2) State religion	No *State Religion*, low *Concordats*, high EPI	BEL,BGR,CAN,CZE,EST,GRC,CHE,NLD,ROU,RUS,USA	0.89
	(3) Legal origin	German legal origin, low *Concordats*, high EPI	CHE*	1
	(4) Main linguistic fractionalisation	Mainly German (Swiss)	CHE*	0.99
	(5) Main ethnic fractionalisation	White ethnicity, high EPI, low *Concordats*	BEL,BGR,CAN,CZE,EST,FIN,GBR,GRC,CHE,IRL,ISL,LUX,NLD,NOR,ROU,RUS,SWE,USA	0.94
Negative outcome (low competitiveness)		**The negative outcome for competitiveness is associated with the following factor combination:**		
	None	NA	NA	NA

Table 22: Conditions, solutions and clusters for competitiveness (Switzerland) (Source: Author's figure).

16.3.3.1.2. Corruption

Unlike the competitiveness analysis, not all group solutions are consistent for Switzerland with regard to corruption: *State religion* (2) and *ethnicities* (5) are not consistent. However, the following conditions may be said to encourage low *corruption* (high transparency) in the case of Switzerland:

1) High Environment Performance (*EPI*);
2) Absence of a *Concordat* between the Swiss Confederation and the Vatican State;
3) High relative adherence to the *Protestant* religion;
4) *German legal origin*; and

5) High proportion of *German-speaking* population (Swiss).

Analysing corruption calls for the same considerations as when analysing competitiveness. The outcome is the same: Switzerland appears on its own in the clusters of groups 3 and 4 (legal origin and languages).

Switzerland	**Conditions for Corruption**	**Solution**	**Cluster**	**Consistency (incl. = or > 0.9).**
Positive outcome (low corruption)		**The positive outcome for corruption (high transparency) is associated with the following factor combination:**		
	(1) Christian denomination (proportion in population)	High EPI, low *Concordats*, adherence to Protestant religion	CAN,DNK,FIN, GBR,CHE,ISL,NLD,NOR,SWE	0.96
	(2) State religion	-	-	-
	(3) Legal origin	German legal origin, High EPI, low *Concordats*	CHE*	1
	(4) Main linguistic fractionalisation	Mainly German (Swiss), High EPI, low *Concordats*	CHE*	1
	(5) Main ethnic fractionalisation	-	-	-
Negative outcome (high corruption)		**The negative outcome for corruption (low transparency) is associated with the following factor combination:**		
	None	NA	NA	NA

Table 23: Conditions, solutions and clusters for corruption (Switzerland) (Source: Author's figure).

In Switzerland, most conservative Catholics escaped modernisation and centralism by relocating to the mountains, while Liberals and Protestants mostly remained in flat areas that became industrialised (Obinger, 2009). The federal government has been mainly liberal (anti-clerical) and close to Protestantism (ibid). Likewise, the Protestant population was in the majority until the 1970s (Federal Statistical Office 2017). Currently, the Protestant cantons are the most competitive, while the mountainous Roman Catholic cantons are the least competitive in the Swiss Confederation (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016).

16.3.3.2. Uruguay

In the case of Uruguay, consistency and coverage are generally not high enough to draw significant conclusions.

16.3.3.2.1. Competitiveness

Regarding the positive outcome — *competitiveness* related to *predominant religion* — Uruguay clustered uniquely with Chile (incl. 0.88) in an outcome where one of the most critical factors determining high competitiveness is EPI (Truth Table 1, Appendix 13.2).

Uruguay exhibits the highest levels of social progress in Latin America (Section 4.2), as well as high safety (UNODC, 2013). Along with Chile, it is the only country in Latin America with low perceptions of corruption (Transparency International, 2016).

Further, Uruguay is by far Latin America's most secular country with the lowest religiosity and lowest proportion of Roman Catholics on the continent (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 46; Gallup, 2010). The Roman Catholic Church-State did not significantly establish itself in Uruguay, unlike in most Latin American countries. After gaining independence in 1828, Uruguay continued a secular direction with the recognition of civil unions in 1837. In 1917, the Uruguayan constitution completely separated church and state. Religious instruction was banned from public schools and divorce became legalised. Consequently, Uruguayan governments have since progressively reduced the influence of the Roman Catholic Church-State without, however, repressing religion as in Communist systems (Barber, 2012). Thus, for instance, the early and effective separation of church and state meant that the State gained complete control over its education system already in 1877. This is unusual in Latin America (Da Costa, 2009).

16.3.3.2.2. Corruption

Like Cuba, the only condition with an incl. near 0.9 is the positive outcome for *corruption* related to *predominant religion* in the population (incl. 0.831) (Truth Table 21, Appendix 13.2). In this group, Uruguay clustered with Chile and Cuba. This cluster shows three countries with an unusual performance outside the entire group of Latin American countries. First, they exhibit the relative lowest corruption in the region. Second, Chile and Uruguay separated church and state in their constitutions unusually early in Latin America (1925 and 1918 respectively); Cuba did so in the wake of the Communist revolution (1959). Thirdly, none of these countries has signed a Concordat with the Roman Catholic Church-State. Some other Latin American countries such as Brazil also separated church and state relatively early, but signed international agreements with the Roman See. Fourthly, they exhibit favourable environmental performance (EPI). Geographically, Argentina should also appear in this cluster for geographical and environmental reasons. This, however, is not the case. Argentina has a Concordat with the Vatican/Roman Catholic Church-State, and its constitution still privileges the Roman Catholic Church.

16.3.3.3. Cuba

16.3.3.3.1. Competitiveness

(Cuba has no data on competitiveness)

16.3.3.3.2. Corruption

In the case of Cuba, coverage and consistency are generally not high enough to draw significant conclusions from the analysis. However, two important findings are:

1. Cuba appears, with high consistency (0.907), in the cluster MDA, MKD, UKR, BIH, CUB for the negative outcome of corruption associated with *legal origin* (Truth Table 31, Appendix 13.2). All the countries in this cluster have a *socialist legal origin* and are located mostly in Europe, except for Cuba.

2. The sole other consistent condition with an incl. near 0.9 is the positive outcome of *corruption* for *predominant religion* in the population (incl. 0.831) (Truth Table 21, Appendix 13.2)**.** In this group, Cuba clustered with Chile and Uruguay, those countries with the lowest perceived corruption in Latin America (Transparency International, 2016).

Cuba ranks in the middle of world distribution on the transparency index (Transparency International, 2016). Compared to the cases studied (Europe and the Americas), the countries clustering with Cuba exhibit moderate to high corruption due to their *Socialist Legal Origin*. However, compared to the rest of Latin American countries, the cluster including Cuba shows moderate to low corruption (i.e. not as high as countries such as Venezuela, Colombia, or Paraguay). In other words, separating the Catholic Church from the state had a positive influence (all three countries in this cluster — Cuba, Chile, and Uruguay — have vigorously implemented this separation). Nonetheless, adopting a socialist legal origin negatively impacts transparency (as the cluster of socialist countries, including Cuba, shows). Moreover, Cuba does not exhibit as much transparency as either Chile or Uruguay. The remaining clusters to which Cuba belongs do not exhibit high enough consistency (Appendix 13.2).

16.3.3.4. Colombia

The analysis of Colombia is diametrically opposed to that of Switzerland.

16.3.3.4.1. Competitiveness

The analysis of competitiveness and corruption in the case of Colombia reveals similar conclusions. Table 24 summarises the solutions for competitiveness, Table 25 those for corruption.

Colombia	Conditions for Competitiveness	Solution	Cluster	Consistency (incl. = or > 0.9).
Positive outcome (high competitiveness)	None	**The positive outcome for competitiveness is associated with the following factor combination:** NA	NA	NA
Negative outcome (low competitiveness)		**The negative outcome for competitiveness is associated with the following factor combination:**		
	(1) Christian denomination (proportion in population)	Concordats and Roman Catholic religion	ARG,COL,ECU,MEX,PER,PRY,VEN	0.931
	(2) State religion	High concordats, low EPI, Catholic State religion	ARG,BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,GTM,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN	1
	(3) Legal origin	French legal origin, Concordats, low EPI	DOM,MEX,SLV,GTM,BRA,COL,ECU,PER,ARG,BOL,PRY,VEN	1
	(4) Main linguistic fractionalisation	Low EPI, high Concordats, Roman languages	BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,ECU,GTM,MEX,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN	1
	(5) Main ethnic fractionalisation	Low EPI, non-white population, high concordats	COL,ECU,MEX,PRY,SLV	1

Table 24: Conditions, solutions and clusters for competitiveness (Colombia) (Source: Author's figure).

Note that Paraguay is the only country, alongside Colombia, that clusters for low competitiveness (Table 24) and high corruption (Table 25). Therefore, the QCA analysis for Paraguay may be expected to resemble Colombia with regard to competitiveness and corruption.

16.3.3.4.2. Corruption

Colombia	Conditions for Corruption	Solution	Clusters	Number of cases	Consistency (incl. = or > 0.9).
Positive outcome (transparency/low corruption)	None	**The positive outcome for *corruption (high transparency*) is associated with the following factor combination:** NA	NA	NA	NA
Negative outcome (high corruption)		**The negative outcome for corruption (low transparency) is associated with the following factor combination:**			
	(1) Christian denomination (proportion in population)	Concordats and Roman Catholic religion.	ARG,COL,ECU,MEX,PER,PRY,VEN	**7**	0.933
	(2) State religion	High concordats, low EPI, Catholic State religion	ARG,BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,GTM,HTI,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN	11	1
	(3) Legal origin	French legal origin, Concordats, low EPI	DOM,MEX,SLV,GTM,HTI,BRA,COL,ECU,PER,ARG,BOL,PRY,VEN	13	1
	(4) Main linguistic fractionalisation	Low EPI, high Concordats, Roman languages	BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,ECU,GTM,HTI,MEX,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN	12	1
	(5) Main ethnic fractionalisation	Low EPI, non-white population, high Concordats	COL,ECU,MEX,PRY,SLV	**5**	1

Table 25: Conditions, solutions and clusters for corruption (Colombia) (Source: Author's figure).

The combination of the following factors explains highly consistently the prevalence of low competitiveness and high corruption in Colombia *(as well as in Paraguay)*:

1) Low Environment Performance (*EPI*);

2) Concordat with the Vatican;

3) Roman Catholicism as state religion;

4) High adherence to Roman Catholicism;

5) French legal origin,

6) Roman language (Spanish); and

7) High proportion of other non-white population.

Colombia is considered “the most clerical Roman Catholic society of the continent” (Munevar, 2008, p. 389) and as “famous throughout Latin America for its powerful Catholic Church and its pervasive religiosity” (Levine, 1981, pp. 7-8). However, it follows Mexico on the blacklist of the top 50 countries where persecution of Christians is most severe in the world. Columbia and Mexico are the only two countries in the Western hemisphere on that list, along with countries in the Middle East and Africa (Open Doors, 2015). Colombia also exhibits very high homicide and corruption rates compared to the rest of the world (UNODC 2013, Transparency International, 2016).

In conclusion, a “Catholic and conservative hegemony” has existed in Colombia until 1991, when the Constitution of Rights was promulgated and religious pluralism became legally recognised (Figueroa 2008, pp. 256-270). However, as a result of centuries of hegemony, the Roman Catholic Church-State still enjoys ample privileges with the Colombian state (Munevar 2008); (Figueroa 2016).

Part VI: Component 3 (Micro) - Case Studies

Switzerland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Colombia

This component analyses four case studies against the background of a literature review and applying Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The case study approach is holistic and seeks to understand generalisable processes and patterns to construct an example of Grounded Theory (GT). In the present study, this approach combines *within-case* and *cross-case* causal inferences (comparative cases and QCA) in order to elucidate the causal mechanisms giving rise to empirical regularities (Goertz, 2017). To offer the broadest possible comparability, multiple case studies were conducted rather than a single in-depth case study.

This part contains six sections. While the following section describes the selection criteria and methods, the four subsequent sections develop the four case studies. The closing section compares and contrasts the four cases.

17. Case Selection Criteria, Methods, and Data Treatment

Nested cases (at the opposite ends of a negative-to-positive scale) were selected from the quantitative database (Appendices 7–10) for more in-depth empirical (i.e. within-case) analysis. Four countries were compared: Switzerland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Colombia. These cases are also linked to the correlated variables in the quantitative model and to the sufficient conditions in the QCA.

Cases were selected based on the "extreme case method." This consists of a selection of cases exemplifying extreme or unusual values of one of the variables of analysis. This approach is appropriate for exploratory research (Gerring & Seawright, 2008). The QCA cases (Section 16.3.3) already mentioned some of the variables that characterise these countries as extreme. Table 26 further illustrates and compares some of the variables

considered. The cases also analyse within-country variations by region (whenever possible) (i.e. more Catholic versus more Protestant areas in Switzerland, Uruguay, Colombia). Such analysis may also be a source of inferential leverage.

17.1. Extreme Positive Case (Worldwide): Switzerland

Switzerland has the highest competitiveness score in the world (World Economic Forum, 2016), one of the lowest homicide rates (0,6 (UNODC, 2013), and one of the lowest corruption indices in the world (85 (Transparency International, 2016). The country also enjoys widely acclaimed political, economic, and social stability. Its population and cantonal (i.e. federated) system exhibit a mixed distribution of Roman Catholics and Protestants, making it an ideal case to analyse and compare the historical influences of these denominations. Furthermore, the author developed this research in Switzerland, which facilitated accessing and gathering primary and secondary information.

17.2. Extreme Positive Case (Latin America): Uruguay

Uruguay has the highest social progress score in Latin America (Porter et al., 2015). Besides Chile, it is also one of the most transparent countries in Latin America (Transparency International, 2016) and one of the continent's most secular countries (Pew Research Center, 2014). These facts make Uruguay a worthwhile case for examining whether the factors that made Uruguay less religious have also made the country less corrupt and more equal. Consequently, this case provides vital information for understanding the interrelations between the variables under study.

17.3. Cuba: *A sui generis case* (Communist Proxy)

Cuba is the only Communist country in the Americas. Communism and secularism are still in force in a country of contrasts: Cuba has one of the lowest homicide rates in the Americas (4,2 (UNODC, 2013)) but also one of the continent's lowest social progress indexes (Porter et al., 2015).

The Cuban government actively suppressed religion for decades. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the government has increased religious liberty by opening up political space for religious belief and practice. This opening has resulted in a dramatic flourishing of religious life in recent years (Goldenziel, 2009). Further, Cuba might also serve as a proxy of former socialist countries that have tried to eradicate the influence of religion on the state through adopting Marxist ideology. Cuba currently faces corruption levels comparable to former Soviet countries (Transparency International, 2016).

17.4. Extreme Negative Case: Colombia

Colombia is a proxy country in Latin America. It is characterised by pervasive Roman Catholicism (i.e. with a valid Concordat, and one of the highest proportion of adults raised as Roman Catholics worldwide (Pew Research Center, 2014)). Other dominant features include high levels of corruption (Transparency International, 2016), and one of the world's lowest equality (World Bank, 2016) and safety rankings (World Economic Forum, 2017). Moreover, the author's first-hand experience of working in government, civil society and international agencies in his native country provided direct insight (along with his extensive network).

17.5. Summary of Case Selection Criteria

Each of the selected countries serves as a proxy of a larger group of countries (Latin American Strong Catholic, Secular, Communism, Protestant or mixed Old World.). Comparing Switzerland and Latin American countries illuminates how religion and

prosperity indicators evolve differently within diverse political systems and against the background of different historical roots.

Nested (extreme) cases were chosen for more in-depth empirical, quantitative and QCA analysis (Appendices 9–10). Table 26 summarises the four cases:

Item/Country	Colombia	Cuba	Uruguay	Switzerland
Social Progress Index	Medium	Low	High	High
Equality	Low	High	High	High
Crime & homicide rate	High	Low	Low	Low
Freedom of conscience and religious freedom	Recent (1991). However, the hegemonic power of the Church remains in place.	Recent (1992)	Old. 1837; 1918 total separation of church and state.	Old. 1798; the 1848 Constitution guaranteed freedom of religion, even if church and state were not completely separate.
Influence of the Roman Catholic Church on state affairs	High	Low	Low	Low
Religiosity	High	Medium-high (mostly Catholic and Afro- Cuban)	Low	Low
Competitiveness	Medium	Low	Medium	High
Education levels	Low	Medium	High	High
Influence of the Roman Catholic Church on education	High	Low	Low	Low
Corruption	High	High	Low	Low
Historical influence of the Protestant Reformation	Low	Low	Low	High
Percentage of Roman Catholics	High	Medium	Low (below 50%)	Low (below 50%)
Concordats with the Roman See	Yes	No	No	No, but some cantons have agreements. Switzerland has a unique dual legal system for the Church.
Christian persecution	High	Medium	Low	Low
Syncretism of spiritism rituals with Roman Catholic traditions	High	High	Low	Low
Incidence of liberation theology (LT)	Medium	Low (Cuban revolution influenced LT)	Low	Low

Table 26: A qualitative comparison of the four case studies (Source: Author's figure. Based on Beltrán & Quiroga, 2017; Beltrán, 2008; Blanco, 2008; Figueroa, 2016; Gill, 2013; 1998; Koonings & Krujit, 2004; Craham, 2017; 1979; Levine, 1981; Munevar, 2008; Obinger, 2009; Open Doors, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2014; Transparency International, 2016; World Economic Forum, 2016).

17.6. Methods and Data Treatment

The qualitative approach adopted here concentrated on which patterns in particular (Silverman, 2005, p. 9) might trigger the observed effects, and hence complemented the analysis of empirical correlations and QCA. The aim was to gain a greater understanding of the research problem (Zikmund, 2003, p. 111), hence complementing the statistical and QCA analyses of the previous sections, even if this approach implies that matters are "subjective in nature" (Zikmund, 2003, p. 132).

17.6.1. Qualitative Method: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Religion

Discourse analysis is central to this study, mainly because discourse, knowledge and power are closely related (Burr, 2003, p. 67; Carabine, 2001, pp. 267-268). One especially fruitful type of discourse analysis was established by the French philosopher Michel Foucault. He suggested examining the interconnections between discourse, knowledge and power based on his key concept of "genealogy." This, as we will see, is related to institutions and prosperity.

Foucault (1972) developed an elaborate conceptual framework for discourse analysis and proposed a rigorous methodological system to underpin such analysis. However, he did not provide a "how to guide" to genealogy. Hence, methodologies and applications vary (Carabine, 2001).

Importantly, CDA cannot be applied mechanically (Hjelm, 2014). Nor does any universal CDA methodology exist (Fairclough, 2010, p. 6). On the contrary, every analytical approach to discourse requires specific design (Hjelm, 2014, p. 860). Oswick (2012) shares similar views and sees CDA as the only discursive method for considering ideology and power. CDA bridges cultural and linguistic studies in a critical approach. Thus, it enables researchers to adequately examine the role of religion in creating, transforming, reproducing, and sustaining inequalities (Hjelm, 2014, pp. 855-58).

Equally importantly, CDA is ethically committed to exposing the processes through which discourses disseminate social structures that perpetuate hegemony (i.e. maintain and assert the interests of dominant groups or classes) (Fairclough and Wodal, 1997; Wodak as cited in Heracleous, 2006, p. 4) and suppress alternative constructions (Hjelm, 2014, p. 860).

CDA is one of the most used methodologies for analysing language and texts in a wide range of fields, including management and organisation studies (the Editors 2010, p. 1192). However, studies employing CDA are scarce in the sociology of religion, and the valuable research potential of CDA has been underused as a result (Hjelm, 2014; Moberg, 2013). Therefore, Hjelm (2014) has strongly encouraged sociologists of religion to apply CDA, due to the obvious lack of critical approaches to religion that take inequality and hegemony seriously (p. 857).

17.6.2. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) Protocol

Fairclough (1992), Fairclough (2010), and Gee (2011) have developed stringent guidelines for applying CDA. According to Fairclough (2010) selecting a CDA methodology involves developing a theoretical framework relevant to a specific research project than choosing from an existing repertoire of methods (Fairclough, 2010, p. 225).

What makes CDA unique is its division of analysis into three, cross-fertilising aspects: (1) Textual analysis, (2) Analysis of discourse practice, and (3) Analysis of social practice (including the relationship to existing hegemonies) (Hjelm, 2014, p. 861; Fairclough, 1992, p. 73). These categories are of central interest for this study as they help produce a comprehensive understanding of the impact of religion on the three levels of analysis:

The first level of analysis (textual) involves closely studying a range of texts such as political constitutions or Christian documents including The Holy Bible. Especially the Scriptures are central to analysing Christianity, as the text has remained largely unaffected by time for centuries (i.e. King James or Martin Luther versions). In contrast, Christian traditions have changed over time and vary among denominations.

The second level (analysis of discourse practice) considers the paradigms and public discourse of Protestants, Roman Catholic Church-State leaders, and government and civil society stakeholders.

The third level, (analysis of social practice) explores the coherence between formal and *de facto* discourses, including the "commonsensical" language of social practices. Typically, producing documents for their own sake neither relates to nor explains social practice. Nevertheless, it is possible to analyse their coherence and influence in institutions. Comparing lived reality beyond formal discourses allows identifying patterns of social acceptance related to corruption and prosperity.

17.6.3. Data Treatment

Sixty semi-structured interviews were conducted and analysed using memos and open coding (Appendices 6, 15–16). Protestant and Roman Catholic Church-State leaders, government, academics, and civil society stakeholders were interviewed in a snowball system between 2015 and 2017. Interviews were conducted in English, German, and French, in the German and French-speaking regions of Switzerland. Interviews in Latin America were conducted in Spanish and English (i.e. English speakers in the Colombian Caribbean). All interviews were translated into English before coding. For reasons of scope, not all the data or stakeholders interviewed appear in the main body of this study (see Appendix 16 for further information). Table 27 shows the total number of interviews conducted in each country.

Country	Colombia	Cuba	Uruguay	Switzerland	Total interviews
Number of interviews	16	15	12	17	60

Table 27: Interviews conducted in this research (Source: Author's figure).

Interviewees were mostly religious leaders or educated and informed stakeholders. Many stakeholders interviewed were also university professors or academic researchers.

Protestants, Catholics, or non-religious interviewees were also asked about their different ideologies.

17.6.3.1. Protecting interviewee identity

Before interviewing, stakeholders agreed to release their data on condition of anonymity. Consequently, the discussion offered in this study and the corresponding public datasets only contain stakeholders' general institutional affiliations for comparison/triangulation purposes (e.g. government officer, university expert-lawyer, Catholic priest, Protestant preacher). Other sensitive data possibly enabling identification were omitted.

17.6.3.2. Coding

Two qualitative researchers independently coded the data to align code application and code definitions (a total of three independent researchers). Moreover, the author took position in a separate memorandum (Appendix 3; for the entire qualitative datasets and codes, see Appendices 6, 15 and 16).

17.6.3.3. Triangulation

Triangulation is essential for crosschecking information through multiple procedures and sources. It produces either corroboration or convergence in the case of agreement, or divergence in the case of disagreement.

The notion of identifiable Roman Catholic or Protestant traditions requires gathering theoretical and historical data, as well as qualitative data from interviewees. Although interviewees shared their perceptions of religious traditions, these perceptions do not provide robust evidence of historical linkages or ramifications. Present-day interviewees can only share their impressions of what their country has inherited from its religious background.

Therefore, findings were triangulated using a triple strategy: 1) Diverse stakeholder perspectives were included in each code (e.g. interviews with a government officer, a Catholic priest, a Protestant pastor); 2) public documents or discourses; and 3) other materials (e.g. historical, theoretical, textbooks).

The next four sections provide background information on the religion–prosperity–institution nexuses for each of the four cases. Each case study includes charts that compare the different stakeholder principles identified in terms of 1) Prosperity, 2) Corruption or 3) Church-State relations. Each chart is followed by a three-level CDA analysis.

Case details vary depending on historical importance, the information relevant for comparison, and scope. More information is deliberately provided for Switzerland, since this is the only European country compared and contrasted with the three selected Latin American countries. Such detailed background information and three empirical analyses concern prosperity, corruption, and church-state relations. Consequently, the case of Switzerland also draws more detailed conclusions from its three empirical analyses. By comparison, each Latin American case contains briefer background information and merely one empirical analysis (Uruguay: prosperity; Cuba: corruption; Colombia: prosperity). The respective conclusions are synthesised in Section 22.

Appendix 16 contains the empirical information collected and codified for the four cases (the information may of course be used in future research). Each case begins by characterising the background information and the main features of the prosperity-corruption-religion nexus. This is followed by empirical analysis.

18.a) Switzerland: Extreme Positive Case Study (Worldwide)

In the name of God Almighty" (Preamble to the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, 2018)

"Protestants value rationality and hard work, and see wealth as a reward from God, an ethos which helped lay the foundations of modern Swiss prosperity." […] "Due to the influx of Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese workers, Catholics have outnumbered Protestants in Switzerland since the 1970s" (Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs – FDFA Presence Switzerland, 2018).

These passages from official Swiss government sources reflect the obvious historical importance of Christian religion in institutional affairs in Switzerland. This case study seeks to briefly describe the possible impacts of the two major historical religions (Protestants and Catholics) on Switzerland's institutions, and thus on the country's prosperity.

Switzerland is the world's oldest democratic nation-state, the oldest federal state in Europe and the world's most competitive country (World Economic Forum, 2016, 2017). By international standards, its institutional structure is exceptionally well-organised. Such outstanding characteristics are worthy of admiration considering the challenges facing an ethnically, linguistically, socioeconomically, and religiously diverse society. Moreover, such social divisions do not necessarily all cluster territorially (Gruner as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 180). The following sections consider the roots of prosperity and Christian religion in Switzerland.

18.1. Religious Roots of Swiss Prosperity

Obinger's (2009) detailed historical study concludes "that religion is indeed important for explaining the developmental trajectory of the Swiss welfare state…" (p. 177). It also extends significantly beyond Weber's (1905) understanding of Protestant rationality and hard work suggested by the FDFA (2018) (see citation at the beginning of this chapter). For Obinger (2009), religion has impacted Swiss social policy in complex and indirect ways. He identifies at least two channels of influence: first, the country's heterogeneous religious make-up, and thus its denominational divide, which has profoundly impacted state and institution building in Swiss society. Secondly, Switzerland's party system reflects the impact of religion on public policy in the "complexion of the federal government" (Obinger, 2009, p. 177). Both channels concern the strong religious tensions that dominated the modern Swiss state and nation-building from the outset. In this light, the next subsections analyse some historical institutional changes and several variations concerning the country's religious distribution.

18.2. Roman Catholics and Protestants in Switzerland

While Switzerland has traditionally been religiously diverse, Reformed Protestantism has predominated since the Protestant Reformation (Baumann & Stolz, 2009). However, since the 1970s Roman Catholicism has been the predominant religious denomination (see initial FDFA citation). Figure 14 maps Switzerland's denominations nearly two centuries after the beginning of the Protestant Reformation (16th century).




Figure 14: Denominations in Switzerland (1700) (Montandon, Gilbert, & Altermatt 1991 as cited in Baumann & Stolz, 2009, p. 100); used by permission of the authors).

The dark grey areas represent those regions where Roman Catholicism persisted after the Protestant Reformation. Notably, they correspond mainly to the central cantons of Lucerne and its environs, Fribourg, north-western Bern (present-day Jura), and the southern cantons of Valais and Ticino. The bright grey areas represent the Reformed cantons. These are Zürich, Bern, and Basel (i.e. today's German-speaking region), and Lausanne and Geneva in the French-speaking part. The striped and mid-grey areas represent mixed regions, some more Roman Catholic, others more Protestant. Today's cantons of St. Gallen and Grisons were fairly diverse.

This religious landscape was the result of successive wars between Roman Catholics and Protestants during the 16th and 17th centuries. Until the 19th century, religion meant state religion. Changing denomination or marrying across denominational boundaries involved losing one's citizenship and led to banishment. Therefore, Protestants and Catholics lived as "clearly defined political entities" (Head-König, 2017, p. 24). Moreover, such traditional denominational divides have determined the major trends and cultural characteristics of Switzerland's cantons to this day (Baumann & Stolz, 2009, p. 49).

18.3. Federalism and Liberalism

In political terms, Catholic-Conservatives have traditionally been federalist. This antecedent originated in the same founding document of the Confederacy, the Federal Charter of 1291 between the communes of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden (Catholic cantons until today) (Comité pour une Nouvelle Histoire de la Suisse, 2006). Liberals have been anti-clerical and centralist-oriented, and sided with the Protestant endeavour to overthrow the ancient order from the 1830s onward (Gould as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 180). Liberal ideology inherently involved an attack on the Roman Catholic Church-State and its preponderant role in education and other areas of society (p.180).

In 1848, the Swiss Federal State resulted from a late religious war (Gruner 1969, p. 23; Obinger, 2009, p. 180). Protestants emerged victorious from this denominational inter-cantonal civil war (*Sonderbund*), which meant that Protestants and non-denominational liberals were largely responsible for writing the Federal Constitution of 1848 (Obinger, 2009). Moreover, they have also dominated federal power until recently. By contrast, Roman Catholics have mostly been a political minority (not numerically) (Campiche & De Rham, 1977, p. 86; Girod, 1977). Social Democrats and Christian (Catholics) Democrats together held the government majority from 1959 to 2004. However, the existence of a significant and robust Catholic Democracy is barely evident (Linder as cited in Haenni, 2009).

According to Obinger, (2009), the 1848 Constitution, whose liberal principles were largely preserved up until the introduction of the revised federal constitution of 1999), was imposed by the liberals (*Freisinn*) against the will of Catholic-Conservative forces. For Kölz (1998), federalism was "a compromise between the more centralist-oriented Liberals and the federalist Catholic-Conservatives" (p. 28). Consequently, the Federal Constitution realises core liberal ideas such as "people's sovereignty, secularism, and the creation of a national market through the removal of trade barriers between the cantons" (Obinger, 2009, p. 180). Also, the creation of the Swiss Federal Constitution and state organisation involved a bottom-up process influenced chiefly by and borrowing from the "liberal constitutions that emerged at the cantonal level from 1830 onward" (Kölz as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 180).

Furthermore, the Swiss Federal Constitution used United States federalism as a blueprint (p. 180). This circumstance is linked to American Protestantism. In the United States, a minority dissenting Protestant view of a separated church and state became dominant in the Constitution and federalism (Miller, 2012). Similarly, in Switzerland, the demand for a strict separation of church and state was also rooted in Protestantism (Haenni, 2009). In the Swiss Confederation, "the free, reformed, nonconformist, dissenting currents of Protestantism played an influential role" in the country's institutions (Manow, 2002, p. 207; Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009).

Swiss liberalism for its part forced the transition from a loose confederation to a federal state and also sought to impose various ideas of the French Revolution (Rosenberg as cited in Haenni, 2009). However, liberal religious ideals (mainly Protestant) have also shaped the freedoms consecrated in the Swiss Federal Constitution. The Constitutional preamble invoking God (cited above) indicates an obviously religious influence rather than a secular (*laïque*) one (Zeugin, 2006, p. 14).

18.4. Economic Backwardness of the Roman Catholic Periphery

Following the 1848 Constitution, Swiss Roman Catholics perceived the liberal centralist government as a threat to traditional Catholic norms and way of life. Federalism provided local autonomy and an institutional shelter, and thus enabled preserving the privileges and influence of the Roman Church-State in Catholic regions. As a result, Catholics concentrated in rural areas where they maintained their traditions, created a Catholic counterculture at the cantonal level against modernisation, industrialisation, government centralisation, and secularisation. They mostly remained firmly attached to the ancient order and opposed developments in science and technology (Obinger, 2009, p. 190). Moreover, the Catholic periphery "reinforced antimodernist and anti-centralist attitudes" due to its economic backwardness and dependency on the more industrialised liberal centres (Altermatt as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 190).

Education in Roman Catholic Cantons

Under the Federal Constitution of 1848, the cantons enjoyed almost exclusive jurisdiction in education and welfare, among other matters. Catholics exploited such local policies of autonomy to protect the strong influence of the Roman Catholic Church-State on education and marital affairs (Obinger, 2009, pp. 190-191).

Stadler (as cited in Head-König, 2017) mentions the difference between a conservative and a more liberal-radical Catholicism in what he calls "Catholic dualism." Conservative Catholicism was prevalent in rural regions where the first sector (agriculture and livestock) was predominant (most Catholic cantons such as Valais, Ticino, Jura, and Schwyz). In contrast, liberal Catholicism emerged "in regions whose population tended to emancipate itself partially from the stronghold of the Church" (p. 28; e.g. in Lucerne, where counter-Reformation Jesuits had influenced the educational system).

Concerning the principal type of Catholicism in most Catholic cantons (conservative), Head-König (2017) refers to the socio-economic power of the Roman Church-State:

> …rural Catholic societies were governed by and virtually saturated with religious precepts. The Church not only controlled church attendance, the observation of the numerous religious holidays, the obligation to participate in religious processions (Joris 1973, 94) and to receive Holy Communion at Easter, but also instructed adults not only on their moral shortcomings and sexual disorders, but also in respect of evening gatherings and evening schools (p. 45).

Head-König further dedicates a section of her discussion to "The Maintenance of Ignorance." This term describes the strategies for keeping people ignorant as one of the most potent tools used by the Catholic Church-State to influence social behaviour. Such strategies were widely deployed in Catholic enclaves, at least until during the interwar period, and included: limiting contact with the outside world, both physically and intellectually; limiting access to information and to authorised literature; influencing the education system; overseeing emigration (Head-König, 2017, pp. 46-47).

18.5. Cultural Struggle (*Kulturkampf*)

The cultural struggle between Catholic-conservative and liberal anti-clerical forces erupted in Europe with the declaration of papal infallibility in 1870 and with the First Vatican Council of 1871. The Council opposed the separation of church and state, secularisation, and scientific progress (Linder, 2005, p. 37; Haenni, 2009, p. 38; Obinger 2009: 181). At the time, the total revision of the 1874 Federal Constitution constituted a response to the strictures of the Vatican Council. It included denominational exemptions, which were directed particularly against the authoritarianism of the Roman Catholic Church. Among others, *Kulturkampf* measures sought to control Catholic religious education, Church appointments and properties. Consequently, the Catholic Church no longer enjoyed undisputed influence, not even in Catholic cantons (Head-König, 2017, p. 27). Pfulg, a Catholic author, described this cultural struggle as follows:

> Catholics are represented as being the enemies of civilization; one accuses them of being blindly attached to the Holy See, one starts to doubt their patriotism (Pfulg as cited in Schmid, 1981, p. 70).

According to Pfulg, the *Kulturkampf* was strongly felt in the Bernese Jura and in the region of Geneva. At the federal level, a critical example of the *Kulturkampf* was the banning of the Jesuit order (which was loyal to the pope) in article 51 of the 1874 Constitution:

> The order of the Jesuits and its affiliated societies shall not be accepted in any part of Switzerland. Their members are prohibited from exercising any office in the Church or at schools.[20]

Historically, the Jesuit order has been associated with the Counter-Reformation and political intrigues (O'Malley, 1993). Several European and other countries (including Catholic Spain

[20] Author's translation of the German original: "*Der Orden der Jesuiten und die ihm affiliierten (angeschlossenen) Gesellschaften dürfen in keinem Teile der Schweiz Aufnahme finden, und es ist ihren Gliedern jede Wirksamkeit in Kirche und Schule untersagt (Schweiz – Bundesverfassung 1874.)*

and Portugal) forced them into exile. Even Pope Clement XIV suppressed the Jesuit order from the Roman Catholic Church just before the French Revolution. However, the Jesuits managed to gradually re-establish themselves in the Church and in those countries from which they had been expelled. Switzerland lifted their ban in 1973 via a national referendum (Gilles-Attinger, 2002).

18.6. Diplomatic Relations Between the Swiss Confederation and the Roman See

The Protestant Reformation had a lasting influence on Swiss politics, at home and abroad. Therefore, Swiss diplomatic relations with the Roman See have been fraught by tensions since the Protestant Reformation (Python, 1994, p. 478). The Swiss Federal Council ordered the papal nuncio in Lucerne to leave Switzerland in the *Kulturkampf* in 1873. A nuncio returned to Bern 50 years later. However, the Swiss Confederation remained without a diplomatic mission in the Vatican (Roman See) until 1991, when a non-resident special envoy was appointed. Then, since 2004, the Swiss government promoted this special envoy to a non-resident Ambassador to the Vatican (Roman See) (currently the Ambassador of Switzerland in Ljubljana, Slovenia) (Amrein, 2012); (FDFA 2018).

18.6.1. Cantonal Concordats

As the diplomatic relations between the Swiss Confederation and the Roman See were consistently fragile, the possibility of a Concordat at the federal level would have been inconceivable. However, valid agreements with the Roman Catholic Church-State exist at the cantonal level, especially on administrative matters concerning dioceses, bishops, and parishes. The following cantons and municipalities have such agreements: *Cantons*: Aargau (1828); Bern (1828, 1864); Fribourg (1924); St. Gallen (1845); Lucerne (1926); Thurgau (1828); Ticino (1884); Municipalities: Chur (1870); Basel (1884, 1968, 1978) (Corral & Petschen, 2004); (Corral, 2014).

18.6.2. Pontifical Swiss Guard

The pontifical Swiss Guard has existed since the Protestant Reformation (1506). It participated in military combats during the Italian wars and was briefly disbanded during the French Revolution. The current 100–110 “Defenders of the [Catholic] Church freedom” (according to their papal title of 1512) must be Swiss Catholic soldiers. Some even descend from Guard families (Python, 1994).

18.7. Current Confessional Ties in the Swiss Population

In Swiss politics, religion still plays a role at the institutional level. Examples include 1) the involvement of ecclesiastical institutions in education and social aspects, 2) the consultation of constitutional articles to the Churches before voting, 3) the military chaplaincy in the army (Campiche & De Rham, 1977, p. 85).

Regarding population distribution, the distribution of Roman Catholics and Protestants in the Swiss Confederation has long persisted. The mainly Protestant enclaves of 1700 (Figure 14) have largely remained Protestant as Figure 15 shows. The same generally applies to Roman Catholic enclaves.




Figure 15: Denominations by Cantons (2000) (Stapferhaus Lenzburg 2006 as cited in Baumann & Stolz, 2009, p. 49); used by permission of the authors).

Nevertheless, analysing data trends during the 20th century reveals drastic changes in population distribution. Table 28 shows demographic changes in the last two centuries for both Roman Catholics and Protestants. A sustained decrease in the Protestant population, a sustained increase of Roman Catholics, and particularly an increase of "other" (religions and non-religions) are evident.

Percentage of (%)	1837	1900	1960	2017
Protestants	59.4	57.8	52.7	24.9
Roman Catholics	40.5	41.6	45.9	37.3
Other	0.1	0.6	1.4	37.8

Table 28: Changes in the demographic distribution of Protestants and Roman Catholics in Switzerland in the last two centuries (adapted from Head-König, 2017; FDFA, 2018; Federal Statistical Office, 2017).

Although the majority of the Swiss population officially belonged to the two main churches (Catholic or Protestant) until 1960, early signs of secularisation had already manifested in 1900 in larger Swiss towns. Besides, secularisation affected both Catholics (in Basel, around only one third were practising members of the faith) and Protestants (in Zürich, only one in ten attended church on Sundays) (Head-König, 2017).




Figure 16: Evolution of religious landscape in Switzerland (1970-2000) (Federal Statistical Office, 2020).

Subsequently, after the 1970s, not only did Roman Catholics outstrip Protestants in numbers, but the most important historical change in the last half-century was the profound "de-Christianisation" of Swiss society. Characteristic of this shift is a profound decrease in

the proportion of both Catholics and Protestants in relation to the total number of inhabitants. This transformation was countered by an essential increase in secular groups (agnosticism and atheism), non-membership, as well as by other religious groups (see Figure 16, and Tables 28 and 29). This pattern is observable both in Switzerland and across other Western European countries (Berger, 1999; Todd & Zurlo, 2016).

Roman Catholics are currently in the majority in most of the cantons and cities, as well as in the entire Swiss Confederation. To compare the urban-rural divide in Switzerland, the next table presents the proportion of religious adherents in some of the main Swiss cities and cantons in 2018.

Cantons and cities	Protestants	Catholics	Other Christians	Other religious communities (e.g. Muslims, Jews)	No religion
Bern (canton)	49,0	15,4	6,4	5,6	22,3
Bern (city)	33,5	19,2	5,1	7,6	33,5
Zurich (canton)	27,2	25,6	6,3	8,4	31,2
Zurich (city)	19,1	26,5	5,4	8,6	39,0
Geneva (canton)	8,9	32,2	5,4	8,2	42,7
Geneva (city)	7,2	31,4	5,9	9,2	43,5
Basel (canton)	29,3	24,9	5,3	6,9	32,2
Basel (city)	14,4	15,5	5,8	11,6	51,4
Vaud (canton)	22,3	28,7	6,1	6,6	34,4
Lausanne (city)	12,7	29,1	6,5	10,1	39,6
St Gallen (canton)	20,4	42,4	6,2	8,7	20,9
St Gallen (city)	18,7	34,0	8,3	10,2	27,0
Lucerne (canton)	9,9	59,2	4,5	5,8	19,6
Lucerne (city)	10,9	48,3	5,4	6,7	27,6
Ticino (canton)	3,9	63,5	5,2	3,0	22,8
Lugano (city)	3,2	59,1	6,6	4,5	24,9
Total in Switzerland	**23,0**	**35,0**	**6,0**	**7,0**	**28,0**

Table 29: Proportions of religious adherents in different Swiss cantons and cities in 2018 (adapted from Federal Statistical Office, 2020).

However, the current proportions of religious adherents alone do not speak of the religiosity of the population, and even less, of the social effects of religion (Hayward & Kemmelmeier, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Barro & McCleary, 2003; McCleary & Barro, 2006), (see Section 5.3). In turn, “current social norms” are the “legacy of prior religious beliefs” (Glaeser & Glendon, 1998, p. 431) and owe more to the historical and institutional weight of

religion than to its contemporary influence (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Arruñada, 2010; Chaves & Cann 1992; Wilde et al., 2010). Therefore, regardless of the higher proportion of Roman Catholics or the secularisation of the society, the Swiss institutional structure still responds to a traditional Protestant and liberal influence (Obinger, 2009; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Python, 1994, Campiche & De Rham, 1977). Moreover, Protestant churches have traditionally been entangled with the political structure of the cantons, as they are, in fact, "canton churches" (Gould, 1999 and Cattacin et al., 2003 as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 180).

18.8. Competitiveness of the Swiss Cantons and Religion

High competitiveness in Switzerland might be associated with the federal model of government. Among other aspects, Swiss federalism is empirically related to sustainable growth, business development, efficient government and increasing social capital. The federal system also encourages the cantons to compete over tax rates and other business conditions (Feld, Schaltegger, Burret, & Schmid, 2017).

The United States, which also has a federal government, is the second most competitive country in the world (World Economic Forum 2018). However, such an argument cannot be generalised. Sudan, Iraq, India, and Mexico, among others, also have federal-type governments and are not as competitive as the US or Switzerland. Likewise, federalism (although important) alone does not explain the significant differences in competitiveness between Swiss cantons.

The previous maps (Figures 14 and 15) show the predominant Protestant or Roman Catholic historical enclaves that have existed in the Swiss Confederation over the last few centuries until the present (2000). Compared in terms of current competitiveness among Swiss cantons, Protestant Cantons are as a rule most competitive, Roman Catholic ones least competitive.

Swiss competitiveness concentrates in the northern, central and western regions. The southern and eastern territories are the least competitive (see Figure 17). According to UBS

Switzerland AG (2016), mountainous topography limits the competitiveness of the large low-competitive southern cantons (Valais, Ticino, Grisons) and other small mountainous cantons. Nonetheless, when compared internationally, even the least competitive cantons in Switzerland, achieve higher values in innovation per capita than France, Italy, or Austria. Exceptionally, Uri, the least innovative canton in Switzerland with the highest proportion of Roman Catholics, attains similar innovation values per capita than Italy (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016); (Federal Office of Statistics, 2017).




Figure 17: Cantonal Competitiveness Indicator (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016; used by permission of the authors).

The dark green areas show the most competitive regions. They correspond to Protestant cantons (e.g. Zürich, Geneva, Lausanne, Basel, Bern) or mixed ones (e.g. Thurgau and St. Gallen). Decreasing to bright green, competitiveness drops to the dark red territories, the least competitive ones. These are Roman Catholic cantons (e.g. Valais, Jura, and Ticino) or mixed ones (e.g. Grisons). Exceptions are Lucerne and Zug, which, although predominantly Roman Catholic, are also highly competitive.

This review suggests that various factors in combination explain the roots of competitiveness in Switzerland. Two factors seem crucial for competitiveness. First, environment and geography: Generally, a canton located in the mountains has more difficulties in developing infrastructure and services than cantons in flat areas.

The second reason adds an important aspect to the first. Before the Protestant Reformation (16th century), even flat areas, where competitiveness is concentrated today (e.g. Zürich), had a mainly rural economy with no tendency towards economic expansion. However, subsequent industrialisation increased literacy and human capital, two of the principal contributions of the Protestant Reformation (Cantoni, 2015; Becker et al., 2016; Becker & Woessmann, 2009; Comité pour une Nouvelle Histoire de la Suisse, 2006).

Moreover, both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism persisted in Switzerland after the Protestant Reformation (Figures 14 and 15). Although the number of adherents is not as significant as six decades ago, the longstanding consequences of liberal and conservative ideologies are still evident in institutions. Conservative Catholicism retreated to the mountains, thus preserving the privileges of the Church-State and serving "The Maintenance of Ignorance" (Head-König, 2017). Consequently, mountainous Catholic Cantons such as Uri, Jura, Valais, and Appenzell Innerrhoden have, even to date, the lowest human capital (i.e. education) in the Swiss Confederation (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016, p. 13). Still, most of these cantons are even more innovative per inhabitant than surrounding Catholic countries with diverse geographical conditions (flat and mountainous). The influence of liberal federal institutions may have nuanced the effect of low human capital, thus making Catholic cantons more innovative.

On the other hand, liberal Catholicism mainly remained in the flat regions and cities (e.g. Lucerne) and benefitted from educational centres, infrastructure, and services (Clark & Kaiser, 2003). In this respect, both Catholic and Protestant regions in Switzerland profited from the Reformation and its influence on federal institutions.

More importantly, the long-term effect of the Reformation is still evident in Switzerland today, culturally and institutionally (regardless of the current low religiosity). Volonté (2015)'s empirical study of 753 firm-years found that Protestants and Swiss-Germans tend

to prevent concentrations of power (i.e. two-tiered board structures in corporate management). Conversely, Roman Catholics and the Swiss-French tend to tolerate strong leadership and hierarchical structures (i.e. single-tier boards) in Switzerland.

The next subsection synthesises and analyses the empirical information collected for Switzerland in terms of CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis).

18.9. Empirical Analysis and CDA for Switzerland (1. Prosperity)

	Prosperity
Stakeholder	**Fundamental principles identified (interviews)**
The Holy Bible	"Keep therefore the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may *prosper* in all that ye do" (Deuteronomy 29:9, King James Version).
f) Protestant Free Church Pastor 1	"The Swiss mentality is to stick to what is right. We stick to what we say [… and this] lead us to *trust* in ourselves. Then we are proud of […] the high quality of what we produce." "[…] Protestants are hard-working. […] Catholic Cantons tend to be agricultural and livestock-oriented partly because they are in mountainous areas where it is not easy to develop economically."
g) Protestant Free Church Pastor 2.	"There is absolutely a relationship between occultism and development. The more a culture is involved in occultism, the faster it is destroyed. […] That was the 'cyclical' history of the Jews [book of Judges]. […] [C]ivilisations that live with [according to] the Bible all manage very well. They have prospered successfully such as the USA and Germany with Protestantism. Using the Bible, they have become world powers. […] [T]he economies of Catholic countries are less well developed because the Catholic elites manipulate the power to keep people low and poor in general (e.g. education). They do not want people to know too much. Protestantism strengthens education and culture attains high moral standards. European countries and cultures like Spain, Italy, and Poland [mainly Catholics] or Romania or Greece [mainly Orthodox] are influenced by *corrupt* ethical codes. The Catholic elite keeps people poor and dominated by mystics and superstition."
l) Non-practising (Catholic) (Academic)	"The [Protestant] Reformation is a major reason for development. At the bottom of everything lies Protestant chauvinism, which perverts Max Weber's original line of reasoning. To some extent, religion is not constant. Sometimes religiosity strengthens and weakens in a cyclical development and runs in parallel cycles to the economy."
m) Independent, Catholic believer (Employee)	"Catholics tend to be more conservative here in Switzerland. […] In Schwyz […], where Catholics are a majority, people tend to be more helpful than in the large cities of other Cantons. […] [P]erhaps […] the conservative mindset has kept them [Catholics] in a medieval economy."
n) Independent, free Protestant believer (Academic)	"Francis Fukuyama says that trust, culture, and religion can explain development. In Switzerland, 85% of industrialisation occurred in Protestant Cantons. […] Huguenots […] established the high-precision industry like watch-making. The perfection evident in this work comes from the idea of doing any work for God's glory and not for men's glory; as we must be perfect as God is perfect [Matthew 5,48]."
q) Catholic Church-State-Government intermediary	"I am not so sure if the religious history of this country can really explain this [Swiss prosperity]. […] There might be a relation [between denomination] and industrialisation. There must be a connection. But the influence might come from both directions. […] [I]n Zürich, it was more interesting for the government […] and also for the people to become Protestants than […] in Central Switzerland, because of the *liberties; the distance they could maintain from being ruled by the hierarchical [Catholic]*

Church. They could have more freedom. […] I do not think that Catholics are less intelligent or less likely to work than others. It is more about interaction. Catholic piety, which relates everything in everyday life to faith, asserts that it is easier to live on a farm than in a city. It is less rational and more about nature, and perhaps also about establishing greater affinity with sacramental theology."

Table 30: Principles of prosperity according to stakeholders interviewed in Switzerland (Source: Author's figure).

(1) Textual Analysis (Theological):

The Christian (i.e. biblical) principle of prosperity is associated with obeying the Commandments (set of moral laws). A fairly harmonious discourse exists among Protestant stakeholders regarding this principle. This might be due to conformity to the original *Sola Scriptura* principle of the Protestant Reformation.

Among the above stakeholders, the Protestant Free Pastor (g) refers to the Old Testament and to more recent examples of disobedience wreaking havoc on civilisations, whereas obedience to the biblical principles ensured prosperity. Similarly, the Independent Protestant Believer (n) links Swiss precision and perfection with the New Testament principle of achieving perfection for a perfect God, rather than for imperfect humans. On the other hand, Roman Catholic stakeholders prefer a somewhat more secular (non-theological) approach to prosperity in Switzerland. None of the Catholic interviews referred to a biblical principle. The Catholic Church-Government Stakeholder intermediary (q) is skeptical about a possible religious (or biblical) relationship between prosperity and industrialisation. Nonetheless, (q) mentions "Catholic piety" and "Sacramental theology" as possible explanations of the rural trend in Catholic cantons and cites other material reasons. Protestantism has heavily criticised sacramental theology for lacking an entirely biblical basis (Witte, 2002).

(2) Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical Triangulation):

Like Fukuyama (1995), the Free Church Pastor (f) links Swiss people's trustworthiness with high productivity and quality, and with a possible religious (Protestant) influence *à la* Weber. The Protestant Free Pastor (g) mentions that the elite controls education in hierarchical (e.g. Roman Catholic or Orthodox) societies. This argument is in line with Head-König's (2017, p. 45) analysis of Swiss Catholic cantons (Section 18.4.) Likewise, the Free Protestant Believer (n) establishes an explicit theoretical relation with Fukuyama (1995). Lastly, for the non-practising Catholic Academic (l) "Protestant chauvinism […] perverts Max Weber's original line of reasoning," which is frequently used to explain the prosperity of nations. After harshly criticising Weber's theory of the Protestant work ethic, stakeholder (l) refers implicitly to the theory of existential security (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). The latter explains why society becomes more secularised when enough freedom and security exist. Stakeholder (l) was most critical of a possible relationship between religion and prosperity.

(3) Analysis of Social Practice:

The Roman Catholic Believer (m) positively associates a more conservative Catholic mindset with examples of helpfulness. However, stakeholder (m) links a conservative mentality with a "medieval economy," and thus partly explains the fact that most Catholic cantons are not as industrialised as Protestant ones. Catholic Church-Government intermediary Stakeholder (q) partly agrees with the relationship established between a conservative mentality and a medieval economy, when referring to "a less rational…Catholic piety." Various authors, for instance, Obinger (2009) and Head-König (2017) have provided evidence that the connection between Catholicism and a medieval economy extends beyond an intuitive link (see also Sections 18.3–18.4). Likewise, the Protestant Free Pastor (f) states that most Catholic cantons are located in the mountains, which also partly explains why they are less competitive. This view concurs with a recent analysis of cantonal competitiveness (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016). As such, this evidence

shows that the combination of at least two factors — geography AND religion, instead of one OR the other — greatly determines cantonal competitiveness.

(3.1) Law and Institutions:

The Catholic Church-Government intermediary Stakeholder (q) recognises a mutual relationship between denomination and industrialisation. Stakeholder (q) also provides relevant examples, including the causes of the Reformation in Zürich and in Basel and the desire to free oneself "*from the control of the hierarchical [Catholic] Church.*"

18.10. Empirical Analysis and CDA for Switzerland (2. Corruption)

	Corruption
Stakeholder	**Fundamental principles identified (interviews)**
The Holy Bible	"Keep thee far from a false matter; and the innocent and righteous slay thou not: for I will not justify the wicked. And thou shalt take no gift: for the gift blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the righteous" (Exodus 23: 7–8).
a) Roman Catholic Priest 1.	"We are a small country with a very dense population. Very developed civil societies work through associations. […] That system works well in civil society to organise citizens as well as in politics. […] That keeps everyone accountable to others […]"…the State was against Catholicism because the Church was not democratic. […] *In the 19th century, we [Swiss] created a Church law that is parallel to the canonical law of the Catholic Church.* This happened only within Catholicism because it was not acting according to legal principles. For this reason, the Church, along with the state, had to create a law according to democratic principles. This means that we now have a dual legal structure that is unique in the world. […] [Now] lay members who are in associations, according to democratic law, manage the Church's finances. The money does not land in the hands of bishops but in those of lay people and Church associations, which are responsible for financial affairs. […] This is the case in Switzerland, not because of Liberation Theology, but because *the State forced the Church to be more democratic* in order to be accepted as a public juridical body. […] Rome was not very happy with the case of Switzerland."
e) Roman Catholic Theologian	"I think it is true that there is a much stricter discourse on responsibility and honesty [in a Reformed context]. […] I believe that in Switzerland, which is very Reformed [Protestant], there is a dual discourse. […] Corruption [in Switzerland] is lived in another way. […] many things do not meet the eye and are not spoken about."
h) Protestant Pastor (Reformed Evangelical)	"In the Protestant tradition, it's very important that your life and principles are the same [coherent]. In Catholic traditions [there] are double standards: You have principles for monks, and for the poor, and [for] lay people. In Catholicism, you have the doctrine on one side and reality on another. These things [doctrine and reality] are always different, and the difference is accepted in Catholicism. […] In the Protestant tradition, you have lower standards, but you are expected to meet them. Not, though, in Roman Catholicism [where matters are the other way around]." […] Rabbinic Judaism has similarities with Protestantism [as] for both; the Scriptures come first and occupy a central role. […] When Jesus, a Jew, spoke about the truth to Pilate, a Roman, Pilate asked Jesus, what is truth? [John 18, 37–38]. This shows how incompatible Roman philosophy can be with Jewish culture…"
l) Non-	"I don't know why Catholics should be corrupt or shouldn't. I'm Catholic, but I'm not especially

practising Catholic (Academic)	associated with it. I'm Catholic… [because] family enforces this when you grow up. This is also true in other countries. ... *As a Swiss Catholic, I have more in common with a Nordic Protestant than with an Italian Catholic.* […] The Church is there, but might not be the cause of corruption."
m) Independent, Catholic believer (Employee)	"Here in Switzerland, direct democracy and our type of government [Federal] might mean more accountability and less corruption. It's always better to share decisions with a lot of people rather than to concentrate them [decisions] on a few [people]. Perhaps, in a monarchy or a Republic, power is concentrated, which increases the risk of a totalitarian regime and corruption."
n) Independent free Protestant believer (Academic)	"For us in the German-Swiss tradition truth and facts are perhaps more important than relations, and it seems that in Latin contexts it is the other way around. The Bible is our source of truth [Protestants]. Latin contexts are influenced by Roman and Greek philosophy, where truth is relative. […] The indulgences were just the tip of the iceberg of corruption in the Catholic Church. They allowed one to do as one pleased. If you repent, for instance, contribute either money or say some Hail Mary prayers, you are completely absolved by a priest. You could have even killed or abused people. […] That [corruption] is what Luther also fought in the Reformation as the Bible clearly states that only God can forgive sins. […] Pope Francis still offers indulgences to his followers on Twitter."
q) Catholic Church-Swiss Government intermediary	"I think the whole system of Switzerland is such that everything next to your town has a strong impact. Every unit has its own police, its own prison, etc. […] Social control is quite efficient because we have no big cities. […] We shouldn't forget that our banks have money that shouldn't have been there, so we are not 100% clean. It was not illegal, but it was not very moral either. […] The state does not allow church taxes to flow directly into our hierarchical structure, but to those who organise themselves to collect this source of income. This idea also exists in the United States, where there is no taxation without representation, and it is applied to the Church as well. This is a unique case in the world. […] The bishop formally proposes a priest, but if the local Catholics do not elect him, he will receive no pay. This is quite a special tradition. It goes back to medieval times in Switzerland, and was strengthened by the Reformation. This led to the elimination of hierarchical thinking. And then the state organised church life to a certain degree."

Table 31: Principles of corruption according to stakeholders interviewed in Switzerland (Source: Author's figure).

(1) Textual Analysis (Theological):

The Scriptures explicitly encourage believers to refrain from accepting bribes (Table 31). In addition, the three last Commandments of the Decalogue (*8. Thou shalt not steal; 9. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor; and 10. Thou shalt not covet (…) any thing that is thy neighbor's*) should provide the conscious Christian believer to abstain from corrupt activities.

Similar to the above prosperity analysis for Switzerland, Protestant stakeholders refer to guiding biblical principles. Stakeholder (n) (i.e. Independent Free Protestant Believer) asserts that the Bible is the source of truth. This recalls the *Sola Scriptura* principle of Protestantism and contrasts with the relative truth characteristic of the Greco-Roman background. The Protestant Reformed Evangelical Pastor (h) also reflects on the discussion of "truth" by drawing attention to the biblical dialogue between Jesus, a Jew, and Pilate, a Roman. For stakeholder (h), both Protestantism and Rabbinic Judaism consider the

Scriptures the source of truth, which is incompatible with relativistic Roman philosophy. Therefore, in line with the previous prosperity analysis, Roman Catholic stakeholders do not refer to a consolidated Scriptural basis, but instead to a variegated one, specifically associating corruption with secular issues. Such variegated associations of Roman Catholic stakeholders concur more with the Aristotelian "non-absolute" and "mean" relative points that Selling (2018) considers typical of Roman Catholic ethics.

(2) Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical Triangulation):

For the Roman Catholic Priest (a), Switzerland is a small country where citizens can organise themselves in associations in which they can participate and are accountable for their actions. These characteristics, among others, distinguish Switzerland (i.e. make the country more competitive and less corrupt) from other countries, according to a Catholic priest (a). This argument concurs with Ostrom (2015), who explains the mechanisms underlying participatory institutions (e.g. Swiss alpine pastures management).

(3) Analysis of Social Practice:

The Roman Catholic Theologian (e) believes that corruption is concealed in Switzerland. He mentions the dual Protestant discourse in this respect, but admits that Protestantism has stricter honesty and responsibility principles. The Protestant Reformed Evangelical Pastor (h) makes a similar observation on double standards, which he identifies in Roman Catholicism, where doctrine and lived reality are opposed or different, while in Protestantism lower standards are expected to be fulfiled.

On the other hand, the Non-practising Catholic Academic (l) identifies with *Nordic Protestants* rather than with *Italian Catholics.* This exemplifies McSweeney's (2015) argument about the impossibility of Roman Catholicism constituting a self-contained cultural unit. Furthermore, in Switzerland, as in other Protestant countries, the Reformation secularised both the state and local Roman Catholicism (Becker et al., 2016; Manow & van

Kersbergen, 2009; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Thus, the self-identification of a Catholic stakeholder (l) with a Nordic Protestant is somewhat foreseeable.

Stakeholder (n) (i.e. Independent Free Protestant Believer) mentions a duality of truth relations in the German-Swiss cultural context as opposed to a Latin context. This view is linked to the concepts developed by Hall (1990) (low-context for German-Swiss and high-context for Latin societies). Stakeholder (n) also refers to the roots of corruption in Roman Catholic doctrines. These include the concept of indulgences used by Bergoglio, also known as "Pope Francis", to promote events like the Catholic World Youth Day in 2013 (Kington, 2013).

(3.1) Law and Institutions:

Among the interviewed stakeholders, the Catholic priest (a) mentions that the Swiss government forced the Roman Catholic Church-State to adopt democratic practices on Swiss territory from the 19th Century. He further asserts that the Swiss managed to create a parallel church law to Catholic canon law. This argument concurs with the legal principles and Protestant revolutions explained in Section 8.3.4. Here, the Catholic Church-Government Stakeholder (q) explains that the current Swiss mechanisms of participation and transparency in the fiscal management and elections of priests and bishops in the Swiss Catholic Church are unique worldwide. The Catholic Stakeholder (q) links this to the Protestant Reformation. Such notions complement Obinger's (2009) and Python's (1994) observations on the profound influence of the Protestant Reformation on Swiss politics and institutions (Sections 18.2–18.6).

Similarly, the Independent Catholic Believer (m) relates two essential factors to the prevalence of high transparency in Switzerland: federalism and direct democracy. Both factors have positively affected transparency (and prosperity) (Obinger, 2009) (Section 18.3). Democracy is also related to Protestantism (Woodberry, 2012). Conversely, the Roman Catholic Church-State has a monarchic structure, which historically has opposed democratic systems (Cook, 2012).

The Catholic Church-Government intermediary (Stakeholder q) points to the efficiency of social control in small Swiss towns (in line with the Roman Catholic priest (a). Also, similarly to the Roman Catholic Theologian (e), Stakeholder (q) challenges the reputation of Swiss transparency with specific examples such as the morality of the banks.

18.11. Empirical Analysis and CDA for Switzerland (3. Church-State Relations)

Church-State relations	
	Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
Stakeholder	
The Holy Bible	"Jesus answered, My kingdom is not of this world: […]" (John 18: 36). "[…] Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's" (Matthew 22: 21).
a) Roman Catholic Priest 1.	"Catholic Churches within Switzerland are not organised on a national level but on the cantonal level, as all Catholic affairs are organised this way. There are, however, organisations that coordinate the different Catholic parishes."
b) Roman Catholic Priest 2. (Ecclesiastical office of the Catholic Church)	"Switzerland and the Holy See do have a bilateral agenda, but compared to a regular sovereign nation, this cannot be considered a priority. […] The Holy See's main interests would not go beyond keeping channels of communication open and cultivating good relations with the [Swiss] Confederation. […] The specific character of Swiss democracy leaves little room for development [of a new agreement with the Holy See (i.e. Concordat)]. Only some kind of state crisis at the cantonal level might provoke discussion and perhaps facilitate negotiating some international agreement. The principal work of the Nunciature in Bern has to do with the Catholic Church in Switzerland. The Holy See is unique among embassies because it represents a unique entity among sovereign entities in our world."
f) Protestant Free Church Pastor 1	"The general attitude of the [Swiss Federal] government is secular. The relation between the state and the churches is getting weaker and weaker, except for the Roman Catholic Church. Catholic [political] parties are strong and the embassy of the Vatican in Bern has a far greater influence than the Protestant churches, which have no embassy. Also, the Protestant population is decreasing, and Protestant leaders have, in general, inferior feelings of themselves and admire the Catholic Church very much."
h) Protestant Pastor (Reformed Evangelical)	"Until 1970, living together without being legally married (cohabitation) was forbidden in Switzerland. Uri was the last canton to accept cohabitation. In the past, only the first son could inherit the parents' land in Switzerland, perhaps also due to the biblical tradition."
i) Ecumenical Pastor	"The Swiss Protestant Church is in many ways like the Swiss federal government. For example, there is not a single head but a multi-party system. Here in Switzerland, even the Catholic Church is different because this is not a hierarchical society. But Catholics are subject to the Vatican anyway. This is why there is a branch of Catholics (*Christkatholisch*) that doesn't accept the Pope's authority. Protestants and Catholics are not united here just because Protestants refuse to accept the Pope's authority in Switzerland."
k) Academic expert-lawyer	"Religious law has strongly influenced the Swiss legal system for many centuries. […] The influence of the Church was mostly dominant until the mid 18th century… [until] a significant change occurred in 1798 with the French Revolution. However, its influence [i.e. the French Revolution's] did not last because the Helvetic Republic ended already in 1803. […] There is a large gap between Protestant and Catholic cantons, most of which have their own tradition of how religion influenced their laws. […] Religion has distinctively influenced inheritance law, Protestant marriage, natural law, canon law, and others depending on denomination, area, period, and fields. […]

	Between 1840 and 1880, the Catholic and Protestant traditions even strengthened their differences due to the *Kulturkampf*. […] The influence of the Catholic Church was strictly reduced at the federal level after the establishment of the Swiss Confederation in 1848. However, several Catholic cantons continued to uphold canonical ideals, and the clergy was actively involved in political processes. […] Also, people's religious beliefs strongly influenced the political process of creating law via direct democracy. A certain impact is still evident today."
l) Non-practising Catholic (Academic)	"There are several cases of [state–church] separations and mixtures. […] Nordic countries have high levels of trust in the state, which largely explains why no conflict between church and state occurs. The contrary happens in France, where the Church convinces people not to trust the state and vice versa. In Switzerland, Protestants have maintained that the Catholic Church is evil and creates distrust."
m) Independent, Catholic believer (Employee)	"In Switzerland, if you are Catholic, you have to pay much higher taxes than if you belong to the Reformed Protestant Church. If you are an atheist or belong to a Protestant Free Church, you do not even have to pay any Church taxes. I think Catholic taxes are a lot higher because it [Catholicism] is like a "mafia Church." Indeed, Catholics have huge cathedrals, frescoes, and lots of gold icons and that, of course, costs much more to buy and maintain than having a simple wooden cross in a Protestant Church. In Valais, if you want to build a house, you have to sign up to the municipality (*Gemeinde*) and then you have to go to the Catholic Priest who has the final say […] (if you have given enough money to the Church or have attended Sunday mass often enough). In Italy, mafia members confess their sins in church and information is exchanged in the confession box."
n) Independent free Protestant believer (Academic)	"The Roman Catholic Church was very corrupt at that time [Reformation time], and Reformers wanted to reform the Church, but not to separate it from the state. But they [the Reformers] and Luther realised that this [reforming the Church from within] was impossible. Therefore, Zwingli advocated the separation of church and state, but that was much later. […] The separation between church and state has never been complete here. Now, for example, we have taxes [for Catholics and Reformed Protestants]. And we have the issue of empty Protestant Church buildings being managed by the government."
p) Swiss Federal Government officer	"According to international diplomatic law, nothing regulates the relations between the Holy See and the Swiss Confederation, except for the Vienna Convention. The main interest of the Swiss Confederation and the Holy See is to have diplomatic relations, as is normally the case with sovereign states. Second, to regulate bilateral issues, such as the Swiss pontifical guard at the Holy See. There are also other issues, like the status of bishops in Switzerland. There are no plans for the Swiss Confederation and the Holy See to sign a new agreement [i.e. Concordat]. Switzerland used to have diplomatic relations but did not appoint an ambassador to the Holy See. […] And then, until 2004, we started having an ambassador to the Holy See, but this official did not reside in Rome. […] The present Ambassador of Switzerland to the Holy See resides in Slovenia. He also accredited as the ambassador to another country. Other than Italy, Switzerland has the largest colony in the Vatican."
q) Catholic Church-Swiss Government intermediary	"Legally and officially, there is a clear separation between the state and the churches. Their relations are governed by the cantons [… and] are very important for the financing and self-organisation of the churches. There are twenty-six different [church taxes] systems. Even though they have some similarities, especially in the German-speaking cantons, the French- and Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland have very different systems. […] Geneva and Neuchatel work mainly under a French system. They receive no state funds and have no church taxes. They […] live especially on the contributions of […] their congregations. […] The bishop does not need to call the President of Switzerland to tell him what to do […]. The distance here is quite large and both sides respect it. […] In some cases, Church representatives offer their congregation voting advice. Normally, this concerns religious aspects that are fundamental to life, like abortion, suicide, etc. […] I think Switzerland has a culture that is strongly influenced by the Christian tradition, but nowadays secularisation and the separation of church and state are plainly evident, […]The [Christian] tendency still exists, but it is less notorious […] in the context of our direct democracy.

	[…] there was a time when Protestants strongly dominated the Swiss government […]. The Swiss constitution of 1848 (and beyond) is a liberal construct. […] even within the Catholic Church, there were strong rivalries between liberal and conservative Catholics as was the case in Ticino and Lucerne. […] Internally, the situation in the Catholic Church became more difficult after the first Vatican Council in 1870, where the bishops defined the infallibility of the pope. This led to polarisation. […] We said that we would not accept this new dogma about the infallibility of the pope. Thus we separated… [*Katholisch / Christkatholisch*]. Ultramontane thought [beyond the Alps heading to Rome] […] was difficult for the young Swiss State. […] A Church-State had existed for a long time. […] [*Christkatholisch*] reached some agreements with the liberal Protestants over political questions. […] though they were quite a small group, they were influential. […] Their philosophy is, "We do not want to have the pope, and we have no celibacy among our priests; they can marry" […] I would mention three important causes for the emergence of this special [democratic] legal system for the Catholic Church in Switzerland. *The first is the [cooperative] corporations*. […] For example, if you go to […] the Alps, you will see that cattle farmers organise themselves in [cooperative] corporations […]. *The second cause is the Reformation*, which strongly promoted participation among its followers in taking church decisions. This practice goes quite well together with democratic feelings in Switzerland. *The third influence stems from the time when the Reformed [and] Catholic denominations in Switzerland opposed each other.* […] [for example] in Cantons St. Gallen and Grisons. […] For decisions concerning religious affairs, Parliament was divided Protestant deputies […] decided on proceedings relevant to Protestants, while Catholic members of Parliament decided Catholic issues. In St. Gallen, this is called '*Katholischer Konfessionsteil*' [Catholic section of the Canton St. Gallen]. Or in Grisons, *Corpus Catolico* [body of Catholics], and [on another group] the body of Protestants. They agreed to have peace because […] they would decide in favour of their church[es] [… instead of interfering] with the other denomination." You cannot understand the relation between church and state in Switzerland without understanding the political system. This is the most important aspect to understand. […] Direct democracy has a very high influence on this system, and this does not exist in other countries. The pronounced form of federalism, which enables every town to set its taxes, makes this organisation unique."
s) Swiss Diplomatic Officer (non-official communication)	"No plans for possible future bilateral agreements with the Holy See, at the federal or cantonal level, have been announced. [Education, Lands and Properties, Religious Freedom, and Ecumenism issues] are discussed and treated bilaterally [with the Holy See] in a similar way as with every other state: diplomatic dialogue and channels (ambassador to the Holy See, with the State Secretariat, or other authorities and services; nuncio or his deputy, with the DFA or other authorities and services), or at the political level on the occasion of bilateral visits, or between experts/persons or services in charge of specific issues."

Table 32: Principles of church-state relations according to stakeholders interviewed in Switzerland (Source: Author's figure).

(1) Textual Analysis (Theological):

The New Testament clearly distinguishes between earthly (government) and spiritual (heavenly) powers, which are and should maintain separated. According to the biblical principle of the separation of powers, the Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (f) asserts that the attitude of the Swiss federal government is secular. Similarly, the Ecumenical Pastor (i) explains that the non-hierarchical organisation of the federal government and the Protestant Church even influence Roman Catholicism in Switzerland.

(2) Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical Triangulation):

The Catholic Church-Swiss Government intermediary (q) describes the Reformation and the liberal influence on the separation of church and state in terms of the democratic scheme of the Swiss Catholic Church, which is unique worldwide. Such historical analyses concur with Obinger's (2009) review, while the Protestant influence on the separation of church and state is consistent with Miller's (2012) framework.

(3) Analysis of Social Practice:

(3.1) Law and Institutions:

Although the Swiss federal state is laic, church and state have never been totally separate in Switzerland. Moreover, the influence of religion on institutions is evident at the following levels:

a) Supranational: The Roman Catholic Church-State has gained ever greater political influence through its embassy in Bern (Nunciature) that no other church has. At the same time, the federal government increasingly acknowledges the state sovereignty and legitimacy of the Roman Catholic Church-State (e.g. by strengthening diplomatic channels

and by appointing an ambassador to the Holy See). (Stakeholders: Roman Catholic Priest 2 (b); Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (f); Swiss Federal Government Officer (p); s) Swiss Diplomatic Officer). These findings substantiate Obinger (2009) and Python (1994).

b) National: The Independent, Catholic Believer (m, employee) and the Independent Free Protestant Believer (n, academic) both mention church taxes and cathedral administration as two examples of a non-complete separation of church and state. The Academic Expert-Lawyer (k) outlines a possible way of religious influence taking effect, namely by people's beliefs directly influencing laws and policies through direct democracy. Both Stakeholder (k) and the Catholic Church-Swiss Government intermediary (q) acknowledge that the former Protestant and liberal influence diminished the power of the Catholic Church-State at the federal level; this is in line with (Obinger, 2009).

c) Cantonal/regional/local: The Catholic Church-Swiss Government intermediary (q) explains pronounced differences between German-speaking, French and Italian-speaking and mixed-denomination cantons. The Academic Expert-Lawyer (k) explains that the clergy has long been very present in the political process in several Catholic cantons. Moreover, the Catholic Church (Roman See) has signed Concordats with several cantons (Corral & Petschen, 2004). The Independent, Catholic Believer (m, employee) provides an example of Church interference in state affairs in the Catholic canton of Valais.

18.12. Conclusions

18.12.1. General

The strong religious tensions between Protestants and Catholics have shaped the Swiss model of government and the country's institutions. While Catholics have defended a federalist, decentralised approach to escape modernisation, Protestants and liberals successfully pushed for a predominantly liberal, anti-clerical constitution and for a federal state. As Obinger (2009) observed:

> The retreat of Catholics form the federal arena in the wake of the events of the 1840s was a strategic response to the secular Federal Constitution imposed by the Liberals. A federal polity strongly based on the idea of local autonomy and the associated devolution of power provided the institutional shelter that allowed Catholics to maintain their traditions, to preserve the influence of the Roman Church in Catholic areas, and to create a Catholic counterculture at the cantonal level. More specifically, Catholics considered the cantons as bulwarks against modernization and its concomitants such as big government, bureaucratization, and secularization. Because they were mostly concentrated in rural areas and showed strong leanings to the ancient order with its enshrined privileges of the Roman Church, Catholics opposed industrialization and were highly sceptical of new developments in science and technology. […] Catholics therefore sought to gain political control at the cantonal level in order to protect the Catholic subsociety from the intrusion by the Liberals who then controlled the federal arena. Because the cantons enjoyed almost exclusive jurisdiction in affairs such as education and welfare under the Federal Constitution of 1848, Catholics exploited local policy autonomy to protect the strong influence of the Roman Catholic Church on education and marital affairs, at least until the constitutional revision in 1874 (p. 190-191).

Later, following the *Kulturkampf*, the Catholic Church-State could no longer exercise its previously undisputed influence, not even in Catholic cantons.

As a result, the Swiss Confederation has had weak diplomatic relations with the Roman See. The absence of a Concordat at the federal level and the absence of a Swiss resident ambassador in the Vatican still suggest that diplomatic relations continue to be weak. However, Concordats with some Cantons exist. Moreover, from 2004, the federal government has appointed a non-resident ambassador to the Vatican, thus creating closer ties with the Roman Catholic Church-State. On the other hand, although Catholic and Protestant enclaves persisted for a long time, the Protestant share of the total population has decreased by more than half since the 19th century. The greatest decline has occurred over

the last 60 years, during which other religious denominations and non-religions have sharply increased. Today, Swiss society is highly secularised.

18.12.2. Competitiveness and Transparency

As a general rule, Protestant cantons are more competitive than the mountainous Roman Catholic cantons. However, even these "low" competitive cantons score higher on innovation/inhabitant values than the traditionally Catholic neighbouring countries (e.g. Austria, Italy, or France).

The historical retreat to the mountains and the anti-modernising reaction against the majoritarian liberal-Protestant federal government might partially explain the lower competitiveness of most Roman Catholic cantons. Nevertheless, the liberal-Protestant federal government seems to have influenced institutions in Catholic cantons by decreasing the pervasive power of the Roman Church-State and by forcing the hierarchical non-democratic Church to democratise. Switzerland's unique democratising of Catholicism may well be related to the principles of accountability and transparency. Besides, such an influence may also partially explain the relatively higher score on the innovation-per-habitant parameter attained by "low competitive mountain Catholic cantons" compared to Italy, Austria, or France.

18.12.3. Prosperity (Competitiveness and Transparency) and Biblical Moral Principles

Analysing the primary information shows that most Protestant stakeholders consistently mention biblical concepts as the moral foundation of prosperity. The original Protestant principle of the *Sola Scriptura* might lie at the heart of such consistency.

In contrast, Roman Catholics stakeholders do not consistently refer to the Scriptures as a moral foundation. Instead, they tend to refer to diverse theories and philosophical influences from secular sources. This would seem to corroborate McSweeney's (2015) argument that

several kinds of Roman Catholicism might exist as philosophical currents and cultural backgrounds.

Accepting biblical principles as the truth might create a uniform moral standard for enhancing trust, as argued by Stakeholder (f) in the prosperity analysis. On the contrary, in the absence of a moral standard, corrupt ethical codes (see Stakeholder (g)) might lead to a vast range of "negative" socially accepted norms, low productivity (Mockus et al., 2012), and low "spontaneous sociability" (low trust) (Fukuyama, 1995). Furthermore, individuals not only respond to the coercive power of the law, but obey their own moral principles (Mockus et al., 2012, p. 7). This might explain, perhaps even crucially, why the Protestant Reformation — based on the *Sola Scriptura* principle — contributed, among other factors, to creating trust in Swiss society.

18.12.4. Recommendations for Future Research

This study has identified two promising fields on which little or no systematic research exists and that would help better understand religion and prosperity in Switzerland: a) the influence of religion on law and institutions at the cantonal level; and b) the relevance and impact of the Concordats signed between several Swiss cantons and the Roman Catholic Church-State.

19.b) Uruguay: Extreme Positive Case Study (Latin America)

> "All religious cults are free in Uruguay. The State does not endorse any religion" (Article 5 of the 1967 Constitution).

Uruguay is one of the highest-scoring Latin American countries in social indicators such as transparency (Transparency International, 2016), political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2016), and social progress (Porter et al., 2015). Accordingly, it has been closer to Western European countries rather than other Latin American countries with regard to institutional performance, collective vision, and demographic composition (Roniger, 2016, p. 416; Transparency International, 2016; Porter et al., 2015). It has been the exception compared to the rest of Latin America due to its stable democratic institutions, great political stability, and prosperity (Klaiber, 1997). Therefore, Uruguay has been praised as *"the Switzerland of Latin America"* (Fitzgibbon, 1956; Roniger, 2016, p. 416).

Uruguay has enjoyed a positive reputation and good performance for most of its life as an independent nation. However, the 16th-century Spanish colonizers considered this small country a "land without any profit," due to its lack of precious metals and modest indigenous civilisations (Corbo, 2011, p. 284; Da Costa, 2009, p. 140). Consequently, the Spaniards' colonial extractive institutions (e.g. the feudal structures of the Roman Catholic Church-State) never became deeply rooted in Uruguay, unlike in the rest of the continent (Fitzgibbon, 1956; Klaiber, 1997; Da Costa, 2009; Corbo, 2011). This coincides with what Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) have called a "reversal of fortune," where the weakness of extractive institutions has decisively "flipped the coin."

As a result, the Roman Catholic Church-State never gained the social importance in Uruguay than it has had in the rest of Latin America. This facilitated various liberal social measures in Uruguay, largely due to the absence of an institutional apparatus and power quotas considered fundamental and asserted by the Roman Church-State in other parts of the world (Da Costa, 2009, p. 140; Corbo, 2011, p. 285). The following subsections briefly explain the progressive secularisation (anti-clerical) that led to the liberal institutions of the Uruguayan (welfare) state.

19.1. Religion and Secularisation in Uruguay

Secularisation and religiosity levels in Uruguay are closer to Western Europe than the rest of Latin America. Among Latin American countries, Uruguay has by far the lowest proportion of Roman Catholics (42%), yet the highest proportion of religiously unaffiliated adults (37%) (Pew Research Center, 2014). Such high levels of secularisation (and low relative Catholicism) are understandable when considering the historical laicising process that began in 19th-century Uruguay (Caetano & Geymonat, 1997; Guigou, 2003; Da Costa, 2003 as cited in Da Costa, 2016, p. 229).

The idea of medieval "Christendom" inherited from Hispanic times became obsolete and residual in Uruguay already during the 19th century (which is early compared to the rest of Latin America). Roman Catholicism represented a religious and political culture that legitimised social and racial asymmetries. Therefore, the country's intellectual and political leadership agreed that totalising religion (the *Old Regime*) needed to be overcome. Consequently, "critical" religious and philosophical thinking succeeded — but did not entirely oust — the Old Regime (Hernández, 2017, p. 111).

In this way, Uruguay closely followed the *laïcité* model of the French Revolution without ever completely replicating it (i.e. including pluralist connotations). This process resulted in the widespread secularisation of institutional fields, displaced religion to the domestic sphere, and guaranteed the freedom of consciousness and religion (Roniger, 2016, p. 414).

Like Switzerland, the Uruguayan understanding of *laïcité* also implied a mode of collective life legitimated by state neutrality and popular sovereignty (Blancarte, 2006; Da Costa 2011 as cited in Roniger, 2016, p. 415). Table 33 summarises the historical process towards secularisation in Uruguay.

Year	Steps towards secularisation in Uruguay
1837	The state recognises civil marriage
1861	Secularisation of public cemeteries (previously ran by the Roman Church-State)
1863	The Bishop of Montevideo was banished
1877	Education Act enacted, removing religion from the educational system
1879	Civil Registration Act enacted, passing registration from the Roman Church to the state
1885	Convents Act enacted, annulling the legal status of all convents
1906	Crucifixes removed from all public hospitals
1907	Divorce Act enacted. Religious references deleted from the oath taken by members of Parliament.
1917	Constitutional reform establishes the legal and actual separation of church and state
1919	Renaming of holidays and towns (now given secular names)

Table 33: Historical steps of the secularisation process in Uruguay adapted from (Da Costa, 2009, pp. 138-140; Caetano and Geymonat as cited in Roniger, 2016, p. 414).

A central and early innovation involved placing public education in Uruguay under civic control and the total absence of any religious content in school curricula since the 19th century (Asiaín, 2010). This process was related to persistent human capital building and prosperity (Becker & Woessmann, 2009).

Roman Catholicism interpreted the 1917 Constitution as a severe blow to its intentions. It became aware of the definitive loss of the old and longed-for medieval "Christendom" and of the irreversible reality of living in a pluralistic and secular society. This led to the Church retreating from public life and gradually reduced its sociocultural influence (Corbo, 2011, p. 303).

19.2. Role of Protestantism in Secularisation (19th Century)

The modernisation of the Uruguayan state and society involved the promotion of several core values, including religious pluralisation, freedom of worship, and the desacralisation of political and civic activities. The legitimisation of the role of religion in modern society became the subject of an intense polemic between Catholics, Protestants and liberals in Uruguay (Hernández, 2017, p. 143).

Anti-clericalism became the link between Protestants, liberals, and Freemasons in their fight against Roman Catholicism as the common enemy. The objectives of this alliance were fourfold: 1) absolute separation of church and state; 2) elimination of all religious education

from state schools; 3) creation of a secular registry of births; 4) reduction of religious holidays to no more than four dates according to the French model (the other holidays were suppressed as they were considered harmful to trade and commerce) (Hernández, 2017, pp. 128-129; Da Costa, 2009, pp. 138-140).

Protestantism opposed the corporate conception of traditional Roman Catholic society (corporatism). Consequently, Protestantism emerged as a religious alternative upholding the values of freedom, republicanism and democracy. Its principal interest was to achieve specific changes in social organisation in line with the Anglo-American model (Amestoy, 1994, p. 617; Hernández, 2017, p. 116). Particularly significant was the missionary activity of Methodism within Protestantism. Methodism portrayed and compared itself with Roman Catholicism in the following terms (Table 34):

Methodism	**Roman Catholicism**
"Religion of common sense", "of the right reason"	"adverse to common sense, opposed to reason"
"of the civilisation"	"hindrances to civilisation"
"of freedom"	"enemies of freedom"
"of the moral purity"	"crude, petty, and degrading materialism"
"a spiritual religion"	"vain pomp" and the "empty appearance"
"the religion of the Bible"	"persecutors of the Bible"

Table 34: Self-portraits of Protestantism (Methodism) compared to Roman Catholicism in 19th-century Uruguay (adapted from Mann as cited in Hernández Méndez, 2017, p. 116).

Thus, Protestantism became coupled with the anti-clerical secularist programme of liberalism. The dilemma of Protestantism as an ally of liberalism was, however, dealing with the most radical liberal postures that considered religion (in general) opposed to social progress. In this respect, Protestantism maintained a critical attitude towards ideological radicalism within liberalism. This manifested itself later in the inclusion of the freedom of religion and consciousness in the constitution, as opposed to the French model of laïcité (Hernández Méndez, 2017, p. 143; Roniger, 2016, p. 414).

19.3. The Role of Roman Catholicism

In the particular dispute that Roman Catholicism maintained with Protestantism, the Roman Church-State resorted to political power. Roman Catholicism claimed that it was the duty of the state to safeguard national religion against Protestantism and liberalism. Therefore, according to the prevailing Roman Catholic opinion, religious freedom was to be rejected. The Roman Church-State demanded eradicating biblical and apologetic literature of Protestant origin, which in extreme cases resulted in the burning of bibles. (Hernández, 2017, pp. 127,136,144). However, the government did not impede dissenting proselytism and refrained from intervening in the ensuing anti-clerical demonstrations. Therefore, the state was no longer the "extended hand" of the Church (Hernández, 2017, pp. 144-145).

The Roman Church-State made numerous attempts to reverse secularisation. These, however, did not succeed in Uruguay (unlike in Argentina) due to the Church-State receiving little support in Uruguay. The measures included: 1) creation of a national clergy to promote the introduction of "regular corporations" and the development of Catholic associationism; 2) establishing a press and media loyal to the Church (i.e. opposed to the liberal press); 3) rural missions; 4) Catholic congresses and a Catholic club; and above all 5) the foundation of educational institutions to counteract secularism and anti-clericalism in education (Corbo, 2011).

19.4. Present-day State-Church Relations

More recent controversies have revolved around the question of whether the Uruguayan Republic is regressing in its secular traditions. Examples of ample discussion have been the state-funded installation of a cross on a public road to celebrate the papal visit (1987), erecting a statue of John Paul II (2005) and other Roman Catholic icons in public spaces (Da Costa, 2009, p. 142).

19.5. Empirical Analysis and CDA (Prosperity):

	Prosperity
Stakeholder	**Fundamental principles identified (interviews)**
The Holy Bible	"Keep therefore the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may *prosper* in all that ye do" (Deuteronomy 29:9, King James Version).
e) Roman Catholic theologian	"I believe that the prosperity situation of Uruguay throughout history does not provide a single answer. On the one hand, it is a small country, and it is much easier to have an overview and know what is happening throughout the country. It is a country that has a tiny population, compared to other countries in Latin America, which also allows the implementation of social policies. […]"
f) Protestant Free Church Pastor 1.	"In this Church, there are no promises of healing, nor prosperity. In this respect, the soul and its orientation towards what is to come are clearly important. From those promises, one can draw peace and strength, but there is no promise that you will get better from your illness or prosperity. This is a distinctly Christian church, but in following Jesus. Jesus established a basis, and we want to prepare for what is to come on that basis. Not for this world, since this world passes away. But there is a future promise that Jesus will come to seek his people [John 14: 3]."
i) Ecumenical academic theologian.	"The Swiss [from Nueva Helvecia] are still more closed; the Waldensians are more open, more progressive. But the working system is the same, i.e. through associations, cooperatives, etc. A characteristic of this area is that you will not find settlements (invasions). If land belongs to someone, nobody builds on that land; it's empty. If you go to La Paz, you will see a plot of land in the corner next to the school and the Plaza. Doroteo García donated that land to a Mr Malcolm (an Englishman) who had a field close to the little town and that helped him when he came to mark the town, etc. Later, Mr García, in gratitude, gave him that land, but he never drew up the documents and for that reason, this land has remained unbuilt to this day. No one has built on that land. The same thing is happening here. You will find only a few humble or derelict houses because, in general, the level of housing in this area is good. You will find low-income families, but with good housing. There are no settlements like those in Montevideo and other cities. Here, the Spanish colony was very methodical in its production; but they were not progressive and were absorbed by these colonies (Waldensians) that were always more hardworking and open to progress."
j) Ecumenical Pastor	"Here in Colonia and in Uruguay, in general, many people prospered thanks to the Swiss; even the government copied things from them. We [Swiss colony] are an example in the country. The cheese we make, the cheese colony, was born here. There are cheese factories in the rest of the country. And they have learned the Swiss technique from here. We know how to save when there is plenty because that is what our grandparents taught us and when there is not, the Swiss have a reservation. Here you take good care of that. "Machete" is our expression for being stingy. To be "Swiss" is to be a collaborator. The immigrants came with nothing except tools. But they were hungry. We even inherited the need to care; we save because it is very difficult to have nothing and go hungry. The Waldensians came to colonise four years before the Swiss colony (1858). Our immigrants [Swiss] began arriving in 1861 or 1862, and the Swiss colony [Nueva Helvecia] prospered a lot. They [the Waldenses] did not prosper quite as well, because religion somehow blocked them. This [Nueva Helvecia] was an open colony; maybe we lost the language of being open, but the Swiss still keep some of the traditions, for instance, dance, food, orchestras, etc., even 150 years later […]."
n) Independent, free Protestant believer (Entrepreneur)	"Recently, Uruguay was said to be one of the least religious countries in Latin America. I suppose that is because we are doing "too well," and therefore forget to look up (towards God). Uruguay has a very 'light' religiosity, nothing deep, in general."
p) Government officer	"To this day, Colonia is very prosperous. During the major crisis of 2002, Rosario [Catholic] closed five of its factories, and there was a massive loss of jobs because it was purely manufacturing. In

	contrast, Valdense [Protestant Waldensians] and Nueva Helvecia [Swiss mixed], who worked more and lived more than their land yielded did not have that problem, because they had a diversified economy. All immigrants have strongly influenced this area. Although they [immigrants] all have something in common, they are also very different. The Waldensian is a little more closed than the Swiss (Nueva Helvecia). Rosario's inhabitant is carnivalesque. We have a saying: 'The Waldensian does not drink mate herb, because he cannot waste time; he has many tasks to do; the one in Nueva Helvecia drinks mate herb, but in his house; and the one in Rosario drinks in the shade of the parsley, because they never cut the parsley.' The Waldensians dedicate themselves first to their daily chores and religion; the Swiss (Nueva Helvecia) retire to the privacy of their house while the Rosarians live the 'crazy life.'"

Table 35: Principles of prosperity according to stakeholders interviewed in Uruguay (Source: Author's figure).

(1) Textual Analysis (Theological):

None of the stakeholders interviewed referred directly to a Christian (i.e. biblical) principle of prosperity being connected to obedience to the Commandments (Moral Law). However, Protestant stakeholders provided the closest direct references to biblical concepts.

The Protestant Free Pastor 1 (f) refers to spiritual prosperity (in the heavenly kingdom; John 14: 3) rather than to physical prosperity in this world. Similarly, the Independent Free Protestant Believer (n) mentions that after becoming prosperous ('too well'), they forget about God, which implicitly refers to the Old Testament proverb:

> …feed me with food convenient for me: lest I be full, and deny thee, and say, Who is the Lord?... (Proverbs 30:8–9).

The other stakeholders prefer a more secular (non-theological) approach to prosperity in Uruguay. None referred directly to a biblical principle. This contrasts with the other three cases (Switzerland, Colombia, Cuba), but can be expected considering Uruguay's high secularisation.

(2) Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical Triangulation):

The Ecumenical Academic Theologian (i) links trustworthiness, the respect for the law, and prosperity (housing), similarly to Fukuyama (1995). When the Independent Free Protestant

Believer (n) mentions that after becoming prosperous ('too well'), they forget God, he is also referring implicitly to the theory of existential security (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). This explains why societies become more secularised when enough freedom and security exist, but become more religious in times of crisis.

For the Independent Free Protestant Believer, causality tends to run from prosperity to secularism. This view, however, denies the historic "reverse of fortune" resulting from progressive secularisation and subsequent human capital building in Uruguay.

(3) Analysis of Social Practice:

Three stakeholders provide largely similar general descriptions of the different colonies (towns with different religious backgrounds). Despite some minor differences, they generally identify Waldensians and Swiss colony inhabitants as "hard workers" and "prosperous," whereas Rosarians (Catholics) are seen as "not progressive" and "carnivalesque." These perceptions point to a Weberian Protestant work ethic in the Colonia province, in line with the global trend discussed in this study (Table 36).

Province/town	**i) Ecumenical academic theologian,**	**j) Ecumenical Pastor**	**p) Government officer**
Rosario (Roman Catholic town)	Methodical, yet not progressive.		– "Carnivalesque" (drinks mate in the shade of the parsley, which he never cuts). – During the major crisis of 2002, Rosario closed five of its factories, resulting in many redundancies.
Valdense (Waldensians Protestant colony)	More open, more hardworking, more progressive (than Swiss colonists and Rosarians).	The Waldensians did not prosper in the same way (as the Swiss colonists), because religion somehow blocked them.	– Hard workers (do not drink mate herb, because they are busy) – Slightly more reserved than the Swiss – Prosperous, diversified economy (not affected by the 2002 crisis).
Nueva Helvecia (Swiss colony, mixed religious)	More reserved (than the Waldensians and Rosarians)	Swiss colony (Nueva Helvecia) prospered a lot.	– Hard workers (drink mate herb, but in the privacy of their home) - Prosperous, diversified economy, (not affected by the 2002 crisis).

Table 36: Perceptions of three stakeholders on the prosperity and performance of towns with different religious and cultural backgrounds in Uruguay (Source: Author's figure).

20.c) Cuba: A *Sui Generis* Case Study (Communist proxy)

"It is illegal and punishable to oppose faith or religious belief to the Revolution, to education or to the fulfilment of the duties of working, to defend the country with arms, to revere its symbols and the other duties established by the Constitution" (Article 54: (3) Political Constitution of 1976 of the Republic of Cuba, valid until 1992).

"The State recognises, respects, and guarantees religious freedom. In the Republic of Cuba, religious institutions are separate from the State. Different beliefs and religions enjoy equal consideration" (Article 8: Political Constitution of 1992 of the Republic of Cuba, valid to this day).

Since the socialist revolution, Cuba has exhibited one of the highest social indicator scores in Latin America (e.g. health, literacy, and personal safety) (Gold, 2015; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2016). However, its communist regime has made Cuba the third most hostile country to economic and political freedom worldwide (after North Korea and Venezuela) (Miller & Kim, 2017; Freedom House, 2016). On balance, however, the Cuban social progress index is one of the lowest in Latin America (Porter et al., 2015).

The religious overview is as contradictory as Cuba's social indicators. Historically, direct political influence and formal participation in religion have been low compared to most Latin American countries, even from before the Cuban Revolution. However, widespread religiosity and syncretism strongly permeate religious and secular belief systems in Cuba. Consequently, the institutional influence of religion has been relatively weak compared to the pervasive cultural influence of religion in Cuba (Crahan, 2017, pp. 386, 388; Crahan, 1979, p. 159).

The overall indifference to institutionalised religion in Cuba stems from anti-colonial/anti-imperial sentiments. The Roman Catholic Church-State has been perceived as tied to colonial Spain. Protestant churches have in turn been linked to US interests. For instance, the Roman Catholic hierarchy strongly opposed Cuba's independence from Spain, and the

US government recommended that US churches ought to use humanitarian aid to promote democracy in Cuba (Crahan, 1979, p. 159; Goldenziel, 2009, p. 206; Ramírez, 2009, p. 169).

The Cuban Revolution impacted the institutional strength of religion (i.e. by abolishing Church privileges, reducing formal membership, and spreading secular education). However, the level of belief among the Cuban population maintained remarkably stable from the 1950s to the present (ca. 75 to 85%) (Crahan, 2017, p. 390).

20.1. Colonial Times Until the First Half of the 20th Century

As in the rest of Latin America, Spanish colonisation introduced Roman Catholicism in Cuba. Consequently, the Catholic Church has always had a strong presence in Cuba, and has formed a complex relationship with the political establishment (Contreras, 2013, p. 177; Ramírez, 2009, p. 167).

Independence from Spain (1898) and relations with the United States led to an influx of Protestant missionaries. As a result, several Protestant denominations have been installed in Cuba since the late 19th-century, including Methodist, Baptist, Lutheran, Adventist, Presbyterian, and Quaker (Contreras, 2013, p. 178; Ramírez, 2009, p. 171).

Before the Revolution, the Roman Church-State did not have a strong influence in Cuba, unlike in most Latin American countries (Goldenziel, 2009, p. 182; Crahan, 2017, pp. 386, 388; Crahan, 1979, p. 159; Ramírez, 2009, p. 171). Nevertheless, the Roman Church-State privileged *de facto* or *de jure* relations with the government, thus enforcing the hegemonic power exerted by Rome until the Cuban Revolution. For instance, the state obliged Protestant churches to register officially, while the Roman Church-State was exempt from such an obligation (Ramírez, 2009, p. 171). Such privileges promoted elitism and created a highly non-egalitarian pre-revolutionary society (Crahan, 1979, p. 170).

20.2. The Revolution: 1960s to the Present

Among other factors, the relative weakness of the Roman Church-State in Cuba provided opportunities for liberals, US Protestants, and communists, and ultimately led to the Revolution. Naturally, Protestants were more progressive and less counter-revolutionary than Roman Catholics (Crahan, 1979, pp. 159, 170, 172).

When the revolutionary regime adopted Marxism and forged ties with the Soviet Bloc, it adopted an atheistic constitution and became hostile to any form of religion. The law on education gave the state the exclusive right to build schools and provide education. Private schools became state property. This severely affected religious and, above all, Roman Catholic schools, which had outnumbered other types of schools before the Revolution (Contreras, 2013, p. 179; Crahan, 1979, p. 179).

The general reaction of Cuban society to the adoption of Marxism in the 1960s was negative, due to the religious implications. Accordingly, the hostilities to religion led to exiling Roman Catholic priests and Protestant pastors. Properties were seized and dozens of clerics and laypersons were tortured (Crahan, 1979, p. 174; Ramírez, 2009, p. 173).

In the 1970s and 80s, the Cuban Revolution stimulated other social movements in Latin America, including Liberation Theology within Roman Catholicism and later also in Protestantism (Berges & Cárdenas, 1993; Ramírez, 2009). Fidel Castro, Cuba's communist leader for almost five decades, publicly expressed a positive view of religion for the first time in 1985. Castro admitted that religion "too, could help change reality, revolutionize a country, overthrow oppression, and establish justice" (Castro & Betto, 2006, p. 5).

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s resulted in a severe economic crisis in Cuba, (known as the "special period") (Goldenziel, 2009, p. 202). This, in turn, led to a revival of religious activity, which was closely linked to the unfolding socioeconomic crisis during the 1990s (Ramírez, 2009, p. 174). This fairly typical phenomenon is corroborated by the theory of existential security (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Accordingly, Afro-Cuban and Pentecostal religions have witnessed rapid growth, like other faiths in Cuba (Goldenziel, 2009, p. 202).

The Cuban regime responded to the crisis by implementing a new constitution (1992), which included religious freedom and the substitution of an atheist state with a secular one (Goldenziel, 2009; Contreras, 2013). Granting greater religious freedom was part of a strategic political ploy to strengthen the socialist regime (Goldenziel, 2009).

Three aspects are worth mentioning in this respect:

1) The collapse of the Soviet Union and the crucial role of the Roman Church-State at the time. The Cuban regime realised the value of an important political trade-off: counting on Rome as an ally (not as an enemy) to maintain dictatorship. Thus, greater religious freedom allowed the regime to cultivate relations with the Catholic hierarchy (Goldenziel, 2009; Crahan, 2017; Contreras, 2013);

2) Religious freedom helped the regime to legitimise itself in a religious society (whose religiosity underwent a revival after the 1990s crisis) (Goldenziel, 2009);

3) Constitutional religious liberty permitted the Cuban regime to circumvent US trade regulations, thus enabling economic aid to flow into Cuba via religious groups. Furthermore, the Cuban establishment took various measures to avoid US-like Protestant opposition by co-opting and regulating the Council of Churches through a clientelistic-corporatist scheme. This mechanism allows Council members to benefit from increased political power while limiting their autonomy to censure the government (Goldenziel, 2009).

After Cuba opened itself in 1991, Afro-Cuban organisations also came into the corporatist fold (Goldenziel, 2009, p. 201).

Finally, the break between the Roman Church-State and the Cuban government after the Revolution demonstrated Rome's ability to survive and adapt to unfavourable conditions (Contreras, 2013, p. 177). The Cuban revolution showed the Roman Church-State that it could include Marxist elements in its dialectic and thus support left-wing dictators to gain political revenue. Consequently, despite initial resistance to liberation theology, the Roman Church-State hierarchy accepted this to a certain extent, as an element integral to upholding its hegemony (see Section 10.4.1.4.1).

Although the Catholic Church-State still does not achieve the same power in Cuba as in other Latin American countries, it still has the necessary elements to achieve this goal. It relies on a centuries-long legacy and on a well-consolidated hierarchical structure, from the Vatican down to Cuban priests and believers (Contreras, 2013, p. 193). After all, in "Cuba, as in much of the world, the Catholic Church has the oldest, largest, wealthiest, and most organized presence of any religion…" (Goldenziel, 2009, p. 195).

In turn, the Protestant experience in Cuba largely confirms the findings of various scholars (e.g. Helmsdorff 1996; Schäfer 2006; and Martin 1999) for other Latin American countries: The Council of Churches (which represents most Protestant denominations) has adopted the same established practices of corporatism and clientage (Goldenziel, 2009).

20.3. Religion Adherents and Prominent Syncretism in Cuba

Protestants have amounted 3 to 6 per cent of the Cuban population according to different estimates (Goldenziel, 2009, p. 206; Crahan, 2017, p. 397). About 70 per cent of Cubans claim to practice spiritism. Also, roughly two-thirds of Cubans have traditionally identified as Roman Catholics, thus indicating the high degree of syncretism in the country (Crahan, 2017, p. 384; Hearn, 2008, p. 17).

20.4. Empirical Analysis and CDA for Cuba (Corruption)

Note: No quantitative data on competiveness is available for Cuba and little qualitative data resulted from coding prosperity (Appendix 16).

Corruption	
Stakeholder	**Fundamental principles identified (interviews)**
The Holy Bible	"Keep thee far from a false matter; and the innocent and righteous slay thou not: for I will not justify the wicked. And thou shalt take no gift: for the gift blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the righteous" (Exodus 23:7–8).
b) Roman Catholic Priest 2.	"Corruption comes from below, from people with limitations. Cuban people survive from the 'black bag' [black market and rubbish]. And there is a struggle to see whom to damage, [which is] typical of the black market that is unscrupulous. And that struggle will end when people have the opportunity to meet their needs in another [legal] way."
e) Roman Catholic Theologian	"As people live badly, they cheat on the state. And the Church [Catholic] says this is not a sin. Why so? Because it's *Fair Compensation*, a Catholic doctrine. The state has taken the properties of the people; it is fair that people seek their compensation. In this sense, it's okay to cheat on the state or

	to steal like Robbin Hood. In 1961, the relations between church and state were impossible. The Church was the largest landowner in Cuba and then the US. The Church supported the revolution and thought its lands would be protected. That was not the case. Now, the closeness between the pope and state are necessary because it suits the state and it is convenient for the Church. The Church wants to receive privileges and status, and the state wants to show piousness and social sensitivity. It is like a 'Mafia kiss' ('un beso de mafiosas')."
f) Protestant Pastor 1 (Pentecostal)	"Christians [Protestants] also do unlawful things but to a lesser extent than the rest. Christians [Protestants], in general, do not party; do not drink alcohol; are not adulterers. They do not commit idolatry. We are committed to God and keep a high [moral] standard here in Cuba. [But] in Cuba, you live outside the law. Cubans think with their bellies. The US has the Cuban Adjustment Act (dry and wet feet). I hope that in heaven there will be a Cuban Adjustment Act, too (laughs).
g) Protestant Pastor 2 (Adventist)	"There is a culture of 'to solve' in Cuba: in society, in general in the population. The concept of "theft" has been distorted and softened by "to solve".
h) Protestant Pastor 3 (Methodist)	"[…] Nowadays, what is said is not done. No one abides by the laws. The difference between before the revolution and now is that now corruption is widespread and before it was not. If we go out walking in the street, I can give you 10,000 examples of corruption. For example, in that little corner, in that cafe, most of their products are not legal. They are not selling what they have to sell, and so on. Or, for example, if we go to a flea market selling agricultural products, they do not measure a fair weight. They are trying to deceive people and are burdening the system. They are evading taxes, and so on. If we go to a government institution or we go to a ticket agency there will be "no tickets." But if you pay a bribe of $20 or $10, regardless of the destination, you can get a ticket. This has become a culture, a culture of corruption. I am an evangelical [Methodist], and we evangelicals are very concerned about these issues. For us, in our Church, when we do an event and have to buy food, we think twice, because it is a matter of conscience and we know where the products come from.
k) Non-Christian (atheist, agnostic) (Academic)	"You have to pay more [a bribe] for a government certification with good spelling. Otherwise, they will give you with bad spelling, sometimes on purpose. [Also] Many Cubans watch television through an illegal package. Cubans normally are seeking to break the law and do what they want. Corruption was minimal after the revolution, and now it has increased. Buying a car was a reward only for good workers."
m) Employee, Independent citizen	"Unnecessary bureaucracy and corruption is eating away Cuba."
n) Tourism professional	Here it is common to evade the law and to pay bribes to get things done. Otherwise, you could wait all your life without anything happening. Here we have a saying: 'The government pretends to pay me, and I pretend to work' (*El gobierno hace como que me paga y yo hago como que trabajo*).
p) Government official	In Cuba, we now have 'indirect democracy,' which means that you vote for representatives who vote for governors. Here, Cubans say that 'Fidel gives everything' [to the people] and the state is infallible, like God.' *However, the 'new man' whom Che Guevara dreamt of has become the corrupt Cuban and a hooker* (Jinetera). Today there are very low moral standards here. Immorality is rife, Jineteras. Rampant state corruption and everywhere else. Unnecessary bureaucracy. But before the Revolution, there was much more corruption, aristocracy and Catholicism. To whom shall the needy look? Shall they look to the government or the church? They are both immoral, and if we focus on them, we will become more immoral. We can be better and lower corruption only by looking at God's perfection."

Table 37: Principles of corruption according to stakeholders interviewed in Cuba (Source: Author's figure).

(1) Textual Analysis (Theological):

None of the interviewed stakeholders refers directly to a Christian (i.e. biblical) principle of corruption potentially linked to the moral law. However, the Protestant Methodist Pastor (h) mentioned the role of the Protestant (Methodist) Church in preventing cheating from spreading in Cuban society. This is indirectly in line with Exodus 23 (Table 37).

The Roman Catholic Theologian (e) mentions the Roman Catholic doctrine of *Fair Compensation*, which "justifies" stealing or cheating in certain situations (like Robin Hood). This doctrine is opposed to Exodus 23 (Table 37). Likewise, the "necessary Mafia kiss" between church and state is against another biblical principle: "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21).

(2) Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical Triangulation):

The atheist, socialist legal principle of the "goodness of humankind" (Berman 2003, p. 18) resembles Roman Catholic natural law, in that it trusts the human capacity to discern good from evil (Selling 2018, p. 9; Gula 2002, pp. 120–21). Arruñada (2010) explains that Roman Catholicism enhances corruption due to the relativistic contents of its moral code, and its dubious enforcement mechanisms (p. 895). These statements are valid in Cuban society, as exemplified above in various ways: 1) by the practice of *Fair Compensation* (see Roman Catholic Theologian); 2) by the Protestant Methodist Pastor's comments on cheating and stealing; 3) by the common Cuban proverb "The government pretends to pay me, and I pretend to work" (Tourism professional); and 4) by the non-Christian atheist's example of cheating to pay a bribe.

(3) Analysis of Social Practice: Law and Institutions:

The Tourism professional (n) highlights the evasion of laws and payment of bribes as the natural way of life in Cuba. Likewise, the non-Christian atheist (k) refers to similar examples of breaking the law. Such examples are consistent with the systematic separation

of law, culture and morals common in most Latin American countries (Mockus et al., 2012; see also Section 10.3.1.2).

The Government Official (p) argues in a similar direction and indirectly challenges the socialist legal tradition (Section 8.3.4.7). His criticism refers to what Marxist theory calls the ideal "new man." In practice, however, this has produced a corrupt Cuban and the hooker (*Jinetera*). Stakeholder (p) expands this perspective, observing that low moral standards pervade the government and the Church. What remains is the need to consider God's perfection the sole point of reference.

21.d) Colombia: Extreme Negative Case Study

"The Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion is that of the Nation; the public powers will protect it and make it respected as an essential element of the social order" (Article 38, Political Constitution of Colombia of 1886, valid until 1991).

"Public education shall be organised and directed under the Catholic Religion […]" (Article 41, Constitution of Colombia of 1886, valid until 1991).

"The State is not atheist, agnostic, or indifferent to the religious feelings of Colombians" (Article 2, Law 133 of 1994, currently valid).

For most of Colombia's history, most "Colombians have been in absolute poverty and plagued by violence and insecurity" (Robinson, 2016, pp. 10, 11). Indeed, serious security risks (violence and terrorism) mean that Colombia ranks bottom of the 136 countries rated for tourists and businesses. In the 2017 Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report, Colombia scored 2.6 on a scale of the most dangerous countries worldwide (min 2.59; max 6.65; median 5.60). (World Economic Forum, 2017). Colombian levels of corruption are also very high (Transparency International, 2016), and Colombia is one of the most inequitable countries in the world (World Bank, 2016).

Robinson (2016) convincingly argues that the causes lie in the country's historical extractive political institutions (low quality of democracy and weak state). However, he disregards the crucial and profound institutional influence of Roman Catholicism on moulding Colombian political institutions.

The vital role of Roman Catholicism in establishing the social, political, institutional, and religious *status quo* in Colombia is plainly evident and well-documented (Figueroa, 2016; Levine, 1981; Blanco, 2008; Munevar, 2008; Beltrán, 2008). The largely successful project pursued by the Roman Church-State in Colombia (so-called *Christilandia* according to Felix Restrepo S.J.) consists of three pillars: 1) political (a confessional state); 2) economic (a corporatist state); and 3) cultural (a Catholic and conservative "Hispanicism") (Figueroa, 2016).

Roman Catholicism deployed Hispanicism (characterised by its triad of language, religion, and race) as its best cultural weapon. Hispanicism shielded the interests of the Roman Church-State against the threats of Bolshevik-Socialist atheism, French liberal anti-clericalism, and triumphant Anglo-Saxon Protestant modernity. Likewise, its feudal-medieval corporatism enabled the Roman Church-State to respond to both modern "right-wing" capitalism/neoliberalism and "left-wing," socialist threats. The whole package needed to be tied politically and legally to a confessional state and to constitution legitimised by a Concordat (Figueroa, 2016; Levine, 1981).

Despite the mild erosion of the hegemony of Roman Catholicism in recent decades, the coherence of the Roman Church-State project is still pervasive in Colombia (Figueroa, 2016); (Beltrán, 2008). The *Christilandia* project of Colombian society has been a product of the country's most conservative and intolerant wing of Roman Catholicism. Such conservative views have been dominant in Colombia, regardless of the existence of less intransigent sectors, which have traditionally been weaker (Figueroa, 2016; Levine, 1981; Munevar, 2008; Beltrán, 2008). Consequently, Colombian Romanism (Catholicism) has forcefully advocated such a theocratic, hierarchical, organic, and corporate society (Figueroa, 2016).

21.1. Brief Historical Background

Contrary to popular belief in Colombia, the Roman Catholic Church-State is not a Colombian institution. It has, however, been very present since independence from Spain and even before. Colombia was a strategic ecclesiastical, political, and economic centre for Spain and the Roman Church-State in the colonial period.

After independence, Simon Bolivar petitioned the Roman Church-State (so-called Holy See or Roman See) to sign a Concordat with Colombia (New Granada). This move allowed legitimising the newly independent state and to continue the "patronato" without the Spanish Crown. Consequently, the Roman Church-State recognised Colombia as the first independent Latin American Nation in 1835 (Salinas, 2013).

Politically, several historical periods alternated between anti-clerical liberals and conservative Catholic "hegemonies" (as well as federalists and centralists), leading to traumatic civil wars. The liberal principles of the French Revolution had a decisive influence, especially in the first five Colombian constitutions until 1886 (Uribe, 1985). The extent of this liberal influence, which can be traced back to John Locke, led former president Lopez Michelsen to affirm that Colombian institutions descend from "Calvinism" (Lopez, 1966). Far from that, Protestant and liberal ideals and influence were severely and systematically avoided in the following centuries in Colombia. Moreover, the Calvinist influence on liberalism occurred only indirectly via the French Revolution (Section 8.3.4.4).

21.2. The progressive and short-lasting liberal Constitution of 1863 (Rionegro)

Ironically, Colombia became the first Latin American country to decree the separation of church and state in 1863. The Rionegro Constitution of Colombia (1863) was an anti-clerical effort promulgated under the auspices of the Liberals in power. It was a very progressive and pioneering Constitution that provided full freedom of religion and other individual liberties. However, it only lasted 23 years. No other religion rivalled the primacy of Roman Catholicism in Colombia, where the state was weak and poor. After a Conservative revolt that resulted in a civil war of marked religious character, Colombia discarded the liberal Constitution of Rionegro and undid much of the Liberal effort to lessen the power of the Roman Catholic Church. It then promulgated its most conservative and long-lasting Constitution in 1886. The 1886 Constitution declared Roman Catholicism to be the religion of the nation, and public authorities were empowered to enforce respect for it. The constitutional provisions of 1886 led Colombia to sign a concordat that reiterated the establishment of Catholicism as the state religion (Delpar, 1980). Thus, Colombia did not formally separate church and state until its current Constitution (1991).

21.3. The Constitution of 1886 (Valid Until 1991) and the Concordat

The Conservative victory in the 19th-century civil wars ensured the substantial removal of liberal principles from the Constitution of 1886. The Roman See imposed the conditions on the state to grant constitutional privileges to the rights of the Roman Catholic Church. These rights were ratified in the Concordat of 1887. Thus, Colombia retained its well-rooted colonial institutions, a powerful Roman Church-State, a unified social and economic elite, and a strong central state (Levine, 1981; Figueroa, 2016).

The Concordat of 1887 was progressively modified, favouring the Roman See, until 1973. Since the Middle Ages, no other country has enforced such a complete integration of church and state (ideal medieval Christendom), as reflected in Colombia's Concordat (Salinas, 2013; Levine, 1981; Figueroa, 2016). Several articles of the 1886 Constitution were identical to those of the Concordat. Among others, under the Colombian Concordat, the following legal instruments were enforced. For instance, Article 3 accepts the force of canon law: "Canon Law is independent of civil law and is not part of it, but the authorities of the Republic will respect it" (Concordat 73, Art. 3). Consequently, civil courts cannot judge the Church hierarchy, only the Roman See can.

In the Colombian Concordat, the Roman Church-State is defined as an "essential element of the social order" (Art. 1). Consequently, the Roman Church-State has played a major role in various areas of society:

1) Public and private education at all levels, which had to be maintained "in conformity with the dogmas of the Catholic religion" (Art. 12) (religious instruction was mandatory);
2) More than 63% of Colombia's territory are "mission territories," in which the Church exercised broad civil powers (Art. 31) (Levine, 1981; de Roux, 2001);
3) The armies of the republic, which enjoy exemptions known as "military privileges" and determined by the pope in a separate decree (Art. 20);
4) Registering births and marriages (Art. 17–19), and the management of death, including cemeteries (Art. 30). Parish records had preference over civil records.

Moreover, the Colombian government is obliged to pay the Roman Church-State an annual fee (Art. 22, 25), in addition to granting tax exemptions for Roman Church-State properties (Art. 6). Regarding education, the Concordat enforces further contentious measures: The government is obliged to prevent "the propagation of ideas contrary to the respect and veneration of the Church and Catholic dogma" in *literary and scientific subjects and, in general, in all branches of instruction*. Diocesan ordinaries, personally or by delegates, should inspect and revise the texts of religion and morals. In the universities, the archbishop of Bogotá identified those books that would serve as texts for religion and morality. Also, to ensure the uniform teaching of these subjects, the archbishop, together with the other prelates, would choose the texts at public schools (Art. 13).

Levine (1981) notes that "it is difficult to imagine a more effective mechanism of ostracism, or a more telling example of the fusion of civil and religious powers than these arrangements" (p.71). Neothomism inspired such conservative arrangements by opposing social change based on the belief of an indisputable "Roman Catholic truth" (Figueroa, 2016, p. 298). Thus, Colombia's large Roman Catholic population is a natural result of such an intransigent institutional regime rather than of the free choice of believers. Colombia has the highest proportion of adults raised as Roman Catholics in the world (92%), after Paraguay (94%) (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 12) (Colombia and Paraguay share the same clusters for low competitiveness and high corruption in QCA; Section 16.3.3.4).

During the conservative regime, the presence of liberals, and even more of Protestants, was strictly limited. Liberals and Protestants, as opponents of the regime, were stigmatised as heretical and dangerous groups (Beltrán, 2008). The president was empowered to take away their civil rights, imprison them, and condemn them to exile (Figueroa, 2016, p. 58). Such a tyrannical social order led to radicalisation and bloody conflicts, for instance, between liberals and conservatives (e.g. *La Violencia*) (Levine, 1981; Figueroa, 2016).

21.4. The Corporatist State

In the Middle Ages, the corporations enjoyed enormous privileges. Political power and social organisation depended entirely on them. The authority of the Roman Church-State was beyond question. All social expressions formed part of a unique organism described by Thomas Aquinas as "harmonious." The Protestant Reformation, and thus the rise of nation-states, as well as the French Revolution, led to a crisis of the corporatist model. This also explains the attacks of the Roman Church-State on modernity and democracy in Colombia (especially before Vatican II, but also afterwards) (Figueroa, 2016; Levine, 1981).

In Colombia, corporatism has maintained a medieval oligarchic society by the corporations relentlessly defending their interests to the detriment of public welfare. The state continues to approve laws and policies for the benefit of corporate associates. As a result, this hierarchical inequality has produced endemic violence across the country, which increased significantly during the same years in which corporatist proposals were implemented (Figueroa, 2016, pp. 15, 19; Levine, 1981). Moreover, corporatism, violence and deadly conflicts have exacerbated in the country's most conservative departments (i.e. Antioquia, Norte de Santander, Nariño) (Figueroa, 2016).

21.5. Partial End of a Totalitarian Roman Catholic Hegemony

The 1990s began with a new constitution. This was the result of a student movement and of a peace agreement that the then liberal government signed with a liberal-intellectual guerrilla (M-19) (Buenahora, 1992). The new Constitution of 1991 included (although only to a modest extent) the views of ethnic minorities, Protestant Christians, and other social groups. Accordingly, the new Constitution questioned the pervasive presence of Roman Catholicism and removed its privileged status as a "state religion," at least formally. Moreover, the new constitution opened up the path for religious pluralism (Munevar, 2008; Beltrán & Quiroga, 2017).

The participation of Protestants in drafting the Constitution of 1991, in the Religious Freedom Law (Law 133 of 1994), and in the Convention of Internal Public Law (Decree 354

of 1998), has helped dismantle the denominationally Catholic character of the Colombian State (Beltrán & Quiroga, 2017, p. 205). Thus, one of the fruits of the 1991 Constitution is the decline in poverty over the last decade, and an unusual series of clashes and crises for the elites (Robinson, 2016, p. 75). However, Protestant intervention in politics failed to abolish the Concordat altogether (Beltrán & Quiroga, 2017, p. 206). The Concordat of 1973 had to be renegotiated with the Roman See and was reduced to six articles (7, 8, 12, 14, 19, and 20) out of the 33 articles in the original text (Garzón, 2011). As the Attorney General formally put matters in 1993:

> …the Concordat does not recognise several *jus cogens* rules of international human rights law, namely: religious freedom; equal rights in marriage, during it and in case of dissolution of the bond; the freedom of teaching; respect for the autonomy, rights, and freedoms of indigenous people; and the right to education (Procuraduría General de la Nación, 1993).

In spite of these reforms, the Colombian government is still required to pay a fee to the Roman See. Religious instruction in public schools according to the Roman Church Magisterium for Catholics also remains firmly in place.

In practice, the Roman Church-State still has considerable privileges, despite being compelled to participate in a meanwhile competitive religious market. Roman Catholicism enjoys the prerogatives arising from more than four centuries of monopoly: First, a privileged relationship with the Colombian State, as guaranteed by the Concordat, which remains in force with modifications despite the 1991 Constitution. Second, clear educational privileges based on the Concordat and its past institutionalisation. Third, an enormous amount of property and cultural wealth, as evident in a solid corporate organisation and extensive infrastructure. And lastly, access to domains otherwise reserved for powerful institutions, such as the mass media (Beltrán, 2008, p. 189).

Thus, the centuries-long Catholic monopoly and hegemony have lastingly impacted Colombian culture, as is visible today. The traditions, styles of action, practices, procedures, and axes of conflict are well-established everywhere in Colombia and are often characteristic of feudal-medieval times (Levine, 1981, p. 58; Blanco, 2008; Munevar, 2008).

Moreover, the influence of the Roman Church-State is still closely bound up with politics in Colombia. The ideological function of the Roman Church (with a less direct link to religious beliefs) still plays a vital role as a cultural point of reference underpinning the Colombian ethos (Figueroa, 2016; Munevar, 2008; Beltrán, 2008). Moreover, even after religious freedom was guaranteed in the 1991 Constitution, 79% of the population remains Roman Catholic (Pew Research Center, 2014).

21.6. Protestantism in Colombia

As Roman Catholicism was closely linked with conservatism, Protestantism was naturally allied to liberalism and anti-clericalism. Accordingly, Protestantism gained ground mainly during liberal periods. Protestants were, however, discriminated and excluded from wider society as "second-class citizens" (Beltrán, 2008). The situation has improved since the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), and especially the Pentecostal movement has flourished since the 1960s (Beltrán, 2008). However, Pentecostal and Neopentecostal movements have played only a marginal role in Colombian public life (Munevar, 2008, p. 389). Moreover, whenever Protestants participate in politics, they often fall into the same corrupt behaviour as traditional politicians; the longstanding practices are too well established (Helmsdorff, 1996).

21.7. Empirical Analysis and CDA for Colombia (Prosperity)

	Prosperity
Stakeholder	**Fundamental principles identified (interviews)**
The Holy Bible	"Keep therefore the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may *prosper* in all that ye do" (Deuteronomy 29:9, King James Version).
a) Roman Catholic Priest 1.	"The enemies of the Catholic Church were Communism, liberalism, and the Secret Societies (Freemasonry). In 1965, the Second Vatican Council ruled that the Church could not oppose progress, liberalism, and modern civilisation."
c) Roman Catholic Priest 3.	"After 1991, Colombia opened up to free markets, imports and exports, which generated development, but also sparked much corruption. Corruption and crime are linked to the issue of relaxation and liberality in education."
f) Protestant Free Church	"…Protestantism remained here, and over the years the values of our society were marked by that essence. San Andres was a prosperous territory. They could also sleep with their doors and windows

Pastor 1.	open at night and hang their clothes outside […] to dry. You did not have to worry about […people] stealing anything from you. They would have farms far away from their homes and no one would steal. People would end up in trouble just for stealing a coconut. When someone was killed on this island, it was an island-wide crisis. It shocked everybody that blood was shed. It was a major episode. All the church bells would ring because there was a murder. That was a society that Colombia came to found here. It was a society that was built by Protestantism and its values, but was eventually […] destroyed by a new value system led by Catholicism [and] implanted by continental Colombia."
g) Protestant Free Church Pastor 1.	"You could say that while society is based on biblical principles and values, the lives of others will be more respected and more valuable. But as society moves away from God, there is more crime and less development."
i) Ecumenical academic theologian.	"Garcia Márquez tries to explain why we [Colombians] are the way we are. He says that we are a cultural blend of the types of Spaniards who arrived, the indigenous people we were ancestrally, and mixed with Africans. This makes us a paradoxical country, a country full of cultural contradictions. Colombia is a society of narcos. […] Congress and the presidential campaigns have been ruled by drug money. We want to excuse and cover things up, but the structure of Colombian society […is] the result of a culture of drug trafficking."
n) Independent, free Protestant believer (Academic)	"Whenever the law of God and moral standard as found in the Bible declines, the economy goes down, morality goes down, the crime rate goes up, and the result is a degenerated society. The closer you live in harmony with biblical principles, the more harmoniously you will live. […] This principle comes down to us historically and repetitively, for example, from the book of Judges […] the more Israel obeyed God's law in the Bible, the better [they] got, whereas whenever they strayed far from God's commandments, they faced the worst crisis. […] this pattern is repeated cyclically over and over again in history, leading to social failure and oppression whenever people disobeyed God. In the same sense, you can explain society today. For example, how do you explain that humans suffer famines and animals have enough to eat and are fit in Africa? Voodoo and spiritist practices can give you the answer."
p) Government official	"Some of the factors that may affect our productivity are that we have a low level of trust in our public institutions since their accountability and transparency are dubious. Likewise, many government employees are not doing their duties. Instead, they are checking personal e-mails, Facebook, etc. […] The sense of public property here is not that they belong to everyone but that they belong to no one and that we have to take advantage of them."
s) Colombian Embassy Official	"[…] there is no legal framework for cooperation between Colombia and the Holy See. Caritas Internationalis develops its work through the National Secretariat of Social Pastoral (Cáritas Colombiana). This includes rural development, helping the population (the victims of the conflict), prevention and attention to emergencies, promotion of human rights, gender equality, peacebuilding and social inclusion. The payment of the Concordat fee (per the Concordat of 1887) by the Government of Colombia to the Catholic Church is still in force. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs processes this payment, but the resources to make it effective are consolidated by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit within the annual national budget.

Table 38: Principles of prosperity according to stakeholders interviewed in Colombia (Source: Author's figure).

(1) Textual Analysis (Theological):

The Christian (i.e. biblical) principle of prosperity is closely linked to obedience to the Commandments (Moral Law). A quite harmonious discourse exists among the different Protestant stakeholders regarding this principle. Thus, for instance, the Protestant Free Pastor 1 (f) refers to San Andres and Providence island as a prosperous place before the

arrival of “Catholics from mainland Colombia” destroyed the local system of values. Similarly, the Protestant Free Pastor 2 (g) refers to the importance of biblical values: They create trust in society. The Independent Protestant believer (n) cites examples from the Old Testament, for instance, Israel prospered whenever it obeyed God, but struggled and suffered whenever disobedience prevailed.

In contrast, Roman Catholic stakeholders prefer a somewhat more secular (non-theological) approach to the prosperity issue in Colombia. None refer to a biblical principle. Roman Catholic Priest 1 (a) mentions the change of discourse, towards progress, after the Second Vatican Council (1965). Roman Catholic Priest 3 (c) mentions that “development” resulted from liberalisation after the introduction of the 1991 Constitution (as corroborated in previous sections). This discourse is expected and in line with the previous sections. It also coincides with the views of similar stakeholders in the case study of Switzerland.

(2) Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical Triangulation):

The Free Church Pastor (f) and the Government Official (p) link trustworthiness, values, and prosperity, similarly to Fukuyama (1995). Stakeholder (n) cites the example of Israel as a society that was (cyclically) obedient to God whenever in crisis. Yet no sooner did Israel proper, disobedience soared — until the next crisis. This principle refers implicitly to the theory of existential security (Norris & Inglehart, 2004), which explains why societies become more secularised whenever freedom and security exist in sufficient measure, but become religious in times of crisis.

(3) Analysis of Social Practice: Law and Institutions:

The Roman Catholic Priest 3 (c) argues that the liberalisation of education (i.e. emancipation from Roman Catholicism) after the introduction of the 1991 Constitution has caused corruption and crime. He advocates a conservative approach, one in line with *old- regime* Roman Church discourse (pre-Vatican II).

22. Summary Overview of the Four Case Studies

Historically, Switzerland's population and cantonal system have been characterised by mixed denominational distribution (Roman Catholics and Protestants). Even if the two main denominations have not always coexisted harmoniously, and despite internal differences, Switzerland is nowadays the most competitive (prosperous) country worldwide with well-recognised political, economic, and social stability. The Swiss case (Section 18) explored the nexuses of prosperity and of a religiously mixed society in which the Protestant Reformation played a prominent historical role in shaping federal institutions. Following the 1848 anti-clerical Constitution, many Conservative Catholics remained in mountainous and rural areas, in an attempt to maintain the old order, including the pervasive influence of the Catholic Church-State on education (also, to ensure the "maintenance of ignorance") (Obinger, 2009; Head-König, 2017). In turn, liberals and Protestants mostly remained in flat areas that were subsequently industrialised. Currently, the historical Protestant cantons tend to be the most competitive, and the mountainous Roman Catholic cantons the least competitive, in the Swiss Confederation (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016), (see Figures 15 and 17). Historically mixed confessional cantons (e.g. Thurgau and St. Gallen) perform in the middle of the cantonal ranking of competitiveness (11th and 13th, respectively, out of 26 cantons) (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016), (see Figures 14, 15, and 17). As the case study has suggested, Protestantism in Switzerland may have also contributed to prosperity via democratisation, state secularism and the creation of trust and moral standards. Yet, the influence of Protestantism owes more to its accumulated historical impact on institutions than to the proportion of current followers. Institutionally, "Protestant churches were traditionally 'canton churches' and thus strongly enmeshed with every canton's political structure" (Gould 1999 and Cattacin et al. 2003 as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 180). In turn, the proportion of Protestants have been outnumbered by Roman Catholics since the 1970s in Switzerland, and Catholics are in the majority in most Swiss cities and cantons noawadays (FDFA, 2018; Federal Statistical Office, 2020) (see Tables 28 and 29).

In Uruguay, as well as in Switzerland, Protestantism has played a crucial role along with liberalism in introducing anti-clericalism (and religious freedom) in its constitution and therefore also in its institutions. Protestantism, then, has played a decisive role in shaping the trajectory of democracy, human capital, ethics, transparency, secularisation, and social progress.

The anti-clerical elements of the Revolution helped Cuba succeed in various indicators (e.g. education quality and coverage, equality, health). The Cuban regime seized, dismantled, and limited the institutional influence of Roman Catholicism on these areas of public life. However, a strong cultural influence of a highly syncretised Roman Catholicism persists in Cuba even if its institutional influence has been curbed. Also, the Communist regime, by adopting Marxism, "threw the baby out with the bathwater" through persecuting all types of religion, including Protestant liberals. Finally, the Cuban regime conveniently turned to Rome to legitimise itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union and to silence Protestantism with a corporatist strategy. The socialist legal tradition had an effect opposite to its claims (e.g. lack of freedom, corruption), even if its anti-clerical element was an advantage. Comparing the Cuban experience to other Latin American countries with leftist dictatorships (e.g. Venezuela) helps understand their failure to achieve the Cuban indicators (e.g. education). Evidently, there is much stronger polarisation and a younger, leftist government in Venezuela, but even there, the Catholic "Church has long had a bias in the use of its resources towards the middle and upper classes" (Smilde, 2018, p. 1; Levine, 1981). The crucial factor in this regard is whether or not the power and influence of the Roman Church-State are reduced.

In Colombia, liberal attempts failed repeatedly and resulted in violent conflicts in which the Roman Catholic Church-State closed ranks with conservatives and imposed a corporatist medieval-like state. In the 1991 Constitution, Protestantism allied itself with liberal forces. This alliance made it possible to finally introduce religious freedom, among others, by removing most of the contentious articles from the Concordat (nevertheless, the Concordat remains valid, as does institutional corporatism).

Subnationally, the four cases studied here confirm the trend of Protestant versus Roman Catholic influence, although under the national umbrella (e.g. Catholic areas in Switzerland

are far more prosperous than liberal regions in Colombia). Swiss Protestant cantons are generally more prosperous than Roman Catholic ones. More conservative regions in Colombia tend to experience more violence and conflict than liberal ones. Uruguayan towns (e.g. in Colonia) tend to be perceived as more prosperous when under Protestant influence.

Although several theories were useful in the analysis of interviews, a common, salient notion in all four case studies was the theory of existential security (Norris & Inglehart, 2004; 2010) (see Section 7.2). After coding in relation to prosperity, the theory of existential security was sufficiently exemplified: in Switzerland, the non-practising Catholic stakeholder (l) claimed that religiosity runs in parallel cycles to the economy. In Uruguay, the Independent Free Protestant Believer (n) mentioned that after becoming prosperous ('too well'), they forget God. In Cuba, the revival of religious activity was closely linked to the severe socioeconomic crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s (Ramírez Calzadilla, 2009; Goldenziel, 2009). In Colombia, the Independent Protestant believer (n) mentions the book of Judges, in which Israel prospered after obeying God, but struggled and suffered after disobedience prevailed.

Part VII: Discussion and Conclusions

23. Integrative Conclusions[21]

Overall, the results of this study are remarkably consistent across methods and models. Its main findings may be summarised as follows:

a) Competitiveness:

The combination of the following factors induces competitiveness in Europe and the Americas: 1) high Environment Performance (EPI); 2) German legal origin; 3) the absence of a French legal origin and of a Concordat with the Roman See; 4) the absence of a socialist legal origin; 5) low proportion of Roman Catholicism or Orthodoxy.

b) Corruption:

The combination of the following factors causes high corruption in Europe and the Americas: 1) low Environment Performance (EPI); 2) Roman Catholicism as a state religion; 3) low adherence to Protestantism; 4) a Concordat with the Roman See; and 5) French legal origin.

Likewise, and consistent with the corresponding theory, the quantitative model on corruption (Section 15.3.4.2) corroborates a high correlation of prosperity, democracy, transparency, and Protestantism. The model thus fulfils empirical expectation 3.

The consistency of the theoretical framework (Part III) with the findings across methods (quantitative, QCA, case studies) confirms my hypotheses (Section 1 and empirical

[21] Integrative conclusions are also called "meta-inferences" (Johnson, 2016). "A *meta-inference* can be defined as a conclusion generated through an integration of the inferences that have been obtained from the results of the qualitative and quantitative strands of a mixed methods study" (Teddlie and Tashakkori as cited in Stolz, 2017).

expectations 1 and 2). The following subsections expand the conclusions per condition and empirical expectation.

23.1. Environment Performance Index (EPI)

The EPI is the most critical variable for explaining prosperity (GCI and CPI) differences. It correlates strongly with prosperity in the quantitative models, while QCA substantiated a direct and robust causal relation. In the quantitative part, the EPI helped to increase model fitness, while in QCA, it was that condition that was closest to being necessary. Removing EPI from the quantitative and QCA analyses considerably reduces the explanatory power of the respective models (e.g. Model 1). However, if EPI is removed, the remaining variables (or conditions) continue to be significant or still maintain their presence, thus yielding similar results (although with less fitness in the regression models, for instance). Thus, EPI explains most of the prosperity variability, whereas the other significant variables also play a vital role in modulating the outcome.

EPI robustness, as causal for prosperity, provides rich evidence in support of the "environment and prosperity theory" (Sachs, 2001; Diamond, 1997). Thus, my results confirm the inferences anticipated in the literature review, thus also fulfiling empirical expectation 12. Moreover, the case study on Switzerland found a particular relation between environmental factors (geography or topography) and competitiveness. Swiss cantons located in mountainous regions tend to exhibit lower competitiveness than non-mountainous ones. Flat topography may facilitate access and trade, for instance. Still, this alone does not explain why some Swiss mountainous cantons are more innovative per inhabitant than other, neighbouring countries (e.g. Austria or Italy).

23.2. Legal Traditions

The second variable most consistently related to prosperity (GCI and CPI) is *legal origin*. This is true of the corresponding quantitative models and also explains the QCA outcome of *legal origin*. German legal origin has a consistently positive effect (correlations and QCA), while QCA also identifies Scandinavian legal origin as positive in terms of *competitiveness* and *transparency*. The Protestant Reformation heavily influenced German and Scandinavian legal systems (Witte, 2002; Snyder, 2011; Berman, 2003).

In contrast, *Socialist* and *French* legal origins negatively influence GCI and transparency (as confirmed by QCA and partly by correlations). Both legal origins have diminished the influence of the Church on state affairs. However, their impact as legal systems as a whole is detrimental to competitiveness and transparency compared to "Protestant" legal origins (*German and Scandinavian*). English legal origin appears to have neither a robustly positive nor a negative influence on prosperity. However, some scholars (La Porta et al., 2008) have reported a strong positive influence of English, German, and Scandinavian legal origins on institutions.

23.2.1. Legal Traditions, Religion, and Prosperity

My empirical results show a strong relationship between prosperity indicators (competitiveness and transparency) and various other indicators (legal origin, religious institutions and denomination). Theoretically, my results are in line with the findings of La Porta, et al. (1999) on legal origins; with Robinson & Acemoglu (2012) on institutions; and with Witte (2002) on the influence of religious denominations on law and institutions.

The underlying logic is that the *Sola Scriptura* principle of the Protestant Reformation influenced German, English, and Scandinavian legal origins (Witte, 2002; Doe & Sandberg, 2010; Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009). On the other hand, French legal origin stems from the French Revolution, which had strong secularising effects in Europe, but whose influence

was not entirely "exported" overseas (e.g. to Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin America). Socialist legal origin originates in the Bolshevik Revolution and contains atheist elements (Miller 2012; Berman 2003). While all of these modern legal origins replaced medieval canon law, each borrowed certain of its elements to a different extent. Canon law owed more to Greek philosophy than to the Scriptures (Selling, 2018; Gula, 2002). However, canon law is still valid today, above all in the Roman Catholic Church-State, and especially in (but not limited to) countries under its direct influence.

The incorporation of several principles originating directly in the Holy Scriptures via the Protestant Reformation was one of the main triggers of change in medieval legislation codes (i.e. medieval canon law) — and thus in the institutions of Protestant countries (Witte, 2002).

The Protestant Reformation demanded that papacy's far-reaching powers in medieval canon law be refuted. However, canon law could not be ousted entirely anywhere. Thus, certain aspects have been preserved (through indirect influence), although to a lower degree, even in Protestant countries such as the United States. In Lutheran territories, for instance, canon law was tested against the Holy Scriptures, and only those aspects that passed exacting scrutiny were upheld (Helmholz, 1992).

In theory, common law is one of the legal traditions exerting the least influence on Roman and canon law. This study, however, has shown that Scandinavian and especially German law (which in theory belong to Roman Civil Law) yield better results than common law countries. Protestant anticlericalism has permeated both common law and German-Scandinavian legislations. The present QCA results help explain the different prosperity outcomes in terms of the greater heterogeneity of English common law countries, along with various other conditions: *1) EPI:* English common law countries are located in distant geographies (and have dissimilar EPI rankings) from the British Isles and North America (high) to the Caribbean (low). In contrast, Scandinavian and German law countries are more EPI homogeneous (high) and share similar geographical/environmental conditions in northern Europe. *2) State religion:* Common law countries have Protestant (e.g. UK), no (e.g. US), or even Catholic (e.g. Ireland) state religion. In turn, Scandinavian and German law countries have either Protestant or no state religion (i.e. absent Catholic state religion).

3) Ethnicities: Common law countries exhibit higher ethnical heterogeneity, ranging from mostly white (e.g. the British Isles and North America) to mostly black (e.g. Jamaica) ethnicities. In contrast, Scandinavian and German law countries are more homogeneous (i.e. mostly white ethnicities). The different ethnicities and their associated cultural attributes (e.g. informal institutions) may interfere in the implementation of formal codes (law) (Lambsdorff, 2006; Alesina et al., 2003; Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Volonté, 2015) and in the syncretisation of religion (see the Cuban case).

The legal code of the French Revolution exhibits another pattern: It yields good results only if anticlericalism is present. Countries with strong anticlerical movements such as France, Italy, Uruguay, or Chile provide better results than countries with a strong influence of the Roman Church-State on their legal and institutional systems (e.g. most Latin American countries).

One of the crucial elements determining prosperity differences in countries of French legal origin is the level of anticlericalism adopted in legislation. Uruguay adopted the French legal code and boldly incorporated the secular-democratic principles descending from the French Revolution in its constitution and other institutions (e.g. education). Consequently, Uruguay is one of the highest-scoring Latin American countries in social indicators such as transparency (Transparency International, 2016), political rights, and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2016), and has achieved the highest social progress in Latin America (Porter et al., 2015), due partly to the persistence of such institutional arrangements.

In contrast, while Colombia also adopted the legal code of the French Revolution, until 1991 it completely neglected the anticlerical principles of this code by signing a Concordat and by implementing a series of denominational constitutions. Consequently, medieval extractive institutions have persisted, making Colombia one of the most inequitable countries in the world to date.

Cuba, by comparison, adopted the socialist legal tradition. Moreover, the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s led to strong anticlericalism (and atheism). Accordingly, Cuba has achieved higher than average levels of equality, literacy and public health compared to other Latin

American countries. While corruption is moderate, low social progress and highly restricted liberties (Porter et al., 2015) tip the balance towards an overall negative outcome.

The German legal tradition widely influenced Switzerland, although the Napoleonic code took root in some cantons (La Porta et al., 2008). The Swiss Constitution (1848) is profoundly anticlerical, but not atheist (e.g. its preamble invokes God). Its liberal-Protestant principles, combined with the country's federalist structure, make Switzerland the most competitive country worldwide. Thus, the results for *legal origin* entirely fulfil empirical expectations 4, 5, 6, and 7.

23.3. State Religion

Quantitative analysis partly revealed that establishing Protestantism as a state religion has an almost twofold effect on competitiveness compared to a high Protestant population. This confirms the higher importance of religious institutions compared to the proportion of adherents. Also, the higher importance of state Protestantism over a Protestant population seems in line with the historical claim that no single Protestant-Catholic conflict resulted in a Protestant victory without state or external support (Brake as cited in Nexon, 2011, p. 152). Historically, political leaders (including the pope) have more strongly influenced the institutionalisation of religion than theologians. Current adherence rates reflect such institutionalisation in many countries (Barro & McCleary, 2005).

Nonetheless, QCA has shown that establishing any state religion, including Protestantism, is detrimental to prosperity (*GCI* and *transparency*) in most cases. This seemingly contradictory result may explain the positive effects of separating church and state (secularisation) as an advance of Protestant state religion (e.g. Switzerland, United States; see Section 15.3.3.1). However, secularisation *per se* (e.g. French or socialist revolution) may not always lead to positive outcomes. This becomes clear when state religion results are analysed along with the results of the last condition (*legal origin*).

Together, both conclusions (about legal origin and state religion) corroborate empirical expectation 4. The reason is that legal origins commonly associated with Protestantism are

positive for prosperity. *English legal origin* is the exception as its outcome seems to be neutral (considering the nuances previously discussed). On the other hand, French legal origin (typically associated with Roman Catholicism) negatively influences prosperity and transparency.

23.4. Religious Affiliation in the Population

Religious adherence (by denomination) is mostly negatively correlated with GCI or is insignificant in quantitative models. Especially consistent, however, are the negative correlations of Orthodox and Roman Catholic adherents with GCI. Protestant adherence is not conclusively correlated with GCI and exhibits a positive influence on transparency (for models, see Section 15.3). QCA also produces mixed results. Changes in magnitude, from one to two digits, in the Protestant population do not significantly change corruption levels, as shown by the two clusters of Latin American countries (for Truth Tables, see Appendix 13).

Therefore, the influence of a Protestant population is not one of the essential conditions (compared to state religion or legal origin, for instance). However, Barro & McCleary (2005) have stressed the importance of the proportion of religious adherents as directly triggering a state religion (whose effect on prosperity almost doubles that of the population). Consequently, although the direct influence of a Protestant population is not conclusive, it helps to build institutions that partially remove old hegemonic structures (e.g. feudal-hierarchical elitists from the medieval papalist monarchical order). This conclusion concurs with Woodberry (2012), who demonstrated the importance of the Protestant population in initiating democratic processes worldwide (except for Pentecostalism).

Also, the Swiss case study shows how liberals and Protestants closed ranks in the federal government to democratise the Catholic Church in Switzerland. Saying that, in Latin America, the Protestant population is not necessarily less corrupt than the Catholic one (Helmsdorff, 1996; Schäfer, 2006; Martin, 1999). This may be directly related to Woodberry's findings, given that most Protestant growth in Latin America, Asia, and Africa

generally comes from Pentecostalism. This, however, does not exert a positive social influence, unlike traditional forms of Protestantism (Woodberry, 2012).

Another potential effect is that historically Protestant countries may become more emancipated than "new-world Protestantist" ones profoundly influenced by Pentecostalism. Therefore, a Protestant population may be relevant when it can bring about institutional changes capable of decreasing the detrimental influence of institutional Roman Catholicism. While Protestant adherents might prove less important than deinstitutionalising the public sphere of the Roman Church, they may be needed to drive forward the latter process.

Denominational ties (proportion of adherents) are important modulators, but not as decisive as the legal (institutional) ties associated with religion. For example, Ireland and Austria are predominantly Roman Catholic countries; and yet, their competitiveness is higher than predominantly Roman Catholic Spain or Portugal (dominated by French law). Ireland shares common law (and the English language) with the United Kingdom, while Austria shares the German legal tradition (and the German language) with Germany. However, neither Catholic Ireland is as prosperous as Protestant Great Britan, nor is Catholic Austria as prosperous as mostly Protestant Germany[22].

These findings on religious adherents partly fulfil empirical expectation 9, as population mostly influences prosperity only indirectly. Direct influence is rather weak. However, these results do fulfil empirical expectation 10. The different Latin American clusters that formed due to slightly different proportions of Protestants do not exhibit significant differences in corruption outcomes (Appendix 13).

[22] Subnationally, highly productive Catholic regions in Germany also exist (e.g. Bavaria today), evidently under the effect of a historically mostly Protestant and liberal influenced Federal Government. Hughes (1935) empirically identified a pattern of industrialisation of Catholic regions in Germany: "…the Catholic peasant was drawn from the land to work in industries established nearby by Protestant capitalists" (p. 287). The author further concludes that "(1) The growth of modern industry in the Catholic regions of Germany was in fact a sort of non-Catholic invasion. (2) The Catholics have, as a group, an inferior position in industry. (3) The Catholic regions have not experienced the industrial invasion equally. […]" (p.290). Each region has different industrialisation triggers (e.g., the availability of raw materials, or the "push" of companies such as Audi or Siemens, which fled the communist expropriation in East Germany) (Hughes 1935; Schaal & Wehling, 2020).

23.5. Concordats

The findings on concordats were highly consistent and confirmed a negative causal relation between *Concordats* with the Roman Catholic Church-State and prosperity (*GCI* and *Transparency*). This variable has proven decisive in case analysis, along with EPI, legal origin, and state religion. Therefore, empirical expectation 6 was fulfiled. Countries with valid concordats have implemented domestic legislation subject to canon and Roman law.

Concordats in Latin America have lawfully perpetuated hierarchical power relations, control over education, and other Church privileges. Thus, education, family and social values are permeated by a relativistic Roman Catholic theology based on Aquinas and Aristotle. In practice, this means that central Roman Catholic values such as *familialism,* double standards, elitism, and a relativistic ethic pervade the institutions and culture of countries under Catholic influence. As shown, the obvious result is low prosperity (i.e. high corruption and low competitiveness).

Countries with Concordats and German legal origin — Germany and Austria — are the exceptions to the previous rule. The longstanding persistence of anticlericalism in law and institutions (Section 8.3.4) and in language (Section 11.1) ever since the 16th-century German Protestant Revolution has remained pervasive to this day. On the positive side, it may counteract some detrimental aspects of the Concordats in both countries.

Countries with a German legal origin (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) also have comparable geographical and environmental conditions. They are also highly competitive. Predominantly Roman Catholic Austria is the least prosperous of the three. Protestant Germany is more prosperous than Austria but less prosperous than Switzerland. Germany has a valid Concordat that Hitler signed with the Roman Church-State, Austria also has a Concordat, yet Switzerland has none. Evidence shows that Switzerland is the most prosperous of these three countries (see Section 16.3.1, Figure 11; Appendix 9; and Truth Tables 9 and 11 in Appendix 13.3.1.3). Clearly, having a Concordat does not constitute a monocausal explanation, as this research has emphasised in multiple combinations of

triggers. For instance, another contributing factor that is a common denominator in the two most competitive countries (Switzerland and the USA) is that their (federal) constitutions are explicitly anticlerical (and neither have Concordats). Concordats are proxies of state-church relations and thus, of the institutional influence of religion on society. Therefore, the absence of concordats may well indicate a certain degree of laicisism in government affairs such as education, military, or real estate (see Sections 8.3.4.6.2 and 16.2.1).

23.6. Languages

Quantitative model 4 (Section 15.3.2.1) shows that the German language positively correlates with *competitiveness*. The German language is also positively associated with transparency (QCA, Table 21). I discussed the role of the Bible translations in standardising languages (German) and in unifying kingdoms (Great Britain), thus contributing to spreading cultural values conducive to enhancing competitiveness and transparency (Section 11.1).

Conversely, *Roman languages* (combined with *high Concordats* and low *EPI*) are associated with low competitiveness in QCA (Section 16.3.1.4). The Colombian case has shown how the Roman Church-State used Hispanicism as a powerful tool to isolate countries from the anticlericalist dynamics of Anglo-Saxon Protestantism[23], French liberalism, and Soviet communism (Figueroa, 2007).

In Colombia, conservative traditionalists identified Hispanicism as a cultural weapon for maintaining corporatist ideals, a medieval-type hierarchical society, and for upholding the principles of seigneurial and counter-reformist Spain (Figueroa, 2016, p. 21). The Hispanicist triad illustrated by Figueroa (2016) — language, religion, and race — grew

[23] Hispanicism has been effective at preventing the success of anticlerical movements. Yet, other political or legal influences, such as constitutionalism from US-American influence, have succeeded (Merryman & Pérez, 2015) (see Section 8.3.4.6.1). Likewise, Hispanicism does not prevent Colombia being the closest political ally of the United States in Latin America (Brock, 2011).

stronger with the rise of institutional (legal-political confessionalism) and economic corporatism, both part of a concerted corporate strategy to maintain hegemony. Consequently, such features are part of the same phenomenon. Rather than competing explanations, they are intervening ones. Therefore, empirical expectation 11 was fulfiled.

23.7. Ethnicities

Caucasian ethnic values exhibited a positive influence in QCA and in two quantitative models (Section 15.3.1). For Huntington, being "overwhelmingly white, British and Protestant" (Huntington, 2004, p. 31) is fundamental to US prosperity. Although the author has received fierce criticism for stating racist, stereotyping generalisations (McSweeney, 2015), the empirical results of this study suggest that Huntington's assertion may not be misguided (see Section 15.3.1 and Appendix 13.2, Truth Tables 17 and 19). However, the QCA clusters reveal that *ethnicities* are not a critical condition (unlike legal origin or state religion). As shown, *ethnicities* are the least important condition in plausible groups and empirical evidence for QCA.

Moreover, the quantitative model of corruption (Section 15.3.4.1) has indicated that the measure of "ethnic fractionalisation" produced no obvious conclusion, thus corroborating empirical expectation 8. Nonetheless, ethnicity results for Latin America might approximate the level of religious syncretism. Countries with a larger African or indigenous population (or both) exhibit higher levels of syncretism, for instance, spiritistic rituals and Roman Catholicism or Protestantism (see the Cuban and Colombian cases) (Contreras, 2013, p. 177; Ramírez, 2009, p. 167; Sánchez, 1992, pp. 90-91). Accordingly, multicultural countries such as Cuba, Brazil, Jamaica, Bolivia, or Colombia can be expected to display higher religious syncretism than more homogenous ones like Uruguay or Argentina. This issue needs to be further explored, theoretically and empirically.

24. Other Considerations

24.1. The institutional and cultural (adherents) influence of religion

Institutional factors related to religion exert a stronger structural and long-term influence on prosperity (competitiveness and corruption) than the cultural influence of religion (adherents). Several pieces of evidence corroborate this conclusion: 1) the abundant historical, theological, and theoretical information; 2) the empirical results on *State religion, Concordats,* and *Legal origin*; 3) the analysis of specific cases.

Models 1 and 3 (Section 15.3.1) confirmed empirically that the influence of Protestant state religion almost twice exceeds that of adherents, for instance. Further, seriously considering the role of the Roman Catholic Church as a state actor has profound implications. The importance of Roman Catholicism is based more on its institutional and political ideology, rather than on its belief system (although religious belief is also necessary for maintaining political ideology and the *status quo*). However, empirical works considering religion and prosperity variables have mostly concentrated solely on the influence of religious adherents. This has resulted in a minimisation paradigm that disregards the institutional influence of religion. Therefore, the relationships between prosperity and religion have tended to be trivialised or misunderstood when analysing religion as a background prosperity factor.

Incorporating the institutional influence of religion allows understanding, for example, why Switzerland has lower levels of corruption (and higher prosperity) when the majority of its population is currently Roman Catholic (i.e. given its 1848 anticlerical, liberal, and Protestant-friendly federal constitution). Uruguay is a similar case to some extent. The majority of Uruguay's population is Roman Catholic (although Uruguay is the most secular country in Latin America) (Pew Research Center, 2014) and one of the least corrupt (and with the highest social progress) in the region. Uruguay's constitution is markedly anticlerical.

The opposite case is Colombia, where the still valid and modified Concordat (1887), pre-1991 constitution, and other arrangements represent "a model of the traditional ideal of Christendom–complete Church-State integration" (Levine, 1981, p. 71). These arrangements have meant that the high proportion of Roman Catholics in Colombia resulted naturally from such restrictive conservative policies and legal instruments. In Switzerland, Protestant-liberals won the *Sonderbund* war, thus paving the way for the 1848 anticlerical constitution. In Colombia, the opposite happened: Conservative-Catholics won the war that led to the 1886 Constitution. In 1991, the new constitution included some liberal elements after a peace process with liberal guerrillas.

A key to understanding the pervasively negative influence of Roman Catholicism on state relations/performance is hierarchy. Hierarchy in church and state is opposed to democracy and transparency, thus promoting power abuse from the higher echelons down.

Thus, the historical institutional influence of Roman Catholicism or Protestantism affects corruption/prosperity rates more directly than the current proportion of believers (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Nonetheless, institutional religion and the proportion of believers are well connected empirically (Barro & McCleary, 2005). The cases of Switzerland, Colombia, and Uruguay show that the current population adherents result visibly from the historical institutional influence of religion.

24.2. Models

The models developed and applied in this study allow analysing determining factors layer by layer. For example, geography and environment are the first determinants. However, variation within zones may be mediated (or moduled) not only by environment, latitude, topography, and climate but also by institutional background, as best represented by legal traditions. Moreover, legal traditions have a direct historical relationship with the successive legal revolutions against the *status quo* (Roman and canon law part of Roman Catholicism or Orthodoxism). The crucial role of Protestantism (and anticlericalism) in such legal revolutions paved the path for modernity and democratic institutions.

This fresh perspective enables us to understand why countries in similar geographic and environment settings exhibit marked differences. For instance, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay share similar environmental and geographical conditions, and yet Argentina is less prosperous (i.e. more corrupt) than Chile and Uruguay. The reason being that Argentina is far more clerical than the other countries (i.e. Argentina has a Concordat) (see Appendix 13.3.1.1, Truth Tables 1 and 3). The same consideration of multiple causalities, given in section 23.5, applies here. The Argentinian Concordat indicates direct interference of the Roman Catholic Church-State in the secular affairs of Argentina, and the presence of a more clerical society than in Uruguay and Chile.[24]

24.3. Returning to the General Research Interest: *"Ye shall know them by their fruits."*

The social experiments

24.3.1. The Roman and Catholic ancien régime

Roman Catholicism has had more than enough time to enforce its Aquinian-Aristotelian social experiment through applying the corresponding theological concepts to politics, law, and social organisation. Romanism has deployed its *ancien régime* for over a millennium, from the European Middle Ages to the present (especially in several Latin American countries).

The Roman *and* Catholic experiment shows that applying Aquinian-Aristotelian principles creates undesirable prosperity scenarios in wider society (while maximising the power and prosperity of the Church). These principles contrast sharply with what Roman Catholicism

[24] For instance, Gill (1998) explained that "Chile and Argentina offer the two cases in Latin America that best approximate a controlled scientific experiment" since both share and "hold constant (within reasonable limits)" several factors. Yet, the author documents how different the political strategy of the Catholic hierarchy is in each country: "The Chilean episcopacy became an outspoken critic of the Pinochet regime, even at the expense of severe persecution of its clergy (Escobar 1986). The Argentine bishops, on the other hand, gained notoriety for not only ignoring the abuses of military rule, but for actively participating in the government (Mignone 1988)" (Gill, 1998, p.121).

claims would make a society prosperous and harmonious (Ratzinger & Pera, 2006; Restrepo, 1939). This, as shown, is a medieval society of greatest benefit of the Catholic Church.

It remains debatable (as during the Reformation) the 'natural law' that the Roman Church-State bases on the human capacity discerning between right or wrong. The Roman Church-State has adopted natural law "as the basis for its teachings pertaining to a just society, sexual behaviour, medical practice, human life, religious freedom, and the relationship between morality and civil law..." (Gula, 2002, pp. 120-121). In practice, the application of Roman Catholic "natural law" has often produced the opposite to its intended principles: centuries-long hegemony and — to this day — corruption and low competitiveness. In the end, the authority of the Roman Catholic Church-State has not depended "on the ability of the truth to convince," but on its legal right as the bearer "of authority to command" and subordinate (Sanks, 1974, pp. 11-13).

Thousands of years of hegemony characterise the Roman Catholic Church as a global political-religious institution. The associated corruption in all the countries under its influence may well be related to the corrupt fruits for which "we shall know them" in the parable of Jesus (Matthew 7:15–23). Among others, these fruits have also been the abuse scandals, maintenance of ignorance, and persecution of God's Word, in the name of Jesus Christ.

24.3.2. Protestant Reformation

The application of Protestant (i.e. biblical) principles (Table 6) on law instead of relativism has produced an ethical code that enhances trust, transparency, and prosperity (see Sections 8.3; 9.1.2; 10.3; 15.3; 16.3.1; Table 4; Appendices 9 and 13.3). The influence of biblical principles in the legislation of Protestant countries also concurs with the following verse of the Scriptures:

> And what nation is there so great, that hath statutes and judgments so righteous as all this law, which I set before you this day? (Deuteronomy 4: 8)

Prosperity and educational differences between Protestants (higher) and Roman Catholics (lower) are still evident in Germany and Switzerland. Such differences are even higher comparing national levels (cross-country). Scandinavian countries are all prosperous and have embraced Lutheranism even more strongly than Germany to the point of making it their state religion.

However, the present and future do not seem encouraging as the world progressively returns to Rome. On the one hand, many historical strands of Protestantism that previously resisted the Catholic hegemony, have now relinquished their founding principles and accept ecumenism in "Rome terms". On the other, the Pentecostalist trend within Protestantism has weakened the latter's historical socio-political impact.

24.3.3. The French Revolution

An experiment similar to (and deriving from) the various Protestant revolutions was the French Revolution. This, too, diminished the hegemonic power of the Church and its associated aristocratic-oligarchic-elitist privileges. Such privileges were curbed in France and Belgium, for instance. Nevertheless, this trend continued in Spain and Portugal, although in weaker form, and has been almost inexistent in most of Latin America.

24.3.4. Communism

Nor have the social experiments of communism (e.g. seizing the liberties and property of ordinary people in the Soviet Union and Cuba) produced ideal results either. In contrast, the social experiment of the Protestant revolutions (or of the French Revolution) initiated positive social developments in the long term (e.g. seizing the privileges and properties of the Roman Church-State, not of those of common people). Unlike the *ancien régime*, all the other social experiments have invested more in human capital building through making education public and state-controlled. On balance, the Protestant Reformation has produced the highest prosperity for society as a whole.

24.4. Suggestions for future research

The results of this study open up various avenues for future research. The QCA evidence generated here allows further analysis of every country in Europe and the Americas. Future research might also continue to apply the vast amount of information collected and already codified in this study (for case study interviews, see Appendix 16).

Further research on the institutional influence of religion could complement the present analysis through (quantitative) time series and (qualitative) cases studies (e.g. Venezuela and the US.). Other indicators of potential value for further qualitative and quantitative analyses might include the number of years since officialising relations with the Roman See per country, the number of dioceses, diocesan priests, persons per diocesan priests, the total number of priests, and the total number of persons per priest/per year/per country.

25. Concluding Remarks

The cross-method results of this study show that prosperity and transparency respond mainly to three reinforcing (rather than competing) explanatory mechanisms. They are, in order of importance: 1) Environment, geography, topography, latitude; 2) Religion (considering its institutional influence, legal origin, proportion of adherents, syncretism) and; 3) Other non-religious political factors such as communism.

More specifically, a combination of factors causing corruption and low competitiveness in countries in Europe and the Americas includes: 1) low Environmental Performance (EPI); 2) Roman Catholicism as a State Religion; 3) high adherence to Orthodoxy or Roman Catholicism; 4) Concordat with the Vatican; and 5) French (clerical) or socialist legal origin.

Consequently, the influence of the Protestant Reformation in Northern Europe, and later, its extended effect in North America, have produced a loop of trust, transparency, and prosperity. In contrast, the hegemony of the Roman Catholic Church-State has not yet been

broken in most Latin American countries. The results are high corruption and low prosperity.

Methodologically, Woodberry's conclusion to his in-depth study of the explanatory influence of Protestantism on democracy also applies here:

> Although any piece of this evidence can be critiqued, the cumulative evidence makes finding a consistent alternative explanation extremely difficult. If alternative explanations are not consistent between contexts and methods, it is not clear why we should prefer them over an explanation that works consistently across such a wide variety of contexts and methods (Woodberry, 2012, p. 268).

I wish to end this study with some thought-provoking lines from the Old Testament:

> Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord; *and* the people *whom* he hath chosen for his own inheritance (Psalms 33:12; original emphases).

The previous verse shall in no way be understood as otherness or exclusion, since the Scriptures also state:

> Thus saith the Lord, […] For I know their works and their thoughts: it shall come, that I will gather all nations and tongues; and they shall come, and see my glory (Isaiah 66: 1, 18).

> For thus saith the Lord of hosts; Yet once, it is a little while, and I will shake the heavens, and the earth, and the sea, and the dry *land*; and I will shake all nations, and the Desire of all nations shall come: and I will fill this house with glory, saith the Lord of hosts (Haggai 2: 6-7).

> And it shall be to me a name of joy, a praise and an honor before all the nations of the earth, which shall hear all the good that I do unto them: and they shall fear and tremble for all the goodness and for all the prosperity that I procure unto it (Jeremiah 33: 9).

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2. Research Paradigms

2.1 Research Paradigm 1 (Dialectical Pluralism)

Dialectical Pluralism (DP) is a broad paradigm with manifold benefits for developing the meta-paradigm needed in this kind of research. The DP is an approach to research and policy that considers multiple paradigms carefully, thoroughly and respectfully (Johnson, 2017). The basic idea behind the meta-paradigmatic perspective of this study is:

> to empathetically and thoughtfully work with more than one paradigm (or perspective or theory) to produce a new, more complex 'whole.' The whole might be mostly divergent, mostly convergent, or, most often, a combination of divergent and convergent perspectives, practices, values, and assumptions (J. C. Greene, cited in (Johnson, 2017, p. 159).

This mixed-methods study applies DP as its main paradigm. Hence, it looks at the possible influence of religion on prosperity from multiple paradigmatic, theoretical and methodological perspectives.

As stated, the main weakness of mainstream theories attempting to explain prosperity is that they tend to reject approaches from other disciplines (See Appendix 4 and Section 5 in the main text). However, each of the explanatory theories employed in this study to understand prosperity imbalances between the investigated countries "may have contained a grain of truth" (Moran & et al., 2007, p. 3). Therefore, gaining a comprehensive and systemic understanding of the situation is vital (see next paradigm 2.2). This in turn requires synthesising the explanatory theories of prosperity in a general model.

This mutual rejection approach of separate disciplines demonstrates the need for a transdisciplinary paradigm to the causes of the historical prosperity imbalance in Europe and the Americas. A model encompassing different theories in a holistic and transdisciplinary manner is necessary to understand the whole picture. Likewise, this also allows including more variables potentially influencing prosperity along with religion. In fact, "the most productive conceptual frameworks are often those that integrate different approaches, lines of investigation, or theories that no one had previously connected" (Maxwell, 2013, p. 35).

Consequently, DP is an ideal paradigm for the aims and concerns of this study. This approach not only respects "different perspectives, but it is also designed to strategically enable adherents to carefully consider differences *and* possible 'syntheses' of their knowledge, abilities, and values." This kind of synthesis is dynamic (Johnson, 2017, p. 161).

2.2 Research Paradigm 2 (Complex Thinking)

This study adopts the paradigm of complexity, since this opposes, yet contains mechanicist and systemic paradigms (Morin, 2001). Historically, the complex thinking paradigm emerged as an evolutive consequence of systemic thinking, which had emerged from mechanicism (Zuñiga & Tarride, 2010). These three approaches are reviewed separately below in light of this study.

Mechanicist paradigm

One of the principles characterising the mechanicist paradigm is the concept of linear causality. This means that a general attribute exists, towards which all the remaining attributes converge (Ibid.). This principle is a standard paradigm, which also guides traditional positivist science, including economics. Many prosperity theories (especially within the neoclassical economic approach) fall into this traditional paradigm (See Appendix 4 and Section 5 in the main text).

Systemic paradigm

The systemic paradigm rejects the dominant reductionism of the mechanisist paradigm. It focuses on the interrelations between the constituents of any particular system, as well as on those between that system and its environment. As such, it privileges a holistic view and thus maintains the principle of generality characterising the mechanicist paradigm. However, "it recognizes the particularity of every organization through its identity, which is defined by the social function it carries out" (Zuñiga & Tarride, 2010, pp. 1115-1116).

Theories revised in this study, such as environment/geography (Sachs, 2003; Diamond, 1997) or institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) (See Appendix 4 and Section 4 in the main text) have incorporated elements of the systemic paradigm. By including historical components and by following unconventional approaches, these theories lay the foundations for systemic explanations of the origins of prosperity. However, by denying approaches of other disciplines, they remain

"trapped" in the mechanicist paradigm, thus accepting monocausal, linear explanations.

Complexity paradigm

The complexity paradigm overcomes adopting either the mechanicist or the systemic approach in favour of a dialogic, complementary perspective (Zuñiga & Tarride, 2010). Table 1 synthesises the key principles of each paradigm:

Simplifier paradigms		
Mechanicist	**Systemic**	**Paradigm of complexity**
Universality	Universality	Dialogic relation between the universal and the particular
Reversible time. Ahistoric and degradable systems	Irreversible time. Historic and evolutionary systems	Dialogic relation between temporal reversibility and irreversibility
The parts determine the whole	The whole determines the parts	Dialogic relation between the parts and the whole
Linear causality	Circular causality	Dialogic relation between linear and circular causality
Ordered reality	The system is ordered	Dialogic relation between order and disorder
Object isolated from its environment	The object is related to its environment	Dialogic relation between the object and its environment
Observer independent of the object	The observer defines the object	Dialogic relation between observer and object
Subject with a passive conscience	Subject with a passive conscience	Subject with an active conscience in the world
Autonomy does not exist	Autonomy depends on the environment	Dialogic relation between autonomy and dependence
Deterministic or probabilistic logic	Deterministic or probabilistic logic	Use of complex logic

Table 1: Key paradigms and their main differences (adopted from Zuñiga & Tarride, 2010, p. 1125)

Accordingly, this study applies a linear, mechanicist approach (e.g. regressions) in combination with systemic models (see QCA and CDA). The various theories are revised (See Appendix 4 and Section 5 in the main text) and the results analysed from a dialogic perspective. Likewise, synthesis, analysis and the conclusions drawn result from a complex logic.

3. Researcher Identity Memo

How my personal experience has shaped my research interests

I have divided this memo into five parts (A,B,C,D,E) and thirteen stages to explain how each has influenced my beliefs and assumptions in relation to this study.

A.The Dark Ages

Like 92% of Colombian adults, I was raised as a Roman Catholic without ever questioning why I was (or should be) Catholic. Interestingly, Colombia has the second highest proportion of adults raised as Roman Catholics worldwide while it is also one of the most unequal, corrupt and violent countries.

1.Childhood

I was born to middle-class parents in a very conservative town in Colombia. I was educated at a regional (and privileged) high school owned and administered exclusively by the Roman Catholic Church to this day (like most important educational centres in Colombia, where access to education is limited to the few).

In Colombia, people remember my hometown (Pasto) for opposing independence in favour of the Spanish Catholic monarchy. Such submissive subservience of the population to the Roman Catholic Church remains to some extent until today.

I had not met a single non-Roman Catholic until I was 15 years old. At school and at home, I learned that people who were not Catholics were “sons of the devil” and were dangerous.

I received a repressive education, especially at school. The guiding principle was that “it is forbidden to think beyond what is established.” We were forced to attend mass at school and religious instruction was compulsory.

Nevertheless, the society in which I grew up accepts a set of values where “evil is good, and the one who cheats is a hero.” Great respect and admiration existed for well known gangsters, drug dealers and “cool criminals” among my classmates and neighbours.

Aside from this, I had some friends who practised “white magic rituals” with the saints worshipped in the Roman Catholic Church. I soon became involved in sorcery, as we believed these practices were “sacred.” A few weeks later, one of my

“magic friends” committed suicide with his girlfriend (and their baby). My life became miserable in every respect. It was determined by suffering, fear, superstition, ignorance, want and disgrace.

Moreover, I was nearly kidnapped twice. The robbers threatened to kill me just to steal my watch or phone. I struggled a lot with evil people, bullying, ignorance and criminality. There was so much about this repressive society that I simply failed to understand.

B.The Enlightenment

2.Adolescence:

Philosophers such as Nietzsche or Marx were unknown in my entire elementary and high school education. I was fortunate to meet a “crazy outsider,” who introduced me to these philosophers, whose ideas opened up a completely new world to me at that time. I understood that like all those people who believe or follow a religion I had been deliberately manipulated with a “people’s opium.” As a result, I ended up declaring myself a complete materialist and atheist. I became a truth-seeker and embraced science and reason in search of a more coherent and rational framework of values.

This quest for knowledge freed me from most of my superstitions. I understood that the power of the mind could create all kinds of enchantments. There was no longer any such thing as witchcraft in my life, but only positive and negative energy. I became an advocate of scientific positivism. I began searching for explanations through science, which led me to move to Bogota (the capital) to pursue a scientific career in the natural sciences. My life started to change for the better. I had found the path to a better life. I firmly believed that nothing in my life would stop me from embracing my chosen materialistic and rationalistic perspective.

Bogota is an enormous city where people tend to be better educated and where services are better than in the rest of the country. I also realised that people were less fervent Catholics than in my hometown. In fact, not everybody was Catholic in Bogota’s cosmopolitan environment. I discovered that not everybody admired Pablo Escobar and other criminals as heroes. Quite the opposite in fact. I also had to adapt my values to a more balanced and secular society where I had began finding more like-minded people.

3.My father's crisis

I received news about my father, who had forged a successful career for himself as a singer after abandoning us. He had fallen into a profound depression and eventually ended up using all kinds of drugs. His state deteriorated drastically and he lost everything he had. He was admitted twice to rehabilitation clinics. After recovering, his situation grew even worse, until he ended up a homeless and begging for money in the streets. His addiction was extreme and lasted about a decade.

I was ashamed of my father and did not want to hear anything about him. At the same time, I was establishing my career and professional network. One day, my father was approached in the street by a Christian group (Protestant) and told him about Jesus. Miraculously, in only one day, he was completely and forever healed. This was unbelievable for all his relatives and friends as no doctor had managed to help him.

Soon, he joined a Christian (Protestant) Church and became a singer there. His life was wholly renewed, and he became a new and very faithful man. He looked for my mother and me to ask for forgiveness. My mother had forgiven him, but did not want to hear about him anymore. I was more hard-hearted and did not forgive him; I said that for me, he had already died years ago. I also mentioned that it was good that he had recovered from his addiction, but between being a drug addict and a fundamentalist Christian, his was the "least worse" option. This deeply saddened my father. He started to cry and prayed fervently and earnestly for my mother and me for about one year.

4. My crisis

After haughtily rejecting my father, many strange things started to happen in my life during that year. One of the most important was that despite a successful career start and an extensive network I was — incredibly but true — unable to find a proper job. I started to feel what scarcity means. Nobody wanted to hire me, regardless of my impressive CV and professional network.

As a result, for nearly two years I subsisted on borrowing money from banks, friends, relatives, neighbours, etc. Having to pay off debts often made me feel desperate. I owed money to everyone I knew.

C. The Reformation

5. The paradigm change

After nearly a decade of atheism, I met someone who suggested a business opportunity: selling quality environmental American products through a well-recognised, multi-level transnational corporation. The idea of selling sounded disgusting to me, but I did not have other income option, so I accepted the offer.

The company is very successful worldwide. It is based firmly on Calvinist values, which the company disseminates through its training programmes and literature. One of the principles they taught me was that for a business to be successful, it was essential to donate at least 10% of net profits to a charity or a philanthropic project. This made no sense to me at all, and I thought the idea was fundamentalist. I said I would be happy to give when I became a millionaire.

However, book after book written by successful entrepreneurs confirmed that giving came first and the quintessential prerequisite for success. This fundamental stance was even confirmed by an unlikely source: a highly respected professor from MIT. I was impressed and convinced, and decided to start donating 50% of the net profits of my sales (although I was still paying off my debts).

Impressively, from the very first time I gave, I experienced a new and pleasant feeling, which encouraged me to keep on giving for the sole pleasure of doing it. Inexplicably, that month I started selling much more and began receiving vast amounts of money from different sources. By the end of the month, I had paid off all my debts.

6. An experiment to prove God's existence

One of my clients was a devout Protestant Christian, and she was always speaking about Jesus. I listened, since I did not want to disappoint her, but still thought Evangelicals were crazy fundamentalists.

She challenged my atheism and asked me to do a rational experiment to prove the existence of God. The experiment involved kneeling down alone in my room and asking God whether he existed; he should give me a proof of his existence in a defined period of time. If nothing happened (as one could expect), I would continue my life as usual, but if I had an affirmative reply, I had to recognise his existence.

I accepted the challenge, and I did the experiment. I gave God one month to demonstrate his existence. After feeling ridiculous, after all I was talking to walls, I forgot about the experiment, and my life continued.

During that month, my profits soared. My cash flow increased substantially, and my debts decreased. Unexpectedly, I was offered my dream job (the salary was three times higher than my expectations!). Unbelievably, after much financial hardship, I bought my own flat. I was so impressed with how giving had worked and had solved my financial crisis!

Another client that month also happened to be a Protestant Christian and talked to me about God. I was not paying attention until she mentioned that the Bible states that we can prove the existence of God. She did not have to say so, as she was unaware of everything that was happening to me!

I asked where the Bible said so, as I had never adequately read its teaching. She replied that in Malachi 3:10, the Lord says:

> "Bring ye all the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in mine house, and prove me now herewith, saith the LORD of hosts, if I will not open you the windows of heaven, and pour you out a blessing, that there shall not be room enough to receive it."

I could not believe these events had all happened in the same month in which I had asked for proof, and I had actually forgotten about it. I quickly went to search for a Bible, and when I found the corresponding passage, I was extremely impressed. It described what was what actually happening to me. I had been living a life of scarcity for nearly two years, not to mention the past hardships, and now I was receiving money and things to an extent I had never considered possible.

I knelt impressed and asked God to forgive my skepticism. All these changes had happened precisely in the same month that I asked God for proof of his existence! It was improbable that this change of fortune had happened by chance. These events would definitely impress any rational mind, like all of God's gifts!

I began reading the Bible and found that this book was alive, unlike any other book I had read. Everything I was reading in the Bible started to happen in my own life. My eyes were opened and I started to understand how life and the world work. I also gained insight into many mysteries that I would otherwise never have understood.

7. Reconciliation: Meeting my father again

Following the principles of the Bible improved my life more than I could ever have imagined. I started experiencing unlikely miracles every single day of my life.

One of the biblical principles that I repeatedly encountered was: *"Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee"* (Exodus 20:12. King James Bible).

So I was amazed by the biblical promise of living longer if honouring one's parents. Realising how mercilessly I had behaved towards my father, I decided to travel to my hometown. I convinced my mother to come and visit my father to forgive him.

My suggestion pleased her very much, as she saw a renewed and faithful son. And so we went to my father's place! He was expecting us, came towards us, embraced us and cried. Our reunion was unbelievable!

My father exclaimed: "Glory to the Lord Jesus as He has listened to my prayers and crying and made the miracle I requested, that you two, come to my house and search me to forgive me."

8. Box of blessings unlocked

Ever since I started believing in God and following the biblical principles, all my dreams became true one after the other. It was like unlocking a large container of gifts and blessings that I had desired all my life!

Among many other miracles, I won two of the most prestigious scholarships to study in the United Kingdom and Switzerland, the countries of my dreams.

Then I understood how real Psalm 37:4 is: *"Delight thyself also in the LORD: and he shall give thee the desires of thine heart"* (King James Bible). I was also growing in understanding and wisdom.

My studies in England

In England, I had the opportunity to visit Lewes, a small town near London full of history. I attended a fair that reenacted how British people used to live in the Middle Ages. To my surprise, I felt like home there. It was pretty similar to how my parents and grandparents used to live in my Colombian hometown.

I immediately wondered how Colombia and England could feel that similar if they were so different geographically and culturally? I assumed that perhaps the only difference was time. I asked one of the experts at the fair how people in England had experienced the change from medieval times to a heavily industrialised country?

Her answer kindled my curiosity even more: “England was a country of peasants without education. It was not until the Reformers came and taught peasants to read the Bible and write that they eventually became entrepreneurs. Roman Catholic peasants remained uneducated.” Her comment was a revelation.

When I was studying my Bachelor’s degree in ecology in Bogota (1999–2004), I had observed the existence of several developmental patterns that were associated with climatic and environmental conditions. However, I also noticed a missing factor that would help better explain the differences between countries. In England, I began finding various clues to this missing element.

D. My personal experience and my doctoral research

Afterwards, it occurred to me that countries with a Roman Catholic tradition struggled with similar problems: corruption, insecurity, inequality, poor education or violence (e.g. Latin America, as well as Italy, Spain and Portugal in Europe). In contrast, those with a Protestant background exhibited the lowest indicators of these variables and were industrialised, developed countries (e.g. United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, United States, etc.).

I realised that the Roman Catholic traditions are more important for the Church than what the Bible says, and in fact that many traditions directly contradict it! This insight prompted me to explore the history of “the Reformers”: Martin Luther in Germany, John Calvin and Huldrych Zwingli in Switzerland, William Tyndale and John Wycliffe in England were among other courageous men who had dared to question the authority of the papacy.

I started feeling that the history of Western civilisation during the last two thousand years had happened in my own life: a period of obscurantism marked by a strong influence of the Roman Catholic Church; a period of atheist enlightenment; and a period of Protestant Reformation (except that the last two were in inverse order). I started reading any literature on the topic. The more I discovered, the more passionate I became.

I also started speaking to different academics and experts. Despite the scientific literature available on the topic, to my surprise, most scholars did not take this subject very seriously. At an academic conference, one simply said that developed countries were just “lucky.” Another even called Max Weber a “pseudo-theorist.” However, a recognised economist told me that economic theories do not work, but that “Weberian Protestant Ethics” were an important field in which to do research.

After this, while working in a UN development agency, I told myself that if I ever had the opportunity to do a PhD, I would be eager to develop this research idea (the influence of religion on countries’ prosperity) further.

All these successive events made change my career focus completely. I now feel I have found what indeed makes sense in my life.

9. Advantages of my personal experience for my doctoral research

After travelling to more than four dozen countries around the world, learning four different languages, and discovering how significant religious values are, I bring various attributes to academic research:

- a transdisciplinary and multilingual perspective;
- a passion to discover the roots of human freedom;
- devoting several years before starting my PhD to seeking different sources;
- first-hand experience of my research topic through living around one-third of my life in each of the systems investigated (Roman Catholic, atheist, dissenting Protestant).

My personal life means that I am very well aware of the advantages and disadvantages of these three systems, based on living in different countries and on practical experience. My scientific research complements my experience, while my study informs both theory and practice.

10. Disadvantages of my personal experience for my doctoral research

A significant disadvantage of this study is that it will create much controversy and encounter fierce criticism. The Protestant Reformers and scholars like Weber also faced similar challenges in their times. Controversy is needed to bring about changes.

I am aware that the results of this study will be very uncomfortable for many and will prompt harsh criticism. They might make more enemies than friends as they are “politically incorrect” by today’s standards. I am, however, confident that this is the only way to change the paradigm of ignorance in which our society is caught up.

One apparent disadvantage of this study is that its author lacks a scientific background in sociology or economics. Nevertheless, my studies in environmental and political sciences provide me with a broader perspective. After all, many good signs of progress in science come from scholars working in different fields, most likely because they bring fresh approaches and biases to the debate.

11. Audience:

The transdisciplinary nature of this research makes it interesting for social and natural scientists alike. Equally, it will speak to Roman Catholics, Protestants, atheists, and all other readers seeking to understand the roots of Western civilisation and its development.

12. Biases:

The following personal experiences from each belief system influence my personal position:

Roman Catholicism:

• I grew up in a Roman Catholic family in a strongly Roman Catholic country;
• I was educated for 12 years in Roman Catholic schools and received Catholic religious instruction;
• I studied for five years at a Pontifical Jesuit university.

Atheism (after being a firm Catholic believer):

• I spent ten years living as a self-confessed atheist who embraced atheistic values;
• I was socialised in and applied the paradigm of scientific materialism (positivism).

Dissenting Protestantism (after being a convinced atheist):

• I spent 12 years living as converted free Christian and I have studied the Bible on my own;
• I have lived and studied in the United Kingdom and Switzerland (two historically Protestant countries) (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

13.Strategies for objective data treatment:

I employed the following strategies to ensure objective data treatment: 1. Two independent quantitative researchers were engaged to select the variables solely using quantitative criteria (e.g. cross-validation) in regressions and QCA. 2. Two independent qualitative researchers were engaged to impartially validate the qualitative coding (a total of four independent researchers). 3. The selected variables (chosen from a pool of more than 70 indicators) were associated with qualitative codes to prioritise them from a mixed methods perspective. 4. The quantitative and qualitative (QCA) database is available for inspection (Appendices 7–14). The interviews conducted as part of this study will not be made publicly available to protect the interviewees' identity.

E. Supplement: What happened to my father and my faith

My father began encouraging me to find a place to congregate with other believers in Jesus. I disliked the idea, as I never wanted to become what I have always criticised as an atheist: a fundamentalist who faints and jumps in ugly, dark and smelly churches on Sundays.

So we decided to pray together with my father, and I asked God that He might show me the truth. I was tired of hearing every single religion declaring that it alone possessed the truth. My father said he would not rest until he saw me in a congregation.

A few days after praying with my father, I received a good job offer in a distant city. The place was a bit unfriendly, as I had no friends or relatives there. The food also complicated matters, because as a vegetarian, I had never seen so many people eat such vast amounts of meat three times a day. There were almost no options for me.

One day at lunchtime in that strange city, I felt alone and realised I had no money, not even to buy food. So I started complaining to God about why I was experiencing scarcity if I was sharing my money giving to the poor. Immediately, walking down the street, I found a banknote, which allowed me to buy a meal. I knelt down and gave thanks to God for such a miracle.

However, I continued complaining about the fact that there was nothing vegetarian to eat! I walked two more blocks with no orientation and found an incredible vegan restaurant that served delicious food.

The people were friendly and told me I could eat there, even if I had no money. They were definitely different from the rest of the world for their gentleness, wisdom, knowledge, and kindness, among other values. I was delighted and began eating there every day.

One day, a kind person came and sat beside me to share the table and asked me where I was attending church. I replied that I was not going to any church. She was surprised; she told me that the restaurant was run by a Christian group that she belonged to and that I was very welcome to join.

When I asked her more questions about their philosophy, she explained that in the Bible, the ideal diet recommended by God was vegan, which was why the restaurant was vegan. She also told me that this Christian group existed all over the world as a result of the Protestant Reformation and based its faith on the Lutheran principle of "*Sola Scriptura*," which I had begun looking for after finding out about Martin Luther.

I was so impressed that I asked if I could visit her Church next Sunday, but she replied that this was impossible: "*On Sundays, we work. It's the first day of the week, we congregate on the true day of the Lord, the Sabbath.*"

For in Exodus 20:9-11, the Lord says:

> "Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work: But the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy manservant, nor thy maidservant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates: For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day and hallowed it" (King James Version).

I was even more impressed after this. The following Saturday, I went to that place, which was just beautiful, quiet and harmonious. The atmosphere was most congenial and the people amazing. I decided that this is the place where I wanted to be! I immediately called my father and told him that I had found the right place for me to congregate.

My father was so happy and exclaimed:

"*Hallelujah, praise The Lord, He has answered our prayers, now I am in peace for my son is in your ways.*"

Only three days later, my father died of fulminant pancreatitis. He passed away peacefully, and I understood that he had achieved his purpose in his life, among others, to accompany me until I found the right way.

My story illustrates that if you persist in finding answers, the truth or whatever purpose, you will have it. As Jesus says in Matthew 7:7–8: "*Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you: For every one that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened*" (KJV). This is precisely what I have experienced.

We must work on our dreams, and finally, we will attract what we long for. My personal experience leads me to conclude that we can achieve many goals, dreams, and purposes in our life by struggling on our own. That, I am convinced, is the longest and hardest way. However, if we have God with us, by our side, this is the most efficient and shortest way to a fulfilling life.

As it is written: "*And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free*" (John 8:32). Jesus is *"the way, the truth, and the life*" (John 14:6).

And my desire for you is: "Therefore God give thee of the dew of heaven, and the fatness of the earth, and plenty of corn and wine" Amen (Genesis 27: 28).

4. Theories Attempting to Explain Prosperity Imbalances

This subsection briefly summarises some of the most prominent theories of prosperity. For statistical data related to these theories, please refer to Appendices 7–10.

4.1 Economic Prosperity Theory

Preston (2012) classifies the different economic approaches to countries' prosperity into positivist, radical, Marxist, orthodox and institutionalist schools. Rather than discussing these approaches in details, I will focus on those most relevant to this study.

Marxist schemes refute the usefulness of orthodox economics when considering what Preston calls the "economies of the Third World." Attention must be paid, on the one hand, to the institutional and social contexts of the economies in question and, on the other, to their location in the world economy. According to this approach, a country's institutions, social context and location somehow account for its prosperity (Preston, 2012).

A second current, according to Preston (2012), rejects the Ricardian notion of international specialisation and is inspired primarily by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLA). Such ideas justified Latin America's role in the world economy as being restricted to that of a primary product exporter. Later, the gradual failure of ECLA reformism led to a reworking of these views (Preston, 2012, p. 6).

Traditional institutional approaches aiming to alleviate prosperity problems such as inequality, poverty or corruption include the highly technically-based and controversially discussed recipes of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. Such recipes, while guiding governments in Latin America and the developing world, have often resulted in failure or have worsened the social situation of such countries (Stiglitz, 2002). This suggests that the causes of structural prosperity are not being properly addressed.

4.1.1 Dependency Theory (Preferred Theory of Liberation Theologians and Leftist Governments in Latin America)

In dependency theory, the misery and inequality abounding in Latin America are not fortuitous but linked to capitalist development. For Levine (1981), they are

> "a necessary consequence of the subordination of Latin American societies and economies to the interests of the dominant world capitalist powers. In turn, the continued development of the industrialised economies depends on the exploitation of Latin America and other 'underdeveloped' regions" (Levine, 1981, p. 45).

According to dependency theory, local allies who control social, cultural, economic, and political institutions in developing countries implement policies and programmes designed by developed nations (Ibid). This strand of dependency theory has been very influential in Latin America and corresponds to the Marxist version, one of whose leading advocates is Andre Gunder Frank (Drexler-Dreis, 2017, p. 275).

According to dependency theorists, US "imperialism" is commonly accepted as a predominant cause of poverty in Latin America (Galeano, 1971). However, there is little empirical evidence to support this approach. For example, Venezuela or Bolivia are not wealthier since opposing the United States; in fact the opposite is true. Likewise, Colombia or Costa Rica are not more impoverished for being US allies.

However, dependency theory might be useful to trace the hegemony of colonial institutions and elites. Empirical and historical evidence shows that after the former Spanish/Portuguese colonies gain independence, hegemony was handed to local elites. Consequently, the socio-economic situation of Latin America did not change much; instead, the extractivist tendency persisted (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001).

"Dependency" analyses typically exclude or deny the historical ties with and the dependency on the Roman Church-State. The present study, however, reveals a clear tendency: the higher the Roman Catholic influence in a country (e.g. the Church's strong control over education), the worse the country's conditions.

Likewise, dependency theories regard the core (prosperous) countries as so-called hegemons. Semi-periphery and periphery countries are usually former colonies. Such a division raises other crucial questions: Why does Spain as the coloniser of Latin America face economic problems to this day? Why does the United States

appear as a hegemon if it was a British colony? Why could this British colony (US) achieve prosperity levels that the other colonies could not? Dependency theory does not properly answer these questions and instead misleads analysis. For example, it mistakenly assumes that US exploitation ("hegemon") causes the poverty problems of Latin America and hence disregards other real structural problems.

Dependency theory is widely accepted *a priori*. However, it has led to further developments, among others, World System Theory, which divides the world into core countries, semi-periphery countries, and periphery countries.

World System Theory

This theory suggests the existence of a global economic behaviour centred on capitalist penetration from industrialised countries to peripheral areas. Further, peripheral countries provide a permanent flow of resources and migrant labour that most prosperous countries require (Wallerstein, 2006). The existence of the global system depends on international flows of capital, supply resources, markets, and labour.

This theory is only applicable at the global level (Papademetriou and Martin, 1991, p. 10). Therefore, world systems theory is usually criticised as "... a historical generalisation, a by-product of a univocal, reductionist and sense-loaded interpretation of history in which all countries pass through as following rigid laws of historic development" (Arango as cited in Guataqui, 2006, p. 28).

4.2 Theory of Institutions

The leading advocates of this theory are the economists Douglas North (1991), Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012). The authors adopt a historical perspective to argue that the imbalance among the Americas has not always been as it is today, but the other way around. To some extent, the "American dream" for the European colonisers meant conquering the golden prosperous South and Central America inhabited by the Incas, Mayas, Aztecs, and other prominent civilisations of the New World.

Acemoglu and Robinson also explain that by the beginning of the colonial period, Spain was the strongest hegemon in Europe. Consequently, the Spaniards managed to gain the "best" (i.e. most prosperous) territories in the Americas (South and Central), leaving the "left-overs" (North) to the British. The northlands were considered "left-overs" as they were desert-like, poor and inhabited by impoverished

aborigines not possessing anywhere near the amount of gold and jewels found in their South American counterparts (p. 21).

Institutions, so Acemoglu and Robinson, enabled the British to build the British Empire and to colonise North America based on the Spanish "left-overs." They were able to establish the United States, the most powerful country that inherited British institutions, which in turn generated a positive loop by sharing goods and wealth in a more equal manner.

By contrast, the Spaniards took advantage of the indigenous populations and created extractive institutions ("*la mita*" or "*la encomienda*"). These were designed to extract wealth from the people and to perpetuate a powerful elite. This situation continued after the independence of the Latin American states. The current institutions are the "descendants" of "*la mita*" or "*la encomienda.*" Social inequality has led to violence and political instability.

Acemoglu and Robinson criticise the geography approach to prosperity for its narrow scope. While able to explain the differences *between* continents, it is unable to account for those *within* continents themselves. They also give examples of how cultural differences are not significant factors: Thus, while North Korea and South Korea share the same language and cultural background, the former is one of the poorest countries of the world, and the latter one of the most prosperous (p. 43).

Another example is the vast prosperity differences between the high quality of life in Nogales (in Arizona) and its poor southern neighbour (Nogales, Sonora, Mexico). The inhabitants of both Nogales, Arizona and Sonora, have the same cultural background. Yet, the Sonora face high crime rates, poor education and health system while they "live with politicians' corruption and ineptitude every day" (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.13).

For these authors, Latin American, as well as other African and Asian countries, fail because of "an elite who design economic institutions in order to enrich themselves and perpetuate their power at the expense of the vast majority of people in society" (p. 24).

Furthermore, according to Acemoglu and Robinson, institutions seem to be the main reason why countries such as Colombia remain in the same relative conditions as during colonisation (compared to countries in the North). This leads the authors to arguing that this situation will probably not change in the foreseeable future, given that institutional feedback loops persist over time.

Prados de la Escosura (2004) summarises Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson's (2002) "reversal of fortune" theory as follows:

> "…in areas of relative affluence, with abundant population, such as Mesoamerica and the Andes, Europeans established 'extractive institutions,' with political power concentrated in the hands of an elite, as the most efficient choice—despite its long-term negative effects on growth. While in poor, less densely populated areas, Europeans settled in large numbers and developed their own institutions that encouraged investment and growth" (Prados de la Escosura, 2004, p. 2)

This point leads to the first critique of institutional theory: It assumes that all European colonisers had the same background and merely "behaved" differently in North America because this region was not densely populated. In South and Central America, they found a densely concentrated population. This assumption does not, however, explain the cases of Brazil or Argentina, which were not densely populated before European colonisation and also have extractive institutions like the rest of Latin America.

Moreover, another related question is whether Canada and the United States would be as they are today if the Spaniards and Portuguese had colonised North America? Authors like Huntington (2004) argue that they would most probably not, as they would be like other Latin American countries, sharing similar institutions and cultural heritage.

Although institutional theory, as well as the other approaches analysed here, have much truth and substantial explanatory power, their main weakness is that they consider other approaches and theories (geographical, cultural) invalid, as if the individual approaches were not complementary.

However, Acemoglu and Robinson recognise the importance of analysing history to understand institutions, as these have their origins in history. The same authors have also explored the importance of understanding *who* has the power to mould institutions and the political dynamics limiting power, (which is a remarkable enquiry in Latin American countries).

In the end, institutions matter and play a decisive role in the prosperity of societies. The question is what makes institutions? People and the ethical and moral principles initiating the establishment of trustworthy institutions? Significantly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) leave this question unanswered.

4.3 Factor Endowments Theory (Institutions and Geography)

In some way, factor endowments theory extends institutional theory as it also considers various political and institutional insights along with geographical factors. Among such theorists, Engerman and Sokoloff (2002a) set out to explain differentials in growth rates of per capita income in the New World. They found that the initial differences between the degree of inequality in the Americas can be attributed largely to endowment factors:

> "… that great equality or homogeneity among the population led [in the North], over time, to more democratic political institutions, to more investment in public goods and infrastructure, and to institutions that offered relatively broad access to economic opportunities. In contrast, where there was extreme inequality, as in most of the societies of the Americas, political institutions were less democratic, investments in public goods and infrastructure were more limited, and the institutions that evolved tended to provide highly unbalanced access to economic opportunities and thereby greatly advantaged the elite" (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002a, p. 4).

Accordingly, initial inequality, as well as soil and climatic conditions on the equator, led to producing large quantities of high value crops like sugar cane or tobacco in Central and South America. Such crops were characterised by extensive scale economies associated with the use of slaves, and with a self-ennriching elite that perpetuated inequality over time. In contrast, the US and Canada economies were developed based on a model of free land, which provided plots suitable for family farms to all those who settled and worked the land for a specified period. This led to an equal distribution of land and wealth (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002a).

Factor endowments theory is based on empirical research that correlates wealth inequality, human capital and political power in order to account for divergent economic growth records. Consequently, this notion only partly explains countries' failure or success concentrating on their economic growth.

Further, this theory provides no comprehensive explanation that would in turn lead to a holistic understanding of countries' prosperity as the present study claims. It focuses exclusively on the macro-economic achievements of countries and fails to explain other related aspects such as corruption or safety.

Like environmental and geographical theory, factor endowment theory does not consider the historical differences between the European colonisers of the Americas and the differential influence of the Iberian Peninsula and Great Britain on their respective colonies. Great Britain built egalitarian societies in North America,

whereas Spain and Portugal replicated their “extractive” and elitist models throughout Latin America (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). In sum, along with environment and geography theory, factor endowments theory can be considered as another piece of the explanation puzzle.

4.4 Environment and Geography Theory

This theory has attracted a higher number of advocates, including Brown & Lall (2006). They explained 60% of GDP per capita variance across countries using selected rainfall statistics and a binary variable accounting for wars and armed conflicts. Their analysis of global datasets shows a statistically significant relationship between greater rainfall variability and lower GDP per capita. They demonstrated that climate variability in the form of rainfall variability is a significant factor of economic growth. They claimed that impacts of climate variability can often be mitigated. The amount and variability of rainfall were significant factors in the prosperity of early agricultural economies and contributed to the differences in the wealth of nations since the early 19th century (Brown & Lall, 2006).

A prominent advocate of this theory is the economist Jeffrey Sachs, who has claimed a direct relation between geography and poverty or the prosperity of nations (Sachs, 2001). Sachs found that geography has greater direct effects on per capita income than institutions (Sachs, 2003). Also, countries located in the inter-tropical or equatorial zone tend to be poorer than those located in temperate zones. According to Sachs, the direct variables accounting for the prosperity of nations are climate, location, land and soil composition, latitude, and the presence of infectious diseases.

Another influential advocate of this theory is the ecologist Jared Diamond, especially his widely recognised “Guns, Germs, and Steel” (1997). According to Diamond, aspects such as the availability of docile animals for domestication and access to storable vegetal proteins, along with favourable environmental and climate factors, enabled European states to develop and conquer other lands, and thus to dominate other countries across the world (Diamond, 1997).

The approaches used to explain the geography and environment theory have solid empirical foundations and are appealing to explore in further detail. The question worth considering in the context of the present study is whether this approach would help explain the differences between North and Latin America.

In light of this theory, countries in the northern hemisphere are all prosperous and hence less violent and less corrupt than those located on the equator. Russia,

located in the northern hemisphere in similar latitudes as Western Europe and North America, would be the exception to this rule regarding corruption (see Figure 3 in main text).

Adapting this theory to the American continent would imply that the temperate countries located in the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn and beyond would exhibit better prosperity indicators on the whole. Accepting this assumption would suffice to understand the prosperity of the United States and Canada and, to a lesser extent, of Brazil, Chile and Argentina — in contrast to the poorer countries located on the equator.

Engerman and Sokoloff (2002b) concur with this view and claim that:

> "Argentina, Canada, and the United States all had an extraordinary abundance of virtually uninhabited public lands to transfer to private hands in the interest of bringing this public resource into production and serving other general interests. In societies such as Mexico, however, the issues at stake in land policy were very different" (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002b, p. 20).

However, violence and inequality are not necessarily related to economic growth or GDP per capita (Koonings, 2014). This theory of environmental and geographical determinism, then, would not explain why Latin American countries have higher homicide rates or inequality. Nor would it explain the differences in GDP per capita within the American continent, although a correlation might exist.

Moreover, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) have criticised this approach, among others for not helping to explain the historical imbalance of power in the Americas: "Before 1492 it was the civilizations in the central valley of Mexico, Central America, and the Andes that had superior technology and living standards to North America or places such as Argentina and Chile. While the geography stayed the same, the institutions imposed by European colonists created a 'reversal of fortune'" (p. 46).

On the other hand, a polarised debate exists over the role of the environment and other variables related to prosperity like violence. For instance, Black (2001), after reviewing several case studies in different regions of the world, concluded that it is problematic to say that environmental decline is the main reason for conflicts. Hence for Black, the linkages between environmental change and conflict remain to be proven since some contrary evidence on the role of environmental stress also exists (Black, 2001).

Barnett and Adger (2007, as cited in Gleditsch, Buhaug, & Magnus, 2011) reviewed a broad range of studies on the effects of changes in precipitation and temperature. They focused mainly on countries where a vast majority of the population still depends on primary-sector employment. If climate change results in higher temperature and reduced rainfall, the potential for conflict will be higher and poverty more widespread. Thus, reduced access to the natural capital sustaining livelihoods and droughts would be key factors (Ibid).

Although these studies present empirical evidence, the environment and geography theory does not take into consideration, for example, the differences between the colonisers of North and Latin America and their respective influence. Although this theory may apply to the other factors outlined, it would remain incomplete without considering the other factors mentioned below. Thus, although important, geography and the environment are merely two pieces in larger puzzle.

4.5 Cultural Theory

Culture as a determinant of prosperity has been heavily criticised as a theory that "does not work" (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; McSweeney, 2015). In his critique, McSweeney argued that cultural determinism makes it impossible to define a "national culture" and that the quantitative approaches in cultural theory underestimate the sub-national levels. However, Hofstede (2001), and The "Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness" (GLOBE) Research Programme have all developed critical empirical (quantitative) contributions to this theory. They may be summarised as follows:

4.5.1 Cultural Dimensions Theory

Geert Hofstede (2001) made the first approach to empirically and quantitatively exploring the differences in thinking and social actions across 72 countries by distributing 116,000 questionaries across IBM, the multinational business organisation (Hofstede, 2001). Although its sample representativeness and categories of analysis were heavily criticised, Hofstede's comprehensive study offered a numerical glimpse of cultural variables influencing differences in countries' institutions and prosperity.

One of Hofstede's six dimensions is the "Power Distance Index" (PDI). This is defined as "the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and

expect that power is distributed unequally" (Hofstede, 2014). According to the PDI index, most Latin American countries have high scores, thus pointing to negative consequences for political systems, religious life and organisations among others. In contrast, North American countries attain low PDI scores, thus pointing to positive consequences for political systems, religious life and organisations among others (Hofstede, 2001) (see Table 8 in main text).

4.5.2 The (GLOBE) Research Program (Center for Creative Leadership, 2014).

The Globe study replicates and expands on Hofstede's work, in particular on leadership topics (McSweeney, 2015). Globe research was first conceived in 1991 by Robert J. House from Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania. It was published in 2004 as "Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies."

GLOBE investigated how culture is related to leadership, organisational, and societal effectiveness. It measured culture in different segments (organisation, industry, and country) and explored practices and values based on data from around 17,300 middle managers from 951 organisations in 58 countries (Center for Creative Leadership, 2014).

GLOBE's first significant achievement "is a comprehensive description of how cultures are different or similar from one another. GLOBE established nine cultural dimensions that make it possible to capture the similarities or differences in norms, values, beliefs and practices among societies" (Center for Creative Leadership, 2014, p. 2) (See Table 2 below).

GLOBE speaks of societies rather than countries, as the gathered data showed that some countries are fractioned into slightly different cultural groups. In Canada, GLOBE distinguishes between French and English speakers; in Switzerland, it differentiates between French and German speakers; in South Africa, it discriminates between White and Black culture; and in Germany, it separates West and East Germany (Ibid).

Power Distance	The degree to which members of a collective expect power to be distributed equally.
Uncertainty Avoidance	The extent to which a society, organisation, or group relies on social norms, rules, and procedures to alleviate the unpredictability of future events.
Humane Orientation	The degree to which a collective encourages and rewards individuals for being fair, altruistic, generous, caring, and kind to others.

Collectivism I (Institutional)	The degree to which organisational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward the collective distribution of resources and collective action.
Collectivism II (In-Group)	The degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organisations or families.
Assertiveness	The degree to which individuals are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in their relationships with others.
Gender Egalitarianism	The degree to which a collective minimises gender inequality.
Future Orientation	The extent to which individuals engage in future-oriented behaviours such as delaying gratification, planning, and investing in the future.
Performance Orientation	The degree to which a collective encourages and rewards group members for performance improvement and excellence.

Table 2. GLOBE's cultural dimensions; adapted from Center for Creative Leadership (2014)

4.5.3 High and Low Context

Unlike Hofstede and GLOBE, Hall (1990) approach is more qualitative and neither quantifies nor produces a numerical database to compare societies.

High-context (HC) communication occurs when very little information is contained in the explicit, coded and transmitted part of the message. Most information is internalised either in people or in the physical context. Examples of HC are Asian or Latin American societies. On the other hand, low-context (LC) communication is the opposite: The mass of information is vested in the explicit code. Examples include North American and North European societies (Hall, 1990).

4.5.4 Criticisms of Cultural Determinism

Despite Acemoglu and Robinson's (2012) criticism of cultural theory, they accept this as useful "in the sense that social norms, which are related to culture, matter and can be hard to change, and they also sometimes support institutional differences" (p. 48).

Meanwhile, McSweeney (2015) has highlighted several inconsistencies in the main postulates grounding the previous three (and other) theoretical contributions in cultural and management theory. Among others, he mentions the difficulties of defining "culture" and "national culture" within a geographical domain. Another issue concerns the misleading acceptance of an invariant or stable "culture."

Furthermore, citing numerous sources, McSweeney criticises the statistical or numerical approach of cultural studies.

First, McSweeney discredits any "view that culture has 'affects,' 'effects,' 'influence,' 'consequences,' 'manifestations,' 'impacts' or 'outcomes […] the social action of defined populations enduringly and predictably" (McSweeney, 2015, p. 16). He maintains that such claims "merely point to possible statistical relationships, associations, or correlations" (Ibid) that provide no evidence for causality (p. 18). McSweeney's objection is very valid: Generally, it has been wrongly and widely accepted in science that correlations are necessarily associated with causality. In fact, a statistical correlation might be spurious, while causal inferencing is a more complicated process. This study approaches this problem by adopting a mixed methods approach consisting of qualitative and QCA methods as a means of establishing causal inference (see Methodology, Sections 13–15 in main text).

Second, McSweeney challenges the notion of geographical boundaries as appropriate for defining countries and culture (he cites various examples, including India, Turkey or former Czechoslovakia). Although these examples are historically accurate, they do not serve to generalise a theory that accounts for reality. For example, if we accept that no boundaries exist, how would we explain the institutional and regulatory differences existing in every country? Why do some countries require a visa for citizens from other countries? Why can some countries provide higher levels of freedom to their citizens than others? In this sense, institutional theory and history provide better answers to these questions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

Third, McSweeney claims that the link that GLOBE, Hofstede, Hall and others establish between culture and actions at the national level provides zero empirical evidence and that their conclusions are biased. This strongly discredits the empirical work undertaken by GLOBE, Hofstede, Hall, and others. Despite McSweeney's objections, Hofstede's and GLOBE's pioneering quantitative approaches have been useful in a myriad of empirical (quantitative) studies (Volonté, 2014; Stulz & Williamson, 2003; Staeheli, 2003). No single theory or science is capable of devising a perfectly rigorous empirical model including all possible variables and with all the desired representativeness. It is essential to have at least one point of departure, which explains why these works are considered here.

Fourth, related to the previous criticism, the importance of subnational heterogeneity is also a valid point raised by McSweeney. However, in practical terms, it would be virtually impossible to collect empirical information at a micro level from every single town and even community in the whole world to generate a

satisfactory model in McSweeney's terms. Moreover, from an institutional point of view, (regulatory, political and institutional) differences exist between countries as a whole (as discussed) and hence produce different prosperity outcomes. I discuss this argument in the empirical findings of this study.

Finally, although McSweeney (2015) raises crucial issues and heavily criticises other authors, he proposes neither a new model nor a better empirical approach. Citing Wagner (1975), he limits himself to asserting that speaking about national cultures is futile. However, it is better to have a point of departure than none. Science is about generating information and insights that allow us either to explain or to predict reality.

4.6 Prosperity Theories (Summary)

The entire set of theories presented here provides clear and useful explanatory power. Needless to say that each has strengths and weaknesses.

Most of the authors reviewed here fcous on analysing the prosperity of nations in economic terms, leaving aside other important prosperity indicators, such as transparency or security.

The main weakness found in most of these authors is their attempt to exclude other approaches, claiming that only geography (Sachs) or institutions (Robinson and Acemoglu) provide a full explanation. It is, however, essential to gain a holistic, comprehensive and systemic understanding of matters and to synthesise the explanatory hypotheses into a general model.

This highlights the need for a transdisciplinary approach to exploring the causes of the historical prosperity imbalance. On the one hand, we need a model that encompasses existing theories in a holistic and transdisciplinary theory. On the other, we need to emphasise the importance of considering the relations between institutions and cultures in terms of territory and time. Further, we need to establish who the actors designing and perpetuating institutions are. It is, therefore, clear that institutions play a decisive role in prosperity. However, people constitute institutions, and they have historical, ethical, religious and cultural backgrounds that need to be considered in order to understand prosperity trajectories (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

5. Studies on the Causes and Consequences of the Protestant Reformation

Studies on positive and negative causes and consequences of the Protestant Reformation (Becker, Pfaff, & Rubin, 2016, pp. 8-16).

1. Studies of the supply and demand-side factors of the Reformation.

Channel	Study	Direction of Association	Unit of observation	N	Period of observation
Supply-Side Factors Influencing Ideological Diffusion					
Printing	Rubin, 2014	+	Cities in HRE	352	1530–1600
Printing competition	Dittmar and Seabold, 2015	+	German-speaking cities	191	1454–1600
Ottoman Incursions	Iyigun, 2008	+	European conflicts	250	1450–1700
Ideological influence by spatial diffusion: *distance to Wittenberg/Zurich/Basel*	Rubin, 2014	–	Cities in HRE	352	1530–1600
	Pfaff and Corcoran, 2012	–	Cities in HRE	218	1523–1545
	Kim and Pfaff, 2012	–	Cities in HRE	457	1523–1545
Ideological influence by spatial diffusion: *distance to Cologne/Louvain*	Kim and Pfaff 2012	–	Cities in HRE	457	1523–1545
Student enrollments to: *Wittenberg/Basel* (social diffusion)	Kim and Pfaff, 2012	–	Cities in HRE	457	1523–1545
Student enrollments to: *Cologne/Louvain*(social diffusion)	Kim and Pfaff, 2012	–	Cities in HRE	457	1523–1545
Demand-Side Factors					
Political Autonomy	Cantoni, 2012	+	Cities in HRE	249	1517–1600
Political influence by spatial diffusion	Cantoni, 2012	+	Territories and cities in HRE	370	1517–1600
Aristocratic Patronage	Kim and Pfaff, 2012	+	Cities in HRE	457	1523–1545
Saints shrines	Pfaff, 2013	–	Large cities in HRE	145	1517–1545
Primogeniture	Ekelund et al. 2002	–	European nations and territories	27	1524–1685
Agricultural potential	Curuk and Smulders, 2016	+	Cities in HRE	249	1600
Monasteries	Pfaff and Corcoran, 2012	–	Cities in the HRE	218	1523–1545

2 Studies on the consequences of the Reformation: human capital.

Outcome	Study	(Expected) Direction of Association	Unit of observation	N	Period of observation	Empirical Method
Literacy rates	Becker and Woessmann, 2009	+	Prussian counties	452	1871	IV
Gender gap in school enrollment and literacy rates	Becker and Woessmann, 2008	–	Prussian counties	289 and 452	1816 and 1871	IV
Primary school supply and enrollment	Becker and Woessmann, 2010	+	Prussian cities and counties	293 counties; 156 cities	1816	IV
Public spending on schooling; educ. performance of military conscripts	Boppart et al., 2013	+	Swiss districts	169	1875–1879, 1885–1889, 1899–1903	IV
Capability in reading, numeracy, essay writing, Swiss history	Boppart et al., 2014	+	Swiss districts	169	1875–1879, 1885–1889, 1899–1903	IV
Upper tail human capital	Dittmar and Meisenzahl, 2016	+	German-speaking cities	239	1300-1820	IV

3 Studies on the consequences of the Reformation: work and work ethic.

Outcome	Study	(Expected) Direction of Association	Unit of observation	N	Period of observation	Empirical Method
Hours worked	Spenkuch, 2016	+	Individual-level data; German Socioeconomic Panel	13,384	2000–2008	IV
(Referenda on) leisure, state intervention, redistribution	Basten and Betz, 2013	–	Municipalities along Prot-Cath border in West Switzerland	305	1980s–2000s	RDD
Life satisfaction when unemployed	van Hoorn and Maseland 2013	–	Individual-level data from EVS and WVS	ca. 150,000	1981–2009 (5 waves)	Multi-level modeling

4. Studies on the consequences of the Reformation: economic development

Outcome	Study	(Expected) Direction of Association	Unit of observation	N	Period of observation	Empirical Method
Income tax revenue, % of labor force in services and manufacturing	Becker and Woessmann, 2009	+	Prussian counties	452	1877, 1882, 1886	IV
City size/growth	Cantoni, 2015	+	Cities in HRE	272	1300–1900	Diff-in-diff
City size/growth	Dittmar and Meisenzahl, 2016	+	German-speaking cities	239	1300–1800	IV
Entrepreneurship among religious minorities	Nunziata and Rocco, 2014	+	Individual-level data from ESS	ca. 9000	2000 s	Diff-in-diff
	Nunziata and Rocco, 2016	+	Individual-level and district-level data from Switzerland	ca. 2 mi. indiv., 181 districts	2000 s	Diff-in-diff
Social ethic	Arrufiada 2010	+	Individual-level data from ISSP	19,246	1998/99	Ordered probit, OLS
Choice of secular university major & occupation	Cantoni, Dittmar, and Yuchtman 2016	+	Individual-level data; university matriculation records, biographies	ca. 30,000	Reformation period	Diff-in-diff

5. Studies on the consequences of the Reformation: governance.

Outcome	Study	(Expected) Direction of Association	Unit of observation	N	Period of observation	Empirical Method
Rise of Parliament as legitimizing agent	Rubin, 2017	+	England and the Dutch Republic	Macro narrative	16th and 17th centuries	Macro narrative
	Greif and Rubin, 2016	+	England	Macro narrative	16th and 17th centuries	Macro narrative
Rise of state system	Philpott, 2000	+	European principalities	Macro narrative	1517–1648	Macro narrative
	Nexon, 2009	+	European polities at regional and super-regional levels	Macro narrative	1517–1648	Macro narrative
Transnational advocacy	Stamatov, 2010	+	Europeans religious organizations	Macro narrative	ca. 1550–1850	Macro narrative
Legal rationalization	Berman, 2003	+	German principalities and England	Macro narrative	1517–1689	Macro narrative
Establishment of state churches	Gorski, 2000	+	European states	Macro narrative	ca. 1520–1700	Macro narrative
Social discipline	Gorski, 2003	+	Brandenburg Prussia and the Netherlands	Macro narrative	ca. 1550–1700	Macro narrative
Poor relief	Pullan, 2005	+	European states	Macro narrative	ca. 1520–1650	Macro narrative
Social welfare regimes	Kahl, 2005	+	Lutheran, Calvinist and Catholic confessional organizations	Macro narrative	ca. 1500–1800	Macro narrative
New institutions for canonizing saints	Parigi, 2012	+	Canonization process of candidate saints	Macro narrative	1588–1642	Macro narrative

6. Studies on the “Dark” Consequences of the Reformation.

Outcome	Study	(Expected) Direction of Association	Unit of observation	N	Period of observation	Empirical Method
Rise of Parliament as legitimizing agent	Rubin, 2017	+	England and the Dutch Republic	Macro narrative	16th and 17th centuries	Macro narrative
	Greif and Rubin, 2016	+	England	Macro narrative	16th and 17th centuries	Macro narrative
Rise of state system	Philpott, 2000	+	European principalities	Macro narrative	1517–1648	Macro narrative
	Nexon, 2009	+	European polities at regional and super-regional levels	Macro narrative	1517–1648	Macro narrative
Transnational advocacy	Stamatov, 2010	+	Europeans religious organizations	Macro narrative	ca. 1550–1850	Macro narrative
Legal rationalization	Berman, 2003	+	German principalities and England	Macro narrative	1517–1689	Macro narrative
Establishment of state churches	Gorski, 2000	+	European states	Macro narrative	ca. 1520–1700	Macro narrative
Social discipline	Gorski, 2003	+	Brandenburg Prussia and the Netherlands	Macro narrative	ca. 1550–1700	Macro narrative
Poor relief	Pullan, 2005	+	European states	Macro narrative	ca. 1520–1650	Macro narrative
Social welfare regimes	Kahl, 2005	+	Lutheran, Calvinist and Catholic confessional organizations	Macro narrative	ca. 1500–1800	Macro narrative
New institutions for canonizing saints	Parigi, 2012	+	Canonization process of candidate saints	Macro narrative	1588–1642	Macro narrative

6.Definitions and Codes

The following definitions are guiding concepts used throughout the whole document and also serve to analyse interviews' data. Codes are organised in hierarchy categories from these definitions (See also Appendix 15). Unless otherwise stated, most of the definitions have been taken directly from the Oxford University Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2016):

Catholicism (doctrines): A set of beliefs held and taught by the Roman Catholic Church.

Christendom: The traditional portion of the world in which Christianity prevails or which is governed principally under Christian institutions (Johnson, et al. 2016).

Christian world communions: Official name since 1979 of what were previously termed world confessional families (WCFs), most of which are rooted primarily in Europe and North America, giving expression to the common heritages of worldwide groups of churches. Most have their own organised world confessional councils (confessional conciliarism). World total: (2000) 250 (Johnson, et al. 2016).

Christian 1: Followers of Jesus Christ as Lord, of all kinds, all traditions and confessions, and all degrees of commitment (Johnson, et al. 2016).

Christian 2: One who believes in, or professes or confesses Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour, or is assumed to believe in Jesus Christ; an adherent of Christianity (Johnson, et al. 2016).

Christianity: The whole worldwide body of Christian believers and their religion (Johnson, et al. 2016).

Christians: Followers of Jesus Christ, including: (a) Roman Catholics; (b) Protestants; (c) Orthodox; (d) Independents; and (e) unaffiliated (Johnson, et al. 2016). In Colombia, the term Christian refers mainly to Protestant denominations, as Catholics differentiate as “Roman Catholic Apostolic”.

Christopagans: Roman Catholics of Latin background, chiefly in Latin America, who combine traditional pre-Columbian ethnoreligion with popular Roman Catholic religiosity (images, shamans, incense, idols, nomenclature) (Johnson, et al. 2016).

Church coherence: Consistency of the real implemented actions with the main doctrines and teachings (mainly based in the Holy Scriptures) of a Church.

Church funding: Money provided, especially by an organization or government, for Church purposes.

Church structure: The arrangement of and relations between the parts or elements of an organization with its own clergy, buildings, and distinctive doctrines (Oxford University Press 2016).

Civil religion: “an implicit set of core values at the basis of life in society” (Roniger, 2016, p. 412)

Classical Pentecostals: Denominational Pentecostals of North American or European origin founded before the year 1945, of 2 types: Baptistic Pentecostals, and Holiness Pentecostals, both being Trinitarian (Johnson, et al. 2016)

Corporatism: “In a corporatist model, the government also maintains some control over the selection of corporate leaders and the articulation of their demands. Schmitter describes "state corporatism," the type of corporatism most common in authoritarian societies, as an arrangement in which governments create representative corporations and enter into relations with them, but do not depend on them for legitimacy and their ability to function” (Goldenziel, 2009, p. 188).

Corruption: Dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery. (Oxford University Press 2016). Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs (Transparency International 2016).

Crime: An action or omission, which constitutes an offence and is punishable by law (Oxford University Press 2016).

Dark Ages: The period in Western Europe between the fall of the Roman Empire and the high Middle Ages, circa 500–1100 ad. A period of supposed unenlightenment.

Dogma: A principle or set of principles laid down by an authority as incontrovertibly true (Oxford University Press 2016).

Ecumenism: The principle or aim of promoting unity among the world’s Christian Churches.

Education: The process of receiving or giving systematic instruction, especially at a school or university (Oxford University Press 2016).

Education (segregated): Education system that sets apart people from the rest or from each other; isolating or dividing.

Elitism: The belief that a society or system should be led by an elite (Oxford University Press 2016).

Generosity: The quality of being kind and showing a readiness to give more of something, especially money, than is strictly necessary or expected (Oxford University Press 2016).

Hegemony: Leadership or dominance, especially by one state or social group over others (Oxford University Press 2016).

History: The study of past events, particularly in human affairs (Oxford University Press 2016).

Idolatry: The worship of an image or representation of a god used as an object of worship (Oxford University Press 2016).

Inequality: lack of equality: Difference in status, rights, or opportunities (Oxford University Press 2016).

Jesuitical. Of or concerning the Jesuits. Dissembling or equivocating, in the manner once associated with Jesuits (Oxford University Press 2016). *Dissemble:* Conceal or disguise one's true feelings or beliefs (Oxford University Press 2016).

Legal ground for Religion: Laws relative to the practice of Religion.

Liberation theology: A movement in Christian theology, developed mainly by Latin American Roman Catholics, which attempts to address the problems of poverty and social injustice as well as spiritual matters (Oxford University Press 2016).

Masonry: The system and institutions of an international order established for mutual help and fellowship, which holds elaborate secret ceremonies. Members are typically professionals and businessmen (Oxford University Press, 2016)

Power distance: is the extent to which the less powerful members of organisations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect poweris distributed unequally. This represents inequality (more versus less) but defined from below, not from above. It suggests that a society's level of inequality is endorsed by the followers as much as by the leaders. Power and inequality, of course, are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that "all societies are unequal, but some are more unequal than others" (Hofstede 2001).

Progress: Forward or onward movement towards a destination (Oxford University Press 2016).

Prosperity: The state of being prosperous. (Prosperous: "doing well") (Oxford University Press 2017). Wealth, success, profitability, affluence, (good) fortune, ease, plenty, welfare, comfort, security, well-being.

Prosperity Gospel: the belief – closely associated with Pentecostalism – "that God grants material wealth and good health to Christians who have enough faith" (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 68).

Protestant or Roman Catholic historically countries: For this research, those concepts are defined according to religious tradition (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). See next Figure:




Figure 4. Locations of 65 Societies on Dimensions of Interpersonal Trust and Economic Development, by Cultural/Religious Tradition

Note: GNP per capita is measured by World Bank purchasing power parity estimates in 1995 U.S. dollars. Trust is correlated with GNP per capita at $r = .60$ ($p < .001$).

Figure 1: Religious tradition, interpersonal trust, and economic prosperity across different countries (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 36)

Moreover, a *historically Protestant country* may have one or several of the following characteristics: 1) The Protestant Reformation took place in its territory (for example, prominent figures of the Reformation such as Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Wycliffe, Tyndale, among others lived and influenced in that country). 2) The country received and protected Protestant pilgrims escaping from Roman Catholic persecution. 3) The country has had Protestant State religion in the *"International Patterns of State Religion"* (Barro, R. J. & McCleary, R. M. , 2005), or Protestantism has had a substantial direct influence in the country's national Constitution (*i.e.*

United States, Switzerland). 4) The country has at least 25% of its population adherent to any Protestant denomination (CIA 2016).

Protestant ethic: The view that a person's duty and responsibility is to achieve success through hard work and thrift. Origin: Translating German *die protestantische Ethik*, coined (1904) by the economist Max Weber in his thesis on the relationship between the teachings of Calvin and the rise of capitalism (Oxford University Press 2016).

Protestant evangelism, Pentecostalism: Relating to or denoting any Christian movements emphasising baptism in the Holy Spirit, evidenced by "speaking in tongues", prophecy, healing, and exorcism (Oxford University Press 2016).

Pentecostals are "Christians who belong to Pentecostal churches. While practices vary, Pentecostal worship services often involve experiences that believers consider "gifts of the Holy Spirit," such as divine healing, speaking in tongues and receiving direct revelations from God" (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 8).

Protestant Reformation: A 16th-century movement for the reform of abuses in the Roman Church ending in the establishment of the historical Reformed and Protestant Churches.

Protestant: A member or follower of any of the Western Christian Churches separated from the Roman Catholic Church under the principles of the Reformation, including the Baptist, Presbyterian, and Lutheran Churches (Oxford University Press 2016).

"'Protestants' is broadly used to refer to members of historical Protestant churches (e.g., Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, Lutherans or Presbyterians)" (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 7).

(Köhrsen, 2017, pp. 3-5) distinguishes among three streams of Protestantism: 1) Historic Protestantism; 2) Non-charismatic forms of evangelicalism; and 3) Charismatic forms of evangelicalism (Pentecostalism). For Köhrsen, many historic and non-charismatic Protestant communities have made a charismatic turn putting them today near the Pentecostal movement.

Religion: A particular system of faith and worship (Oxford University Press 2016).

Religious Conscience: A person's moral sense of right and wrong, viewed as acting as a guide to one's behaviour in Religion.

Religious freedom: Freedom of conscience: The right to follow one's own beliefs in matters of religion and morality (Oxford University Press 2016).

Religious persecution: Hostility and ill-treatment, especially because of religious beliefs; oppression.

Revolution: A forcible overthrow of a government or social order, in favour of a new system (Oxford University Press 2016).

Roman Catholic Church, Roman Catholicism, or Romanism: The part of the Christian Church, which acknowledges the Pope as its head, especially as it has developed since the Reformation.

Roman Catholic historically country: See Figure 1 (Historically Catholic country) (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 36). Moreover, a *historically Catholic country* may have one or several of the following characteristics: 1) The Protestant Reformation has not taken place in its territory (for example, prominent figures of the Reformation were persecuted and exiled, and their influence was diminished); 2) The political system and institutions have been interdependent with the Roman Catholic Church-State (for example, the Roman Catholic Church enjoys numerous privileges with the State above other belief systems); 3) The country has had Roman Catholic State religion in the *"International Patterns of State Religion"* (Barro, R. J. & McCleary, R. M. , 2005), or Roman Catholicism has had a substantial direct influence in the country's national Constitution (*i.e.* linked to a Concordat); 4) The country has at least 40% of its population adherent to the Roman Catholic Church (CIA 2016). (One cannot consider Protestant proportions on an equal basis as the Roman Catholic in the countries. Protestants have historically been an alternative option to the "business as usual" official *status quo* the Roman Church-State continuously reinforced over centuries).

Secret societies: Any of various oath-bound societies often devoted to brotherhood, moral discipline, and mutual assistance (Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2016).

Social emancipation: liberation: The fact or process of being set free from legal, social, or political restrictions (Oxford University Press 2016).

State – Church relations: The way in which the State and the Church are connected and has effects on or relevance to each other.

Syncretism: The amalgamation or attempted amalgamation of different religions, cultures, or schools of thought (Oxford University Press 2016).

Usury: The action or practice of lending money at unreasonably high rates of interest (Oxford University Press 2016).

APPENDICES TO CORRELATIONAL (QUANTITATIVE) ANALYSIS

7.QUAN Appendix A. Competiveness Variables (Models 1–5)

Note: This appendix does not include the entire set of variables (>70) analysed at the beginning but the selected ones after the data treatment in steps 1 and 2 (as well as the subcategories that were significant statistically).

Type of variable	Category (prosperity theory associated)	Sub-category	Variable	Code	Source	Original value rank	Description (taken mostly literally from the original sources)
Predictor variables of interest	Religion	Religious denomination (proportion in population)	Roman Catholic	Catholics (%)	(Johnson & Zurlo 2016)	% 0-100	Percentage of population in each country belonging to different religious affiliations.
			Protestant	Protestants (%)		% 0-100	
			Muslim	Muslims (%)		% 0-100	
			Orthodox	Orthodox (%)		% 0-100	
			Christianity: Other (% Adherents)	Other Christians	(Teorell, *et al.* 2017)	% 0-100	
		Societal religious norms	Global Restrictions on religion (GRI)	Restrictions	(Pew Global Religious Diversity 2014)	0-10	The GRI is a fine-grained measure created by adding the 20 items on a 0-to-10 metric, with zero indicating very low levels of government restrictions on religion and 10 indicating extremely high levels of restrictions. (Pew Research Center, January 2014, 'Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High')
			Social Hostilities (due to religion)	Hostilities		0-10	The Social Hostilities Index (SHI) measures acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organisations or groups in society. This includes religion-related armed conflict or terrorism, mob or sectarian violence, harassment over attire

Type of variable	Category (prosperity theory associated)	Sub-category	Variable	Code	Source	Original value rank	Description (taken mostly literally from the original sources)
Predictor variables of interest							for religious reasons or other religion-related intimidation or abuse. (Pew Research Center, January 2014, 'Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High')
			Interference of Religious Dogmas	Dogmas	(Teorell, *et al.* 2017)	1, - 10	The extent to what legal order and political institutions are defined without interference by religious dogmas? 1-10. 1. The state is theocratic. Religious dogmas define legal order and political institutions. 4. Secular and religious norms conflict with the basic constitution of the state or are forming a hybrid system. 7. The state is largely secular. However, religious dogmas have considerable influence on legal order and political institutions. 10. The state is secular. Religious dogmas have no noteworthy influence on legal order or political institutions. Bertelsmann Stiftung http://www.bti-project.org/index/ (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016), cited in Teorell, et al. 2017 p. 114)
			Freedom of Religion in Constitution	Constitution		1,2,96	Does the constitution provide for freedom of religion? 1. Yes 2. No 96. Other The Comparative Constitutions Project http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ (Elkins et al., 2014, cited in Teorell, et al. 2017 p. 122)
			Conflict intensity	Conflict		1, - 10	How serious are social, ethnic and religious conflicts? 1-10. 1. There are no violent incidents based on social, ethnic or religious differences. 4. There are only a few violent incidents. Radical political actors have limited success in mobilising along existing cleavages. Society and the political elite, however, are divided along social, ethnic or religious lines. 7. There are violent incidents. Mobilized groups and protest movements dominate politics. Society and the political elite are deeply split into social classes, ethnic or religious

Type of variable	Category (prosperity theory associated)	Sub-category	Variable	Code	Source	Original value rank	Description (taken mostly literally from the original sources)
Predictor variables of interest							communities. 10. There is civil war or a widespread violent conflict based on social, ethnic or religious differences. Bertelsmann Stiftung http://www.bti-project.org/index/ (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016, cited in Teorell, et al. 2017 p. 107)
	Institutions	State religion	Muslim	MUSLIM (S.R)	(Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. M. 2005)	0,1	State monopoly over religion has probably been the single most important form of state monopoly in existence. The choice of a state religion is a political calculus that involves interactions between the government and the religion sector (Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. M. 2005). The key aspect of a state religion is its promotion of the monopoly position of the favoured religion, partly through limitations on entry and partly through subsidies (Smith [1791, Book V, Article III], cited in Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. M. 2005). They categorise official state religion as an all-or-nothing choice. The data is taken for the year 2000. This variable can also be part of the societal religious norms subcategory and along with Christian denomination, being part of the predictor variable of interest. However, for practical reasons, this variable appears only here in category "institutions".
			Catholic	CATHOLIC (S.R)		0,1	
			Protestant	PROTESTANT (S.R)		0,1	
		Legal origin	English Common Law	ENGLISH (L.O.)	(La Porta, *et al.* 1999)	0,1	It identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each country. There are five possible origins: (1) English Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; (3) German Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code; and (5) Socialist/Communist laws. These traditions were developed in England, France, Germany, Scandinavia, and the Soviet Union but then spread through the world through conquest, colonisation, imitation, and voluntary adoption. Source: (La Porta et al. 1998, 1999)
			French Commercial Code	FRENCH (L.O.)		0,1	
			Socialist/Communist Laws	SOCIALIST (L.O.)		0,1	
			German Commercial Code	GERMAN (L.O.)		0,1	

Type of variable	Category (prosperity theory associated)	Sub-category	Variable	Code	Source	Original value rank	Description (taken mostly literally from the original sources)
			Scandinavian Commercial Code	SCANDINAVIAN (L.O.)		0,1	
Other Predictor variables	Environment and geography		Latitude (average)	Latitude	(Teorell, *et al.* 2017)	0-1	The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values between 0 and 1). P. 446
			Environment Performance Index	EPI	(Hsu, *et al.* 2016)	0-100	The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) ranks countries' performance on high-priority environmental issues in two areas: protection of human health and protection of ecosystems. Within these two policy objectives, the EPI scores national performance in nine issue areas comprised of more than 20 indicators (Hsu, et al. 2016)
	Cultural determinants (other than religion)	Main Languages fractionalisation	English	English (lang)	(CIA 2016)	% 0-100	The share of main native speakers in the population
			French	French (lang)		% 0-100	
			Spanish	Spanish (lang)		% 0-100	
			Russian	Russian (lang)		% 0-100	
			German	German (lang)		% 0-100	
			Portuguese	Portug. (lang)		% 0-100	
			Italian	Italian (lang)		% 0-100	
		Main Ethnical fractionalisation	Caucasian	Caucasian (ethn)		% 0-100	The proportion of ethnicities in population
			Latino	Latino (ethn)		% 0-100	
			African	African (ethn)		% 0-100	
Other Predictor variables			Amerindian	Amerind. (ethn)		% 0-100	

Type of variable	Category (prosperity theory associated)	Sub-category	Variable	Code	Source	Original value rank	Description (taken mostly literally from the original sources)
Other Predictor variables			Mestizo	Mestizo (ethn)		% 0-100	
			Mulatto	Mulatto (ethn)		% 0-100	
			Asian	Asian (ethn)		% 0-100	
Criterion Variable	Prosperity		Global Competitive-ness Index (GCI)	Competitive-ness	(World Econo-mic Forum 2016)	(1–7)	Competitiveness is defined as the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine a country's level of productivity. The level of productivity, in turn, sets the level of prosperity that can be reached by an economy. The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) is a comprehensive framework that measures the microeconomic and macroeconomic foundations of national competitiveness, grouped into 12 categories (World Economic Forum 2016). The twelve categories that comprise this index are institutions, technological readiness, innovation, higher education and training, health and primary education, business sophistication, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, labour market efficiency, market size, financial market development, and goods market efficiency. (World Economic Forum 2016).

8. QUAN Appendix B. Corruption Variables (Model 6)

Type of variable	Category (corruption theory associated)	Subcategory	Variable	Code	Source	Original value rank	Description (taken mostly literally from the original sources)
Predictor variables of interest	Religion	Christian denomination (proportion in population)	Roman Catholic	CATH	(Johnson & Zurlo 2016)	% 0-100	Percentage of population in each country belonging to different religious affiliations.
			Protestant	PROT		% 0-100	
		Main Religion fractionalisation		RELF	Alesina *et al.* (2003)	0-1	Average value of five different indices of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation. Its value ranges from 0 to 1. The five component indices are: (1) index of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation in 1960, which measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group (the index is based on the number and size of population groups as distinguished by their ethnic and linguistic status); (2) probability of two randomly selected individuals speaking different languages; (3) probability of two randomly selected individuals do not speak the same language; (4) per cent of the population not speaking the official language; and (5) per cent of the population not speaking the most widely used language. Original Sources: Easterly and Levine, 1997. The sources of the components of the average index are (1) Atlas Narodov Mira, 1964; (2)Muller, 1964; (3) Roberts, 1962; (4) and (5) Gunnemark, 1991. (cited in Alesina et al. (2003) p.31
Other Predictor variables	Cultural determinants (other than religion)	Main Languages fractionalisation		LINGF			
		Main Ethnical fractionalisation		ETHF			
	Economic determinants	Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita		GDPPC	(World Bank 2016)	US$	GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)

Type of variable	Category (corruption theory associated)	Subcategory	Variable	Code	Source	Original value rank	Description (taken mostly literally from the original sources)
Other Predictor variables		Index of Economic Freedom		IEF	(The Heritage Foundation 2017)	0-100	The Index of Economic Freedom takes a comprehensive view of economic freedom. Some of the aspects of economic freedom that are evaluated are concerned with a country's interactions with the rest of the world. The 12 aspects of economic freedom measured in the Index may be grouped into four broad categories: • The rule of law (property rights, judicial effectiveness, and government integrity); • Government size (tax burden, government spending, and fiscal health); • Regulatory efficiency (business freedom, labour freedom, and monetary freedom); and • Market openness (trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom) (Miller & Kim, 2017) http://www.heritage.org/index
	Political determinants	Political rights and civil liberties		PRCL	(Freedom House 2016)	0-100	Index of political rights. Higher ratings indicate countries that come closer "to the ideals suggested by the checklist questions of: (1) free and fair elections; (2) those elected rule; (3) there are competitive parties or other competitive political groupings; (4) the opposition has an important role and power; and (5) the entities have self-determination or an extremely high degree of autonomy." Source: Freedom House, 2016.
		Political stability		STABIL	(Kaufman *et al.* 2010)	0-100	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010).
Criterion Variable	Corruption Perception Index (CPI)			CORRUPTION	(Transparency International 2016)	0-100	The Corruption Perceptions Index developed by Transparency International (2016), is a composite index drawing on corruption indices of 11 independent institutions (including, among others, the World Economic Forum, the European Intelligence Unit, and the World Bank). The index summarises perceptions of business people and country experts around the world, both residents and expatriates. The CPI values range from 0 to 100. Lower values indicate a higher degree of corruption (i.e. a lower degree of transparency).

9. QUAN Appendix C. Countries of Analysis and Key Variable Data

			Predictor variables (x) / Causal Conditions: Theories of prosperity										Criterion variables (y) / Outcome:	
			Percentage of population in each country belonging to main religious affiliations in Europe and the Americas (Johnson & Zurlo 2016).							State religion in 2000 (Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. M. 2005)	Legal Origin (La Porta et al. 1999)	EPI (Hsu, et al. 2016)	Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum 2016)	Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Transparency International 2016)
Countries	Continent	Code	Protestant	Catholic	Orthodox	Muslim	Indep	Agnostic	Atheist					
Albania	EUROPE	ALB	0%	18%	18%	61%	2%	2%	0%	Muslim	Socialist	74.38	4.06	39
Belarus	EUROPE	BLR	3%	11%	58%	0%	2%	20%	3%	none	Socialist	82.3	No data*	40
Moldova, Republic of	EUROPE	MDA	2%	0%	94%	0%	1%	2%	0%	none	Socialist	76.69	3.86	30
Austria	EUROPE	AUT	5%	64%	3%	6%	1%	16%	2%	none	German	86.64	5.22	75
Belgium	EUROPE	BEL	1%	65%	1%	6%	1%	23%	2%	none	French	80.15	5.25	77
Bulgaria	EUROPE	BGR	2%	1%	82%	12%	1%	3%	1%	none	Socialist	83.4	4.44	41
Croatia	EUROPE	HRV	1%	84%	5%	2%	1%	3%	1%	Catholic	Socialist	86.98	4.15	49
Czech Republic	EUROPE	CZE	2%	29%	0%	0%	3%	41%	5%	none	Socialist	84.67	4.72	55
Denmark	EUROPE	DNK	80%	1%	0%	5%	1%	11%	2%	Protestant	Scandinavian	89.21	5.35	90
Estonia	EUROPE	EST	19%	1%	13%	0%	5%	51%	4%	none	Socialist	88.59	4.78	70
Finland	EUROPE	FIN	74%	0%	1%	1%	1%	17%	2%	Protestant	Scandinavian	90.68	5.44	89
France	EUROPE	FRA	2%	59%	1%	9%	3%	20%	4%	none	French	88.2	5.20	69

			Predictor variables (x) / Causal Conditions: Theories of prosperity										Criterion variables (y) / Outcome:	
			Percentage of population in each country belonging to main religious affiliations in Europe and the Americas (Johnson & Zurlo 2016).							State religion in 2000 (Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. M. 2005)	Legal Origin (La Porta et al. 1999)	EPI (Hsu, et al. 2016)	Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum 2016)	Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Transparency International 2016)
Countries	Continent	Code	Protestant	Catholic	Orthodox	Muslim	Indep	Agnostic	Atheist					
Germany	EUROPE	DEU	32%	30%	2%	5%	1%	24%	3%	none	German	84.26	5.57	81
Greece	EUROPE	GRC	0%	1%	89%	5%	1%	4%	0%	none	French	85.81	4.00	44
Hungary	EUROPE	HUN	25%	59%	2%	0%	2%	8%	4%	none	Socialist	84.6	4.20	48
Ireland	EUROPE	IRL	3%	76%	0%	1%	1%	6%	0%	Catholic	English	86.6	5.18	73
Italy	EUROPE	ITA	0%	78%	0%	3%	2%	13%	4%	Catholic	French	84.48	4.50	47
Latvia	EUROPE	LVA	16%	21%	40%	0%	1%	19%	4%	none	Socialist	85.71	4.45	57
Lithuania	EUROPE	LTU	1%	79%	5%	0%	1%	10%	1%	Catholic	Socialist	85.49	4.60	59
Macedonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of	EUROPE	MKD	1%	1%	63%	33%	1%	3%	0%	none	Socialist	78.02	4.23	37
Norway	EUROPE	NOR	84%	2%	0%	3%	1%	7%	1%	Protestant	Scandinavian	86.9	5.44	85
Poland	EUROPE	POL	0%	89%	1%	0%	1%	4%	0%	none	Socialist	81.26	4.56	62
Portugal	EUROPE	PRT	1%	86%	0%	0%	4%	6%	1%	Catholic	French	88.63	4.48	62
Russian Federation	EUROPE	RUS	1%	1%	79%	12%	2%	4%	1%	none	Socialist	83.52	4.51	29
Slovakia	EUROPE	SVK	9%	75%	1%	0%	1%	11%	3%	none	Socialist	85.42	4.28	51
Slovenia	EUROPE	SVN	2%	77%	4%	2%	1%	8%	2%	Catholic	Socialist	88.98	4.39	61

			Predictor variables (x) / Causal Conditions: Theories of prosperity										Criterion variables (y) / Outcome:	
			Percentage of population in each country belonging to main religious affiliations in Europe and the Americas (Johnson & Zurlo 2016).							State religion in 2000 (Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. M. 2005)	Legal Origin (La Porta et al. 1999)	EPI (Hsu, et al. 2016)	Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum 2016)	Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Transparency International 2016)
Countries	Continent	Code	Protestant	Catholic	Orthodox	Muslim	Indep	Agnostic	Atheist					
Spain	EUROPE	ESP	0%	87%	0%	3%	1%	8%	2%	Catholic	French	88.91	4.68	58
Sweden	EUROPE	SWE	58%	2%	1%	6%	1%	20%	11%	Protestant	Scandinavian	90.43	5.53	88
Switzerland	EUROPE	CHE	30%	43%	2%	6%	3%	14%	1%	none	German	86.93	5.81	86
Ukraine	EUROPE	UKR	2%	11%	71%	2%	3%	10%	2%	none	Socialist	79.69	4.00	29
Bosnia and Herzegovina	EUROPE	BIH	0%	12%	37%	48%	0%	3%	1%	none	Socialist	63.28	3.80	39
Iceland	EUROPE	ISL	79%	4%	0%	0%	7%	4%	0%	Protestant	Scandinavian	90.51	4.96	78
Netherlands	EUROPE	NLD	17%	26%	0%	6%	3%	29%	2%	none	French	82.03	5.57	83
United Kingdom	EUROPE	GBR	45%	9%	1%	4%	5%	20%	1%	Protestant	English	87.38	5.49	81
Luxembourg	EUROPE	LUX	2%	77%	0%	2%	1%	16%	2%	Catholic	French	86.58	5.20	81
Montenegro	EUROPE	MNE	3%	3%	71%	17%	2%	4%	1%	none	none	78.89	4.05	45
Serbia	EUROPE	SRB	1%	6%	84%	7%	2%	3%	1%	none	none	78.67	3.97	42
Romania	EUROPE	ROU	10%	9%	93%	0%	1%	1%	0%	none	Socialist	83.24	4.30	48
Malta	EUROPE	MLT	0%	92%	0%	0%	1%	2%	0%	Catholic	French	88.48	4.52	55
Dominican Republic	NORTH AM	DOM	11%	81%	0%	0%	5%	2%	0%	Catholic	French	75.32	3.94	31

			Predictor variables (x) / Causal Conditions: Theories of prosperity										Criterion variables (y) / Outcome:	
			Percentage of population in each country belonging to main religious affiliations in Europe and the Americas (Johnson & Zurlo 2016).							State religion in 2000 (Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. M. 2005)	Legal Origin (La Porta et al. 1999)	EPI (Hsu, et al. 2016)	Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum 2016)	Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Transparency International 2016)
Countries	Continent	Code	Protestant	Catholic	Orthodox	Muslim	Indep	Agnostic	Atheist					
Honduras	NORTH AM	HND	18%	74%	0%	0%	8%	2%	0%	Catholic	French	69.64	3.98	30
Mexico	NORTH AM	MEX	4%	88%	0%	0%	6%	3%	0%	none	French	73.59	4.41	30
Costa Rica	NORTH AM	CRI	11%	83%	0%	0%	8%	3%	0%	Catholic	French	80.03	4.41	58
El Salvador	NORTH AM	SLV	17%	76%	0%	0%	21%	2%	0%	Catholic	French	68.07	3.81	36
Guatemala	NORTH AM	GTM	15%	83%	1%	0%	12%	1%	0%	Catholic	French	69.64	4.08	28
Jamaica	NORTH AM	JAM	40%	2%	0%	0%	12%	4%	0%	none	English	77.02	4.13	39
Canada	NORTH AM	CAN	11%	42%	3%	3%	4%	18%	3%	none	English	85.06	5.27	82
Nicaragua	NORTH AM	NIC	23%	86%	0%	0%	10%	3%	0%	none	French	64.19	3.81	26
Panama	NORTH AM	PAN	15%	69%	0%	1%	6%	4%	1%	Catholic	French	78	4.51	38
Trinidad and Tobago	NORTH AM	TTO	28%	28%	1%	6%	6%	2%	0%	none	English	74.34	3.93	35
United States	NORTH AM	USA	18%	23%	2%	1%	22%	15%	1%	none	English	84.72	5.70	74
Haiti	NORTH AM	HTI	22%	66%	0%	0%	6%	3%	0%	Catholic	French	43.28	No data*	20
Cuba	NORTH AM	CUB	4%	53%	0%	0%	4%	17%	4%	Catholic	Socialist	79.04	No data*	47

			Predictor variables (x) / Causal Conditions: Theories of prosperity										Criterion variables (y) / Outcome:	
			Percentage of population in each country belonging to main religious affiliations in Europe and the Americas (Johnson & Zurlo 2016).							State religion in 2000 (Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. M. 2005)	Legal Origin (La Porta et al. 1999)	EPI (Hsu, et al. 2016)	Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum 2016)	Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Transparency International 2016)
Countries	Continent	Code	Protestant	Catholic	Orthodox	Muslim	Indep	Agnostic	Atheist					
Brazil	SOUTH AM	BRA	17%	74%	0%	0%	12%	3%	0%	Catholic	French	78.9	4.06	40
Colombia	SOUTH AM	COL	3%	88%	0%	0%	4%	2%	0%	Catholic	French	75.93	4.30	37
Ecuador	SOUTH AM	ECU	4%	86%	0%	0%	5%	3%	0%	none	French	66.58	3.96	31
Peru	SOUTH AM	PER	6%	87%	0%	0%	8%	1%	0%	Catholic	French	72.95	4.23	35
Argentina	SOUTH AM	ARG	6%	82%	0%	2%	6%	5%	1%	Catholic	French	79.84	3.81	36
Bolivia	SOUTH AM	BOL	11%	88%	0%	0%	6%	2%	0%	Catholic	French	71.09	3.54	33
Paraguay	SOUTH AM	PRY	4%	89%	0%	0%	8%	2%	0%	Catholic	French	70.36	3.65	30
Uruguay	SOUTH AM	URY	3%	56%	1%	0%	7%	29%	7%	none	French	73.98	4.17	71
Guyana	SOUTH AM	GUY	39%	8%	1%	8%	12%	2%	1%	none	English	71.14	No data*	34
Venezuela	SOUTH AM	VEN	6%	83%	0%	0%	5%	4%	0%	Catholic	French	76.23	3.27	17
Chile	SOUTH AM	CHL	3%	71%	2%	0%	29%	8%	2%	Catholic	French	77.67	4.64	66
Suriname	SOUTH AM	SUR	17%	30%	0%	16%	3%	5%	0%	none	French	68.58	No data*	45

Note: In the case of the competitiveness analysis (Models 1-5), observations marked with an asterisk (*) were not included due to inexistent data.

10. QCA Appendix A. QCA Data Matrix of Pre-Calibration Raw Data Values

ISO	countries	continent	con-cor	epi	ethnicity	lan_ger	lan_rom	lan_rus	st_muslim	st_catholl	st_protest	dom_ort	dom_musl	dom_ag_at	dom_cat	dom_prot	lo_french	lo_ger_eng	lo_sociall	compeeti	corruption
ALB	Albania	EUROPE	2	74.38	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.18	0.61	1.61	0.18	0	0	0	1	4.06	39
ARG	Argentina	SOUTH AM	4	79.84	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.02	0.02	0.82	0.06	1	0	0	3.81	36
AUT	Austria	EUROPE	4	86.64	0	0.886	0	0	0	0	0	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.64	0.05	0	1	0	5.22	75
BEL	Belgium	EUROPE	1	80.15	11	0.05	0.4	0	0	0	0	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.65	0.01	1	0	0	5.25	77
BGR	Bulgaria	EUROPE	1	83.4	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.82	0.12	0.12	0.01	0.02	0	0	1	4.44	41
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	EUROPE	1	63.28	48.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.37	0.48	0.48	0.12	0	0	0	1	3.80	39
BLR	Belarus	EUROPE	1	82.3	3.2	0	0	0.7	0	0	0	0.58	0	0	0.11	0.03	0	0	1	NA	40
BOL	Bolivia	SOUTH AM	4	71.09	85	0	0.607	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.88	0.11	1	0	0	3.54	33
BRA	Brazil	SOUTH AM	3	78.9	46.3	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.74	0.17	1	0	0	4.06	40
CAN	Canada	NORTH AM	1	85.06	34	0.6	0.246	0	0	0	0	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.42	0.11	0	1	0	5.27	82
COL	Colombia	SOUTH AM	4	75.93	80	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.88	0.03	1	0	0	4.30	37
CRI	Costa Rica	CENTRAL AM	4	80.03	6	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.83	0.11	1	0	0	4.41	58
CUB	Cuba	CENTRAL AM	1	79.04	34.9	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.53	0.04	0	0	1	NA	47
CZE	Czech Republic	EUROPE	1	84.67	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.29	0.02	0	0	1	4.72	55

ISO	countries	continent	con-cor	epi	ethnicity	lan_ger	lan_rom	lan_rus	st_muslim	st_catholl	st_protest	dom_ort	dom_musl	dom_ag_at	dom_cat	dom_prot	lo_french	lo_ger_eng	lo_soc ial	comp eti	corru ption
DEU	Germany	EUROPE	4	84.26	6.1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.3	0.32	0	1	0	5.57	81
DNK	Denmark	EUROPE	1	89.21	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.8	0	0	0	5.35	90
DOM	Dominican Republic	CENTRAL AM	4	75.32	84	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.81	0.11	1	0	0	3.94	31
ECU	Ecuador	SOUTH AM	3	66.58	93	0	0.93	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.86	0.04	1	0	0	3.96	31
ESP	Spain	EUROPE	4	88.91	0	0	0.74	0	0	1	0	0	0.03	0.03	0.87	0	1	0	0	4.68	58
EST	Estonia	EUROPE	1	88.59	1.6	0	0	0.3	0	0	0	0.13	0	0	0.01	0.19	0	0	1	4.78	70
FIN	Finland	EUROPE	1	90.68	0	0	0	0.01	0	0	1	0.01	0.01	0.01	0	0.74	0	0	0	5.44	89
FRA	France	EUROPE	3	88.2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.01	0.09	0.09	0.59	0.02	1	0	0	5.20	69
GBR	United Kingdom	EUROPE	1	87.38	7.9	0.79	0.129	0	0	0	1	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.09	0.45	0	1	0	5.49	81
GRC	Greece	EUROPE	1	85.81	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.89	0.05	0.05	0.01	0	1	0	0	4.00	44
GTM	Guatemala	CENTRAL AM	2	69.64	40.6	0	0.6	0	0	1	0	0.01	0	0	0.83	0.15	1	0	0	4.08	28
GUY	Guyana	SOUTH AM	1	71.14	100	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.01	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.39	0	1	0	NA	34
HND	Honduras	CENTRAL AM	1	69.64	9	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.74	0.18	1	0	0	3.98	30
HRV	Croatia	EUROPE	4	86.98	5.9	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.84	0.01	0	0	1	4.15	49
HTI	Haiti	CENTRAL AM	4	43.28	100	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.22	1	0	0	NA	20
HUN	Hungary	EUROPE	3	84.6	5.8	0.272	0.012	0.02	0	0	0	0.02	0	0	0.59	0.25	0	0	1	4.20	48
CHE	Switzerland	EUROPE	1	86.93	6	0.64	0.362	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.43	0.3	0	1	0	5.81	86
CHL	Chile	SOUTH AM	1	77.67	100	0.102	0.995	0	0	1	0	0.02	0	0	0.71	0.03	1	0	0	4.64	66
IRL	Ireland	EUROPE	1	86.6	11.5	0.613	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.01	0.01	0.76	0.03	0	1	0	5.18	73
ISL	Iceland	EUROPE	1	90.51	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0.04	0.79	0	0	0	4.96	78
ITA	Italy	EUROPE	4	84.48	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.03	0.03	0.78	0	1	0	0	4.50	47
JAM	Jamaica	CENTRAL AM	1	77.02	100	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.4	0	1	0	4.13	39
LTU	Lithuania	EUROPE	3	85.49	2.3	0	0	0.08	0	1	0	0.05	0	0	0.79	0.01	0	0	1	4.60	59
LUX	Luxembou	EUROPE	1	86.58	5.2	0.011	0.065	0	0	1	0	0	0.02	0.02	0.77	0.02	1	0	0	5.20	81

ISO	countries	continent	con-cor	epi	ethnicity	lan_ger	lan_rom	lan_rus	st_muslim	st_catholl	st_protest	dom_ort	dom_musl	dom_ag_at	dom_cat	dom_prot	lo_french	lo_ger_eng	lo_soc ial	competi	corruption
	rg																				
LVA	Latvia	EUROPE	3	85.71	3.1	0	0	0.34	0	0	0	0.4	0	0	0.21	0.16	0	0	1	4.45	57
MDA	Moldova, Republic of	EUROPE	1	76.69	1.3	0	0	0.16	0	0	0	0.94	0	0	0	0.02	0	0	1	3.86	30
MEX	Mexico	CENTRAL AM	3	73.59	91	0	0.927	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.88	0.04	1	0	0	4.41	30
MKD	Macedonia	EUROPE	1	78.02	2.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.63	0.33	0.33	0.01	0.01	0	0	1	4.23	37
MLT	Malta	EUROPE	3	88.48	0	0.06	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.92	0	1	0	0	4.52	55
MNE	Montenegro	EUROPE	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.33	0.33	0	0	4.05	45.0	NA
NIC	Nicaragua	CENTRAL AM	1	64.19	83	0	0.953	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.86	0.23	1	0	0	3.81	26
NLD	Netherlands	EUROPE	1	82.03	4.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.06	0.06	0.26	0.17	1	0	0	5.57	83
NOR	Norway	EUROPE	1	86.9	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.84	0	0	0	5.44	85
PAN	Panama	CENTRAL AM	1	78	90	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.01	0.01	0.69	0.15	1	0	0	4.51	38
PER	Peru	SOUTH AM	3	72.95	85	0	0.84	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.87	0.06	1	0	0	4.23	35
POL	Poland	EUROPE	4	81.26	2.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.01	0	0	0.89	0	0	0	1	4.56	62
PRT	Portugal	EUROPE	4	88.63	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.86	0.01	1	0	0	4.48	62
PRY	Paraguay	SOUTH AM	2	70.36	100	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.89	0.04	1	0	0	3.65	30
ROU	Romania	EUROPE	1	83.24	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.93	0	0	0.09	0.1	0	0	1	4.30	48
RUS	Russian Federation	EUROPE	1	83.52	12.1	0	0	0.86	0	0	0	0.79	0.12	0.12	0.01	0.01	0	0	1	4.51	29
SLV	El Salvador	CENTRAL AM	3	68.07	91	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.76	0.17	1	0	0	3.81	36
SRB	Serbia	EUROPE	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.33	0	0	0	3.97	42.0	NA
SUR	Suriname	SOUTH AM	1	68.58	99	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.16	0.16	0.3	0.17	1	0	0	NA	45
SVK	Slovakia	EUROPE	3	85.42	1.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.01	0	0	0.75	0.09	0	0	1	4.28	51
SVN	Slovenia	EUROPE	2	88.98	12	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.77	0.02	0	0	1	4.39	61

ISO	countries	continent	con-cor	epi	ethnicity	lan_ger	lan_rom	lan_rus	st_muslim	st_catholl	st_protest	dom_ort	dom_musl	dom_ag_at	dom_cat	dom_prot	lo_french	lo_ger_eng	lo_soc ial	competi	corruption
SWE	Sweden	EUROPE	1	90.43	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.58	0	0	0	5.53	88
TTO	Trinidad and Tobago	CENTRAL AM	1	74.34	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.28	0.28	0	1	0	3.93	35
UKR	Ukraine	EUROPE	1	79.69	1.8	0	0	0.3	0	0	0	0.71	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.02	0	0	1	4.00	29
URY	Uruguay	SOUTH AM	1	73.98	12	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.01	0	0	0.56	0.03	1	0	0	4.17	71
USA	United States	NORTH AM	1	84.72	20.04	0.792	0.129	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.23	0.18	0	1	0	5.70	74
VEN	Venezuela	SOUTH AM	4	76.23	10	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.83	0.06	1	0	0	3.27	17

11. QCA Appendix B. Data Matrix with Calibrated Conditions

ISO	countries	continent	con-cor	epi	ethnicity	lan_rom	lan_rus	st_muslim	st_cathol	st_protest	dom_ort	dom_musl	dom_ag_at	dom_cat	dom_prot	lo_french	lo_social	lo_eng	lo_ger	lan_ger	lan_eng	competi	corruption
ALB	Albania	EUROPE	0.66	0.33	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.33	0.66	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33
ARG	Argentina	SOUTH AM	1	0.33	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.66	0	0	1	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33
AUT	Austria	EUROPE	1	0.66	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.33	0.33	0.66	0.33	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
BEL	Belgium	EUROPE	0	0.66	0.33	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33	0.66	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
BGR	Bulgaria	EUROPE	0	0.66	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33	0	0.33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	EUROPE	0	0	0.66	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.66	0.66	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33
BLR	Belarus	EUROPE	0	0.66	0	0	1	0	0	0	0.33	0	0	0	0.33	0	1	0	0	0	0	NA	0.33
BOL	Bolivia	SOUTH AM	1	0.33	1	0.66	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.66	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.33
BRA	Brazil	SOUTH AM	0.66	0.33	0.66	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.66	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33
CAN	Canada	NORTH AM	0	0.66	0.66	0.33	0	0	0	0	0.33	0	0	0.33	0.66	0	0	1	0	0	0.66	1	1
COL	Colombia	SOUTH AM	1	0.33	0.66	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33
CRI	Costa Rica	CENTRAL AM	1	0.66	0.33	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.66	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.66
CUB	Cuba	CENTRAL AM	0	0.33	0.66	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.33	0	1	0	0	0	0	NA	0.66
CZE	Czech Republic	EUROPE	0	0.66	0.66	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.33	0.33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.66
DEU	Germany	EUROPE	1	0.66	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.66	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
DNK	Denmark	EUROPE	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.33	0.33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DOM	Dominican Republic	CENTRAL AM	1	0.33	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.66	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33
ECU	Ecuador	SOUTH AM	0.66	0.33	1	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0	0	1	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33
ESP	Spain	EUROPE	1	1	0	0.66	0	0	1	0	0.33	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.66
EST	Estonia	EUROPE	0	1	0	0	0.66	0	0	0	0.66	0	0	0	0.66	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.66
FIN	Finland	EUROPE	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
FRA	France	EUROPE	0.66	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33	0.66	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.66

ISO	countries	continent	con-cor	epi	ethnicity	lan_rom	lan_rus	st_muslim	st_cathol	st_protest	dom_ort	dom_musl	dom_ag_at	dom_cat	dom_prot	lo_french	lo_social	lo_eng	lo_ger	lan_ger	lan_eng	competi	corruption
GBR	United Kingdom	EUROPE	0	0.66	0.33	0.33	0	0	0	1	0	0.33	0.33	0	0.66	0	0	1	0	0	0.66	1	1
GRC	Greece	EUROPE	0	0.66	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.33	0.33	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33
GTM	Guatemala	CENTRAL AM	0.66	0.33	0.66	0.66	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.66	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0
GUY	Guyana	SOUTH AM	0	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33	0.33	0	0.66	0	0	1	0	0	1	NA	0.33
HND	Honduras	CENTRAL AM	0	0.33	0.33	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.66	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0
HRV	Croatia	EUROPE	1	0.66	0.33	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.66
HTI	Haiti	CENTRAL AM	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.66	1	0	0	0	0	0	NA	0
HUN	Hungary	EUROPE	0.66	0.66	0.33	0	0.33	0	0	0	0.66	0	0	0.66	0.66	0	1	0	0	0.66	0.33	0.33	0.66
CHE	Switzerland	EUROPE	0	0.66	0.33	0.33	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.66	0	0	0	1	0.66	0.33	1	1
CHL	Chile	SOUTH AM	0	0.33	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.66	0.66
IRL	Ireland	EUROPE	0	0.66	0.33	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.33	0	0	1	0	0	0.66	0.66	1
ISL	Iceland	EUROPE	0	1	0.33	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.66	1
ITA	Italy	EUROPE	1	0.66	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.66
JAM	Jamaica	CENTRAL AM	0	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0.66	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.33	0.33
LTU	Lithuania	EUROPE	0.66	0.66	0	0	0.33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.66
LUX	Luxembourg	EUROPE	0	0.66	0.33	0.33	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
LVA	Latvia	EUROPE	0.66	0.66	0	0	0.66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.66	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.66
MDA	Moldova, Republic of	EUROPE	0	0.33	0	0	0.66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0
MEX	Mexico	CENTRAL AM	0.66	0.33	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0
MKD	Macedonia	EUROPE	0	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33
MLT	Malta	EUROPE	0.66	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.66	0.66
MNE	Montenegro	EUROPE	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.66	1	0.33	0	0	0	NA	NA	0	0	NA	0.33
NIC	Nicaragua	CENTRAL AM	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.66	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0
NLD	Netherlands	EUROPE	0	0.66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.66	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
NOR	Norway	EUROPE	0	0.66	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PAN	Panama	CENTRA	0	0.33	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.66	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.33

ISO	countries	continent	con-cor	epi	ethnicity	lan_rom	lan_rus	st_muslim	st_cathol	st_protest	dom_ort	dom_musl	dom_ag_at	dom_cat	dom_prot	lo_french	lo_social	lo_eng	lo_ger	lan_ger	lan_eng	competi	corruption
		L AM																					
PER	Peru	SOUTH AM	0.66	0.33	1	0.66	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33
POL	Poland	EUROPE	1	0.66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.66
PRT	Portugal	EUROPE	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.66
PRY	Paraguay	SOUTH AM	0.66	0.33	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ROU	Romania	EUROPE	0	0.66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.66
RUS	Russian Federation	EUROPE	0	0.66	0.33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0
SLV	El Salvador	CENTRA L AM	0.66	0.33	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.66	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33
SRB	Serbia	EUROPE	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.66	1	0.33	0	0	0	NA	NA	0	0	NA	0.33
SUR	Suriname	SOUTH AM	0	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.66	1	0	0	0	0	0	NA	0.33
SVK	Slovakia	EUROPE	0.66	0.66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.66
SVN	Slovenia	EUROPE	0.66	1	0.33	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.66
SWE	Sweden	EUROPE	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.33	0.33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TTO	Trinidad and Tobago	CENTRA L AM	0	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.66	0	0	1	0	0	0	0.33	0.33
UKR	Ukraine	EUROPE	0	0.33	0	0	0.66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.33	0
URY	Uruguay	SOUTH AM	0	0.33	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	1
USA	United States	NORTH AM	0	0.66	0.66	0.33	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.33	0.66	0	0	1	0	0	0.66	1	1
VEN	Venezuela	SOUTH AM	1	0.33	0.33	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0.33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

12.QCA Appendix C. Calibration Thresholds and Description of Conditions and Outcome According to Indicators, Categories and Sources of Origin

Type of variable	Category (prosperity theory associated)	Subcategory	Indicator	Code	Source	Original value rank	Qualitative Anchors				Description (taken mostly literally from the original sources)
							0	0.33	0.66	1	
Conditions	Religion	Christian denomination (proportion in population)	Roman Catholic	DOM_CAT	(Johnson & Zurlo 2016)	% 0-100	<=0.2	0.5	0.8	>0.8	Percentage of population in each country belonging to different religious affiliations.
			Protestant	DOM_PROT		% 0-100	<=0.01	0.1	0.5	>0.5	
			Orthodox	DOM_ORT		% 0-100	<=0.03	0.4	0.8	>0.8	
			Muslim	DOM_MUSL		% 0-100	<=0.03	0.47	>0.47	NA	
			Atheists & Agnostics	DOM_AG_AT		% 0-100	<=0.03	0.33	0.5	>0.5	
	Institutions	Agreements with the Vatican	Concordats	CONCOR	(Corral and Petschen, 2004)	(1–4)	0	NA	3	4	The condition "Concordats" was created adopting the information about the status of the countries' agreements with the Vatican contained in (Corral & Petschen, 2004): 1. Null or apparent low influence of Vatican/Roman Catholic Church in State affairs. 2. Some diplomatic relations with the Vatican/Roman Catholic Church might be present. 3. Agreements and interference of the

Type of variable	Category (prosperity theory associated)	Subcategory	Indicator	Code	Source	Original value rank	Qualitative Anchors				Description (taken mostly literally from the original sources)
							0	0.33	0.66	1	
											Vatican/Roman Catholic Church in State affairs (Education, Military, Lands, Ecclesiastical) 4. Currently valid Concordat with the Vatican/The Roman Catholic Church. Vatican/The Roman Catholic Church is in most cases, the official Religion of the State.
		State religion	Roman Catholic	ST_CATHOL	(Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. M. 2005)	0,1	0	NA	NA	1	State monopoly over religion has probably been the single most important form of state monopoly in existence. The choice of a state religion is a political calculus that involves interactions between the government and the religion sector (Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. M. 2005). The key aspect of a state religion is its promotion of the monopoly position of the favoured religion, partly through limitations on entry and partly through subsidies (Smith [1791, Book V, Article III], cited in Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. M. 2005). They categorise official state religion as an all-or-nothing choice. The data is taken for the year 2000. This variable can also be part of the societal religious norms subcategory and along with Christian denomination, being part of the independent variable. However, for practical reasons, this variable appears only here in category "institutions".
			Protestant	ST_PROTEST		0,1	0	NA	NA	1	
			Muslim	ST_MUSLIM		0,1	0	NA	NA	1	
		Legal origin	English Common Law	ENGLISH	(La Porta, *et al*. 1999)	0,1	0	NA	NA	1	It Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each country. There are five possible origins: (1) English Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; (3) German Commercial Code; (4)
			German Commercia	GERMAN		0,1	0	NA	NA	1	

Type of variable	Category (prosperity theory associated)	Subcategory	Indicator	Code	Source	Original value rank	Qualitative Anchors				Description (taken mostly literally from the original sources)
							0	0.33	0.66	1	
			l Code								Scandinavian Commercial Code; and (5) Socialist/Communist laws. These traditions were developed in England, France, Germany, Scandinavia, and the Soviet Union but then spread through the world through conquest, colonisation, imitation, and voluntary adoption. Source: (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999)
			Scandinavian Commercial Code	SCANDINAVIAN		0,1	0	NA	NA	1	
			French Commercial Code	FRENCH		0,1	0	NA	NA	1	
			Socialist/Communist Laws	SOCIALIST		0,1	0	NA	NA	1	
	Environment and geography		Environment Performance Index	EPI	(Hsu, *et al.* 2016)	0-100	<=65	80	88	>88	The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) ranks countries' performance on high-priority environmental issues in two areas: protection of human health and protection of ecosystems. Within these two policy objectives, the EPI scores national performance in nine issue areas comprised of more than 20 indicators (Hsu, et al. 2016)
	Cultural determinants (other than religion)	Main Languages fractionalisation	English	LAN_ENG	(CIA 2016)	% 0-100	<=0.02	0.2	0.8	>0.8	Share of main native speakers in population
			German	LAN_GER		% 0-100	<=0.02	NA	0.8	>0.8	
			Russian	LAN_RUS		% 0-100	<=0.01	0.1	0.5	>0.5	
			Romance languages	LAN_ROM		% 0-100	<=0.02	0.4	0.9	>0.9	
		Main Ethnical	Caucasian	WHITE		% 0-100	0	0.3	0.8	>0.8	Proportion of ethnicities in population

Type of variable	Category (prosperity theory associated)	Subcategory	Indicator	Code	Source	Original value rank	Qualitative Anchors				Description (taken mostly literally from the original sources)
							0	0.33	0.66	1	
		fractionalisation	Latino	LATINO		% 0-100	0	0.4	0.8	>0.8	
			African	AFRICAN		% 0-100	<=0.04	0.4	0.9	>0.9	
			Amerindian	AMERIDIAN		% 0-100	<=0.04	0.4	>0.4	NA	
			Mestizo	MESTIZO		% 0-100	<=0.04	0.4	0.8	>0.8	
			Mulatto	MULATTO		% 0-100	<=0.04	0.4	>0.4	NA	
			Other non-white	NON_WHITE		% 0-100	<=0.04	0.4	0.8	>0.8	
Outcome	Prosperity		Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)	Competitiveness	(World Economic Forum 2016)	(1–7)	<=3.7	4.5	5.2	>5.2	The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), a comprehensive framework that measures the microeconomic and macroeconomic foundations of national competitiveness, grouped into 12 categories' (World Economic Forum 2016). The twelve categories that comprise this index are Institutions, technological readiness, innovation, higher education and training, health and primary education, business sophistication, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, labour market efficiency, market size, financial market development, and goods market efficiency. (World Economic Forum 2016).
	Corruption Perception Index (CPI)			CORRUPTION	(Transparency International 2016)	0-100	<=30	45	70	>70	Transparency International develops the Corruption Perceptions Index (2016). It is a composite index drawing on corruption indices of 11 independent institutions

Type of variable	Category (prosperity theory associated)	Subcategory	Indicator	Code	Source	Original value rank	Qualitative Anchors				Description (taken mostly literally from the original sources)
							0	0.33	0.66	1	
											(including, among others, the World Economic Forum, the European Intelligence Unit, and the World Bank). The index summarises perceptions of business people and country experts around the world, both residents and expatriates. The CPI values range from 0 to 100. Lower values indicate a higher degree of corruption (i.e. a lower degree of transparency).

13. QCA Appendix D. Truth Tables and "QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine-Mccluskey Algorithm"

13.1 Interpretation Guide

13.1.1 Truth Tables

In the truth tables, especially the rows exhibiting outcome=1 (entire rows in yellow) merit attention. These are the rows where the outcome is present. The combination of ones and zeros for each row refers to the combination of conditions leading to the outcome.

Exceptionally, I have also highlighted in yellow two clusters (but not the entire row) and their incl proximate to 0.9 (sufficiency inclusion). Such clusters are of interest for the analysis of QCA cases (Cuba and Uruguay; see Section 16 in main text and truth Tables 1 and 21 in Appendix 13.2).

Conventions:

OUT: outcome value

n: number of cases in configuration (with the same combination of conditions)

incl: sufficiency inclusion score

PRI: Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency

Both incl and PRI are parameters of fit. If we wish to draw any conclusion from the rows, "incl" ought to be at least close to 0.9 or higher (better). The higher the number of cases, the better.

13.1.2 Sufficient Conditions in the Tables "QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine-Mccluskey Algorithm":

Two parameters of fit inform the interpretation of QCA results: the consistency and the coverage scores. The consistency score indicates the degree to which the empirical data is entirely in line with a result, or how much deviation is evident. If the findings pass a plausible consistency threshold, they can be considered significant (scores below 0.80 should be avoided). The coverage score provides information on the share of cases that explain results, which is how comprehensive or trivial the findings are. Both scores run between 0 (worst) and 1 (perfect) and are provided for each path as well as the entire solution (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 128; Fiedler, Graevingholt, & Mross, 2018, p. 11).

The Quine–McCluskey algorithm is used to simplify Boolean algebra expressions based on finding all prime implicants. The rules of Boolean algebra help to minimise

logical expression (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 115). While similar to Karnaugh mapping, it is better suited to computer algorithms. It also allows testing whether minimisation of Boolean functions has been reached.

Conventions:

CAPITAL LETTERS: the presence of the condition (e.g. 1 for high COMPETITIVENESS).

Lowercase letters: negation or absence of the condition (e.g. 1 for not high competitiveness = usually low competitiveness).

For example, “EPI*LATINO” means high EPI index and high Latino population, while “epi*latino” means something like low EPI index and low Latino population.

: Each line is one possible way of attaining the outcome (e.g. low corruption, high competitiveness).

incl.: (consistency=inclusion). This is the inclusion score for sufficiency relations (should be at least 0.9).

cov.r: Coverage. If it is lower than 0.5, the results do not have enough power.

* Means that these conditions must be all present (logical AND). The logical operator AND describes the necessity of each condition combined with another condition for an outcome of interest to be in place.

+ Means that at least one of the conditions must be present – alternative ways for an outcome (logical OR). The logical operator OR denotes that it is sufficient for any condition (or combination) separated by OR to be present for the outcome of interest to be also present.

Applied to sets of elements, AND (*) yields the intersection of sets while OR (+) results in their union (Fiedler, Graevingholt, & Mross, 2018).

13.2 Truth Tables and "QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine-Mccluskey Algorithm"

13.3 Competitiveness

13.3.1.1 Predominant Religion and Competitiveness

A.Positive Outcome

1. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	DOM_CAT	DOM_PROT	DOM_ORT	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.951	0.835	BIH
2	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	0.717	0	MDA,MKD,MNE,SRB,UKR
3	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0.912	0.769	JAM,TTO
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0.882	0.676	CHL,URY
7	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	0.847	0.59	HND,NIC,PAN
9	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.996	0.987	CZE
10	0	1	0	0	1	0	4	0.833	0.244	BGR,GRC,ROU,RUS
11	0	1	0	1	0	1	11	0.975	0.958	CAN,DNK,EST,FIN,GBR,CHE,ISL,NLD,NOR,SWE,USA
13	0	1	1	0	0	1	3	0.933	0.827	BEL,IRL,LUX
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.898	0.642	ALB
21	1	0	1	0	0	0	7	0.649	0.164	ARG,COL,ECU,MEX,PER,PRY,VEN
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	5	0.65	0.199	BOL,BRA,DOM,GTM,SLV
27	1	1	0	1	0	1	2	0.907	0.795	DEU,LVA
29	1	1	1	0	0	0	11	0.773	0.519	AUT,ESP,FRA,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,PRT,SVK,SVN
31	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	0.773	0.375	CRI,HUN

2. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 20/40/0

Total: 60

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1 concor*dom_cat*dom_ort	0.904	0.841	0.539	0.033
2 concor*EPI*dom_prot*dom_ort	0.948	0.851	0.393	0.081
3 EPI*dom_cat*DOM_PROT*dom_ort	0.957	0.932	0.473	0.031

M1	0.882	0.805	0.651

B.Negative Outcome:

3. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	DOM_CAT	DOM_PROT	DOM_ORT	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.75	0.165	BIH
2	0	0	0	0	1	1	5	1	1	MDA,MKD,MNE,SRB,UKR
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.705	0.231	JAM,TTO
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0.753	0.324	CHL,URY
7	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	0.78	0.41	HND,NIC,PAN
9	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.698	0.013	CZE
10	0	1	0	0	1	1	4	0.946	0.756	BGR,GRC,ROU,RUS
11	0	1	0	1	0	0	11	0.41	0.002	CAN,DNK,EST,FIN,GBR,CHE,ISL,NLD,NOR,SWE,USA
13	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	0.679	0.173	BEL,IRL,LUX
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.817	0.358	ALB
21	1	0	1	0	0	1	7	0.931	0.836	ARG,COL,ECU,MEX,PER,PRY,VEN
23	1	0	1	1	0	1	5	0.913	0.801	BOL,BRA,DOM,GTM,SLV
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.637	0.205	DEU,LVA
29	1	1	1	0	0	0	11	0.704	0.374	AUT,ESP,FRA,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,PRT,SVK,SVN
31	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	0.864	0.625	CRI,HUN

4. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 23/37/0

Total: 60

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1 concor*dom_cat*dom_prot*DOM_ORT	0.886	0.733	0.275	0.239
2 CONCOR*DOM_CAT*DOM_PROT*dom_ort	0.889	0.769	0.284	0.023
3 CONCOR*epi*DOM_CAT*dom_ort	0.941	0.882	0.383	0.122
M1	0.902	0.809	0.657	

13.3.1.2 State Religion and Competitiveness

A.Positive Outcome

5. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	ST_ CATHOL	ST_ PROTEST	ST_ MUSLIM	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0.668	0.291	BIH,JAM,MDA,MKD,MNE,NIC,SRB,TTO,UKR,URY
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0.787	0.476	HND,CHL,PAN
9	0	1	0	0	0	1	11	0.889	0.772	BEL,BGR,CAN,CZE,EST,GRC,CHE,NLD,ROU,RUS,USA
11	0	1	0	1	0	1	6	0.936	0.932	DNK,FIN,GBR,ISL,NOR,SWE
13	0	1	1	0	0	1	2	0.874	0.594	IRL,LUX
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.795	0.496	ECU,MEX
18	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.5	0	ALB
21	1	0	1	0	0	0	10	0.456	0	ARG,BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,GTM,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
25	1	1	0	0	0	0	7	0.812	0.699	AUT,DEU,FRA,HUN,LVA,POL,SVK
29	1	1	1	0	0	0	8	0.677	0.3	CRI,ESP,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,PRT,SVN

6. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 19/41/0
Total: 60

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1 concor*EPI*st_cathol*st_muslim	0.903	0.845	0.494	0.155
2 concor*EPI*st_protest*st_muslim	0.884	0.733	0.483	0.144
M1	0.896	0.812	0.638	

B.Negative Outcome:

7. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	ST_ CATHOL	ST_ PROTEST	ST_ MUSLIM	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0.811	0.596	BIH,JAM,MDA,MKD,MNE,NIC,SRB,TTO,UKR,URY
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0.803	0.515	HND,CHL,PAN
9	0	1	0	0	0	0	11	0.597	0.171	BEL,BGR,CAN,CZE,EST,GRC,CHE,NLD,ROU,RUS,USA
11	0	1	0	1	0	0	6	0.064	0	DNK,FIN,GBR,ISL,NOR,SWE
13	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0.815	0.406	IRL,LUX
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.798	0.504	ECU,MEX
18	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	ALB

21	1	0	1	0	0	1	10	1	1	ARG,BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,GTM,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
25	1	1	0	0	0	0	7	0.564	0.301	AUT,DEU,FRA,HUN,LVA,POL,SVK
29	1	1	1	0	0	0	8	0.789	0.543	CRI,ESP,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,PRT,SVN

8. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 11/49/0

Total: 60

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1	CONCOR*epi*st_cathol*st_protest*ST_MUSLIM	1	1	0.024	0.024
2	CONCOR*epi*ST_CATHOL*st_protest*st_muslim	1	1	0.287	0.287
M1		1	1	0.311	

13.3.1.3 Legal Origin and Competitiveness

A.Positive Outcome

9. Truth table

	CONCOR	ENGLISH	SOCIALIST	FRENCH	GERMAN	SCANDIN	EPI	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
4	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	5	0.927	0.92 1	DNK,FIN,NOR,SWE,ISL
6	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	CHE
9	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	0.727	0.43 9	HND,NIC,PAN,URY,CHL
10	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	4	0.864	0.70 1	BEL,GRC,NLD,LUX
17	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0.712	0	MDA,MKD,UKR,BIH
18	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	5	0.844	0.48	BGR,CZE,EST,RUS,ROU
33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.748	0.6	JAM,TTO
34	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	4	1	1	IRL,GBR,CAN,USA
70	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	AUT,DEU
73	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	12	0.421	0	DOM,MEX,SLV,GTM,BRA,COL,ECU,PER,ARG,BOL,PRY,VEN
74	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	6	0.729	0.41	FRA,ITA,PRT,ESP,MLT,CRI
81	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.863	0	ALB
82	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	7	0.667	0.27 9	HRV,HUN,LVA,LTU,POL,SVK,SVN

10. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 12/46/0

Total: 58

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1 english*socialist*french*GERMAN*scandin*EPI	1	1	0.063	0.063
2 concor*english*socialist*french*german*SCANDIN*EPI	0.927	0.921	0.137	0.137
3 concor*ENGLISH*socialist*french*german*scandin*EPI	1	1	0.105	0.105
M1	0.966	0.96	0.305	

B.Negative Outcome

11. Truth table

	CON COR	ENGLISH	SOCI ALIST	FRENCH	GERMAN	SCAN DIN	EPI	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
4	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	5	0.073	0	DNK,FIN,NOR,SWE,ISL
6	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	CHE
9	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	0.741	0.468	HND,NIC,PAN,URY,CHL
10	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	4	0.681	0.299	BEL,GRC,NLD,LUX
17	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	4	0.946	0.811	MDA,MKD,UKR,BIH
18	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	5	0.805	0.35	BGR,CZE,EST,RUS,ROU
33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.622	0.4	JAM,TTO
34	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0.303	0	IRL,GBR,CAN,USA
70	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	AUT,DEU
73	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	12	1	1	DOM,MEX,SLV,GTM,BRA,COL,ECU,PER,ARG,BOL,PRY,VEN
74	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	6	0.734	0.42	FRA,ITA,PRT,ESP,MLT,CRI
81	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	ALB
82	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	7	0.871	0.721	HRV,HUN,LVA,LTU,POL,SVK,SVN

12. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 17/41/0

Total: 58

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1 english*SOCIALIST*french*german*scandin*epi	0.953	0.842	0.255	0.255
2 CONCOR*english*socialist*FRENCH*german*scandin*epi	1	1	0.326	0.326
M1	0.979	0.953	0.581	

13.3.1.4 Languages and Competitiveness

A.Positive Outcome

13. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	LAN_GER	LAN_ROM	LAN_RUS	LAN_ENG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0.784	0.523	BIH,MKD,MNE,SRB,TTO
2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.874	0.799	JAM
3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.748	0	MDA,UKR
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5	0.748	0.554	HND,CHL,NIC,PAN,URY
17	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	12	0.898	0.818	BEL,BGR,CZE,DNK,FIN,GRC,ISL,LUX,NLD,NOR,ROU,SWE
18	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	4	1	1	CAN,GBR,IRL,USA
19	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	2	0.997	0.985	EST,RUS
25	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.99	0.985	CHE
33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.774	0	ALB,ARG
37	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	11	0.389	0	BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,ECU,GTM,MEX,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
49	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	7	0.816	0.489	HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,SVK,SVN
51	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.75	0	LVA
53	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	4	0.699	0.33	CRI,ESP,FRA,PRT
57	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0.833	0.8	AUT,DEU,HUN

14. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 7/53/0
Total: 60

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1	concor*EPI*lan_ger*lan_rom*lan_rus*LAN_ENG	1	1	0.123	0.103
2	concor*EPI*lan_ger*lan_rom*LAN_RUS*lan_eng	0.997	0.985	0.092	0.082
3	concor*EPI*LAN_GER*lan_rom*lan_rus*lan_eng	0.99	0.985	0.031	0.01
M1		0.997	0.994	0.216	

B.Negative Outcome

15. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	LAN_GER	LAN_ROM	LAN_RUS	LAN_ENG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0.735	0.413	BIH,MKD,MNE,SRB,TTO
2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.498	0.201	JAM
3	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	1	MDA,UKR
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5	0.646	0.372	HND,CHL,NIC,PAN,URY
17	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	12	0.521	0.146	BEL,BGR,CZE,DNK,FIN,GRC,ISL,LUX,NLD,NOR,ROU,SWE
18	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	4	0.336	0	CAN,GBR,IRL,USA
19	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.785	0.015	EST,RUS
25	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.34	0.015	CHE
33	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	ALB,ARG
37	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	11	1	1	BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,ECU,GTM,MEX,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
49	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	7	0.824	0.511	HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,SVK,SVN
51	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	LVA
53	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	4	0.802	0.559	CRI,ESP,FRA,PRT
57	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0.333	0.2	AUT,DEU,HUN

16. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 16/44/0

Total: 60

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1 CONCOR*epi*lan_ger*lan_rus*lan_eng	1	1	0.407	0.371
2 concor*epi*lan_ger*lan_rom*LAN_RUS*lan_eng	1	1	0.096	0.06
3 CONCOR*EPI*lan_ger*lan_rom*LAN_RUS*lan_eng	1	1	0.047	0.011
M1	1	1	0.478	

13.3.1.5 Ethnicities and Competitiveness

A.Positive Outcome

17. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	WHITE	LATINO	MESTIZO	NON_WHITE	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0.823	0.382	JAM,TTO

4	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	0.76	0.381	CHL,NIC,PAN
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.868	0	UKR
6	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0.8	0	BIH
9	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	0.834	0.602	HND,MDA,MKD,SRB,URY
13	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.917	0.5	MNE
17	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	DNK
25	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	18	0.938	0.891	BEL,BGR,CAN,CZE,EST,FIN,GBR,GRC,CHE,IRL,ISL,LUX,NLD,NOR,ROU,RUS,SWE,USA
34	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0.578	0	BOL,DOM,PER
36	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	5	0.417	0	COL,ECU,MEX,PRY,SLV
37	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.333	0	VEN
41	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0.813	0.389	ALB,ARG
42	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	0.714	0.2	BRA,GTM
49	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0.784	0.565	FRA,ITA,MLT,PRT
53	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.596	0.323	ESP
57	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	10	0.731	0.459	AUT,CRI,DEU,HRV,HUN,LTU,LVA,POL,SVK,SVN

18. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 21/39/0
Total: 60

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1	concor*epi*LATINO*mestizo*non_white	0.863	0.327	0.133	0.021
2	concor*EPI*latino*mestizo*non_white	0.944	0.904	0.546	0.433
	M1	0.913	0.851	0.566	

B.Negative Outcome

19. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	WHITE	LATINO	MESTIZO	NON_WHITE	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0.891	0.618	JAM,TTO
4	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	0.85	0.613	CHL,NIC,PAN
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	UKR
6	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	BIH
9	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	0.749	0.398	HND,MDA,MKD,SRB,URY
13	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.917	0.5	MNE
17	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.623	0	DNK
25	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	18	0.493	0.107	BEL,BGR,CAN,CZE,EST,FIN,GBR,GRC,CHE,IRL,ISL,LUX,NLD,NOR,ROU,RUS,SWE,USA
34	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	1	1	BOL,DOM,PER
36	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	5	1	1	COL,ECU,MEX,PRY,SLV

37	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	VEN
41	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0.881	0.611	ALB,ARG
42	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	2	0.929	0.8	BRA,GTM
49	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0.648	0.291	FRA,ITA,MLT,PRT
53	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.602	0.333	ESP
57	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	10	0.772	0.541	AUT,CRI,DEU,HRV,HUN,LTU, LVA,POL,SVK,SVN

20. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 14/46/0

Total: 60

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1 concor*epi*LATINO*mestizo*non_white	0.934	0.673	0.167	0.059
2 CONCOR*epi*latino*mestizo*NON_WHITE	0.945	0.877	0.203	0.047
3 concor*epi*white*LATINO*mestizo	1	1	0.119	0.011
4 CONCOR*epi*white*latino*NON_WHITE	1	1	0.225	0.082
5 epi*white*LATINO*mestizo*non_white	1	1	0.119	0.012
M1	0.951	0.895	0.463	

13.4 Corruption

13.4.1.1Predominant Religion and Corruption

Religious distribution interpretation

A.Positive Outcome

21. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	DOM_CAT	DOM_PROT	DOM_ORT	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.865	0.675	BIH
2	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	0.574	0	MDA,MKD,MNE,SRB,UKR
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0.798	0.6	GUY,JAM,SUR,TTO
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0.831	0.674	CUB,CHL,URY
7	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	0.721	0.463	HND,NIC,PAN
9	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.911	0.769	CZE
10	0	1	0	0	1	0	5	0.65	0.122	BGR,BLR,GRC,ROU,RUS
11	0	1	0	1	0	1	11	0.958	0.934	CAN,DNK,EST,FIN,GBR,CHE,ISL,NLD,NOR,SWE,USA
13	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	0.879	0.733	BEL,IRL,LUX
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.83	0.496	ALB
21	1	0	1	0	0	0	7	0.598	0.142	ARG,COL,ECU,MEX,PER,PRY,VEN
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	6	0.561	0.154	BOL,BRA,DOM,GTM,HTI,SLV
27	1	1	0	1	0	1	2	1	1	DEU,LVA
29	1	1	1	0	0	0	11	0.849	0.677	AUT,ESP,FRA,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,PRT,SVK,SVN
31	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	0.818	0.496	CRI,HUN

22. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 14/51/0

Total: 65

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1 concor*EPI*dom_cat*dom_ort	0.943	0.907	0.487	0.049
2 EPI*dom_cat*DOM_PROT*dom_ort	0.962	0.941	0.475	0.038
M1	0.947	0.917	0.525	

23. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	DOM_CAT	DOM_PROT	DOM_ORT	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.718	0.325	BIH
2	0	0	0	0	1	1	5	1	1	MDA,MKD,MNE,SRB,UKR
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0.698	0.4	GUY,JAM,SUR,TTO
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0.65	0.326	CUB,CHL,URY
7	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	0.76	0.537	HND,NIC,PAN
9	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.704	0.231	CZE
10	0	1	0	0	1	1	5	0.952	0.878	BGR,BLR,GRC,ROU,RUS
11	0	1	0	1	0	0	11	0.417	0.066	CAN,DNK,EST,FIN,GBR,CHE,ISL,NLD,NOR,SWE,USA
13	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	0.668	0.267	BEL,IRL,LUX
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.833	0.504	ALB
21	1	0	1	0	0	1	7	0.933	0.858	ARG,COL,ECU,MEX,PER,PRY,VEN
23	1	0	1	1	0	1	6	0.92	0.846	BOL,BRA,DOM,GTM,HTI,SLV
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.64	0	DEU,LVA
29	1	1	1	0	0	0	11	0.632	0.213	AUT,ESP,FRA,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,PRT,SVK,SVN
31	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	0.821	0.504	CRI,HUN

24. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 23/42/0

Total: 65

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1 concor*dom_cat*dom_prot*DOM_ORT	0.893	0.802	0.275	0.253
2 CONCOR*epi*DOM_CAT*dom_ort	0.944	0.899	0.375	0.353
M1	0.92	0.857	0.628	

13.4.1.2 State Religion and Corruption

A.Positive Outcome

25. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	ST_ CATHOL	ST_ PROTEST	ST_ MUSLIM	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0.568	0.279	BIH,GUY,JAM,MDA,MKD,MNE,NIC,SRB,SUR,TTO,UKR,URY
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	0.695	0.43	CUB,HND,CHL,PAN
9	0	1	0	0	0	0	12	0.781	0.606	BEL,BGR,BLR,CAN,CZE,EST,GRC,CHE,NLD,ROU,RUS,USA
11	0	1	0	1	0	1	6	1	1	DNK,FIN,GBR,ISL,NOR,SWE
13	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0.824	0.571	IRL,LUX
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.705	0.407	ECU,MEX
18	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.5	0	ALB
21	1	0	1	0	0	0	11	0.408	0	ARG,BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,GTM,HTI,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
25	1	1	0	0	0	1	7	0.938	0.898	AUT,DEU,FRA,HUN,LVA,POL,SVK
29	1	1	1	0	0	0	8	0.82	0.605	CRI,ESP,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,PRT,SVN

26. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 13/52/0
Total: 65

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1	concor*EPI*st_cathol*ST_PROTEST*st_muslim	1	1	0.153	0.153
2	CONCOR*EPI*st_cathol*st_protest*st_muslim	0.938	0.898	0.142	0.142
	M1	0.969	0.961	0.295	

B.Negative Outcome

27. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	ST_ CATHOL	ST_ PROTEST	ST_ MUSLIM	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0.809	0.682	BIH,GUY,JAM,MDA,MKD,MNE,NIC,SRB,SUR,TTO,UKR,URY
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	0.767	0.564	CUB,HND,CHL,PAN
9	0	1	0	0	0	0	12	0.637	0.349	BEL,BGR,BLR,CAN,CZE,EST,GRC,CHE,NLD,ROU,RUS,USA
11	0	1	0	1	0	0	6	0	0	DNK,FIN,GBR,ISL,NOR,SWE
13	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0.766	0.429	IRL,LUX
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.798	0.593	ECU,MEX
18	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	ALB
21	1	0	1	0	0	1	11	1	1	ARG,BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,GTM,HTI,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
25	1	1	0	0	0	0	7	0.447	0.102	AUT,DEU,FRA,HUN,LVA,POL,SVK

29	1	1	1	0	0	0	8	0.65	0.234	CRI,ESP,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,PRT,SVN

28. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 12/53/0
Total: 65

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1	CONCOR*epi*st_cathol*st_protest*ST_MUSLIM	1	1	0.022	0.022
2	CONCOR*epi*ST_CATHOL*st_protest*st_muslim	1	1	0.298	0.298
	M1	1	1	0.32	

13.4.1.3 Legal Origin and Corruption

A.Positive Outcome

Conditions for low corruption

29. Truth table

	CONCOR	ENGLISH	SOCIALIST	FRENCH	GERMAN	SCANDIN	EPI	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
4	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	5	1	1	DNK,FIN,NOR,SWE,ISL
6	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	CHE
9	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	0.592	0.369	HND,NIC,PAN,URY,CHL,SUR
10	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	4	0.783	0.583	BEL,GRC,NLD,LUX
17	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0.614	0.105	MDA,MKD,UKR,BIH,CUB
18	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	6	0.697	0.293	BLR,BGR,CZE,EST,RUS,ROU
33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0.697	0.571	JAM,TTO,GUY
34	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	4	1	1	IRL,GBR,CAN,USA
70	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	AUT,DEU
73	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	13	0.344	0	DOM,MEX,SLV,GTM,HTI,BRA,COL,ECU,PER,ARG,BOL,PRY,VEN
74	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	6	0.767	0.49	FRA,ITA,PRT,ESP,MLT,CRI
81	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.878	0	ALB
82	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	7	1	1	HRV,HUN,LVA,LTU,POL,SVK,SVN

30. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 19/44/0

Total: 63

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1 english*socialist*french*GERMAN*scandin*EPI	1	1	0.058	0.058
2 concor*english*socialist*french*german*SCANDIN*EPI	1	1	0.136	0.136
3 concor*ENGLISH*socialist*french*german*scandin*EPI	1	1	0.106	0.106
4 CONCOR*english*SOCIALIST*french*german*scandin*EPI	1	1	0.145	0.145
M1	1	1	0.446	

B.Negative Outcome

Conditions for high corruption

31. Truth table

	CONCOR	ENGLISH	SOCIALIST	FRENCH	GERMAN	SCANDIN	EPI	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
4	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	5	0	0	DNK,FIN,NOR,SWE,ISL
6	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	CHE
9	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	0.76	0.629	HND,NIC,PAN,URY,CHL,SUR
10	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	4	0.696	0.417	BEL,GRC,NLD,LUX
17	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	5	0.907	0.784	MDA,MKD,UKR,BIH,CUB
18	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	6	0.83	0.604	BLR,BGR,CZE,EST,RUS,ROU
33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0.596	0.429	JAM,TTO,GUY
34	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0.273	0	IRL,GBR,CAN,USA
70	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	AUT,DEU
73	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	13	1	1	DOM,MEX,SLV,GTM,HTI,BRA,COL,ECU,PER,ARG,BOL,PRY,VEN
74	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	6	0.698	0.337	FRA,ITA,PRT,ESP,MLT,CRI
81	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	ALB
82	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	7	0.547	0	HRV,HUN,LVA,LTU,POL,SVK,SVN

32. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 19/44/0

Total: 63

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1 english*SOCIALIST*french*german*scandin*epi	0.918	0.805	0.258	0.258
2 CONCOR*english*socialist*FRENCH*german*scandin*epi	1	1	0.334	0.334
M1	0.963	0.932	0.592	

13.4.1.4 Languages and Corruption

A.Positive Outcome

33. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	LAN_GER	LAN_ENG	LAN_ROM	LAN_RUS	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0.717	0.471	BIH,MKD,MNE,SRB,SUR,TTO
2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0.443	0	MDA,UKR
3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	0.657	0.515	CUB,HND,CHL,NIC,PAN,URY
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0.798	0.713	GUY,JAM
17	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	12	0.903	0.845	BEL,BGR,CZE,DNK,FIN,GRC,ISL,LUX,NLD,NOR,ROU,SWE
18	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	0.547	0.162	BLR,EST,RUS
21	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	4	1	1	CAN,GBR,IRL,USA
25	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	CHE
33	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.782	0	ALB,ARG
35	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	12	0.307	0	BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,ECU,GTM,HTI,MEX,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
49	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	7	0.955	0.872	HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,SVK,SVN
50	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	LVA
51	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	4	0.749	0.435	CRI,ESP,FRA,PRT
57	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	3	1	1	AUT,DEU,HUN

34. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 28/37/0

Total: 65

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1	EPI*lan_eng*lan_rom*lan_rus	0.914	0.868	0.61	0.056
2	CONCOR*EPI*lan_ger*lan_eng*lan_rom	0.957	0.886	0.209	0.009
3	concor*EPI*lan_ger*lan_rom*lan_rus	0.913	0.861	0.496	0.056
	M1	0.922	0.881	0.675	

B.Negative Outcome

35. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	LAN_ GER	LAN_ ENG	LAN_ ROM	LAN_ RUS	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0.721	0.478	BIH,MKD,MNE,SRB,SUR,TTO
2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	MDA,UKR
3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	0.634	0.482	CUB,HND,CHL,NIC,PAN,URY
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0.497	0.287	GUY,JAM
17	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	12	0.471	0.155	BEL,BGR,CZE,DNK,FIN,GRC,ISL,LUX ,NLD,NOR,ROU,SWE
18	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	0.912	0.838	BLR,EST,RUS
21	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	4	0.308	0	CAN,GBR,IRL,USA
25	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.34	0	CHE
33	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	ALB,ARG
35	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	12	1	1	BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,ECU,GTM,HTI,M EX,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
49	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	7	0.693	0.128	HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,SVK,SVN
50	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.758	0	LVA
51	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	4	0.755	0.449	CRI,ESP,FRA,PRT
57	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0.172	0	AUT,DEU,HUN

36. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 19/46/0
Total: 65

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1	CONCOR*epi*lan_ger*lan_eng*lan_rus	1	1	0.409	0.376
2	concor*lan_ger*lan_eng*lan_rom*LAN_RUS	0.869	0.804	0.143	0.11
	M1	0.96	0.935	0.519	

13.4.1.5 Ethnicities and Corruption

A.Positive Outcome

37. Truth table

	CON COR	EPI	WHITE	LATINO	MESTIZO	NON_ WHITE	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0.643	0.194	GUY,JAM,SUR,TTO
4	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	0.636	0.158	CHL,NIC,PAN
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.496	0	UKR
6	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0.6	0	BIH
9	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	0.766	0.594	CUB,HND,MDA,MKD,SRB,URY
13	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0.769	0.25	MNE
17	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.824	0.626	DNK
25	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	19	0.852	0.783	BEL,BGR,BLR,CAN,CZE,EST,FIN ,GBR,GRC,CHE,IRL,ISL,LUX,NLD ,NOR,ROU,RUS,SWE,USA
34	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0.396	0	BOL,DOM,HTI,PER
36	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	5	0.417	0	COL,ECU,MEX,PRY,SLV
37	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.333	0	VEN
41	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0.764	0.335	ALB,ARG
42	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	0.643	0.167	BRA,GTM
49	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0.784	0.561	FRA,ITA,MLT,PRT
53	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.596	0.323	ESP
57	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	10	0.923	0.855	AUT,CRI,DEU,HRV,HUN,LTU,LVA ,POL,SVK,SVN

38. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 29/36/0
Total: 65

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u
1	EPI*WHITE*latino*mestizo*non_white	0.874	0.818	0.598	-
	M1	0.874	0.818	0.598	

B.Negative Outcome

39. Truth table

	CONCOR	EPI	WHITE	LATINO	MESTIZO	NON_ WHITE	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	4	0.914	0.806	GUY,JAM,SUR,TTO
4	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	0.929	0.837	CHL,NIC,PAN

5	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	UKR
6	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	BIH
9	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	0.657	0.405	CUB,HND,MDA,MKD,SRB,URY
13	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.923	0.75	MNE
17	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.706	0.374	DNK
25	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	19	0.465	0.216	BEL,BGR,BLR,CAN,CZE,EST,FIN,GBR,GRC,CHE,IRL,ISL,LUX,NLD,NOR,ROU,RUS,SWE,USA
34	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	4	1	1	BOL,DOM,HTI,PER
36	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	5	1	1	COL,ECU,MEX,PRY,SLV
37	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	VEN
41	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0.881	0.665	ALB,ARG
42	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	2	0.929	0.833	BRA,GTM
49	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0.65	0.289	FRA,ITA,MLT,PRT
53	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.602	0.333	ESP
57	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	10	0.548	0.145	AUT,CRI,DEU,HRV,HUN,LTU,LVA,POL,SVK,SVN

40. QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine-McCluskey algorithm

n OUT = 1/0/C: 22/43/0

Total: 65

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	(M1)	(M2)
1	epi*white*latino*NON_WHITE	0.931	0.887	0.443	0.111	0.244	0.111
2	concor*epi*LATINO*mestizo*non_white	0.938	0.835	0.165	0.066	0.066	0.066
3	CONCOR*epi*latino*mestizo*NON_WHITE	0.953	0.918	0.22	0.044	0.044	0.044
4	epi*white*LATINO*mestizo*non_white	1	1	0.11	0.011	0.011	0.011
5	concor*epi*white*LATINO*mestizo	1	1	0.11	0	0.011	
6	concor*epi*white*mestizo*NON_WHITE	0.918	0.823	0.244	0		0.011
	M1	0.921	0.863	0.639			
	M2	0.921	0.863	0.639			

14. QCA Appendix E. QCA Venn Diagrams of Outcome Corruption

14.1 Predominant Religion (Proportion of Adherents) and Corruption



Positive outcome	Negative outcome
	
High *EPI* and *Protestant religion adherence* are associated with lower *corruption*, especially if both are present.	*Concordats* in combination with *Roman Catholic religion adherence* increase corruption. *Orthodox religion* has a similar negative effect.

Figure 2: Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for *Corruption* with *Predominant Religion adherence* in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author's figure).

14.2 State Religion and Corruption



Positive outcome	Negative outcome
	
EPI and *Protestant State religion* again have a positive effect, i.e. decrease corruption. The difference is that *Concordats* might also have a positive effect only in the absence of *State Religion*.	Groups of countries with high *corruption* indicate the substantial adverse effect of *Concordats* in combination with *Roman Catholic State religion*. *Concordats* combined with *Roman Catholic or Muslim state religion* have a negative effect, i.e. increase corruption.

Figure 1: Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for *Corruption* with *State Religion adherence* in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author's figure).

14.3 Legal Origin and Corruption

German and *English legal origin* help reduce corruption, while *French* and *Socialist legal origins* and *Concordats* tend to increase corruption.



Positive outcome	Negative outcome
	
All countries belonging to groups with *Scandinavian, German* and *English legal origins* have low *corruption* (and always high *EPI*). Countries with *Socialist legal origin* in combination with *Concordats* and high *EPI* tend to have low corruption.	Most countries with high corruption are of *French legal origin* and have high *Concordats*. This trend is robust (mainly caused by 13 Latin American countries). No group with high *EPI* has high corruption. Also, countries with *Socialist legal origin* combined with low *EPI* tend to have higher *corruption*.

Figure 2: Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for *Corruption* with *Legal Origin adherence* in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author's figure).

The adverse effect of French and Socialist legal origins and Concordats disappears if a country has high EPI.

14.4 Languages and Corruption



Positive outcome	Negative outcome
	
Every country with low corruption has high *EPI*. The *German language* always leads to low corruption. Some of the *German*-speaking countries have high *concordats*. No country belonging to a group of *Roman language* has low corruption. Also, *Russian*-speaking countries, except for Lithuania, do have high corruption.	All countries belonging to groups with high *corruption* have low *EPI* (except for some Russian speaking countries). In general, the *Russian language* tends to lead to higher *corruption*. *German* and *English*-speaking countries, in general, do not have high *corruption*. High *EPI*, low *Roman*, low *English* and low *Russian* languages is a sufficient condition for low *corruption* (in this combination, *corruption* is undoubtedly low, although low *corruption* may be achieved in other ways).

Figure 3: Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for *Corruption* with *Languages adherence* in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author's figure).

The analysis of *languages* and *corruption* confirmed the results of the previous analysis: 1) a robust influence of *EPI* and *German language* on low *corruption,* and 2) *Russian* and *Roman languages* are connected with higher *corruption*. Enough coverage also exists for a sufficient condition for low *corruption: high EPI, low Roman, low English* and *low Russian languages.*

14.5 Ethnicities and Corruption



Positive outcome	Negative outcome
	
High *EPI* and high *white* ethnicities in combination with both high and low Concordats leads to low corruption. A sufficient path to low corruption is high *EPI*, high *white*, low *Latino*, low *mestizo*, and low other *non-white* ethnicities. Low *corruption* may happen in other ways, but always occurs in this configuration.	Countries with high *corruption* almost never have predominantly *white* ethnicities, are often *non-white,* and always have low *EPI*. All predominantly *mestizo* countries have high corruption. The effect of other conditions is not evident.

Figure 4: Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for *Corruption* with *Ethnicities* in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author's figure).

In the truth tables (Appendix 13.2), we can check the belonging of countries to different groups. Countries with similar conditions are often in the same groups, therefore, clusters and group selections have proven to work well.

15. Biblical Law and Prosperity

At least three types of law exist in the Christian Bible: Civil law, ritual law and moral Law:

Civil laws: Consisting of civil regulations such as laws dealing with crimes, property rights, marriage and divorce, health regulations, among others. Several civil laws are not applicable nowadays. Nonetheless, some of civil regulations, including hygiene principles, are incorporated in modern societies via scientific knowledge (e.g. washing one's hands before eating, circumcision to reduce infection risks of sexually transmitted diseases).

Ceremonial laws: Ritual directions defining the sacrificial system, the specific characteristics of the tabernacle, the role of the Levites, and the festivals. The Apostle Paul explains that these symbols are already fulfiled in Jesus' sacrifice and are therefore, nailed to the cross ("For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth" Romans 10:4); ("blotting out the handwriting of ordinances that was against us, which was contrary to us, and took it out of the way, nailing it to his cross" Colossians 2: 14).

Moral law: Permanent regulations including the Ten Commandments and Jesus' ordinances in the New Testament (i.e. Sermon of the mount).

What follows discusses the third type of biblical law, which should be valid for Christians of different denominations (as a system of morals). The Holy Bible is the foundation and standard text for all Christianity; however, its interpretation varies from denomination to denomination. Therefore, it is essential to analyse the roots of moral law, which have (probably) influenced secular (temporal) laws and the moral attitude of institutions and individuals.

What follows is far an exhaustive theological study (as it is not the purpose of this study) and merely highlights the significant themes of biblical moral law. I also consider the driving principles behind the New Testament (Jesus) and how this coheres with the guiding codes of the Old Testament. Table 6 (see main text) looks at the Great Commandment and its operationalisation in the Decalogue. It also provides further biblical clarification, including some curses for disobedience or blessings for obedience. This chart is important to understand Table 3 (below), which links the Decalogue with some of the codes required for the qualitative analysis presented in this study. Finally, Table 4 consists of further ordinances issued by Jesus in the New Testament. These are also linked to the rest of the codes used in this study (see Definitions, Appendix 15).

The tables have been designed to match the codes and definitions with the biblical moral ordinances. This presentation provides the basis for analysing the practices and ideologies found in the interviews conducted as part of this research. Some concepts or codes might overlap with other biblical ordinances (e.g. legal origin can occur across tables), but this is not problematic as analysis is synergic.

Table 3. Codes associated with the qualitative analysis

The Great Commandment	The Ten Commandments (Exodus 20, 1-17) King James Version)[i]	Codes (definition) associated with moral biblical law		
		1	2 and 3	4 and 5
Matthew 22, 34-40 Jesus said unto him, **Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment.**	**1. Thou shalt have no other gods before me.**	**1. Prosperity: Subcode: 1.1 Competitiveness:** "Competitiveness is defined as the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine a country's level of	**2.1. Subcode: Idolatry:** The worship of an image or representation of a god used as an object of worship (Oxford University Press 2016). **2. Syncretism:** The amalgamation or attempted amalgamation of different religions, cultures, or schools of thought (Oxford University Press 2016). The moral principles of Deuteronomy 18, the Old Testament prophets, the Ordinances of Jesus and the Pauline letters warn against amalgamation with pagan practices, such as idolatry, that generally oppose these Commandments.	**5. Ecumenism:** The principle or aim of promoting unity among the world's Christian Churches (Oxford University Press 2016). When understood the etymological origins of its word, it comes from the Greek Oikos, which means 'home'. In the 16th century. Late Latin took this concept to mean "oecumenical or ecumenical," which means "belonging to the universal [Catholic] Church." A Roman Catholic deacon and university professor explained ecumenism as "a process of bringing the separated
	2. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, (…) thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them (…)			
	3. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain (…)			
	4. Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labor, and do all thy work: but the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work,			

The Great Commandment	The Ten Commandments (Exodus 20, 1-17) King James Version)[i]	Codes (definition) associated with moral biblical law		
		1	2 and 3	4 and 5
	(...)	productivity. The level of productivity, in turn, sets the level of prosperity that can be reached by an economy" (World Economic Forum, 2016). From a biblical perspective (Table 7: "Blessings of obedience"), observing the moral commandments would be translated into prosperity (in red). Therefore, according to this principle, countries with German, English, or Scandinavian legal origin, which have been influenced by the Sola Scriptura principle of the		brethren from the Catholic Church (Protestants, among others) back 'home'" (Appendix 16–796). Considering the numerous pagan origins of Roman Catholic practices, and contrary to moral biblical law (e.g. The Ten Commandments of the Roman Catholic Catechism), ecumenism counteracts the original principles of the Scripture as established in the Protestant Reformation
And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy	**5. Honor thy father and thy mother (…)**		**3. Crime:** An action or omission, which constitutes an offence and is punishable by law. (Oxford University Press 2016). Following a canonical reasoning, one feels not completely one feels not	
	6. Thou shalt not kill.			
	7. Thou shalt not commit adultery.			

The Great Commandment	The Ten Commandments (Exodus 20, 1-17) King James Version)[i]	Codes (definition) associated with moral biblical law		
		1	2 and 3	4 and 5
neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.	**8. Thou shalt not steal.**	Protestant Reformation, would be expected to have higher prosperity rates than any other country.	completely convinced but compelled to fulfil a human law that changes to the caprices of the fascistic pope of turn. Similarly, in a Socialist regime, people do not feel utterly persuaded but compelled to follow authoritarian rulers. In both of the previous cases, people are mostly forced to follow the rules rather than persuaded to accept them. In a democracy influenced by the French Revolution, the ideologies persuade reason but one feels not completely compelled to follow human laws and imperfect institutions. In contrast, under German, English, or Scandinavian democratic legal origin regimes, the ideologies persuade reason and law enforcement would be easier as Protestant believers would be morally compelled to fulfil a law based on God's perfect law for them. Therefore, countries with a German, English, or Scandinavian legal origin, i.e. influenced by the Sola Scriptura principle of the Protestant	**4. Corruption:** Dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery (Oxford University Press 2016). Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs (Transparency International 2016). The same reasoning applies here as to the code "Crime".
	9. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.			
	10. Thou shalt not covet (…) any thing that is thy neighbor's.			

The Great Commandment	The Ten Commandments (Exodus 20, 1-17) King James Version)[i]	Codes (definition) associated with moral biblical law		
		1	2 and 3	4 and 5
			Reformation, would be expected to exhibit lower levels of corruption and criminality.	

Table 4. Further Jesus' Moral Ordinances and Codes relevant to this study

Some additional ordinances by Jesus			
Main Topic	**New Testament (NT)**	**Ordinance in OT terms**	**Code associated with moral biblical law**
1. The principle of love in the law	John 14, 15: If ye love me, keep my commandments. John 14, 21: He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me: and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him. 1 John 5:3: For this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments: and his commandments are not grievous.	"Psalms 19, 7-9 The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul: the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple.	**6. Legal origin:** Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country. There are five possible origins: (1) English Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; (3) German Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code; and (5) Socialist/Communist laws.

2. Jesus and his disciples' attitude toward the law	Matthew 5, 17-19: Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled. Whosoever therefore shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven: but whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven. 1 John 3, 4: Whosoever committeth sin transgresseth also the law: for sin is the transgression of the law. James 2, 10: For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all. Romans 6, 15: What then? shall we sin, because we are not under the law, but under grace? God forbid.	The statutes of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart: the commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes. The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever: the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."	These traditions were developed in England, France, Germany, Scandinavia, and the Soviet Union, but then spread through the world through conquest, colonisation, imitation, and voluntary adoption. Source: (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999). The underlying logic is the *Sola Scriptura* principle of the Protestant Reformation, which influenced German, English, and Scandinavian legal origins (Witte, 2002; Doe & Sandberg, 2010; Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009). On the other hand, a French legal origin has its roots in the (secular) French Revolution and the socialist (atheist) legal origin of the Bolshevik Revolution, (Miller 2012). While all of these modern legal origins replace medieval canon law, they nevertheless borrow some of its elements.

Some additional ordinances by Jesus		**Code associated with moral biblical law**
Main Topic	**New Testament (NT)**	
3. Love of enemies and perfection	Matthew 6, 38-48: Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but	**7. Religious persecution:** Hostility and ill-treatment, especially due to religious beliefs; oppression.

	whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain. Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away. Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust. For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? do not even the publicans the same? And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? do not even the publicans so? Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.	**Subcode 7.1 Religious freedom:** Freedom of conscience: The right to follow one's own beliefs in matters of religion and morality (Oxford University Press 2016). If this biblical principle were followed by Christians, ideally no kind of persecution would exist in a Christian society. However, history provides ample evidence for the complete opposite to this day.

4. State-Church relations	Matthew 22, 17-22: Tell us therefore, What thinkest thou? Is it lawful to give tribute unto Caesar, or not? But Jesus perceived their wickedness, and said, Why tempt ye me, ye hypocrites? Show me the tribute money. And they brought unto him a penny. And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and superscription? They say unto him, Caesar"s. Then saith he unto them, Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's. When they had heard these words, they marveled, and left him, and went their way.	**8. State – Church relations:** The way in which state and church are connected and influence one another. In this principle, Jesus lays a moral foundation for the complete separation of earthly (government) and spiritual (heavenly) matters. "It is the believers' responsibility to obey the law of the land until it becomes sinful to do so" (See also Rom, 13:1–7; 1 Pet. 2:13–17. When the two realms are in conflict, Christians must follow God (see Acts 4: 18–20; 5:29) (King James Study Bible, Ed. Hindson.)

Some additional ordinances by Jesus		**Code associated with moral biblical law**			
Main Topic	**New Testament (NT)**	**Code**	**Subcode 1**	**Subcode 2**	**Subcode 3**

5. Hierarchy and Hegemony	Matthew 20, 25-28: But Jesus called them unto him, and said, Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant: even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many. Matthew 23, 8-12: But be not ye called Rabbi: for one is your Master, even Christ; and all ye are brethren.	**9. Hegemony:** Leadership or dominance, especially by one state or social group over others (Oxford University Press 2016). According to this principle, Jesus states that there shall not be a hegemonic or hierarchical relation among Christians, to the point that no one should be called "Rabbi" or "Father" (as Jews or Roman Catholics do). "The measure of greatness is not position,	**9.1. Inequality:** Lack of equality: Difference in status, rights, or opportunities (Oxford University Press 2016). **9.2. Power distance**: The extent to which the less powerful members of organisations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. This represents inequality (more versus less) but as defined from below, not from above. It suggests that a society's level of inequality is endorsed by the followers as much as by the leaders. "All societies are unequal, but some are more unequal than others" (Hofstede, 2001). **10.3. Elitism:** The belief that a society or system should be led by an elite. (Oxford University Press	**9.4: Hierarchy:** A system in which members of an organization or society are ranked according to relative status or authority. The hierarchy: The clergy of the Catholic Church or of an episcopal Church. (Oxford University Press 2018)	**9.5. Fascism:** An authoritarian and nationalistic right-wing system of government and social organisation. Extremely authoritarian, oppressive, or intolerant views or practices. The term was first used by Mussolini's totalitarian right-wing nationalist regime in Italy (1922–43); the Nazi regime in Germany and Franco's rule in Spain were also Fascist. Fascism tends to include a belief in the supremacy of one national or ethnic

	And call no man your father upon the earth: for one is your Father, which is in heaven. Neither be ye called masters: for one is your Master, even Christ. But he that is greatest among you shall be your servant. And whosoever shall exalt himself shall be abased; and he that shall humble himself shall be exalted.	power, or prestige; it is service" (King James Study Bible, Ed. Hindson.).	2016).		group, a contempt for democracy, an insistence on obedience to a powerful leader, and a strongly demagogic approach (Oxford University Press 2018).

Some additional ordinances by Jesus		Code associated with moral biblical law
Main Topic	**New Testament (NT)**	
6. Truth and Freedom	John 8, 31-32: The Truth Shall Make You Free Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on him, If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed; and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. John 17, 17: Sanctify them through thy truth: thy word is truth.	**10.Social emancipation:** The fact or process of being set free from legal, social, or political restrictions (Oxford University Press 2016). **Subcode 10.1 Liberation theology**: A movement in Christian theology, developed mainly by Latin American Roman Catholics, which attempts to address the problems of poverty and social injustice as well as spiritual matters (Oxford University Press 2016). From a biblical perspective, “One who abides in the Word of God knows the truth.” “Your word is truth” is a strong confirmation of Jesus’ confidence in the veracity of Scripture. People’s opinions may vary, and experiences are notoriously untrustworthy, but God’s Word always remains true” (King James Study Bible, Ed. Hindson.).
7. Deception	Revelation 12, 9: And the great dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world: he was cast out into the earth, and his angels	**11. Jesuitic**. Of or concerning the Jesuits. Dissembling or equivocating, in the manner once associated with Jesuits (Oxford University

	were cast out with him. 2 Timothy 3: 12-14: Yea, and all that will live godly in Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution. But evil men and seducers shall wax worse and worse, deceiving, and being deceived.	Press 2016). Dissemble: Conceal or disguise one's true feelings or beliefs (Oxford University Press 2016). According to the Bible, deception comes from the Devil (Satan).
8. Mystery	Ephesians 5: 11-12: And have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them. For it is a shame even to speak of those things which are done of them in secret. Revelation 17: 1-6 (…) and I saw a woman sit upon a scarlet-colored beast, full of names of blasphemy, having seven heads and ten horns. And the woman was arrayed in purple and scarlet color, and decked with gold and precious stones and pearls, having a golden cup in her hand full of abominations and filthiness of her fornication: and upon her forehead was a name written, MYSTERY, BABYLON THE GREAT, THE MOTHER OF HARLOTS AND ABOMINATIONS OF THE EARTH. And I saw the woman drunken with the blood of the saints, and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus.	**12. Mystery:** Something that is difficult or impossible to understand or explain. 12.1 Secrecy or obscurity. 12.2 A person or thing whose identity or nature is puzzling or unknown (Oxford University Press 2018).

Some additional ordinances by Jesus			**Code associated with moral biblical law**
Main Topic	**New Testament (NT)**	**Ordinance in OT terms**	

9. Generosity (give and take)	Acts 20,35: I have showed you all things, how that so laboring ye ought to support the weak, and to remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he said, It is more blessed to give than to receive.	Proverbs 11:24-25: There is that scattereth, and yet increaseth; and there is that withholdeth more than is meet, but it tendeth to poverty. The liberal soul shall be made fat: and he that watereth shall be watered also himself. Proverbs 19,17: He that hath pity upon the poor lendeth unto the Lord; and that which he hath given will he pay him again.	**13. Generosity:** The quality of being kind and showing a readiness to give more of something, especially money, than is strictly necessary or expected (Oxford University Press 2016).
10. Instruction and education	Colossians 2, 8: **Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.** 2 Timothy 3: 14-17: But continue thou in the things which thou hast learned and hast been assured of, knowing of whom thou hast learned them; and that from a child thou hast known the holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus. All Scripture is given by	Deuteronomy 11, 18-19: Therefore shall ye lay up these my words in your heart and in your soul, and bind them for a sign upon your hand, that they may be as frontlets between your eyes. And ye shall teach them your children, speaking of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, when thou liest down, and when thou risest up.	**14. Education:** The process of receiving or giving systematic instruction, especially at a school or university (Oxford University Press 2016). **14.1. Education (segregated)**: An education system that sets apart people from the rest or from each other; isolating or dividing.

	inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works.		

16. Comparative Cases Studies: Coded Interviews

1.PROSPERITY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
a)Roman Catholic Priest 1. Jesuit (Colombia: Jesuit, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Jesuit)	1.The enemies of the Catholic Church were Communism, liberalism, and the Secret Societies (Freemasonry). In 1965, the Second Vatican Council ruled that the Church could not oppose progress, liberalism, and modern civilisation.	2.	3.	4.
b)Roman Catholic Priest 2. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: Other, Uruguay: Other, Switzerland: Other)	5.	6.The anthropological damage left by the political thought (Communism) is great. There are a number of factors that develop the Cuban [citizen] today with little integrity.	7.	8.
c)Roman Catholic Priest 3. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	9.After 1991, Colombia opened up to free markets, imports and exports, which generated development, but also sparked much corruption. Corruption and crime are linked to the issue of relaxation and liberality in education.	10.	11.	12.
d)Roman Catholic Religious 4. (Colombia: Nun, Cuba: Seminarian, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Deacon)	13.	14.	15.	16.
e)Roman Catholic Theologian 5. (Colombia: Theologian, Cuba: Theologian, Uruguay: Theologian, Switzerland: Theologian)	17.	18.	19.I believe that the prosperity situation of Uruguay throughout history does not show a single answer. On the one hand, it is a small country, and it is much easier to have an overview and know what is happening throughout the country. It is a country that has a tiny population, compared to other countries in Latin America, which also allows the implementation of social policies. This is something that is not new but from the Second World War, which had a very positive influence on the country for an economic development on the 60s and 70s with a strong component of social policies. It is also true that being so small, Uruguay depends a lot on what happens above all in Argentina or Brazil, which are the most important economic partners. Recently, when the crisis was in Argentina and in Brazil (2001) that immediately reverberated in Uruguay.	20.

1.PROSPERITY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
f)Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (Colombia: Baptist, Cuba: Pentecostal, Uruguay: Evangelical, Switzerland: Other).	21.That kind of Protestantism remained here, and over the years the values of our society were marked by that essence. San Andres was a prosperous territory. They could also sleep with their doors and windows open at night and hang their clothes outside for them to dry. You did not have to worry about someone stealing anything from you. They would have farms far away from their homes and no one would steal. People would end up in trouble just for stealing a coconut. When someone was killed on this island, it was an island-wide crisis. It shocked everybody that blood was shed. It was a major episode. All the church bells would ring because there was a murder. That was a society that Colombia came to found here. It was a society that was built by Protestantism and its values, but was eventually being destroyed by a new value system led by Catholicism implanted by continental Colombia.	22.	23.In this Church, there are no promises of healing, nor prosperity. In this respect, the soul and its orientation towards what is to come are clearly important. From those promises, one can draw peace and strength, but there is no promise that you will get better from your illness or prosperity. This is a distinctly Christian church, but in following Jesus. Jesus established a basis, and we want to prepare for what is to come on that basis. Not for this world, since this world passes away. But there is a future promise that Jesus will come to seek his people [John 14: 3].	24.The Swiss mentality is to stick to what is right. We stick to what we say, more than Austrians or Germans, for example, We also have a sense of time management. Sticking to what we say lead us to trust in ourselves. Then we are proud of what we produce and of the high quality of what we produce. We don't like other things that are not like ours. The origin of this can be a religious influence as the Protestants are hard working. I think that Catholic Cantons tend to be agricultural and livestock-oriented partly because they are in mountainous areas where it is not easy to develop economically But Thurgau is a mixed [Catholic and Protestant] Canton and the industrial area is in the middle.
g)Protestant Free Church Pastor 2. (Seventh Day Adventist - SDA) (Colombia: SDA Pastor, Cuba: SDA Pastor, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: SDA Pastor).	25.You could say that while society is based on biblical principles and values, the lives of others will be more respected and more valuable. But as society moves away from God, there is more crime and less development.	26.	27.	28.There is absolutely a relationship between occultism and development. The more a culture is involved in occultism the faster it is destroyed as occultism damages moral and social intelligence. Some occultists get some power and get dependent. But in general, as people have less power and all lose. That was the “cyclical” history of the Jews who were getting to those rituals, getting apart from God until disaster came to made them repent and come back to God over and over again. Also the Mayas and the Incas. The more they used those [occult] rituals the faster they got destroyed and corrupted themselves. That made them weaker and more vulnerable to other people from outside to destroy them. They destroy themselves. That happened also in Rome. They were successful and they became more and more corrupt and were inwardly destroyed (not from outside). It is easy to win against them, as they were weak. On the contrary, civilisations that live with [according to] the Bible all manage very well. They have prospered successfully such as the USA and Germany with the Protestantism. Using the Bible they have become world powers. People get many advantages and wealth as God's Blessings. The moral and intellectual performance is also high. They became in a higher position, relative to other countries. But the current progressive decadence of Protestant Christianity is putting them [Protestant countries] in an increasingly vulnerable position. In African countries, the occultism connection is clear and explicit. When the voodoo culture is higher, the country is getting worse. People get dependent and this is the real slavery (spiritual). The more the country gets into true Christianity, the better it gets. And moral standards get better. They become honest, they work, and the entire system works. Religion has a big influence on how well a country is getting. Africa is having a lot of faithful Protestants,

1.PROSPERITY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
				but the problem in Africa is that rulers are corrupt (and or consult Spiritism), even though many people are converted and doing well 29.There is a relationship between occultism and Catholicism. You can always see the economies of Catholic countries are less well developed because the Catholic elites manipulate the power to keep people low and poor in general (for example, education). They do not want people to know too much. Protestantism strengthens education and culture attains high moral standards. European countries and cultures like Spain, Italy, and Poland [mainly Catholics] or Romania or Greece [mainly Orthodox] are influenced by *corrupt* ethical codes. The Catholic elite keeps people poor and dominated by mystics and superstition. It's always like this in Catholic places.
h)Protestant Mainline (old) institutional Pastor 3. (In Latin America free historical churches, in Switzerland official Church-State Reformed Evangelical) (Colombia: Presbyterian, Cuba: Methodist, Uruguay: Lutheran, Switzerland: Reformed Evangelical)	30.	31.Protestantism was presented as an alternative proposal of faith, aside from our preaching of salvation by faith and grace. This is a proposal of faith that brings progress, religious freedom, democracy, participation, and development. We need to understand why the very active participation of Americans in that first stage of the Cuban Republic. Upon which foundation this Republic was born? There was no health infrastructure, no education, and no educational infrastructure, there was nothing ... then, at that time what the world knew about development was the United States of America. The progress at least in this part of the world was thanks to the American influence. The vast majority of the building development we see here in Havana and in Cuba were due to the Americans. We have a saying here in Cuba: "Better a prosperous heretic American (gringo), than a Spanish Catholic exploiter". "Preferible gringo hereje próspero, que español católico explotador". And we say this because the time of Cuba's best economic prosperity was when it was British colony for one year and then when the Americans occupied the island. During the first half of the twentieth century, before the arrival of the revolution in the year 1959, the Protestant churches were heavily economically dependent on the US. It exists no Church, no denomination in	32.	33.

1.PROSPERITY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
		Cuba that its major projects are not funded from foreign capital (the US and in less extent from other countries). Now we are more independent. The government of Florida in the 1950s led the Methodist Church. His missionaries were Americans. Their mission was to gradually create a native leadership able to lead their own churches. Many properties were built.		
i)Ecumenical academic theologian. Colombia: Catholic ecumenical theologian, Cuba: ecumenical theologian, Uruguay: ecumenical academic, Switzerland: ecumenical theologian)	34.There is a text [written] by García Márquez (1994), "proclaims a country within the reach of children", in a study delivered by the Commission of the 30 Sages about science, education and development. Garcia Márquez tries to explain why we are the way we are. He says that we are a cultural blend of the types of Spaniards who arrived, the indigenous people we were ancestrally, and mixed with Africans. This makes us a paradoxical country, a country full of cultural contradictions. Colombia is a society of narcos. You look at the Congress and the presidential campaigns have been ruled by drug money. We want to excuse and cover things up, but the structure of Colombian society; both in developments (because eventually the money has also been invested in some way, in sports, in art, in infrastructure), and in the great sins, mistakes, and tragedies we have in Colombia are the result of a culture of drug trafficking. Let's go back to 70s when there was the marijuana bonanza. Then comes the coca issue. In this political ecology and vision of a market economy, I think that explains why we are as we are in Colombia. The issue is where money arises and how it circulates and how that money set up a scale of values that moves us away from ethical principles that promote transparency and peaceful coexistence.	35.In an evangelistic campaign in Latin America, the tithe is the base of the Prosperity Theology. As a result, in the US nobody wants to be a pastor and in developing countries, it means status because you live very well. - Your prosperity depends on the structure of the property. 36.	37.The Swiss [from Nueva Helvecia] are still more closed; the Waldensians are more open, more progressive. But the working system is the same, through associations, cooperatives, etc. A characteristic of this area is that you will not find settlements (invasions). If land belongs to someone, nobody builds on that land; it's empty. If you go to La Paz, you will see a plot of land in the corner next to the school and the Plaza. Doroteo García donated that land to a Mr Malcolm (an Englishman) who had a field close to the little town and that helped him when he came to mark the town, etc. Later, Mr García, in gratitude, gave him that land, but he never drew up the documents and for that reason, this land has remained unbuilt to this day. No one has built on that land. The same thing is happening here. You will find only a few humble or derelict houses because, in general, the level of housing in this area is good. You will find low-income families, but with good housing. There are no settlements like those in Montevideo and other cities. Here, the Spanish colony was very methodical in its production; but they were not progressive and were absorbed by these colonies (Waldensians) that were always more hardworking and open to progress.	38.
i)Ecumenical Pastor. Colombia: none, Cuba: Ecumenical, Uruguay: Ecumenical, Switzerland: Ecumenical)	39.	40.	41.Here in Colonia and in Uruguay, in general, many people prospered thanks to the Swiss; even the government copied things from them. We are an example in the country. The cheese we make, the cheese colony, was born here. There are cheese factories in the rest of the country. And they have learned the Swiss technique from here.	43.

1.PROSPERITY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
			We know how to save when there is plenty because that is what our grandparents taught us and when there is not, the Swiss have a reservation. Here you take good care of that. “Machete” is an expression to say stingy. To be “Swiss” is to be a collaborator. The immigrants came with nothing except tools. But they were hungry. We even inherited the need to care; we save because it is very difficult to have nothing and go hungry. The Waldensians came to colonise four years before the Swiss colony (1858). Our immigrants [Swiss] began arriving in 1861 or 1862, and the Swiss colony [Nueva Helvecia] prospered a lot. They [the Waldenses] did not prosper quite as well, because religion somehow blocked them. This [Nueva Helvecia] was an open colony; maybe we lost the language of being open, but the Swiss still keep some of the traditions, for instance, dance, food, orchestras, etc., even 150 years later. 42.We have tried to strengthen the spiritual part. The outside is what normally attracts people: to have a good car, a house, etc., but wealth is inside. The outside comes and goes and there are people who cannot do enough for material things. I have what I need; what does not work, I have not, since I came with nothing and I do not take with me anything to the other world. Money and work are necessary to be able to live, but we should not allow ourselves to materialize	
k)Non-Christian (atheist, agnostic) (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: Academic/Intellectual, Uruguay: Academic/Intellectual, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	44.	45.	46.	47.
l)Non-practising Christian (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none,	48.	49.	50.	51.The [Protestant] Reformation is a major reason for development. At the bottom of everything lies Protestant chauvinism, which perverts Max Weber’s original line of reasoning. To some extent, religion is not constant. Sometimes religiosity strengthens and weakens in a cyclical

1.PROSPERITY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)				development and runs in parallel cycles to the economy.
m)Practitioner/entrepreneur, Independent citizen, free Catholic believer (Colombia: Practitioner, Cuba: Employee, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Employee)	52.	53.	54.	55.Catholics tend to be more conservative here in Switzerland. However, you do not see so strong differences between confessions, except perhaps in remote Cantons such as Appenzell [Innerrhoden and Ausserrhoden]. In Schwyz for example, where Catholics are majority, people tend to be more helpful than in the large cities of other Cantons. Catholic cantons tend to have a more agricultural economy perhaps because the conservative mindset has kept them in a medieval economy. But, of course, this is not completely applicable; you find the case of Luzern, a Catholic industrialised Canton, and Bern, a Protestant indebted Canton.
n)Academic/Practitioner/entrepreneur Independent citizen, free Protestant believer (Colombia: Teacher, Cuba: Tourism professional, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Academic)	56. Whenever the law of God and moral standard as found in the Bible declines, the economy goes down, morality goes down, the crime rate goes up, and the result is a degenerated society. The closer you live in harmony with biblical principles, the more harmoniously you will live. The farther you live with the biblical principles the worse development problems you will face either as a person or as a society. This principle comes down to us historically and repetitively, for example, from the book of Judges in the Old Testament in the Bible where the more Israel obeyed God's law in the Bible, the better [they] got, whereas whenever they strayed far from God's commandments, they faced the worst crisis. In the book of Judges, it is explained that this pattern is repeated cyclically over and over again in history, leading to social failure and oppression whenever people disobeyed God. In the same sense, you can explain society today. For example, how do you explain that humans suffer famines and animals have enough to eat and are fit in Africa? Voodoo and spiritist practices can give you the answer.	57.	58.Recently, Uruguay was said to be one of the least religious countries in Latin America. I suppose that is because we are doing "too well," and therefore forget to look up (towards God). Uruguay has a very 'light' religiosity, nothing deep, in general.	59.Francis Fukuyama says that trust, culture, and religion can explain development. In Switzerland, 85% of industrialisation occurred in Protestant Cantons. Years ago you could see the difference as soon as you crossed the border of Appenzell Innerrhoden and Ausserrhoden. The Catholic part was always poorer and less industrialized than the Protestant. Now you can't see this difference that clear anymore. When Huguenots arrived in Switzerland escaping from religious persecution in Catholic France, they established the high-precision industry like watch-making. The perfection evident in this work comes from the idea of doing any work for God's glory and not for men's glory; as we must be perfect as God is perfect [Matthew 5,48].
o)Afro-Caribbean/indigenous religion Priest (Colombia: Rastafarian, Cuba: Babalawo, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	60.	61.	62.	63.

1.PROSPERITY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
p)Government officer Former Government officer (Colombia: central government, Cuba: central government, Uruguay: regional government Colonia, Switzerland: Federal government)	64.Some of the factors that may affect our productivity are that we have a low level of trust in our public institutions since their accountability and transparency are dubious. Likewise, many government employees are not doing their duties. Instead, they are checking personal e-mails, Facebook, etc. That's why those networks are forbidden in most of the public institutions. The sense of public property here is not that they belong to everyone but that they belong to no one and that we have to take advantage of them. You should add that we are the country with most public holidays in the Western hemisphere and we are the fourth in the world, after some Asian countries. We have 18 public holidays during the year, out of which twelve are Catholic and six are civic. Likewise, we waste several hours a day in the traffic jams and we get to work already exhausted. 65.I am struck by the fact that in the more traditionally conservative / Catholic departments (for example, Nariño, Cauca, Antioquia, Norte de Santander) there is historically a concentration of conflict actors and a high violation of human rights. But those departments (especially Antioquia and Nariño) have at the same time a high development of the jurisprudence. In the University of Nariño for example, the degree traditionally more important and prestigious has been by far Law.	66.	67.To this day Colonia is very prosperous. During the major crisis of 2002, Rosario [Catholic] closed five of its factories, and there was a massive loss of jobs because it was purely manufacturing. In contrast, Valdense [Protestant Waldensians] and Nueva Helvecia [Swiss mixed], who worked more and lived more than their land yielded did not have that problem, because they had a diversified economy. All immigrants have strongly influenced this area. Although they [immigrants] all have something in common, they are also very different. The Waldensian is a little more closed than the Swiss (Nueva Helvecia). Rosario' inhabitant is carnivalesque [as Swiss academic said also]. We have a saying: "The Waldensian does not drink mate herb, because he can not waste time; he has many tasks to do; the one in Nueva Helvecia drinks mate herb, but in his house; and the one in Rosario drinks in the shade of the parsley, because they never cut the parsley". The Waldensians dedicate themselves first to their daily chores and religion, the Swiss (Nueva Helvecia) retire to the privacy of their house while the Rosarians live the "crazy life".	68.
q)Catholic/Ecumenical Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: Central government, Cuba: National Council of Churches, Uruguay: Military/Church media, Switzerland: Catholic central committee)	69.	70.	71.	72.Well, you know that there is this favourite thesis of Max Weber who said that the Protestantism has created the ideas of working hard and being modest and rich, and so forth. This is a rather complicated discussion as to decide whether this is true or not. I am not so sure if the religious history of this country can really explain this. Certainly, we are a small country, with not many natural resources, like coal, gold or oil. As a nation, it has always been important to trade with other countries. We are a mandatory transit country to the north, south, east and west. These factors have contributed enormously to take Switzerland to its current state. For a long time, Switzerland was a very poor county. It is a relatively modern thing to deal with the industrialization. I think we can safely say that during the 20th century our neighbours were interested in having access to this small neutral country, where they could do a lot of things even in the middle of a war. Nobody had any reason to be afraid of Switzerland. It was a safe place to discuss and to sell and buy goods. We have been really lucky with the public transport. But my explanation

1.PROSPERITY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
				can be overly simplistic. As a churchman, it is not for me to be able to analyse in depth this issue. As Swiss people, we have always maintained different relations due to the different languages we are influenced by, not only here in Europe but also abroad, since we have been for centuries emigrating to the United States and Asia, without being a colonizing power. Individual people that went somewhere and came back are quite interesting like the ones who migrated to South Italy and back to Switzerland. The coffee culture came from Sicily to us. There were Swiss bakers that brought our sweets to Sicily. This was the kind of exchange we had. Chocolates, watches, etc., were the result of this type of trade. There might be a relation [between denomination] and industrialization. There must be a connection. But the influence can come from both directions. For example, if you analyse the first Reformation in Zürich, it was more interesting for the government […] and also for the people to become Protestants [in Zürich] than outside, in Central Switzerland, because of the *liberties; the distance they could maintain from being ruled by the hierarchical* [Catholic] Church. They could have more freedom. When you see a city like Basel with roots in Rotterdam, this opened the minds to accept the ideas of the Reformation. To say, "we want to read the Bibles by ourselves because we want to read". If you are a farmer living outside, this interest is not that strong. Cities like Zürich, Basel or Geneva also controlled their peripheral fields. Therefore, the old cantons became Protestant. If we went to the Zürich outskirts, we could see that they have had an influence from the city. After the Reformation, there was a principle in the whole part of northern Europe, which reads "Cuius regio, eius religio". This means that if the chief of the State is Catholic, then the whole country is Catholic and the same rule applies if the chief is Protestant. This had an influence on the confessional landscape. I do not think that Catholics are less intelligent or less likely to work than others. It is more about interaction. Catholic piety, which relates everything in everyday life to faith, asserts that it is easier to live on a farm than in a city. It is less rational and more about nature, and perhaps also about establishing greater affinity with sacramental theology.
r)Protestant Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: none, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Political-Church officer)	73.	74.	75.	76.

1.PROSPERITY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
s)Embassy of the Country at the Vatican (Colombian Embassy at the Vatican, Cuban Embassy at the Vatican (no answer), Uruguayan Embassy at the Vatican, Swiss Embassy in Ljubljana)	77.In terms of International Cooperation, there is no legal framework for cooperation between Colombia and the Holy See. Caritas internationalis develops its work through the National Secretariat of Social Pastoral (Cáritas Colombiana). This includes rural development, helping the population (the victims of the conflict), prevention and attention to emergencies, promotion of human rights, gender equality, peacebuilding and social inclusion.	78.	79.	80.

2.CORRUPTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
a)Roman Catholic Priest 1. Jesuit (Colombia: Jesuit, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Jesuit)	81.	82.	83.	84.We are a small country with a very dense population. Very developed civil societies work through associations. If a citizen wants to organize something, he can create an association and it succeeds because of the very dense network of other associations where people work actively and take responsibility. I think that keeps everybody organised. People do not feel overruled or terrorized to the point that they cannot change anything, because the structure is not so high that prevents them to have access to whatever they want, but there is a structure in daily life where they can practice and be active at different levels. That system works well in civil society to organize citizens as well as in politics. It is sometimes a burden to go to vote as frequently as four times a year, which keeps people involved, and working all the time. But I think that the political system and the civil society roles provide this closeness among the people making them participate in the process. That keeps everyone accountable to others and also it focuses on political aspirations, commitments and so on. The Jesuit order in Switzerland is legal only since 1973. The reason being that in the 19th and 20th centuries the State was against Catholicism because the Church was not democratic. Therefore, the Church, which had in its religious community no democratic structures, could not be officially recognized as a body of public acceptance. *In the 19th century, we [Swiss] created a Church law that is parallel to the canonical law of the Catholic Church.* This happened only within Catholicism because it was not acting according to legal principles. For this reason, the Church, along with the state, had to create a law according to democratic principles. This means that we now have a dual legal structure that is unique in the world. Another repercussion derived from this decision is that lay members who are in associations, according to democratic law, manage the Church's finances. The money does not land in the hands of bishops but in those of lay people and Church associations, which are responsible for financial affairs. Thus, all the Church buildings or the money from the priestly work are administered in that fashion. The Swiss government said in the 19th century that the Catholic Church had to be democratic, but that was far from reality. Subsequently, the parish decided that they had the right to elect the priests instead of being a task for the bishop. He cannot delegate any priest to any Church, but he sends a priest to a parish, which approves him, or not by means of democratic election. So you have a lot of elements of basis democracy in the Church from the 19th century onwards because Switzerland was so keen and eager that the Catholic Church became a democratic Church.
b)Roman Catholic Priest 2.	85.	86.Corruption comes from below, from people with limitations. Cuban people	87.Although you have to understand, what does corruption mean; I understand that in	88.

2.CORRUPTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: Other, Uruguay: Other, Switzerland: Other)		survive from the "black bag" [black market and rubbish]. And there is a struggle to see whom to damage, [which is] typical of the black market that is unscrupulous. And that struggle will end when people have the opportunity to meet their needs in another [legal] way.	Uruguay these indexes are quite low, but I cannot say why. I have no idea.	
c)Roman Catholic Priest 3. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	89.We have had corruption from before [1991] and there's more after the constitutional reform [1991].	90.	91.	92.
d)Roman Catholic Religious 4. (Colombia: Nun, Cuba: Seminarian, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Deacon)	93.It terrifies me, for example, that media and the same high political class, are talking about theft, murder, among those great personalities, where it is assumed that they were consistent economic, cultural and socially, and have had a high social position. And if they are denounced for all of that crime and corruption, imagine a common criminal that feels supported or endorsed because the higher leaders do that too. If those of the above [politicians and elite] make so much money and steal, the underdogs who are poor, full of hunger and children then also steal. I wonder, how will the morale of these children be now? The case of Father Alberto in the USA became famous because he went to the beach and began to have love affairs with a woman and the media exposed him. He became an Anglican because there they allow priests to get married. He has done a very big damage. He says that in the Vatican and in the church, about 60% of priests are homosexual.	94.	95.	96.
e)Roman Catholic Theologian 5. (Colombia: Theologian, Cuba: Theologian, Uruguay: Theologian, Switzerland: Theologian)	97.First, corruption is an issue that does not change. Still exists with different actors. It is a "cancer" worldwide, not only in Colombia. Second, from the 1991 Constitution, the opening of new institutions was allowed and that gives a little more legality to the state and the institutions that did not exist. In that sense, you could say that a breakthrough occurred. For example, there was the issue of custody, the prosecution, geographical organization, etc. Theoretically, institutions were created and on a practical level, new forms were created. However, legality was in the theory, in practice, not so much. On the other hand, I think that the "astute malice" (viveza) is one of the basic principles of	98.As people live badly, they cheat on the State. And the Church [Catholic] says this is not a sin. Why so? Because it's Fair Compensation, a Catholic doctrine. The state has taken the properties of the people, it is fair that people seek their compensation. In this sense, it's ok to cheat on the state or to steal like Robbin Hood. In 1961 the relations between church and state were impossible. The Church was the largest landowner in Cuba and then the US. The Church supported the revolution and they thought its lands would be protected. That was not the case.	99.Not necessarily because of a change of government is going to immediately change the whole social situation. All these power games that exist in societies, this led to many experiences, - many of the countries in Latin America in the 70s and early 80s were marked by military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes-, but even when many governments of the left, accede to power, as in the case of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, although there are a number of changes at the level of social policies, in my view the roots of social injustice were not really taken into account and the changes that were expected were not given. The issue of corruption in left-wing	100.Geneva is considered a reformed or Protestant city. I think it is true that there is a much stricter discourse on responsibility and honesty [in a Reformed context]. When you know more about it, I do not think it is so different from other [Catholic] countries. It is true that there is a whole social and structural context that helps to live in a certain way, but when one looks at why Switzerland is rich, you cannot stop seeing everything that Nazism meant to this country, or that in Switzerland there is the headquarters of the most important mining and extractive companies. I believe that in Switzerland, which is very Reformed [Protestant] there is a dual discourse. The Lutherans were different in that, too. Corruption [in Switzerland] is lived in another way. In Geneva, if you do not know people, even if you apply for 20 jobs, you will not get a job. There are complaints of discrimination based on the origin, the colour of the skin and that exists, but it is covered. I believe that we must recognize that the situation is much more

2.CORRUPTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	corruption. It is the cancer of corruption. This principle, we [Colombians] have been taught very well, by these large groups and great people who seek to dominate. It's worrisome. If something hurts me, is the corruption in politics, but it hurts more than most of our young people in Colombia think also the same way. It applies in almost all contexts through "gifts", etc. This has to do with the consciousness of every Colombian and only a good education from children, from the family, and homes can change. But one must be convinced and convince others of that.	Now, the closeness between the pope and state are necessary because it suits the state and it is convenient to the Church. The Church wants to receive privileges and status, and the state wants to show piousness and social sensitivity. It is like a "Mafia kiss" ("un beso de mafiosas").	governments -that whole change, for example, that has meant in Venezuela, from what was seen as a Bolivarian revolution to the current situation, which is unsustainable and unjustifiable-, shows that the situation is very complex. The human condition is much more complex and the fact of changing a government does not necessarily mean that injustice will end. If you look in comparison with Latin America, you can be happy with how we are doing in Uruguay. But if you look at the internal process of the country there is a very strong criticism - especially in these three left-centre governments in which much hope was deposited - the issue of corruption is something that also begins to reveal itself.	complex. Probably in Catholic countries, it is much more open also because of the lifestyle - if you compare a Swiss and a Latin American, in their way of being and in their way of expressing themselves - is very different. In Switzerland and in Geneva many things do not meet the eye and are not spoken about. In newspapers, for example, all the violence that exists in schools or on the street does not come out. There is no such yellow press that exists in Latin American countries where everything bad appears immediately; here it is covered a lot.
f)Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (Colombia: Baptist, Cuba: Pentecostal, Uruguay: Evangelical, Switzerland: Other).	101.It is part of our Protestant belief that we are accountable to God. One day we will be judged by Him and our actions will be weighed. Confessing to a priest is not going to wipe out my sins. Jesus does that on the cross, but I am still accountable for my lifestyle. I am accountable for the way I live, the example I set, for presenting Jesus Christ here on earth, and for having a clear testimony to the world of what God's ways look like. When God said He wanted to make a peculiar people, set apart, that is what He was looking at. He was looking specifically at people who would represent Him and would live according to His values and His instructions. That is my motivation. Furthermore, I know that no society that accepts corruption and crooked ways will ever prosper or thrive. Such society is destined to fail. People came to our territory and said that the Raizal, our people, are lazy. "They do not want to work. They are backwards; look at their homes falling apart because they do not work". Really? I can tell you why our homes were falling apart. The first question they should have asked is, "How come they have these large and big wooden houses? How did they build them if they are so lazy? How did they get these elegant and beautiful houses?" We are in this situation because we are working under a system that does not match us. Under a system where as an engineer, if I want to get a contract to build a street, I would better put in the contract that I am going to give them five or ten million of it. If I do not promise to give the politicians ten million when they establish the	Christians [Protestants] also do unlawful things but to a lesser extent than the rest. Christians [Protestants], in general, do not party; do not drink alcohol; are not adulterers. They do not commit idolatry. We are committed to God and keep a high [moral] standard here in Cuba. [But] in Cuba, you live outside the law. Cubans think with their bellies. The US has the Cuban Adjustment Act (dry and wet feet). I hope that in heaven there will be a Cuban Adjustment Act, too (laughs).	102.Here in Uruguay, we are few. As that proverb says: 'small town, big hell,' and here we know each other and I think that helps to contain some restraint, but there is corruption, there is a lot of corruption. It's a bit underestimated, but there is. Of course, as Argentina is so big, there is also much corruption, but in Uruguay is small and there is little, but we are all aware of many things. In my personal opinion, there is a lot of unnecessary spending in the public sector and it greatly influences everything that is of the country. We are beginning to suffer the consequences of corruption. Everything has a background in the love of money that leads to, unfortunately, very sad situations. It is an issue that concerns them (politicians and government), it is not our issue (Church).	103.

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	bid, will the Christian Protestant ever get the bid? He will not. Because he is convinced he is working under a different value system where he cannot bribe the politician to get the contract because it is against God. But the others that say, "You can sin and pray, it is okay", can bribe, and afterwards, gets the job. He pays off and then he goes and tells the priest, "I just bribed this politician". The priest goes on and says, "Okay, say 5 Hail Marys and go ahead and move on". It is crazy. There is no possible way for this society to survive under those conditions. We are here being bombarded by this philosophy, literally wiped out by this, and with no help. We have screamed to the international community, "Help us". We have even screamed to England, to Ireland, "Hey, I am a [] (That is my last name. Trace it back to Ireland. We have McGlackins here; we have Bush, Dilberg, and Hawkings). Can somebody help us? Where is the Protestant world? Where are you? Why have you abandoned us into this? We are fighting on our own".			
g)Protestant Free Church Pastor 2. (Seventh Day Adventist - SDA) (Colombia: SDA Pastor, Cuba: SDA Pastor, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: SDA Pastor).	104.As societies grow and years pass, corruption and deterioration of moral issues and principles are more marked. Formerly there was persecution of all kinds, social (groups outside the law), political and religious. Today, as people grow older, the statistics increase; the reason is that there is moral degradation, leaving aside the principles. Humanity believes that does not need a divine government and self – governs herself with no need of moral or ethical principles to live in community and debauchery shows that every time the situation will be worse. An increase of wars and rumours of wars and moral issues and social crisis.	105.There is a culture of 'to solve' in Cuba: in society, in general in the population. The concept of "theft" has been distorted and softened by "to solve".	106.	107.
h)Protestant Mainline (old) institutional Pastor 3. (In Latin America free historical churches, in Switzerland official Church-State Reformed Evangelical) (Colombia: Presbyterian, Cuba: Methodist, Uruguay: Lutheran, Switzerland: Reformed Evangelical)	108.There has not been any kind of changes related to corruption affected by a Protestant church that now has a little more participation [after the Constitution of 1991]. Those items remain the same as before the Constitution; exactly the same. In some institutions, corruption has even increased. In political, economic, and social terms the Colombian typical expression " el vivo vive del bobo" [the astute who cheats makes his living from the stupid innocent] is perfectly located here. The Colombian presumes that there is enough amount of idiots from whom make a living, starting from mom and dad, which is an	109.It existed organized crime and there was corruption in the Republican period before the Revolution 1900-1959. Now there is a widespread large-scale corruption but with a very low economic power. We do have more corruption. Nowadays, what it is said it is not done. No one abides by the laws. The difference between before the revolution and now is that now corruption is widespread and before it was not. If we go out walking in the street, I can give you 10,000 examples of corruption.	110.	111.When it comes to Christian confession, corruption is higher in Catholics, but Max Weber [Protestant Ethics] I can't prove. In the Protestant tradition, it's very important that your life and your principles are the same [coherent]. In Catholic traditions [there] are double standards: You have principles for monks, and for poor, and [for] lay people. In Catholicism, you have the doctrine on one side and reality on another. These things [doctrine and reality] are always different, and the difference is accepted in Catholicism. Some say that this is because Catholics can confess their sins to a priest. In the Protestant tradition, you have lower standards but you are expected to meet them. Not, though, in Roman Catholicism. Zwingli said, for example, that celibacy is too much and is not fulfillable. Jesus said you have to be perfect as your father in heaven is.

2.CORRUPTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	absolute negation of the Commandment: "honour thy father and thy mother". Where we should not find this typical expression applied is in the church. But it is there precisely where you find it maximized. There is a "vivo" [an astute who cheats] (a religious leader, a Church priest, a leader of sect, a pastor, an elder), who through his message makes a living of the idiocy, ignorance and stupidity of a lot of people that trusted him thinking they were listening to a "servant of God". This practice is now and always. The "vivo vive del bobo" should not be in the Church [in general], but I would say that it is practised more in the Church than out there. And who should correct that should be the church, but it is who further enacts that subject. [We can trace this to the selling of indulgences that Luther strongly opposed]	For example, in that little corner, in that cafe, most of the products are not legal. They are not selling what they have to sell, and so on. Or, for example, if we go to a flea market selling agricultural products, they do not measure a fair weight. They are trying to deceive people and are burdening the system. They are evading taxes, and so on. If we go to a government institution or we go to a ticket agency there will be "no tickets." But if you pay a bribe of $ 20 or $ 10, regardless of the destination you can get a ticket. This has become a culture, a culture of corruption. I am an evangelical [Methodist], and we evangelicals are very concerned with these issues. For us, in our own Church, when we do an event and have to buy food, we think twice, because it is a matter of conscience and we know where the products come from.		Rabbinic Judaism has similarities with Protestantism [as] for both; the Scriptures come first and occupy a central role. […] When Jesus, a Jew, spoke about the truth to Pilate (a Roman), Pilate asked Jesus, what is truth? [John 18, 37-38] This shows how incompatible Roman philosophy can be with Jewish culture…
i)Ecumenical academic theologian. Colombia: Catholic ecumenical theologian, Cuba: ecumenical theologian, Uruguay: ecumenical academic, Switzerland: ecumenical theologian)	112.	113.	114.We are 3 million inhabitants throughout Uruguay and we somehow know each other. It is different where there is a lot of population, where control is lost. We live in Nueva Helvecia, as in a separate world, which had a strong influence from the Waldensian and Swiss settlers, very controlled by their churches. I do not know how much the Swiss (Nueva Helvecia), but the Waldensians. Waldensian is - a social movement – that is very controlled by the church until not many years ago and even today. But the church does not impose, but it is a reference to many issues, not only social and religious but also at work. It is a very communal church because of its history and in this area is shared in the form of a cooperative. There are many associations and they work with their partners, who come together and work and, that is part of the teaching that was at the beginning in this colony. In our history, The Waldenses wanted to end the corruption of the Catholic Church.	115.

2.CORRUPTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
			which was a political power (Roman Church). They wanted people to read the scriptures or the vulgar Bible; if it was French, in French and if it was Italian, Italian. That is what Pedro Valdo did, when he gave part of his fortune to translate the Bible into the vulgar language, in that case: French and began to read the bible and in turn have disciples or followers who read parts of the Bible.	
j)Ecumenical Pastor. Colombia: none, Cuba: Ecumenical, Uruguay: Ecumenical, Switzerland: Ecumenical)	116.	117.	118.	119.
k)Non-Christian (atheist, agnostic) (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: Academic/Intellectual, Uruguay: Academic/Intellectual, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	120.There are three important drivers of corruption, inequality and criminality in Colombia. First, I think that it goes through an exaltation of the cunning malice as value ("viveza criolla" or "malicia indígena"), understood as making an astute trap [cheating] in Colombia. That is one of the pillars understood as "if you are astute, seize opportunities. If you seize opportunities, no matter which means..." and I think there is an excessive exaltation of the cunning malice that is probably associated with the economy drug trafficking; the "Law of Least Effort" to profit. Second, it has to do with a Colombian cultural institution reaffirmed as the natural order of things, that believes "those who are poor, it is because they are lazy or do not move" the suffering of others and the other are essentialised from a position of ignorance. I think that contributes profoundly to inequality. Here, there is no recognition of that experience and no recognition of the other's experience, and thus there is an inability to get on the other' shoes and promote different social demands. Third, actually, in this country, there is a sense of "since they do not catch me, I do it". And there is a deep sense of justice as an institution that does not operate, that nobody will say anything because "if justice does not work, then it's over". And then, when there is a failure of citizen accountability over corrupt actions of the other and when there is an absence of a legitimate institution of justice, people feel they can skip any rule because the rules are just painted on the wall. These three things come together around a lack of values and	121.You have to pay more [a bribe] for a government certification with good spelling. Otherwise, they give you with bad spelling, sometimes on purpose. [Also] Many Cubans watch television through an illegal package. Cubans normally are seeking to break the law and do what they want. Corruption was minimal after the revolution, and now it has increased. Buying a car was a reward only for good workers.	122.What has to do with corruption? Uruguay is not a country that has oil or natural resources that do exist in other Latin American countries, for example in Brazil, -we know how corruption matters are in that country-. Then in Uruguay, this is one of the factors that contributed to the fact that corruption is not so high since what there is to distribute is much less than what exists in other countries. In Uruguay, even the dictatorship was called 'soft-dictatorship' (in Spanish dictablanda instead of dictadura).	123.

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	institutions that guide our daily lives as Colombians promoting any kind of individualistic attitude just to protect my own benefits lacking honesty, respect for others, generosity, solidarity, etc.			
l)Non-practising Christian (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	124.Impunity (flaws in the judicial system) is at the core of corruption and inequality.	125.	126.	127.“I don’t know why Catholics should be corrupt or shouldn’t. I’m Catholic but I’m not such associated with it. I’m Catholic... [because] family enforces this when you grow up. This is also true in other countries. ... As a Swiss Catholic, I have more in common with a *Nordic* Protestant than with an Italian Catholic. What you see in Russia (for example) is that Religion becomes prominent again. Would you attribute corruption to religion? The state is using religion. It is a price to be paid. The patriarch in Moscow knows very well that he has been played by Putin. The Church is there, but might not be the cause of the corruption.”
m)Practitioner/entrepreneur, Independent citizen, free Catholic believer (Colombia: Practitioner, Cuba: Employee, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Employee)	128.Here in Colombia, almost all politicians are corrupt. Even the attorney anti-corruption was recently arrested due to corruption scandals. That’s why we say it is better “known evil” rather than “good to be known”. (Más vale malo conocido que bueno por conocer). All of them steal. It is ok that they steal but not much being shameless! (Bueno que roben pero no tanto. Que no sean descarados) [triangulate with turbay].	129.Unnecessary bureaucracy and corruption is eating away Cuba.	130.Uruguay is a small country with 3 million inhabitants, compared to 50 million in Argentina and 100 million in Brazil. Corruption there is bigger and unfortunately, here in the last two governments, I do not think they were the best. Corruption is happening in the world. In South America, the socialist governments say that we must be like the Uruguayans. However, in Venezuela, Chávez was said to be one of the richest men in the world and Fidel Castro, likewise. If I have wealth, I should give it to the ones who do not have it, but they ride in their latest model cars, with brand name shirts, live in luxury neighbourhoods, then: “It is that what I say, but not what I do?”. The little you see in those regimes is not what they say. I do not understand people that feel happy when they do not even have to eat, they do not have the basic needs met, while those dictators do have wealth. I am Catholic and I see it also in the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church proclaims that we must help the poor and they are surrounded by gold. If we say that Jesus was born in a manger, surrounded by a cow and a donkey and died on the cross and had nothing, why don’t we sell that gold and give it for eating and for the welfare of those people in need who are humble? The human being has ambition. The human being should have just enough to live well but when he wants more, the sense is lost. It is linked to ambition.	131.Here in Switzerland, the direct democracy and the type of government (Federal) might mean more accountability and less corruption. It’s always better to share the decisions with a lot of people rather than concentrate them [decisions] on a few [people]. Perhaps, in a monarchy or a Republic, power is concentrated, which increases the risk of a totalitarian regime and corruption. I think that most of the Catholic people here in Switzerland do not care about paying the taxes for the Church; they just pay them without asking any further. I do not think that Church taxes are a reason for people here to leave the Church (ausgetren). We Swiss do as we are used to. But foreigners try to save money as much as they can. I know the case of a Catholic Mexican who works here [in Switzerland] and who has written for the tax declaration that he is an atheist just to not pay the Church taxes. [The Catholic Mexican] further said that if this Church taxes system that we have in Switzerland were to be applied in Latin America, perhaps all people would declare to be atheists (laugh). I think that when Swiss Catholics leave the Church is because they are not happy with the Church, and not because of avoiding paying the Church taxes.’

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
			Unfortunately, it will always be the love of money, power, and ambition that will move people towards corruption and criminality. For everything to work better today, we must start at the root and have to finish with those who are above, in the government. At least what I see here in Uruguay when a candidate wins, he employs a large number of people or officials into a government that must be maintained, paid, and where does that money come from? From the rest of us who work, but they do not worry about compliance of the rules and when they fulfil their duties, as they should, they see it as if they did us a favour. And because they are immovable, no one can fire them. In the private sector, if an employee of mine makes a serious mistake, I say: thank you very much, I pay you what corresponds and I leave you without work. But there is a privilege or investiture for the rulers in the government. The mentality of the politician must change. They should not be more political, they have to be more people and administrators remembering that this money is not theirs. They continue to earn their salary even if they add more or less on projects earning a "commission" of 30% or 40% in addition to the real value, justifying that it will not be paid on time. If you do not pay on time, the value may increase. In the government, as Minister of Defence, there should be a retired policeman who knows the security operations, in turn, a doctor should be Minister of Health, in Energy, an engineer he should be the Minister, and so on. But here it is the other way around: if you place 100 votes to the politician and you are a hotelier, they will place you in charge of the Ministry of Public Health or other that has nothing to do with you and you know nothing about. That has to end.	
n)Academic/Practitioner/entrepreneur Independent citizen, free Protestant believer (Colombia: Teacher. Cuba: Tourism professional.	132.García Herreros, was perhaps one of the most important Catholic priests in Colombia in the last couple of decades, as he had a daily TV show called: God's minute "El Minuto de Dios". García Herreros was related to Pablo Escobar and he recognized publically that he received money from Escobar. He stated: "Do	133.Here it is common to evade the law and to pay bribes to get things done. Otherwise, you could wait all your life	134.	135.For us in the German-Swiss tradition truth and facts are perhaps more important than relations and it seems that in Latin contexts is the other way around. The Bible is our source of truth for us [Protestants]. Latin contexts are influenced by Roman and Greek philosophy, where truth is relative. This paradigm has now influenced all the academia and the secular world. [Jesus and Pontius Pilatus].

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Academic)	not think that I have become corrupt… if the money is used for good causes, it is not a dirty money". [This was a public endorsement that a Church leader made to one of the most dangerous criminals in history. This could have sent a message of "the end justify the means" and, there is nothing too bad, as you can always get an "indulgence" from the Church, everything is ok.] Our protestant religion helps to reduce a little the strong tendency we have rooted to act with corruption and which is legacy of the Church of Rome and our culture. Corruption comes in our history. When the Spanish and Portuguese arrived here to "saquear" all the gold and wealth of the indigenous people in the Americas they invested little in the development of their peoples either. That's why even until today, Spain and Portugal are not the wealthiest countries in Europe, but on the contrary. Their monarchies were Catholic domains that passed most of the wealth directly to their "boss", the papacy in the Vatican. Those elites are the families that govern until today.	without anything happening. Here we have a saying: 'The government pretends to pay me, and I pretend to work' (*El gobierno hace como que me paga y yo hago como que trabajo*). (Compare to - Do or do not the payment comes. Colombia.)		The indulgences were just the tip of the iceberg of corruption in the Catholic Church. They allowed one to do as one pleased. If you repent, for instance, contribute either money or say some Hail Mary prayers, you are completely absolved by a priest. You could have even killed or abused people. The principle of forgiveness of sins in the Roman Catholic Church is: 'ego te absolvo' ...in Latin ''I forgive you''. According to it, only the priests and the Pope have the authority to forgive sins. That's what Luther also fought in the Reformation as the Bible clearly states that only God can forgive sins. After the Lutheran Reformation, indulgences are supposedly overcome in the Catholic Church. Indulgences are forbidden in the Catholic Church and that's why they say that the 'protest' [Protestant Reformation] is now over. However, Pope Francis still offers indulgences to his followers on Twitter. If you add to the indulgences thing, the issue of having a bunch of Catholic priests with a lot of sexual abuse scandals as your ethical reference, you won't feel compelled to act well by such human justice that claims to be divine.
o)Afro-Caribbean/indigenous religion Priest (Colombia: Rastafarian, Cuba: Babalawo, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	136.	137.	138.	139.
p)Government officer / Former Government officer (Colombia: central government, Cuba: central government, Uruguay: regional government, Colonia, Switzerland: Federal government)	140.What shocks me is that several of my former colleagues were unworthy of the salary they were earning. They were just there as clientelist political payments (cuotas políticas) for votes they or their political "godfathers" had placed to senators or the executive government. The same Vicepresident German Vargas Lleras recognized publically some time ago that 75% of the government posts in Colombia are not on the basis of a competitive meritocratic process for public servants but chosen by politicians by favouritism "by finger" (a dedo). One former colleague used to say shamelessly "either if I work or I do not, anyway I get my payment" (haga o no haga, llega la paga). Another one did not even had a computer to work but went to work at the time he wanted to pretend he would work and receive the payment at the end of the month. Cases like this are the common denominator in	141.In Cuba, we now have 'indirect democracy', which means that you vote for representatives who vote for governors. Here, Cubans say that 'Fidel gives everything' [to the people] and the State is infallible, like God. However, the 'new man' whom Che Guevara dreamt of has become the corrupt Cuban and a hooker (Jinetera). Today there are very low moral standards here. Immorality is rife, Jineteras. Rampant state corruption and everywhere else. Unnecessary bureaucracy. But before the Revolution, there was much more corruption, aristocracy and Catholicism. To whom shall the needy look? Shall they look to the government or the	142.There is a loss of values that is reflected from childhood to the adult age, and then there are lies and corruption. It is the loss of the original work values that immigrants first brought. Earlier, if I had one hectare of the field and you had the machinery, we got together and work and share something. That value of work and then the communion of sharing what we work; does not exist anymore.	143.

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	most public institutions in our country. They [the Colombian government] would ask people a bribe to give you a service that is your right (such as electricity) and then steal the money of the bribe and still delay the service. I used to work for the Colombian government and they wanted me to be corrupt but I didn't accept it, so they threw me out. I was fired for doing the right thing. My former boss used to say that "if you are humble here, you are a naive innocent, you have to be a 'son of a bitch' [bad boy] to be respected and that it goes well with you" (opposite principle of the gospel). And it really seemed to be that this logic is real. If you act well, they take advantage of you. But if you are the "bad boy", then you gain the respect of others and it goes well with your work within the government. That way [being the bad boy] you get "recycled" in different government institutions and escalate in positions. It is like the Colombian people serve the privileged government and not the other way around as it should be. If you try to defend a humble cause such as the oppressed people, rights of minorities, women, or environment, then you are seeing as a radical or worse as an NGO infiltrated in the government. You just have to follow the commands of your superiors that come to the president, without question it. At the end of the day, when you are in the government you have many privileges that a normal citizen does not have. In the presidential elections of 2010, Mockus, the candidate from the Green Party said he will raise the taxes, and the people got disappointed and prefer to choose a liar, the current President said that he would not increase taxes and was the first thing he did. One of the shameless cases here is the so-called "the Great Colombian" (History channel). This is a Colombian two-times president who typically applies the Machiavelli (todo vale) "the end justifies the means" methods and belongs to the Opus Dei. He was so close to Pablo Escobar, in the list of the DEA as the narcotrafficker 82 in the USA, with judicial processes in The Hague, and the Justice court of Colombia for violations of human rights, with literally hundreds of other unsuccessful judicial	church? They are both immoral, and if we focus on them, we will become more immoral. We can be better and lower corruption only by looking at God's perfection.		

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	processes in Colombia. Media and most Colombians (as for the polls of favourability and those who vote for the "No" in the peace referendum) still consider him as the "greatest Colombian in history". For no one in the world is a secret that the mafia case of the Ex-honourable Senator Pablo Escobar Gaviria was not an isolated one, but the shameless case, part of the roots of this mafia culture. He is even taken as "the model to follow", and his cousin (Jose Obdulio Gaviria), is a current senator of the same party of which Uribe is currently the leader.			
q)Catholic/Ecumenical Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: Central government, Cuba: National Council of Churches, Uruguay: Military/Church media, Switzerland: Catholic central committee)	144.	145.	146.	147.I think the whole system of Switzerland is of such a nature that everything next to your town has a strong impact. Every unit has its own police, its own prison, etc. Social control is quite efficient because we have no big cities. I hadn't been in Berlin for some years but I went there this past spring and if you see a city of two or three million people and compare it to Zürich, you will realize how easy it is to control Zürich as opposed to cities like that. As an example, if you saw this accident with the tower in London, that would have been different in Switzerland. The control of other buildings is much stronger because everything is near. The office in Bern in charge of these matters is not far away but it is in the city of Zürich that this is controlled. We have a strong old interest to make these things more or less in an orderly fashion. We shouldn't forget that our banks have money that shouldn't have been there, so we are not 100% clean. It was not illegal but it was not very moral either. Think about the old Switzerland during the Apartheid in South Africa. That was not very nice. The state does not allow church taxes to flow directly into our hierarchical structure, but to those who organise themselves to collect this source of income. This idea also exists in the United States, where there is no taxation without representation, and it is applied to the Church as well. This is a unique case in the world. For example in canton Zürich, we have a bishop, priests and parishes, and beside this, we have at the canton level and in the different towns or parishes, an organization for Catholics and Protestants that come together for political decisions in the assembly of the community to decide especially about finances. They have also the right to re-elect the priest. The bishop formally proposes a priest, but if the local Catholics do not elect him, he will receive no pay. This is quite a special tradition. It goes back to medieval times in Switzerland, and

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
				was strengthened by the Reformation. This led to the elimination of hierarchical thinking. And then the state organised church life to a certain degree.
r)Protestant Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: none, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Political-Church officer)	148.	149.	150.	151.
s)Embassy of the Country at the Vatican (Colombian Embassy at the Vatican, Cuban Embassy at the Vatican (no answer), Uruguayan Embassy at the Vatican, Swiss Embassy in Ljubljana)	152.	153.	154.	155.

3.CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
a)Roman Catholic Priest 1, Jesuit (Colombia: Jesuit, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Jesuit)	156.Before 1886 it was the United States of Colombia, a Liberal and Federal creation. In 1886 is the origin Republic of Colombia, which its first Constitution was marked by Conservatism and centralism. After the fall of the Federalism, three institutions made it possible to join together the first Republic: The Central Bank (that came from the colony); the Army, and the Catholic Church. In 1887 Colombia signed a Concordat, which expressly states that the Catholic Church is the religion of the State and is an essential element. But it was Simon Bolivar who asked the Holy See to sign the first Concordat with Colombia (New Granada), signed by Salvador Jiménez de Enciso. Bolivar did not want the separation of the State and the Church, but he wanted the Church as a moralizer element of the State. There was the institution of the "patronato", and Bolivar sought the legitimacy of the new State in the Concordat with the Holy See. That allowed continuing the "patronato" without the Spanish Crown. The Catholic Church is not a Colombian institution, but very present from the Independence from Spain and before.	157.	158.	159.Catholic Churches within Switzerland are not organised on a national level but on the cantonal level, as all Catholic affairs are organised this way. There are, however, organisations that coordinate the different Catholic parishes.

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
b)Roman Catholic Priest 2. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: Other, Uruguay: Other, Switzerland: Other)	160.Overall, there has always been a good relationship between Church and State, both, nationally and locally. When some [governmental] points go against Christian religious principles, then the church gets involved. The church gives its opinion and makes decisions. When there are other issues, the Episcopal Conference of Colombia intervenes, which represents us, but the Conference also advocates other denominations (Baptist, Adventist, etc.).	161.Fidel, in 2000, met with the bishops and acknowledged that God's commandments are good for society after decades without dialogue, but he always had a dialogue with the pope.	162.Uruguay was one of the first countries in Latin America where the separation of church and state took place. That marked this relationship and made the Church its way. When the church was separated from the state, the patronage right was also lost, which did have its difficulties at the beginning of the 20th century. The separation between the Church and state and the Batle government were in the midst of a conflict, and then there was a little delay in the appointment of some bishops. But later the Church did not have much interference from the state and vice versa. The Church is now free to express itself as another actor in society. The Church did not have anymore the presence in the government areas as it still has in other countries. Here, it is not usual to see the presence of the authorities in religious acts, except in a personal capacity. In Uruguay, religion is very relegated to the private and personal spheres. However, there is now a fluid dialogue at a general level, with the government and the authorities. There is a cordial relationship currently. Each one [is] at its own place.	163.Switzerland and the Holy See do have a bilateral agenda, but compared to a regular sovereign nation, this cannot be considered a priority. The principal work of the Nunciature in Bern has to do with the Catholic Church in Switzerland. The Holy See is unique among embassies because it represents a unique entity among sovereign entities in our world. The Holy See's main interests would not go beyond keeping channels of communication open and cultivating good relations with the [Swiss] Confederation. At the level of the [Swiss] Confederation, there is nothing specific regarding a current canonical instrument that regulates the relations [with the Holy See]. With individual cantons, there would be custom and some older historical agreements of various juridical value. I have never seen an exhaustive catalogue of the same. The Swiss Confederation does not discuss topics such as Education, Lands and Properties, Religious Freedom, and Ecumenism with the Nunciature in Bern. The Swiss Guard has always had its own agent and discusses directly without an intermediary. The specific character of Swiss democracy leaves little room for development [of a new agreement with the Holy See (i.e. Concordat)]. Only some kind of state crisis at the cantonal level might provoke discussion and perhaps facilitate negotiating some international agreement.
c)Roman Catholic Priest 3. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	164.It must be recognised that over the life of the country the Catholic Church has deeply permeated the entire culture from the faith and values. For many years there was a culture of faith that permeated the various realities of life in the country: education, family, politics, culture, economy etc. But we must recognise that over the years and particularly in recent decades, the [Catholic Church] influence has been declining as a result of de-Christianization, loss of faith, and loss of true values. I think that the powerful leadership that provided the Church has been declining. Worldliness environment becomes tight against the values that seek to raise the spirit, and many of those environments are in the state institutions. We must also humbly recognise that the Church, which are not only the sacred ministers but also the lay, have lacked more firmness and conviction when living and preaching the Gospel values. To influence in the conversion and transformation of	165.	166.	167.

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	institutions, we must begin with the same conversion of ourselves. It is required the solid formation of Catholic leaders to commit themselves resolutely to permeate of Gospel the ambivalent as politics, government, justice, education, economics, etc.			
d)Roman Catholic Religious 4. (Colombia: Nun, Cuba: Seminarian, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Deacon)	168.All depends on the attitude of the person who is in government. There are some who are in public office and are favourable for the church because they value the presence of the church and outcomes such as education. There are others who are hostile to faith or church and then come the difficulties.	169.The topic of the relations of the Church and the State here is creepy, and it can mean a conviction.	170.	171.
e)Roman Catholic Theologian 5. (Colombia: Theologian, Cuba: Theologian, Uruguay: Theologian, Switzerland: Theologian)	172.Influence of the Church on the state but on contrary direction I believe that in the past, there was an influence of the state and its policies toward the Catholic Church. In the 60s, 70s, and 80s, whoever belonged to the hierarchy, had to belong to influential families in the country or to be relatives of a politician. From the 1991 Constitution with the establishment of the "Secular State" (which is no longer consecrated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus), direct separation of church and state did occur. However, as history shows, you cannot talk of complete separation, because there has been that historical connection between Church and State. Politics have a huge influence on the Catholic Church and other religious institutions. That means that it is politics that influence the Church and this is because we are heirs of everything that left the Spanish colonisation. And what did the Spanish colony have? A Catholic Queen who obeyed a pope. This means a Queen and a Church that determined that everyone who belonged to their dominion had to belong to their religious movement.	173.In 1961 the relations between church and state were impossible. The Church was the largest landowner in Cuba and then the US. They supported the revolution, and they thought that their lands would be protected. That was not the case. - Now, the closeness between the pope and state are necessary because it suits the state and it is convenient to the Church. The Church wants to receive privileges and status, and the State wants to show piousness and social sensitiveness. It is like a Mafia kiss (un beso de mafiosas).	174.Uruguay historically has looked much more to Europe than to the rest of Latin America. It is important to remember, for example, that in Uruguay there are no indigenous people because it was the government -not that of the colony, but when Uruguay became independent-, which considers that the indigenous people are a hindrance to development and that is why there is genocide against them. Uruguay is always looking towards Europe (we are white, there are no indigenous people, there are few black people who "do not count"). That look towards Europe is what shaped Uruguay, especially what it meant since the end of the 18th century with the French Revolution, the 19th century and until the beginning of the 20th century. Paris was the place you looked at. When I studied in secondary school, there were still more hours of French than English. Now that has changed; but that shows a bit how Uruguay tried to be like a mirror of what Europe or at least France was regarding equality, freedom, fraternity, the century of lights. All the positivist philosophy of Comte had a lot of influence in Uruguayan nineteenth-century thinkers, philosophers and writers. That was the intellectual background that imposed in Uruguay many achievements, not only in the separation of church and state matter, but on the issue of how democracy is built, the vote of women, laws towards the equality of men and women, and such things began to have a place in Uruguay at a very early stage. As a Christian, I believe that the separation of state and church was a blessing for the	175.

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Stakeholder	Colombia	Cuba	Uruguay	Switzerland
			Uruguayan. I think it helped a lot, I do not know if so much on the issue of human development, but at least for the church to be a poor church, not so linked to military-political power, as in other countries in Latin America, but I believe that This not only from a sociological, political, but also theological perspective, the early separation of church and state since the beginning of the 20th century (1917) was really something that greatly helped the process.- As for the Catholic Church, the Church-State separation in Uruguay helped to have an understanding of what it means to be a poor church, not linked to power. That allowed the Uruguayan Church not to have so much responsibility, for example when it was the time of the dictatorship or not to be linked with the political-economic power of the country. Churches are human organisations, wherein all of them the element that one has to take into account -when analysing any type of human organization-, one must also be taken into account there. One of those elements for me, very important, is the issue of power. The church can also be considered as a political subject, in the sense of exercising power, not necessarily political supporter, but it is another actor in the society that plays its power in relation to other actors. While there has been, historically, on the one hand, a series of events that have caused the division of the churches, these events allow us to see that many times - if we take the Reformation, but if we take the Schism of the West -, the political situation or the historical, political and cultural context has occupied a weight, many times, -in my opinion-, more important than theological discussions. That is why today, for example the Pope has agreed with the Ecumenical Patriarch to issues related to the Schism of the West; The Catholic Church has signed a document on Justification with the Lutherans. Then we must see that it is not exclusively, probably, mainly theological issues that have caused the divisions, but issues that I encompass in the term "political", but that it has to do with history, with culture, with the context in general, with the society in which these divisions occur.	

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
f)Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (Colombia: Baptist, Cuba: Pentecostal, Uruguay: Evangelical, Switzerland: Other).	176.We find a significant difference in the balance of power between the Protestant and the Catholic churches and the government. It is very marked, very clear. For example, I recently discovered that the government had given some funds to a Catholic school to help rebuild and fix its infrastructure. Whereas we have our Baptist school that has been here even before the Colombian Catholics came. When we request any type of funding from the government, they argue that they cannot fund a private institution. But this Catholic school is supposed to be a private institution as well: semi-private, semi-state, a combination of both. We are talking about millions for them to fix their infrastructure. In our case, we are not eligible for those funds. The former governor just came out of power not so long ago. She attends the Catholic Church. And as soon as she came into power, within a year, she basically rebuilt and expanded the Catholic school, and it was ready to go, from one day to another. It is difficult to deal with the government regarding any type of aid whatsoever when it comes to the Baptists or any other Protestant church. Also, you can often see a close relationship between the Catholic Church and the government in our territory. It is very evident. All of our pastors know it, they have seen it, and when we talk about it in meetings, the case of the school, for instance, we marvel that because the school is semi-private and semi-public, the government has to fund it. These are the excuses that you end up getting. They [colombian government] told me, “Do you realise they need an engineer with a Master's degree like you at the environmental agency?” I said, “No, I am not interested”. “It is a good pay!” they said. “Yes, to lie, to falsify documents, to take reports and say that the hotel is not really contaminating the ocean by releasing all of the solid waste into the sea? That is what they want to pay me millions to do? My conscience is not for sale”. So I refused the job. I could be making big money. I could be working right now in the transportation department but can I? No! Because all of these things are permeated with corruption, and I just cannot work under that system. So I decided to continue working as a pastor, which is my ministry, instead of using those other skills that	177.Even now relations with the state are not comfortable. From 2000 to today it has improved a lot, but still, you cannot legally open a new church. We are only allowed to open branches of established Churches. New Churches are undocumented.- But Raul Castro has improved the situation. Today nobody is persecuted or discriminated on religion basis. There are even Christian groups in the government and in the prisons and in the military.- Still, The Roman Catholic Church is now more privileged by the State and stronger in power than the Protestant, although media says in Cuba Roman Catholicism is a minority. When Franciscus (Bergoglio) came, we saw the media hype and high importance the government gave to this event.	178.Our Church is apolitical. It does not touch politics. If you participate and work in a church office, it is clearly a spiritual work only. A work towards the soul, towards the Lord Jesus; Almighty God, the Son of God, the Redeemer and his promises, which we hope and trust, that he will come again to seek his people. There are no political parties; there is no talk of politics. That's why there is no such friction with the state.	179.The general attitude of the government is secular. The relation between the state and the churches is getting weaker and weaker, except for the Roman Catholic Church. Catholic parties are strong and the embassy of the Vatican in Bern has a far greater influence than the Protestant churches, which have no embassy. Also, the Protestant population is decreasing, and Protestant leaders have, in general, inferior feelings of themselves and admire the Catholic Church very much.

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	could otherwise benefit my people but they have to stay there because I am not going to compromise with them.			
g)Protestant Free Church Pastor 2. (Seventh Day Adventist - SDA) (Colombia: SDA Pastor, Cuba: SDA Pastor, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: SDA Pastor).	180.Catholic churches enjoy benefits to the state. For example, they are not bothered for parking their vehicles around their temples, but when it is a non-Catholic church, the traffic police fining reaches the parishioners for parking their car in front of a place where they are worshipping God. Also, the Constitution and the law says that both the temple and the rectories are tax exempt; the Catholic Church will be the only one that applies for the 100% exemption. For a non-Catholic denomination, the exemption applies only to where people worship, where there is a pulpit. But if buildings also contain Church administrative offices, among others, taxes are applied to them, and it is not worth complaining based on the law, we must pay. But we cannot say that everything has been negative. From 1991 to here, we have enjoyed some privileges that we did not have before: as tax exemption for the area where we have the cult. With a card that identifies us as pastors, we have the possibility of hospital visits outside regular schedules. Another aspect was the fact of recognising with the state marriages conducted by pastors, giving them compliance also on the civilian side. But the total of what is wished, it was not possible. For example, we are not entitled to state grants or scholarships; it only applies to Catholic schools. As a church we are apolitical; indeed we do not allow any politician to proselytise through the pulpit. Everyone makes his or her own decisions on whom to support in the polls based on the freedom of conscience. Parishioners are invited to participate freely deciding to exercise their democratic duty as a citizen. Jesus said, " Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's." [Matthew 22, 21]. While we are on this earth, we must participate in the decisions of who governs us. As an organisation, our Church does not support any political party. Being apolitical, we have no politician who represents us. We do not appoint pastors or church members to occupy positions of political responsibility in the	181.After 1990 religious meetings in particular houses were authorised, but not the construction of churches. - Today the government allows us to promote our literature on television. On 16th of August of last year, the President of the Adventist Church is for the first time on television. That was because SDA Church had reached 1,000 blood donations.	182.	183.

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	government. Although there are brothers who freely support politicians and they are free to do so. When there are situations that affect us, such as a church tax reform, for example, what we do is to go to these authorities and pray for them, talk to them, tell them who we are, we invite them to our church, we make them know ourselves and tell them of our principles. We give them books, and we try to have the best relationships with the people that God has placed there. Because we believe that God puts and removes kings and we have our greatest respect for them. But we do not partake of the deeds that may accuse them. We defend our rights as an organisation as far as possible or as far as the Lord allows. Internally, since we are followers of the Lord, He is our main Ruler, and when we have God, He teaches us to be respectful of the authorities He has placed in each country. The Catholic Church and other religious denominations are directly linked to politics with their representatives and political parties. That is why this has sparked in part the persecutions of what we were talking about. Because there is a principle: "Religion and politics should be like water and oil ", they should not be mixed and who have sought to mix politics with religion, has brought disastrous results.			
h)Protestant Mainline (old) institutional Pastor 3. (In Latin America free historical churches, in Switzerland official Church-State Reformed Evangelical) (Colombia: Presbyterian, Cuba: Methodist, Uruguay: Lutheran, Switzerland: Reformed Evangelical)	184.I think the [Catholic] church has lost some power. When the Concordat was sued and with the Constitution of 1991, of course, changing from a religious [Roman Catholic] state to a secular state, power is lost in the sense that the [Catholic] Church had not anymore a strong interference, at least openly. The fact that the Constitution of 1991 said that there is religious freedom gave more strength to the emerging church, which is evangelical or Protestant. The Catholic Church lost some elements, but in general, it remained the same due to the inertial power it has. There remains much preponderance of the [Catholic] Church, even at public events. You can see it in all scenarios. The Catholic Church, in theoretical terms, lost the possibility to be the church that commands and defines in Colombia, but in practice, after 1991, there have not been greater things. What the Catholic Church has lost is the interference regarding the vote, because, in this context, the Evangelical Church has been growing and making compromises with politicians that	185.2.2 *Revolutionary or post-Republican Period (Time of the revolution triumph) 1959 onwards* *2.2.1. Non-communist revolutionary period (Friendly coexistence of the State and Churches*) After the progressive era, other problems existed that justified the revolution. As always, all those characteristic phenomena of Latin America such as social problems, the equality problem, and social justice. All those issues brought alternative movements in reaction to the circle of power (hegemony). - The reforms that the revolution raised were in principle welcomed by the Protestant Churches. - There was a sort of sympathy between the new government and the Protestant Churches. *2.2.2. Marxist-communist revolutionary period. (Conflict and enmity between the State and Churches) State – Church relations.* After the revolution, significant problems began in	186.Uruguay is considered a secular country unlike Argentina, which is Catholic. The president of Argentina must be Catholic to reach the presidency. Menem, for example, was Muslim but had to convert to the Catholic Church, to be able to exercise the office of president. The other positions do not matter, but the presidency does. In contrast, Uruguay is a secular country, and the Religion' issue does not have much influence in the state. Although now the Evangelical or Protestant churches see with concern that there is a greater influence of the Catholic Church in state matters since Sturla was named cardinal by Pope Francis (Jorge Bergoglio). President Vásquez' wife is also very Catholic, and this adds with this issue with Sturla. Uruguay is a secular country, and it troubles a little that suddenly that difference appears.	187. Until 1970, living together without being legally married (cohabitation) was forbidden in Switzerland. Uri was the last canton to accept cohabitation. In the past, only the first son could inherit the parents' land in Switzerland, perhaps also due to the biblical tradition.

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	previously were uniquely the Catholic Church's field. Earlier in politics, it was only the Catholic Church bearing the word, and there was never representation from other churches. Even today at the schools, jails, the national army, or the hospitals need a Protestant chaplain, but there is no budget for them, only for Catholic priests, which are paid by the state. I do not think the [Catholic] church has lost too much. Influence of the Church on the State The Catholic Church continues to dominate and has a significant influence on state institutions. There are hints of some sort of political influence of some Protestants, but at the individual level, not so much collectively. There is no influence of the Protestant church. The Catholic Church remains the standard bearer at all levels, and it has an influence on the courts [Justice], in the Congress [Laws], and in the executive government.	1960 and especially in 1961 with the declaration of the socialist character of the revolution. - A significant problem is when Marxism is declared as the official ideology and when the Soviet model is copied. That means a socialist, revolution of a single party; the Communist Party becomes a totalitarian regime. - Following this, properties of the church and American missionaries, at least in the Methodist church, were all confiscated. The same happened in other denominations, only very few remained. - All properties of considerable value, which were built by missionaries, were transferred to the State and even today the vast majority still belong to the State.		
i)Ecumenical academic theologian. Colombia: Catholic ecumenical theologian, Cuba: ecumenical theologian, Uruguay: ecumenical academic, Switzerland: ecumenical theologian)	188.I think that here in Colombia there is an idea of Catholic Church of dominant Roman rite with an exclusivist thinking (outside the Church there is no salvation), with a very strong alliance between the Catholic Church and State. And then, not due to the fact of being religious freedom written in the constitution is culture changed. Here there's a fetish, thinking that just having laws will transform reality when what transforms really is the pedagogical and educational experience of cultural change within ethical and moral frameworks. We have many rules, but few are fulfiled.	189.Department of religious affairs of government has infiltrated all religions in Cuba. This infiltration structure, Fidel could have learnt from the Jesuits - Bishop and Pope interceded for the release of Fidel from prison, then after, the Peter Pan Operation has occurred. Then, the Church is not monolithic.	190.The Uruguayan government helped the Waldensians. The Uruguayan government used to give credits to the Waldensians through the Republic Bank in projects that also interested the government. Then the Waldensians bought territory and built the temple, for that reason there is a famous book here "The Temple and the school". Until one of the last Waldensian colonies, which was intended to form around 1930, the White party opposed giving that credit for that colony, based on the separation of the church and the state article. The White party said that the government was going to give money to the Waldensians to "make a Temple", and there the colonisation of the Waldensians was cut off. Otherwise, Uruguay would have changed a lot, if there had been more Waldensian colonies because they have a way of working that is very different from the Creoles. -Now there is an excellent relationship between the different religions and with the municipality. However, what is certain is that the state does not provide any economic assistance to Churches. If you go with a religious project, they do not lend you any help and even more now with the current government. Before, it was more accessible, but there is a very marked division between church and state. So much marked, that	191.

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			now there is even a law that approves of calling "Family Festival" what we formerly called "Christmas". Since 1818 there is in Article 5 of the Constitution the separation of the church and the state. Until 1818, what had been built with the help of the state went to the Catholic Church or the other various cults, and then they are responsible for the maintenance of those buildings. This was between the government of Batle and Baltazar. The Batle government was a socialist, of liberal tendency. A little Marxist, too, I think Batle was an atheist. -We Uruguayans are not religious. I go to church very little. Nueva Helvecia has 12 thousand inhabitants, about 80% are baptised as Catholics, and if you go to the church, there are only 4 or 5 "old women" who always go. And if you go to the Waldensian church, there are 4 or 5 "old women" who go always. I think all this goes hand in hand with the separation of church and state. My mother was Catholic but I did not go to the church often, and I passed this on to my children.	
j)Ecumenical Pastor. Colombia: none, Cuba: Ecumenical, Uruguay: Ecumenical, Switzerland: Ecumenical)	192. Ley Concha preventing migration	There are no Marxist dialogues with Christians and vice versa. It is a rampant ignorance from both parties. (Very important to explore what is behind this)- The revolution thinking is very close and only accepts Marti's anti-imperialist thought. - The external US blockage is blamed for all the problems in Cuba; when in no external blockage we also had issues. 193.	194. the beginning, those relations were difficult, but then they settled, they accepted, the government had to adapt to people and so it was done. Until the government of José Batlle Ordoñez, here in Uruguay, it was like in Argentina, the Catholic Church was imposed, where the state and church were one, the state was Catholic, then it's over. The government stopped being Catholic (and turned Laic) in the government of Batle. Catholics dominated at the beginning, although a lot of evangelical communities came. In contrast, the Argentinian government is still with religion, the Uruguayan does not like that. -However, there is a very good, human, cordial, and social relationship between Church and State. We have a Cardinal in Uruguay after a long time of not having any. The president is now Catholic, and there are one and a half million Catholics. Basically, people did not want that structure of the church stuck with the state to give a bit of respect to other religions and be more democratic.	195.The Swiss Protestant Church is in many ways like the Swiss federal government. For example, there is not a single head but a multi-party system. Here in Switzerland, even the Catholic Church is different because this is not a hierarchical society. But Catholics are subject to the Vatican anyway. This is why there is a branch of Catholics (*Christkatholisch*) that doesn't accept the Pope's authority. Protestants and Catholics are not united here just because Protestants refuse to accept the Pope's authority in Switzerland.

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k)Non-Christian (atheist, agnostic) (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: Academic/Intellectual, Uruguay: Academic/Intellectual, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	Today the Colombian Episcopal Conference has selected a group of bishops who accompany the negotiations with the ELN, which shows a position of trying to put an end to political violence in Colombia. It could be said that the Catholic Church at this time, as an institution, is an important stakeholder in building peace in Colombia, despite the ambiguity that it may have been identified in the past. I think it no longer plays the same role as 60 years ago and since the beginning of the Republic. Of course, there are sectors within the Catholic Church that are much more orthodox, and this is normal in any social institution in which human beings believe. This means that thinking of homogeneous and monolithic institutions would be a simplification of reality. And I think there are some more open sectors that one could identify the Jesuits for example. But there are also others that have been slightly retarding, such as the Opus Dei as a clear example. There is also a large segment of the Catholic Church that is associated with all the military institutions, as Chaplains of the troops. When one thinks of all this spiritual scaffolding that the Colombian army forces have, is only supported by the Catholic Church in its entirety. No pastors of Christian [Protestant] churches, no Buddhist monks, are allowed in the army (i.e., in all battalions and sites). The only religious institution that has a place in the whole military structure is the Catholic Church. And if one tries to understand what happened in Colombia between 1978 and 1982 in Turbay's status of the opposition, where the military was involved in torture and forced separations, then it is worth asking, What happened or what has been the role of the Catholic Church within these institutions? But that is very opaque, and it is very difficult to see further. In fact, I had not thought about it until recently that I was invited to the Military School of Cadets and I got astonished to realise the preponderant role the Catholic Church has there. I would say is that there are different sectors within the Catholic Church absolutely committed to civilian life, human rights, and the	196.Operation Peter Pan was designed to harm the revolution. The Roman Catholic Church performed this (especially a Priest whose last name was Walsh in Miami). They took thousands of newly born children to be raised in Catholic orphanages in the US. - Fidel used to say: "Who betrays Christ betrays the revolution". In the fifth Communist congress, in Santiago de Cuba, 1991 the Communist Party agreed for the first time that religious may be part of the party. This was part of the correction of communism errors. [or answer the political agenda of the Soviet Union fall] The system (communism) returns to the churches part of what he had taken. 16 April 1961. Fidel Castro declares Cuba a socialist state. - Catholic priests who had conspired against the revolution were deported. - For the government, believers are not reliable or good revolutionaries. Therefore, it existed an official form to fill if one was a believer or had relatives abroad. If that was the case, the person was not reliable for the government.- It is not forbidden to go to Church, but it existed social pressure to not go to church. If one denied being a believer in the official form and was seen in the church, he was taken apart.- However, this has changed since 10 years ago. According to the new constitution, one may have any belief.- Raul Castro like Fidel were both educated and impressed by a Jesuit high school.	197.I would separate state – church relationship by periods. At the beginning of the 20th century, the relationship (state - church) in 1917 was not the best, especially in the direction Catholic Church to the state. But when they (the Church) got used to the new rules of the game, they finally settled down, and they have been pretty clear. With the emergence of all these movements of evangelical currents of all kinds, I believe that the balance of power changes. For example, the Chair of the Chamber of Representatives and Chamber of Deputies, -Gerardo Amarilla-, he is evangelical. Then, from that point of view, the political relationship of the evangelical church has grown, especially since the National Party, which is one of the two traditional parties, of which there are many evangelical deputies. When Gerardo Amarilla took office, the first thing he said was that the Law of God should be above of what the Republic is. Who says something like that in Uruguay, can be meant to be quite out of place. In the Uruguayan state, it is quite striking that someone says that. It is quite surprising. There is a thing in Uruguay known as the evangelical bench within the parliament that are deputies representing the National party. I know that there are pastors who were elected deputies and there is also one that is part of the Colorado party that is the other traditional party. In 1917 onwards -for about 20 years-, there was progress in legislation. The separation of church and state was not given out of nothing. But, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, civil marriage was first recognised by the state under the Government of Rivera. Fitzgibbon, a US political scientist, gives three reasons why the Catholic Church was weakened in Uruguay. 1) Late Spanish colonisation, just at the beginning of the eighteenth century and the religious fervour that existed in Spain or elsewhere in South America was quite weak at that time when it arrived in Uruguay. If we take into account the case of other Latin American countries, colonisation begins before the eighteenth century. 2) The British and French, economic, social and cultural influence. The English arrived in	198. Religious law has strongly influenced the Swiss legal system for many centuries. As far as I know, until now nobody ever dared to scrutinise that in a single research. The influence of the Church was mostly dominant until the mid 18th century. However, the influencing process worked very differently depending on the confession. A significant change occurred in 1798 with the French Revolution. However, its influence [i.e. the French Revolution's] did not last because the Helvetic Republic ended already in 1803. We had 25 Cantons until 1978. There is a large gap between Protestant and Catholic cantons, most of which have their own tradition of how religion influenced their laws. Religion has distinctively influenced inheritance law, Protestant marriage, natural law, canon law, and others depending on denomination, area, period, and fields. During the era of Mediation and Restauration religious influences turned very strong again. The Jesuits, for example, dominated the educational system in Lucerne [same as Paraguay] and strong Catholic influence in Central Switzerland caused a war of secession in 1847. Between 1840 and 1880, the Catholic and Protestant traditions even strengthened their differences due to the *Kulturkampf*. The influence of the Catholic Church was strictly reduced at the federal level after the establishment of the Swiss Confederation in 1848. However, several Catholic cantons continued to uphold canonical ideals, and the clergy was actively involved in political processes. Also, people's religious beliefs strongly influenced the political process of creating law via direct democracy. A certain impact is still evident today.

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	rights of the less advantaged populations. Francisco de Roux, Javier Giraldo, Mauricio García Durán, Monsignor Dario Echeverry, and a bunch of other priests of the Catholic Church are 100% committed and are an essential part of the peace challenge in Colombia today. They opt for a different country. But on the other hand, there is a die-hard orthodox sector that is unwilling to do so. I give you the clearest example; I was at a meeting of bishops in Pereira, with the Episcopal Conference of Pereira. There was an extreme intransigent, recalcitrant group still scared of the atheistic communism that would take the country. And in the same space, it was an impressive progressive people that said you have to fight and they began to discuss in front of me. I do believe that there is a thick tension. On the one hand, the Orthodox sector is concerned on how do we maintain the traditional values of the Colombian society? And that involves going through hierarchical, static institutions that defend Colombia as a Catholic country, having its armed forces, "those heroes of the nation that defend us from those bad, sons of the devil" [ironic sense]. And on the other side, there is an opposite sector that believes that this country needs priority for those disadvantaged people and to remove all these hierarchical structures so that indeed the country can move forward. I think that here ecumenical sectors (the ecumenical peace table) play a crucial role in all the progress of peacebuilding projects. As well as on many of the signs of progress of the negotiations to de-escalate the armed conflict between civil society and guerrillas.		Uruguay in the mid-nineteenth century with the aim at exploiting and taking advantage of the state of development of Uruguay and also investing in different things. One of such investment projects was the railroad company and other types of companies that did not exist in Uruguay at that time. The French influence comes from the judicial and legal aspects. The Uruguayan legal system has much of the French code. 3) The last thing is the mega immigration that occurred in the nineteenth century, especially of Italians and Spaniards, for whom the religious part was a little secondary as they were merchants and all kinds of people who came to do business. More currently, there was a discussion some months ago, as there was an attempt by the Catholic Church to place a statue of the Virgin Mary on the Rambla de Montevideo. But the initiative was stopped by the Government, and I believe that until today that problem is still being discussed.	
I)Non-practising Christian (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	199.	200.	201.	202. I have never thought of church-state relations systematically. There are several cases of separations and mixtures. If you are in Sweden, there's no out-of-state Church. It is a complete monopoly. On the contrary, in the United States, Churches are competing, and there is no monopoly, but there are profit organisations with real competition among Churches. In Denmark, only 5% of the population are still believers, but 95% of inhabitants belong to the State-Church of Denmark. [In] Denmark Churches are empty [like the Swiss ones], and Brazilians meet on every Sunday there to socialise, as this gives you the feeling that you are not that alone.

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				In a Paper of 1998 in the act of sociology appeared that Nordic countries have high levels of trust in the state, which largely explains why no conflict between church and state occurs. The contrary happens in France, where the Church convinces people not to trust the state and vice versa. In Switzerland, Protestants have maintained that the Catholic Church is evil and creates distrust. But religion is the vehicle and not the cause.
m)Practitioner/entrepreneur, Independent citizen, free Catholic believer (Colombia: Practitioner, Cuba: Employee, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Employee)	203.	204.Jesuits educated Raul and Fidel Castro.- Revolution was atheistic, but we all know afterwards that Fidel Castro is a Spiritist (Santero).	205.In Uruguay today, there is no political or social friction due to religion. I think this is part of what the Uruguayan culture is. We are mostly descendants of European immigrants, whether we like it or not because autochthonous here there is not anyone left. Unfortunately, the Spaniards ended up with the few natives who were here, who were called Charrúas. Most are here descendants of Italian, Spanish, and in Nueva Helvecia, from the Swiss colony. I have never felt that there is a matter of pulling and loosening political and social differences between the churches and the government.	206.In Switzerland, if you are Catholic, you have to pay much higher taxes than if you belong to the Reformed Protestant Church. If you are an atheist or belong to a Protestant Free Church, you do not even have to pay any Church taxes. I think Catholic taxes are a lot higher because it is like a "mafia" Church. Indeed, Catholics have huge Cathedrals, frescoes, and lots of gold icons and that, of course, costs much more to buy and maintain than having a simple wooden cross in the Protestant Church. In Valais, if you want to build a house, you have to sign up to the municipality (Gemeinde) and then you have to go to the Catholic Priest who has the last say to confirm or not such building (if you have given enough money to the Church or have attended Sunday mass often enough). In Italy, mafia members confess their sins in church and information is exchanged in the confession box.
n)Academic/Practitioner/entrepreneur Independent citizen, free Protestant believer (Colombia: Teacher, Cuba: Tourism professional, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Academic)	We have been hampered in our development. This island was first populated in 1640 by the British Puritans. They came here at a time when the English Constitution was being prepared. The Puritans believed that the church was corrupted. The same people that went to the United States were the same ones that came to Providence and founded what they called the Providence Company. They were prominent people in England. The ship that brought them here was called The Sea Flower, and the boat that carried the Puritans to the USA was called Mayflower. This name was very famous in the United States. They settled in Providence because it had water and protection. When the Spaniards invaded, the people of St. Andrews and Providence were mostly Protestant and English speaking. They did not know how to speak Spanish. All their documents and writings were in English. The Baptist church was the first church that established here, and the vast majority was Baptist. In 1902, the first Catholic missionaries arrived from Baltimore. After 1925 the Colombian government wanted to use the Catholic Church to impose their language, their	208.	209.The Catholic Church was always more linked to the state. With the other evangelical churches, there is acceptance, but the one that is more linked to the state and politics, is the Catholic Church; until today. Despite the fact that political leaders are half atheists, leftists, etc., the state is always more linked to Catholicism. However, there are no obstacles for the Protestant churches. We do not rule out that even our Church might be connected to the state, through the school and the churches of Montevideo, since each one does its work for the benefit of society.	210.The Roman Catholic Church was very corrupt at that time [Reformation time], and Reformers wanted to reform the Church, but not to separate it from the state. But they [the Reformers] and Luther realised that this was impossible. Therefore, Zwingli advocated the separation of church and state, but that was much later. Luther influenced him [Zwingli] although Luther didn't want to have the Zurcher translation. However, they met and had supper together, and Luther said he didn't understand Zwingli' Swiss German quite well. The separation between church and state has never been complete here. Now, for example, we have taxes [for Catholics and Reformed Protestants]. And we have the issue of empty Protestant Church buildings being managed by the government. [Reformed Protestant buildings] are producing economic losses and there has been even the discussion that these buildings should be returned to the Catholic Church. You have to consider that almost all the cathedrals in Protestant Cantons have been Protestant in the last centuries. More recently in Zurich, but further in space from the city centre, they [Roman Catholics] built Catholic cathedrals.

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	costumes, and their culture on us. When I went to school – they do not teach this anymore – they used to teach the subject "¿Qué es patria?" Patria is the place where we are all born, in which we are part of the same ethnicity, have the same language, and the same religion. But what they did was to enforce a different language, a different culture, and a different religion on us. How did they do it? They used a strategy known as Reducción (Reduction). If you wanted to get a job, or a scholarship, you had to be a Catholic. And who recommended that approach? The local priests. They had an agreement, a Concordat signed with the Holy See about education. They held on that Concordat, and the priests were who controlled the official education. 207.As a consequence, many of the "new converts" to Catholicism were referred to as "Job Catholics". They were Catholics because of the job. Many Baptists did it. That is how the Catholic Church does it and strengthens itself. Keep in mind that the island was self-sustaining back then, and it received very little revenue from Colombia. Many Colombians didn't visit the islands, and the Catholic was neither the largest nor the dominant church, but the Baptist church. While in the Protestant countries they forget that the Catholic Church is the seat of Satan, they continue to gain much terrain and their power decline. You can see that in the US for example.			
o)Afro-Caribbean/indigenous religion Priest (Colombia: Rastafarian, Cuba: Babalawo, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	211.	212.Fidel and Raul practice Santeria. Hugo Chavez was also being made "saint" (Santeria/Spiritism). He surrendered to Santa Barbara or Changó [confirmed in a letter from his ex-wife]	213.	214.
p)Government officer / Former Government officer (Colombia: central government, Cuba: central government, Uruguay: regional government Colonia, Switzerland: Federal government)	215.The Catholic Church as monarchy works as the Military following the hierarchy. In fact, the Jesuit order has been historically a military-order. In the military, you don't have to question the commands of your superiors (and you are not allowed to), you just have to obey, not to-think! This is why you can never question a priest, or you don't have any possibility to analyse or discuss why the Church makes or does not make something according to the	216.Cuba was Catholic par excellence before the revolution. - The political power of the church was immense in the government of Cuba, but they underestimated the rebels. - Before, if you were not Catholic, you were a heretic. That was no longer so in the revolution - The Bishop of Santiago de Cuba saved Fidel Castro the first time he was	217.Actually, Colonia is characterised because religion was at the beginning of everything. Almost all the immigrants who arrived, especially in Valdense and La Paz, Piedmontese Colony, had been fleeing Europe because of a religious problem and they settled in this country. The first and most important thing for the people who arrived was to meet around religion. It was that religious belief that drove them to study.	218.According to international diplomatic law, nothing regulates the relations between the Holy See and the Swiss Confederation, except for the Vienna Convention. The main interest of the Swiss Confederation and the Holy See is to have diplomatic relations, as is normally the case with sovereign states. Second, to regulate bilateral issues, such as the Swiss pontifical guard at the Holy See. There are also other issues, like the status of bishops in Switzerland. There are no plans for the Swiss Confederation and the Holy

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	gospel as the evangelicals do. In the military. This is why here, the Military, the Catholic Church, and the Conservative Party (and the government) are almost always together in a quasi-perfect marriage. In the military, Evangelicals have the preference for "office" works, as they are more trustworthy [than the rest]. The problem is that here nobody chose the country where to born, the social strata, the city or the religion to follow, or even the school to study. We were all predetermined without many options (although having them all) afterwards when you gain security, you start to question less the system and you tend to follow traditions as they are.	arrested by the government. However, The Roman Catholic Church was the only Church officially against the Revolution. Other Churches favoured or were neutral. 95% of people were in favour of the revolution.- Catholics were the strongest against the regime. - Fidel removed the absolutism when Fray Beto interviews him, and he says Religion is no longer people's opium. That was very positive because The Americas viewed Cuba as discriminatory State before. Now after the socialist congress in the 1990s, it does not matter if you say you are religious or not. The only important is being pro the Communist Party ideology. And this is done by strategy.	to improve, to make community, to be in communion. After the religious part was more settled, the connections with the state were made. Many of the immigrants were brought or sought by the state to repopulate (especially those of Nueva Helvecia). The immigrants brought an idiosyncrasy of work that we (the Uruguayans) did not have. I can tell you that the link between religion and the state works here very well -although our nation has no established religion like in Argentina-. All the institutions have a very good way of working, always in communion, without taking into account what type of creed they have; If they are Protestants, or if they are Waldensians, or if they are Catholics, they all work in communion when it comes to achieving a common good. [like in the US or Switzerland]	See to sign a new agreement [i.e. Concordat]. Switzerland used to have diplomatic relations but did not appoint an ambassador to the Holy See. We have no Ambassador in the Holy See. And then in the 90s, there were some problems, especially in the bishopric of Chur and some cantons ask the Swiss Confederation to intervene and at that moment the Swiss Federal Government thought that it was perhaps better to have a direct representative in the Holy See, instead than only a communication with the Nunzio in Bern. The Holy See has had a Nunzio for a very long time in Bern. It was only interrupted for a while in the 19th century. But the Nunzio came back and has always been here. And then we had a special envoy to the Holy See. And then, until 2004, we started having an ambassador to the Holy See, but this official did not reside in Rome. He could reside somewhere else, like in Vienna, Budapest, or in Prague. The present Ambassador of Switzerland to the Holy See resides in Slovenia. He also accredited as the ambassador to another country, (not only to the Holy See). The Swiss Guards is a very old institution, more than 500 years old. Most of them [Swiss Guards] reside within the Vatican. Other than Italy, Switzerland has the largest colony in the Vatican. Usually, the council of functions are regulated by the Swiss embassy in Rome, that means by the bilateral Embassy to Italy the council of affairs.
q)Catholic/Ecumenical Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: Central government, Cuba: National Council of Churches, Uruguay: Military/Church media, Switzerland: Catholic central committee)	219.	220.From the sixteen to the nineteen centuries the only Church was the Roman Catholic. - The council of churches emerges in 1941 to confront the Roman Catholic Church because it is believed in the separation of powers between the State and the Church and also to promote secular education.- Communist Party communicates with churches at the local, provincial and national levels. The office of religious affairs of the government belongs directly from the Central Committee of the Communist Party. - Eight religions in Cuba meet regularly with the office of religious affairs of the government.: 1. Spiritists 2. Hebrews 3. African Abacua 4. Bajais 5. Muslims 6. Subud 7. Orthodox Catholics and Autocephalous	221.While there were right-wing parties, the Catholic Church was more indifferent. There were no opinions of the church regarding the behaviour of the government. The only change occurred in the previous term of Mujica's government. For the first time, the Army invited the church in a day of celebration of the national army. And Monsignor Sturla, who is our bishop of Uruguay, gave a mass in honour in the cathedral of Montevideo. For the day of the military, it was a historic moment, because it was the only time in Uruguay that the church was manifested in favour of the army. A connection exists. But usually, here, they are totally independent. There are no ties between the military or government and church. At that time, the invitation was made from the army to the church. The bishop is young, advanced and more open-minded, encouraged by the press and criticised a lot for having used the church to open the doors to the army. At the time it generated a lot of discomfort and turmoil in the government, but it already passed like	222. Legally and officially, there is a clear separation between the state and the churches. Their relations are governed by the cantons. Regarding the relations of Church and State in the different cantons, I think these are very important for the financing of the Church and for the self-organisation of the Churches. There are twenty-six different [church taxes] systems. Even though they have some similarities, especially in the German-speaking cantons, the French- and Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland have very different systems. The cantons of Geneva and Neuchatel work mainly under a French system. They receive no state funds and have no church taxes. They are organised associations regarding civil rights, and they live especially on the contributions of the believers. The members of their congregations. In the other cantons, we have taxes and the system is quite different and complicated. The bishop does not need to call the President of Switzerland to tell him what to do. It is different from what it is in Germany where I have the impression that the Churches are much closer together [to the State]. The distance here is quite large and both sides respect it. In some cases, Church representatives offer their congregation voting advice. Normally, this concerns religious aspects that are fundamental to life, like abortion, suicide, etc. Those are issues that concern our Churches. For example, some years ago we had a Swiss voting on whether or not to open shops on Sundays. The Church would say, if you go

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		8. “Us” (National Council of Churches of Cuba) Twenty-eight Protestants denominations are on the board, and we are working with Catholics as well.- The Council of Churches of Cuba is a fraternal fellowship of churches, ecumenical movements and institutions, which brings together more than fifty per cent of the Cuban evangelical churches that in turn includes a total of 28 denominations. Revolution and Protestantism - Protestant Churches participated actively in the revolution. A US historian called it actually “the evangelical revolution” because many Protestants had participated. - Some Protestant Churches even financed with their resources the revolution.	everything. The Church returns to pronounce when media goes and ask them about the subject of the disappeared ones. Now they are going to begin excavations again in some battalions, because it is true that there were tortures, disappearings, etc.	ahead, this is going to be harmful to the culture of our land [country]. The Church is not only concerned about Church attendance. They do not think that the people would go to Church if the shops were closed, they think that families need to spend time together. That is why we are sceptical against this solution. I would say that their aim is to prevent people from having certain ways of thinking to avoid giving the Church power to have a direct influence. I think Switzerland has a culture that is strongly influenced by the Christian tradition, but nowadays secularisation and the separation of church and state are plainly evident, people who take their distance from the Church. The vast majority of people, if you make a sociological analysis, are people who are distanced from the Church or even have no Church at all. The tendency still exists, but it is less notorious and in the context of our direct democracy. I would say that these general matters about State affairs are not exactly the same [in all cantons], but they work similarly in the whole country. Maybe they are a little different in very traditional Protestant or Catholic cantons, which have remained strongly influenced by the Church life. I might say that things are changing quite rapidly now. It is quite clear that there was a time when Protestants strongly dominated the Swiss government. This was not so much a religious question, but it was influenced by a liberal party that had won the conflicts (and the elections). Also, within the Catholic Church, there were strong rivalries between liberal and conservative Catholics as was the case in Ticino and Lucerne. Finally, the liberal system had to have the victory. The Swiss constitution of 1848 (and beyond) is a liberal construct. This was a decent advantage for the Catholics. Internally, the situation in the Catholic Church became more difficult after the first Vatican Council in 1870, where the bishops defined the infallibility of the pope. This led to polarisation. We said that we would not accept this new dogma about the infallibility of the pope. Thus we separated ourselves. People who claimed to be Ultramontane thought that the power was on the other side of the mountains, and this was difficult for the young Swiss State. Of course, there was fear that this would influence not only the religious but also the political life. A Church-State had existed for a long time. As in Germany after the Vatican I, we had in Switzerland a separation from the so-called Old Catholic. These Catholics [*Christkatholisch]* reached some agreements with the liberal Protestants over political questions. They replied strongly in cantons like Aargau, Solothurn, Basel-Land, etc. There still exists a small minority today but at that time between 1870 and 1900, though they were quite a small group, they were influential. They occupied certain parts of Catholic politics, especially in the cantons. They were never very powerful nationally, but they had some influence in the cantons. They are forgotten today because

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				they became very small, like twenty thousand people or so. Their philosophy is, "We do not want to have the pope, and we have no celibacy among our priests; they can marry". Lately, they also introduced the ordination of women, thus becoming some sort of reformed Catholics. But I think these differences today have not a significant influence. I would not even know how exactly our government is composed when I think about confessions. This can change. It is not that important anymore as it was in the past when the first Catholic became a minister in the first federal council thus becoming one of the seven people in Switzerland to have this historic achievement. I would mention three important causes for the emergence of this special legal system for the Catholic Church in Switzerland. The first is, the Corporations, appeared in the medieval times. It is a system that we know in other forms of life in Switzerland. For example, if you go to the mountains, to the Alps, you will see that cattle farmers organise themselves in a corporation. They say, "Well, we choose one person to go to the alp, to watch our cattle, we pay him, and we organise ourselves to build up the house there, where the cows and these people can live". This is a system that helps them take care of common things together. The same thing is done with schools. There are special school corporations. In some parts of Switzerland at the beginning of the 20th century, there were different tax systems, one beside the other. You paid the tax for the town, for the school, for your bill, and you also paid the tax for the Church. This was very normal. Now, in the last decades, the systems have been unified, and the Church is more distant from the rest walks of life, and the other taxes have been unified in just one. The second cause is the Reformation, which strongly promoted participation among its followers in taking church decisions. This practice goes quite well together with democratic feelings in Switzerland. The third influence stems from the time when the Reformed Catholic denominations in Switzerland opposed each other. The State had the initiative to intervene, and it said; "we take care of these problems, so that you may live in peace". A very interesting example is the Parliament in Cantons St. Gallen and Grisons. These were divided cantons, sometimes within the same city there were Catholics and Protestants and could live together even though they did not totally agree with each other. For decisions concerning religious affairs, Parliament was divided. Protestants deputies, decided on proceedings relevant to Protestants, while Catholic members of Parliament decided Catholic issues. In St. Gallen, this is called '*Katholischer Konfessionsteil*' [Catholic section of the Canton St. Gallen]. Or in Grisons, *Corpus Catolico* [body of Catholics], and [on another group] the body of Protestants. They agreed to have peace because everybody knew that they would

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				decide in favour of the Church and they will not start to interfere with the other denomination. In some parts of the cantons of St. Gallen, Glarus, and Grisons some Churches were used by both confessions. They had special rules; for example, when the Protestants made use of them, the Catholics had to take items out of the Church while the Protestants were there, etc. The State organised a religious peace in separating the confessions and in giving the rights to the members of the confessions to organise themselves. This is quite a very typical Swiss kind of solution (laugh). All this came after the Reformation when the conflicts emerged. Even in the 18th and 19th century, the conflict was still harsh in Switzerland. Then it continued to go in this direction until the Swiss State as we see it was born in 1850. In 1848 or so, the constitution reached its form as we have it today, in a time when this conflict was still quite strong. Regarding the political and economic implications of this system today, I would say that the legal system of the Catholic Church has implications for the Churches. But for the economy and politics of Switzerland, this influence is not significant anymore, maybe only in the sense that we are able to deal quite well with differences. You can also see this influence in other parts of our political system. For example, in all the important participation we have in the Parliament, and in the government, we contribute with a type of system that declares, "everybody can remain just as he is, but for the important issues, we try to find common solutions". We deal with compromises. It is very important, but it has become increasingly difficult in the last years. You cannot understand the relation between Church and State in Switzerland without understanding the political system. This is the most important aspect to understand. It would be difficult if we went to the Vatican as Catholics and we had to explain how our system works. It is so different that it causes astonishment. People often think that something like that cannot even work. There are people who think we should export this model to other countries, but we would need certain conditions. Direct democracy has a very high influence on this system, and this does not exist in other countries. The pronounced form of federalism, which enables every town to set its taxes, makes this organisation unique.
r)Protestant Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: none, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Political-Church officer)	223.Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (CVP) is a strong political Catholic party in St. Gallen. Protestants don't have that. In the Protestant Church, we have like a council or a club to make decisions that the Catholic Church doesn't have. It's called "Verein". For example, CVP had push a lot for closing shops and Sunday as a day of rest. Now, for the first time in history they have lost its power	224.	225.	226.

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	in the council. And they also lost the marriage of different sex only.			
s)Embassy of the Country at the Vatican (Colombian Embassy at the Vatican, Cuban Embassy at the Vatican (no answer), Uruguayan Embassy at the Vatican, Swiss Embassy in Ljubljana)	227.The dialogue with the Holy See is conducted, as with other States, through direct diplomatic contact between government institutions created for this purpose, i.e., through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia and its Embassy before the Holy Headquarters and the Secretary of State of the Holy See and its Apostolic Nunciature accredited in Colombia. Note: The last diplomatic contacts have been made at a high level, and we have no record that topics such as "Education, Land and Property, Religious Freedom, and Ecumenism" have been included in the agenda. The payment of the Concordat fee (per the Concordat of 1887) by the Government of Colombia to the Catholic Church is still in force. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs processes this payment, but the resources to make it effective are consolidated by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit within the annual national budget. The appropriate amount year by year for the payment of this commitment can be consulted in the annexe of the decree by which the General Budget of the Nation is settled for each fiscal period. For the year 2018, the annexe to Decree 2236 of December 27, 2017, must be consulted, through which the General National Budget for the fiscal year 2018 is settled, the appropriations are detailed, and expenses are classified and defined.	228.	Currently, the rules governing relations between the Vatican and the Uruguayan Government are of a general nature and are governed by the Vienna Convention, signed on April 18, 1961. Also, and with regard in particular to the situation of Uruguayan diplomats accredited to the Holy See, it is regulated by the Lateran Treaty, signed between the Kingdom of Italy and the Holy See on February 11, 1929, and confirmed later by the Italian Republic. By the aforementioned treaty, Article 12 establishes, among other provisions that diplomats accredited to the Holy See will enjoy in Italy all the privileges and immunities accorded by International Law. Likewise, the activity to be carried out by the Diplomatic Mission accredited to the Vatican is regulated by the conventional norms for foreign missions that determine the Constitution of the Republic and the laws, decrees and other rules pertaining to the point. Under article five of the Constitution of the Republic, which states: "that the State does not hold any religion", historically it has been understood that, without prejudice to possible coincidences, the activities of the Uruguayan State and the Vatican, -and therefore, of the Churches in general-, are developed in totally independent areas. Unlike other countries, there is currently no concordat or agreement in force between the Uruguayan State and the Vatican. Concerning the diplomatic activity of the Mission before the Holy See, it should be informed that it was resumed on April 21, 1939, after a long interregnum that began in 1896. The main topics of the collaboration agenda between the Vatican City State and the Uruguayan Government consist	229. No plans for possible future bilateral agreements with the Holy See, at the federal or cantonal level, have been announced. No State has direct diplomatic relations with the Vatican City State. Foreign relations with the Vatican City State go through the Holy See. The Vatican City State is the only party to technical treaties or fora with technical, territorial application, such as postage. The different topics mentioned are discussed and treated bilaterally [with the Holy See] in a similar way as with every other State [nuncio said not]: diplomatic dialogue and channels (ambassador to the Holy See, with the State Secretariate or other authorities and services; nuncio or his deputy, with the DFA or other authorities and services), or at the political level on the occasion of bilateral visits, or between experts/persons or services in charge for specific issues. A difference with other cases is the special importance of multilateral and global issues, or of discussions of non-bilateral problems (e.g. conflicts, peace processes).

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			predominantly in a work that is located in areas of particularly social coincidence, such as the concern for the environment, policies in favour of the poorest, attention to immigrants. It should be noted that this relationship develops with total autonomy and independence of the parties.	

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
a)Roman Catholic Priest 1. Jesuit (Colombia: Jesuit, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Jesuit)	230.1986-1991 was a period of intensification of violence, a crisis of legitimacy of political parties, narcotraffic, and paramilitarism against guerrillas. After 150 years of a centralist, conservative constitution, the new 1991 Constitution speaks of religious freedom and reduces the central role of the [Catholic] Church in the government. The Church is then related to the armed conflict, due to its role as a humanitarian institution. However, it is the first time in the Church history in Colombia that the Church hierarchy questions whether the Colombian problems do not come from a moral crisis (lack of soul conversions) but from a socio-political issue. Two documents from episcopate that support this: (1995) (first sociological study on forced displacement in Colombia) and "Pastoral para la paz" (1997). The most conservative department is Antioquia and is the most violent department. But also Tolima is a traditionally liberal department that also had strong violence in the 50s. That violence depends on regional and historical characteristics.	231.	232.	233.
b)Roman Catholic Priest 2. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: Other, Uruguay: Other, Switzerland: Other)	234.If a person lives according to what the Lord says, he will never commit crimes or do something that goes against honesty. Not to live according to the will of the Lord; not obeying the Lord's commandments, it's what drives us to crime and corruption.	235.You can see the low crime rate in Cuba compared to other countries in history, due to an authoritarian regime, Franco succeeded it also in Spain.	236.On crime in Uruguay, I have nothing to say. It would be better to see the statistics. In turn, there is a difference between the statistical data and the real perception that one has.	237.
c)Roman Catholic Priest 3. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	238.	239.	240.	241.
d)Roman Catholic Religious 4. (Colombia: Nun, Cuba: Seminarian, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Deacon)	242.I think the first thing to see concerning criminality is the family. If the children in their childhood had vital shortcomings of affection, care, etc., in the future, they would have some complaints. If we talk about violence, it is necessary to see if the same child has been abused or have experienced violence from their parents. This will prepare the heart and soul to become a grudge, which ultimately generates violence. On the other hand, it is the failure to cultivate and give the right the values to	243.I was afraid to go to Colombia more than El Salvador. There have been problems with priests in Colombia and assaults. - Every country has its charm and its issues. Cuba enjoys much more peace and tranquillity than in any other Latin American country. The tranquillity of Cuba is enviable. That is a process of state and culture. - The Cuban state is concerned about ensuring tranquillity. There is much	244.	245.*Sexual abuse of children by Catholic priests* There have been shattering series crimes. In our diocese, only one case is known to me, and the bishop has acted immediately. Sexual abuse is soul murder. Sexual harassment is the misuse of great trust. Reasons:- Unexplained sexuality (in priestly seminars, sexuality was not mentioned 1940-1970). Today, psychologists/psychiatrists examine the suitability of the candidates. - Often, the rooms are not professional for pastoral

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	children. For when the children are given respect for others, honesty, honesty, responsibility, they grow up with those guidelines. But if children also witness a bad testimony of parents they do not impart children good values. Children know when dad came running after stealing. When there is domestic violence between parents, it helps to produce misbehaviour. If the family is wrong, then society will also be wrong. Media presents negative values (anti-values) as values. For example, if children see a soap opera with intrigues, fornication, divorce, adventures, etc., they are introduced to it, eliminating the criterion of the child to identify what is a [good] value and what it is not. The trouble is that negative values are presented positively and as acceptable, which makes children assimilate anti-values as values. What moral, what ethical, what principles will have that child for the future? On the contrary, when the child has experienced at home that mom and dad they love each other, are respectful, taught to respect others, teach values, then that child grows straight. So there are great personalities who lead positively in society. There is a book that is called: "We were not born to be seed" written by a priest who infiltrated a poor neighbourhood (comuna) in Medellin, who discovered the boys who were trained to be assassins. Those boys had their parents about to die of hunger because there is no work. There are misery and hunger. A boy killed a person to bring money home. They had a pressure of poverty and misery and killing is easy money. To do the "little job" of killing a person. That's why I say that if a politician who has everything, fall into the temptation of theft, how much more these children. The priest discovered that these children were going to do their "little job", went to mass, prayed to the Virgin of Carmen, made promises to him, so that God would help them to do the "little job", but before they crossed themselves and left. If they did well, they would go back to the church to give thanks and bring money so there would be food. They knew the risk they were running. There is no root in life. What moral principles can we give our children today?	vigilance from the State. Similarly- With Franco religions were swept in Spain. With Mussolini, religions were swept in Italy.		conversations. If a pastor does not have an office and has conversations at home (in the parsonage), it is easy to get sexual approximations. Mt 15,19 f: 19 „For out of the heart come evil thoughts, murder, adultery, sexual immorality, theft, false witness, slander. These are what defile a person. “ [biblical quote with no further (or superficial) elaboration like in the Mass]. The triggers [of corruption and crime] are often seen in the biography of the people. Corrupt or criminal people are often deeply injured people [like children abused by priests]. A person who does not feel loved by his mother, for example, is in danger of seeking love or affection in other ways: he has many loves at the same time, or even he tries to increase his self-esteem by stealing a lot of money. This can also be for other people, then it shows his power. I've also seen that corrupt behaviour is related to addictive behaviour. Play in casinos, loss of money and the attempt to make it right again. [There are] 7 deadly sins: The term „mortal or deadly sin" took almost 800 years to get through. The early monks were good men [catholic ethic.] [and] they had the ability to feel and feel themselves very well. The monks were not just theologians, but anthropologists [who] looked deeply into the human soul and from which it was moved. ... Thus the Egyptian monk Evagrius Ponticus wrote a book on "Bad thoughts" in the fourth century - but he did not use the concept of mortal sin. It was not so much about the vices (Laster), but the thoughts, which cognitions lead to them. The book was brought to Europe by Johannes Cassian and edited. Then, after Pope Gregory wrote about it, it also entered into the high theology. Petrus Lombardus and Thomas Aquinas spoke of seven main struggles. Thus the mortal sins had arrived in everyday life. 7 Deadly Sins List: Envy = the desire to have an item or experience that someone else possesses Gluttony = excessive ongoing consumption of food or drink Greed or Avarice = an excessive pursuit of material possessions Lust = an uncontrollable passion or longing, especially for sexual desires Pride = excessive view of one's self without regard to others.Sloth = excessive laziness or the failure to act and utilise one's talents

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				Wrath = uncontrollable feelings of anger and hate towards another person What distinguishes mortal sin from other sins? Mortal sins are more serious sins than other sins. I think the mortal is that they lead to ever deeper misery and to resist life. A psychologist from Princeton presented this in a life-historical location of the deadly sins in a matrix: And thus said: to each age of life fits a special mortal sin. For the student age, the psychologist sees before all the lust, that is, the vagabonding outward of sexuality as the age-appropriate sin potential. Donald Capps, Deadly sins and saving virtues, 1987 (Old man: sadness/Depression) Adult: Sloth Young adult: Lust young Man: Pride Child school: Envy Child 2-5: Greed or avarice Little Child (1-1,5 years) Wrath Baby: Gluttony
e)Roman Catholic Theologian 5. (Colombia: Theologian, Cuba: Theologian, Uruguay: Theologian, Switzerland: Theologian)	246.Regarding violence, all criminal groups were grown in the early 80s and '90s in Colombia, with the emergence of paramilitarism and drug trafficking (Pablo Escobar). In fact, at that time it was worse than now because the legacy of what we are consuming today was created. In those years, schools of hired killers were created (why to study in a traditional school, if you will win all the money you want as a murderer?), groups of collective crime, etc. The idea of easy money without effort, training, etc. was created in people. It becomes a legacy until today. An example is Cali that in the 70s was an interesting culture, that city was an example; then came the various drug cartels to harm citizens' culture. Not only they permeated the urban but also the farmers who were proposed to change their traditional food crops for coca leaves. Coca crops meant less harvest time, increased financial income, but damaging the farmer's mind through the "easy money". Therefore, there is not a positive and concrete change concerning violence until now. [no change after 1991 perceived] Sexual abuse: There is a common denominator in the way the issue of sexuality is	247.Religion has nothing to do with the crime. It has with the severity of the laws. Here this severity is what explains the low criminality, that even death penalties are applied extrajudicially.	248.The main driver of corruption, inequality and criminality is a situation of generalised social injustice, which is not current but prevails since decades or centuries of existence. That is a form of wealth distribution in all Latin America that although wealth has changed (it is probably not as tied to the land today as it was decades ago but to other factors), injustice continues to exist in the wealth distribution. This is one of the very important factors.	249.

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	dealt [in the Catholic Church]. In past years there was an absolute denial of sexuality within the Catholic clergy, especially as this has much to do with us as Catholic hierarchy, both religious and clergy. You cannot talk about it, that's forbidden any semi-naked image display relates to a mortal sin. Although the scandal is given now, corresponds to extreme situations of years ago. It has to do with young men and women who were admitted very young to the seminars, believing they had a vocation, combined with a denial to speak of the sexual topic. It must be added to this an ingredient, which was unknown, from the psychological, psychiatric and sociological. Facing this repression, plus ignoring the issue and not allowing the persons to recognise themselves as sexually actives (as the priest or religious are not inactive), they have to ignore the reality of a sexual development that will remain there until death. These issues were not discussed before as were seen as a sin. All the repressed is still a problem. A not assumed sexuality is repressed sexuality that ends up in great disorders. On the other hand, in large male or female communities, it is very easy for a person who has been raped in childhood to look for similar communities to somehow feel welcome or even find a way to get revenge in the future. Like any rapist or paedophile would do with boys or girls. This has many situations and connotations, which is not only that the priest is sick, but it also has a backstory.			
f)Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (Colombia: Baptist, Cuba: Pentecostal, Uruguay: Evangelical, Switzerland: Other).	250.We [faithful Protestants] get laughed at, mocked at, they [Colombian Roman Catholics] make fun of us, and tell us, "You guys are fools. Are you stupid or something? Just steal, make a fake document and take the land". And some of our people have fallen into that practice to survive. And others that have gone to the mainland to study have learned their ways, have come back to establish themselves among their people; have abused them because they have learned the ways of South America. The country of Colombia had campaigns where they sent mainlanders to our territory to flood it. St. Andrews is known now as one of the most densely populated oceanic islands in the world. Colombia said, –and some documents prove it– "We need to send people	251.Before the revolution, there were more violence and less control. In the 1960s the Act of danger helped to reduce crime. - The State also recognises that the Protestant church benefits society by creating, multiplying and training in ethical values. - We reach the poorest neighbourhoods with the gospel. This also reduces crime.	252.	253.Sexual abuses in the Catholic Church may occur due to a hypocrite understanding of marriage, and sexuality, and celibacy of nuns and priests. Some even have what they call "Mystic spirituality" for which they use an erotic language to describe the relationship with God. A nun who elaborated a lot on that was Teresa von Avila in "Die Bedeutendesten Mystiker".

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	to colombianise the territory" because those people speak English, they are Protestant; their culture is different from ours, so we need to get rid of that and insert Colombian culture deeply. Once they did it, that is how we end up with the situation we have in our territory; the destruction of our value system, murders almost every day, contract killers all over, we have St. Andrews being on the DEA list of dangerous territories that are used as hubs to transport drugs to Florida, for example. That is the outcome.			
g)Protestant Free Church Pastor 2. (Seventh Day Adventist - SDA) (Colombia: SDA Pastor, Cuba: SDA Pastor, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: SDA Pastor).	254.	255.The tranquillity and security of people here are due to government custody.	256.	257.
h)Protestant Mainline (old) institutional Pastor 3. (In Latin America free historical churches, in Switzerland official Church-State Reformed Evangelical). (Colombia: Presbyterian, Cuba: Methodist, Uruguay: Lutheran, Switzerland: Reformed Evangelical)	258.Concerning crime, after [the Constitution of] 1991, anyone could open a Christian [Protestant] church in the garage of their homes. The Christian [Protestant] church has grown 25% since 1991, and one would think that with that population growth crime should lower and statistics tell us otherwise. Crime has not only , but crime has also been systematised and professionalised. Today, not just a watch or a pair of glasses are stolen, but there are criminal gangs with an organised team to steal mobile phones. Sexual abuse: We are naturally sexual beings and when the Catholic Church, invented celibacy, by issues of heritage, generated a big problem at the institutional level and internally. Celibacy is not natural; then, it generates the normal stresses of a person wanting to have a sexuality that cannot develop because it is "forbidden". Surely some celibates feel, it is and has no problems, but the vast majority cannot deal with the issue. The truth is that the Catholic Church will not let celibacy goes because this is a purely economic issue in nature. Even as progressive popes as the current -Francisco-, will have many problems to release celibacy issues. Direct guilty of sexual difficulties within the church's celibacy and paedophilia will not be avoided unless the celibacy of the church is removed. But I repeat that it is very difficult because the subject is money and as money gets in, institutions and	259.It existed organised crime in The Republic (or Republican period before the Revolution before-1959). In contrast, now, after the revolution, we do not have anymore organised crime. Before there was a dictatorship that favoured especially organised crime. - The Roman Catholic Church was very close to that power structure (dictatorship). Not directly, but indirectly. It was very benefited from all this. For example, a priest blessed not a brothel, but the pimp who was head of the brothel gave his money to the Roman Catholic Church.	260.Here in Uruguay people are calm. There is not much difference between rich and poor, contrarily to what does happen in other countries such as Argentina. Uruguay is much more democratic for decision-making. People are asked to give their opinion on decisions at the state level.	261.For me, there are three reasons for which sexual abuse is widespread within the Catholic Church: 1) Sexuality is unofficial and hidden. For example, whether you rape a girl or a child is for them the same. 2) A strong hierarchy that covers such acts. 3) Another thing is that Catholics have the canon law. That juridical system is not democratic. The Bishop is the judge and has no separation of power. Bishops protect themselves. They are used to that.

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	their goals change.			
i)Ecumenical academic theologian. Colombia: Catholic ecumenical theologian, Cuba: ecumenical theologian, Uruguay: ecumenical academic, Switzerland: ecumenical theologian)	262.I have raised the issue of culture in relation to violence, that mixture of the natives and Spanish that we [Colombians] have. The Spaniards came up with an idea in their head of conquest. Then they brought the Africans, and that cultural blend gives us a history of violence. That explains why we are like we are. And at that stage, a more nominal type of Catholicism is imposed. Many people appeared to be converted to Catholicism because it was their only way to survive. It is a sociological or statistical Catholicism, but it is not a genuine, conscientious, responsible, and existential Catholicism, that does not follow the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth. That's why it is known the divorce between faith and life or the dichotomy between faith and life. We have many processions, rituals and liturgies, sacraments, but little coherence in daily life. In Medellin, there is the assassin who places his weapons before the Virgin Mary overnight to ensure that they will effectively kill his neighbour the day after. Religion is not always implying an ethical consistency of respect for human rights and respect for Mother Earth. Actually, there is a big gap in these two visions. It is a counterintuitive phenomenon: we [Colombians] are not as Catholics as we believe and we are more violent than we think. [also for corruption code] A phenomenon of recent years appeared and is the metal mining, because there is an illegal extractive boom and became another very profitable source of both so we found groups of paramilitaries and guerrillas that today they charge [the so-called tax like] “vaccines” because the business is too lucrative. The coltan issue in the Orinoco and Amazon is another one that is rarely discussed, but these minerals are too attractive in a market economy and that raises some fields in which, for the money, anything is done, and it is all-pervading money. Cases of corruption, crime and violence have to do with it.	263.Cuban natives were not as violent as Mayas and Aztecs. Cuban Indians believed in the spirit of good. That facilitated the success to the Spaniards.	264.To date, many of the values that the settlers brought to Uruguay are receding. As we are leaving behind those values, there is now criminality and corruption. Those same values were followed by the Batllist governments, who were very socialist, and without being religious, they were very much in agreement with the traditional way of working in these regions (Colonia). There is some crime here. Many come here and ask how is security here? I advise them to always close the car because we never know. As we know each other, we take care of ourselves. If someone shows up weird, we're on a defensive attitude to control the situation.	265.
i)Ecumenical Pastor. Colombia: none, Cuba: Ecumenical, Uruguay: Ecumenical, Switzerland: Ecumenical)	266.	267.Cuba is a country with very repressive policies. Police and over-control make here crime lower than in other countries. Informant committees exist in each block of a city here. - It is very well known here the criminal Peter	268.Criminality is an entirely cultural issue, although in this cultural theme there is much shamelessness. Being a murderer, for example, I do not know if the mind is damaged from before or not. A child who rose in a hostile and challenging	269.

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		Pan Plan performed directly by the Roman Catholic Church.	environment, where there is no food, go to steal, then the crime is institutionalised. I understand that it is also necessary a bit more of strict hard hand on. We must comply with the laws that we have, but they must be stronger. Here in Uruguay, more state policies could be made, and although we have old laws, it can be tightened a bit more. It is to admonish more energetically. That is the feeling that there is here. You can still live, but there are thefts. The commissioner says that with the natives there are no problems, the problems are with people who come from outside, who come without work or are doubtful, then this place is favourable to crime. Another problem is immigrants.	
k)Non-Christian (atheist, agnostic) (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: Academic/Intellectual, Uruguay: Academic/Intellectual, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	270.I think the role of the Catholic Church throughout the conflicts experienced by the country, has been changing. When you look back and see what the role played by the Catholic Church until the 60s, from the nineteenth and twentieth century, was, the church instigated violence against different sectors of the Colombian society. But I think even, within the Catholic Church, there were some nuances, some sectors and personalities that were less radical, which enacted the goodness in their actions. In general, the institution [Catholic Church] was directly involved in promoting conflicts at certain times in our history. This is documented in historical novels such as Gonzalo España's novel, "Cold Hatred" (Odios Fríos). Here, he tells the story of Ezequiel Moreno Rojas, who ended up being the prelate located in Pasto and who really during the Thousand Days' War, promoted profound political stigmatisation against some sectors of Colombian society. Sectors that were not aligned with the Catholic Church most orthodox positions. This was repeated in the 50s decade, when the murder of liberals was openly promoted and where the [Catholic] Church is aligned with a sector of Colombian politicians that were burning the country as a way of not solving the structural problems that had kept The Violence in Colombia. After the 60s, this new trend of liberation theology really played an important role in Latin American revolutionary movements, particularly in the case of the ELN in Colombia. With the liberation theology, there was a distinct-	271.Before the revolution, it existed gangsters in Cuba. Not anymore after. The revolution prohibited the use of weapons and promoted education. This led to less crime. Casinos were closed.	272.Crime in Uruguay is low for its relation to high levels of public education in comparison to other countries. That had helped until the decade of the 70 or 80s. However, in the last years, the level of education has decreased, and crime has increased. A while ago you did not feel insecure, and in the previous years, there are growing insecurity feelings in the streets. On the roads now one can feel threatened to all kinds of things. That has changed from previous years, and that also happens in neighbouring countries. But I think it is something typical of the last time and has to do with the little public investment in education and on programs intended for the low or low-middle classes of the society.	273.

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	connection with a sector of the Catholic Church that really felt that the church had not played an important role within Colombian society to redistribute social contributions to support the most unfortunate. I think the extreme example is Camilo Torres. A priest who decides to join the ELN and becomes the great banner of the ELN and his image is still today one that brings together a broad sector of social and political movements which belong to the Camilista ideology. That marked a new trend within the Catholic Church dedicated to doing some important work in peacebuilding, but I think that flourishes mainly in the late 70s and early 80s. And then arises an important role in organisations such as the SINEP, associated with the Jesuits, on development programs and peace in Mid-Magdalena. This important work to build peace has been expanded in this sector of the church that one day supported the armed rebellion and today it has become a sector that requires the insurgency to leave their armed struggle and pursue work from political actions for social transformations. I think all this leads to one thing that is this peace process between the government and the FARC, which has been supported by the Catholic Church at a higher level. The relation between Christian religion and violence is very difficult. That is, how counterintuitive it is when one of the Ten Commandments is supposed to be "not to kill". Now, it seems to me that one way to be clear about it is seeing how they [believers] behave within legal and illegal armed groups in Colombia. I can think of what happened with the gunmen here in Colombia, that they were poured blessings, they asked the Virgin [Mary] to protect them, and then they came and killed people and after they returned to the [Catholic] church to thank the Virgin and bring offerings. But I am not sure to blame the church for that reason; surely the same goes for Islam, but from fanaticism.			
I)Non-practising Christian (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	274.I dare not to say that there is a relationship between homicides and Catholicism, the historical complexities are enormous. However, some thinkers claim that one of the legacies of the Spanish Catholic colonisation is an intolerant look the other (see, for example, GUTIERREZ Girardot, Rafael. "University and Society." Arguments, 1986, No. 14-17, pp . 64-	275.	276.	277.On children's sexual abuses scandals in the Catholic Church, I think that sick people are everywhere, also in Switzerland. This is a psychiatric problem. But why is the Church involved? I suspect that the reason has possibly a lot to do with the role the [Catholic] Church plays on national identity. For example, in Ireland Catholic priests are unattackable. If you attack a [Catholic] priest is as if you attack Ireland, to the extent to which they [the Roman Catholic

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	65).			Church] are part of the national identity [same as Colombia]. If you are unattackable, then stealing and cheating is easy. However, Ireland has a very different Catholicism than Switzerland, way beyond of what you see in the whole of Europe. In Ireland, Catholicism is associated with the Republic and religion means much more than "just God" but become the national cause.Francis Fukuyama argues that Priests' celibacy is good for restricting the accumulation of capital of Church individuals. [and guarantees the capital accumulation of the Church]
m)Practitioner/entrepreneur, Independent citizen, free Catholic believer (Colombia: Practitioner, Cuba: Employee, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Employee)	278.	279.Before the revolution, much violence and torture existed in Cuba.	280.It will always be the love of money, power and ambition that will move people towards corruption and criminality. Today, there are many deaths due to the drug dealing. Many innocents also die due to the drug war.	281.Here, statistically, about 90% of the crime is done by foreigners. But if you say this publically, then all came to say that you are racist. Youth people (Swiss or Germans) make more problems with online *betrug* (deceiving such as selling by the internet and not delivering the product) neighbours, alcohol, or drugs. Drug dealing is typically performed by Black people (Nigeria and other Africans). Muslims from Georgia, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Turks make more violent crimes (also against women). I used to work for the Catholic Aid in Switzerland, and they were not interested at all if I had problems with my family. We have in Switzerland one weekend for the family by law, and they [the Catholic Aid] didn't give me that weekend for helping my brother. They did things against the law. They were so, and it was a hard time for me. That has been very different when I have worked in other secular [places] or done social work in a Free Church where they have understood when I have had troubles.
n)Academic/Practitioner/entrepreneur Independent citizen, free Protestant believer (Colombia: Teacher, Cuba: Tourism professional, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Academic)	282.The doctrine of the Catholic Church induces a person to be less moral. Because they say that after you die you can go to Purgatory, your family can pray for you and in doing that you can all go to heaven. If I can simply do that, I do not have to live a very moral or right life. I can do my little things, and if I sin and die in sin (If it is not a mortal sin, as they say), I go to Purgatory or Limbo, and my dear ones can pray for me, and thus I gain entrance to heaven. Another reason for the decay of morality is the doctrine they have called the immortality of the soul. I know stories of criminals in Colombia, that before they go to carry out their act, knowing that they might get killed, they go and confess beforehand to the priest and then go ahead and perform their action. The church induces the person not to be so morally upright. They do not have a clear concept of what the judgement is and what the law of God demands. They change it at their convenience, and they are not strict. You can be a member of that church, and still, you can smoke, drink,	283.Before the revolution there existed pimps, prostitutes and gangs. In the book: "No truce against crime" it is narrated how in the 1950s: Colon, Canal and Cerros Poblete and Marianaos, were very dangerous neighbourhoods with the highest criminality before the revolution. Fidel even said: "I do not want a man from Colon". Tavo was another known tough guy and famous criminal in Havana at that time.After the revolution, we have much more tranquillity, and even before the fall of the communist camp, milk was placed on the door, and no one stole it in the early 80s. Here we all know about the Peter Pan Operation executed by the Roman Catholic Church: That is wrenching. And one Catholic nun on television even dared to say that they did something right. Shameless and Ironic! - Dozens of thousands of children and families have been in despair after the Peter Pan	284.We are descendants of foreigners, and before, it was the word the only that was worth. Documents were not needed to be signed. Today the word is worth nothing. Today, not even a paper is worth, because documents, despite being signed, lawyers who know "their things" invalidate them. Before it was very peaceful and now there is criminality here. This is related to the loss of morals, to the lack of education at home. Children are now given much freedom. They are now "liberated." Girls are the most liberated. The parents must control their children. If the parents do not control them, who will? But if children are given "freedom", control will be lost. It gets out of hand.	285.If your attitude to crime simply is a matter of how significant the risk to get detected is, more police and supervision are the only countermeasures that society can use to reduce crime. Or if you can buy an indulgence as a remedy for your offense, committing a crime then becomes a matter of how much money you can spend. But if you know that there is a God that sees what you do, even if there is no police or another person present, you will refrain from committing the crime, because God has defined what sin is in His law.

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	fornicate, be a homosexual, etc. As long as you go and take the communion, obey church regulations, and keep all the holidays, no problem. The Bible is on a secondary level for them. They say it clearly: "If there is a conflict between the Bible and tradition, we position tradition over the Bible. And the pope has the last Word". People live according to that standard, and that is why morality has gone down. Since the massive arrival of mainland Colombian Catholics, criminality rates went up automatically. Now we live among hired assassins and criminal gangs. We are not better off than the mainland because we are smaller and for that reason, the impact is felt much stronger. What the island is today is indeed very different from when I was a child or a teenager. It is getting worse, and it will undoubtedly continue worsening. That is the main reason: The wrong concept of who God is, the false concept of morality, and the wrong concept of punishment. They have a saying here in Colombia, "El que peca y reza empata" (He who sins and prays evens the score). I sin, and then I go to the priest to confess and pay my penance, then I am free, and my conscience is clear. That is the problem.	Operation. When Fidel allowed many of these children, to return to greet their family in Cuba many of them gave the testimony that they had been victims of paedophilia and sexual abuse by Roman Catholic priests in the US.		
o)Afro-Caribbean/indigenous religion Priest (Colombia: Rastafarian, Cuba: Babalawo, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	286.	287.I think crime exists in Cuba; however media hides those types of news for tourism' sake.	288.	289.
p)Government officer / Former Government officer (Colombia: central government, Cuba: central government, Uruguay: regional government Colonia, Switzerland: Federal government)	290.	291.Before the Revolution, there was more social segregation generated by the Roman Catholic Church; therefore, there were more resentment and crime.- There were more criminals, gangs and large Mafia cartels. Fidel Castro, in fact, belonged to a gang.- Operation Peter Pan is part of the counterrevolution organised by the Roman Catholic Church when 90% of Cubans were in favour of the revolution.- The special period in the 1990s led to social degradation and prostitution (Jineteras). - Today you find little crime in Cuba in comparison to other countries in Latin America, but you see a lot of cheating, immorality, lies and deception,	292.I think that the loss of values is noticeable, but it is not easy to define what is the cause of its loss. We cannot blame the political changes and the freedoms that are taking place politically. We see crime, we see the criminal, and we take him to jail, and then the judge releases him. There are things that the population cannot handle; they are things that the state handles. And the state has this criterion: "better not in jail, but in a place where the criminal can" regenerate ". But it is not so easy to regenerate a person who already comes with a very rooted bad habit from his family, because usually, it is rooted from his family. However, you don't see in other places the concern of losing values that we praise and	293.

4.CRIME				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
		- Cubans have a saying “He who does not steal does not survive”.	try to protect so much as in here.	
q)Catholic/Ecumenical Church-Government Intermediary (Colombia: Central government, Cuba: National Council of Churches, Uruguay: Military/Church media, Switzerland: Catholic central committee)	294.	295.Before the fall of the Soviet Union not thefts and other crimes existed that we have been experiencing after that.	296.Many statistics and media reports state that Uruguay is in the number 1 security in Latin America. And we Uruguayans are astonished watching the news and seeing every day the atrocities that happen here because they are contradictory to those statistics. People are being killed for a purse or assaulting, and even if you give you the money to the thieves, they kill the owner of the premises and make big robberies. We are number one in security, but we are only 3 million; we are few. We are a village and to be such a small village; we are alarmed with things like that. But in big countries such as Brazil or Argentina, big things happen. Here there are drug traffickers, and they stay. A few years ago a Serb came, rented a house and from there he handled large drug trafficking networks, everything on the Internet. As Uruguay is a peaceful country, people come from abroad, who can become citizens who fulfil all their obligations. And even though you are a foreigner, if you pay bills, taxes, be a good neighbour, if you are a drug trafficker or a terrorist, etc., no one here realises so. So, here there are terrorists, there are drug traffickers, but all are undercover. Uruguay hosts these people because it is an open country, it does not deny entry to anyone.	297.
r)Protestant Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: none, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Political-Church officer)	298.	299.	300.	301.
s)Embassy of the Country at the Vatican (Colombian Embassy at the Vatican, Cuban Embassy at the Vatican (no answer), Uruguayan Embassy at the Vatican, Swiss Embassy in Ljubljana)	302.There are also inter-institutional cooperation instruments such as the Memorandum of Understanding between the National Police of Colombia and the Vatican Gendarmerie and the Memorandum between the UIAF and IDA. UIAF of Colombia and the AIF (Agency for Fiscal Information - established by Pope Benedict XVI).	303.	304.Recently, Pope Francis has expressed his determination to provide information on the situation that was configured during the dictatorship concerning the "disappeared people", adopting the Vatican Secretariat of State measures for that purpose.	305.

5.EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
a)Roman Catholic Priest 1. Jesuit (Colombia: Jesuit, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Jesuit)	306.	307.	308.	309.In general, education provided by Jesuits was not possible because Jesuits had been forbidden in Switzerland. They could not have any schools. They were not allowed to have any primary or high schools or universities. Everything was forbidden. What did the Jesuits do? They established a high school outside of Switzerland, in Austria, just on the other side of the border. This was closed in 1976 or 1978, so they decided to build a high school in Sankt Blasien, south of Germany, across the border, in the black forest. And these were Catholic schools where families were able to send their boys to a Jesuit school outside Switzerland. One issue is the influence from abroad to Jesuit education. But on the second hand, it was illegal, but as long as the Jesuits wrote to dioceses and priests, they were accepted. They went into the cities from the beginning of the 20th century. The Jesuits started to work in Basel and Geneva, and they did not start their activities with nominal Church or school teachings, but with catechesis and cultural centres. You have to imagine, for example, in the time of the Reform -16th century up to the end of 19th century- there was no holy mass, no Catholics in Bern, Basel and Geneva. It was just not allowed. At the beginning of the 19th century when the new modern State of Switzerland was created, Catholics started to move into this new State, and the Catholic Church had to establish a Church structure in Geneva, in Basel, in Zürich. The Jesuits helped to shape the whole Catholic education and the whole Church structure in the protestant cities. Their presence was illegal it was something all irrational. It is a rather complex contribution that Jesuits made to education. But it was definitely not the main contribution from them. Instead, they were mostly working on the level of two important theological reviews and on the level of spiritual exercises, catechism and Catholic education in the sense of pastoral education. That type of instruction was more emphasised than school education. There was, of course, a very important journal: Orientierung. And it was closed down in 2009 but for the whole second half of the 20th century; it became one of the main intellectual Catholic magazines, not only in Switzerland but in all German-speaking countries. Because we were not allowed to enter Switzerland, a good number of Jesuits were just working in parishes. Officially, they did that work in parishes because there was no other structure the law allowed for of Jesuits to be present. These were not, of course, ordinary parishes but especially city parishes. They had a bigger influence than a regular parish. For instance, in Basel, the Jesuits did the whole system of school catechism for the whole city. Another important aspect was, for example, the case of a Jesuit who introduced movies for the first time into the Church catechism sometime between 1900 and 1920.

5.EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
				thus developing the first cinema. The Catholics did not attend that public cinema but their own. All the movies they projected at that time can now be seen at the London Pictures and Movies Museum. They still belong to us, but the museum worked on all the restorations and the relevant care of the films. There was a huge contribution to the development of the Swiss cinema by the Jesuits. That was the field we could work on because other fields were forbidden. That allowed us to become pioneers in quite different fields.
b)Roman Catholic Priest 2. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: Other, Uruguay: Other, Switzerland: Other)	310.	311.Before the Cuban revolution, the Roman Catholic Church controlled around 90 per cent of Education in Cuba, and most of the schools belonged to it. Abolishment of illiteracy has been an achievement of the revolution.	312.	313.
c)Roman Catholic Priest 3. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	314.Before the establishment of the 1991 Constitution, the education level was more firm and based on authentic values. After 1991 an opening to new more liberal and relaxed educational proposals was given. New educational models with the criterion of the free development of personality were adopted, no demands, no firm correction. By generating this relaxation a breakdown of morality and ethics opens. Under the criterion of "free development of personality" social and moral decay has come to terrible ends.	315.	316.	317.
d)Roman Catholic Religious 4. (Colombia: Nun, Cuba: Seminarian, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Deacon)	318.	319.With Batista (last president before the revolution) existed disinterest in health and education issues which are of prominent importance in the revolution; that reduced crime, as even the poorest can be a doctor.	320.	321.
e)Roman Catholic Theologian 5. (Colombia: Theologian, Cuba: Theologian, Uruguay: Theologian, Switzerland: Theologian)	322.	323.In the book 100 hours with Fidel it is explained that before the Revolution, the Roman Catholic Church also provided education to the poor.	324.	325.
f)Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (Colombia: Baptist, Cuba: Pentecostal, Uruguay: Evangelical, Switzerland: Other).	326.To be honest with you, I would say that there was a work that has been done and as a consequence, they [Colombian government and Catholic Church] do not have to do much right now. Let me explain: It is like if you have a house and you release ants, wood eaters and tree termites, and then you leave. You do not have to worry. Even if it is for a year, the house will collapse. The work was done a year before.	327. At school, we were all (Cubans) taught in textbooks that the mother of all evils has been the Roman Catholic Church. They were the tool of the Spanish conquistadors to colonise, exploit and mistreat people and do cruelty with native indigenous. - We learn that Spain and Catholicism (for example, what Fray Bartolome de las	328.	329.

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	One year later you see the house collapsing, and you say, "What is going on with the house?" Well, the problem was this evil sown way back. Many years ago –I cannot tell you the exact time frame right now– we had an entire movement where the Colombian government-funded schools to be set here even though we have always had our own schools. As a matter of fact, our Protestant churches started with a school. We had to teach the people to read and write first, and once we instructed them, we built the church. That is the way our ancestors did the work. Although we had a solid education system –we would get textbooks from Jamaica, the USA, English textbooks because our background is the English language–, what the government did was to fund high school programs through the Capuccinos. They funded the B. Nuns and brought the Sagrada Familia, which is a massive institution, they built and funded. They funded the Bolivariano as well. They said to our students, "Look, if you want to continue, to advance your education, you have to go to the Sagrada Familia or the Bolivariano. Your school is very limited". In that fashion, they began to use that tool to change the people into Catholicism. That was a State-sponsored initiative, done by the government. The kids would go there, and one thing that they would tell them, for instance, was, "Do not speak English here". Whether English or Creole, they could not speak it at school. They had only to speak Spanish. Afterwards, they began to teach them all of the Catholic doctrines. Eventually, they said, "We have great opportunities for you to go to college. St. Andrews doesn't have a university, and you want to become a professional, don't you?" People wanted to become professionals, but we did not have that option here. They converted these Protestant believers into Catholicism. They trained them since they were kids or teenagers and they bombarded them until they changed them to become Catholics. They would say, "Now we are going to help you to enter college and become a professional. St. Andrews does not have a lot of professionals, so the government can help you to attain a	Casas did) are violent and evil. Cubans opinion' of the Roman Catholic Church is in general negative. There are few Catholics here.- The misunderstanding problem we face now as Christians [Protestants] is that the secular world (and the regime) have perceived us on an equal basis with Roman Catholics.- At school, we always have confrontations due to the theory of evolution, as we believe in creation. As a result, many of our Church members had fear to recognise their faith in public and left the Church. They ended up mostly in alcoholism.		

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	great career." Subsequently, they would send them with a scholarship to attend Catholic universities in the continent, to afterwards send them back to make them rulers. Basically, they would become governors and all the whole range of leaders. They said, "Now they have degrees, they are lawyers, etc." The government empowered them so that they would take their place at the Catholic religion, take its banner, expand it, and extend it on our territory. Eventually, the church wrote a report after the new leaders did a vast amount of the work, called Mision Cumplida (Mission Accomplished). The local people looked at that and said, "Are they crazy?" They laughed at it and said, "How can they write a document, send it back to the national government and say "Mision Accomplished"? How can they do that if we are still Protestants here? All of us are Protestants; our Protestant churches are still here. We still have our schools; they are crazy. No! They are not crazy. They released enough termites capable of corroding and destroying what was here. That is exactly what they have done. These guys are experts. We are talking about a time in our territory in the middle of the ocean when these guys proved they are intellectual experts that have been managing machinery for centuries. We were ignorant of what was going on and what their agenda was. We did not know this was a structured plan, brought here well documented and laid out to roll. Innocently, the people just fell into the trap. Now we have the problem of having tons of raizal people who are Catholics. On the other side, we have another group that is Protestant, whereas approximately sixty years ago 100% of our population was Protestant.			
g)Protestant Free Church Pastor 2. (Seventh Day Adventist - SDA) (Colombia: SDA Pastor, Cuba: SDA Pastor, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: SDA Pastor).	330.	331.	332.	333.The link between the Jesuits and education is very clear. If you have the young, you have the people. They think this on a long-term basis, as they know that they will not change the society in 5 years [John Paul II cathedral of generations]. But educating the young people it [society] will change towards what you want. The government and society leaders of the future are the youth you educate, who are going to be doing what you programme them to do. That's why education has been extremely important for Jesuits. In Switzerland they [Jesuits] have been banned from educating, but not in Germany or Austria. The government in

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				Germany wants to have control over education, and therefore, no homeschooling is allowed. Every child has to go to kindergarten; this is almost a law. They [German government] want to teach them the way they want them to think [influence of German concordat?].
h)Protestant Mainline (old) institutional Pastor 3. (In Latin America free historical churches, in Switzerland official Church-State Reformed Evangelical) (Colombia: Presbyterian, Cuba: Methodist, Uruguay: Lutheran, Switzerland: Reformed Evangelical)	334.The Catholic Church has controlled for many years the education in this country and many other countries. Catholic Priests and nuns have educated several generations, and I wonder: what is the outcome of those students? Those educated Colombians from 3 or 4 previous generations are the corrupt politicians now, and that began with an educational process. We are now [after 1991] sharing the [education] exercise with the state and some small private groups that made a business from education and have never been interested in values. Corruption in politics, in academia, in all areas of our society has been given because young people were educated in Catholic schools and did not learn the basics of the gospel, which is "do not do unto others what you do not want them to do to you".In education, it has gotten worse [after the Constitution of 1991]. There is a tension between what the Catholic Church wants and what the Evangelical Church wants in diversity issues (LGBTI), which makes the issue more complicated. But overall education has not improved.	In The Republic (or Republican period before the Revolution -1959), - The Roman Catholic Church also had built many private schools that reported vast revenues and high income. Practically, a large part of the educational establishment in this country was kept the Roman Catholic Church. In their schools, they reported enormous profits. They had even the hugest and most important school, the famous Jesuit College in Belén where Fidel Castro had studied. It was the largest school, with a thousand of students (three or four hundred internal and the rest external). Protestant churches, and particularly Methodists were the ones that most schools had built. The education issue is highly important in various Protestant churches because it influences work, and therefore it is also a way to influence society. How? With new patterns, new principles, preparing young people for the business world. Like Protestantism did in England in the industrial revolution.- By the year 1959, the Methodist church had 22 schools and over 5,000 students enrolled nationwide. We had the first Protestant University in Cuba. We also had the largest Protestant school in Cuba, and the Methodist Church became the largest Protestant denomination in Cuba. Marxist-communist revolutionary period: - 1959 onwards: Education became fully public. The law of nationalisation of Cuban education in May 1961 stated that the State controls all education in Cuba until now. 335.- Cuba implemented educational models also practised in the Soviet Union	336.Secular education in Spanish is obligatory. That has been fulfilled. State decisions here in Uruguay are met. Precisely the foundation of the Protestant Reformation was to translate the Bible into the language of the people so that it reaches everyone and promotes the issue of education. Church services, in the beginning, were in Swiss-German. Due to the Swiss tradition, they have spoken several languages. However, some communities of Nueva Helvecia lost the language more quickly. Today people do not know how to speak German. Most of the history books that are here are written in German and Gothic German, and people cannot read them. Some time ago they did a translation into Spanish.	337.I can't tell whether about the bible reading movements in the Catholic Church are popular or not. I know that in Protestant Churches, of course, this [reading the Bible] was always mandatory. The first thing you studied and you do as children in the church is your children's Bible. The Bible is still for everything.

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		throughout its educational system. - Atheistic, Marxist propaganda, was established throughout the education system, so that the so-called "new man" who allegedly was forming, was meant to be revolutionary. Today, - There are many problems with education here in Cuba; problems among teachers, corruption issues, so many problems in our education system. Education coverage does not mean that you have quality.		
i) Ecumenical academic theologian. Colombia: Catholic ecumenical theologian, Cuba: ecumenical theologian, Uruguay: ecumenical academic, Switzerland: ecumenical theologian)	338.In the education crisis in Colombia, in part, there is a great responsibility of a state that is very fragile and a Catholic church that in general is interested neither in social changes nor in a pedagogy of liberation in the holistic sense, educating social actors seeking a fairer, more equitable and more peaceful world. I do not categorically say that it is a one-way responsibility, because I think that these issues must be understood more from a paradigm of complexity. I do not remove the responsibility of the Catholic Church since they have many lands and a lot of influence on education. Our leaders have been mostly trained, in Catholic schools and universities [article of processed corrupts]. I recall Father Remolina, ex-Rector from Javeriana University saying, "What a shame to say that this university is the one that educates this country's leaders and see how the country is going". We cannot cover the sun with a finger; there is a great responsibility in the interests and orientation of the Catholic Church and the state as well. What does it mean to educate? Why ethics have no place? Where are spirituality, religion, conscience and courage, some deontological [ethical] principles, as what it should be, etc.? There may be corruption, but if you do not let yourself to be bought, if your values are above, that will not happen as a public officer. The "regueton singer model" (reguetonero) is the one who is a young man singing, having many beautiful women with different plastic beauty surgeries, with a super house and the last model car, with extravagant clothes. That model of life, personal fulfilment, and success	339.In Cuba, after the Revolution, "Education for all" has been achieved.	340.At that time in the past, until the church was separated from the Uruguayan state, a little Christian education was taught in the schools. In 1863 there was the reform of education and became secular. In this region (Colonia), the main objective was the maintenance of production, but also education. These colonies were mostly Protestant (Valdense and Nueva Helvecia). In Rosario, a town founded by Creoles and Catholics, there were Catholic schools. In Uruguay we do not take advantage of the education we have that is free. A boy who lives in Montevideo should take advantage of having the university there. For people who are from the interior, it is costly, since they must maintain another house in Montevideo. Italians, French, and Swiss cannot believe that people do not take advantage here and that no people are studying the university level or at least the primary cycle. Considering that what you have to pay for education is little (books, photocopies, etc.). It's a shame because education is good. In Uruguay, it is difficult for us to change the laws and enforce them. We first have to educate, and then comes the implementation. [compare with Switzerland] One of the constants of the colonies in Valdense and Nueva Helvecia is that the first thing they did was to establish a school with the persons who had more education and training, who could serve as teachers. The first thing the Waldensians did when they formed a colony was to reserve the	341.

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	has to do with education. What are we educating? Just to be a consumerist, leaving values behind, and that absence gives us a society that privileges and idolises this easy capital.		place for the temple for their meetings and the area of the school. First due to religion, as the majority of Protestants, the Protestant has to know how to read to interpret the Bible; otherwise, you could not practice religion. As the colony expanded, there were seven small schools in the campaign zones. Every 5 kilometres they formed a school. There was a central school that was located in what now is the Waldensian colony. There was a German-speaking school and also a French school for the French-speaking Waldensians. Waldensians wanted people to read the Holy Scriptures, that's why the importance of education because people had to know how to read, to read the Bible. And this was poorly taken by the Catholic Church as they said that the Catholic priests were the only ones who could interpret the Bible in Latin, so nobody could understand what they were saying. And the Waldensians, as they began to educate their children to read and so on, were very educated, including the Waldensian women who were much sought for caring the houses of the Nobles of that time. They were in charge of health, but many times they were burned and considered witches, just for the sake of knowing how to read. In the case of Colonia Valdense (Waldensian Colony), there is a fascinating book called "the Temple and the School", which explains the Valdense colonisation in detail. The language of the Waldensians was French. But those languages were lost with the Varalian reform in 1866, where the Uruguayan state forced that the classes must be given only in Spanish. It is there where the mother tongue was lost. They could provide certain courses in French or German, but children had to be all day in school. Farmers constituted this colony. Children collaborated in the work of their house in addition to going to school. The way of life of the Waldensian promotes their education and their way of working. The Waldensian settlers here had a pastor	

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			who came around 1870 and was a young person from the progressive or reformed sector. He came with new ideas that in turn were very influential with the Uruguayan government. Many colonies after this stayed in different places of Uruguay thanks to the impulse of that person. He had 12 children, and all his children were professionals: Many lawyers; one of the first female chemists in Uruguay. One of the lawyers participated in the preparation of the Civil Code, on issues of divorce and women's rights. Without wanting to, these people, with education, influenced the improvement of the country. The Adventist Church is about 100 years old here. Since 1902, they had a school; the importance of the school that two churches shared it (Catholics and Protestants) is the chapel. I think the development has been more or less the same in the Swiss and Waldensian colonies. But the Waldensians went a little bit further, in the educational context. The "Liceo de Los Valdenses" was created in 1888, while the Swiss Lyceum is from 1948, there is a considerable time difference. In Nueva Helvecia, today many Swiss people come and ask if we still speak Swiss or German, and much [language] is lost. Some words remain, and all generations can still talk some. Although in the school they spoke German, at home they spoke a Swiss dialect. Progressively, they were losing the language a bit. The Valdense, until some decades ago, could take some classes in French. That was until the year 1960. Another issue that boosted education and that was quite a revolution, is that the schools were mostly mixed in the colonies. In spite of being directed by the Waldensians, they accepted boys who were not Waldensians. The Liceo Valdense is the first in the region and in the department of Colonia, the second in the interior of the	

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			country. Because the other one that existed was in Salto, in a departmental capital, and this one was in the middle of the countryside and was also mixed. At Liceo Valdense people from all over the area came to study. But another novelty was that it was sexually mixed, because here in Uruguay, at that time the schools were only for boys. Girls went only to primary school to learn values and cooking, sewing, etc. Secondary school was impossible for girls.	
j)Ecumenical Pastor. Colombia: none, Cuba: Ecumenical, Uruguay: Ecumenical, Switzerland: Ecumenical)	342.	343. Education is vital for development here. There is a complete agreement here with the State of removing education from the church. This is key to reach good levels of education. - Young people today know nothing about religion.	344.	345.
k)Non-Christian (atheist, agnostic) (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: Academic/Intellectual, Uruguay: Academic/Intellectual, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	346.To me, it seems perverse that in Colombia education continues to be run by the Catholic Church or by any church instead. There, then, what prevails is not necessarily teaching how humans can handle our emotions and recognise the difference. And this does not go through historical revisions or quality standards. But what prevails is to create a community around spirituality where what matters is that if everyone goes to school to study if they are Catholic. So this may be related to these schools privileging religious teachings on other skills and qualities. And then, low education quality would not only be a failure of schools but the Ministry of Education. Overall I think the education that favours only one type of religion and that does not allow Buddhism teachings, Taoism, Islam, etc. is teaching that ends up being biased. This ends up creating a type of mental framework that does not contribute to what I would call a culture of reconciliation and recognition of the other as a legitimate "other" in coexistence; as Humberto Maturana says. So if there are institutions that privilege that "we are Catholics" and this is our business "for us" and what we are going to promote is our Catholic values, and we do not focus on the quality of education, then that itself will have to do with the low quality of education in Colombia. I think that the education management should be a public good and	347.The Revolution removed education from the Church power, and it was assumed directly by the State. Education and literacy were secured after the Revolution.	348. Today, there is a very strong criticism of the current government, which is a center-left government that in theory, should defend human rights, because you see a decrease many of the flags of Uruguay such as Education, the Distribution of Wealth, etc., although, in the context Latin America they can continue to be high. Public schools do not teach religion; it has been prohibited since 1917, the year in which religion and the State were separated. The religious communities have total freedom of worship, and also regarding primary and secondary education. In Catholic schools, religion is also taught, since it depends on each institution.	349.

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	should be managed from a secular perspective by the state. That all religions should be allowed to be taught and that quality standards of education should be constantly evaluated by the Ministry of Education to prevent this from being a business that fall into private hands where promoting values of a particular sector of the society.			
l) Non-practising Christian (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	350.The Constitution of Núñez governed from 1886 Until 1991. Núñez constitution established that the official language of Colombia is the Spanish and the official religion the Roman Catholic. In the 1991 Constitution, that changed. Until 1991, all public and private schools in the country were obliged to teach the Catholic religion in primary and secondary schools. Usually, the teachers who taught it were religious (Catholic nuns). Now, after 1991, the Ministry of National Education demands that a "fundamental religious area" be dictated in Primary and Secondary schools, where religion must be studied in a general and transcendental manner and no longer dogmatic as before. There you can study the history of religions. Each school has some flexibility to apply the topics in the curriculum. The religious also continue to teach this area, but they should no longer deepen Catholic dogma. Now, laic teachers from the social sciences or philosophy preferably teach this area. It is not forbidden for religious to teach this subject. In any case, both in public and private public schools, masses are held in general, without forcing students to participate (especially if they are not Catholic). The students are now free to profess their worship and respect that of others. Law 115 of 1994 regulates these matters.	351.	352.	353.
m) Practitioner/entrepreneur, Independent citizen, free Catholic believer (Colombia: Practitioner, Cuba: Employee, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Employee)	354.Formerly, education was strict and of good quality. Teachers and parents used to say and apply “learning comes in with blood” (la letra con sangre entra), which was very effective. Nowadays, you can do whatever you want at school and home, and if you correct children, then you are a criminal. Education has decreased its standards as a result.	355.Education today belongs only to the state. In the schools, we are taught that the United States is our enemy and also that the Roman Catholic Church is evil and brought by the Spanish. Both are tools of the imperialism.	356.You have to see more deeply because you do not want people to evolve to control them. You can indeed on purpose decrease education levels to gain control; that's what happens in Uruguay with the education issue. Uruguay has always been highly recognised for its high levels of education; unfortunately, in the last 15 years, we have been retreating. They (government) say that they do not want the boys to repeat the school year, and then they pass them with low grades without being prepared. They want that they do not know too much, that	357.The idea of the education system [beruf lernen] in the USA comes originally from Switzerland. But the constitution of 1848 was very influenced by the US Constitution and the French Revolution. [without Jesuits' education]. Our primary and technical education is of very high quality, and when you compare those people with Italian or Austrian university professionals, you find that a Swiss that has not entered the University knows more than them in general. That you have studied [a University degree] does not mean that you can work. Here it is better to have experience than to have an academic title because the latter does not guarantee that you have the capabilities for work.

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			they will be half "donkeys" and so "we can take them where we want". We put the brain aside, and others say "what is good and what is wrong". And when the person can think and say what they think and do it, that's where the thing changes. If you do not want things to change, you will try to prevent others from thinking and follow the path that is being told and established. And there they will be dominated. That is why one sometimes wonders, how is it that, in Venezuela, in Brazil, or Uruguay, that type of government wins? Because they promise you money without working and a little more profit by keeping them dominated.	
n)Academic/Practitioner/entrepreneur Independent citizen, free Protestant believer (Colombia: Teacher, Cuba: Tourism professional, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Academic)	358.In 1925, they brought The Cappuccinos from Spain, and they did their job very well. They started enforcing the Spanish language on the people, and they had to learn to speak it, or they could not get a job, and they would call them uncivilised. That is how they defined them. If they did not speak Spanish and were not Catholic, then they were uncivilised. They insisted on this new idea, and a large number of the population gave in. At one point, they closed the Baptist and the Adventist schools. The priests said, "You are not teaching Spanish, you do not have any approval from the government; therefore, you cannot teach". Somehow they survived, they recovered. Catholics pressed the people into their religion, into the Spanish language, and if they could not speak Spanish, they had to face the consequences. Many people accepted Catholicism nominally for the sake of survival. They sent them to the continent and brainwashed them. Later they came back to continue with their indoctrination. That is how they did the work. That is how the Catholic Church infiltrated San Andrés. The morality began to go down. The single largest church in the United States is the Catholic Church. It is not the Baptist [Church] anymore. They [Catholic Church] have power and know exactly how to use it. They have the largest educational system in the world. In Providence Creole is more spoken. They stopped teaching English. It was prohibited to speak it in the schools. Although	359.What the State presents as education in religion (as in Christianity) are the horrors of the Roman Catholic Church. - A typical educated or Professional Cuban believes that the Roman Catholic Church is shameless.	360.see crime code	361.Greek philosophy leads to mysticism and scepticism. Alexander the Great doubted that the logical mind leads to truth. Hinduism and Buddhism adopt an absolute scepticism. Buddhists say that in the beginning was silence. In contrast, the logic of Protestant Christianity comes from reason. John 1, 1 says "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God". The Word is translated from the Greek "logos" that is knowledge and reason. Aristotle strongly influenced Roman Catholic theology via Augustinus and Aquinas. From that philosophy, the Bible is only allegoric to the Roman Catholic Church [Similar to deacon]. In contrast, Protestantism emerged as a movement that is faithful to the original Scriptures. Martin Luther concluded that Aristotle was a devil. This conclusion was also due to all the influence Aristotle philosophy had on false paradigms such as in physics: "Two balls of different weight fall at different times". This is logic but is wrong. It does not include systematic observation. With Francis Bacon, there is a paradigm shift to empiricism. This is a cycle of observation plus logic. Not simple logic. Then in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries happened a scientific revolution in Europe due to the [Protestant] Reformation (and against Aristotle). The aim of the Reformers was that the people may study God's word and do God's work. Therefore, the University was the model to spread such educational purpose. That's why you find that Theology was often the first Faculty Department in the prestigious Universities in Switzerland and Europe. There were fasting and prayers for 30 days in Cambridge, for instance. The next disciplines came as auxiliaries of the Theology

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	they would teach it as a subject, it was prohibited. I studied both English and French when I was in high school. They used to say the mass in Latin when I was a child. My sister was a Catholic, and sometimes they would take me to church with her. My mother did not oppose to it because I knew the commandments by heart. Right now all you see is the English language decreasing day by day. You cannot find people younger than I that can speak English. And if they speak, it is because they learn it abroad. They have to go and live in the USA or Europe. They are teaching English as a second language, not as a first language. When I studied, mathematics, history, everything was in English, but gradually they started teaching in Spanish and English became a second language. In Colombia, there are timid efforts to teach English as the education has been controlled by the [Catholic] Church, which is scared of Protestantism ideas through language. Even being politically Colombia close to the USA, only some privileged elite can learn English here. *Protestant education* Mainline Protestant preachers and those of the State-Churches (such as Lutherans, Anglicans, etc.) here and in Europe must study Theology as a Professional career several years at the University/Institute and then they are employees of their Church earning a fixed salary. The problem is here in Latin America with the boom of the Pentecostal pastors that can be beggars in the street and the next day become preachers and open a new church without any knowledge of theology. There are plenty of scandals here in Colombia and Latin America regarding several of those pastors that become rich with the tithes of people and many other cases of abuse. And the worst part is that with that kind of testimonies, they damage the reputation of other Protestant Churches of good doctrine. They are so-called Christian fundamentalists. But this assumption is false since they do not make a rigorous study of the Bible (the fundament) and they take the pieces that are convenient to the Pastor or Apostle, who is the main leader and semi-God. If they			departments. Therefore, we celebrate the 500 years of the Reformation; otherwise, no Universities would be here, as we know it. Europe began to learn from the Jews in the Middle Ages. For the Jews, the Holy Temple was the centre of the intellectual resources to multiply talents. However, it was the Roman Catholic Church who created the University for those who served the Church. In Bologna, Italy, Augustinian Monasteries were the beginning of Universities. Monks studied Canon Law [there]. The bishops were the judges [totalitarian regime judges and parties at the same time]. But Luther found in the Bible that "every believer is a priest and a king" (spreading education for all, not only for the monks or priests). Reformers such as Luther and Zwingli took this idea from the Augustinian Monasteries to create the schools' system to study God's word. The Pastor was the teacher and education began with a word of prayer. Luther had problems with the German farmers who were against him [Luther] and education because they [farmers] were concerned about who will take care of their cows while they study? Luther said that they would get more money with training and God will provide. The Bible translation (Martin Luther) standardised the German language in syntax and grammar. Before the Bible, German was only a spoken language. In 1832 with Napoleon and the French Revolution, the education was secularised.When you are a believer, the more you go to science logics the more atheist you get until you got a deep point where you will undoubtedly recognise a spiritual dimension.

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	were "fundamentalists" in the strict sense, they should keep all the commandments of the Bible and not jump, clap, and dance. If the pastor makes a mistake, the whole church enters in crisis. On the contrary, in our churches that have a democratic structure, if the pastor fails, the community can understand, and there are many other leaders so that the Church is not in crisis. They do what Satan bible. They are more fanatics instead of fundamentalists. Walter Veith speaks of the current way to impede people to read and practice the Bible is through an aggressive campaign to discredit its contents. An education system that obeys not entirely what the laic" Colombian government commands but most precisely what the hierarchy ordains in an obedient line from the Vatican state. Likewise, you can easily machiavellianly brainwash generations of people until you mould a society in the way that you want it, not questioning the hierarchy, neither the fundamental questions of life, but just obedient automats to a tyrant purpose.			
o)Afro-Caribbean/indigenous religion Priest (Colombia: Rastafarian, Cuba: Babalawo, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	362.	363.	364.	365.
p)Government officer / Former Government officer (Colombia: central government, Cuba: central government, Uruguay: regional government Colonia, Switzerland: Federal government)	366.I studied at a Catholic university. Once I asked the dean why the non-religious (led by the State or private non-religious) universities had better results of education quality in different rankings. His answer was those non-religious or state-led institutions were careless of the real problems of the students and were only focused on results educating "automatic machines". On the contrary, he said, a Catholic university is focused on the "integral human formation" and therefore, we should think of it as a mother. He said, "If a mother has three children, one of them is excellent, the other one is normal, and the other one has a mental disorder, to whom do you think she will pay the greatest attention? To the ill one, the other two are OK. In the same way is our University, but the other universities [led by the State or private	367.The scientific atheism and Marxism are subjects in the curriculum of universities in the Soviet Union and Cuba. - Then we studied that Christ did not exist and that it was a myth invented. Children from 6 to 10 years were not taught "BC" and "AD" but "our era". That has now changed.	368.	369.I don't remember any discussion on Education of the Swiss Government with the Holy See

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	non-religious] attain good results by filtering and excluding the worst students from their system, which is inhuman".			
q)Catholic/Ecumenical Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: Central government, Cuba: National Council of Churches, Uruguay: Military/Church media, Switzerland: Catholic central committee)	370.	371.The Vatican has repeatedly insisted the government that there must be religion in schools. The National Council of Churches is against this objective. Emilio Rodriguez director of the Presbyterian schools in Cuba said nationalisation of education was a necessary evil.	372.What terrifies me is that the quality of teaching is falling. When we attended public schools teachers were excellent, and we left the school with excellent instruction. And now, you have a poor public education. Then a subculture of people has been created that has other terms, other values, other codes, other principles that Uruguayans are not used to. [shared by 3]. In public schools nothing of religion can be imparted, education in Uruguay is free, secular, and compulsory by law. Private schools must be governed by the program that imposes primary education, to that, they add an hour extension with the subjects that they want, more catechesis or religion hours of the religion of the private school, be it Catholic or Evangelical, etc.	373.
r)Protestant Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: none, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Political-Church officer)	374.	375.	376.	377.
s)Embassy of the Country at the Vatican (Colombian Embassy at the Vatican, Cuban Embassy at the Vatican (no answer), Uruguayan Embassy at the Vatican, Swiss Embassy in Ljubljana)	378.Neither the Directorate of Europe nor the Embassy of Colombia to the Holy See have registered topics such as "Education, Land and Property, Religious Liberty, and Ecumenism" in the recent high-level diplomatic contacts between Colombia and the Holy See	379.	380.	381.

6.SYNCRETISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
a)Roman Catholic Priest 1. Jesuit (Colombia: Jesuit, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Jesuit)	382.	383.	384.	385.
b)Roman Catholic Priest 2. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: Other, Uruguay: Other, Switzerland: Other)	386.Here many people are Catholics and Baptists and still, they believe in witchcraft and other rituals, but we preach that this is wrong.	387.The church syncretism with the African religion is a matter of comfort and ease to other worshipers may find thus God.	388.In Uruguay, syncretic rituals come by transfer from Brazil, especially Umbanda and spiritist rites. But they come by contact with Brazil since the Afro-descendant presence in Uruguay is low. This area has a greater influence of Argentina, so there is not so much presence of those rites around here.	389.
c)Roman Catholic Priest 3. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	390.	391.	392.	393.
d)Roman Catholic Religious 4. (Colombia: Nun, Cuba: Seminarian, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Deacon)	394.	395.The vast majority of things we have in our religion come by tradition, and this contributes to a culture that changes daily.- It is very complex that the Roman Catholic Church would accept the baptism of a Babalao for Oru's approval. Maybe the priest does not accept it.	396.	397.
e)Roman Catholic Theologian 5. (Colombia: Theologian, Cuba: Theologian, Uruguay: Theologian, Switzerland: Theologian)	398.Syncretism is a very complex issue. It has to do with history and the treatment of indigenous peoples in Latin America. When the Spaniards arrived, they came to catechise instead to evangelise. They [natives] were taught to cross themselves, to recite the creed and some prayers by memory and then it was assumed that "Christians" sons of God were made, and then they proceeded to baptise them. But there was never an Evangelism process; the term Jesus or the Word never came; the Word was not taught directly (and this is another reason why the Bible is almost not read is that the Word was also not taught since the colonisation). People who came from Spain were not smart. Indigenous, publicly practised out Catholic rites of the time, but internally they continued to practice their religion to avoid punishment. In religious syncretism, (i.e. in what a person professes), some pseudo-beliefs will stay because that's	399.The Afro Cuban Religion did not have an own rite, so they adopted the Roman Catholic rituals. The Roman Catholic Church did not commit to this, but as for the priests, it is a convenient way to fill the Church with adherents. The Priests are happy with that, although they know they are making a theological mistake. - This means that the Roman Catholic Church has accepted syncretism for convenience. At the end, it is in the consciousness of each person.(	400.I do not like to use the term syncretism. For me, all religion is syncretic. One sees it from Christianity, from the nascent Christianity where there is a strong Jewish influence but also Greek, and there is a whole process. And what we call pure Christianity is a syncretism; it is something that has brought different religions. In Uruguay, Christianity is Lay. All this separation of church and state goes beyond a political issue and has caused Christians - Catholics in particular - to introject a secular mentality, where there is, for example, a rejection of manifestations of what has been called popular religiosity. There is in Uruguay a whole way, in my view, very intellectual to live the faith (but I am part of that too). There is a difficulty in integrating the affective or corporal dimension into the experience of faith. I am part of that tradition, but I recognise it as a limitation. I	401.

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	with what the person has been born and grown. It is a very strong cultural issue. Several countries where practices such as Santeria predominate such as Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica, are polytheistic cultures. They named their gods with Christian Catholic saints, in order not to be killed. For example, The worship of Santa Barbara is actually the worship of Changó. This was taking place in all cultures and remembers that our cultures are superstitious; tend to look for the magical, for something different, and something that is typical of the indigenous people. I'm not saying that this is terribly wrong, it is a cultural issue to be studied and we must be cautious when it comes to delving into these issues, as they can damage the culture itself. The situation is given by history, and we have to guide people, without starting with the phrase: "You are worshipping the devil" or suchlike. When you start with the negative, what will happen is that person keep on doing it, inclusively in secret, and of this, it is not only responsible the Catholic Church but every Christian denomination in Latin America. It should be known how to address these issues. We must learn to go with the Gospel with the cultures. For example, the lady who comes and partakes the communion wafer in church on a Sunday, is the same lady who will go to the fortuneteller to get read the tobacco, why? That has nothing to do with being wrong in preaching or something but has to do with a cultural issue, evangelism, mission and much more.		prefer not to talk so much about syncretism but to respect other types of faith that probably are not as I understand them, as I live them, but that respond to a culture, a history, a way of life, that, for me, from a theological perspective, is part of the process of incarnation. That is, faith lives incarnated in a social, cultural, historical, political reality and as these realities are different; the expressions of faith are also going to be different.	
f)Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (Colombia: Baptist, Cuba: Pentecostal, Uruguay: Evangelical, Switzerland: Other).	402.We had a Protestantism that was prevalent here, almost a hundred per cent. We had some leftovers from the African ancestry, a form of Voodoo known as Obeah. Over time, that was almost destroyed and washed away. We still have one or two people around that practice these things. But in the past, it was almost entirely destroyed. We have had a resurgence of it in the last couple of years because there have been a lot of different groups coming into our territory from mainland Colombia. We have had people going to consult with Santeros. They have come from Cartagena, for example, teaching people these practices again. And the church has become tolerant of it. You do not	403.Afro Cuban Religion makes syncretism only with the Roman Catholic Church. The Catholic church has disguised many of its teachings and has appeared to have changed many of them according to the sacred scriptures. However, she is still a promoter of idolatry, a promoter of myths and really ... she does not pronounce herself in favour of the word of God.	404.Nowadays, it is common in society to hear about healers and fortune-tellers that are being used and all that, but we do not believe them.	405.

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	see this practice entering the church, at least not here. I think the problem is tolerance. I think the church has become a little passive about it. For example, a pastor friend of mine had a witch in his church. He did not know she was a witch. She would do everything to try to kill him. He is a Protestant pastor, but she would do witchcraft and all kinds of sorcery. Eventually, she realised that she could not get him killed no matter what she did. Finally one day she came to him and confessed. She said, "I do not understand what power you have, but whatever it is I need it because I have done everything to kill you to no avail. I have done it and killed many other people, but I could not do it to you. She showed him the markings on her body, of all the things she had done to try to kill him. She repented, confessed her sin to him, and all that she did. He prayed for her, God delivered her from evil spirits, and now she is a member of his church. In our Protestant churches, we are not falling into that per se, but it is part of our culture that some people still practice these things, and to some extent, it is growing. A lot of women are getting involved in the practice of smoking tobacco, and reading it, and things like that. In my journey, I have met some satanic priests, and they have told me that to become a satanic priest I must be first a Catholic priest. [c.f babalawo in Cuba, and sexual abuses as satanic rituals].			
g)Protestant Free Church Pastor 2. (Seventh Day Adventist - SDA) (Colombia: SDA Pastor, Cuba: SDA Pastor, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: SDA Pastor).	406.	407.	408.	409.The Catholic Church is a mixture of traditional Biblical Christianity and gentile pagan rituals. If they were to make only the pagan rituals, they were quickly spotted by Christians. They use as little Bible as needed to bring enough people and as many pagan rituals as they can to deceive them [people]. They put things of the Bible that are OK for them (sometimes without a right context) and adapt just the things that are OK with their dogmas. Many (or most) Catholics don't know the background from where those [Catholic] dogmas come from. And they [Catholic dogmas] come from the pagan rituals of the Gentiles. But if you explain this to them [Catholics], they say, "this can't be true". Most Catholics believe that what the [Catholic] Church teaches is the Bible. Some rituals and practices put the "Pontifex Maximus" as the bridge between people and God. Or the use of symbols that come from ancient Egypt and Babylon. [Explained by Walter

6.SYNCRETISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
				Veith, and book of Daniel]. [persecution code] They [Roman Catholic Church] started to use their influence to slow true Christianity step by step along history. It was not a sudden change. It began in the 4th century removing element by element [such as the Sabbath, salvation by grace, the Ten Commandments]. If they were to make it all suddenly, obviously, no Christian will accept it. But when changes are done slowly, not many people fight against it. And even If some [people] were against, they get rid of them. When Loyola founded the Jesuits' order, he was near to death sick. When he got healed, he studied mysticism, and he wrote a book called "The spiritual exercises" with guidelines on meditation and mystic experiences that he had. Not all Jesuits do these exercises, but many make them in the House of exercises. Those exercises are the basis of the Emerging Church movement. This is a combination of Catholic Church mysticism and postmodern thinking. (Gebet leben). Emerging Churches have a lot of spiritual exercises, that's why it's so dangerous. People go to monasteries to do this, and here in Switzerland, there are a series of preachings and preachers [Catholics and Protestants] that use spiritual exercises. The Jesuits were founded against the Reformation. They were the main factor counterreformation and also inquisition (also with Opus Dei). Without this, counterreformation would not work.
h)Protestant Mainline (old) institutional Pastor 3. (In Latin America free historical churches, in Switzerland official Church-State Reformed Evangelical) (Colombia: Presbyterian, Cuba: Methodist, Uruguay: Lutheran, Switzerland: Reformed Evangelical)	410.Santeria is a kind word compared to witchcraft and Satanism. In that sense it is one of the big complaints -which came with the Catholic Church since the conquest-, is that the [Catholic] church had links with Santeria and witchcraft. Although I want to mention that there are also sectors of the Protestant church, which willy-nilly, are getting on that line as well. For example, spiritual calls for people to go, the subject of mediumship, the fetishes issue. If for a Catholic the image of a saint to get money or a girlfriend is the fetish, for charismatic Protestants and Pentecostals are also anointed cloths, candles, water, etc., and there is no greater difference among those fetishes. That is very attractive for our culture. If someone wants to create a church here, just introduce fetishes elements, and you will fill it very fast. It's amazing how Colombian or Latin American people like such emphasis [fetishes] on religious culture.	411.	412.I have not heard so much syncretism here. But I have heard from people who are Christian and also believe in reincarnation. I also know that people with candles have been seen at night in the cemetery sometimes. But they are not Protestants but other people.	413.

6.SYNCRETISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
i) Ecumenical academic theologian. Colombia: Catholic ecumenical theologian, Cuba: ecumenical theologian, Uruguay: ecumenical academic, Switzerland: ecumenical theologian)	414.	415.Yorubas commandments are similar to Catholic ones with the difference that they believe Hifé has given them. - Islamic greeting rituals are identical to those made by the Yorubas [spiritism] - In Christianity, we have replaced pagan festivals for Christmas and other pagan temple rites. - All people who had practised idolatry in history said that their idols were ancestors of the king. Idolatry is justification to oppress. (Triangulate, a tool for hegemony).	416.Here the cult of iemanjá has increased a lot. That is santería, and it comes from people of African ancestry from Brazil. We have the candonme, music with which black slaves were pressured in Montevideo; that music has been declared cultural heritage of humanity and is what identifies Uruguay. However, as an Uruguayan I do not feel identified with the candonme. It's because of the cultural difference we have. The bubandistas have always practised the cult of iemanjá, but it comes from Brazil. As in Montevideo, there is an Afro-descendant population that has stuck a lot, although it also involves a lot of people who practice it and are not Afro. It is assumed that iemanjá is the goddess of the sea and on February 2, a ceremony is performed, and offerings are given to the sea with fruits, flowers, etc. The figure is a virgin, and I do not know what the Catholic Church thinks. I haven't heard any comments in favour or against it. In some parts, there is witchcraft and voodoo, but little. I have not heard of satanic sects in Uruguay. There are healers (curanderos), but not necessarily always black people. My Catholic grandmother was Italian, and she was a healer (curandera). My mother also healed certain things. In Uruguay, it is not like in other countries the slave hand was used a lot for plantations. There were slaves here, but little. And it was only temporary, more commercial, meaning that the slaves did not stay. Moreover, at that time slavery was abolishing. In Sacramento and Rosario there is a colony of Afro-descendants, this is because Rosario is a population founded by Spaniards. You can find some mulattos (mixed Between Spaniards and slaves) but black, black; you will not find here. At first, the colonies were closed, but then they allowed the slaves to mingle a bit.	417.It's very difficult to distinguish among Catholic Charismatics, Renewed Pentecostals, and Neo Pentecostals as their rituals are almost the same. You have to get deep background information to distinguish them. Hermeneutically is difficult to differentiate them; all of them clap hands and rite and preach the same, but they want to be differentiated: Catholics as Catholics and Pentecostals as Pentecostals, as such as they don't congregate together. The Catholic is a very heterogeneous Church. Their common discourse elements are 1. Prosperity gospel, 2. Demonology. 3. Millennialism. Syncretism is sort of a "Dirty word" as it has an implicit judgement and is hegemonic.
j) Ecumenical Pastor. Colombia: none, Cuba: Ecumenical, Uruguay: Ecumenical, Switzerland:	418.	419.In Cuba, Protestant pastors preach in Roman Catholic Churches and vice versa. With the Vatican II council, this is allowed and also that Roman Catholics read the Bible.	420.	421.

6.SYNCRETISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
Ecumenical)		- Ecumenism in Cuba, as in the world is going backwards. People often say that the National Council of Churches is very liberal and close to the government and may be very political. They say that the Church should not be political; and this is stupid, whether by action or omission you participate politically. [Contrast to Ceasar's and God's]		
k)Non-Christian (atheist, agnostic) (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: Academic/Intellectual, Uruguay: Academic/Intellectual, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	422.	423.	424.In Uruguay, the indigenous culture was erased from the map very early in the first half of the 19th century, and the whole indigenous community was killed in a place known as Salsipuedes as a result of direct government policy. On the other hand, what has to do with the Afro-Uruguayan culture, there is the Umbanda religion, which is a fairly strong religion within Uruguay. This is the cult of one of the Catholic religious saints in Uruguay and occurs on the beaches of Montevideo during the summer (around February), when all those who are part of the Umbanda community arrive at the beach in Montevideo and give gifts to the goddess of the religion called Yemanchá and that is the name of the day of the celebration: Day of Yemanchá.	425.
l)Non-practising Christian (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	426.To trace back the origin of cultural assumptions [such as the tendency to see positive to cheat or take advantage of others] is not easy. That kind of ideas are part of the Colombian popular culture; this is a mostly Catholic, but especially where hybridisation of Spanish heritage elements are mixed with indigenous and African ones.	427.	428.	429.
m)Practitioner/entrepreneur, Independent citizen, free Catholic believer (Colombia: Practitioner, Cuba: Employee, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Employee)	430.	431.	432.	433.
n)Academic/Practitioner/entrepreneur Independent citizen, free Protestant believer (Colombia:	The problem is that there is a syncretism between Protestant Christianity and necromancy. Let me explain something: Many of the rites of this African culture and ceremonies have been passed on to the	435.	436.The macumba and other strange things are rarely seen here in Uruguay. Not much of that is promoted but there exists.	437.I have had the opportunity to travel to other countries in Africa and Asia, and I have found with surprise in Africa that some Christian [Protestant] believers practice Voodoo and sorcery, and somehow they manage to remain in the Church. In other Asian countries, I found that some fellow Protestants

6.SYNCRETISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
Teacher, Cuba: Tourism professional, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Academic)	Protestant church. The clapping and the dancing in the churches have its roots in Africa where people worship in that manner. Claps and drums and dance. You can see it in the Protestant world, and it is even being practised today in the United States. "I clap and dance because I feel good," they say. I call them Epicurian Christians. Epicurian is a Greek philosophy that says that you can obtain happiness through pleasure. The goal is happiness. Never mind what means you use, you do what you like, and you can still be a Christian. That is exactly the principle they hold here. They come and link the African Voodoo system with occultism. They believe in the natural immortality of the soul. Those Protestants also believe in that doctrine as well as the Catholics. There we have it. The sun god that they used to worship in Africa under different names and forms is the same god they unknowingly worship today. The Protestants learned from the Catholic Church, and the Catholic Church learned from Rome and brought it here. They have some common ground where they all meet. This lowering of the level of the standard of the Bible has led to a lower standard of living. Psalms 150:4 says, "Praise Him with the timbrel and dance". The original word for dance can be translated as "dance" or "pipe", and if you look this word up in a cross-reference Bible, it refers to a "pipe", a stringed instrument. They argue that because they used to dance back, then they have to do it now. And I reason, "Yes, David killed a man and took his wife, so what? Is David our example?". If we followed David's example, we would get in big trouble. Many people are honest in the heart but they are blind, misguided, and sadly, it is difficult to get across to some of them. We go and try to tell somebody these things, and they do not have any interest in these topics. The devil is working with the emotions of the people — emotional worship. Everybody is just having a happy time. We should not go to church to be entertained but to worship Him. I let them know that we go to church to worship, not to be entertained. Many people do not come back because the service is too dense and too slow			are less trustworthy than what you see here in Europe.

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Stakeholder	Colombia	Cuba	Uruguay	Switzerland
	for them. But I tell them that when I read the Bible, I do not see Jesus clapping and dancing. He read the Bible, taught the people and healed them. Satanic sects (for example, Anton LaVey's Church of Satan) state in their Satanic Bible that satanic rituals inspire the hand-clapping music in many Christian churches. According to the Satanic Bible, the same goes with their influence in clothing and some preachings that divert the true message of the gospel within Christian churches (both Catholic and Protestant). What is also interesting of the Satanic Bible is that they openly recognise that Lucifer (for them the light bearer by its Latin root, Satan) is the Roman god, for which "All roads lead to Rome". And they even state that the most Satanic people are the most powerful on earth, including popes, media, and governments, among others. This you can also see in the occult symbols and signs they publically use. For example, many popes, priests and the "Praha Jesus child" use the two-finger sign that is nothing more than a representation of Baphomet, the goat (a symbol of Satan used in Satanic rituals). They [the Satanists] say that the Satanists have always ruled the earth. 434.Interestingly, our Christian Bible says that Satan did indeed tempt Jesus in the desert offering him all the earthly kingdoms. Why would he [Satan] dare to offer such a big present to the God of the Universe if his earthly dominion were not real? Jesus refers to him as "the prince of this world". In the book Lucifer's Lodge by William H. Kennedy, he says that the ideal hierarchical earthly institution for Satan dictatorship is nothing less than the Roman Catholic Church. Satanism and occultism have been very well established within the Catholic Church, and you can trace it through all the pagan rituals and practices. They even have a chapel in Cagliari, Italy, called the Saint Lucifer chapel, and indeed Lucifer is a not much-known Saint within the Catholic Church. They say that the person of Lucifer is perhaps different from the devil, but it is dubious that a person could be named Lucifer. Likewise, in Italy, according to a public survey among Roman Catholics,			

6.SYNCRETISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	Jesus was in sixth place of importance, after Mary, the pope, Saint Pious, and other saints. One of the aims of the Vatican has been to syncretise Protestants as much as possible with Roman Catholic doctrines. That can be counted with great success for Roman Catholicism.			
o)Afro-Caribbean/indigenous religion Priest (Colombia: Rastafarian, Cuba: Babalawo, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	438.Here, the Rastafari do not have any congregation. But we do it in Panama, in Jamaica, in Africa. I must say that Rastafarianism was initiated in Africa, not in Jamaica. That's why you see all these colours. They are African. There everything began. The one that has worn the most African colour has been Jamaica, in the Caribbean Sea.The Rasta can get into the spirit of Voodoo, but if he does, it is not a Rasta. It is not accepted if he practices it because he does not have to be involved with black magic. You must be sincere, loyal and give your strength and courage to move forward with Rastafarianism; otherwise you can be blinded by that philosophy. You would not be in anything. You would be hurting someone else.	439.Yoruba religion came to Cuba through slavery. - Olofi is the Supreme Being. He is the god of the dead and is celebrated on Sunday his feast since Olorun means (Sun and gold). - In Santeria gods have control of good and evil and the Babalao reaches his spiritual peak when he achieves that control over good and evil. Many die when they get to that knowledge. Babalao means father of secrets. - Rituals are made to do good or evil spells also. - Francisco (Jorge Bergoglio) met with Yoruba and Protestants when he came to Cuba. He is simple, but he has a higher rank than any country or president. The centre of the world is Rome. - The world must have everything, good and evil to have a balance. - From all over the world people come to Cuba to become Babalaos. Cuba leads the world in the Yoruba religion. It began in Africa but then it was moved to Cuba. - We have respect and veneration for the Catholic Church as a mother and centre. Our saints [icons] must receive light in Catholic rituals, for example with holy water.- It is an essential requirement for our ordination as Babalao or "Santo" [saint from Spiritism], to be baptised in the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church knows and is aware of this requirement for sanctification, but they never acknowledge this publicly.	440.	441.
p)Government officer / Former Government officer (Colombia: central government, Cuba: central	442.	443.Methodists and Baptists have pentecostalised their services and rituals.	444.	445.Ecumenism is a matter of discussion of the religious entities, and the Swiss government is not discussing that issue with the Holy See. I am sure there are discussions at the level of the Swiss Bishops on ecumenism, but not with the Swiss government.

6.SYNCRETISM				
Stakeholder	Colombia	Cuba	Uruguay	Switzerland
government, Uruguay: regional government Colonia, Switzerland: Federal government)				
q)Catholic/Ecumenical Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: Central government, Cuba: National Council of Churches, Uruguay: Military/Church media, Switzerland: Catholic central committee)	446.	447.In Cuba, the current proportion of Roman Catholics and Protestants is somehow equal. However, one can count more Roman Catholics as many babalaos are baptised as Roman Catholics.	448.I believe that of a 100 we are 90% Catholics. All 90% is not practising, but you could say that there is a 60 that does. Most Uruguayans are Catholics (although much are not practising). But it is very important that it is like that, regardless of the security issue and all the atrocities that are currently happening. We are a peaceful country, and I think this can be related to the Catholicism because, in the middle of everything, it is a peaceful religion.	449.
r)Protestant Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: none, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Political-Church officer)	450.	451.	452.	453.
s)Embassy of the Country at the Vatican (Colombian Embassy at the Vatican, Cuban Embassy at the Vatican (no answer), Uruguayan Embassy at the Vatican, Swiss Embassy in Ljubljana)	454.	455.	456.	457.

7.INEQUALITY, HIERARCHY, AND ELITISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
a)Roman Catholic Priest 1. Jesuit (Colombia: Jesuit, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Jesuit)	458.When does the Catholic Church begin to be an object of study in the social sciences? It begins in the 50s decade. Before it was not possible because of the self-conception of the Church that has been an elitist, ahistorical, irreformable institution, instituted by God, divine. In Colombia, the first [studies] were from the historians, then the sociologists, (Gustavo Perez Ramirez statistic-quantitative). After the political scientists and then the Anthropologists. The studies on the Church in Colombia are mostly on the hierarchy, on influence on politics. And they are primarily from official documents of the episcopate. We can't define the Church only from a part of it, which is the hierarchy. But studies in the field are scarce. Historical studies are easier because you can do that in a library, but on the field it was almost impossible or challenging due to the armed conflict in Colombia. Until 1930 Colombia had governments from the Conservative party, which was easily associated with the Catholic Church. We speak of the Conservative hegemony then because the Church and the State were together by Constitution. The State protected the Church and the Church controlled all the education (public and private) in the entire country. The country has had an insignificant percentage of foreign immigrants because the Catholic Church has controlled most immigration, making it almost impossible for a Protestant to come in, live, and start a new life in Colombia. This is why there are few immigrants in Colombia, mostly from the Middle East, but not from Europe or North America. According to the Concordat, the government was committed to protecting the Catholic Church community. And the Church made part of the State and, "The Catholic social fact" (el Hecho social católico) meaning that the majority of the nation is Catholic and must be protected. One of such policies was that the institutions in charge of migration in Colombia used to ask the immigrants explicitly their religion. And that makes a lot more difficult for a German Protestant or an English Anglican to settle in Colombia than for a Spanish or an Italian Catholic, for example. This is why; the	459.	460.	We [Swiss] have a very good social system, which allows even the poorest people to have a decent quality of life. Subsequently, it does not exist a wide gulf between the very rich and the poor, because fortunately, the working class became middle class in the 20th century, thus eliminating the poor class completely. If a society does not have a strong middle class but only upper and lower classes, tensions and instability arise. But if it does, as it is the case with Switzerland, stability is the natural outcome. The same principles apply to a church level. We are originally a State of farmers and workers and have never had a monarchical structure. When the queen of England comes here to a State visit, nobody goes to wave on a parade. And when the Pope comes, people do not go to see him. They ask themselves, why should we go and see the Pope? We are Catholics, but we do not have to go and greet him! It is a very basic society, and those who try to be heroes on a political or social scale, or high academics, distance themselves from the general population. In summary, we are the citizens; we managed to travel through history for centuries without ever having any type of monarchy. The Jesuit order in Switzerland is legal only since 1973. The reason being that in the 19th and 20th centuries the State was against Catholicism because the Church was not democratic. Therefore, the Church, which had in its religious community no democratic structures, could not be officially recognised as a body of public acceptance. We [Swiss] created in the 19th century a Church law that is parallel to the canonical law of the Catholic Church. This happened only within Catholicism because it was not acting according to the legal principles, and for that reason, the Church, along with the state had to create a law according to democratic principles. That means that we now have a double legal structure that is unique all over the world. Another repercussion derived from this decision is that lay members who are in associations according to democratic law manage all the financial system in the Church. The money does not land in the hands of bishops but of lay people and Church associations, which are responsible for the finances. Thus, all the Church buildings or the money from the priestly work are administered in that fashion. The Swiss government said in the 19th century that the Catholic Church had to be democratic, but that was far from reality. Subsequently, the parish decided that they had the right to elect the priests instead of being a task for the bishop. He cannot delegate any priest to any Church, but he sends a priest to a parish, which approves him, or not by means of democratic election. So [in Switzerland] you have a lot of elements of basic democracy in the Church from the 19th century onwards because Switzerland was so keen and eager that the Catholic Church

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	immigration has been very weak in Colombia in comparison to other South American countries. The Catholic Church had fought against the liberals and communists in the Conservative hegemony. That was a kind of a parallel society. If there were work unions from the liberals, as a reaction, the Church created a parallel counterparty of conservative work unions, etc. After 1930, the Conservative party begins to lose power to give origin to a liberal hegemony but timid and gradually, step by step. Such influence was characterised by industrial development, land and agriculture reform, and an increase and improvement in the technical education to support the industrialisation. Liberals have started to speak about freedom of conscience and cults and that complicated the situation. President Lopez Pumarejo proposed to change the Concordat, especially trying to remove the influence of the Church in public education, and the Catholic Church began to make a strong opposition. In 1931, with the Declaration of the Spanish Republic, the Conservative Party in Colombia was very concerned that the same could happen in Colombia with the Liberals and strongly opposed them to stop them. That gave place to a so-called "holy war" a religious war between the Conservative Catholics against the non-Catholic Liberals and Communists. This was not only political violence but also with a strong religious component that would escalate until the period known as "The Violence" (1948-1958). In 1948, the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, a Liberal candidate to the Presidency was the trigger for "El Bogotazo" where a great part of Bogota was destroyed and began "The Violence" in Colombia.This was a very difficult period of polarization where entire families and towns killed each other for being either Conservative or Liberal. If you were Conservative you could not marry a Liberal, for example, and vice-versa. In 1958 the two parties agreed to alternate the executive political power in periods of six years (Frente Nacional). The regional assemblies and the internal government bureaucracy were divided half for the Liberals and a half for the Conservatives, except the Ministry of Defense controlled by the military. This was a period of			became a democratic Church. 461.In summary, Liberation Theology required more participation of lay people in personal politics from the Catholic Church. This is the case in Switzerland, not because of Liberation Theology, but because *the State forced the Church to be more democratic* in order to be accepted as a public juridical body. That comes all together in the 20th century. Rome was not very happy with the case of Switzerland. They [Rome] said [Swiss Catholics] are much too Protestant already because we [Swiss] have so many elements together in history that made us also very acceptable from the Protestant theology and distant from the Catholic tradition. The lay people are here also responsible for the real estate, the houses where the [Catholic] priests live. The diocese neither manages the money nor is responsible to provide human resources. The bishop appoints a priest for a parish, but if the parish does not want that particular priest, they reject him. Thus, the bishop cannot nominate a priest for a parish, but the final word belongs to the lay people who have the right to vote.

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	relative political and social stability supported by the Catholic Church. That was a "peace agreement", where the Liberals declared themselves "submissive children" of the Roman Catholic Church.			
b)Roman Catholic Priest 2. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: Other, Uruguay: Other, Switzerland: Other)	462.	463.	464.	465.
c)Roman Catholic Priest 3. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	466.	467.	468.	469.
d)Roman Catholic Religious 4. (Colombia: Nun, Cuba: Seminarian, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Deacon)	470.	471.Revolution did much to Christianity and Catholicism in Cuba because it was formerly the religion of the elite, as elsewhere. Now Catholicism is the religion of people. - The elite schools in Cuba were Catholic. There were schools for blacks and different schools for whites. The same in the church, it existed books for whites and books for brown (pardos). [c.f. Cuban Catholic theologian]	472.	473.
e)Roman Catholic Theologian 5. (Colombia: Theologian, Cuba: Theologian, Uruguay: Theologian, Switzerland: Theologian)	474.	475.Before the revolution, there was huge social segregation. Even in banks, there were banks for rich and for poor. Schools for rich and for poor, etc.	476. An issue that in my view, is still not resolved, is that Latin American elites clearly identify themselves with the US or European elites rather than with their own conational. While there is a substantial part of the population in Latin America that are either indigenous or African American and have other dynamics. But the possibility to build an identity, both at the continental level and at the level of each country, is one thing that I think is very weak in Latin America. And that has not allowed overcoming issues such as injustice, violence, or discrimination, even with all the wealth and production -not only agricultural but also intellectual that Latin America has had-. But It's something I do not have the answer for. For many centuries, the Catholic Church did not want to recognise the importance of the Scripture, disregarding the importance the Bible has for the church. One of the reasons is that knowledge gives power, so if the Bible was exclusively for the cleric who obtained an authority over the faithful for	477.Latin America seeks for the transformation of the status quo. Elites must be educated in social responsibility. It is unacceptable that Latin America is full of Catholic universities where the elite is educated and the continent is the most unequal and unjust [Same reflection of Remolina, Alirio and the other s.J]. It leaves me a great deal to be desired [the fact that] Germany and Switzerland are more equitable than Latin American countries. Would this be a failure of the Catholic Church?

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			many centuries, then it makes sense to forbid reading the Bible. As a reaction to that, the Protestant Reformation has the Sola Scriptura as one of its principles. That is one of the reasons for the Protestant Reformation, with the translations of the Bible through Luther, then the translations into French, the Bible is brought to the people. So one of the reasons for this is that knowledge is power and then the church and its hierarchy want to maintain that power, and that is why it does not allow the Bible to be read. That I think is going away. In the II Vatican Council appears the centrality of the Bible for the Catholic Church but always recognising the importance of tradition, as an interpretive for the reading of the Bible. This because the risk that the Protestant Reformation has run is that with only the Bible each one interprets it as they want and this way the churches have multiplied. Because every time one does not agree, it will interpret it differently. Tradition and teaching in the Catholic Church have helped to have some common interpretation.	
f)Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (Colombia: Baptist, Cuba: Pentecostal, Uruguay: Evangelical, Switzerland: Other).	478.	479.	480.	481.
g)Protestant Free Church Pastor 2. (Seventh Day Adventist - SDA) (Colombia: SDA Pastor, Cuba: SDA Pastor, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: SDA Pastor).	482.	483.	484.	485.There is a relationship between occultism and Catholicism. You can always see in Catholic countries their economies are lower because the Catholic elites manipulate the power to keep people low and poor in general (education for example). They want that the people don't know too much [like the Uruguayan entrepreneur]. In Protestantism education is strengthened and culture gets higher moral standards. You can see in Europe that corrupt ethic codes influence southern Europe countries and culture, such as Spain, Italy, and Poland [mainly Catholics] or Romania or Greece [mostly Orthodox]. The Catholic elite keeps people poor and dominated by the mystic and superstition. It's always like this in Catholic places.
h)Protestant Mainline (old) institutional Pastor 3. (In Latin America free	486.	487.The Republic (or Republican period before the Revolution -1959) Catholicism in The Republic Hegemony	488.	489.Rome was a very segregated society in Paul's time.

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historical churches, in Switzerland official Church-State Reformed Evangelical) (Colombia: Presbyterian, Cuba: Methodist, Uruguay: Lutheran, Switzerland: Reformed Evangelical)		- For ordinary Cubans, the Roman Catholic Church had defrauded them. Even the vast majority of Cubans did not practice Catholicism at that time because the Roman Catholic Church was always in favour of Spain. And every time that there was a priest or people who supported the independence movement, they were removed, taken out, convicted, or exiled away. And by appointing a new Spanish priest, the problem was simply solved, given the characteristics of hierarchical structure leadership of the Roman Catholic Church. Elitism - If we do a demographic analysis, possibly most (if not all) of the Roman Catholic Churches were located where the circles of power were. Most temples were built as sumptuous and wonderful temples. For example, in the municipalities of Marianao, Playa, where the aristocracy was, they built very nice wonderful temples, mega temples. All this was common because it was the Church that was at the side of power. This economic power guaranteed stability.		
i)Ecumenical academic theologian. Colombia: Catholic ecumenical theologian, Cuba: ecumenical theologian, Uruguay: ecumenical academic, Switzerland: ecumenical theologian)	490.Today, the issue of "easy money", the whole drug culture, is permeating everything that happens, not only in Colombia but on the whole Continent. For example, the narco who becomes a millionaire with very few steps on grows and multiplies money with an illegal transformation business where profit margins are huge. In that "easy money" scheme all are attached, the state, guerrillas, military, emerging populations, and social sectors of a different kind. That's why crime, corruption and the great asymmetry and inequality are explained. Because the matter is not only poverty and misery, but there is rampant inequality in our countries, Colombia, Brazil, Central America, etc. It is scandalous that the wealthiest rich live in the same territory of the poorest of the poor. And those who have enriched themselves, in general, have done so because they have gotten into money launderers business or participate of it or just	491.The Roman Catholic Church supported the Spanish colonialism. People had, therefore, an aversion to Catholicism. - José Martí said that the Roman Catholic Church is clever and it does not do what monarchies used to. They use multiple strategies to perpetuate power. Martí also said: "The hierarchs of Protestantism and Catholicism are together to bring a political and social process". - The high-level leaders of the Churches' hierarchy always live very well, while missionaries suffer badly. Examples of this are "The Little Brothers of Jesus" (monks and Catholic nuns) that penniless make a mission in Cuba.	492.On the other hand, there was a farm that Catholics and evangelicals together. The chapel was built there and was used by the two creeds taking turns each week for church services. During the week there worked the Adventist school too, and there was also the first cemetery. The first Swiss funeral was held in that place. When the Swiss arrived, in today Nueva Helvecia, they made that chapel, and the cemetery and everything worked well until in 1870 a Catholic bishop in charge of the diocese of San José arrived and was horrified to see a cemetery for Catholics and Protestants. At that time the churches were united, they were a compendium of evangelical churches (the Lutheran, the Calvinist and the Waldensian). Then that ecclesiastical authority came and proposed to make a wall that would divide the cemetery, on one side for Catholics and on the other side for	493.One of the difficulties to involve Catholic priests in academic research is that it's really difficult to speak with them. They either say that you have to read the books or they have already prepared the answers in a format.

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	hijack drug properties.		evangelicals. He was horrified that the dead were buried in the same holy field. That was raised in the community, and the community said that a wall planted in the cemetery was a sign of division, which they had not from the beginning and said they did not want that wall. Then this issue was solved in an assembly of that chapel, where for the first time in Uruguay a secret vote was taken. Between 1900 and 1920 voting in Uruguay, was by showing of hands, it was a sung vote, where it was said out loud: "vote for so and so" and if the commissioner looked at you badly, they were able to change the vote. It was a strange half-democracy. In contrast, the Swiss, in 1870, they made a secret vote to decide what to do with the cemetery issue and agreed that the evangelicals would stay there and return the money that the Catholics had spent in the chapel, on the wall, etc. Then the Catholics bought a piece of land, where the Catholic Church works currently and they made a little chapel and, unintentionally that created division in the colony. That division occurred when the colony grew, and the small town was formed around the Catholic Church - but before that time they were farms. In some paths, you can see the Cairns that divided the lands with stones.	
j)Ecumenical Pastor. Colombia: none, Cuba: Ecumenical, Uruguay: Ecumenical, Switzerland: Ecumenical)	494.	495.The government expelled Roman Catholic priests due to their "Colonial mentality." - The Roman Catholic Church continues to have privileges with the State, as they do not have to pay any report to the government, while all Protestant churches must. - Protestant Churches were revolutionary for the clash with the Roman Catholic Church.	496. In Nueva Helvecia, there was never an elite or "high social class".	497.
k)Non-Christian (atheist, agnostic) (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: Academic/Intellectual, Uruguay: Academic/Intellectual,	498.	499.	500.	501.

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)				
l) Non-practising Christian (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	502.	503.	504.	505.
m) Practitioner/entrepreneur, Independent citizen, free Catholic believer (Colombia: Practitioner, Cuba: Employee, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Employee)	506.	507.	508.	509.
n) Academic/Practitioner/entrepreneur Independent citizen, free Protestant believer (Colombia: Teacher, Cuba: Tourism professional, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Academic)	510.The Catholic Dogma that they teach in the schools consists in that you can't question anything, you can't say anything. Everything is kept hierarchically in secret, mystery, without any transparency. The Catholic Church is such a mysterious and dictatorial regime where no freedom of conscience exists. You just have to obey guidelines from arrogant authoritarians. Along the history of this country, and in the entire world, people have been forced to be converted, and then the children and next generations will be born Catholic, but not by will. They will not question that faith that will they assume is part of their culture. If you check the number of genuinely converted from other religions to Roman Catholicism in current years, you will find that it is relatively few, compared to other religions.	511.Cuba has not such income inequality. Minimum health food and education are guaranteed for everybody. There are almost no illiterates here.	512.	513.In hierarchical religions such as the Roman Catholic, or the Orthodox, the priests are the "truth owners" or the "chosen by God" "semi-gods" and everybody has to accept what they say. There is almost no chance to discuss or to make questions. This also applies to [old] Protestant denominations such as the Anglican or the Lutheran. When you leave no room for participation, you can easily establish dogmas and authoritarian schemes. Also, people get used to the submission only, but not to think proactively. The original spirit of Protestantism has been to discuss and learn together as for Luther "every believer is a priest". Normally, in many Protestant denominations, you still find today that people can participate in the Church Service for example in the Sunday [or Sabbath] lesson, where the preacher sits to study and participate in the school as one believer more. Of course, another big difference is the fellowship that you find when you establish this type of non-hierarchical participation. And this equity principle and rejection of hierarchy can be traced back to Jesus' commandment [Luke 22, 25-27: "And he said unto them, The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them; and they that exercise authority upon them are called benefactors. But ye shall not be so: but he that is greatest among you, let him be as the younger; and he that is chief, as he that doth serve. For whether is greater, he that sitteth at meat, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at meat? but I am among you as he that serveth."] Fascism has been the ideal political and religious system of

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				the occultism, Satanism, and Rome. A powerful elite of oppressors (the initiated) and catechumens compose such system. The catechumens are the goyem who are the mass population, ideally poor and ignorant to be indoctrinated with catechetical dogmas taught at schools and churches. The initiated (elite) use esoteric and exoteric discourses, and the catechumens believe and reproduce the exoteric discourses. Catechumens need to be kept in ignorance by different means. This ensures to perpetuate the hegemony and status quo of a Machiavellian system that has worked well for thousands of years. In Germany, Hitler and fascism came from Catholic Austria without they admit it. As soon as Hitler got the power, to legitimate his dictatorship, the Nazi regime signed a Concordat with the Holy See that is valid in Germany until today (Reichskonkordat).
o)Afro-Caribbean/indigenous religion Priest (Colombia: Rastafarian, Cuba: Babalawo, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	514.	515.	516.	517.
p)Government officer / Former Government officer (Colombia: central government, Cuba: central government, Uruguay: regional government Colonia, Switzerland: Federal government)	518.Here in Colombia, we are under the caprices of the same family elites that have governed this country since we belonged to Spain. They make us believe that they are enemies among themselves from Liberal or Conservative, from left or right, but in the end, they all belong to the same club. The best examples of this are the game power of the Santos Family, descendants of the Liberal ex-president Eduardo Santos. The current President, Juan Manuel Santos who is making the peace agreements with the guerrilla, was the most extreme rightest as Minister of Defence from Alvaro Uribe's government, where Francisco Santos, his cousin, was the Vice President of the Republic. Now, they pretend to appear publically as the worst political enemies (Francisco Santos from the Right and President Santos from the centre (or left according to Francisco)) when they are cousins, who have belonged to the same government and family. Francisco Santos was likewise, baptised Catholic by the Priest Camilo Torres, liberation theologian founder of the ELN leftist guerrilla. Ex-president Alvaro Uribe, leader of the extreme right party ironically	519.Catholicism, before the revolution in Cuba, was in favour of the wealthy classes. Banks had preferences to white people and blacks were backwards. - The Roman Catholic Church influenced dividing and creating superiority, inferiority and domination of classes in Cuba before the Revolution. - The state is unquestionable in a Soviet regime; except in Poland and other countries, where the unhappiness started.	520.	521.

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	called officially "Democratical Centre" is the ex-boyfriend of the Liberal ex-President Alfonso López granddaughter' Clara López, today extreme leftist leader and political enemy. Their families, all belong to the same "clubs" Uribe to the Opus Dei, and Santos and López to the Freemasons.			
q)Catholic/Ecumenical Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: Central government, Cuba: National Council of Churches, Uruguay: Military/Church media, Switzerland: Catholic central committee)	522."The political class does not change; it reproduces itself" Colombian Senator.	523.There was a class conflict in Cuba everywhere before the Revolution. - However, some Protestant churches were also classist before the Revolution. [Triangulate] - The Cuban revolution brought dignity to many people. For many criticisms made to Cuba, many countries Cuba yearn the conditions that we have, for example for the poor. What a privilege that any peasant can become a doctor here!	524.A person from the UN said that you do not have to give the fish to the poor but the fishing rod. However, here the fish is being given and not the fishing rod to ensure the vote of the leftist and its permanence. The worker is the one who pays taxes and everything, and the "clever" is a free rider that is used live from it. Many of those free riders go on vacation as tourists and wet workers have only one day of leave. That is "viveza criolla" Creole cleverness.	525.The Catholic Church is a hierarchical Church in the German-speaking cantons, but no so in Fribourg or in the canton of Jura, where we have democratic corporations of the Christians for collecting the Church taxes. The State does not allow the Church taxes to go directly to our hierarchical structure, but they have to go to the people who organise themselves to collect these Church finances. This idea also exists in the United States, where there is no taxation without representation, and it is applied to the Church as well. This is a unique case in the world. For example in canton Zürich, we have a bishop, priests and parishes, and beside this, we have at the canton level and in the different towns or parishes, an organisation for Catholics and Protestants that come together for political decisions in the assembly of the community to decide especially about finances. They also have the right to re-elect the priest. The bishop proposes a priest formally, but if Catholics in the town do not elect him, he cannot get a salary. This is a quite special tradition. It goes back to medieval times in Switzerland, and the Reformation strengthened it. It ignited the liquidation of the hierarchical thinking. And then the State organised the Church life to a certain degree. In the details, this is a rather complicated issue. Regarding the Concordats, and relations to the State, the most important part of the law, is the Cantonal, which is made by the State law and not much by agreements with the Church. Agreements exist in some dioceses but not in all, and especially there is a recommendation about the extension of the diocese and the election of the bishop. He has his speciality in St. Gallen and in Basel and in the diocese of Chur. There are possibilities of the local Church to participate in the designation of the next bishop. Maybe if you read the newspaper, you have seen that there are conflicts about that in the diocese of Chur, but it all works out very well in the other two dioceses in the German-speaking Switzerland. In the Western part of Switzerland, this problem does not exist. These are quite complicated issues.

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
r)Protestant Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: none, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Political-Church officer)	526.	527.	528.	529.
s)Embassy of the Country at the Vatican (Colombian Embassy at the Vatican, Cuban Embassy at the Vatican (no answer), Uruguayan Embassy at the Vatican, Swiss Embassy in Ljubljana)	530.The issues that are handled in the agenda with the Holy See are of a high political level. Public support is known for the peace processes and the post-conflict.	531.	532.	533.

8.SOCIAL EMANCIPATION / DEPENDENCY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
a)Roman Catholic Priest 1. Jesuit (Colombia: Jesuit, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Jesuit)	534.In the 60s Colombia was influenced by an increase in social movements and liberal ideas. In 1964, Camilo Torres Restrepo, the grandson of the Ex-President Carlos E. Restrepo, had a strong influence on the Church and the country. He studied in Belgium, and he founded the Faculty of Sociology in the National University in Colombia and resigned as Catholic Priest to make part of the ELN guerrilla, where three months after, he was killed in combat against the army. Camilo Torres was, by far, more important for the leftist ecclesial movement within the [Catholic] Church than the Latinoamerican Episcopal Conference of Medellin or the Liberation Theology. In fact, Camilo Torres ideology was a source for the Liberation Theology. We have not seen a big Church institutional transformation either in the '70s nor in the '80s in Colombia. It was not the Liberation Theology that causes any institutional change in Colombia, because the Liberation Theology was weak in comparison to Brazil, Peru, or Argentina. The hierarchy in Colombia is so stable; the institutional structure (of the Catholic Church] is very solid even until today. The end of (Frente Nacional) 1974-1986 was a very difficult period were great tensions produced divisions among liberals, conservatives, but also inside the Catholic Church (between "field priests" and the hierarchy). But the Liberation Theology did not have a significant impact in Colombia, while it did at international level. Liberation theology has a mixture of Marxist elements of class (that are not properly of peace), of Christianism, and syncretism with local practices. The process of secularisation and laicisation that the Colombian society has experimented since the '80s has been the fastest in all its history. The social changes that we see in the Church had begun in the 1990s or the 2000s, due to regional processes that originated violence in Colombia (for example, in San Vicente del Caguán (guerrilla), Barrancabermeja (paramilitaries), Quibdó (guerrilla), Tumaco (guerrilla and narcotraffic)), where not only the population but also the Church has been	535.	536.	537.You know that in the Swiss Church, Catholics are a minority and the majority of members are Protestants. Therefore, I speak only on behalf of the Catholic theology and the Catholic Church because, on the Protestant side, the situation is quite different. Liberation theology was not the central topic of the Protestant theology but instead; they have a very strong tradition on political theology and Christian socialism. And with Leonardo Boff there is also a tradition of political theology, and it has similar ideas very often, but it is not about the Theology of liberation. So, just to distinguish, both are very present, but the Liberation theology is more or less only present in the Catholic tradition. There is a faculty at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland that taught the Liberation theology, which was really dominant in the '70s through the '90s. The emphasis was really strong. I studied this theology there at that time, and just to mention an incident, the assassination of Jesuits in El Salvador led to a day of mourning at the University in Fribourg, to the point that everybody stopped teaching at the faculty due to the strong bond with the Liberation Theology in Latin America. This social catastrophe was the focus of the Catholic German-speaking Church. There is a distinction between the Catholic theology in German compared to the theology in the French language. The French Catholic section was not affected by the Liberation Theology contrary to what happened in the German side of the Church where it was quite strong. My generation studied in Switzerland in the '70s, '80s and early '90s, and the Liberation Theology was not the only school, but it was one of the most dominant ones taught to everybody, and it went on to create a political tradition of Christian Socialism as I already mentioned. Catholics are also influenced by Christian socialism as we had had in the Protestant tradition. Catholics had been second-class citizens in the 19th century in Switzerland. Jesuit society had been forbidden in Switzerland up to 1973 or so. It has been only 40 years since we have been legal here. I would say that it was simply the openness of the German-speaking culture to Latin America in the '60s and '70s. Social commitment was very important for the German Church. In consequence, sociology was a natural link between the Church interests and what was going on in Latin America. On the other hand, the French culture remained much more focused on the philosophical and literary questions. They had a different approach since their theology was not as open to socialism as their German counterpart. Another crucial aspect was politics. Culturally, religion, Church, and politics have remained separated within the French culture, which in turn has had an influence on the French-speaking Switzerland.There is only one faculty in Fribourg, the French school of Theology where the scientific discourse is mainly the debate of France.

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	affected by violence. The changes are not due to a particular ideology, such as Liberation Theology. Today, it is possible to travel to those areas and confirm this in the field.			Conversely, the debate of the German-speaking Switzerland is the debate of the German-speaking culture. Austria and Germany are both linked to the Anglo-Saxon context, and the Swiss du Monde is much more linked to France.
b)Roman Catholic Priest 2. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: Other, Uruguay: Other, Switzerland: Other)	538.	539.Liberation theology is a Christian theological current born in Latin America between 1968-1979 and composed of several Catholic and Protestant strands. The liberation theology believes that the gospel requires a preferential option for the poor and uses social and human sciences to define the ways to be performed. - Liberation Theology has its biblical foundation and an open dialogue with the world. I think there are not correlation points that match with Marxism. -In Cuba, it was not achieved any theology of liberation. In practice it is not enforced [as] I told Fray Beto, the writer of the book "Fidel and Religion,". However, Liberation Theology impacts Cuban revolution since the revolution brings freedom to people. [the revolution influenced Liberation Theology]	540.	541.
c)Roman Catholic Priest 3. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	542.	543.	544.	545.
d)Roman Catholic Religious 4. (Colombia: Nun, Cuba: Seminarian, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Deacon)	546.	547.	548.	549.
e)Roman Catholic Theologian 5. (Colombia: Theologian, Cuba: Theologian, Uruguay: Theologian, Switzerland: Theologian)	550.	551.	552.[see inequality code]	553.Liberation theology has much in common with the philosophy of liberation. The latter is ethical and the former answers further where does it come from? Liberation theology tries to transform reality by taking the gospel of the kingdom of God protesting against oppressive structures here on earth. To this [purpose], the creation of a new man [as in Marxism] is fundamental. It takes elements of the Cuban and Sandinista's revolutions. If we examine the philosophy of the Liberation theology there are two tendencies: The first is Gustavo Gutiérrez, who says that [Liberation theology] is not Marxist thinking but the salvation of sin and liberation of the oppressed. The second is Enrique Dussel's positive construction of morality systems. Dussel analyses the

8.SOCIAL EMANCIPATION / DEPENDENCY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
				messianic attitude of the Latin American ethos as Hispanic cultures have an overdose of messianism, therefore, the longing for a new world, Caudillismo and the new man in Latin America. […] That has been overcome in Europe. [Dussel's Philosophy of liberation departs from Latin America as part of a global periphery (dependency theory)]. In the 1980s, the Catholic Church profoundly criticised the theology of liberation. The Catholic social doctrine is little social in Latin America. In Europe, the Social Doctrine of the Church took roots in Germany and Belgium. That in Latin America has not existed; we lack that [there]. Some politicians have found convergence [of the Catholic social doctrine] with socialism. We are between the thesis and the antithesis, and someday we will arrive at the synthesis [Hegel]. The problem with liberation theology is that it is like in the 16th century; they [Liberation theologians] think they know more about what the poor need than the poor themselves.
f)Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (Colombia: Baptist, Cuba: Pentecostal, Uruguay: Evangelical, Switzerland: Other).	554.	555.	556.	557.
g)Protestant Free Church Pastor 2. (Seventh Day Adventist - SDA) (Colombia: SDA Pastor, Cuba: SDA Pastor, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: SDA Pastor).	558.	559.	560.	561.[Protestant] Christians form parallel societies [already triangulated]
h)Protestant Mainline (old) institutional Pastor 3. (In Latin America free historical churches, in Switzerland official Church-State Reformed Evangelical) (Colombia: Presbyterian, Cuba: Methodist, Uruguay: Lutheran, Switzerland: Reformed Evangelical)	562.The Colombian [Catholic] Church can make something better; the question is whether they want those goals or not. They have a lot of power and a lot of money to do it. The contributions of the Protestant Christian Church are a drunkard less, an adulterer less, and an addicted less. The state would have greater ability to support and accompany processes of structural improvement, but "I do not know if they want" and this is a topic of much pessimism. Although the state responds to us all the time: "we do want", there is a huge limbo. Leadership is neither in religion nor politics.	563.2.2.3. 1980s decade (Collapse of Socialism in the World and revival of churches in Cuba) - When the socialist camp collapsed, churches began to revive. Mainly in 1985, 1986 and 1987, it began an easing of the State as a result of what was happening in the world, especially in 1989 with the famous fall of the Berlin Wall, a symbol of the fall of the socialist world. - There is a philosophical principle that says, "Do not give bread to the hungry, but teach him how to make bread." This means that, while you maintain a paternalistic system in a society, or while you make others	564.The main characteristic of a real Christian Church is everybody's freedom to be able to decide. But we live in a society where many of us expect that they (government, church leaders, etc.) tell us, what should we do. And many churches take advantage of that.	565.

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		dependent on you, they are going never to have the ability to develop by themselves. So that it is a serious problem of socialism and communism. Systems that moreover, also deny two fundamental principles: Freedom and Development.		
i) Ecumenical academic theologian. Colombia: Catholic ecumenical theologian, Cuba: ecumenical theologian, Uruguay: ecumenical academic, Switzerland: ecumenical theologian)	566.The concept of Liberation starts from a reflection of how a continent, mostly Catholic lives those situations, mostly of poverty and inequality. There appears the theory of dependence, and that is how these countries end up being the backyard as the defence historically of Spain, Portugal, England and then the USA and nowadays of the great transnational capitals. Fifty years ago it was dependency theory and the United States.- Dependence is opposed to Liberation. How to break dependency? we have to free ourselves from that dependence, and that's where a philosophy of liberation, a liberation pedagogy and theology of liberation appeared. And "liberation" has to do with freedom and basically, in that moment freedom has to do with the economic and political dependence of the United States. How do you get there? Using a matrix of Marxist analysis, class struggle, relationship, capital and labour relationship, but that is the starting point, and that's why many understood that there was a political militancy to be made. Like Camilo Torres, who ends up thinking that the way is to hoists the weapons. The Liberation theology must be understood in that framework, a reflection on dependence and dependence that is structural, concerning the economic model and the political model of a great empire represented by the United States. But the theology of liberation did not just stay there; the biblical resource, the same theological reflection, was concluding that the liberation is not only structural, but it has to be liberation concerning the person, of his conscience, of his interiority. In this context, we cannot equate the liberation theology movement with guerrilla priests or with armed movements. But the theology of liberation is a great theological, ecclesial movement that continues in force, that has not died, that has been transformed, that it has been enriched. And that is why, many of the critical	567.We have been taught (in the Schools) that our problems are related to US political influence.- What the revolution did in Cuba could be comparable to what the Reform did in Germany 500 years ago. It was the social gospel what Luther brought and gained political support from the Prince. Later Luther became Germany's hero, even for Communists. - In Cuba, the revolution was a result of blending social work with people and theological and ideological work. Reformers were revolutionaries also. Capitalism defends the interests of the individual, and the system needed a release from feudalism, and therefore Protestantism gained political support. (In Cuba capitalism is commonly seen as an ideology)- A correlation between political, economic and religious freedom exists.- The gospel, when put into practice, produces changes in society.- However, the reason for the Reform is political and had to be given a theological ground [Triangulate and Discuss]. The Church is not independent of the social process that goes through. All churches come in a social process. -Liberation theology received influence from Marxist sectors. The ideals were liberation from slavery and Emancipation.- Jesuits had promoted the liberation theology to change oppression systems and structures of sin.	568.Uruguay got its independence in 1830, with the first constitution. We had independence since 1825, but it was an independence dagger, by an agreement between England, Brazil and the countries that surrounded us. We were always like the isolated ones, and we are still sometimes. We are so tiny and so few people, but we have achieved that two big powers, such as Brazil and Argentina, do not absorb us. At that time it was England that demanded that the territory should left be free. Uruguay lost a lot of land, but got freedom.	569.

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	consciences, of the prophetic voices in these 50 years, are those that pose a novel and hopeful look at the situation of the church and the situation of the continent. It is not that liberation theology has created more problems than it was intended to solve, but that in the same dynamic of conflict the theology of liberation has generated problems regarding these signs of violence. But it has also proposed alternatives concerning that takes a much deeper look at the root of the problem and remains an alternative, a validity. Because, in strict order, every authentic Christian theology is a theology of liberation, understood in freedom: "The truth sets us free", says the Gospel of John; "To be free, Christ has liberated them," says Paul. The discussion is more philosophical than theological, what is meant by freedom and what is meant by freedom and liberation from the project of Jesus. It is not only a political structural question of taking power, but it is a liberation from one's sin, from one's selfish pettiness, it is an invitation to the profound transformation of the human being, and I think that the theology of liberation is still a very valid current. It learned from the mistakes of extreme institutions of armed struggle. For example, many researchers have not remained with the Camilo Torres killed in combat in Santander, but with the entire history. What was the thought of Camilo Torres that was leading him to make that decision? What for some it is heresy or almost an issue of idolatry to the diabolic of communism, for others is a very interesting theological investigative exercise. Because Camilo [Torres] had a great criticism of the socio-economic and political structure, the slavery dependencies of Colombia in the 60s years and that are valid until today. This liberation theology is very clarifying, historically situated and does not end up in the guerrilla priest. But it extends to the committed priest to the social transformation that at one time concludes that the only way out is to go to the mountain with weapons, but that his social analysis and vision of the social task of the church are impressively current and valuable.			

8.SOCIAL EMANCIPATION / DEPENDENCY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
j) Ecumenical Pastor. Colombia: none, Cuba: Ecumenical, Uruguay: Ecumenical, Switzerland: Ecumenical)	570.	571.In Cuba Liberation theology did not penetrate but quite the opposite: The revolution could feed the theology of liberation with progressive thinking. Gustavo Gutierrez.	572.With my wife, we are partners of 8 institutions, and according to the Swiss idiosyncrasy, we know how to live with others, which is not easy, but it is not impossible. And the mayor always boasts with the central government saying that here in Nueva Helvecia all the "public" institutions are private communitarian and that is the legacy that the Swiss made them and they keep them. The library, the cultural centre, etc., are private, but they belong to the whole society. Then we collaborate with them from the municipality. For example, the Cultural Centre has a high cost, and we all help with the amplification, with all the needs. Or we look for help in the departmental government to support that institution.	573.
k) Non-Christian (atheist, agnostic) (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: Academic/Intellectual, Uruguay: Academic/Intellectual, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	574.The Catholic Church has had a very perverse tradition associated with the Vatican, with a lot of secrecy, with a hegemony of power, that is, it is very different from Taoism and Hinduism that have never had an institution like the Vatican that has had a geopolitical game in all the territorial management and how he played such an important role in the whole dispute for power and the construction of the European state from the fifteenth century onwards, one could see patterns and when this difference is given with the associated Protestantism with corruption practices, but I do not know.	575.	576.	577.
l) Non-practising Christian (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	578.The Protestant Reformation had and still has historical and social consequences. And both various Protestant versions, as well as the Catholic Church, have taken up its principles.	579.	580.	581.Marx's argument is clear in the Shi'ite case that is more on the political side. From a materialistic point of view, they have used religion to dominate those people. They took advantage of the proletarians due to their naivety to dominate them.
m) Practitioner/entrepreneur, Independent citizen, free Catholic believer (Colombia: Practitioner, Cuba: Employee, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Employee)	582.[also for crime and education codes] They [mainland Colombians, government, Church] sent people who spoke Spanish and were Catholics in order to populate the island. Previous to that invasion, the Islanders were sailing vessels, which belonged to the native people. We had our own transportation, our own businesses, but they came and broke the economy, destroyed it all, and today tourism is the main source of income, which by the way, is	583.	584.	585.

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	not in the hands of the local people. Nowadays we depend on the mainland. Basically, what took place was "The Pacific invasion of the island", as I call it. Nobody opposed them, and you could not afford to fight with them. Basically, that is the history of how they entered here and how they affected the island. They declared San Andres and Providence "Intendencias" in 1912. They said, "The nation will provide a free pass for families of more than four people to come and establish themselves in St. Andrews". That is recorded in the law. But everybody already had their own land, then they arrived and started buying all the land and filling up the swamps. Today we have people from Bolivar, the poorest places of Cartagena, Santa Marta, and places like that. That is how the rate of delinquency went up as it is today. When I was a child, we did not have anything wrong here; the police were on vacation. The 1991 Constitution is just on paper. Some things have changed, but people still continue with certain mentality because the leaders are Catholics and when they have holidays or whatever they celebrate, they do it inside the church. The Catholic Church has an advantage over the Protestant churches here. They still have the Concordat. Protestants do not have a great educational system. They do have some schools but in general, the leaders who are managing the education are Catholics, and situations that should not be happening, are covertly performed.			
n) Academic/Practitioner/entrepreneur Independent citizen, free Protestant believer (Colombia: Teacher, Cuba: Tourism professional, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Academic)	586.If you analyse historically, Rome and the Jewish have been together to fight against Jesus. This happened in his crucifixion and continues to happen until today. For example, the United States, a formerly country of free followers of Jesus constituted its Supreme Court with 100% Protestants. However, this has been slowly taken over by Roman Catholics and Jewish magistrates who now represent 100% of the court, and there is no single Protestant.	587.	588.	589.Lincoln [Abraham] quoted Wycliff for the definition of democracy: "The Bible will allow a government of the people, by the people, and for the people". Switzerland is the best example of how the Bible can make a society free as Switzerland in one of the most democratic countries in the world. The opposite philosophy is Machiavelli in "The Prince", and that has been the Catholic philosophy [Veith amazing discoveries speak of fascism]. The battle for freedom begins in the Bible, for example, the liberation of the Israelites in Egypt, etc. Freedom develops after seriously study the Bible. "Christian [Protestants] make a parallel society" to the secular society said a sects expert. And when we read Paul and Acts of the Apostles, that's right.

8.SOCIAL EMANCIPATION / DEPENDENCY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
				Some people have lived all their lives like in a bubble practically having the only contact with their Christian community (their family is there, their school, their work, etc.).
o)Afro-Caribbean/indigenous religion Priest (Colombia: Rastafarian, Cuba: Babalawo, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	590.	591.	592.	593.
p)Government officer / Former Government officer (Colombia: central government, Cuba: central government, Uruguay: regional government Colonia, Switzerland: Federal government)	594.	595.Pay Fran Brothers were Protestant Leaders of the July the 26 movement and Pastors of the Baptist church. Some Roman Catholic priests were also in favour of the revolution such as Sardinia who used to wear a green olive soutane as a rebel.	596.Here, it does not matter if you're red, green or yellow (politically speaking), the question is, if you're proposing something that will do well to the community, we all work together. Here it has been well demonstrated – for example when we celebrated 150 years of Nueva Helvecia-, where ten commissions formed with around 150 people working, and it was a great success. It worked spectacularly, regardless of whether you were from Frente Frente, Blanco, Colorado, Catholic, Protestant or whatever else. There was only one objective, and it was achieved. It is a region that works in that way in almost all things. Commissions are always used. In fact, in Nueva Helvecia there are just a few institutions that are solved by the state; they are almost all private, so it is the community itself that drives the creation of a library, a culture room, an amphitheatre, a house of culture. It is cooperative but private. In contrast, for example, in Rosario [the Catholic town], the House of Culture is solved by the Municipal Intendency of Cologne; they pay the rent, the light, the water,etc., something that does not happen in Nueva Helvecia.	597.
q)Catholic/Ecumenical Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: Central government, Cuba: National Council of Churches, Uruguay: Military/Church media, Switzerland: Catholic	598.[also corruption, education, church-state, and elitism codes] The 1991 constitution was the door to the plurality, democracy and justice. Before this constitution, the political system was based on bipartisanship [Liberal and Conservative] that was characterised by the political exclusion of many social sectors. Education was confessional; corruption was-	599. Protestant Churches participated actively In the revolution. A US historian called it actually "the evangelical revolution" because many Protestants had participated. - Some Protestant Churches Even financed with their resources the revolution. Triangulated - Faustino Perez and Fernando Ceballos	600.Uruguay has always been a peaceful country made up of immigrants. Those immigrants who had been escaping the war, -my grandparents escaped the war-, and working hard immigrants reformed the country. What we have today is done entirely by them, then, the culture of work made them work and not thinking about war, or conflicts; there were no unions.	601.[also church-state relations, hierarchy codes] The Concordat is only for dioceses. It is not as important as it is in Germany. For us, the most important things are the constitutions and the laws of the cantons that regulate the Church. We have people in the Catholic Church who are against this [State-Church] organisation because they argue that it severely limits the freedom of the Church. But of course, it is a State law, and the Church has to obey. I think this a very singular case.

8.SOCIAL EMANCIPATION / DEPENDENCY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
central committee)	focused on the political delegation that made central government politicians [Bogotá] to notariats, [Catholic] Church and economic elites. The [Catholic] Church played an essential role in the process of political delegation; this allowed them to have political and economic power in the regions of the country, considered as an "all-powerful" in the regions. Instead, the constitution of 1991, determined that the Colombian State ceased to be a confessional state to become a secular state, which means that there is freedom of worship and eliminates the close relationship between church and state. Today, the church plays an important role but is not essential for decision-making. To complement this question, I suggest the Handbook of History of Colombia, Volume II of the Colombian Institute of History. Specifically Chapter XIV, which deals with the state, religion and democracy. Before the 1991 constitution, precisely in 1988, Colombians had the first opportunity to choose mayors, this; according to some authors urged that corruption was no longer based on delegation [from central politicians] but decentralisation.	were Protestant revolutionaries for example.		
r)Protestant Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: none, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Political-Church officer)	602.	603.	604.	605.
s)Embassy of the Country at the Vatican (Colombian Embassy at the Vatican, Cuban Embassy at the Vatican (no answer), Uruguayan Embassy at the Vatican, Swiss Embassy in Ljubljana)	606.	607.	608.	609.

9.RELIGIOUS FREEDOM / RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
a)Roman Catholic Priest 1. Jesuit (Colombia: Jesuit, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Jesuit)	610.	611.	612.	613.During WWII, the Nazis persecuted the Jesuits. The faculty, for example, in Innsbruck in Austria was closed down and the Jesuits were exiled. Karl Rahner, for example, came to Switzerland exiled during WWII. There was also a prohibition for Jesuits in Switzerland but they came to the Catholic part of the country where they stayed, wrote their books, did their research, and after the war was over they left back for Germany or Austria.
b)Roman Catholic Priest 2. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: Other, Uruguay: Other, Switzerland: Other)	614.	615.	616.That only persecution episode I can mention, was at the end of the 19th century, when the Bishop of Montevideo, Monsignor Jacinto Güera, was exiled. At other times, I know not.	617.
c)Roman Catholic Priest 3. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	618.The issue of religious freedom leads to destructive intentions. Be aware that today the religious issue in many environments has become merely a business. Ask if your intentions to evangelise (bring God to men and bring men to God) are really honest. We are okay so for the respect of differences. But many times it is obvious the frontal attack on the Catholic Church when looking to compare the Church as just another [player] in the group of many. Remember the words of Jesus, which says that there will be one flock with one shepherd. (John 10:16). If the dream of Jesus is unity, it is highly questionable how, when what it reigns is the division and multiplication of groups and congregations. There may be communities or congregations who honestly want to be faithful to the criteria of the Gospel, but we cannot hide that are so many that simply use faith as a mere pretext to profit at the expense of naive people.	619.	620.	621.
d)Roman Catholic Religious 4. (Colombia: Nun, Cuba: Seminarian, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Deacon)	622.	623.	624.	625.
e)Roman Catholic Theologian 5. (Colombia: Theologian, Cuba: Theologian, Uruguay: Theologian, Switzerland:	626.There have been no concrete changes on Religious Freedom after the Constitution of 1991. We would say politically, and socially the constitution allowed the opening of many Christian [Protestant] centres of different denominations. But we cannot say that there	627.	628.	629.Evangelicalism in Latin America is a special problem as it comes to the fight for religious freedom. Religious freedom is typical of Protestant influence. Anglo-Saxon dominance means Protestant pre-eminence. Protestants claim the right of conversion to evangelise. But you cannot send missionaries to destabilise that [another] culture [e.g. what Catholicism has

9.RELIGIOUS FREEDOM / RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
Theologian)	has been a "super change" after the Constitution. The Catholic Church institution has an enormous weight in Colombia as in many Latin American countries. That is a reality, and people give credibility to the institution. But many people say, and that is also true, that from the Catholic Church side there was not an aggressive confrontation against other religious movements. On the contrary, those Christian [Protestant] religious movements did confront against the Catholic Church as a way of defence and difference. There was the fighting of Pentecostalism against the church of the light of the world [Roman Catholic], equally from the Revival's church, and all these kinds of confrontations that were before, remain until now. So, to say that there has been a difference, thanks to the Constitution, for both the Catholic Church and other Christian [Protestant] denominations? Not much. There are people open-minded people, and there are other very locked in their group that leaves no other option. In the 70's decade, certain priests there did some persecution or attacks, although neither systematic nor scheduled. That was especially true in some villages, where Protestant pastors of any denomination came and began creating "sects", that made the priest react. But there has not been an event where a priest or bishop had faced a direct confrontation. Sometimes there is a stronger reaction from some faithful rather than from priests or bishops. Sometimes it is the same faithful who attack each other in the same institution. This is nor systematic neither general nor scheduled. Unfortunately, sometimes the Christian [Protestant] faithful who belong to different church denominations tend to defend, sometimes aggressively, their creed or religious affiliation and that's a problem. It is a very big failure, not only the person who does it but the pastors that do not orient. They are supposed to believe in a God of peace and unity, not in a God who will make problems for whatever reason. This is an issue more of mentality, and I would not see it much as institutions that have a preference.			done since the conquest]. The penetration of Lutheranism in the 19th century [in Latin America] comes from European migration [which in Colombia it has been controlled by the Concordat developments]. Beginning in 1916 in the Congress of Panama [triangulate book beltran], the Protestants of North America set a doctrine of penetration [in Latin America]. They said that they had to teach in Latin America the authentic Christianity and not the "pagan" form that the Catholic promotes. As a result, there has been a boom [of Protestantism in Latin America] after the world wars. Honduras has reached 40% of Protestants [contrast data]. Pluralism from non-Catholic theologians is good. But the Episcopal conferences of Puebla show that the Catholic Church sees a danger that the population fall into these [Protestant] networks. They [Protestants] are seen as unsocial and individualistic. They promote personal development but not development at a community level. Evangelicals are blamed that they are more individualistic. The Catholic is a festive and communal religion. Catholics have a peasant agrarian mentality. [Hispano Americans] are a people with a rich and poor culture. But Jesuit [priest] Alberto Hurtado did not criticise against [evangelicals], but he said that we have to do in the social what evangelicals do systematically.

9.RELIGIOUS FREEDOM / RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
f)Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (Colombia: Baptist, Cuba: Pentecostal, Uruguay: Evangelical, Switzerland: Other).	630.In this age and time, we have not had a direct attack, but in the past we did. The government, along with the Catholic Church, got soldiers –I wish I could remember these dates– who went into the first Baptist church (founded in 1848). Both soldiers and Catholic priests said, "We are going to take over this church". This is real. They decided that they were going to take the church and make it into a Catholic church. If you go to the first Baptist church now, you can see the time period of Reverend Gonzal who was the pastor at that time and know the exact date. They have all the pictures on the wall and you if you track them, you will see Reverend Gonzal. Reverend Gonzal said to the committee, "Arm up yourselves, get machetes, pick-axes, sticks, clubs, whatever". He came out there and said, "Come on and take it". He himself was ready with a machete in his hand, and the entire community said "Come on and take it! You are going to take our church on our dead bodies!" That is how they prevented these soldiers and priests from taking it. This is what we always talk about in St. Andrews, the little-hidden colony of Colombia, about what they have been doing here, and the world does not know it. We are the Colombian little secret right now — a secret of annihilation, of the destruction of Protestantism; its culture and values. This is our reality.	631.Before the revolution, we spoke freely of Christ. After the revolution, the UMAP was created to take the idler, homosexuals, and religious. My uncle and a brother were led there to be obliged to deny their faith in Jesus, although they loved the revolution, ironically. - The decade of the 1960s was the hardest of the persecution. In 1970 persecution softens. In the 1980s it began the period of "rectification of errors of the Communism" which was beneficial to us, as we were not anymore persecuted, but we were despised. - In 1987 faith awakens due to the crisis of the socialist camp [existential security]. This is why Fidel softened his discourse and said at that time that there was no problem with being a believer. However, there was indeed religious discrimination. - In the 1990s there was an Evangelical revolution with important revival and openness. Baptists and Pentecostals awaken and many pastors began to preach. However, several cases existed in the 1990s were the police arrested some preachers just for doing worship. In 1995 the police knocked down a temple. - In 1996, they demolished the Baptist church with a bulldozer, being the Church perfectly legal.- In Los Indios de Caranoa, the police destroyed a temple with people praying and crying inside. That was the most dangerous area to preach the gospel, and now after that, the gospel has multiplied and prospered. The people of Los Pinos and Los Cocos were converted, and the alcohol has been eradicated. - In those cases, all the people from the Protestant church went with stones against the police. And the gospel has been multiplied with the fire of the persecution like in Biblical times. Persecution is like a fuel for revival. - We (evangelicals) are experiencing a sustained growth from 1 to 10 since 1990. In 5 years only, we have opened	632.Perhaps there was persecution in the past. At the moment, our Church has not suffered any persecution in Uruguay.	633.The Protestant Reformation led to the freedom of the individual conscience; this is why since that moment onwards there have been more and divisions of Protestant denominations. And division is natural. In the Catholic Church, there is no freedom, so there is no division either.

9.RELIGIOUS FREEDOM / RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
		53 churches in Guantanamo. The government says they are illegal.		
g)Protestant Free Church Pastor 2. (Seventh Day Adventist - SDA) (Colombia: SDA Pastor.' Cuba: SDA Pastor.' Uruguay: none.' Switzerland: SDA Pastor).	634.Until 1991, there was persecution not only between parties; bipartisan (which was the central persecution that has taken this country) because they were killed for a flag, for a political party, colour and there were many people who shed their blood due to this in this country, Colombia. But added to that, came the religious part. I come from a population of this country where a relative of mine was locked in a house, and he was killed for being Protestant of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. I belong to the third generation of Adventists in my family, and the first generation was persecuted for having a creed other than Catholic. Neighbours betrayed whoever did not pray the "holy marys" or who did not have a virgin in the house, an idol, an image, or who just sang hymns of worship to God, etc. And then, the neighbours along with the local [Catholic] priest coupled the Protestant family with the opposite party that ruled in that region alleging political persecution, and that was enough reason for taking their life, burn their house and considered them persona non grata in the community. If we see the story of how Adventism came to this country, you can confirm that it had to go through a lot of persecution. For example, in Santander, Pastor Max Trummer and others who believed and were baptised, were terribly persecuted, many of them shot to death, others burned their houses, other amputated them some parts of their bodies, to recant of what they believed and thought. But always the blood of these people contributed to the advancement of the gospel in this country. Then, the religious persecution was masked in a supposed link to belonging to an enemy political party (generally to the liberal), and not so much directly due to belonging to another religious denomination. After 1991, it was decreed in this country Religious Freedom, where the letter reads that all denominations are equal before the state. But the reality is different, and persecution continues in other contexts such as closing the space that belongs to different religious faiths. For example, regarding "chaplaincy": the only	635.Non-communist revolutionary period (Friendly coexistence of the State and Churches)- Che Guevara's Troops were given medical care at the Adventist school in 1957. They had actually camped in the Adventist School. While Che Guevara was in Cuba, all the Adventists were protected.- Soon after, in a visit of Fidel Castro to the Adventist school, he participated in a vegetarian dinner, and he said that the Revolution would make schools like the SDA School. (But it did not happen) Marxist-communist revolutionary period. (Conflict and enmity between the State and Churches) Religious persecution - After Che Guevara was killed, the Cuban government started to persecute us. - First obligating us to close the theological seminar and allowing us only 20 students per year in the main building that belonged to the Antilles Association. After the revolution, the Association was not any longer from the Antilles but national. - SDA was the only denomination that the State expropriated a theological seminary. This was because the government believes that the ideology of the Adventist Church is very strong and opposite to an atheistic Marxist ideology. - Fidel Castro said that Jehovah Witnesses (JW) and Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) were the most dangerous religions because the former are reluctant to praise national symbols and the latter because they keep the Sabbath weekly and don't do any work on it.] - Second, the government confiscated us the Adventist school and now runs a public school in poor conditions. - From 1963 to 1980s our Church had around 20 years of absolute no communication with the rest of the world.	636.	637.Counter-reformation (Jesuits) was created to fight Protestantism by any means. Protestants have the gospel; the idea has been to distract them from that focus through all entertainment industry and secularising the society to a level never seen before. And they have achieved a great deal on that.

9.RELIGIOUS FREEDOM / RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	allowed the Catholic Church. In the Armed Forces, in hospitals, schools, etc., there are only Catholic priests. Everything that is paid by public resources applies only to Catholic priests- even when the constitution says that all denominations are equal before the state. But in practice, that does not apply. Now the persecution is not only to kill, but there are other types of persecution we are experiencing. Precisely these days, the government is taking to the Congress a new tax reform, and that will be the greatest persecution against Protestant churches. The reason is if the reform is approved, it will impose that all religious denominations must declare 10% in taxes of all properties, as well as properties that have the pastors. All properties must be in the Chamber of Commerce and published the list on a website. This does not apply to the Catholic Church. The Tax Reform supposedly applied for the Catholic Church, but for them, there is always concessions that others do not know, concordats, etc.	meaning that we didn't send or bring any pastor or literature to foreign countries. - There was the well-known case of an infiltrated government agent in our Church as palaeontologist called Antonio. He first gained the trust of all and studied hard our faith. Then he started to discredit our faith sending letters to all church members with information that only the government knows. Nobody believed in him, and he was ridiculed. - In 1980 the government denied permission to instruct pastors. Many of the Christians who had supported Fidel Castro, were afterwards confronting and opposing the government. And this was the justification for the entire government to proceed against all Christian churches. - Third, the government gave a final order to close the Adventist church, and all the pastors had to be exiled. Exceptionally and clandestinely, the president of the Adventist association Alejandro Delgado was the only who remained. He stayed with his family in a little house and continued the missionary work out of nothing and training new leaders. That was the situation of our Church until the year in which there was a public recognition from Fidel Castro that religion can be accepted in the communist regime. - The government recognised that they did all possible strategies to weaken the churches, everything to diminish the SDA church but contrary to what was expected, they do not understand how it grew up to 3 times in 10 years. From 10.000 to 30.000 members. From 100 to 300 churches in houses, not in buildings as it is not allowed. - Pastor President of the SDA Church in 1987 was six months in prison for making desk chairs for the pastors at the headquarters of the Adventist Church. And it was given a fee notice to the Church to pay 3'000.000 Cuban pesos		

9.RELIGIOUS FREEDOM / RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
		(USD 120.000) in 3 days. Today we have the testimony of the wonderful efforts of the entire congregation to save the church, (hidden military made donations, engaged couples donated their savings and many wonderful things God made in those three days).- In 1989 we started to receive foreign help again, and the SDA World President travelled to Cuba and organised the church. - By 1990 after the fall of the socialist camp, Fidel Castro apologises and offers religious freedom.		
h)Protestant Mainline (old) institutional Pastor 3. (In Latin America free historical churches, in Switzerland official Church-State Reformed Evangelical) (Colombia: Presbyterian, Cuba: Methodist, Uruguay: Lutheran, Switzerland: Reformed Evangelical)	638.I see no difference in practice after the constitution of 1991, referring to Article 19 on religious freedom. Religious freedom in the Constitution of 1991 was on Only on the paper.- Not practical.	639.1. *Nineteen century*. Religious persecution- The Inquisition had already expired at that time (1883), but religious freedom was not guaranteed when the Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, came to establish the first congregations.- Very few congregations were established because the oppression and persecution were very strong. All Patriots' missionaries were accused of conspiracy against the establishment because they were in congregative activities for independence, which was also real. *Religious freedom*. - Now comes the famous "necessary war" in 1895, ended in 1898. It is the American occupation and from the moment it started, religious freedom is guaranteed.- The US intervened in that war, but it did not intervene to combat Cuba, rather than fighting the Spaniards, exactly. - It is said that the Methodist missionary Enrique Benito, brought half of his luggage full of Bibles and the other half full of dynamite powder and other things for war. Cubans Protestants and the Protestant community based in Florida in the US unanimously supported the independence movement. *2. Twentieth century*. *2.1 The Republic (or Republican period before the Revolution 1900-1959)*.- The Methodist Church in the US was the founder of the Methodist church in	640.Uruguay population comes from migrations. When the new nation was opened for settlement, what better than working people from Europe! So they looked at Europe, and the most hardworking people in Europe were, above all, Protestants. So the founders of Uruguay were somehow forced to allow religious freedom, and it has been recognised throughout Uruguay, so there have never been problems with persecution. That tolerance that there has been between religions caused that many people decided to come and settle here. There were even people like the Evangelicals and Protestants who had been in Florida and then decided to come and settle here.	641.

9.RELIGIOUS FREEDOM / RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
		Cuba. The Methodists were very attached to their mother church, which was in the US. However, initially, American missionaries did not come as it did happen in the rest of Latin America. In Cuba specifically, Patriots' Cuban missionaries founded the Methodist church, the Baptist church, the Presbyterian Church and the Episcopal Church. - Protestantism and especially, Methodists had its significant growth in these three first decades of the early twentieth century. In Cuba, the Roman Catholic Church, could also reborn too. But how was this possible that the Roman Catholic Church could reborn? Ah! Because it was aligned to the new circle of power in Cuba. *3. Revolutionary or post-Republican Period (Time of the revolution triumph) 1959 onwards* There existed concentration camps created by Stalin. Why he made them? They were to be sent anyone who was not in favour of the system and therefore was supposedly not contributing to national production. They were called UMAP, which means "Military Unit for Production Support". - Who was going there? Those who were not able to partake a common battlefront with the communism. Therefore they sent Pastors and key leaders of all churches to the UMAP to live under subhuman conditions. *The high clergy of the Catholic Church was not in the UMAP but only the lower clergy and laity (triangulated with ecumenical and Catholic hierarchy). - And in that sense, it was affected the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church had lost a lot of power.* - Protestantism was also profoundly affected. First, the American was gone. Second, about 60% of the members of the Methodist Church had migrated. Another large percentage of membership left the Church. - In the history of Cuba, such policies significantly affected. They also affected Protestantism considerably. **Religious freedom today:** Freedom of		

9.RELIGIOUS FREEDOM / RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
		expression is religious freedom, freedom of development. Cuba supposedly is meant this to the world. But there is no freedom of speech. Because there is no freedom of association; otherwise, we had to reinterpret the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the vast majority of governments around the world, including Cuba. - What good is that I have the freedom to express myself if I have no freedom of association for a political or a religious project in Cuba? That is my human right, and here it is not respected. Therefore I cannot say that I have freedom of expression because I have no freedom of association from a social point of view.		
i) Ecumenical academic theologian. Colombia: Catholic ecumenical theologian, Cuba: ecumenical theologian, Uruguay: ecumenical academic, Switzerland: ecumenical theologian)	642.Although the 1991 Constitution speaks of religious freedom, we are an intolerant country. We grew up thinking that what is different to us was bad, and therefore, we must exterminate it or eliminate that evil. If I am conservative, which is the strong line of the Catholic Church attached to the state, then we have to get rid of anything that sounds liberal (in progressive terms, in human rights issues and certain social transformations). Many priests and bishops commanded to kill liberals, and they saw it as a defence of the doctrine of the church. And of course, many liberals killed conservatives believing that they did something good for humanity. History repeats itself, using names such as right and left, paramilitaries and guerrillas, etc. Intolerance is a cultural issue and only becoming aware of what we are, and where we come from, we can understand this religious freedom framework posed by the Constitution of 1991. We come from 500 years where there is a cultural melting pot where the Roman Catholic Christianity is hegemonic, and suddenly, it arises a constitution that says, "No, there is religious freedom here." Many holidays are of Catholic origin, such as Easter. Culturally, who says no to Easter? But if we were really to apply religious freedom, we would not have to rest on Easter. Culturally we continue with that trace in the schemes. Concordats are the expression of that. The contradiction is there: we have now laws	643. Even the witchcraft was persecuted in Cuba. - Here the love to your motherland and love for communism are interpreted by the state as the same thing.	644.This area has been of many religious denominations, like the apostolic ones who are about 80 years old and live together in peace and harmony here. After the issue of the cemetery wall to divide Catholics and Protestants, there has never been friction and many times we work together. Our Waldensian movement began in the 12th century, much before Luther and Calvin. The Waldensians started in France, in Lyon, then they went to the north of Italy, and when they were very persecuted they went to Switzerland and Germany. There was a time when they were almost exterminated, but some could until the Reformation, whom Calvino and Luther helped, then they could return to the Valley again. Then, flying from the persecution in Europe, Waldensians came to this area in Uruguay in 1852. The first Evangelical Waldensian temple in South America was built in La Paz, Uruguay; declared cultural heritage. The first ones who came were a few families who arrived in Florida, Uruguay. But there was a Catholic priest in Florida who made war against them. He raised the people of Florida against the Waldensians. The Waldensians planted wheat, and the people set fire to the crops one night. The people attacked a ranch of the Waldensians and tied and dragged a settler with a horse.	645.In the last century (1847) Protestants in Switzerland experienced strong persecution. The Nazarenes, for example, had to flee to America as they refused to take part in the army.

9.RELIGIOUS FREEDOM / RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	that are written through religious freedom. But we have a cultural load of 500 years [plus 1260 from the Middle Ages in Europe], of multifactorial mix that makes us tremendously violent, intolerant and with a significant inability to dialogue towards different religious and political topics. [Every law has its loophole: hecha ley hecha trampa]		And the son of that Waldensian settler fired a gun and released his father. But that Valdense died. The Waldensians, more than religious faith, is a way of living in a community. In the face of persecution, it is a way of living in community for survival, but when those persecutions ceased to be, it is a way of associating, because it is for the common good of all. Francisco (Jorge Bergoglio) went to the first Valdense temple in Turin to ask for forgiveness. But the Waldensians do not forget since it was very hard all that happened in history. What the Jews went through with the Germans for about 4 or 5 years, the Waldenses went through with the Catholic Church for nearly 700 years of persecution. That is why I say that the Waldensian religion, more than a religion, is a way of life because in those 700 years of persecution, Waldensians had to learn to survive and that can not be forgotten. Today, I still have not been persecuted. If you act within the legal framework, we can say much here without problems.	
j) Ecumenical Pastor. Colombia: none, Cuba: Ecumenical, Uruguay: Ecumenical, Switzerland: Ecumenical)	646.	647.Religious persecution (sub) - Lawyers were not needed in the revolution, and I am a lawyer. Then I had to study engineering. - The government was anticlerical. I could never make a government career due to my condition as a Christian. It was only until 1992, where the State becomes lay again, and I was awarded the "exemplary worker" price. - The Cuban government knows even when you go to the bathroom. - Fidel studied in a School of Jesuits called "La Salle". - During the Revolution Methodists members decreased from 10000 to 2000. [Contrary to JW, SDA and evangelicals] - When churches grow the most, it is when there is a crisis in the world such as wars. In Cuba, this happened after the special period (fall of the Soviet Union) in the 1990s. [contrast with Inglehart theory] and evangelical and JW and SDA	648.The Valdense colony here in Uruguay are immigrants from the Valdense Church in Italy, who were persecuted in France and killed for being "heretics" and thanks to Switzerland that received and sheltered them for years then they could migrate to Piemonte, northern Italy. A pastor told me: "Valdense is a religion with people and Nueva Helvecia is a town with religion	649.

9.RELIGIOUS FREEDOM / RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
		interviews].Religious freedom [Legal ground for Religion] - Comparing with the past, there is considerably more religious freedom nowadays, but without legal ground. - We are in judicial limbo. We do not have a Law of cult, and therefore we do not know what we can or cannot do. For asset purchases, we have to ask permission to the government to the office of religious affairs.- We do not have a law of worship either, and there are a lot of unrecognised churches. Associations Act does not apply to churches.		
k)Non-Christian (atheist, agnostic) (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: Academic/Intellectual, Uruguay: Academic/Intellectual, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	650.The problem is that Colombia has failed to have a profound cultural transformation that accompanies the institutional changes made in the Constitution of 1991. For example, within the military forces, there has been a discussion on the idea of creating spaces where religious freedom may be expressed. But of course, the army is perhaps the most concrete example of a structure that resists change, and amid such a war it is much more difficult to reform the security sector. Because at the end of the day it is this sector that continues to operate in defence of institutionality. [see also state church relations code, in the army only Catholic priests are allowed] It must be said that, in Colombia, although I had not felt persecution, some orthodox sectors have always associated atheism with communism, and atheism with an armed insurgency. That inevitably comes from that heritage, where supposedly Communists ate children and that was promoted by some Orthodox sectors of the Catholic Church. At least in very orthodox sectors of the Colombian society, such non-sense ideas remain and have been instrumentalised by political sectors that are looking to generate some rhetorical devices to allow them remain in positions of power through emotional manipulation of the Colombian society. Undoubtedly, that could contribute to religious persecution. [Also related to hierarchy code]	651.	652.It does not mean that there has not been Religious persecution, but there is not known a famous case of clashes between Catholics and Protestants in Uruguay. I have never heard about religious persecution in the Uruguayan Christian community. If I have heard about it is related to the Jewish community in some opportunities. The Jewish community in Uruguay has been in a good situation compared to other countries, but a year and a few months ago there was a religious murdering of an activist from the Islamic community in Uruguay - which is a quite small community - who killed a well known Jewish merchant in the city of Paysandú, which is in the interior of the country. That merchant died and generated commotion in the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim religious communities of Uruguay. It was an act that broke with the scheme of a relative interreligious understanding that has existed for many years in Uruguay, where there has never a big problem like this. As for the Christian communities in Uruguay, being a reasonably homogeneous population in the sense that most are Catholics and those who are not Catholics, they live mostly in other parts that are not Montevideo, there has not been a problem. I would define Uruguay as totally open; at least I have not perceived any persecution or prohibition in expressing myself regarding religious issues. And I think it is also	653.

9.RELIGIOUS FREEDOM / RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
			something that is part of the idiosyncrasy of Uruguayans, which is very open compared to other countries in that sense. I believe it is due to the secular tradition that exists in Uruguay. The religious part is important for those belonging to the different religious communities, regarding the social framework and what social life is. But there is an acceptance, not only in religious issues but also in other social issues, such as LGTBI rights and all those issues that perhaps in other countries are more difficult to accept. In Uruguay, there is an opening in that sense that has been developed from policies of the state, from the government point of view. The arrival of the "Frente Amplio" party (Broad Front) in 2005 that is a socialist and liberal party has meant an advance in the inclusive state policies from the social point of view, and that comes even from before.	
l)Non-practising Christian (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	654.In Colombia, there are culturally discriminated groups (especially indigenous and afros). And other sectors claim to be living religious persecution; however, this latter generally militate in any political movement, which has always been difficult to differentiate between political violence and religious violence causes.	655.	656.	657.The character of this country [Switzerland] is more Protestant than Catholic, due to historical influence and larger Protestant population. Catholics have been discriminated in Switzerland.
m)Practitioner/entrepreneur, Independent citizen, free Catholic believer (Colombia: Practitioner, Cuba: Employee, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Employee)	658.	659.	660.	661.Here in Switzerland, it is different. I bet everybody is secular and religion is not as important. Here, there is not a significant difference in "freedom" in Protestantism and Catholicism. In general. If you know some Catholics, they are the ones who have and practice more faith. If you go on Sunday to a Protestant Church, you will find mostly and perhaps only "white hair" people. What there is now is a proliferation of free churches that people tend to have a negative opinion of them as "sects" that seem to have bizarre teachings. Italians, for example, are normally very attached to the Roman pope and so, here you don't find that. Protestants are more from "the world" more secular, they are not interested in "God or Church" things here.
n)Academic/Practitioner/entrepreneur Independent citizen, free Protestant believer (Colombia: Teacher, Cuba: Tourism professional, Uruguay:	662.In recent years, the Conservative Party was more radical, and against any concession towards anybody who was not a Catholic. The Liberal Party was more tolerant, with a different ideology. But when it comes to the island, they implemented a stiff policy on us, regardless of the party we followed. There are written	663.There has been panic since the revolution for Fidel's persecution of religions. In the book "Journey to the Center of Cuba". Carlos Alberto Montaner mentions the most persecuted religions by communism in the following order:	664.Since I exist, there has been no religious persecution. There have been little issues once in a while, but not directly. Since I have memory, there has always been religious freedom here.	665.Zwingli had fought against the Anabaptist. They [Anabaptists] were persecuted. Zwingli was not pro the adult baptism. In the river in Zürich [Limmat] Reformed Protestants sunk Felix Manz an Anapytist leader and five more Anabaptists. They [Anabaptists] suffered persecution from both, Catholics and Protestants because they [Anabaptists] were accused of destroying the Christian unity. At that

9.RELIGIOUS FREEDOM / RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Academic)	documents where it is outlined what they had to do in order to destroy our culture. It is really outrageous. They wanted to extinguish us because we did not speak Spanish and were not Catholics. Colombians are hypocrites. They are smiling at you, but they have a knife hidden at the back. They wanted to exterminate us but without making it look like extermination. Otherwise, they would have to face the United Nations and international scandals. But they are doing it very politely and subtly. For example, intermarriages between continental and native people; imperceptibly the breed is getting weaker and weaker and going old. [San Andres and Providence] are a lot more Catholic. Overwhelmingly Catholic. About persecution, there was a period of violence in 1949 or 1950. In 1941 they closed the Baptist and the Adventist schools. That was a legal decision. The police went into the Baptist church in Providence, and they destroyed much of the communion service utensils, tables, cups and tablecloth with machetes. Another episode occurred here in St. Andrews; When Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was murdered in Bogotá, the police stopped the people on a Sunday from going to church. They piled tables upside down and prevented them from having access to it. They did use some violence, and it still remains a secret. They always favoured their people to get jobs. They [Roman Catholic Church] have infiltrated our church. I am sure of that.	1. Jehovah's Witnesses (JW) 2. Adventists (SDA) 3. Methodists 4. Baptists - The "Military Units for Production Support" (UMAP) were where persecuted Christians went. - Now, even Fidel Castro says that the answers to the problems are religious (March 2010).		moment, Anabaptists were only claiming the baptism of adults but not the baptism through immersion. [me: Same as in 1884 against the Sabbath. The awakening is little by little, and there's always resistance to more truth. Like images and so forth.] Zwingli had many disputes with the Catholics, but he had the support of the major of Zurich. With him [the major], Zwingli went to Bern to promote the Reformation, which was accepted there. In the disputes with the Catholics, Protestant Women had to dress as soldiers to pretend to have a great army. They [Protestatns] had to use weapons only at the end to defend until eventually, Zwingli died in combat. Bullinger continued the leading after Zwingli's death, but he [Bullinger] died of the plague. In 1545 Gutenberg invented the printer, and that facilitated a lot the Reformation. In 1551 the Spanish Inquisition in Sevilla prohibited any reading of the Bible other than the Latin one for the Catholic priests. They couldn't read the Bible exegetically but only as dogma. Reformers Casiodoro de Reina and Cipriano de Valera had to escape from the Inquisition in Spain and published the first Spanish translation of the Bible in Basel. Nowadays, people tend to take religious freedom for granted. People are not even aware that the Catholic Church forbade the Bible in the world until the II Vatican Council in the 60s. Having a Bible (which was extremely expensive, as you had to buy years of work of a person who writes it), was a grave crime condemned with firing the person and many died due to that in the Middle Ages.
o)Afro-Caribbean/indigenous religion Priest (Colombia: Rastafarian, Cuba: Babalawo, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	666.Many times Rastafarian practices have been threatened by government institutions or by the Catholic Church here in San Andrés. In San Andrés and in certain parts of the world too. Discrimination for certain things. I tell you one thing: I smoked my marijuana. That is very natural. What God blesses, nobody curses him, but in a place like this, certain people have a different way of thinking and discriminate against other people. It is something that will always exist. And surely this problem is not going to be solved.	667.With the revolution, there was indeed religious persecution to us, but rituals were followed clandestinely	668.	669.
p)Government officer / Former Government officer (Colombia: central government, Cuba: central	670.	671.Religious persecution- After the revolution, Fidel expulsed Spanish priests. The political problem became contempt against the Roman Catholic Church. Afterwards, all churches had to	672.	673.We [Swiss government and Vatican State] also have multilateral issues such as the defence of human rights and religious freedom. On the latter every second year usually there is a political dialogue with the Holy See. The Swiss government has discussions on Religious Freedom with the

9.RELIGIOUS FREEDOM / RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
government, Uruguay: regional government Colonia, Switzerland: Federal government)		share the blame of the Roman Catholic Church, and the Bible was persecuted. - "No more supreme saviours, not Caesar, neither bourgeois nor God, we will make ourselves our own redemption" this is the anthem of the Communist International. - You had to fill a Template form answering a question if you "believe or do not believe in God" for schools and different jobs. That was direct discrimination against believers. - Churches declined profoundly in numbers. Churches were with 3 or 4 people. Most Protestant pastors left the country.		Holy See, (but not in a bilateral sense on religious freedom in Switzerland or the Holy See, but as human rights issue worldwide or in other countries).
q)Catholic/Ecumenical Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: Central government, Cuba: National Council of Churches, Uruguay: Military/Church media, Switzerland: Catholic central committee)	674.	675.Russians complicated everything. Before, there was no persecution to destroy churches as in the Soviet Union.	676.	677.
r)Protestant Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: none, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Political-Church officer)	678.In canton St. Gallen, for example, Grabs is Protestant, and Gams is Catholic. In Gams, they have been farmers mainly. [prosperity code also] In Grabs and Gams they used to have problems with "mixed marriages" between both [Catholics and Protestants] as in Appenzell [Innerrhoden and Auserrhoden]. Our kids were discriminated in the school. We were the only Reformers in our [town], being sort of a Protestant enclave in the middle of a Catholic town.	679.	680.	681.
s)Embassy of the Country at the Vatican (Colombian Embassy at the Vatican, Cuban Embassy at the Vatican (no answer), Uruguayan Embassy at the Vatican, Swiss Embassy in Ljubljana)	682.	683.	684.	685.

10.GENEROSITY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
a)Roman Catholic Priest 1. Jesuit (Colombia: Jesuit, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Jesuit)	686.	687.	688.	689.
b)Roman Catholic Priest 2. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: Other, Uruguay: Other, Switzerland: Other)	690.As a priest, I should earn a salary here, but since I'm retired, I do not get paid that salary. I should receive about USD 500 monthly, and I do not receive it. Therefore, it is donated to the parish. I have a pension for my work in a school. I work here without payment. On the other hand, I do acts of charity to low-income families and other community members. I live only from my pension. The parish gives me food and pays the household expenses.	691.	692.I have enough with those who come to ask the parish. Anyway, within what is the economy, I distinguish between my personal charity and the charity that the parish does. I do mine within what I can, and the parish makes its own with what it is possible.	693.
c)Roman Catholic Priest 3. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	694.	695.	696.	697.
d)Roman Catholic Religious 4. (Colombia: Nun, Cuba: Seminarian, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Deacon)	698.The [economic] situation is very difficult for us, and we have to look for what to eat. Here at the community, we have an extreme economically crisis. [Our income] means what we earn in a government place that we no longer have [church state relations] or a rectory. Here we help each other a little with marriages, first communions, etc., or with the fee when we lend the chapel. That goes to the chamber of the community, and then we can buy groceries from it. We live from our work. Besides, we pay taxes to the government, utilities, gardeners, clerical staff, bakers, etc. The same crises that families have, we also have.	699.	700.	701.[I give] from my salary ca. 20% [to charities or tithe]. But also I give time to help for example in Service Clubs. I collect money for "Mothers in emergency", who have children an no husband etc.... For sacraments spending like marriage and baptism, and services like burial I never take money. But if they give money, I give the money for social projects
e)Roman Catholic Theologian 5. (Colombia: Theologian, Cuba: Theologian, Uruguay: Theologian, Switzerland: Theologian)	702.The material is not visible at this time to help. But a fundamental principle I have always had is that I was born to serve others, then my service does not have to do necessarily with giving food, but to help people who need it: listening, accompanying spiritually, preaching, bringing the Word, carrying a message that is neither biased nor sectarian (that tries not to divide or separate), etc. That's like my great contribution.	703.Roman Catholics do not regularly practice tithing or offering because it belongs to the old alliance. Christ defended tithes because he was a Jewish and that is a self-righteous, pious practice in pharisaical Judaism. And Christ was pharisaical in some trends. But Christ did not establish Christianity but Paul. However, the offering of gifts is practiced in Roman Catholicism, which has no limits neither laws regulate it. For grace has no limit, that is the principle.	704.	705.
f)Protestant Free Church	706.I would say it is around 20% or even more. We faithfully pay our tithes and additionally, we	707.	708.The church is solidary, but nobody knows that. Where there are catastrophes,	709.I give more than 10% of my monthly income as tithes and offerings.

10.GENEROSITY				
Stakeholder	Colombia	Cuba	Uruguay	Switzerland
Pastor 1 (Colombia: Baptist, Cuba: Pentecostal, Uruguay: Evangelical, Switzerland: Other).	give an offering every Sunday. And every week when we meet on Thursdays for our Bible study and prayer meeting, we give offering as well. In every service we have, we are basically giving. Also, we help the poor and people that may need a little help, so we are giving and giving. I think there are some areas that we can improve regarding the church's giving. There have been preachings against the tithe by people saying that you can give whatever you want to give. That has hurt the churches a little here.		where there are serious situations, such as the tsunamis in Asia, in Africa, etc., the church helps. Europe, Germany, Switzerland are in general very cooperative with many weak projects. In October we make what is called "Thanksgiving for the harvest" and on that day we all offer a special way, and all that offering goes to different places, through the administration of the church. When someone comes to church and begins to participate, as long as they do not understand the true value of the offering, they do not offer it. The church does not need it; it does not live for that. There are many tasks of the church: the altar is arranged, floral arrangements are made, and everyone contributes with what they can, there are members of the choir, the orchestra, different activities, cleaning, an offering of time, everything is voluntary, but there are no businesses.	
g)Protestant Free Church Pastor 2. (Seventh Day Adventist - SDA) (Colombia: SDA Pastor, Cuba: SDA Pastor, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: SDA Pastor).	710.We learn from the Holy Scriptures that we should give the tithes and that teach our brothers. In addition to tithing, we give a second tithe (offering), and the more faithful we are, the more blesses us the Lord. My tithe is directly discounted from my salary as a Pastor. Of the total of my salary, 10% is discounted for tithing. Another 5%, I separate additionally for direct offering and another 5%, to give to all the churches I visit with my family. In total, I give 20% of my income as a Pastor. I feel more than blessed. The more I invest in being faithful to God, the more blessings I receive. You have to open your hand and not close it to give and receive. I am blessed with my family, health, work, academic, spiritual, financial, etc. Through the offering, entire families are benefited, and the Church develops local projects such as buildings, schools, universities, hospitals, temples, etc.	711.	712.	713.
h)Protestant Mainline (old) institutional Pastor 3. (In Latin America free historical churches, in Switzerland official Church-State Reformed	714.The basic principle of the love of God is based on the service to others. In the world, there will always be poor because of human injustice that always generates poverty. But the Christian community will always have to help those poor. Then, in the gospel, the constant it is "help the poor". When a poor man is converted to the Gospel, he should stop being	715.	716.There is a church membership fee and payment to a set number with good offerings. I support with materials needed for the church or the home, crafts, photocopies, elements of the holy supper, etc., I give them, and I do not charge the church. I do not have a percentage to give; instead, it is according to the occasion. Once a month I	717.I give less than 5% of my income [as a tithe or charity] to be honest. But there are non-material donations. For example, I work two days a week for charity, which is 10% of my time.

10.GENEROSITY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
Evangelical) (Colombia: Presbyterian, Cuba: Methodist, Uruguay: Lutheran, Switzerland: Reformed Evangelical)	poor, because he has God's help primarily, but he also has the support of the community as well. I am a Presbyterian priest who earns a salary, and from that income, I have commanded that 10% (tithe) of my salary is destined to serve the community. But the tithes of the church are distributed to the community expenses and for our social programs, children protection and poor neighbourhoods. Besides, I'm the godfather of a child that I support with my resources, and I accompany another child who studies music paying his allowance. If my funds were not intended for a diaconal activity, it would not make sense that I was a priest in the Christian church		give an offering or special offerings that go to another community. We are more in solidarity with others. In my case it is voluntary.	
i)Ecumenical academic theologian. Colombia: Catholic ecumenical theologian, Cuba: ecumenical theologian, Uruguay: ecumenical academic, Switzerland: ecumenical theologian)	718.	719.	720.The Waldensian people are supportive. It is not blind solidarity, but it consists of helping those to learn help themselves. The Catholic gives alms, the Valdense in his colony is very supportive with those who need it helping them to help themselves. It is not that cheap or gratuitous charity. Tithing is not obligatory. In my case, we receive a publication, and they give you the envelope to give, but it is not mandatory. You give whatever you want from the heart or for particular reasons. It is the harvest festival, which is an annual benefit for the church. It's a sale of foods and candies, and it's called the harvest. In reality, it was like when the harvest in autumn, there are apples, potatoes, etc. Everything that is harvested and produced is donated to whoever does not have it. It is an annual benefit. In Valdense it is celebrated "the day of the Waldensian confraternity" which is in August. In August, it is also the day of the virgin for Catholics, where polenta is made, and there you pay a ticket and give an offering as well. But Catholics give not the tithe itself. The colonies initially worked together, but for a few years there is a certain division. At this moment, it is very difficult to undertake a project between Nueva Helvecia and Valdenses. Nueva Helvecians are more individualistic than the Waldensians.	721.

10.GENEROSITY				
Stakeholder	Colombia	Cuba	Uruguay	Switzerland
			Popularly, they say that the Waldensians are devotees of the Virgin of the "elbow", to say that we are stingy. I do not agree with that, as we are more administrators or stewards of the money that enters us. And the Swiss (Nueva Helvecia) are equal or "worse" than us in that sense, and all this was brought from history.	
j)Ecumenical Pastor. Colombia: none, Cuba: Ecumenical, Uruguay: Ecumenical, Switzerland: Ecumenical)	722.	723.In Cuba, a Protestant Pastor earns about 15 or 20 US Dollars per month. But now you can get help from churches abroad, which is an abyssal difference compared to 20 years ago.	724.I am one of those who tries to help in the things that are indeed justified. There was a flood last March, and the institutions always talk about the generosity of the people of Nueva Helvecia; here nothing is measured. In general, the Uruguayan people are generous and supportive; Latin American generosity exists to a greater or lesser degree and according to the idiosyncrasies of each people. Here, in our country, town, and institutions are very generous.	725.
k)Non-Christian (atheist, agnostic) (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: Academic/Intellectual, Uruguay: Academic/Intellectual, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	726.	727.I am not a Christian; therefore I do not give any contribution to charities or tithes.	728.I, at some point, donated. Not something monthly, but I have donated to some organisations in Uruguay, but it has nothing to do with any affiliation I may have.	729.
l)Non-practising Christian (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	730.	731.	732.	733.
m)Practitioner/entrepreneur, Independent citizen, free Catholic believer (Colombia: Practitioner, Cuba: Employee, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Employee)	734.	735.	736.	737.

10.GENEROSITY				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
n)Academic/Practitioner/entrepreneur Independent citizen, free Protestant believer (Colombia: Teacher, Cuba: Tourism professional, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Academic)	738.I return 10% of my income to the church every month, out of my pension. I do not give tithes. I return tithes. They are not mine but God's. And I give an offering to sustain the church building. If they are going to do something, I give directly to that project. The money does not necessarily pass through the treasury. I give part of my wealth and my time because I believe in this church, in this movement. This is a free will offering, and there is not a fixed person I give it to.	739.Americans, British, Swiss, Germans and Canadians are the top tip givers in tourism (around USD 25: tip). You have to speak another language, and everybody wants that job. On the other hand, Italians, Spanish, Portuguese and other Latin Americans never give tips, despite talking in a more friendly the language. I do separate 10 per cent of my income to the tithe and another percentage as an offering, according to Church needs.	740.	741.
o)Afro-Caribbean/indigenous religion Priest (Colombia: Rastafarian, Cuba: Babalawo, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	742.	743.	744.	745.
p)Government officer / Former Government officer (Colombia: central government, Cuba: central government, Uruguay: regional government Colonia, Switzerland: Federal government)	746.	747.I do not separate anything such as tithe or offering, but I give what I feel I can give.	748.When we talk about being "stingy", it is not that we do not want to collaborate, what happens is that when the immigrants arrived, they arrived with nothing, so the daily expense is what the next day's meal assured them. The word that is used is stinginess "it hurts the elbow", but it is to secure the future. [Triangulate with ecumenic in prosperity code] We give to the Catholic Church. It is not exactly a tithe, but every month I want to contribute. Regardless that sometimes I disagree with the wealth that the church has, and I do not want to see. But I know that suddenly money is needed. Or instead of giving money, I go and buy the flowers for the decoration and then I do collaborate with the nursing home, with the schools, with the clubs, etc. But it is a habit.	749.
q)Catholic/Ecumenical Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: Central government, Cuba: National Council of Churches, Uruguay: Military/Church media, Switzerland: Catholic central committee)	750.	751.The National Council or Churches finances come from international projects such as Church international, etc.	752.	753.

10.GENEROSITY				
Stakeholder	Colombia	Cuba	Uruguay	Switzerland
r)Protestant Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: none, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Political-Church officer)	754.	755.	756.	757.
s)Embassy of the Country at the Vatican (Colombian Embassy at the Vatican, Cuban Embassy at the Vatican (no answer), Uruguayan Embassy at the Vatican, Swiss Embassy in Ljubljana)	758.	759.	760.	761.

11.ECUMENISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
a)Roman Catholic Priest 1. Jesuit (Colombia: Jesuit, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Jesuit)	762.	763.	764.	765.First of all, I would say that Ecumenism functions very well. The main official protestant churches, the Catholic, and any other officially recognised churches in Switzerland as well as the split of the Vatican I, and the Catholic church are working together in all parishes and communities quite well, and it has been a common representation towards the State. There have been no problems. Mixed marriages are accepted nowadays. I would say that we do many things together and that there are no prejudices anymore and what has been done during the previous 50 years is quite significant. There is however one theological obstacle that remains latent, which is not a doctrinal one, but it is, of course, the question of the ordination of priestly functions at the level of ecclesiology. Secondly, I would refer to history. Protestants have huge institutions, faculties, many religious associations and structures. It would not make any sense to destroy these things or even merge. The perspective of the Catholic Church to approve of the Protestant Church is that the latter would recognise the question of the Eucharist and the priestly theology; if that happened, then everything would be perfect. We want unity in diversity. Unity does not imply that there is one church but that there is a diversity of different churches and traditions highlighting different aspects of the gospel, recognising each other. There are also a lot of small movements, and that raises the question of whether they are churches or not. In the case of Latin America, the Pentecostals have all these small "churches" which does not constitute a problem for Catholicism, but there is always division within the protestant tradition. The official Ecumenism in Switzerland is more or less inclined to be like the traditional old churches from the Catholic reform. Although all other divisions have large memberships, it is difficult to determine if they are real churches. From the Catholic point of view, they are not, but rather, they are evangelical movements. Similarly, in the Catholic Church, we have different orders and spiritualities such as the Benedictines, the Franciscans, and all this range of The Movimenti, the Focolabini, the Liberazioni, and so forth. The difference rests in that for the Ecumenism they are not on the same level as the established and structured churches.
b)Roman Catholic Priest 2. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: Other, Uruguay: Other, Switzerland: Other)	766.	767.	768.	769.
c)Roman Catholic Priest 3. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	770.	771.	772.	773.

11.ECUMENISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
d)Roman Catholic Religious 4. (Colombia: Nun, Cuba: Seminarian, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Deacon)	774.	775.	776.	777.
e)Roman Catholic Theologian 5. (Colombia: Theologian, Cuba: Theologian, Uruguay: Theologian, Switzerland: Theologian)	778.	779.	780.Ecumenism tried or continues to try to advance in important elements, and I believe that it has had many successes, for example, in the mutual recognition of baptism, of the sacraments, of the ministry in general. And I believe that the ideal of the one united Church is maintained, regarding "one confession of faith", as it is done in the symbol of the apostles, as we believe in the ONE, Holy, Catholic and apostolic Church. But at the phenomenological level, I believe that we must also recognise the wealth of diversity. That diversity has been expressed, for example in different liturgies or celebrations that have to do with a context. A Latin American liturgy is different from a European, African, or Asian liturgy. But also diversity has been expressed in a diversity of theologies. I am one of those who consider that all theology is contextual. There is no theology and separate regional, or women's, or ecological manifestations, but every theology has to be recognised in the context in which it arises. So, in that dynamic I believe that we should - above all - recognise and value diversity and, look at ecumenism not as a movement that has to create a super church, but how the different churches can recognise each other, respect and enrich themselves within the difference.	781.
f)Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (Colombia: Baptist, Cuba: Pentecostal, Uruguay: Evangelical, Switzerland: Other).	782.Let us go back to Jerusalem, to the spreading of the gospel. Remember, first of all, the belief that Christianity is Catholicism and that it was born in Rome, is the first lie that needs to be chopped down and demolished and burn down and thrown away because Christianity started in Israel with the Jews. It began with a Messiah who was a Hebrew. It started with Aramaic, Hebrew and the Greek languages. And then, the gospel that was born in Israel began to spread into Rome. Great event. Praise God for it. Now Rome is getting the light, and it is being saved through the truth	783.The papal system is still a type of the apocalypse beast. Several types represent that government of the apocalypse. I think so ... And that the beast is preparing the planet worldwide to receive the antichrist [...]	784.As we have a faith and a hope, this sometimes contradicts another Churches' faiths. I think it's good to have activities together with other Churches because they all point to the faith and accept God. Then we have a good dialogue with all the churches. Each church has its point of view on some topics of the Bible. But what is necessary and good is that there is faith and that faith can be maintained.	785.I speak with five different pastors of several Churches in my region. The positive phase [of these relationships] is that [our Church] is no longer considered as a sect. However, they [Pastors of other churches] have a superficial theology not based on the Bible, even though they are pastors. When I have theological reasons, for example, they don't ask. They invite me to preach at their Churches, and I have been preaching at their Churches several times.

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Stakeholder	Colombia	Cuba	Uruguay	Switzerland
	of the gospel of Jesus Christ. After slaughtering hundreds and thousands of Christians, Constantine said, "Well, from now on, Christianity is the official religion of Rome". All of this began and what happened next? They laid a foundation of corruption. Why? Because they began to please everybody. They began to mix the pagan religion, the belief system of Rome, with Christianity. They wanted to pacify everybody and did not want people to rebel. They wanted them to accept this new religion, and to do so, their pagan holidays began to be baptised as Christian holidays. So they would take Pashak or the Pascua, and they began to call it Easter (Astarte or Ashtoreth, the pagan goddess). In general, they baptised paganism with the clothes of Christianity. They took pagan deities and called them saints. They began to travel everywhere, and whenever they went, they said, "A saint appeared here from your people, and we are going to raise him up, canonise him, and now you will have a saint". But that was a deity of that pagan culture that they just changed his name and brought him in. That is how they began to mix the pure gospel that came out of Israel with paganism, thus compromising the truth of the gospel in order to satisfy and please people and to make everybody happy, saying, let's-get-together-and-feel-alright type of things. When the uncompromised gospel that was preached caused people to die for; caused Jesus to die on the cross; caused Stephen to be stonned. That is the gospel we find there in Rome with those Christians that were originally killed and slaughter and ripped apart by lions. The true gospel said, "I will not compromise nor mix with paganism, and if you have to kill me I will die for it, but this gospel must remain as it is". Catholicism began then to compromise in every direction. Setting a standard and opening a door for corruption. All because the church institution itself is corrupt. It is built on corruption and falsehood. Everywhere Catholicism goes, wherever that society is established, is inheriting that legacy of corruption. [for corruption, syncretism, crime, and church-state codes as well]			

11.ECUMENISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
g)Protestant Free Church Pastor 2. (Seventh Day Adventist - SDA) (Colombia: SDA Pastor, Cuba: SDA Pastor, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: SDA Pastor).	786.	787.	788.	789. The Ecumenical movement and the New Age are entirely in disagreement with the fundamental principles of the [Protestant] Reformation: *Solus* *Christus* *Sola* *gratia* *Sola* *fide* *Sola* *scriptura* If you follow these Reformation principles now, you are seen as a radical fundamentalist. Infiltration is one of the methods of work of the Jesuits. They send people (spies) to the Churches to join, study, and pretend to be real Church members until they take leading positions to push each Church to an ecumenical movement. That's in all the Churches, and I believe that the Adventists are also Jesuits infiltrated. It's difficult to say who is, but it is sure that they are. However, the entrance of the Adventist Church in the ecumenical movement has been later than in other Churches. While the other Protestant Churches entered in the ecumenical movement between 1950-60s, the Adventist Church took part in the 1990s (30 years later). However, it's not been so easy for them to push [the Adventist Church] in the direction they want (ecumenical). [The Adventist Church] have a delegated system and only worldwide decisions. I would say that the Adventist Church is more protected and has a better system as this system protects that we are more into the Bible than other Protestant denominations. The Catholic Church has utilised the Counter-Reformation as a strategy to pretend it's a weak institution when it has been a really powerful one. They all come to the new world order agenda of one global government with the papacy as the head.
h)Protestant Mainline (old) institutional Pastor 3. (In Latin America free historical churches, in Switzerland official Church-State Reformed Evangelical) (Colombia: Presbyterian, Cuba: Methodist, Uruguay: Lutheran, Switzerland: Reformed Evangelical)	790.	791.Catholicism is a version of Christianity that was distorted in its origins. We know all that has happened in Rome, being the product of a syncretism that was between paganism and Christianity. By the 330 after the death of Christ with the conversion of Constantine to Christianity and even as regards the city of Rome the great Babylonian city of the seven hills that is obviously talking about Rome as such. Identifying the Beast with the Pope as they did would be a little broader. Every world religious system that denies the principles of the Christian faith I believe is an antichrist. Historically speaking the papacy may be, the antichrist may be [...	792.In the beginning, the temple was shared, both Catholics and Protestants used the same temple at different times (e.g. one Sunday the Protestants, one Sunday the Catholics. The first school and the first municipality in Nueva Helvecia took place in a chapel.	There is an expression in Protestantism: *"Ecclesia semper reformanda"*, which means that the church has to be reformed permanently. So, in this sense, the reformation is never comfortable with it. It is an on-going process. The church per se is on-going. It is always changing. It is not a necessity, it is just happening, that the church is being reformed because people are changing and as a consequence, the church is changing as well. There is also a spiritual effect; people believe. They have faith; it is just reality, an on-going process. It's a question of whether we could overcome differences because they are there, but how could we live with them? Of course, there are different approaches; there is now reconciliation, it is now a very current because of the Reformation jubilee. Or reconciled differences (versöhnte Verschiedenheit). Being different but in a reconciled way. That is now the current approach to it. There is also a question of unity, but as soon as you get into the details, then you will see

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Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
		We are not going to identify the pope. Now the papal system historically looks a lot like the beast. I think that in that the reformers were more radical than me. But every religion that denies Christian principles is Babylonian. In my personal opinion, God will judge that world religious system because we are talking about the great harlot that drank of the wine and fornicated with all the kings of the earth. Obviously, it is talking about a religious system in a secular world that was contaminated, and her hands have shed a lot of innocent blood too. With all that, I find it difficult to identify the pope as the Beast, although it can be.		how difficult it is to form a unity, especially regarding the Eucharist which is still an open affair or when it comes to the pope. I think demonisation, demonising the pope is of course not acceptable nowadays. I think it is just part, the papal system per se is of course like focusing all the differences between the Protestant and the Catholic Churches. For instance, when it comes to the idea of the biblical Sola Scriptura, everything is just bible content, nothing is written about the pope. But when it comes to Christ, the papal system says that he is the representative of Christ on earth. There is always an argument, especially from these Swiss reformers, Zwingli, Calvin... Christ does not need a representative because He is on earth; He is among us, as the bible tells us. Actually, a representative is not needed. There is no need to have a replacement of Christ. And then, of course, it is also crucial when it comes to ecclesiology, the meaning of the Church. In the Roman Catholic Church, of course, the Church is a salvation institute. You have access to salvation only through the church. Let us say that is the function of the Church, the priests, and popes. This is not the case in the Protestant Church, you know, the Church is just a vehicle, the believer is having an individual, direct access to God. He does not need a mediator. Of course, you could now ask, is there possibly a Roman Catholic Church without the Pope? Are there Catholic Church reform movements that have abolished the Pope? We can also say that the Anglican Church of England is nothing else than a Roman Catholic Church without the pope when you look at their rituals, their organisation, their worship, and so on. On the other hand, the pope has become for the Catholic Church like the symbol of unity. It is the idea of unity; there must be something like a leader. A [Swiss] bishop once said: we could overcome reformation. We could overcome the differences between Protestantism and Catholicism. It would be very easy if the Protestant church would just accept the pope as pope and then be part of their own Catholic Church and then they could do whatever they wanted. We have, for instance, Orthodox churches in Eastern Europe. They are under the umbrella of the pope, but they still have their own traditions, priests that marry, they are very independent. Then I told him, very good idea, but I have a better idea. Actually, the Catholic Church could join the Swiss Protestant Church, and you could become one of our churches. It is not a problem for you. You are just under our umbrella, and then you can still be very independent. That is actually not his idea. It is only a one-way street for him. That was his idea, which by the way, it was a very Catholic one. There was a German theologian, Karl Rahner, a very

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Stakeholder	Colombia	Cuba	Uruguay	Switzerland
				famous [Jesuit] reformer. He was somewhat, but if you had a closer look, you could perceive that he was still very Catholic, and being a Catholic always means that they have the attitude of having to cover the whole. They are the universal church. There cannot be a church outside of them. It means they have to take everything else outside. A similar idea, when it comes to different religions, let us say, non-Christian religions is the connection between Christian and non-Christian religions, the way we have corporations, how we have to deal with these differences. Then he [Rahner] said, "you know, actually when you examine closely, many Asian people are Taoists or Buddhists, but their attitude is that of a Christian. They are anonymous Christians. They themselves do not know that they are in essence Christians". That is how he embraces them. "Actually, you Buddhists, are like Christians." To show him how unacceptable this might be for other religions -that is what I normally do when people tell me that- I said, okay, in this case, let us see it form the other side. When people say, you are Catholics; therefore you are in fact anonymous Buddhists because we have similar ideas; maybe you are a lot like Buddhists. And then you feel what this embracing does to you. It is like a violation. The differences are put away, or you are just accepting them because of your similarity with something else. That is actually not the idea, you know. Then I could say, oh, you are such a perfect Colombian because Colombians are so similar to Swiss people. That is actually a very unrealistic attitude. It sounds nice, but it is not. That is simply an example. Differences cannot be just overcome that way. The Catholic Church has a very strong sense of exclusivity, you know. That is why it is necessary for them that somebody should join them, especially at an institutional level. 793.On the other hand, to be self-critical on the Protestant Church, we raise the question: Why is this church needed in the Protestant world? [Laugh] If the believers have direct access to God, then the church -and that is exactly the point- that is why so many Protestant people are actually indifferent towards Church, you know, why should I go to Church? I can make a walk on Sunday morning, and I am also close to God. It is very difficult for the Protestant Church to justify their institutions. It's not true that line of Christianity is only traced to Peter as the Catholic [Church] says. There were diverse congregations from the beginning. Paul had even to invent Christianity. There are two different main goals for ecumenism. One of them is unity. That is the Catholic approach. There is the one

11.ECUMENISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
				condition to reach reconciliation. But it is at the same time the result of reconciliation. It is a circular process, you know. They also say that unity is necessary before they can have the Eucharist together, which is seen as the constitution of unity among Christians, the body of Christ. This unity model is very often the Catholic model. The Protestant model is more about community rather than unity or an ecclesiological level. It is about having a community. And then the idea for both theories is focused on the teachings of 1 Corinthians chapter 12, the body of Christ, one body and many believers.
i) Ecumenical academic theologian. Colombia: Catholic ecumenical theologian, Cuba: ecumenical theologian, Uruguay: ecumenical academic, Switzerland: ecumenical theologian)	794.The word ecumenism comes from the Greek Oikos, which means home. As ecology (Oikos logos) is the study of home, economy (Oikos nomos) is the administration of home. In the same sense, ecumenism can be understood to bring back religions home [Rome]. it is a process of bringing the separated brethren from the Catholic Church (Protestants, among others) back "home". This "home", more than being understood architecturally, should be understood as relationships. In the Gospel of John, Jesus on the eve of his death makes a prayer called Unity; "May all be one as You and I are One." That has been like the orientation that the project of Jesus, the project of the kingdom implies a communion, implies unity and of course, among all of us who consider ourselves disciples and missionaries of the Gospel of the Lord. Throughout history, there have been ruptures, games of interests, accents, etc., which lead to three theories that explain why this rupture or separations have occurred. First, it has to do with "Exclusivism" and means that outside the church there is no salvation. The only one is the Catholic Church, especially the Roman rite, who has the holy seat in the Vatican and is the true church. The second line is "Inclusivism", where there is "one house and the others are around, but they must return", where the Catholic Church is, then the others, like the Protestants: like the Lutherans, the Pentecostals, etc., what they must do is return to the origin. And finally there is the "pluralism" that recognises the symmetry of Christian experiences, recognises inequality and even exists the ecumenical concept, but it is also controversial because ecumenism in its own sense is not only Christian. Some people speak	795.The Roman Catholic Church has always been against Protestants in Cuba because according to them, they are traitors and bring the ideas of the enemy, which is the United States.- To call heretics the adversaries is only at a cognitive level.- According to the biblical descriptions, it is still valid today to identify the papal system as the beast of Revelation. And the antichrist corresponds to all the religions that do not accept Jesus Christ as the only saviour and do not profess him adoration.	796.There are ecumenical activities in the first Valdense colony of La Paz, that is, between the two creeds, the Evangelicals and Catholics together. In Uruguay, they have worked together (Catholics and Waldensians) and with the Swiss colony. My mother was Catholic and my father Waldensian. The Catholic Church had married them not inside the temple because it was a mixed marriage. They were married in the parish hall. My father did not want to give up his faith, and my mother did not either. Our mother educated us and sent us to the Catholic Church, although she said that the priests should get married, she did not believe in the nuns, and she was a strange Catholic, I say "very typical Uruguayan". My father, like all the Waldensians who had read the Bible, thought differently. My brothers and I used to say that we are "neither chicha nor lemonade" They took us to the two churches, and although we professed the Catholic faith and did all the sacraments, we went to the festivities of the other church as well; then more ecumenical impossible. My grandmother from Waldensians did not go to my parents' marriage as she did not go to the Catholic Church, that was because of the family history, but not because in Uruguay they were persecuted. A very poor aunt lived in Valdense colony, and the Catholic Church helped her. My grandmother once said to my mother: "Although I did not want to enter the church when you got married, now the Catholic Church helps us". That is a teaching of life. In this area, we are defenders of our roots.	797.

11.ECUMENISM				
Stakeholder	Colombia	Cuba	Uruguay	Switzerland
	of a macro ecumenism that includes different religions, dialogue and interreligious cooperation and also of spiritualities and cultures. Basically, they are historical reasons, interests, philosophical and theological understandings about the same meaning and experience and in a certain way, it is like a kind of deviation from the original meaning of that call of the Lord Jesus. If He invites us to Unity, we have become distracted and diverted from that path by putting other factors before us, which precisely hinders communion. In my personal case, I am more on the pluralist macro-ecumenical line. It seems to me that the revelation of God is not exhausted in Christianity and of course I see the Roman Catholic Church as an expression or mediation, but I do not absolutise it. God is constantly recreating, renewing it and in the midst of scandalous structures of sin and of a contradiction of this church to which I belong - Catholic and of Roman rite- the Lord is inviting us and showing that, in other cultures and other Christian and non-Christian experiences, He is also speaking. That is why eco-theology reads creation, nature, reads the cosmos as a book in which God is inviting us to that change, to that conversion and that communion, to feel ourselves as children of a family that live in the same house. The Roman Catholic hierarchy continues to think that the centre, that the absolute truth is precisely this historical concretion of the Vatican and that all other churches have to fold and join it. There, it seems to me that there is a lack of humility and is arrogant in the sense that the Revelation of God does not speak only within the Catholic Church. Even the Catholic Church would seem a place where we deny God, with all these problems of violence in Human Rights, contradictions and corruption. In many aboriginal cultures and many spiritual experiences of the East, many people are finding in the Pentecostal churches experiences of God much closer existentially than what we are offering as a Catholic church. It seems to me that exclusivism is already historically anachronistic, (that outside the church there is no salvation, it is proven that this is not the case). A person like Gandhi or Luther King to		but we are not fanatical about religion as seen in other parts of the world. Fanaticism is bad, but it is much more unfortunate when it comes to soccer, for example.	

11.ECUMENISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	name some famous, nonviolent and paladins of justice and peace, were not Roman Catholics. Inclusivism has that problem, which is like saying "I am the one who knows, I have the truth, come to me, little children", but does not recognize a dialogue of experiences and that also the Catholic Church has to move and Pope Francis is saying now: "we have to be a church on the way out, we can not be a church kept between four walls, but we have to go to the meeting, and that meeting is also with other spiritual and religious experiences". We have to rethink in Christian ecumenism, but today we must talk about interreligious dialogue and alliances and cooperation between a pluralism, from historical inequalities, from asymmetries, from differences, really build a unity, see what is what unites us to respond to the great problems we have in this common home.			
j) Ecumenical Pastor. Colombia: none, Cuba: Ecumenical, Uruguay: Ecumenical, Switzerland: Ecumenical)	798.	799.In Cuba, Protestant pastors preach in Roman Catholic Churches and vice versa. With the Vatican II council, this is allowed and also that Roman Catholics read the Bible. - Ecumenism in Cuba, as in the world is going backwards. People often say that the National Council of Churches is very liberal and close to the government and may be very political. They say that the Church should not be political; and this is stupid, whether by action or omission you participate politically.	800.The Swiss came together. They were ecumenical but by force. Here we have the first chapel and school. One Sunday mass was given, and one Sunday Evangelical service and Bible school were given. That chapel is 157 years old. It's called the Chapel of the Foundation, and there is where they got together. After the Swiss began to make money and improve financially, (they also had bad times), they started their church that they built next door and the Catholics made their church too. But there were problems because it was noticed where the town would congregate: in the Swiss hotel or the Catholic Church? In the end, there was a project for the state and the project where the town square is now won, which is the town centre. And the evangelicals were located in another place (in the Swiss Hotel). The first years, they were all together, but then each one took their own piece of land. There is no difference between Catholics and Evangelicals here now. We are already ecumenical. We got married there, and they get married here. Those differences were overcome. The Swiss did not want them to marry through the Valdense cult. I have married uncles who are first cousins, but each defends their race. There are many	801.

11.ECUMENISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
			mixed and cross-family marriages.	
k)Non-Christian (atheist, agnostic) (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: Academic/Intellectual, Uruguay: Academic/Intellectual, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	802.	803.	804.	805.
l)Non-practising Christian (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	806.	807.	808.	809.
m)Practitioner/entrepreneur, Independent citizen, free Catholic believer (Colombia: Practitioner, Cuba: Employee, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Employee)	810.In a meeting of graduates, we proposed to start a celebration with a mass. Most of us agreed, but some opposed being atheists or other religions. I told them that now even the dynamics of the mass have changed and it is done in about 30 minutes. That just we do not call it a Mass but a space of meditation and prayer with the Great Architect of the Universe where we all fit with something of tolerance. This way we can also resolve besides whoever does not have pleasant memories of beating and bullying. Simply everything is resolved in the good attitude of all and in achieving the goal of sharing with everyone. Afterwards, we can share a good meal, party and "SEX, DRUGS AND ROCK AND ROLL" as I call it. In the end, not everyone agreed, but we did so.	811.	812.	813.
n)Academic/Practitioner/entrepreneur Independent citizen, free Protestant believer (Colombia: Teacher, Cuba: Tourism professional, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Academic)	814.There are too many churches because there are always efforts to come back to the origin of the gospel (the Lutheran reformation again and again) and they got syncretised in the cultural process of history so that new reformations are needed to go back to its origins. Those who defend the roots and true essence are seen as essentialist and fundamentalists in each epoch such as the	815.	816.There is a lot of talk about ecumenism, but our Church does not enter there. It does not participate neither is accepted.	817.About two years ago I met with a group of retired engineers, and the discussion was suddenly focused on the increasing number of Muslims in Germany and Switzerland. One engineer said: They are destroying our culture. Then I asked what is our culture? The most senior of the engineers in the group said without hesitation: Christianity

11.ECUMENISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	prophets in the Old Testament, Jesus and his disciples and early Christian followers, the Waldensians and each of the reformers until nowadays. Inquisition was instituted to persecute those who read the Holy Scriptures as heretics. Now the strategy is to label them as fundamentalists (with a negative connotation) and infiltrate them with a bunch of pagan doctrines. Another strategy is to entertain the secular society with media, matches, theatre, TV, etc. to keep them away from reality. This is something that Jesuits have well developed. The Bible has been prohibited until dead through centuries. The Second Vatican Council allowed reading the Bible only from the 1960s onwards. But the ridiculisation and discredit campaign against the Bible have been that successful that ensures that almost no one will read it even though we are all allowed to do so. It is a very smart strategy from the devil.			
o)Afro-Caribbean/indigenous religion Priest (Colombia: Rastafarian, Cuba: Babalawo, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	818.	819.	820.	821.
p)Government officer / Former Government officer (Colombia: central government, Cuba: central government, Uruguay: regional government Colonia, Switzerland: Federal government)	822.	823.	824.	825.
q)Catholic/Ecumenical Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: Central government, Cuba: National Council of Churches, Uruguay: Military/Church media, Switzerland: Catholic central committee)	826.	827. In the Council we promote Ecumenism. It is the cornerstone of Ecumenism.	828.	829.I think when you have decided that people can take responsibility for their faith; there is an intrinsic dynamic that says that there will be more differences. It is like in a family. If the concept is that the mother regulates what has to be done, the outcome is children much more similar to each other. But if this is not the case, if there is more freedom, they will begin to show marked differences. Any movement creating changes in internal Christian affairs like the Reformation and other aspects like that reflects an influence on other aspects of life, thus becoming more diverse than it was before. Diversification is like a certain trend. For me, the most

11.ECUMENISM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
				important argument would not be to declare that Ecumenism has failed, because it is a movement that was and still is interested in putting the big ones together. It is a matter of finding common ground with churches that are organised. We can now see a very interesting move from Pope Francis in Rome. He comes from South America, and he knows that not only the historical Protestant churches but the new Pentecostal churches are very important. He has opened the Ecumenical dialogues with them. He knows in his head and by his own experience that to find a way is important. It is a dynamic that travels in both directions. We have diversification within the different churches. On the other hand, we have this feast celebrating the 500 years of Reformation. It is a very significant sign that the pope had gone to Lund in Sweden to open these ceremonies along with the Protestants. This approach is not only important for the Catholics but also for the Protestants because for centuries... we became Protestants against the pope. We did not want to have him here because there were important reasons for him to leave. Now we say, well you celebrate this important event, we are sorry for the way things developed to the point of provoking disruption between the confessions. This is a new approach we had never seen before. These kinds of strategies take a lot of time, and we do not know where it all will lead us in the future. In our Swiss church there is an exposition about the Reformation at Wittenberg where Luther lived, and the Swiss pavilion there has been organised and financed by both the Protestants and the Catholics. If we are present in Germany, we want to show them how strong Ecumenism is in our country, to the point that we can do these things together. The opening ceremony was made by the chief of the Protestants and the president of the Swiss Bishops Conference. This demonstrates that the dynamic of walking together seeking common ways is yielding results. I would say that I know people that are 60 or 70 years old who lived in countries or parts of Switzerland where both Protestant and Catholics were living together in the same village. In the '50s and even the '60s in the past century, it was normal to say "we go to the Catholic bookshop, we are the Catholic association where we do our gymnastics, we are the Catholic women's choir, or we are the Protestant this or that". But this custom has now vanished during the past 30 years.
r)Protestant Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: none, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Political-	830.	831.	832.	833.

11.ECUMENISM				
Stakeholder	Colombia	Cuba	Uruguay	Switzerland
Church officer)				
s)Embassy of the Country at the Vatican (Colombian Embassy at the Vatican, Cuban Embassy at the Vatican (no answer), Uruguayan Embassy at the Vatican, Swiss Embassy in Ljubljana)	834.	835.	836.	837.

12.COHERENCE WITH MORAL LAW / REFORM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
a)Roman Catholic Priest 1. Jesuit (Colombia: Jesuit, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Jesuit)	838.The Church is not monolithic. Inside the Catholic Church, there is polarisation. For example in the peace referendum in Colombia, the Bishop of Medellín had invited faithful to vote for "no" to the referendum, but at the same time, the Archbishop of Cali was doing the contrary, inviting to vote for "yes" at the same time. The Church as an institution did not take any official position but only left the faithful to decide freely. The Church is not a "block". What the Protestant churches are doing now in Colombia, telling their faithful for whom to vote, is the same of what the Catholic Church has been doing from before. What type of [Catholic] Church does exist, depending on the kind of society? The Church does not proceed in the same manner in Barranquilla, or Bogotá, or Popayan…. Even that is the same Church, at the same time, with the same principles and the same doctrine. The manifestations of the Church are different in each region.	839.	840.	841.
b)Roman Catholic Priest 2. Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: Other, Uruguay: Other, Switzerland: Other)	842.We read the Word of God, but we do not try to fulfil what is inside the Word of God and that we all lack, that is why it originates those desires to do evil. That's the problem. We do not live what the Word of God says. Although not everybody, we cannot say everybody. Among us, some people of the church read the Word of God is, but they do not fulfil what it is written. So it is just the same. Exodus 20, has the 10 commandments, but since the first commandment is quite long, and Jesus has said that the commandments are summarized in two: "Love God above all things and your neighbor as yourself," then the [Catholic] Church places this as the first commandment in the catechism: "Love God above all things". This includes everything that is in the book of Exodus in the first part. The rest is the same: Keep the Lord's Day; you will not worship images and everything else. So, if I love God, I will not worship images, and I will not do anything that offends Him. As for the images in the church, they are by no	843.If the church were not founded on the Bible, it would be heresy.- The visit of Pope John Paul II, for me and many: a big surprise for John Paul's attitude toward communism; and for others the encounter between the shepherd and the lost sheep. - Infallible is the person who speaks in the name of God or with the support of the word of God, and the pope is not always talking about the word of God or biblical or religious issues. We are humans.	844.Regarding the Ten Commandments, there are two versions of the commandments in the Bible, one in the Exodus and another in Deuteronomy. I cannot see it at this moment because I am setting up my library, but you should look carefully because there is one of the two that all are mentioned. Since there are two versions, one version develops the commandments and another one that selects them in short sentences to remember by memory. But, I do not remember at this time which of the two texts follows the Roman Catholic catechism. "Soft lies" are an extended custom, yes. Then you have to analyse case by case and see what is considered soft "pious" or not. Coherence is a very complicated issue. There we start judging subjective, personal elements, and intentions that I cannot see. I suppose about actions, but not about intentions. I can talk about whether there is religious practice or not, but from there to	845.

12.COHERENCE WITH MORAL LAW / REFORM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	means to be worshiped. They represent a living person who is in the Kingdom of Heaven, but we do not worship images. The bible says that we should NOT tell lies; that my word should be: YES or NO. (Reference to Matthew 5: 37. But let your communication be, Yea, yea ; Nay, nay : for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.) The "soft" pious lies, if they do not offend any person, they will not be a grave sin, but as long as I do not get used to saying them, if I do, I am in some way committing sin. I must always tell the truth and not tell lies. A person who firmly lives his faith and life will live according to the commandments of God and will not commit sins. But if I do not have control, and do not have a guide, I get to commit all kinds of things. Infallibility of the Catholic Church We teach that the pope is infallible in doctrine and morals. When he studies the Bible, hears the concept of the whole church and revises the tradition, he declares that a dogma is like that. The pope cannot be wrong like any of us (priests).		talk about such coherence, it is more difficult and even more difficult and even more unfair to generalise. In every human activity, there is always a level of incoherence, but I do not know to what extent we can say it. Religious practice in Uruguay is low, yes; it is very low, compared to other countries. You always have to compare. There are statistics from LatinoBarometers (2015), under the title "The Church and Pope Francis". There you find the compared values, but when the statistics compare reasonably objective values, you leave the story aside. Uruguay has been, a not very practising Catholic country traditionally within Latin America. But there are no statistics from before (the separation of Church and State) for one to compare. Religion has been relegated to a more private sphere here. I think there are religious concerns or, to be broader, transcendent concerns, but from there to that transcendent concern is manifested, and more publicly, the Uruguayan is more reserved; not only the religious. Religious, in particular, are reserved, but in other things, we are much more reserved. In the private sphere, it is private. I could not speak about Scandals within the Catholic Church. I prefer not to talk about the things I do not know.	
c)Roman Catholic Priest 3, Other (Colombia: Other, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	846.The most profound formation of human beings has been degraded for a long time, and the result is now. The person is no longer a being with dignity but a tab that serves me or does not help me, that suits me or does not suit me. Ethics, morals, and fundamental values are recorded in the Bible or the Constitution, but are not recorded and much less tattooed in the hearts of people. It is a depersonalising culture. And that's very unfortunate. To change a decree or a law is easy and fast: it is written on a paper, signed, and ready. But to change the minds of people is an arduous task that involves generations. It is the task of all. It has to be the effort of great political, religious, and social leaders. But the first who have to change their minds are the same leaders.	847.	848.	849.

12.COHERENCE WITH MORAL LAW / REFORM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	What motivates me to respect others is their dignity as persons and as children of God. The commandment of love may not be a utopia; it is that we really can heal us if you really assume it with seriousness and maturity.			
d)Roman Catholic Religious 4. (Colombia: Nun, Cuba: Seminarian, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Deacon)	850.Commandments: God gave us Ten Commandments that sometimes come in one order and sometimes in another. According to the culture, it must be presented with terminology that people may understand. It's a matter of terminology. But fundamentally it is the same. They might not be literal, but the meaning is the same. Honoring father and mother applies anywhere in the world, and the child has a father and mother, and you have to honour them. You have to respect the elderly, and you must abide by the authority. Each commandment is very broad. The commandments that God gave us are God's plan for man in his relationship with himself, with God and with his brother. The ignorance of the commandments is one of the causes of the current situation. I think that the background of the problem [crime and corruption] is that there is a lack of principles. Where are principles sought? God has given us the commandments. We have a conscience and common sense written in our hearts, the ability to distinguish good and evil. For example, when Adam and Eve sinned in the paradise, nobody accused them. But they were afraid and hid, and the reason is that there is a consciousness in the depths of the being, which is the voice of God. His voice tells us that you are approved with satisfaction and inner peace when you have done well, but produces remorse manifested in fear, anguish in distress, when you have done wrong. God has inscribed his law in the heart of man. Biblical validity: We cannot dogmatize. What the bible says is still the principle of life, behaviour and happiness; it is what God wants in men. The word of God continues to have all the validity. You will find in the church baptised, priests, religious, and henceforth the hierarchy that are true saints in the church. That is why there is the proclamation of the saints. There are those who have understood the word of	851.I'm Catholic, and I try to be a Christian, which is not easy.- The essence is distorting in the Church. Although the church does not approve some things, it ends up accepting them by culture, such as Christmas. Getting to the essence is very complex, and those like us who seek the essence are signs of contradiction as was Jesus. - It existed deaconesses and family priests before in the Roman Catholic Church. Why celibacy? Catholic universities do not approve research on this. And the theological foundation is weak. Example. Jesus did not marry, and therefore we should follow Jesus. - No church in the world is doing what the Bible says [verify Catholic book]. One must choose between doing what it is written in the Word and doing according to the circumstances. Because there is an opposition between what we do and what it is written. And love is what Christ came to show us of the Word and is what absolves us from guilt.	852.	853.*Church Infallibility* The doctrine of the Christian faith is summarized in the [Catholic] Creed. This seems to be a general place. But if this is so, the dogmas (doctrines) are not to be understood as an additive to the Christian's credo, but rather as an explication. This is a very consoling point of view, which was especially represented by Prof. Dr..Dr. Johann Baptist Metz. To the infallibility dogma is meant in this, the Church speaks the capacity not to err in the unfolding of the Christian Credo. Only their competence refers to this. We can not add anything to the credo. *Commandments in the Bible* I see no central difference [between the Ten Commandments in the Bible and the Catechism]: for memotechnical and didactic reasons, the Ten Commandments are briefly summarized. Hopefully, yes, there is consistency between what the Bible says and what the Church preaches. The Church must always re-translate the Bible into our time, Understand the language and image [the] world. For example, cursing and foe psalms, They use picture language:"Blessed is the one who takes your children and smashes them at the rock." (Ps 137: 8f) [King James states differently] This [Psalm] is also allegorical: it is not a matter of crushing the children of the enemy, but the children of bad thoughts that rob one's life. They shall be crushed upon the rock of Christ, that we may return to good thoughts. It is not in these psalms that the enemies as such go, but that the prayer finds a valve and expression for his fear. In the book of Psalms alone, 99 enemy names can be found. Around two-thirds of them are not actual nouns, but participles. This is how the Psalms speak when they are taken from the original text, for example, "me who hate me without hatred" (35:19, 38:20), "me who are fighting" (35: 1, 56, 22) (35.4, 38.13, 40.15, and so on). This is significant.For a participle serves to characterise a

12.COHERENCE WITH MORAL LAW / REFORM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
	God with the light of the Holy Spirit and have strengthened their spirit in such a way that they have lived the coherence of life. They are the heroes in the faith. Like Saint Francis of Assisi, Saint Ignatius of Loyola, Peter who is our founder, who were sinful men like everyone, of the ordinary people, but in them, there was an opening to the Holy Spirit who gave them the light to understand the word of God and what goes against the bible. This is the prophetic mission of the church and the baptised. The church is made up of saints and sinners. Sexual abuse: The first thing to recognise is that the priest is a human being. He was not born a priest, and before becoming a priest and being a member of the active church, he is a person who had a childhood, who had a family, who had an environment. What childhood? What family environment? What situations have had traumatised him? One may fall because of human weakness, but God gives you the opportunity to qualify for repentance. Priests have their own sin, but instead of recognising their sin and rectifying, they become arrogant before others, but they continue to sin. On the other hand, the holy priest, perhaps in his heart and in his instincts, also feels the tendency to sin and feels temptation, but he says: "my commitment to God, to myself and my vocation, and I who am giving to be the shepherd of these children, how am I going to tempt a child? He has the temptation and struggle, but in that struggle, he calibrates himself in prayer, with the action of the Holy Spirit, with an internal discipline consistent with His conscience, with the word of God, with the commandments and with the strength of God, will be a holy priest for these children, now, this same, if not lead to the light of prayer, of the word of God, with the action of the Holy Spirit, which leads to humility, conversion and positive commitment to life, then it will be the one that will abuse the children.			subject by virtue of its action, that is, not the subject itself, but its action is at the centre of attention. In this context, another circumstance is to be mentioned, which becomes apparent in the case of the participatory enemy names. Unfortunately, most translations of the Psalms on this point are inaccurate. For they almost never translate a participle as a participle; Instead of "the opposing" or "enmity-hunters" they speak falsely of "the enemies" and thus suggest that they are concrete people. But from the perspective of Old Testament supporters, such an enemy designation can mean any "hostile power" or any "hostile power". Let us look at the names in the enemy passages They are mostly names with which we can start today.It is, therefore, all the more important to look at them more closely. Some of them are originally national names. But within the enemy's passages, they seldom think of the people from whom the name originates. It's similar to ours. For example, In the Tagblatt of Vandalismus read, then this newspaper issue scarcely concerns any kind of ethnic belonging to the Volksstamm of the Vandals. Nor would any reader come to this idea."Vandal" or "vandalism" acts as a cypher for blindly destructive distress. This is the prayer in Psalm 83: 10ff: "Make it with them as with Midian and Sisera, as with Jabin at the brook Kishon, which you destroyed at En-Dor. They became dung for the fields. Make her princes like Oreb and Seeb, how Sebach and Zalmunna do all their leaders! " The name Midian could be translated in German with "Streithammel", the word root has something to do with dispute and discord. Sisera is reproduced in a Hebrew lexicon with an "order of battle". The name might perhaps be translated more freely by "the armed to the teeth". Jabin, from the wording of the word one, "who is aware of everything," is the "lurker," who is constantly insidious, "and then to what is said. The word Oreb specifically means the proverbially insatiable, greedy raven, who is everywhere and relentlessly searching for food.As a scavenger, who was often abandoned, and who is also fond of ruins, the sphere of death, he was, as it were, a victim of death since he is at least as insatiable as he is. It bears witness to a pearling, divine humor when the Elijah stories tell of the fact that God feeds his prophet just by this bird! Seeb is the wolf, Sebach the butcher, Zalmunna "the one who denies protection": Many of the names are speaking names, which are not

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				concrete people, but rather the power of evil. Conclusion: The prayers in the Psalms rather bear God's need, and then appeal to him to react and give an answer. How he reacts, what he undertakes to remedy his distress, leave it entirely to him. They do not act by doing something evil to evil, but leave the action to God. But the goal is to deal with God before and above all with the fact that there are enemies and hostility in our everyday life. The enemy passages in the Psalms have nothing else in mind.
e)Roman Catholic Theologian 5. (Colombia: Theologian, Cuba: Theologian, Uruguay: Theologian, Switzerland: Theologian)	854.The Catholic Church is confused with the ecclesiastical hierarchy with institutionality. In some way, the people of God are taken out of what is really the understanding of the church. Catholic Church is the ecclesiastical hierarchy and also with the people of God. As it is a human institution, there will be people who do not fully fulfil the Word. But there is a percentage of the people of God who do live the Word. The Catholic institution is worldwide, not only Colombia or the Latin American continent. As a people, as a church, our source is the Word, and some people do live it that way. Dogma The text [Bible] should not be taken literally. It is an agreement that has been reached with the Lutheran Church and the Catholic Church (Declaration of Lutherans and Catholics together). The text has literary genres; it is not a metaphor or a book loaded with symbols, without more. It has a specific context and has a whole that integrates it; therefore, it cannot be taken literally, word by word. First, it would somehow fall into fundamentalism, and we would not differ much from an orthodox Jew who takes the Torah literally, without taking away the letter. Or it would be similar to Islam and the book of the Quoran that, when taking text by text, we would have a God who asks for revenge, which goes against even the human beings. It must take into account what the text says, where and when it was written and for whom it was written. Literally, definitely you could not take it. But it cannot be seen as a mere book of symbols or a mere metaphorical book genre either. Remember that it is inspired Word and the Word of God.	855.It exists not, and it will never exist a complete consistency between what the Bible says and what the Church practices. Any project that involves human effort will always have this limitation. - The Roman Catholic Church is aware of this for which it preaches and calls for the self-consciousness examination. - There is no such Catholic or evangelical Bible, the only version that changes is the translation of the New World, which is the Jehovah witnesses' Bible. Bibles used by Catholics are those of 70 books no matter the version (Jerusalem or American) although you can use the King James or Reina Valera, which is the Protestants' Bible. The commandments are the same in all these versions. - As we climb the hierarchical spheres of the Roman Catholic Church, the coherence between what the Bible says and what the Church practices become more utopian. This is because Jesus' teachings always collide against individual interests accentuated in areas of power. But this sad reality that affects all levels from the grassroots community, does not mean that the Church should close or commit suicide. The Church recognises herself as sinful and inconsistent and tries to the "possible" extent to stay in conversation without coming into serious conflict with earthly interests. - I, myself, greet and talk to the bishops of the things they can talk and, of those things that we cannot talk; we pass them over (as if one knew nothing). Dogma	856.[see inequality code.] When we consider the Thomistic theology at the level of the Catholic Church, it clearly relies on all Aristotelian philosophy. It tries to answer what the challenges of Europe meant in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and in that context, we have to understand it. The same if we take the European Protestant or Catholic theology of the 1950s, or in the Second World War, where everything the theological reflection was marked of existentialism as a philosophy. On the other hand, if we take all the evolution of Latin American theology of the 60s and 70s; the current opening to the whole ecological dimension, intrigue it of the woman, that were not subjects that were planted in the Latin American theology of the 60-70, shows how the context has a very strong influence in the theological work. I believe that the Bible occupies a central place in the Church today (after II Vatican council), but taking up a bit of Ignatian theology. One also has to recognise the presence of God in reality. God speaks to us not only through the Bible but through all of the creation and through the encounter with the other, the relationship "I-you", recognizing the other as "other", as different that has something to say to me and, from a theological perspective with an expression of the presence of the Spirit of Jesus in human beings.	857.Many traditions in the Catholic Church do not have a biblical basis. For example, you know that Jerusalem has been destroyed around ten times in the last 2000 years, meaning that the current Jerusalem is built upon the ruins of "several Jerusalems" built after Jesus. Yet, many pilgrims travel yearly to Israel expecting to step the floor that Jesus stepped. That's why Franciscans "invented" the Stations of the Cross (via Crucis stations) with several chapels like the "Veronica" in the Via Dolorosa. That is, sort of "a Disney world" to entertain pilgrims

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	Coherence Personally, of course, the Bible is the foundation of my faith. Without it, I cannot say I'm a believer. Therefore, I have a keen interest. My studies in theology have to do with a desire to delve a little deeper, not only from the Bible studies but also, of course, starting from the foundation, which is the Word, as well as grow in experience with God.Second, if there is a specific intent: all departs, and it should be treated from the Word. If you want to have a good life in harmony, happy, you have to devote yourself to read the Word. And to convince you, that the Word has everything to have a different life that anyone else could not. In that sense, of course, every time I have the opportunity to share the Word of God with groups and others, preaching, etc.; the Bible, in particular, must be the foundation. Today it is not difficult to have access to the Word as before. It's too easy. If it is not accessible, it is because the person is not motivated for that or because I really do not want. It should not be forced, but you have to show the beauty this book contains, using a very good teaching, pedagogy to teach, sharing, etc., and the Catholic Church does it in every Eucharist reading a different passage. Faithful Catholics do not read the Bible because they lack much encouragement from leaders. In Germany [where I studied], where all the Bible studies were born, and after so long, it is clear [encouragement or guidance], and it's nice to see how many people actually have a personal interest in biblical studies, regardless of which church denomination they come from. But people are interested in it, contrary to countries such as Colombia or in Latin America. The greater the motivation and guidance, the closer the faithful to the Bible. *Difference between reciting (rezar plegarias: repetition prayers by memory (say prayers) and pray (orar).* To recite is indeed a pedagogical way to meditate and get in touch with God. It is the way to repeat a phrase, a sentence, something that needs repeating. To recite is to repeat certain prayers. As the Jews did, repeating the Talmud, the Psalms, almost every day against	- We as Roman Catholics accept the dogma of faith for which the Roman Catholic Church and its leader are infallible. Orders (commands) need to be fulfilled and obeyed. The Church is an army. So we think.		

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	the Wailing Wall. Now, prayer is intimate contact with God through dialogue with God directly, which is not repeated, or does not have to have already a text. You can take the Word of God through a psalm or a gospel, meditate on it, and from there begin the prayer. That's a real and concrete dialogue between the person and God. For this, no fundamental key is needed, but the desire and the ability to connect with God, to talk to Him. *Infallibility of the Catholic Church*. We can talk about ineffability nowhere, neither in Church nor in the State because these two institutions are made up of human beings. Therefore, in whom you can trust? There is confidence in the state and the church, but not absolutely, unfortunately. In a state like Colombia, it is much more difficult especially concerning credibility. What I am sure is that we cannot say that we do not believe in anyone, because if we do so, we would be automatically eliminated; as directly or indirectly we belong to one or the other. What motivates me to respect others is the love of God. What God does by one, the wonders he has for the world, all good things God has done, encourages me to respond to his love. My response to His love let me tell you: I do not harm others.			
f)Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (Colombia: Baptist, Cuba: Pentecostal, Uruguay: Evangelical, Switzerland: Other).	858.[code also for generosity and corruption.] Biblical views: There are areas of the Scriptures that are symbolic, but those are very clear. You can just read them and see that they are using symbolic language or in the poetry, poetic language. The Bible has some symbolisms and figures, but the vast majority of what you have in it in my view and my personal experience is literal. Therefore, most of the Bible should be taken literally. Comparison with Catholicism: Two incompatible worldviews collided on this island [San Andres]. The Protestant and Catholic worldviews with their value systems. When the first set of Colombians [from the continent] began to come, our people received them. We slept on the floor and gave them our	859.The most you should do is to reform. The Protestant Reformation was very necessary at the time it originated, with Martin Luther. At that time the Catholic Church had hegemony over the order of life, had the power over life and death of people. In the current years, the Catholic Church does not have the same power nor the same influence that it had, neither moral, nor spiritual, nor political that it had in those times; but I still believe in the power, necessity, and validity of the reform. I think that in recent times the reform is still necessary. With sadness, I want to tell you that not only the Catholic Church but also some evangelical churches must also be reformed. The kingdom of the Lord is not of this world; It is from the kingdom of	860.All Christian teachings are based on the Bible, and this should be like that. That Book was intended for everyone. Many times they wanted to destroy that book, and God allowed that Book to continue to be until our time. And to a large extent, many churches with which we have contacts, or we have some activities together, they have the Bible in mind. We take what is in the Bible, the Ten Commandments. The Ten Commandments are marked in more than 600 precepts that God had given to Moses in the mount Sinai. Then those precepts were summarised to the Ten Commandments and are an important basis in our church. Jesus summarised them saying "you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul and all your mind and your	861. Soft lies are not correct.

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	beds. That is the reality. Because they were visitors and the Bible says that we should treat foreigners this way. We would realise that so many people came trying to make a life, so they would ask us to live in the backyard somewhere, and our people said, ok, no problem and let them live in the backyard. Next thing you know is they are taking the documents for your land. They took all our documents and said “I have been living here for ten years; therefore this portion of land is mine”, and so they took the document for that land. Our people said, “what are you saying, what are you doing?” We have mango trees that were planted by those same Puritans and those slaves we are talking about. You can enter anyone's property and get some mangoes. You can take a bag and load full your bag of them. We always did that. As a child, we would walk into the bush, as we call it, and I would get a full bag of mangoes, take it home so that my entire family could eat them. But I could never think that I am going to take mangoes and sell them because I know they were not mine. And the owner of the mango tree would meet me in his property and said, “How are you doing? You are from the Kelly family”, Yes, I am Viola Kelly's son, and he said “Okay, go ahead and take as many as you want”. That was our culture. They would not charge you a penny. But what we began to see was that these newcomers started taking the mangoes not for their home use but for selling. And they went farther than that. It was not enough to take the ones on the floor or the ripe ones, but they began to go on the tree and pluck the green ones because they could make a lot more money selling them with salt. For us, this was a cultural shock. “What are you doing? How can you dare do this? How can you speak to me and give me your word, having signed a contract and you end up doing something different?” It just did not enter our mindset. Our worldview was always, “Honesty is the best of policies”. The worldview that we collided with coming from Catholicism was, “The end justifies the means”. If I need to accomplish something, if I need to get something done, whatever I need to do to get it done, I will do it as long as I	heaven, and you have to focus more on the spiritual, which is what really counts before God, and not on material things. So my answer is: the reform was necessary and still necessary.	neighbour as yourself", that was the life of Jesus. It's super simple: look and observe the commandments and follow the Lord. Nothing else. In Psalms 115 God speaks clearly of idols: "they are made of wood or they are made of metal. He says: "he has hands but they do not feel, they have nose but they do not smell, they have eyes but they do not see". He says that "idols can do nothing". We do not worship any image. But we are not saints. Sometimes it is easier to believe the lie rather than the truth. But we also respect what each one believes and accepts. Small sin or big sin, it is a sin. Without a doubt, we are all going to make mistakes because we are not perfect. At some point, we are going to lie and lie. That's why every Wednesday and Sunday, we receive forgiveness and with forgiveness that commitment should be, that effort not to sin. But we know that it is not easy and that Jesus established it that way. He placed it, and he knew about our mistake. A word that we heard in one of our offices said: "Jesus was a man and he was among us, but if Jesus thought as a man he would have said "why to go through the cross, why die if the man is going to continue sinning? " But since God is not a man and Jesus is not a man, they opened the door of salvation and keep it open with forgiveness, because he knows what we are lacking. Then we have that grace in each activity. Although the ideal should be that we fight every day not to do evil because if evil is not done, there is blessing and that means that things are going well.	

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	get my objective. You talk to mainland Colombians here on the island, and they will tell you, "It is okay to do drugs and to sleep with many women, and to drink alcohol or whatever". We were not taught that way. And they say, "Well you guys do not get it. What happens is that "El que peca y reza empata". You just have to sin, and then you pray a couple of Hail Marys and the sin is washed away. "Be free, go wild, it is okay. All you have to do is go to the priest, confess to him, and then he will tell you, 'Go, and say so many Our Fathers, so many Hail Marys and your sins are washed away. You are fine, everything is good, so keep limit'". With such ideology and philosophy, could you have a society without corruption? The very institution that is supposed to teach people not to bend to corruption is the one that is promoting corruption.			
g)Protestant Free Church Pastor 2. (Seventh Day Adventist - SDA) (Colombia: SDA Pastor, Cuba: SDA Pastor, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: SDA Pastor).	862.A society cannot expect anything good when does not fear God, when has left aside his principles, the Ten Commandments, when preaches that those principles were abolished on the cross of Calvary when says that they are outdated and not needed. Unfortunately, Catholics and non-Catholics have abolished the Ten Commandments. Not to kill, not to steal, not to bear false witness, etc., today, in the various confessional or not confessional pulpits it is preached that is abolished and left behind. As the man leaves behind or beside the principles that God has established, what the modern world harvests are crime, lies, stealing, abuse, etc. Because the principles that say, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and thy neighbor as thyself" have been abandoned, what currently exists is the "papaya culture" [meaning that when the other gives a chance, we have to take advantage of them, and we have to be careful of not give that chance to others], the pious "white" lies, the "don't make yourself a gringo/don't pretend to be a gringo" [meaning that Colombians are astute (viveza criolla, indigenous malice) and the Americans stupid/innocent/naive/indifferent (as they do not have the "viveza criolla or indigenous malice" and they do not "take papayas but give them"; as they tend to respect more their law), which is related to living the	863.	864.	865.I was Reformed Evangelical, and I was looking for a Church that lives the Bible literally, as the Sola Scriptura principle, until I have found the Adventist Church, where I am now Pastor. Jesus is the will of the Reformation. The Reformation had greatest and unimaginable consequences we can draw from. For example, religious freedom we can say is thanks to the Reformation. The memorial for the Reformation for us [Swiss] is 2019 due to Zwingly Reformation. 2017 is the jubilee from the German Lutheran Reformation. There are a lot of historical connections. In fact, we are standing here because of the Reformation. The history of Jesus and salvation were understood due to Reformation. Due to it [the Reformation] we also have the understanding that "the righteous shall live by faith". (Romans 1,17. Galatians 3,11. Hebrews 10,38.) Also, the understanding of forgiveness of sin that does not depend on humans [priests], and that salvation from sin and guilt can only come directly from Jesus Christ. In spring 1508 was the real discovery of this fundament. Christ is who forgives and not the Church. It's the gospel. The Reformation means to have Jesus and nothing else. Why else should we be here if not for Jesus? We're here because our sins have been forgiven. The most important thing in human beings is relations. And Luther found the true relationship with God, not with people, not with a Church. The only sacrifice is the offer that God made on the cross. No other sacrifice. This had a tremendous impact on society until today. The Reformation helps to know

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	gospel principles from Protestantism], for the corrupt society. From the position of the Seventh Day Adventist Church - SDA, the principles that God has left is what we teach. We encourage brotherhood to be faithful to God in all aspects. We believe that there are Ten Commandments and with one that we break, the result is zero. For God 10 minus 1 equals zero. When you are faithful to God, it must be true in all Commandments, not in 9. Among the principles, we maintain as a church are not acceptable to lie, to steal, to perjury, etc. However, everyone is free. One of the most corrupts in Colombia said: "Corruption is inherent in human beings". Those are expressions they use to justify their acts, but with God, we cannot justify ourselves: either we are, or we are not. The major cause of moral degradation that exists today is because the principles that God teaches and reminds us have been laid aside. Without Him we are nothing. Jesus himself said: "Without me ye can do nothing." As a church, we do not teach the "papaya" culture and culture of "crouch" (cultura del agache). We teach not to lie because from the Bible we take God as a source of wisdom and knowledge and He is clear: "Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not bear false witness," "You shall love your neighbor". He states that clearly. The fear of God and the love of neighbour is what motivates me not to lie, steal or kill. I grew up in an Adventist home since childhood. I learned those values from my parents that I still apply in my life and transcend as I try to teach them to my children. Sexual abuses: God said " it is not good for man to be alone " and if God says it, it's true. Everything that comes out of what God has established brings difficulties. The paedophilia and other consequences that it has carried on the leadership of the Catholic Church are because they do not do what God has established and they consider a sin what God has called good. That is why these great scandals appear. Also, pastors of other denominations have also been linked in this			Jesus personally. Like in John, that "that they know me and I come from the father" The intimate relationship it's only through Jesus and only through him. Now, they say that to focus on Jesus is too little and then we need to add many other unnecessary things. Paul wrote that we have to focus on Jesus Christ and him alone. Everything focuses on Jesus also since the Old Testament. I have a concern that frightens and is that the people are suspicious that we should focus only on Jesus, as Paul and Luther told us. The Reformation is not another thing that the continuation of the Restoration of the original truth that the early Church (Jesus and his first followers) left in the Bible and that has been paganised or hidden through centuries. The history of such Restoration begins much before the Reformation and the printing [this was the key to success of Reformation] with the early Christians that were persecuted for defending the Bible in the Middle Ages. The movement of Peter Valdes (Waldensians) rescued and translated the Bible to keep its principles in the Middle Ages. A next step in the Restoration was the movement of Jan Hus who raised the obedience principle (a hundred years before the Lutheran Reformation). Then, Martin Luther gave one step further raising the salvation through grace (Sola gratia), and not through works. John Calvin continued the spiritual growth while the Anabaptist movement advanced in the baptism of adults. Later, Roger Williams continued defending the separation of Church and State. Then, John Wesley brought back the biblical piety and after, William Miller's movement raised the importance of the second coming of Jesus again. From Miller's [movement], the Adventist movement was born as a Church. We are the heirs of this Restauration process. Each one of those groups that have defended coherently and progressively the biblical principles had suffered harsh opposition and persecution from the other Churches who remained at their time. We [Adventists] tend to, in general, keep a consistency between what the Bible says and our practice. But Adventists are not everywhere applying the Biblical principles, depending on the region or the cultural background. We [Adventists] focus on the Second Coming of Jesus as stated in the Bible that is what our Church' name says. And we differentiate from other [Christian] denominations because we keep the Biblical Sabbath holy, which is the fourth of the Ten Commandments. But why if Luther and the reformers defended the Sola Scriptura principle as we do, but they didn't keep the Sabbath holy? I think for several reasons, at least I can guess two: First, the Reformation has been done

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	type of difficulties to a lower extent.			gradually and not at a single step. If you wanted to keep the entire Biblical principles in the Middle Ages, you were having a significant risk of losing the Reformation for being an extremist. Second, the important principle to be understood at that moment was that Jesus saves us by faith and grace and not by works, that is basic to understand later to keep the Commandments and not the other way around. The Lutheran tradition comes from the Catholic tradition, and that is why they, as the Roman Catholics, have even different commandments in their Catechism as in the Bible. However, when I was in the Reformed Evangelical Church, I had never had a Catechism. In those Churches [Catholic and Lutheran], tradition is more important than what the gospel says. But here in Switzerland, Roman Catholics also read the gospel.
h) Protestant Mainline (old) institutional Pastor 3. (In Latin America free historical churches, in Switzerland official Church-State Reformed Evangelical) (Colombia: Presbyterian, Cuba: Methodist, Uruguay: Lutheran, Switzerland: Reformed Evangelical)	866.No one is infallible. There is no coherence on the Bible compared with what the Catholic Church does. No. But neither on what the Bible says and the evangelical Protestant church does. If you refer to the message of Jesus Christ as the foundation of the Christian religion, then there is not much application. Motivations and interests change and that, of course, generates inconsistency. If instead of accompanying the needy or the helpless you join the mighty or you become powerful, then it becomes difficult to be consistent with the message of helping the poor and being honest with the needy. But in politics, if you get motivated to vote for this or the other candidate, in order to receive "aid", then the whole exercise of the evangelical perspective simply changes by motivations. The church, in general, remains united with the political and the rich and thus evangelical impartiality becomes more difficult. You cannot take the Bible literally. If you're referring to the exercise of the practice of gospel message, not. Now, if you're referring to the practice of writing, for example, a literal reading of the Old Testament, then yes: kill, steal, lie, even religious leaders. We are Christians, and our Christianity is based on the message of Jesus Christ, which is very simple: Love your neighbor as yourself, and by doing so you prove that you love God, Is anybody doing that? Nope. For example, the Catholic Church has many movements and institutions	867.If we talk about the spirit of the Protestant reform, I do believe that it is still necessary to this day, although we are in a very open society. However, the society of the Sixteenth century was very different from ours. When I say the spirit of the Reform, I refer to the principles and ideals that devised it (the five fundamental principles: *Sola Fide, Sola Scriptura, Sola Gratia, Solus Christus, Soli Deo Gloria*). Everything that was criticised to Catholicism in the Sixteenth century in one way or another seen in Protestantism today. Evidently, faith has become a lucrative business. Before it was a Priest asking for an indulgence, today is a Pastor, or an apostle, or another Church leader asking for money to receive God's blessings. The Catholic Priest or the Protestant Pastor is someone in whom people place their trust and their faith as the means to reach Christ, while Jesus Christ must be addressed directly and personally. In practice, the anointed one is the leader, the pastor and not Jesus Christ as it should be. Likewise, the interpretation of the Bible is monopolised and loses the Spirit of the Reform. The spirit of the reform was to enter into dialogue with the Scriptures to return to its original foundations. So somehow there are current trends that may be at that time were also criticised. Why do I say the	868.	869.But why are there many different Christian denominations? If you trace the history back to its origins, there is no oneness. You have a Galileans movement with Jesus, and then, the Pauline Christianity, and the Judaism Christianity. It has always been a heterogeneous group. Byzantine, Ethiopian and Armenian Christianity are older than Roman Christianity, for instance. The Catholic Church in the 16th century also underwent also a coup and the Reformation process: The counter-Reformation or especially the Council of Trent, Tritentinum. And that's also really interesting, the development of the Protestant Churches also challenged for the Catholic Church to give a sort of like a Scriptological definition. So it means they had to provide a theological statement to the meaning of [The] Scripture or about [The] Scripture. So, it was something like the answer of the 'Sola Scriptura' of the Protestant Church and of course they did exactly the contrary. They are to make the difference clear. First of all, they [Catholics] said: 'The Bible per se needs the Church tradition to be understood'. That's exactly the contrary to what the Reform said: … the Bible per se is enough "sacra scriptura sui ipsius interpres": The Holy Scripture is its own translator or, its own interpreter. There is no Church authority needed to make an interpretation of the Bible. In the Council of Trent, the Roman Catholic Church stated [the] complete opposite opinion. And the second saying was the Protestant approach [to] the Bible was to translate the Bible. That is also a very old pre-Reformation thing; already Jan Hus did that in the early 15th century. [Also] Already in England in the 14th century John Wyclif translated the English Bible. So, that's a very old fashioned [laugh], reformed idea within the Church but only with Protestantism, this idea had a breakthrough and of course, also with printing books (…). In general, we had a much more educated population. So, that's why it was for the reformers just so important to translate [the

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	attached to it, which are big, strong and powerful, that even came against the Protestant Reformation, I mean the Society of Jesus. The so-called Society of Jesus in Colombia owns 12 large emporiums such as Javeriana University and others. The university charges much a student and pays little or no help -regarding Christian and social support- to students who have no resources. The state funds in the famous program (Ser pilo paga) "Being Smart pays" for some needy students studying at the Javeriana University. Now, if we talk about the financial sector, the Catholic Church does not implement the model of the gospel to accompany, assist, and care for people, because in Colombia the most expensive interests for credits are paid. (In the colony there were saving and credit mechanisms. There was, of course, who received money at interest and lent it to earn the intermediation margin. The Catholic Church, confused with the Spanish Crown, established ways to grant credit through a kind of property mortgage: the "chaplaincy," by which some goods were subject to the fulfilment of Masses and other religious commitments.) For example, a gentleman lends about USD 35.000; he pays around USD 7.000/ a year divided in monthly instalments for that credit. When he checks his credit balance at the end of the year, the customer owes to those "gentlemen" USD 37.000. He has paid USD 7.000 to an initially USD 35.000 credit, but he still owes USD 37.000 at the end of the first year! These are the guidelines of a Catholic community-owned bank that has nothing to do with justice or peace, but even in its theological sector, they are flaunting that they are the theology of the people, of the poor, of the liberation in Latin America. I know them very well because I was educated in seminars of that rigour. So, of course, there is no consistency between the message that is proclaimed and the daily practice of life. People do not read the Bible because it's scary to read. For example, the Old Testament is scary to read, unless you get into some sect	spirit of the reform ?, because the world today is much more plural and diverse than that of that time, because of the little freedom of conscience and religion that at least predominates in quotes in Western democracies. At that time we are talking about a state church, which determined in the life of the people was a church that impeded free access to the scriptures free access to biblical information. In this era that there is is an excess of information. There is a lot of good information and a lot that is garbage. The individual of today is not the one of that time, the one of that time was illiterate that received in Latin the mass and left without contribution some to his spirituality, an individual gotten the subject of the superstition, the cult to the relic. At this time in that sense, it is no longer the same now there is an excess of information and the church moves in that very different context From the historical point of view, I believe that the Protestant Reformation conceived as it was in its time, is not necessary now because I think that the differences or the causes that motivated it in one way or another have been overcome. The reform had an interest ... to reform the church, that reform was not achieved, but the Protestant churches emerged. But the Protestant church itself had to have a reform within the reform gradually. Because there are still structural traces that remain to this day ... for example, one meditates a bit on the Anabaptist movement that was persecuted by both Catholics and Protestants; however, there was a substantial contribution from that movement on the issue of the separation of church and state. That in fact, until today it is still a subject that has not been completely overcome. On the other hand, we are not talking about people freely deciding what faith they were going to profess, that is, if a prince was a Protestant, his people were Protestant, so we are talking about		Bible]. And again, the Roman Catholic Church said in the Council of Trent, only the Latin version of the Bible is the true Bible. Roman Catholic translations of the bible always refer to the Latin version of the Bible, never to the Greek or Hebrew versions. This is the "Sacra Scriptura" of the Latin … not following the Protestant path. This unity idea [of the Roman Catholic Church], that Latin is the lingua franca and of course they said: 'We are not a regional Church. We are a global Church. It's necessary that we have this [Latin Bible] as our Bible, and of course, we've stuck it to the Latin Bible". They also avoided the discussions about translation because the translation is already the first step of interpretation. Of course in the Roman Catholic Church nowadays you have also different languages… probably this means actually translating the Bible in different languages that you already lose this unity idea. Nowadays, the Bible it's not like in the Renaissance, as an approach, let's say as the centre of theologian studies. That has to do with the crisis of other leading figures in the human studies. When you go back to the 19th century or in the 20th century, you have some beating professors or teachers, who decided [laugh] what to do; what to say. They published and nowadays we have a much more open pluriform birth, and that's by the Bible, its perfect. I'm always surprised that also the most progressive Christian movements justify their views from the Bible. For instance, feminism, everything; they refer to the Bible because they need it. They have to, so the Bible is really an open book also in this sense. It's not just for conservatives; contrarily all movements are taking the Bible…so, that's why I think [the Bible] is still the centre. For example, in the poststructuralism feminism, the Bible is seen both as a critique for the patriarch scheme and also as the document that can bring emancipation interpreting that in the New Testament all men (human beings) should be equal. But of course, maybe [the centre] in a different way, as a spiritual, personal book rather cultural source of let's say inspiration. Or just as a very accepted authority of human tradition, knowledge, but not really as the Word of God. Of course, there are still more conservative Christian movements, and also, in my Church, the Bible still is very important for making the people's sermon and for the people to read the text on. In general, I would say, I guess that's maybe also very interesting thing why people still are listening to sermons and go to service because they want to hear this interpretation. It's such a strange book, you know. It's so old fashioned, so fascinating. It's like a medieval castle... The wording of the catechism, both in Catholicism and in

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	that teaches you to read it and you get even more afraid. And the NT, being a little simpler, it has many complications related to reading, because there are contradictions to read that even an ordinary person will not understand. The free examination of Scripture that came with the Protestant Reformation made it easier the access to the Bible because almost every house has one copy of it, (which is not read of course). And this has been very little time [since the Second Vatican Council] but reading and studying the scriptures, is almost the same as before, this means, almost inexistent. Reading [the Bible] literally is frightening, if we add the element that "it is the Word of God" and God willed it so, that will be very difficult for one person. As it is the Word of God and the church has not done any pedagogy, then merely people do not care. If people adhere to the Scriptures, there will be a transformation of the mind and human thought, the problem we all have is: Where? Because almost every church and even nearly every movement has a line of interpretation, including within the Catholic Church. If you go by the Jesuit line, you'll find the emphasis on liberation theology; if you go on the side of Eudists, you'll see a pretty emotional and almost Pentecostal church, although they are doing a lot of exercise in the text. As for the Protestants, practically every "garage" church has its Bible school, where the pastor tells them what they should learn and what not. There is no careful academic study. Catholic seminaries do not do much research, they merely replicate the old discourse, and there is no concrete study of the Scriptures. Also, they handle different emphases. If you go by an emphasis, it will be challenging to grasp the message of Scripture for everyone. Scripture teaches respect for others, and that is simple in theory, but in practice, you will find criminals, corrupts, etc., as agents of the Catholic or Protestant Christianity. [Ecumenism code also] We pray, and that is that we have a dynamic dialogue in which no fixed prayers as prayers, but prayers that are a little more open to the free spontaneity of prayer. But to be honest, sometimes we end up also in reciting repetitive recites prayers also. People end up always	Protestant states of Protestant principalities.		Lutheranism, is different from the original 10 Commandments of the Bible because the idea was to educate and teaching. It was a 16th-century pedagogical tool with question and answer. This is a Scholastic way that comes from the Greeks, from the dialogue and is directed to another audience. Cathecism is directed to the younger and "weak", whereas the Biblical 10 Commandments are to men and landowners. Luther did not pick up the biblical portions of the Ten Commandments. First of all, Luther, contrary to the Swiss Reformers, was not that much into the humanistic studies and he was also not involved in biblical studies in the original languages. It is not by accident that the first complete Bible in German was published in Zürich, not in Wittenberg, because the Swiss Reformation in Zürich, when it first started, was performed only among humanists. The network of humanists contrary to Luther had a different approach; Luther was a traditional theologian, and he was not very fond of humanists. They were too intellectual for him. That was his personal approach and I suppose this fact had much to do with his standing. That may be one of the reasons; I am just guessing. The second aspect is, you know, the commandments; there are two different versions of them. Maybe it is easier if one just picks up a traditional version, but it is also very interesting that the counting of the Ten Commandments is different in Catholicism and Protestantism. There is a difference; Luther and the Catholics have the same counting, and the Swiss Theologian Reformers have a different way to count them. That is also interesting to see. In the same manner, there is a difference in the catechism. But again, I am just guessing. Many commandments in the Bible are not useful anymore. The Ten Commandments are very basic, for example, not to kill, not to steal, not to lie. But to me, what motivates me to respect others is that It's reasonable not to do that, it would be very harmful to do it. "Soft lies" depend on the ethics of principles and ethics of responsibility the person has. In some cases, it's better not to say the truth than to lie. One is the principle of love, and the other is to be loyal to the truth. A typical case is the work certificates (Arbeitzeugnis): they have to be true and respectful. For us in Switzerland, it's more important [for the certificate] to be true, but for the Germans, it is more important that it is respectful. Another example, if a woman goes to the hairdresser and then asks how she looks: you can't say "you are ugly", because love is more important. I'm flexible to my principle in that case. Rabbinic Judaism has much relation to Protestant worship. For both, the Scriptures are first and have a central role. The word

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	saying the same things: they are recites in another way. What motivates me to respect others is the love of God, it is evident in the gospel. God's love in a believer's heart compels automatically to love neighbours, which naturally begins with the love of myself. So obviously I'm not going to do anything that I do not want to happen to me; the famous "golden rule". It is a principle that starts with me. Some people deeply love God in the Catholic Church and the Protestant church. Here, it has nothing to do with the theological line, nor with history, only what God does in people's hearts.			"Pharisees" means actually pure in terms of keeping the Law. [Here, there is a contradiction with changing the ten commandments: me] The Gospel of John is Christ-centred. When Jesus spoke about the truth to Pilatus, Pilatus asked Jesus, what is truth? This shows how incompatible Roman philosophy with Jewish culture can be... And for the pre-Socratic Greeks, for example, Anaximander, Gods are made from humans. This is why, when Paul was in Athens speaking of the Gospel with the Greeks, it was a fiasco. For the Jews, it was a scandal. Christianity is non-material. Archaeology is only found 300 years after Jesus. We only need to trust the scriptures.
i)Ecumenical academic theologian. Colombia: Catholic ecumenical theologian, Cuba: ecumenical theologian, Uruguay: ecumenical academic, Switzerland: ecumenical theologian)	870.And one facet is that we are very "santanderistas" [from Francisco de Paula Santander]. The fact is that we are very nominalists in the sense that we think that having the law, we solve the problem and then we apply: "law made, cheating made" (hecha la ley, hecha la trampa). The laws are followed, but not fulfiled. We talk about "indigenous malice". We say yes to everything, but finally, we do what we please because those are defence mechanisms against an invader. The Sacred Scriptures need to be interpreted and part of the problem of ecumenism has to do with the literal reading attached to the letter and every text has its context and its pretext. The basic principles of interpretation and hermeneutics, precisely by a conception of God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is a God who is recreating and blowing where he wants and where he goes. We Christians read the Holy Scripture and understand that God is still speaking today. With what criteria are we reading the Scriptures? And I would say that it is necessary, not only to read the Scripture but also to read today's newspaper. and we must learn to read from ecoteology; I say that one reads the Bible with the newspaper in hand and with a map on the desk. Catholicism tends to be very heteronomous in the sense that there is an ordained minister, a father, a bishop, who is the shepherd who	There are Catholic social teachings that do not teach you what they practice and vice versa. "The priest preaching, but does not apply." - Catholic Theologians spoke against usury. Although in the Middle Ages they were the usurers. . [Why Colombia has higher interests rates than UK or US?] - Calvin and Luther condemned usury, but they say that you can practice it as the Bible allows it (Verificate). The Protestant reformation is still necessary because there are elements left from which it was generated. Although others were eliminated, such as the predestination of souls, there are still others that have not been overcome. [...]	871.As for the commandments of the bible and the catechism, they are different because each one interprets it in their own way. There are always vested interests, and that's why they differ. But the fundamental thing is the gospel of love: "do not do to your neighbour what you do not want them to do to you, in every sense, in the deal, in a business, etc. That for me is the fundamental thing (rights and duties). Everything that is within that should define human behaviour. A lie (small or big) is always a lie.	872.

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	moves the sheep and somehow we got used to that someone looks at us, judge us or point us and that creates much hypocrisy and duality. We say "yes" at the light, but in the darkness, we make the "no". Protestantism tends to autonomy in terms that is every believer with his Bible and grace is discovering what God asks; it is a matter of loyalty and conscience at the time of making such behaviour. But if the matter is extended to find how much consistency between the mostly Catholic and Protestant countries, I think the issue is also relativised in history. For example, Pirates. What is their origin? And one finds many Protestants. Behaviour in war, as in Vietnam or the USA atomic bomb, is not consistent. That warlike military behaviour, if extended, neither Catholics nor Protestants are coherent. Because ultimately, if you behave in public or within your state correctly, but then you go and expropriate, kill, and hurts those who are outside your border, there's also a bias. It may be very transparent management of my state because it is my culture, but if I run over those who are not like me, it is a contradiction.			
j) Ecumenical Pastor. Colombia: none, Cuba: Ecumenical, Uruguay: Ecumenical, Switzerland: Ecumenical)	873.Migration and permanent settlement of Germans or British who were also probably Protestants was avoided in the implementation of the Concordat.[...]	874.	875.In the background there are about 1 and a half million Catholics in Uruguay, they may not go to church, but they believe. And what has begun to emerge here are denominations like Pentecostals. One day I told the pastor and the priest: "you do not change, you do not go around neighbourhoods, nor visit families, you go by car, with polished shoes and that explains why the little religions have grown because people are looking for an answer that you do not give". I do not know if those answers are given or not in small churches, but more denominations have come directly to the people. [Theory of market churches, Becker]. I discuss a lot the Infallibility of the Catholic Church, totally. I also discuss the confession. I go to the Catholic Church when I have a need; if not, I just do not go. I have made funerals, a celebration of the Word here because I was a deacon. Can you imagine the reaction of the women when they found out that I was married through an evangelical service? My wife was evangelical, and I wanted to marry	876.The Reformation happened for reasons that don't exist anymore. Many of the disagreements [between Protestants and Catholics] come from the Council of Trent. However, I do think every person and institution and Church needs to be reformed. I think one of the differences nowadays is that we Protestants believe that each one of us is a priest. The Presbyterian Church is doing many things in Switzerland that the [Protestant] Church was doing 400 years ago in the Reformation. I see, for example, that there is a trend to return to older forms of worshipping. But, at the same time [the Swiss Presbyterian Church] is one of the most liberals: a preacher can have three women pregnant at the same time with no problem. In the United States that is unthinkable. Secularism is also so strong here, as in general in Europe. Cathedral traditions can save the tourism economy in Europe such as Notre Dame.

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			ecumenically. We talked to my wife, the Catholic priest and the Evangelical pastor and it turns out that the Catholic bishop wanted my wife to resign from being evangelical and to be baptised Catholic so that she could get married. So I decided to ask the evangelicals if I had to renounce my faith to go there and marry. They said no, meaning that I could continue to be Catholic and marry from the evangelical faith and they opened the doors for me [intransigent hierarchy]. The serious problems Catholic priests have are related to celibacy. I was in the seminary in Buenos Aires; they simply do not do what they say [Incoherent discourse]. It was said that it was better not to have a family because it was cheaper. The problem is all about the money. A priest cannot advise on marriage problems, as you must live it yourself to give advice. Having children and educating them can be read in books, but it is necessary to live it. Being a father is not a label.	
k)Non-Christian (atheist, agnostic) (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: Academic/Intellectual, Uruguay: Academic/Intellectual, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	877.There is a component from the Catholic religion that could contribute to this kind of culture where dishonesty is vaingloried: "he who sins and recites (repetitive prayers) matches". This is what at the end of the story is the Papaya's law: "a papaya puesta, papaya partida" [meaning that when the other gives a chance, we have to take advantage of them and we have to be careful of not give that chance to others]. In many cases, it was said that it does not matter that you hurt others since you go and recite (rezar, pray repetitions), then your sins are forgiven. This is associated with the Assassins' culture as they become "free from sin" because they go and ask for forgiveness on the altar at the church after killing a person again and again. On the other side, I know very religious people who had seven family members murdered and this person instead of taking revenge went to adopt three paramilitaries that may in the future not hurt anymore. In this, I think there is a component that goes beyond rationality and allows a fresh start.	878.I did not know that the commandments of the Roman Catholic catechism are different from the Bible. I was not aware of such difference.	879.	880.

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	On my side, I have found that there is nothing that makes me happier than to have good social relations with the environment around me and then between more one gives positive things like one feels that life is much prettier, more bearable and that one achieves unthinkable goals.			
l) Non-practising Christian (Colombia: Academic/Intellectual, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Academic/Intellectual)	881.To say that the Catholic Church is the beast of Revelation, according to Calvin and Luther, it is a look related to a theological reading of their time. There are currently Pentecostal and evangelical versions that still keep this idea. I am not a theologian and therefore do not find much sense in that statement, but obviously, it still makes sense for a sector of Protestantism. On the other hand, historical Protestant versions, such as the Lutherans, still claim the postulate of "Sola Scriptura".	882.	883.	884.As Catholic, I see there is a discrepancy between what is being said and what is done level. I do not know how much [faithful] are cynics or they truly believe, or some listen, and some don't. There is a discrepancy of what we say, and we live in reality, but I'm ok with it. In my marriage, my wife (Protestant) was really annoyed by the (Catholic) priest, while I [as Catholic] get so bored in the Protestant service. It [religious confessions] separates us with my wife, but I say, "come on, please ignore it". […] I don't believe there's any scientific evidence to claim the existence of Jesus. [syncretism code also] The only good thing of being Catholic is the symbolism stuff. They [Catholic Church] make people realise this is fun. But Protestantism is such a boring ceremony if you don't have a rhetorical. I don't really believe in that; then there's nothing for me there. Ceremonies and symbols are really truly important. Then it does not matter if your [Catholic] priest is a gay (mine was). But he was a good guy. Nobody cares, and nobody judged them while he was kissing his boyfriend. Catholicism is an idea, but it is also an actor that behaves differently in each country. The idea is stable from the Pope in issues such as women ordination, but not on everything.
m) Practitioner/entrepreneur, Independent citizen, free Catholic believer (Colombia: Practitioner, Cuba: Employee, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Employee)	885.In the time of my parents, in my town, the priest taught that it was a sin and a heresy to have and read the Bible. They used to say that you could become crazy if you read it, as it was considered a dangerous book. Usually, the mass was in Latin, and the priest gave its back to the congregation. Now, not anymore. I had a training course abroad, where I had to share my room with someone from the Middle East. It was summer, so it was the , and I had to witness the torture this Muslim had to pass (as well as I could not sleep in peace the entire season). The religious had to wake up at night several times to pray and eat before the sunshine and asked me what I was required to do as Catholic. I explained and concluded that I have the best religion in the world because the Catholic Church allows me to do whatever I	886.	887.I am a Catholic, and I was an altar boy, but at that time I was, the church was different, and religion was an issue to talk about. But nowadays it is more commercial. I'm not really attracted to that. The Catholic religion speaks about the family, about the union of the family. Why priests then cannot get married, when they are the ones who should set the example? Today we find that there are cases of paedophilia, child abuse by priests, which should change too. In the evangelical church, the pastors can get married, they have their family, and they officiate the religion. It seems to me that this is the justest thing. The human being, man or woman, have the same needs and I do not think that Catholic priests are the perfect chaste. It is in that sense where I differ from	888.Here in Switzerland, the society is too secular in everything. But I think, when you are in the world (secular) the most faithful seem to be Roman Catholics. The Protestants (Reformed) are like the secular, I mean, I do not see much difference between them. My father is Protestant (Reformed), and he says that he knows the Bible very well since he learnt that in the school, but he even doubts whether God exists. I was born and raised Catholic because my mother is Catholic. But I haven't ever felt any special connection with God. Our faith is Catholic, but this is different than saying that I like the Church. I was just going some Sundays to the Church but do not quite remember much of what has been said there. Perhaps the social after the Church is more important, such as going to the restaurant to eat and have a drink. At the school, we were separated from Protestant children. I grew up in Valais, and the priest of the [Catholic] Church was at the same time my teacher at the school. However, he was an entirely different person as a priest than as a teacher.

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	want. I have been taught to pray the rosary, or novenas, with saints (images or icons), but that you do only in December before Christmas, rarely in the "holy week" (Easter), or when someone dies.		what religion is. There is not Coherence in what it is preached and done. I believe that there should not exist such "soft lies". For me, white is white and black is black; there is no grey. You have to go with the truth, and that's how you end up being a good person. Now, if you lie by little or by much, at least it does not go with me. Man is man and flesh is flesh; the flesh is weak, and I do not think they [Catholic priests] are so perfect that they say: "no, I do not feel anything". The human being is not perfect, but if you look for certain ways, you can get to perfection yourself. In my case, apart from the Catholic religion that comes from my family, I also integrate freemasonry. Today, what we speak in that temple, we try to live in profane life, but it is not easy. Sometimes I question myself! What we live there in those jobs that we do weekly, how do we transmit it? I think it happens to many, being them Catholic, being them evangelical, because we go to the church and talk about being compassionate with others, etc. But then we get out of there, and if we can take advantage and go over someone, we do it. It is not easy. Everyday life takes you to that. But when you have a certain conviction, and you want to try to be better, you will try to transmit, outside religious areas, to become better people. Sometimes you question yourself, they teach you something, and we act differently. I believe that it happens in all religions. When there is a political campaign, politicians make promises to be elected, such as: "there will be no increase in taxes, we will do this and that", after they get the votes and get the government the post, they change the discourse, and then they say: "We change the whole programme, I already have the votes, and I am now already a president" now to struggle 5 years. The same cycle repeats over and over. In Freemasonry, it comes everyone who can integrate it, regardless of religion, because	When I asked why was that, the answer was that I was not allowed to ask such questions. I have had images [Catholic icons] only to separate pages in my books, but I have never ever heard of anyone that had to worship any of those images. The only episode I can remember was when my grandmother died in the hospital she held a crucifix. Once I have been taught to make a Rosary with my hands, but I never prayed with that. But of course, I have recited prayers from my heart [not prayed]. I remember that before the mass there was a group of people who met to pray the Rosary, but I never participated in it. I used to attend the mass once in a while. Sometimes I used to go every week, depending if I had friends to come with me. Usually, youth never go there. I would say that a typical Catholic way of thinking here is that you help back others that have helped you and its harder to forgive those who have harmed you, or, at least you avoid them. I would say that Catholics tend to look for the "easy way". It's more like the outside, the ritual; you dress well because that is important. The difference I find in some Protestants I know is that they are ready to go the "extra mile" with you. For example, one Protestant woman was able to help me in her work extra her working hours very kindly. Here, you find that very rarely. Protestants tend to be less careless of appearances. How cold or warm is the Catholic Church here [in Switzerland], it really depends. In a Church in Schwytz I found they were cold like dead, but in a Church in St. Gallen I found everything done with love. I think that in a Church where the structure, the formality, and the external appearance is more important, is more difficult for a person to find the love of Jesus. But that depends on each person. You can find more love perhaps in a Free Church. But of course, the people here have negative stigmatisation when you say you attend a Free Church because they immediately associate that with a "bizarre sect". Our Church [Catholic] has always been mixing with superstition beliefs. [Question? How do you know what is true and what not? R. Truth is relative] as Catholic can't go to a priest for my problems. They don't help at all. I'm Catholic, and at a personal level, I believe that something is not OK with the Church, but I do not know precisely what it is.

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			there is no talk about religion. In Brazil, for example, Freemasonry is much more open than in Uruguay. There are Masonic symbols that identify well where the temples are. In Uruguay, discretion continues. Freemasonry is a discrete institution, but not a secret one. (It has always been thought that it is more secret). We are discreet. Because this interview is an academic matter, I will not say who is a Mason and who is not. In Uruguay, Freemasonry has a lot of influence. Many of those who make up the strategic high points of government are Freemasons. That discretion, today has opened in Uruguay. Freemasonry is made up of men of all levels and all religions. Today, there are public talks so that people know what Masonry is, people are allowed to enter the temples, and people go. It is about knowing the truth in such a way that each one draws their conclusions. Freemasons were always badly seen. But today, at least in Uruguay, society is more open regarding this.	
n) Academic/Practitioner/entrepreneur Independent citizen, free Protestant believer (Colombia: Teacher, Cuba: Tourism professional, Uruguay: Entrepreneur, Switzerland: Academic)	889.When I was a little boy, my mother taught me the Ten Commandments, and I learned them very well. We had to recite them by heart. Killing and stealing was something that was offensive to God and our parents, and we respected them. Respect for all the people was the norm in the community where I grew up. We could not say a bad word or do anything wrong in front of another elderly person from the community. They would tell our parents, and we had to repent of our fault. We could not disrespect an older person and get away with it. There was a high standard of morality on the island. Respect and decency were the norm. Stealing was out of the question. Anyone who would steal was looked down upon in the community, even for petty thefts like stealing a coconut. It was very strict. Nowadays, the norm is totally different. I learned the Ten Commandments from memory. That is really what kept me from stealing or lying. As a matter of fact, the church where I used to go had a picture on the wall, the Ten Commandments. That was on my mind all the time.	890.I am aware of the changes in the Ten Commandments of the Roman Catholic catechism, in relation to its original source in the Bible.	891.There are not such "soft lies". But lying is a lie everywhere, and sin is a sin. The Pope is like any other sinner. He is like everyone, and we are all the same. He has no infallibility. In small towns here, you do not notice many Scandals within the Catholic Church. It is in the largest cities and in the Vatican where you perceive the most of those scandals.	892.Switzerland is forgetting the blessings of the Reform, of following God's word, the same as it happened in old Israel. Current generations only receive the blessings from last generations faith and are very spoiled that they believe do not need God. The same happens in the rest of the Protestant countries in Europe. Lorenzo Walla found that the "Donation of Constantine" is a forgery. 500 years before Gutenberg printing was invented in China, but it did not have any success. The Reformation and the Gutenberg printing made it possible to both to succeed. In the Middle Ages, theologians used to see the Bible through Aristotle' philosophy as the Catholic Church teaches. At that time it was normal. Salvation through works is normal. If we don't have the Bible as a reference, we can't see our sinful nature and then believing that "I'm a good person because I do good works" is the standard accepted thought in Catholicism. Aristotle categories of substance and accident influenced Thomas Aquinas and other Catholic scholastics' theology to develop the host transubstantiation in the communion, for example. That's why Rome adopted transubstantiation in the Eucharist. Such is not a biblical doctrine because the Holy Supper is only to remember Jesus' sacrifice. Aristotle logics have been inherited in Rome, and the Catholic Church

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	The Catholic Church is colder than ice. The mass is only a repetitive iteration, and people almost don't have much contact with each other. Usually, people who are converted to Jesus do that jumping from Catholicism or atheism to Protestant Christianity. (Cite with Kirkpatrick) You don't hear much Catholics who say that Jesus within the Catholicism converted them. For them, Mary (the mother of God as they call it) is a lot more important. How can they find that [Jesus] way? If they read the Bible, then they find themselves in contradiction with pagan or superstitious rituals once again in their Church. How could they purify themselves to receive the Holy Spirit? I'm sure God could also work in that path, but I'm also sure, it's way more difficult. Why so many hundreds of years of harsh persecution against the Bible? Why does the book still survive and is so discredited? Does it have something special that they occult us? The relation of Satanism rituals with Catholic ones is so clear. For example, Guns n' Roses use Jesus' icons from the Catholic Church. To trace those pagan traditions of the Catholic Church, you find that all come to the point of "sun-worshipping" from Egypt and Babylon. You can find in Laponia, Finland, for example, an annual meeting of Satanists and witches where they make use of similar icons such as the Virgin Mary of the Catholic Church. There are not such "soft lies". That is exactly what Satan has been doing since the Eden garden when he said the "soft lie" that Adam and Eve would not die if they eat the fruit prohibited by God. Afterwards, modifications of such "soft lies" have been until today. Once I asked a good friend of mine who is a Roman Catholic priest that why do they teach the error, teaching the Ten Commandments changed and not the original from the Bible? He replied that he was paid by following instructions and not by thinking. He said that almost nobody follows exactly what the Bible says and added: "if you want to follow what the Bible says literally, become a Seventh-Day Adventist!".We culturally accept the error. That has been the success of the enemy, that we may sin without being aware of that and that by our ignorance			adopted many of his ideas [Aristotle] on ethics, physics, metaphysics, and politics via Thomas Aquinas. [Book of Daniel and from Babylon to Rome]. Catholic Theology (which influence all Theology) set aside the Bible alone as the sole source of theological knowledge and blend elements of Greek philosophy, among other sources. Example of this is also the soul immortality doctrine. But Aristotelian philosophy has not only an impact on Catholic, but also on Jewish, and Islam theologies. Afterwards, scholasticism is also adopted in Lutheran and Calvinist Protestantism as an exhaustive treatment of theology supplemented by the deductions of reason, ironically what Luther protested against. For Luther, the reason could be used to question men and institutions, but not God, as the Scripture is the most important divine revelation [Sola Scriptura]. Roman Catholic status quo was the "Indulgences to forgive sins". This was divided into three dimensions: 1. Regret until to be crushed (zerknirscht sein) 2. A Catholic priest must absolve the sins. 3. Punishment (with repetitive prayers and/or money). Luther was a Catholic monk and didn't have all the money to pay for the forgiveness of all of his sins, and at the beginning, he didn't understand how Money could buy forgiveness. The first and second were OK for Luther, but he couldn't stand the third (money). In March 1518, Luther understood that is God directly who forgives us. Not humans. "The righteous will live by his faith". Romans 1,17. And so Luther was at this point entirely against indulgences (the whole three dimensions). In August 1518, Rome started a process against Luther. And the defence of Luther was "if you can explain your points with only the Bible then it will be ok for me" they never could. How to apply the Sola scriptura principle? The first key to study the Bible is praying before reading. Ezra 7,10 says that we must have a heart prepared. The second key is to explore God's Word, reading at least a verse for the day. The third key is to apply Jesus' method, the best method to study the Bible. This consists of three principles that when applied, there is no room for any contradiction. It's the ABC: 1. All the scripture. This means the whole Bible, not a single chapter, like some charismatic Churches or the Catholic do. 2. Beginning from Moses, systematically. 3. Christ is the centre of all the Scripture.

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	we perpetuate the error. A common saying that we have in Colombia is that "the priest preach but does not implement" (el cura predica pero no aplica), referring to the divorce between practice and preaching that remains in the field of "theory" many times. [crime code] Regarding Catholic priests sexual abusers, the cases are not isolated but come in an organised and systematic way. This is why the Vatican protects the abuser with the canon law when secular courts condemn the priests in many different countries. The sexual abusers usually are taking part in occultist rituals of human sacrifice sexually) to attain earthly power. Those are satanic rituals in which the goal is to pervert as many children as possible to multiply perversion and sexual disorders when they will become adults. It is something that pleases Satan very much and has been introduced long ago in the Catholic Church through occultist rituals. Details of this issue are well documented in the book Lucifer's Lodge by William H. Kennedy. A book that describes that Satan's always purpose has been to establish his kingdom through a worldwide organisation, and the Catholic Church accomplish all the characteristics for that purpose.			A real conversion with Jesus means transformation not only of external actions with the neighbours but a conscience of the inner thoughts that even God sees.
o)Afro-Caribbean/indigenous religion Priest (Colombia: Rastafarian, Cuba: Babalawo, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: none)	893.	894.	895.	896.
p)Government officer / Former Government officer (Colombia: central government, Cuba: central government, Uruguay: regional government Colonia, Switzerland: Federal government)	897.	898.	899.I am divorced, and with all the pain of my soul, I have to admit that today I cannot take the Communion because the Catholic Church does not allow divorced couples to receive it. I go to church, I pray (rezo), I go to mass, I go to baptisms, marriages and I do all the ritual, but I do not profess the Catholic religion I would like. It cannot be that today my church denies me that sacrament. Someone would say that I am trying to place things for my side, as some religious did or even Batlle who instituted the divorce because it was convenient for him to divorce so he could marry his cousin.	900.

12.COHERENCE WITH MORAL LAW / REFORM				
Stakeholder	Colombia	Cuba	Uruguay	Switzerland
			but that is not what I want, I would like the Catholic church to revive that possibility of restoring my faith. [similar argument of Henry Tudor to adopt Protestantism in England] In a class that has 30 students, 25 have separated parents. What do we do with that? Parents want to baptise their children, they want to give them faith, but they are divorced, and the church punishes them for being divorced because I can not go to Communion because I am divorced. You go to the Catholic Church, and there you find a maximum of 10 people, almost all of them women, over 70 years. We are losing the faithful because there is something that does not allow them to get closer to God and I do not think God wanted that. We have lost the value of what was meaningful for us, for example, religion. We have lost what it was to sit around a table to give thanks to whoever, for the bread, for the roof, for the shelter. We have lost that since we are busy having a last generation cell phone, a bicycle with all the luxuries, a vehicle. Sometimes I have the last cell phone, and I just have to go to eat in the communitarian restaurant because I do not have a plate of food on the table. Then we do not prioritise the right values. I do not see in the priests the commitment that there must be. I do not see in the church what is supposedly entrusted to them, "where there are more than two speaking in my name, that is church" (me: Original cite is found in Matthew 18: 20: For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them). There is no need to see gold, no need to see images, no need for wealth, no need of a vehicle to go to give the mass; If I can have a bicycle or I can have a faithful one to take me, I do not need to have the last model car to go. That part is where I totally disagree with the Church. For me, a priest is the representative of God on earth, and he is the first to preach by example. My brother was extremely practising, he was an altar boy, he went to church, he took	

12.COHERENCE WITH MORAL LAW / REFORM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
			communion, confirmation, went to a youth group, collaborated in the Church, etc. And there was the time to get married he went to ask in the Church, and they said: "With red carpet or without red carpet? " and my brother replied: "with a carpet". To which they responded: "if you marry with a carpet it costs 500 pesos". My brother said: "Does the church charge me when I have given more than 50% of my time?" then he decided not to marry by the church. That's why I tell you that they lose the faithful because that is not done. It is not the importance of the carpet; it is the importance of the sacrament. That's what I do not share. First, they pass the bag to give alms, and then the priest spent the money to put the cover on the new car, that's not right. It cannot be like that. I totally disagree that the churches of some places are exceptionally super poor, having at the same time the Vatican all the wealth that there is in it. I do not see in that the teachings of Jesus. Jesus tells you "a tunic, and a pair of sandals and God will provide," then what do they do with everything else in the Church? Likewise, many priests are paedophiles because they are human because the spiritual part has not reached them as it should have. Their human fleshly part is more than their spiritual part. It is the only explanation that I can give because if you are really in soul and spirit devoted to the teachings of God, those things cannot happen.	
q)Catholic/Ecumenical Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: Central government, Cuba: National Council of Churches, Uruguay: Military/Church media, Switzerland: Catholic central committee)	901.	902.	903.I'm Catholic and infallible there is no one because the church is made up of human beings and we all have shortcomings. Moreover, recently came to light, as well as it has happened other times, about the paedophile priests. Those things society condemns them a lot and the distrust begins, and the church is depopulated. And they have to do a tremendous job to make people believe in religion again. If you choose to be a priest or a nun, it is a life option, but you have to follow rigorously the rules of "rajatabla" as in everything, like the military, like the doctor,	904.At the beginning of the 20th century there was a Bible movement in the Catholic Church and also a movement for liturgical reforms. These were movements from theologians and regular people albeit not official. However, these were not unimportant people but famous theologians that emphasised the need of reading the Bible and of having a liturgy that all could understand. The official liturgy continued to be presented in Latin until the end of the council in 1965. Liturgy is very important not only for the hour you are there on Sunday but also for the whole religious culture. If you had met all the priests or all the religious monks and monasteries, they were used to know the Latin texts by heart like the Psalms they prayed, the Gospels, etc. Culturally, there was not so much interest in doing this task in their language,

12.COHERENCE WITH MORAL LAW / REFORM				
Stakeholder	**Colombia**	**Cuba**	**Uruguay**	**Switzerland**
			Just as the doctor is condemned when he performs illegal abortions, here, the priests should be condemned when these types of events are discovered. Soft lies are like good intentions, and with good intentions, hell is paved. Lies are lies, at last. But one cannot put oneself in God's place and judge or not forgive. Sometimes a soft "pious" lie is that a doctor does not tell a patient that they have terminal cancer, because perhaps if the doctor does not tell that it is terminal, the patient fights and manages to save himself; that is a "pious" soft lie. I am saying it from another point of view. I do not know what soft "pious" lies for the church may have said or omitted at a given time, as if to be accused. If a soft "pious" lie is hiding information where there are criminals or where there are people disappeared, they are not so "pious" as they say.	but as soon as the liturgy changed, it became interesting. In this whole dynamic of Vatican II, the idea of every Catholic being responsible for his own religion was very attractive as well. So you had to think about opening dialogues with the modern world, to find yourself answers to big questions. It is not anymore the idea that the Church or the priests know everything and they must tell you what you have to do. Now you are responsible, knowing the basis of your faith, which leads you to the knowledge of the Bible. This is, in summary, the movement that took place. When Europe had digested the WWII in the '60s and '70s, there was a great dynamic in the whole society in the direction of autonomy, reflection, formation, and liberation movements. This was also linked to the idea of becoming adults. This affected not only the Church but also society.
r)Protestant Church-Government intermediary (Colombia: none, Cuba: none, Uruguay: none, Switzerland: Political-Church officer)	905.	906.	907.	908.
s)Embassy of the Country at the Vatican (Colombian Embassy at the Vatican, Cuban Embassy at the Vatican (no answer), Uruguayan Embassy at the Vatican, Swiss Embassy in Ljubljana)	909.The negotiation of a new concordat is not on the bilateral agenda.	910.	911.	912.

17. Appendix 17: Declaration of previously published parts of the thesis

Art 371 of the Award Regulations 17 for Doctor's Degrees of the University of St.Gallen permits the publication of parts of the thesis prior to definitive submission. Components of this thesis were written during my doctoral studies at the University of St.Gallen and have already been published. This refers to the following publications, which can be found in the places in the thesis that are indicated as such:

1. Components of the article:

Garcia Portilla J. "Ye Shall Know Them by Their Fruits": Prosperity and Institutional Religion in Europe and the Americas. *Religions.* 2019; 10(6):362. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10060362

can be found on pages:

Components of the article	**Pages (article)**	**Can be found in the dissertation (section/pages)**	
1. Introduction	1–4	Introduction	1–10
		5.3. Religion (Cultural and Institutional Influences) (B)	38–41
2. Research Model	4–5	2. Research Model	18–20
3. Outcome: Prosperity and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)	5–6	3.2 The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) as a Prosperity Proxy (Outcome or Criterion Variable) (A')	23–25
4. Diagnosis: Prosperity in Europe and the Americas	6	4. Diagnosing Corruption and Prosperity in Europe and the Americas (A)	30–31
5. Prosperity and Religion	7–8	7. Prosperity and Religion (A'), (B), (1)	54 38–41

Components of the article	Pages (article)	Can be found in the dissertation (section/pages)	
6. Institutions as Triggers of Prosperity	8–9	8.1 Institutions as Triggers of Corruption/Prosperity (3)	65–67
7. Legal Traditions and Prosperity in Europe and the Americas	9–25	8.3.1 Legal Traditions in Europe and the Americas	85–119
8. Materials and Methods	25–27	Part V: Empirical Results (Macro & Meso Components)	205
		15. Component 1 (Macro): Quantitative (Regression) Analysis	209–216
9. Empirical Results (Correlational Analysis)	28–33	15.3 Empirical Results of Regression Analysis	217–227
10. General Conclusions	33–34	Part VII: Discussion and Conclusions	328–340

CURRICULUM VITAE

JASON GARCÍA PORTILLA

1.Personal Information:

e-mail: jason.garcia@student.unisg.ch
Google Scholar profile: https://scholar.google.ch/citations?hl=en&user=SPLljbYAAAAJ
Academia profile: https://unisg.academia.edu/JasonGarciaPortilla
Alternative e-mail address: jasgarcia@gmail.com
Colombian citizen I Swiss resident

2.Education and Scholarships:

Dates	Degree obtained	University/Country	Scholarship	Thesis Supervisor
09.2014-Currently	PhD (des) Organization Studies and Cultural Theory (DOK). Defence date: 17.10.2019	University of St. Gallen, Switzerland	ESKAS Swiss Federal Government Excellency Scholarship	Prof. Dr Yvette Sanchez
09.2010-01.2012	Master of Science (MSc) in Climate Change and Policy	University of Sussex, United Kingdom	Chevening British Government Scholarship	Prof. Dr Dominic Kniveton
01.2005-05.2007	Master's Degree in Political Science	University of Los Andes – Bogotá, Colombia	Teaching Assistant (TA)	Prof. Manuel Rodríguez Becerra
01.2004-03.2005	Graduate Diploma in International Relations and Negotiations	University of Los Andes – Bogotá, Colombia	Juriscoop Academic Excellence Scholar	
01.1999-12.2003	BSc in Ecology	Javeriana University– Bogotá, Colombia	Rector Scholarship	Dr Carlos Gómez and Brigitte Baptiste

3.Employment History and Institutional Responsibilities

Dates	Position	Organisation	Institutional responsibilities
11.2014-04.2015 10.2015-07.2016	CONSULTANT - CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLICY EXPERT	ITAD Ltd. Hove, United Kingdom	• Contribute to the development of the draft and final evaluation report for CIFF's 2015 Strategy. • Conducting document review, including programme and strategy analysis. • Contribute to the implementation of the data collection and analysis including developing relevant materials, e.g. evaluation matrix, and facilitating key processes such as interviews, consultations, liaise with stakeholders, and analytical work on the outcome of the UNFCCC climate negotiations process in 2015.
06.2012-05.2014	ENVIRONMENT COORDINATOR / CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISOR	United Nations Development Programme - UNDP (Colombia)	• Assess and supervise four technical consultants in different climate change areas. • Strategic input into organisation development and proposals for additional funding. • Providing Climate Change Policy Advisory services to the Territorial Approach for Climate Change Initiative. • Delivering cost-effective projects in the area of climate change adaptation and mitigation; writing policy briefs, reports and presentations for local and central government

			departments.
09.2009-09.2010	CLIMATE CHANGE COORDINATOR	Ministry of Interior. National System for Disasters Prevention and Response. Bogota, Colombia	• Represent and attend national and international meetings, including UNFCCC negotiations and the Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction. • Coordinate and give support to issues related to adaptation to climate change and disaster risk reduction. • Provide Climate Change Policy Advisory services to the National System of Disaster Prevention and Response. • Offering information and knowledge linking climate-related disciplines to Risk Management and Disaster Risk Reduction.
07.2008-08.2009	ADVISOR ON CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION	Ministry of Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development. Bogotá, Colombia	• Participation as an official delegate at international negotiations, particularly in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. • Support in the design of the Climate Change Adaptation National Policy. • Design and coordination of the National Portfolio of Adaptation projects.
11.2007-06.2008	COORDINATOR FOR COLOMBIA - ISIACC	Centre for sustainability ETH Zürich sustainability – Academia Engelberg. Switzerland	Represent “Engelberg’s Latin American Climate Change Forest Policies Research And Influence Project” at high-level and public policy consultations, influencing forest policy-making towards the mitigation of climate change.
05.2006-12.2007	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICER	National Natural Parks System. Colombia	• Coordinate the organisation of environmental regulations in the Colombian borderline with Venezuela. • Fundraising of international cooperation sources to finance conservation projects in Eastern Colombia. • Support the design and implementation of participative projects for conservation in Chingaza’s Natural Park (in the framework of the Dutch International Aid). • Coordinate the meetings among different stakeholders, including local communities, NGO's and government officers for activities such as the declaration of Chingaza’s Lake as an International Ramsar Wetland.
10.2005-05.2006	ENVIRONMENT POLICY RESEARCHER	Alexander von Humboldt - Institute of Biological Research	• Research and develop environmental policy instruments for the conservation of coastal and marine ecosystems in Colombia.

4.Supervision of Students/Junior Researchers (Summary Information)

Javeriana University. Bogota, Colombia
MSc Thesis Supervisor. Master of Environment Management. Student supervised: B.Sc. Esp. Jennifer Johana Forero-Patiño (10.2013-03.2015)
General Examiner. BSc in Ecology. Students evaluated: Camilo Castellanos (05.2006); Geraldine Quintero (01.2005)

UNDP–IDEAM. Bogota, Colombia
Supervision of interns:
Naira Bonilla (International Relations, El Rosario University); Jenny Patricia Gomez (Sustainable Development Esp., Buenos Aires University); Diana Estefanía Pulido (Biology, Los Andes University); Maria Camila Prado (Environment Engineering, El Bosque University); Daniela Gutierrez (Environment Engineering, El Bosque University); Raul Eslava (Public Administration, ESAP); Alejandra Malaver (Public Administration, ESAP); (10.2012- 12.2013).

5.Teaching Activities (Summary Information)

University of Los Andes, Colombia
- Master of Development Practice (MDP):

Invited Lecturer and Teaching Assistant. Course: Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development (08.2012-12.2013)
- Department of Political Science:

Teaching Assistant. Course: Conflict Resolution (01.2006-06.2006)

International Corporation for Educational Development. Bogota, Colombia
- Natural Resources and Environment Programme:

Lecturer. Regular courses taught:
Ecology; Environment Policy; Environmental Aspects; Disasters Prevention; Research Projects;
Supervision of Internships (08.2005-11.2005)
Ecosystems; Professional Projects; Sustainable Production; Disaster Risk Management (02.2005-05.2005)
Ecosystems; Sustainable Production; Environment Policy (08.2004-11.2004)
Disasters Prevention (02.2004-05.2004)

Javeriana University. Bogota, Colombia
- School of Environmental and Rural Studies. BSc in Ecology:

Lecturer. Course: Environment and International Relations (05.2004-08.2004)

6.Memberships In Panels, Boards, and Scientific Reviewing Activities

Expert Reviewer of the Working Group II. Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), 2013. Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change / IPCC (06.2012 – 06.2013).

Peer Reviewer, Colombia Biodiversa Grants (05.2012 – 08.2013).

7.Prizes, Awards, and International Fellowships

07.2012	Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) / Mountain Partnership, Ormea, Italy	IPROMO - Understanding and Adapting to Climate Change in Mountain Areas. **(LECTURER).**
07.2010	President of Colombia (Decree 2596, July 2010).	"Merit Award" given for the singular devotion to disaster prevention, social care, and rehabilitation of people affected by the earthquake in the Republic of Haiti in 2010.
08.2010	United Nations Environment Programme / University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland	UNEP - UEF course on Multilateral Environment Agreements - Climate Change.
11.2009	United Nations International Strategy for Disasters Reduction / NEMA, Incheon, South Korea	UNISDR - NEMA. Second Pilot Programme for National Officers on Disaster Management - Adaptation to climate change.
10.2008	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change / Cartagena, Colombia	UNFCCC - RIOCC. Evaluation of Climate Change Adaptation measures in Ibero-America
11.2008	CATIE / International Union for Conservation of Nature, Turrialba, Costa Rica	CATIE / IUCN. Adaptation to Climate Change - The role of ecosystem services.
06.2008	Central European University / Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Budapest, Hungary	CEU/ IPCC. Climate Change: An interdisciplinary enquiry.

08.2006	Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule - ETH Zurich, Switzerland.	ETHsustainability Youth Encounter. Climate change, population, development, and biodiversity.

8.Personal Skills (Language Skills, Digital Competences)

Language skills: **Spanish**: native **English**: fluent **French**: fluent
German: Intermediate **Portuguese**: Intermediate

Computer skills: Proficient use of Microsoft Office Package. Knowledge of R, SPSS, and GIS

9.Major scientific achievements

The following table describes my most important scientific achievements, specific contributions, and their overall impact.

YEAR	RESEARCH EXPERIENCE	INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED	RESEARCH SUBTOPIC	SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS AND OVERALL IMPACT OF THE RESEARCH
2014-2019	PhD (des) Organization Studies and Cultural Theory (DOK).	University of St. Gallen, Switzerland	The prosperity differences between countries in Europe and the Americas and their relation with the institutionalization of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.	Presentation of the research in six international conferences. Publication of three peer-reviewed conference proceedings. Publication of an article in a peer-reviewed journal (Published: 1 June 2019; Views: 1526, Downloads: 1006: 10 July 2020)
2012-2013	Climate change specialist	UNDP (TACC Colombia)	Climate change impacts and future scenarios in the capital region of Bogota.	Local and regional policy-makers have used the results of this research for territorial planning in the capital region of Bogota (incl. mayors and governors).
2010-2012	Climate Change and Policy (Second MSc Degree)	University of Sussex, United Kingdom	Climate Change Impacts and evidence of Migration in Colombia.	The results of this research were published in a peer-reviewed journal and the International Organization for Migration — IOM used them as the first approach to this issue in Colombia for policy design.
2007-2008	Coordinator for Colombia in the International Student Initiative for Action on Climate	Centre for Sustainability Studies of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology– ETHsustainability	This project aimed to influence forest policy towards the mitigation of climate change by providing technical analysis for policy-makers.	The results of this study were taken into account by the Colombian government and supported the national position on REDD in the 13th Climate COP in Bali in 2007.
2006-2007	Political Science (First MSc Degree)	University of Los Andes	The implementation of the Climate Change Convention in Colombia as national public policy.	The Ministry of Environment and the National Department of Planning used this document as an input in the consolidation process of the Climate Change National Policy (CONPES) in

				Colombia.
2005-2006	Research associate	Alexander Von Humboldt National Institute of Biological Research – Colombia	Policy instruments for the conservation of wetlands and mangrove ecosystems as a measure of climate risk reduction in local communities.	This study formed the scientific basis for the legal design of the District of Integrated Management (DMI) in the Colombian Caribbean Coast under the lead of environmental authorities in Colombia.
2003-2004	Ecology (Degree)	Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies and National Natural Parks of Colombia	Relationship between carbon fixation in soils and climate change in wetlands and high mountain *"paramo"* ecosystems.	This document served as a basis for different NGO publications, such as Greenpeace and "*Grupo Paramo*." It emphasised the importance of high mountain ecosystem conservation not only as carbon sinks but as adaptation buffers.

10.Research Output List

1. Publications in peer-reviewed scientific journals

Garcia Portilla J. "Ye Shall Know Them by Their Fruits": Prosperity and Institutional Religion in Europe and the Americas. *Religions*. 2019; 10(6):362. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10060362

Garcia, Jason. & Kniveton, Dominic. (**2012**) Impactos del cambio climático y evidencia de migraciones en Colombia. In: "Diálogos Migrantes". (8), 2012. ISSN 2027-1867. (pp. 34-46). https://www.academia.edu/32129654/Impactos_del_cambio_clim%C3%A1tico_y_evidencia_de_migraciones_en_Colombia._2012

Garcia, Jason. (**2012**) Climate change in mountain ecosystems. An Andean perspective at IPROMO 2012. Mountain Research Initiative Newsletter no. 7, 2012. Global Change in Mountain Regions. The Mountain Research Initiative. c/o Institute of Geography, University of Bern, Erlachstrasse 9a, Trakt 3, 3012 Bern, Switzerland. (pp. 48-49). https://www.academia.edu/32129949/CLIMATE_CHANGE_IN_MOUNTAIN_ECOSYSTEMS._2012

2. Peer-reviewed books/monographs

Naira F. Bonilla; Martha Yoleny Correa Casas; Kristina Dietz; Raúl E. Eslava; Andrés Felipe García Pineda; **Jason García Portilla**; J. Freddy Grajales; Clara Inés Henao; Gil Farekatde Maribba; Magda Murcia; Javier E. Mendoza; Andrea Ivette Prieto-Rozo; Zonia Patricia Puenayán Irua; Ana D. Pulido; July Carolina Rojas Gómez; Imke Schmidt; Astrid Ulloa. Culturas, conocimientos, políticas y ciudadanías en torno al cambio climático. Biblioteca Abierta. Colección General, serie Perspectivas Ambientales, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, sede Bogotá, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, Primera edición, 2013. ISBN: 978-958-761-612-5. Colciencias (**2013)**. Astrid Ulloa, Andrea Ivette Prieto-Rozo (Ed). https://www.academia.edu/32127372/Acciones_de_mitigaci%C3%B3n_y_adaptaci%C3%B3n_para_enfrentar_los_retos_territoriales_del_cambio_clim%C3%A1tico_en_la_Regi%C3%B3n_Capital_de_Colombia._2013

Gerardo Ardila; Germán Andrade; Juan Benavides; Julio Carrizosa; **Jason García;** Manuel Rodríguez; Guillermo Rudas; Juan Pablo Ruiz. (**2013**). Desarrollo económico y adaptación al cambio climático. Friederich Ebert Stiftung in Colombia – FESCOL /National Environment Forum. Bogotá, Colombia, 2013. Martha Cárdenas & Manuel Rodríguez,(Ed). https://www.academia.edu/32129981/Desarrollo_econ%C3%B3mico_y_adaptaci%C3%B3n_al_cambio_clim%C3%A1tico._2013

Chavarro, Mauricio; García, Andrea; **García, Jason**; Pabón, José; Prieto, Andrea; & Ulloa, Astrid. (**2008**). Preparándose para el futuro. Amenazas, riesgos, vulnerabilidad y adaptación frente al cambio climático. UNODC, National University of Colombia, Ministry of Environment of Colombia. Bogotá, Colombia. ISBN: 978-958-98840-1-0. https://www.academia.edu/32127603/Amenazas_riesgos_vulnerabilidad_y_adaptaci%C3%B3n_frente_al_cambio_clim%C3%A1tico._2008

García, Jason; Kniveton, Dominic (**2011**) Climate change impacts and evidence of migration in Colombia. University of Sussex, UK.

García, Jason; Rodríguez, Manuel (**2007**). La implementación de la convención de cambio climático y su adopción como política pública en Colombia. 2007. Universidad de los Andes. https://www.academia.edu/32128413/LA_IMPLEMENTACI%C3%93N_DE_LA_CONVENCI%C3%93N_DE_CAMBIO_CLIM%C3%81TICO_Y_SU_ADOPCI%C3%93N_COMO_POL%C3%8DTICA_P%C3%9ABLICA_EN_COLOMBIA._2007

García, Jason; Gómez, Carlos; Baptiste, Luis (**2004**). Análisis del potencial de emisión de carbono del páramo de Chingaza y lineamientos para su conservación en el contexto del MDL. 2003. Universidad Javeriana. https://www.academia.edu/32124908/An%C3%A1lisis_del_potencial_de_emisi%C3%B3n_de_carbono_del_p%C3%A1ramo_de_Chingaza_y_lineamientos_para_su_conservaci%C3%B3n_en_el_contexto_del_MDL._2003

3. Peer-reviewed conference proceedings

Jason Garcia Portilla. Parallel session 1A *"…by their fruits ye shall know them":* Religious discourses and their impact to maintain low human development indicators in Colombia. **Publisher:** ISORECEA - International Study of Religion in Eastern and Central Europe Association. Institute for Social Research in Zagreb. Editors: Dinka Marinović Jerolimov and Siniša Zrinščak. 12th ISORECEA Conference & ESA RN34 Sociology of Religion Mid-Term Conference in cooperation with University of Zadar, Croatian Sociological Association. Institute for Social Research in Zagreb. RELIGION AND NON-RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES. Theoretical, Empirical and Methodological Challenges for Research in Central and Eastern Europe and Beyond. 21-24 April **2016.** ISBN 978-953-6218-70-7. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available in the Online Catalogue of the National and University Library in Zagreb as 000930162. http://idiprints.knjiznica.idi.hr/498/1/Religion%20and%20non-religion%20in%20contemporary%20societies.pdf

Jason Garcia Portilla. "[…] by their fruits ye shall know them": Religious discourses and practices, and their relation to development indicators in Europe and the Americas (case studies: Switzerland, Cuba, Colombia, Uruguay). Book of Abstracts. International conference of the Lithuanian Society for the Study of Religions co-organized with the Latvian Society for the Study of Religions and the Estonian Society for the Study of Religions. "Religion(s) and Power(s)" Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania. 2017. http://en.religijotyra.lt/files/2017/09/Abstracts_2017m_konferencijai.pdf

Jason Garcia Portilla. "Religious Discourses and Practices, and Their Relation to Development Indicators in Countries with Christian Heritage (Colombia, Cuba, Switzerland)". Conference on the 500th Anniversary of Martin Luther's "95 Theses". Andrews University, Michigan, USA. November 1–2, 2017 https://www.andrews.edu/services/research/research_events/conferences/luther_conference/luther-conference-program-version-oct-29.pdf

García, Jason & García, Andrea. (2008). Impactos ambientales y socio económicos del cambio climático en Colombia. In: "Adaptation for Climate Change: the Role of Ecosystem Services". International Workshop, SIAASE. CATIE, Turrialba, Costa Rica. November 3–5, 2008

4. Contributions to books

Manuel Rodríguez Becerra & **Jason García (2013)**. Las políticas de prosperidad económica y la adaptación al cambio climático: ¿choque de locomotoras? Martha Cárdenas y Manuel Rodríguez (Editores). Desarrollo económico y adaptación al cambio climático. Bogotá: Foro Nacional Ambiental, https://www.academia.edu/32131018/Las_pol%C3%ADticas_de_prosperidad_econ%C3%B3mica_y_la_adaptaci%C3%B3n_al_cambio_clim%C3%A1tico_Choque_de_locomotoras

Franco-Vidal, C.L., A. M. Muñoz, G.I. Andrade y L.G. Naranjo. (Compiladores y editores). 2010. Experiencias de adaptación al cambio climático en ecosistemas de montaña (páramos y bosques de niebla) en los Andes del Norte. Memorias del Taller Regional. Bogotá, D.C. Febrero 19 y 20 de 2009. WWF, MAVDT, Ideam y Fundación Humedales. **Jason García Portilla:** Adaptación al cambio climático. Política nacional de cambio climático pp. 83-88).
https://www.academia.edu/32127913/Adaptaci%C3%B3n_al_cambio_clim%C3%A1tico._Pol%C3%ADtica_nacional_de_cambio_clim%C3%A1tico._2010

5. Contributions to international conferences (e.g. oral or poster presentations)

06.2018 Universality v Particularity: Human Rights and Religions Conference. UNESCO Amphitheatre University of Nicosia, Cyprus. 8-9 June 2018.
(Oral presentation: Human Development Indicators and their Relation to Religious Confessions and Institutions in Europe and the Americas).

11.2017 Conference on the 500th Anniversary of Martin Luther's "95 Theses". Andrews University, Michigan, USA. November 1–2, 2017
(Oral presentation: "Religious Discourses and Practices, and Their Relation to Development Indicators in Countries with Christian Heritage (Colombia, Cuba, Switzerland)".

05.2017"Christian Renewal Movements in the Global South in the 20th and 21st Centuries: Religious, Social and political transformation". The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, The Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace. 28th-29th of May 2017. Jerusalem, Israel.
(Oral presentation: "*[…] by their fruits ye shall know them"*: Religious discourses and practices, and their relation to development indicators in Europe and the Americas (case studies: Switzerland, Cuba, Colombia, Uruguay).

03.2017 "Religion and Society in Latin America". The Swiss Graduate School of Latin American Studies. University of Bern, 17-18 March 2017.
(Oral presentation: "'[...] by their fruits ye shall know them': Religious discourses and practices and, their relation to development indicators in countries with Christian heritage (cases: Colombia, Cuba, Uruguay, Switzerland)".

04.201612th ISORECEA Conference & ESA RN34 Sociology of Religion Mid-Term Conference in cooperation with the University of Zadar, Croatian Sociological Association. Institute for Social Research in Zagreb. RELIGION AND NON-RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES. Theoretical, Empirical and Methodological Challenges for Research in Central and Eastern Europe and Beyond. 21-24 April 2016, Zadar, Croatia.
(Oral presentation: *"…By their fruits ye shall know them":* Religious discourses and their impact to maintain low human development indicators in Colombia).

04.2016 Critical Perspectives on Latin America. Second Annual Graduate Student Conference. Latin American Network Initiative (LANI). Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) Geneva. 29 April 2016. **(Oral presentation: *"…By their fruits ye shall know them":* Religious Discourses and Practices, and Their Relation to Development Indicators in the Christendom (Cases: Colombia, Cuba, Switzerland)"**

12.2015 ProDoc Workshop XVII: “Climate change: impacts on Latin America and the role of Latin American Actors in International Negotiations. The Dynamics of Transcultural Management and Governance in Latin America”. University of Bern, December 11-12 2015.
(Oral presentation: Climate change “An introduction to technical and political debates”.

07.2012 Food and Agriculture Organization / Mountain Partnership, Ormea, ItalyIPROMO - Understanding and Adapting to Climate Change in Mountain Areas. **(LECTURER: Climate change in the Andes).**

11.2009 United Nations International Strategy for Disasters Reduction / NEMA, Incheon, South Korea UNISDR - NEMA. Second Pilot Programme for National Officers on Disaster Management - Adaptation to climate change. **(Oral presentation: Adaptation to climate change and Disaster reduction in Colombia)**

10.2008 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change / Cartagena, ColombiaUNFCCC - RIOCC. Evaluation of Climate Change Adaptation measures in Ibero-America **(Oral presentation: Colombian position on Adaptation at the UNFCCC)**

11.2008CATIE / International Union for Conservation of Nature, Turrialba, Costa RicaCATIE / IUCN. Adaptation to Climate Change - The role of ecosystem services. **(Poster presentation: Adaptation to climate change projects in Colombia)**

6. Outreach activities (e.g. public engagement)

Delegate of the Colombian government to the following United Nations documents/sessions:

• Fifteenth conference of the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 15) and the fifth meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP 5). (Copenhagen, Denmark, December 2009).

• Continuation of the seventh session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperation under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (AWG-LCA 7) and the resumed ninth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on New Commitments Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 9). (Barcelona, Spain, November 2009).

• First part of the seventh session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperation under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (AWG-LCA 7) and the first part of the ninth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on The new commitments Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 9). (Bangkok, Thailand, September-October 2009).

• Second session of the Global Platform for Risk Reduction (Geneva, Switzerland, June 2009)

• Thirtieth Session of the Subsidiary Bodies of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - UNFCCC - SBI-SBSTA, Eighth Session of the AWG-KP and Sixth Session of the AWG-LCA, (Bonn, Germany, June 2009)

• Fifth session of the ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and seventh session of the group on commitments of Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol. (Bonn, Germany, March-April 2009).

• Thirteenth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. (Poznan, Poland, December 2008).

• Third session of the ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the sixth session of the group on commitments of Annex I parties under the Kyoto Protocol. (Accra, Ghana, August 2008).

7. General contributions to science
(Institutional publications where my authorship or contribution was transferred to an institution):

7.1. Expert Reviewer of the Working Group II. Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), 2013. Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change / IPCC
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/WGIIAR5-AnnexI_FINAL.pdf

7.2. To the United Nations Development Programme & Institute of Hidrology, Meteorology, and Environmental Studies – IDEAM (**2013**) (all available at: http://www.cambioclimatico.gov.co/pricc):

7.2.1. Technical reports

Technical Report. Características generales y los procesos de desarrollo de los principales fenómenos climáticos que caracterizan la variabilidad inter-anual la Región Capital Bogotá-Cundinamarca

Technical Report. Síntesis de la información existente para el análisis crítico de los desafíos y prioridades del desarrollo regional frente a la variabilidad y al cambio climático en la Región Capital.

Technical Report. Lineamientos para construcción de capacidades Institucionales a nivel local y regional en temas de cambio climático y gestión del riesgo, por medio de la implementación de estrategias de educación, formación y sensibilización.

Technical Report. Compilación y análisis de información sobre registros de emergencias asociadas al clima en la región capital 1980-2010.

Technical Report. Recopilación de índices de extremos climáticos para Bogotá-Cundinamarca calculados por software STARDEX para 1980-2010

Technical Report. Inventario de Gases Efecto Invernadero para la región Cundinamarca - Bogotá

Technical Report. Primera etapa de la identificación de sectores prioritarios para la implementación de estrategias de mitigación

Technical Report. Instructivo para incorporar el riesgo en el ordenamiento territorial y la gestión del riesgo en decisiones de planificación y en sus aspectos programáticos

Technical Report. Perfiles de 20 proyectos para sectores y áreas prioritarias en los capítulos de mitigación y de adaptación

Technical Report. Síntesis sobre la evaluación y proyección de la variabilidad interanual del clima relacionada con los fenómenos El Niño y la Niña

Technical Report. Lineamientos metodológicos y experiencia piloto de asistencia técnica para incorporación de riesgos climáticos en el ordenamiento territorial a nivel subregional en la Región Capital

7.2.2. Policy papers

Policy paper. Síntesis de las presentaciones de Julio Carrizosa Umaña, Manuel Rodríguez Becerra y Ernesto Guhl Nanetti durante el Foro Nacional Ambiental

Policy paper. Enfoque territorial. Fuente de información para la toma de decisiones relacionada con variabilidad y cambio climático en la Región Capital

Policy paper. Evolución de Precipitación y Temperatura durante los fenómenos El Niño y La Niña en Bogotá - Cundinamarca (1951 - 2012)

Policy paper. Incorporación de la Gestión de riesgos hidroclimáticos en el Ordenamiento Territorial municipal como un camino seguro para la adaptación al cambio climático

Policy paper. Mitigación del Cambio Climáico en la Región Capital. Medidas priorizadas para reducir las emisiones de Gases de Efecto Invernadero

Policy paper. Vulnerabilidad de la Región Capital a los efectos del cambio climático y opciones para la adaptación

Policy paper. Escenarios de cambio climático. El Cambio Climático en la Región Bogotá Cundinamarca y sus implicaciones para el desarrollo regional (2011 – 2100)

Policy paper. Estrategia regional de mitigación y adaptación al cambio climático para Bogotá y Cundinamarca

7.2.3. Books

Gestión del Cambio Climático Región Capital. Referencia para formulación de políticas públicas de cambio climático e insumo en la construcción de la estrategia Regional de Mitigación y Adaptación al cambio climático. Diplomado en gestión del Gestión del Cambio Climático en la Región Capital Bogotá, Cundinamarca. Universidad Javeriana

Final Report. Plan Regional Integral de Cambio Climático de la Región Capital Bogotá-Cundinamarca (PRICC)

Brochure. Presentación general PRICC. Información general sobre el Plan Regional Integral de Cambio Climático de la Región Capital Bogotá-Cundinamarca (PRICC)

7.3. To Greenpeace (2009):

Book: Cambio climático: futuro negro para los páramos.
http://www.greenpeace.org/colombia/Global/colombia/informes/informe_todo3.pdf

7.4. To the Alexander von Humboldt -Institute of Research on Biological Resources (2006):

Instrumentos de política e información de base acerca de las políticas que apoyaron la puesta en marcha de un Distrito de Manejo Integrado para la Bahía de Cispatá en Córdoba (Costa Caribe colombiana).

7.5. To the Ministry of Environment (Colombia) 2002.

Book: Logros y Avances de la Gestión Ambiental en Colombia. “Proyecto Colectivo Ambiental”.
https://www.academia.edu/32124409/LOGROS_Y_AVANCES_DE_LA_GESTI%C3%93N_AMBIENTAL_EN_COLOMBIA._2002

7.6. To UNDP, ASOCARS, The Ad Hoc Sustainable Development Council and the Río+10 Process (2002)

7.6.1. Reports:

Reflections from Colombia: A decade after Río
https://www.academia.edu/32124571/REFLECTIONS_FROM_COLOMBIA._A_DECADE_AFTER_R%C3%8DO._2002

Cumbre Mundial sobre Desarrollo Sostenible. Recopilación de materiales relevantes para el proceso preparatorio de Río+10. Grupo ad-hoc de la Sociedad Civil y Autoridades Ambientales Regionales de Colombia. Bogotá, abril 12 de 2002.
https://www.academia.edu/32124726/Cumbre_Mundial_sobre_Desarrollo_Sostenible._Johannesburgo_2002

(Magazine article): Garcia, J. (2004). *An agreement to preserve life (Convention on Biological Diversity).* In: Expedición 4 Magazine. Ed. Norma S.A. Bogotá, Colombia, 2004.

[i] Acknowledgement

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