Foreign Policy Experts, Think Tanks and the Russian State

A Field Theoretical Approach

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St.Gallen, May 28, 2019

The President:

Prof. Dr. Thomas Bieger

To my family

One man in a field is no warrior

Russian proverb

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Hamburg, 26.07.2019 Alexander Graef

II. Abstract

This study examines the social relations between academic experts, think tanks and foreign policy professionals in contemporary Russia. Drawing and expanding on Pierre Bourdieu's notions of the 'social field' and different forms of capital, as well as on Gil Eyal's concept of 'spaces between fields', I argue that the interactions between these actors constitute an important field of practices that help to explain the ways state power operates in Russia. I capture individuals' and organizations' dynamic position within the field by measuring their 'political capital', defined as institutional proximity to state organs, and 'media capital', understood as visibility in the public sphere, in terms of expert council memberships, publications and citations. In addition to extensive secondary data (including memoirs and experts' publications), I draw on (and add to) databases provided by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the UDB-COM database of Russian federal newspapers, as well as 56 interviews that I conducted with Moscow-based foreign and security policy experts. My key argument is that foreign and security policy expertise, in particular in Russia, permanently exists as a 'space between fields'. This is due to the constant negotiation of the specific logics and distinct norms of established fields (e.g., media, politics, academia) in the 'thick boundary zones' in which agents both encounter each other and position themselves. Here they are simultaneously influenced by and shaping the different forms of capital they command. The findings also show that, the clear-cut distinction between state and society is not a useful analytical tool when studying Russian foreign policy experts and expertise, given the fact that the Russian state is both a dominant and a non-unitary actor.

III. Zusammenfassung

Diese Studie untersucht die sozialen Beziehungen zwischen wissenschaftlichen Experten, Think Tanks, Politikern und Diplomaten im post-sowjetischen Russland. Mit Bezug auf Pierre Bourdieus Begrifflichkeit des Feldes und verschiedenen Formen von Kapital sowie unter Verwendung von Gil Eyal's Konzept der 'Räume zwischen Feldern', argumentiere ich, dass die Wechselwirkungen zwischen diesen Akteuren ein wichtiges Feld der Praktik begründen, welches dabei hilft zu erklären, wie staatliche Macht in Russland operiert. Ich erfasse die dynamische Position von Individuen und Organisationen innerhalb des Feldes, indem ich deren 'politisches Kapital', definiert als institutionelle Nähe zu staatlichen Organen, und 'Medienkapital', verstanden als öffentliche Sichtbarkeit, in Form von Mitgliedschaft in Expertenräten, Veröffentlichungen und Zitationen messe. Zusätzlich zu umfangreichem Sekundärmaterial (z.B. Memoiren und Veröffentlichungen einzelner Experten) verwende (und erweitere) ich hierzu bestehende Datenbanken des Russischen Rates für Internationale Angelegenheiten (RIAC) und die UDB-COM Datenbank über nationale russische Zeitungen, sowie 56 mit in Moskau ansässigen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik Experten durchgeführte Interviews. Mein Hauptargument ist, dass Expertise im Bereich Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, vor allem in Russland, dauerhaft als 'Raum zwischen Feldern' existiert. Dies beruht auf der fortwährenden Verhandlung spezifischer Logiken und Normen etablierter Felder (z.B. Medien, Politik, Wissenschaft) in den 'breiten Grenzzonen', in denen sich die Akteure begegnen und selbst positionieren. Dieser Prozess wird beeinflusst von den verschiedenen Formen von Kapital, über die Letztere verfügen, und gibt ihnen zugleich Gestalt. Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen auch, dass eine allzu klare analytische Trennung zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft für die Untersuchung von russischen Außenpolitikexperten und -expertise aufgrund der Dominanz des Staates, der jedoch keinen einheitlichen Akteur darstellt, kaum hilfreich ist.

IV. A Note on Transliteration and Translation

This study uses the ISO 9 transliteration system (GOST 7.79 System B) for Russian. Where established English conventions for certain proper names exist, these have been given preference. For instance, I write ‘Mikhail Gorbachev’ and ‘Boris Yeltsin’ instead of ‘Mihail Gorbačëv’ and ‘Boris El'cin’. All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.

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VI. List of Abbreviations

AEAC	Association for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation
CACEES	Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies
CAST	Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies
CENESS	Center for Energy and Security
CKEMI	Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies
CPSU	Central Committee of the Soviet Union
CSA	Center for Situational Analysis
CSR	Center for Strategic Research
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
FANO	Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations
FNE	Foundation New Eurasia
GAUGN	State Academic University for the Humanities
GKČP	State Committee for the State on Emergency
GRU	Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
HSE	Higher School of Economics
IDV	Institute of Far Eastern Studies
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMEMO	Primakov Institute for World Economy and International Relations
IMI	Institute for International Studies
INION	Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences
INSOR	Institute of Contemporary Development
ISKAN	Institute for US and Canadian Studies of the Academy of Sciences (of the USSR)
ISKRAN	Institute for US and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
KGB	Committee for State Security
KPRF	Communist Party of the Russian Federation

LDPR	Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia
MDG	Interregional Deputies Group
MED	Ministry of Economic Development
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MGIMO	Moscow State Institute of International Relations
MION	Interregional Research in the Social Sciences
MIPT	Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology
MIRV	Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MONF	Moscow Science Foundation
MSLU	Moscow State Linguistic University
MSU	Moscow State University
MVD	Ministry of the Interior
NCO	Non-commercial organizations
NKSMI	Scientific-coordination Council on International Studies
NOFMO	Scientific-Educational Forum on International Relations
OTR	Public Television of Russia
OVR	Fatherland-All Russia (Party)
PGU	First Chief Directorate of the KGB
PIR-Center	Center for Political Research in Russia
RAN	Russian Academy of Sciences
RANEPA	Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
RFFI	Russian Foundation for Fundamental Research
RGA	Russia in Global Affairs
RGGU	Russian State University for the Humanities
RGNF	Russian Humanitarian Research Foundation
RIAC	Russian International Affairs Council
RIO	Centre for the Development of an Information Society
RISI	Russian Institute for Strategic Studies
RNF	Russian Science Foundation

RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
RSPP	Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
RVSN	Strategic Missile Forces
SPbGU	St. Petersburg State University
SVOP	Council on Foreign and Defense Policy
SVR	Foreign Intelligence Service
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAVT	Russian Foreign Trade Academy

1 Introduction

> I don't like experts, he said. They are our jailers.
> I despise experts more than anyone on earth.
>
> You are one yourself, aren't you?
>
> Therefore, I know! Experts are addicts. They solve nothing! They are servants of *whatever system* hires them. They perpetuate it.[1]

This study examines the social relations between academic experts, think tanks and foreign policy professionals in contemporary Russia. I argue that their interactions constitute an important field of practices that help to explain the ways state power operates in Russia. In doing so, I respond to a major research gap: simply put, we currently know very little about this issue, even though its importance has been recognized by many scholars, both inside and outside Russia.

More specifically, the few existing attempts at capturing the field of Russian foreign policy experts and expert institutions suffer from three major shortcomings: first, much of the available literature is more akin to personal observations (including polemic commentaries) instead of rigorous analysis. Second, the (often quite comprehensive) data collections generally do not have any elaborate theoretical or conceptual basis and thereby overlook many of the actors, institutions and relations that shape the field. Third, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the academic interest in the topic has been limited to studying domestic debates *about* foreign policy, in which experts and think tanks were relevant only as producers of discursive material. Combined with the lack of access to these actors in the Soviet Union, this legacy means that there is not much of a tradition of in-depth academic engagement.

1.1 Who Makes Russian Foreign Policy?

Most analyses of agency in post-Soviet Russian foreign policy either ignore experts and think tanks altogether, or they do not go beyond general observations without offering any in-depth empirical analysis.

[1] John le Carré, *The Russia House* (Scribner, New York, [1989] 2004), 197, emphasis added.

Generally speaking, scholars observe that it is "not easy to determine who makes policy and how they make it",[2] because the institutional environment of Russian foreign policy-making has become "immeasurably more complex" when compared to the Soviet period.[3] Lo, for example, considers the academic and think tank community, the media, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian regions and 'eminent persons' simply as "the rest" among the institutional agents shaping the policy-making environment. Because institutions are generally weak, strong personal ties and the quality of individual relationships would determine access to decision-making and influence.[4] Mankoff, acknowledging the difficulties in identifying the agents who make Russian foreign policy, also observes that the latter has become the preserve of an elite that has become smaller and more directly related to the regime than in the 1990s.[5]

In this context, commentators hint at important changes in the institutionalized foreign policy landscape since 1991. Lo, for example, distinguishes "between members of the traditional academic institutions from the Soviet period, and the Western-style think tanks of recent vintage",[6] even if the latter would only have "marginal influence as sources of predominantly Westernizing advice."[7] Gvosdev and Marsh also highlight the emergence of "new think tanks based on the American model",[8] including the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (*Sovet po Vnešnej i Oborony Politike*; SVOP) and the Institute for Contemporary Development (*Institut Sovremennogo Razvitiâ*; INSOR) close to President Dmitri Medvedev.[9]

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[2] Bobo Lo, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 31.
[3] Bobo Lo, *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era. Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002), 30. Neill Malcolm noted in 1996 that the Soviet system of foreign policy making had been "one of the most secretive of all", but argued that "since the the collapse of the Communist order considerably more information has become available about how foreign policy is made in Moscow". See Neil Malcom, "Foreign Policy Making", in *Internal Factors in Russian foreign policy*, Neil Malcom, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, Margot Light (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996), 101.
[3] Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh, *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors* (Washington: CQ Press, 2013), 47.
[4] Lo, *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era*, 34; see for a similar argument Sarah E. Mendelson, *Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 130.
[5] Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 53.
[6] Lo, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*, 31.
[7] ibid. 41.
[8] Gvosdev and Marsh, *Russian Foreign Policy*, 47.
[9] ibid. 47-8.

The role of civil society and the public sphere, meanwhile, has received (even) less attention, although 'experts' are seen as playing an important mediating role. The overview of domestic factors in Russian foreign policy provided by Donaldson, Nogee and Nadkarni, for example, covers the entire spectrum of formal state institutions, but dismisses other factors such as non-governmental agents.[10] Herd, in his discussion of Russian security policy, argues that "expert commentators influence policy-makers in framing security strategy […] they set the parameters for foreign policy choices, as well as interpret and so disseminate it to a wider Russian and international public."[11] In his opinion, experts thereby highlight objectives, shape perceptions and influence the evaluation of policy options.[12] Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh also emphasize the role of the public sphere and civil society, arguing that the latter "makes its voice heard" as it is engaged in a "lively and rambunctious debate" about Russian foreign policy.[13] In this context, Mankoff notes that public opinion, including media debates, do in fact constrain the range of political choices, which cannot go far beyond of what the public accepts.[14] What the exact relationship between 'experts', media and the public sphere is, however, remains unclear.

These cursory statements thus tell us little about how foreign policy experts as political agents or 'think tanks' as institutions operate in the broader field, in particular in interaction with each other.

1.2 A New Landscape Emerges

Indeed, apart from such general observations, the empirical study of 'experts' and 'think tanks' in contemporary Russian foreign policy and their relationship to state power has so far been limited to the provision of lists, short reports, journalistic accounts and commentaries from 'insiders', i.e. those who are (or were) themselves part of the field. This is largely attributable to the fact that following the disintegration

[10] Robert H Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee and Vidya Nadkarni, *The Foreign Policy of Russia. Changing Systems, Enduring Interests* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014).
[11] Graeme Herd, "Security Strategy: Sovereign Democracy and Great Power Aspirations", in *The Politics of Security in Modern Russia*, ed. Mark Galeotti (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 16.
[12] Dodds makes a similar argument in relation to Britain, suggesting that "the strategic or foreign policy expert plays an important role in cultivating and sustaining an elite audience", see Klaus J. Dodds, Geopolitics, "Experts and the Making of Foreign Policy," *Area*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March, 1993), 70-74.
[13] Gvosdev and Marsh, *Russian Foreign Policy*, 47.
[14] Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy*, 61.

of the Soviet Union in 1991, the once strong interest in the study of Russian (academic) foreign policy experts and think tanks[15] and the institutes of the Academy of Sciences,[16] which had produced a rich body of literature, waned both in Russia and the West, despite the fact that access to information dramatically increased. As Mendelson argued in 1998, "Russian foreign policy […] has been more talk than action […]. All those involved in politics have been consumed by the revolution that is sweeping Russia, by the transformation and construction of the new state".[17]

In the 1990s the institutes of the Academy of Sciences, which had held the monopoly on civilian (foreign) policy analysis in the Soviet Union, faced considerable problems. There was a massive decline in state-funding, meager salaries and the mass departure of young scholars, resulting in the fragmentation of the Academy of Sciences throughout the 1990s. Due to this difficult financial situation, many traditional research institutes had to rely increasingly on funding from business and foreign sources. More importantly, it meant a steady decline of opportunities for academic research institutes to influence foreign policy making since the late 1980s.[18] According to Pynnöniemi (2003), only the directors of the research institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences can still be considered influential in foreign-policy

[15] For studies that examine Soviet (academic) debates about foreign policy and international relations, see for example William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-1967* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Morton Schwartz, *Soviet Perceptions of the United States* (Berkeley: University of California, 1980); Neil Malcolm, *Soviet Political Scientists and American Politics,* (London: Macmillan Press, 1984); Allen Lynch, *The Soviet Study of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Jeffrey F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World. Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986); Margot Light, *The Soviet Theory of International Relations 1917-1982* (University of Surrey, Dissertation, 1986); Margot Light, "The Study of International Relations in the Soviet Union," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 16, no. 2, (1987): 287-96.

[16] For studies that examine Soviet experts and research institutions from an institutional perspective, see for example Tyrus W. Cobb, "National Security Perspectives of Soviet Think Tanks," *Problems of Communism*, 30 (November-December 1981): 51-59; Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Oded Eran, *Mezhdunarodniki. An Assessment of Professional Expertise in the Making of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Tel Aviv: Turtledove, 1979); Eberhard Schneider, "Soviet Foreign-Policy Think Tanks," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 11, no. 2 (1988): 145-155; Jeffrey Checkel, *Organizational Behavior, Social Scientists and Soviet Foreign Policy Making* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dissertation, 1991); Richard S. Soll, Arthur A. Zuehlke and Richard B. Foster, "The Role of Social Science Research Institutes in the Formulation and Execution of Soviet Foreign Policy, Stanford Research Institute: Strategic Studies Center," (March 1976), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a026280.pdf, accessed Sept. 14, 2018.

[17] Mendelson, *Changing Course*, 130.

[18] Katri Pynnöniemi, "Russian Foreign Policy Think Tanks in 2002," *upi working papers* 38, Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) (2003), accessed Sept. 18, 2018, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/19009/Wp38.pdf.

advice.[19] A similar opinion is expressed by former Vice-Chancellor of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Ivan Tûlin (2005), who finds that "scientific institutions have lost their previous impact on the development of the course of action taken by the Russian Federation in the international arena".[20]

This development, however, coincided with the emergence of new institutes, such as 'think tanks' connected to the former Soviet President and governmental structures (e.g. Gorbachev Foundation and the Foreign Policy Association established by former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze).[21] In 1996 the then Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center Scott A. Bruckner noted the proliferation of "smaller, leaner research centers" through which, for the first time, "large-scale, high-quality research was being organized outside the structure of the Academy of Sciences."[22] According to Sandle, this proliferation of private research centers in post-Soviet Russia profited not only from the drastic reduction of state financial support for the institutes of the Academy of Sciences, but also substantial thematic fragmentation and the removal of "monopolies of expertise" due to the more competitive political environment.[23] Whereas in the authoritarian Soviet state elites had been relatively insulated from broader societal and bureaucratic forces, in post-Soviet Russia a growing number of organizations and individuals started to compete for attention of key political decision-makers.[24] Mendelson, too, points to this dynamic, saying that the institutes of the Academy of Sciences "have given way to a plethora of 'think tanks' that operate independently of the state", working for banks or companies instead.[25]

Authors also emphasize, however, that non-research institutes and universities have become more salient. Pynnöniemi highlights the role of the Carnegie Moscow Center

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[19] Pynnöniemi, "Russian Foreign Policy Think Tanks in 2002," 6.
[20] Ivan Tûlin, "Institucional'noe izmerenie rossijskoj nauki MO," in *Rossijskaâ nauka meždunarodnyh otnošenij: novoe napravleniâ*, ed. Andrej P. Cygankov and Pavel A. Cygankov, (Moskva: Simvol-Plûs, 2005), 52.
[21] Vladimir B. Yakubovsky, "A Short History of Russian Think Tanks," *NIRA review 30* (Winter 1995), accessed June 10, 2018, http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/review/95winter/yakubo.html.
[22] Scott A. Bruckner, "Think Tanks in Russia: Tottering toward an Uncertain Future," *NIRA Review* 32 (Summer 1996), accessed Dec. 10, 2018, http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/review/96summer/scott.html.
[23] Mark Sandle, "Russian Think Tanks, 1956-1996," in *Think Tanks across Nations: A Comparative Approach*, ed. Diane Stone, Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 217; Raymond J. Struyk, *Reconstructive Critics: Think Tanks in Post-Soviet Bloc Democracies* (Washington: The Urban Institute Press, 1999).
[24] Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change. Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War* (New Haven, London: 1997), 107.
[25] Mendelson, *Changing Course*, 130.

as “Moscow’s leading new institute since the early 1990s.” According to her, “the center is regarded as one of the most important participants in the discussions of foreign and security policy.”[26] Moreover, she states that some research institutes exert influence by relying on direct personal access to the Presidential Administration and the Russian government. This includes the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI), but also MGIMO and the Diplomatic Academy, which are directly subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For Tûlin, too, RISI “makes a significant contribution to the handling of foreign policy problems by the Russian research community.”[27]

1.3 Categorizing New Players

There have been several attempts at mapping the field of this new landscape of (foreign policy) think tanks. However, since these generally lack a theoretical and conceptual foundation, they mostly resemble arbitrary lists of institutions and are unable to offer any profound insights into the complex social relations that constitute the field.

An often-cited report by Oxana Antonenko for the ‘Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project’ at the John F. Kennedy School, for example, presents short descriptions of a large list of ‘analytical’ centers active in both social, economic and foreign policy.[28] Pynnöniemi presents 32 foreign policy research institutes, including universities, various institutes of the Russian Academy of Science, and non-governmental organizations.[29] Tûlin, similarly, distinguishes between universities and the institutes of the Academy of Sciences on the one hand and independent research institutes on the other.[30] Among the latter he further identifies specialized institutes, centers of complex research and structures of education and research. He also discusses various professional associations and coordinating structures, including the Russian Association of International Relations (RAMI), the Association of European

[26] Pynnöniemi, “Russian Foreign Policy Think Tanks in 2002,” 6.
[27] Tûlin, “Institucional'noe izmerenie rossijskoj nauki MO,” 56.
[28] Oxana Antonenko, “New Russian Analytical Centers and Their Role in Political Decisionmaking,” *Strenghtening Democratic Institutions Project*, John F. Kennedy School of Government, February 1996.
[29] Pynnöniemi, “Russian Foreign Policy Think Tanks in 2002,” 5.
[30] Tûlin, “Institucional'noe izmerenie rossijskoj nauki MO,” 50-65.

Studies (AES) and the Academic Association of Russian Universities in the field of International Relations. Okunev, finally, differentiates between official structures, academic structures, governmental think tanks, non-governmental think tanks and international think tanks.[31] In a similar vein, Străuțiu briefly discusses academic institutions, universities, state-affiliated think tanks, mixed research organizations, private organizations and institutions that he terms "watchdog" think tanks.[32]

In a more recent report, Pallin and Oxenstierna examine nine Russian 'think tanks' as 'government-organized non-governmental organizations' (GONGO) in the context of projecting Russian soft power abroad. Their list includes the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), the Valdai Discussion Club, SVOP, the Gorchakov Fund, RISI, Rethinking Russia, the Dialogue of Civilizations (DOC), the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation (IDC) in Paris, and the Information Security Institute (IISI) at the Moscow State University (MSU).

Pallin and Oxenstierna, define 'think tanks' based on their tasks rather than their organizational form; they are institutions that "produce public-policy research analyses or take part in public debate and the media."[33] They also note that think tanks take over the role of a bridge between the two communities of academia and policy-making, as well as between state and civil society.[34] Although the authors purposefully exclude universities such as MGIMO and the institutes of the Academy of Sciences because they are "academic institutions",[35] they note that they are linked by personal relations to the GONGOs they select.[36] Their definition of GONGO's, too, lacks precision. At one point, Pallin and Oxensteirna argue that "they are managed by the state"[37], but simultaneously hold the more rigorous view that "they are controlled by the government".[38] Yet, when examining RIAC they argue that it

[31] Igor Okunev. "Barriers to the Development of Independent Foreign Policy Think-Tanks in Russia," Training Program for Russian Policy and Opinion Makers, Policy Papers 2/11 (2011), accessed Jan. 20, 2019, https://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/drive/oldfiles/IgorOkunev.pdf.
[32] Eugen Străuțiu, "Security Think-Tanks in Post-Communist Russia," (2012): 9, accessed June 6, 2018, http://www.academia.edu/4947285/SECURITY_THINK-TANKS_IN_POST-COMUNIST_RUSSIA Străuțiu.
[33] Carolina Vendil Pallin and Susanne Oxenstierna, "Russian Think Tanks and Soft Power," *Swedish Defence Research Agency* (FOI-R) (August 2017): 10.
[34] ibid. 10.
[35] ibid. 14.
[36] ibid. 14, 21.
[37] ibid. 13.
[38] ibid. 13.

"appears to be relatively independent when taking part in public debate".[39] This rather ambiguous treatment of think tanks points to a lack of theoretical reflection and understanding of the object under investigation. In fact, the authors try to evade the need for further elaboration by noting that "categorizing think tanks is difficult".[40]

Finally, Laruelle offers a comprehensive study of nationalist Russian think tanks.[41] She examines the formation of different ideological wings and political clubs within the ruling 'United Russia' party since 2005 and discusses various conservative-nationalist institutions, groups and discussion platforms. Laruelle shows how the presidential administration after the Duma elections in winter 2007 sought to bring the diversity of opinions under control by nurturing ideological groups. By 2008, she argues, three discussion clubs inside United Russia had been established: the Club of 4th November, the Center for Social Conservative Policy, and the State Patriotic Club. In her opinion, they "form a supple conglomerate with permeable borders, a continuum in which personal relations and strategies of cooptation make it possible to get near to the leadership circles of United Russia".[42] Laruelle thus exposes many connections between nationalist think tanks and the Kremlin that are little known, particularly with the Department of Domestic Policy of the Presidential Administration. Her excellent overview, however, does not specifically focus on foreign policy. Moreover, she also uses the term 'think tank' quite loosely to include almost any kind of organization that is not a political party – including sociological survey institutes, ideological think tanks private consultancy and public policy centers – without offering any theoretical justification.

1.4 Schools of Thought

While conceptually sound empirical studies of experts and think tanks in Russian foreign and security policy are thus virtually non-existent, these actors sometimes appear instead in the context of analyses of Russian elite debates. Here most

[39] Vendil Pallin and Oxenstierna, "Russian Think Tanks and Soft Power," 23.
[40] ibid. 27.
[41] Marlene Laruelle, "Inside and Around the Kremlin's Black Box: The New Nationalist Think Tanks in Russia", Stockholm Paper, Institute for Security & Development Policy (October 2009), accessed Jan. 30, 2019, http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2009_laruelle_inside-and-around-the-kremlins-black-box.pdf.
[42] ibid. 68.

scholars apply the concept of 'schools of thought' as it has been introduced by Andrei Tsygankov. In an early article he builds on Martin Wight's distinction of theoretical traditions in international relations scholarship[43] to distinguish between three 'schools' dominant in Russia in the 1990s: 'international institutionalists', realists' ('balance-of-power' school), and 'revolutionary expansionists'.[44] Later he replaced these labels with social groups: 'liberals', 'social democrats', 'statists', and 'neo-communists',[45] eventually developing a five-school typology that splits the neo-communist category into 'civilizationalists' and 'eurasianists'/'expansionists'.[46] In more recent publications, however, he returns to Wight's triad by speaking of 'westernizers', 'statists', and 'civilizationalists'.[47] Following Tsygankov, various scholars, both Russian and Western, have developed different typologies, ranging from three to six schools. The most prominent version, however, remains the triad. For example, Donaldson, Nogee and Vidya Nadkami speak of 'westernizing' (or 'Atlanticist'), 'pragmatic nationalist' (or 'eurasianist') and 'fundamental nationalist' orientations.[48] Andrew Kuchins and Igor Zevelev introduce 'pro-Western liberals', 'great power balancers', and 'nationalists'.[49] A slightly different conceptualization is provided by Gvosdev and Marsh who draw on the work of both Tsygankov and White. In addition to 'westernizers' and 'nationalists'/'eurasianists', they also introduce 'sinophiles', 'pragmatic easternizers' and 'penultimate pragmatists' without any clear ideational preferences.[50]

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[43] Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1992).
[44] Andrei Tsygankov, "From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia," *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (November 1997): 247-268.
[45] Andrei Tsygankov, "Rediscovering National Interests after the "End of History": Fukuyama, Russian Intellectuals, and a Post-Cold War Order," *International Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 2002): 429. See also Andrei P. Tsygankov, "The Irony of Western Ideas in a Multicultural World: Russians' Intellectual Engagement with the "End of History" and "Clash of Civilizations"," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 2003): 56-7.
[46] Andrei P. Tsygankov, "Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia's Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet Break-up," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 2003): 106. See also Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Whose World Order? Russia's Perception of American Ideas After the Cold War* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 2004), 45.
[47] Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Rowman & Littlefield: Landham, [2006] 2016): 4-8.
[48] Donaldson, Nogee, and Nadkami, *The Foreign Policy of Russia. Changing Systems, Enduring Interests*, 119.
[49] Andrew C. Kuchins, and Igor A. Zevelev, "Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 35, no 1, (Winter 2012): 148; Andrew C. Kuchins, and Igor A. Zevelev, "Russia's Contested National Identity and Foreign Policy", in *Worldviews of aspiring powers: domestic foreign policy debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia*, ed. Heny R. Nau and Ollapally, Deepa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 183.
[50] Gvosdev and Marsh, *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors*, 57.

As indicated above, this schools-of-thought approach is primarily concerned with the content of Russian foreign policy debate, presenting the full range of existing views across the political spectrum. Although helpful in the study of political discourse, Lo correctly notes that this form of categorization provides an insufficient account of changing allegiances. Furthermore, he argues that "[l]abels are also highly normative, and often reflect the commentator's biases as much, if not more so, than those of the subject."[51] Most scholars who use the concept are aware of this problem, however. Kuchins and Zevelev, for example, argue that

> some schools of thought might include features of other perspectives, and some subgroups within different schools of thought might serve as the basis for intellectual and political coalition-building on concrete foreign policy issues.[52]

A similar point of view is expressed by Mankoff, who suggests that "[m]any of the most influential foreign policy thinkers and practitioners in Russia do not fit neatly in any of these boxes anyway".[53] Even Tsygankov himself admits that no (Russian) author is a perfect fit, but adds that the ideas expressed in writing are usually more or less in line with one or the other school.[54]

Despite this broad agreement that schools do not correspond well to empirical reality but represent ideal types and heuristic devices,[55] the methodological basis for their construction is rarely spelled out. Tsygankov, for example, simply states that his five ideal types are based on "an examination of what scholars, foreign policy analysts, bureaucrats, and the media are writing about security issues".[56] Similarly, Clunan holds that the content of the national self-images she identifies (including 'westernizers', 'statists', 'neo-communists', 'national-restorationists' and 'slavophiles') "was uncovered through an inductive qualitative analysis of post-1991 elite discourse,

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[51] Lo, *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era*, 167.
[52] Kuchins and Zevelev, "Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change", 148; Kuchins and Zevelev, "Russia's Contested National Identity and Foreign Policy," 185.
[53] Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 65.
[54] Andrei Tsygankov, "From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia," 249.
[55] Anne L. Clunan, *The Social Construction of Russia's Resurgence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press University Press, 2009), 226; Gvosdev and Marsh, *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors*, 57; Kuchins and Zevelev, "Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change," 148; Kuchins and Zevelev, "Russia's Contested National Identity and Foreign Policy," 185; Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy*, 64-65.
[56] Tsygankov, *Whose World Order? Russia's Perception of American Ideas After the Cold War*, 44-45.

political party platforms, and political movement manifestos".[57] The methodological discussion in the appendix to her study merely acknowledges the use of a "variety of scholarly and journalistic media of differing ideological persuasions", yielding a text corpus of more than one thousand elite statements between 1991 and 2004. Kuchins and Zevelev assign entire research centers, parties, political movements and non-governmental organizations to specific schools. For example, the Carnegie Moscow Center and INSOR as well as several institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, such IMEMO and ISKRAN, are said to represent the school of 'pro-Western Liberals'. By contrast, SVOP, various clubs of the party 'United Russia' and MGIMO are at least partially qualified as 'great power balancers'. In turn, several unnamed "independent intellectuals" and the Institute for the CIS countries founded by Konstantin Zatulin are counted as representatives of the 'nationalist' school.[58] The logic and method behind this attribution, however, remains unclear. Kuchins and Zevelev simply claim that the analysis of foreign policy views and programs leads to this conclusion.[59]

At this point, Laruelle makes an important observation: despite the frequent use of the term 'school', most authors never define its exact meaning and usage.[60] Tsygankov at one point calls the school an "idea-based community",[61] and with reference to geo-political thinking he speaks about four distinct groups that can be identified within the Eurasian movement.[62] However, it remains unclear whether his ideal-types, at least vaguely, correspond to sociological groups that, for example, share outreach platforms, strategies and social networks,[63] or merely presuppose a common ideational outlook without any organizational capacity. After all, while social bonds often follow or emerge from already existing (ideological) similarities, such links are not a given nor do they flow only in just one direction. The meaning of the term "community", in other words, remains unspecified. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that some authors seem to equate social science discourse and academic

[57] Clunan, *The Social Construction of Russia's Resurgence*, 60.
[58] Kuchins and Zevelev, "Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change," 149; Kuchins and Zevelev, "Russia's Contested National Identity and Foreign Policy," 185.
[59] ibid. 148, 184.
[60] Laruelle, "Inside and Around the Kremlin's Black Box," 89.
[61] Tsygankov, "Contested Identity and Foreign Policy: Interpreting Russia's International Choices," 25.
[62] Tsygankov, "Mastering space in Eurasia," 106.
[63] Laruelle, "Inside and Around the Kremlin's Black Box," 89.

traditions in thinking about international relations with policy debate and ideologies of foreign-policy makers. Political frames are taken *as if* they were direct expressions of theoretical arguments, while the different social positions of speakers and the varying political status of practices are not examined.[64]

Laruelle, by contrast, emphasizes that the difference between policy and discourse is key, because those who speak about foreign policy in public are not necessarily those who participate in actual decision-making.[65] Based on this critique, she argues that the so-called 'nationalist school' is, in fact, no school at all, if by this term one understands an identifiable group of decision-makers. It is a narrative *about* foreign policy present in public space that is, however, far removed from foreign policy practices.[66] Her distinction between narratives of foreign policy and foreign policy practices therefore re-introduces a social dimension to the study of foreign policy discourse that the schools-of-thought approach ignores.

1.5 Research Questions

The present thesis is concerned with precisely this social dimension as its central issue. More specifically, against the background of the above discussion, it seeks to answer the following research questions:

a) How can we make sense of the *multiplication* of experts and expert organizations in the field of post-Soviet foreign and security policy?
b) How can we make sense of the *social differentiation* of Russian experts and think tanks in the issue area of foreign and security policy?

In answering these questions, this study aspires to provide a detailed institutional history rather than a causal analysis. It provides the first comprehensive analysis of what we may consider the *field of foreign and security policy experts and expert organisations in post-Soviet Russia*.

[64] A different opinion, with which I agree, is presented by Kuchins and Zevelev who argue that "Russian foreign policy debate is rooted in the discussion of IR theory but has its own purposes, structure, and dynamic", see Kuchins and Zevelev, "Russia's Contested National Identity and Foreign Policy, " 203.
[65] Laruelle, "Inside and Around the Kremlin's Black Box," 89.
[66] ibid. 89.

1.6 Thesis Structure

To develop this analytical historical account, the thesis is structured as follows.

Chapter 2 introduces the conceptual framework. I first discuss concepts that other authors have used to make sense of experts and think tanks broadly speaking, arguing that we should move away from essentialised notions of intellectual agency that *a priori* privilege certain attributes as they render important practices and their empirical consequences invisible. With an eye to my empirical case I argue that we need to promote a field-theoretical perspective that allows us to understand the temporal and spatial dynamics of constituting experts' social position within a system of relations. I draw on the writings of Pierre Bourdieu to develop this perspective, focusing in particular on his notions of 'field' and 'capital' and how they have been applied in foreign policy analysis and security studies to date. I argue that Bourdieu's expectations about social closure and the relative autonomy of fields must be relaxed in order to account for dynamic practices of knowledge production in foreign and security policy (2.1). In section 2.2 I do this by taking recourse to Gil Eyal's idea of 'spaces between fields' to suggest that the field of foreign and security policy experts stretches across different professions and institutionalized practices, covering politics, media, academia, business and the military. Finally, I discuss ways of capturing the social position of experts within the field by expanding Bourdieu's conceptual apparatus (2.3). Here I argue that the field of experts is sub-ordinated to the state and the public as two meta-fields, whose constitution and mutual relations determine the movement of agents. In the first case, the main resource available to experts is political capital defined as institutionalized proximity to state organs. In the second case, experts need media capital in the form of publications and citations in the press in order to be visible. Both elements are essential for generating expert authority.

Equipped with this conceptual inventory, chapter 3 discusses the three different types of data that I draw on to study the field of Russian foreign and security policy experts empirically. The first part (3.1) details the quantitative dataset which I have compiled based on a directory provided by RIAC. Reflecting on previous attempts to collect information about Russian foreign and security policy experts and having identified gaps in the RIAC directory, I explain my own process of data preparation and present a number of descriptive statistics about the 1,055 experts included in my dataset. The

second part (3.2) I operationalize political capital and media capital as introduced in chapter 2 by capturing individuals' membership in state expert councils as well as their (and their associated institutions') number of publications and references in Russian federal newspapers, the latter of which can be found in the UDB-COM database provided by East View information services. In the third part (3.3), I present expert interviews as an empirical method to study fields of practice and highlight common obstacles within a post-Soviet Russian context. I report on my interview strategy, overall results and the challenges I encountered during the interviewing process.

Chapter 4 is the first of three empirically analytical chapters. It examines the life stories of five experts *as* experts (i.e., translators of social knowledge between fields). Four of them belong to the generation of Soviet baby boomers, whereas one represents the last Soviet generation. As young researchers at the institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the late 1980s, the former transitioned from their status of 'pure academics' to that of 'experts' in the early post-Soviet period, shaped by the increasing openness and transparency under Gorbachev's rule, by using their cultural capital as a political resource in the nascent public sphere and joining political elite networks. While Andrej Kortunov, the current Director General of RIAC, left his research career (at least partially) behind to dedicate himself to the rescue of Russian social sciences from collapse following the end of the Soviet Union (4.1), former East Asian Studies specialist Aleksej Bogaturov spent the 1990s and 2000s becoming Russia's most prominent IR theorist and teacher of the next expert generation of scholars (4.2). Aleksej Arbatov (4.3), a policy entrepreneur from IMEMO, was active in post-Soviet Russian politics for ten years, but has since returned to academia and remains Russia's most authoritative arms control specialist. Vâčeslav Nikonov (4.4) abandoned his promising career as a historian already in the late Soviet Union and engaged actively in advisory work and campaigning for political parties, thereby illustrating opportunities for translating between the political and the academic field. Fedor Luk'ânov (4.5), a journalist by education and profession, has become an eminent foreign policy commentator and currently chairs SVOP. Considerably younger than the other four experts, life story illustrates how a late transformation of capital in post-Soviet Russia leads to expert status. With the help of the analysis of

these experts' movements across established fields, it is possible to illustrate how novel social spaces are produced.

Chapter 5 moves from the level of individuals to the analysis of expert organizations, i.e., think tanks. Here I break new empirical ground by scrutinizing the history and membership development of the most prominent Russian network of foreign policy experts: the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP). Founded in early 1992, SVOP represents an expert institution of the transition period that functioned as an early meeting point for post-Soviet Russian political elites with different ideological and professional backgrounds (5.1). I argue that in parallel with the development of the Russian polity over the last 25 years, SVOP has changed its organizational posture and position within the field. Whereas during the 1990s it was at times an efficacious platform for policy development due to it having members who held political office (5.2), it has increasingly moved towards the public sphere since the early 2000s (5.3). This evolution highlights one of the dilemmas of expert institutions: by becoming a more autonomous societal actor, SVOP has lost much of its former political influence (political capital), although its public visibility (media capital) has increased.

The final empirical chapter 6 presents an overview of the current landscape of foreign policy think tanks in Russia. I argue that rather than competing directly against each other within one field, such organizations exist in various institutional forms, pursue different agendas, and claim distinct spaces that address different audiences; these different positions correspond to their specific combination of media and political capital. I first (6.1) discuss the present position of three academic organizations that were established in the Soviet Union and struggled to replace the void that was left by the collapse of the state, with different results: the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the Institute for the USA and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN), and the Institute for International Studies (IMI) at MGIMO. The second part (6.2) consider four organizations that dominantly evolved in the 1990s on the initiative of private policy entrepreneurs and with the support of foreign sponsorship, which has been stigmatized by recent legislation, making alternative funding sources necessary: the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, the Center for Political Research in Russia (PIR-Center), the

Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), and the Center for Energy and Security (CENESS). Section 6.3, finally, presents state-sponsored foreign policy think tanks created since 2007 to support Russia's growing political ambitions and economic potential. It shows how this sponsorship is driven by different factions within the Russian state administration that compete with each other over whether domestic modernization conflicts (Institute for Contemporary Development (INSOR), Center for Strategic Research (CSR)) or the concept of Russia as a great power (Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI)) should take primacy. I also introduce state-sponsored international outreach platforms promoted with the aim of consolidating the expert community: the Valdai Discussion Club and (picking up on the discussion in chapter 3) RIAC.

The concluding chapter 7 summarizes the theoretical and empirical findings of this research and, more importantly, discusses the contribution they make to the study of the field of foreign and security experts and expert organizations, both in Russia and more broadly. It also identifies the thesis' limitations, and presents avenues for further research on the topic, in particular as regards opportunities for bringing the conceptual and empirical approaches presented here even closer together.

2 Towards a Relational Understanding of Foreign Policy Experts

> All men are intellectuals, […] but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals.[1]

In this chapter, I argue that foreign policy experts and think tanks need to be studied not as mere producers of privileged forms of knowledge, but through the lens of social relations. I thereby suggest moving away from essentialized concepts of intellectual agency that *a priori* privilege certain attributes, because they render important practices and their empirical consequences invisible. Instead, I propose a field-theoretical perspective that allows us to understand the temporal and spatial dynamics of constituting experts' social position. Such an approach is particularly important in the context of Russian foreign policy, given the minor role of formal institutions and the primacy of informal political practices.

I will develop this argument as follows. Section 2.1 critically engages with the academic literature on experts, intellectuals and think tanks. I criticize approaches that determine agency in terms of specific forms of knowledge and/or the accomplishment of tasks. Instead, I suggest that the terms 'expert' and 'intellectual' refer to multidimensional social roles. Similarly, I hold that think tanks, rather than forming bounded organizations, should be seen as "platforms, composed of many individuals who have multiple affiliations and multiple ideas".[2] They are nodal points of interpersonal networks. I conceptualize this approach by applying Pierre Bourdieu's concept of social fields, which allows to embed the protagonists of intellectual work within a relational system.

Section 2.2 develops this notion of 'experts between social fields' in the context of Critical Security Studies, where the social position of security analysts has been at the center of the debate. Although the literature develops a powerful theoretical critique of traditional approaches based on pragmatist social theory, its conclusions remain empirically underspecified. To fill this research gap, section 2.3 elaborates on

[1] Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (ed.), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (Lawrence & Wishart: London, 1971), 140.
[2] David Cadier and Monika Sus, "Think Tank Involvement in Foreign Policymaking in the Czech Republic and Poland," *The International Spectator*, Vol. 52, no. 1 (2017): 119.

the conceptual instruments that can be used to capture the position of foreign policy experts within social spaces. I introduce two specific forms of expert resources, political and media capital, and discuss how these can be defined in the context of studying the field of Russian foreign policy experts.

2.1 From Essentialist Concepts to Relational Positions

At the core of the argument in this subsection is the observation that most definitions of intellectual work and its protagonists are based on arbitrary decisions that take for granted what must be explained, namely how social boundaries come into existence through constant production and re-negotiation. When it comes to the production and legitimization of social science knowledge, this negotiation of boundaries between authoritative and non-authoritative social positions is particularly striking. Drezner, for example, raises the question why economists, in contrast to political scientists, have been able to speak with scientific authority on matters of public policy, even if their predictions and analyses turn out to be wrong or misleading.[3] In his view, the explanation rests on two interrelated elements: different perceptions of agency among citizens, and the attitude and style of economists that resonates with what Drezner terms the "ideas industry".[4]

Whereas economists convey the impression of science with all its symbolic profits of disinterestedness and truth-seeking, political scientists are merely perceived as 'public intellectuals'. The ideas industry, in turn, provides advantages to those who display confidence in the rightness of their ideas. Economists' normative consensus on methods and free markets is able to gain support from the new class of plutocrats that provide essential funding. Drezner's approach hints at the minor role that analytical tools and professional knowledge play in public recognition of epistemic authority. Instead, it highlights the importance of relational positions within a totality of relevant agents for the generation of intellectual roles.

[3] Daniel W. Drezner, *The Ideas Industry* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 112-115. Kindle.
[4] ibid. 10. According to Drezner the ideas industry, in contrast to the market place of ideas, rewards primarily speed, loudness and bold proposals, even if they are wrong.

2.1.1 Intellectuals: Speaking Truth to Power or Mediating Knowledge?

The concept of 'intellectuals' constitutes an entire subfield in sociology, and the various attempts at finding an agreeable definition have produced a voluminous and extensive literature. In his prison letters from 1947, Antonio Gramsci notes that "all men are intellectuals […] but not all men have in society the *function* of intellectuals.[5] By this he means that the criterion of distinction between intellectuals and other social groups cannot be found in the intrinsic nature of specific activities, but rather "in the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities […] have their place".[6] This already points to an important insight, namely that one *is* not simply an intellectual' (although everyone has an intellect), but that this function is *ascribed* to them by others.

Indeed, in the Western European tradition the term 'intellectual' often depicts a social figure that stands in opposition to the state. This understanding goes back to the Dreyfus-Affair in France in the late 1890s when writers and journalists, following the initiative of Emil Zola, united to publicly oppose the sentence of Jewish artillery officer Alfred Dreyfus, who had been convicted of treason. In this context, the owner and editor of the French newspaper *L'Aurore*, Georges Clemenceau, who himself published hundreds of articles on the trial and later became French Prime Minister, coined the term *les intellectuels.* Denoting the leaders of the group that supported Dreyfus, it gained widespread acceptance as referring to critics of political authority and those who employ their knowledge to fight societal injustices.

This normative viewpoint, which depicts intellectuals as agents that "speak the truth to power",[7] resonates with debates about the political role of intellectuals (*intelligenciâ*) in Russian society. Here the *intelligenciâ* as a group is located in-between the people and the rulers. Seen as an avantgarde advocating political modernization, it comes into conflict with statehood interested in the preservation of the *status quo*. Thus, the Russian state with its authoritarian tradition becomes the natural opponent against which the *intelligenciâ* develops its own distinct subculture.[8]

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[5] Hoare and Smith (ed.), Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 9, emphasis added.
[6] ibid. 9.
[7] Jerome Karabel, "Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics," *Theory and Society*, Vol. 25, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 205.
[8] Vladimir Slapentokh, *Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power. The Post-Stalin Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 4.

At the same time, the high level of political centralization limits legitimate forms of intellectual activity, so that "intellectuals must cooperate with, and accept the roles imposed on them by, the state".[9]

This state-dependency of (true) intellectual activity, however, has been challenged by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Rather than being a historical success, the collapse of the state deprived the *intelligenciâ* of its main reference object. In consequence, the identity of intellectuals, once united by common opposition to Soviet power, split into various ideological fragments and social clusters. In addition, the increasing economic hardship devaluated the power of ideas as resources. Documents that had been classified or were only accessible to a selected minority in specific reading rooms (*spezkran*), including foreign newspapers and academic literature, became freely available. Where the state had once provided modest but stable incomes, economic markets established strict rules of supply and demand. In total, state collapse thus posed the question if the *intelligenciâ* existed in post-Soviet Russia as a group or even class at all.[10]

The realist tradition within the sociological literature on intellectuals focuses on this changing historical role of intellectuals itself, rather than conceptual unambiguity. Dissatisfied with normative overtones, these scholars inquire about the empirical position of intellectual agency within social structures. Some authors attempt to define intellectuals explicitly as agents of social change who are either 'class-bound' or 'class-less'. In the first case, which has received considerable attention in particular in the study of Eastern Europe, including Russia, classical elite theorists argue that, given the absence of progressive elites in economically underdeveloped societies, intellectuals may come to form the governing class.[11] The second case builds on an idea initially formulated by Karl Mannheim and defines intellectuals as partially independent from the economic structure in society. Intellectuals would promote "universal values as opposed to particular interests or power".[12] Both approaches,

[9] Slapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power, 4.
[10] Quintin Barnes, "Today's Russian Intelligentsia: A New Role in the Post-Soviet Political Order," *Elements*, Vol. 5 No. 2 (2009); Serguei Oushakine, "Introduction. Wither the Intelligentsia: The End of the Moral Elite in Eastern Europe," *Studies in East European Thought*, 61 (2009): 243-248.
[11] Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (New York, the Seabury Press, 1979); George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979).
[12] Gil Eyal and Larissa Buchholtz, "From the Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of Interventions," *Annu. Rev. Sociol*., 36 (2010): 122.

however, remain to some extent entangled in the dilemma of demarcation, because they adhere to conceptual ideal types with essentialised attributes.

The same applies to recent discussions of experts as the 'intellectuals of knowledge society'. Grundmann and Stehr, for example, hold that intellectuals mostly possess general knowledge, whereas experts are defined by reference to specialized knowledge. Following Shils, they argue that intellectuals express themselves frequently with the help of general symbols and abstract references.[13] According to the authors, this style of cognitive behavior is determined by intellectuals' function: the construction and development of 'culture'. Moreover, drawing on Merton's characterization of the social role of intellectuals in bureaucracies, Grundmann and Stehr identify an active element characteristic of intellectual practices: 'genuine' intellectuals produce novel, original knowledge, whereas experts merely pass on knowledge and function as transmission belts for communicating existing ideas. Although Grundmann and Stehr do claim that there is an active element in the process of transmission, they hold that experts' main role is that of "mediators between producers of knowledge and users of knowledge".[14]

Bauman's work shows how this conceptual difference between intellectuals as knowledge producers and experts as knowledge mediators acquires significance on a societal level by signaling the transition from the industrial age to knowledge societies. Bauman proceeds from the idea that the modern and postmodern experiences of the world are fundamentally different and correspond to two types of intellectual work: legislation and translation.[15] In the modern world view, both social order and epistemological truth are possible and theoretically reachable goals of human conduct. Claims to knowledge are decided based on rational examination of arguments. In this context, intellectuals, due to their superior knowledge, provide authoritative de- and prescriptions. By contrast, the post-modern experience, which consists in the multiplication of worldviews and a growing awareness of the impossibility of absolute certainty based on rational thought, requires translation work

[13] Reiner Grundmann and Niko Stehr, *Experts. The knowledge and power of expertise* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 29. Kindle; Edward Albert Shils, *The Concept and Function of Ideology* (New York: Crowell Collier and Macmillan, 1968), 399-400.
[14] Grundmann and Stehr, *Experts. The knowledge and power of expertise*, 40. Kindle.
[15] Zygmunt Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters. On Modernity, Post-modernity and Intellectuals* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).

between different community-based traditions of knowledge, all of which are deemed legitimate.

Bauman's notions of mediation and translation as genuine intellectual work are a theoretical advancement that leads back to theoretical approaches that place intellectuals, as Brym puts it, within a "web of shifting group affiliations".[16] Brym builds upon the insight by Gramsci, noted at the beginning, that intellectuals exist within networks of social relations. He argues that the ideologies and political allegiances intellectuals enjoy need to be explained with reference to their "education, employment, and political involvement they face during their careers.[17]

Bourdieu's Field Theory

Pierre Bourdieu's sociology presents a promising starting point for developing this conceptual approach further, because it presupposes a relational ontology of the social world. It suggests that individual and institutionalised agents, equipped with various forms of resources, occupy positions which are defined in reference to a holistic field of interaction.

Bourdieu originally develops his concept of such fields in discussing the emergence of intellectuals as social types. In his account, 19th century writers and artists were able to establish their own rules of production by reversing the economic order: The 'pure artist' dismissed all claims to commercial interests and suspended the economic logic, by which the value of literary and art work was subject to market forces. Far from being idealistic, this move to 'purity' confronted economic with cultural and symbolic profits. Taking the Dreyfus Affair as an iconic example, Bourdieu suggests that the writer Emil Zola "needed to escape the discredit to which he was exposed by his successful sales".[18] Thus, his letter in support of Dreyfus converted the negative and vulgar meaning of his commercial success into an asset by extending into politics the very value of independence characteristic of the nascent arts field. By this move, Zola asserted himself, as Bourdieu says, against the specific norms of politics, which

[16] Robert J. Brym, "The Sociology of Intellectuals," in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, ed. James D. Wright (Elsevier: Oxford, 2015), 279.
[17] ibid. 279. See also Robert J. Brym, *Intellectuals and Politics* (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1980), 14.
[18] Pierre Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art. Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 129.

consist in the "reasons of state" or, [19] one might add, the reason of the state. In consequence, Zola established for himself a social space that, at least to some degree, acquired autonomy from external forces.

This story both historicizes the moralist notion of intellectuals as agents who are 'speaking truth to power' *and* points to the importance of social context for identifying intellectuals. It highlights that the terms 'intellectual' and 'expert' cannot be defined by reference to essential attributes, but derive their meaning both as concepts and empirical types from their position within a network of relations. Yet, as I will argue, the notion of autonomy needs to be qualified, especially when it comes to foreign policy experts.

2.1.2 The IR Perspective: Academic Theorists and Political Practitioners

Echoing the sociological debate about intellectuals, students of International Relations and Public Policy Analysis question the relationship between academic theorists and political practitioners. In IR, these two groups of agents are predominantly seen as adhering to fundamentally different practices in terms of how they use theories, their modes of reasoning, and the amount of time they have at their disposal. Likewise, in Public Policy Analysis scholars see them as two separate communities that "live in *separate worlds* with different and often conflicting values, different reward systems and different languages".[20]

This two-community approach implicitly builds on an idealized model of scientific-academic practice. It takes a version of the natural sciences and its relation to policy-making as its point of reference. According to this model, scientific practice *first* produces rational and valid truth-claims about cause-effect relations under the conditions of the laboratory, which *subsequently* form the foundation for rational political decision-making. This view is flawed for several reasons.

First, the underlying concept of science does not fit the empirical practices of scientists. This is especially important in the case of the social sciences where the

[19] Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, 129.
[20] Nathan Caplan, "The Two-Communities Theory and Knowledge Utilization," *American Behavioral Scientist,* Vol. 22, no. 3 (1979): 459, emphasis added; See also William N. Dunn, "The Two-Communities Metaphor and Models of Knowledge Use: An Exploratory Case Survey," *Science Communication*, Vol. 1, no. 4 (1980).

ontology of societal phenomena determines epistemological practices. That is, the sheer complexity of social life creates a "considerable degree of indeterminacy in the social scientist's finding".[21] In consequence, truth-claims made by social scientists are inherently contestable, particularly because in late modernity social science knowledge has become an integral part of everyday life.[22]

Second, the focus on rational claims about cause-effect relations produced by the academic scholar obscures the existence of other forms of knowledge and their importance in political life. 'Knowing-how' and tacit forms of knowledge instead of simply 'knowing-that' are important to both the professional academic and the citizen. By contrast, in the 'trickle-down model' of the relation between theory and policy,[23] the abstract but 'true' knowledge produced by scholars is axiomatically opposed to the action-oriented view of the practitioner. The result is a gap between academia and policy-making that needs to be bridged.

Since the emergence of constructivism as a full-fledged meta-theory in IR, scholars have started to explore boundary arrangements between science/academia and politics. Berling and Bueger connect this development to the second and third generation of research on expertise.[24] The second generation shifts the focus from the role and application of technical knowledge in decision-making to political discourse. It asks for the function of experts and "how different processes of expertise produce […] world views and understandings of politics".[25] In this context, the literature on securitization has been most influential, but "the role of actual actors and the authority of different types of agency in international security remain underspecified".[26]

The third generation responds to this gap by focusing on the practices of expertise and their agents. One of the more eminent examples here is the Paris School in

[21] Robert K. Merton, "Role of the Intellectual in Public Bureaucracy," *Social Forces*, Vol. 23. No. 4 (May, 1945): 407.
[22] Ulrich Beck and Wolgang Bonß, "Soziologie und Modernisierung: Zur Ortsbestimmung der Verwendungsforschung," *Soziale Welt*, Vol. 35, no. 4 (1984): 383.
[23] Stephen M. Walt, "The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 8, no. 1 (2005): 25.
[24] Trine Villumsen Berling and Christian Bueger, "Security Expertise: An Introduction," in *Security Expertise. Practice, Power, Responsibility*, ed. Trine Villumsen Berling (New York: Routledge, 2015), 1-18.
[25] ibid. 4.
[26] ibid. 4.

Security Studies associated with Didier Bigo. Bigo shows how the boundary between internal and external security is both transformed and stabilized by security professionals such as policemen and border control officers.[27] He develops this into an analysis of the "governmentality of unease", whereby politicians and professionals but also scholars participate in processes of securitization. Bigo is interested in breaking up everyday practices, bureaucratic routines and institutional competition that form distinct structural positions, rather than examining speech acts.[28]

Unfortunately, Bigo conceptualizes the security professionals as a unitary group. His 'managers of unease', the police, customs, immigration controls and intelligence experts, all "believe and act/react in a similar way."[29] Instead of questioning the foundation of their expert authority, he assumes that as participants of the "field of (in)security" they have the "capacity to claim that they know better than others",[30] which provides them with the status of experts.[31] Although this approach may be justified for his purposes because the professionals are members of the state bureaucracy, authority, as Sending points out, is never simply given, but evolves from "ongoing competition for recognition within social spaces".[32]

I follow Sending in arguing that when studying experts we cannot use analytical tools that *a priori* privilege specific types of actors with ascribed attributes. Instead, we need to shift our ontological position in a way that allows us to study the *relative* positions of agents and the different resources they bring to the table.[33]

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[27] Didier Bigo, "When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe," in *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community*, ed. Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (London/New York: Routledge, 2000), 171-204.
[28] Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political,* 27, Special Issue (2002): 73-74.
[29] ibid. 75.
[30] Didier Bigo, "Globalized (In)Security: The Field and the Ban-Opticon", *in Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11*, ed. Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (London: Routledge, 2008), 27.
[31] ibid. 12.
[32] Ole Jacob Sending, *The Politics of Expertise. Competing for Authority in Global Governance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015), 13.
[33] Sending, *The Politics of Expertise*, 13.

2.1.3 Foreign Policy Think Tanks

The scientific study of think tanks has been plagued by similar problems as the literature on experts and intellectuals in that it also carries an essentialist bias that forestalls an analysis of the constitution of agency and its interrelations within a social context. Although the 'think tank' concept frequently appears in empirical discussions, its definition has spurred much debate and controversy. Stone notes that the concept has become "ubiquitous" but simultaneously "overworked and underspecified". Cadier and Sus speak of think tanks' "blurred agency",[34] while for Medvetz they are "murky objects" that remain conceptually "fuzzy, mutuable and contentious".[35] Rich emphasizes that the institutional boundaries between think tanks and other types of organizations are "frequently amorphous and overlapping".[36] Given these conceptual difficulties, James holds that attempts to define what 'think tanks' are "often degenerate into futile semantics",[37] while McGann – who has been publishing the annual TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Report since 2008 – at one point even tries to evade the problem altogether by claiming that "I know one when I see one".[38]

These considerations notwithstanding, most scholars continue to accept the boundaries of their object of study as self-explanatory. That is, the social fact of the existence of think tanks and the policy expertise carried by them is often simply assumed or settled with reference to an arbitrary definition of some kind. This is reflected in the different conceptions of think tanks and their relationship to policy-making, of which at least four can be identified. First, some scholars regard think tanks as the "intellectual machinery of a closed network of corporate, financial and political elites".[39] Domhoff, for example, views them as "hubs of the complex network that links the corporate community and government", providing the US Council on Foreign Relations as an example.[40] However, the concept of pure co-optation that underlies

[34] Cadier and Sus, "Think Tank Involvement in Foreign Policymaking in the Czech Republic and Poland," 117.
[35] Thomas Medvetz, "Think Tanks as an Emergent Field" (New York: Social Science Research Council, Oct. 2008), 1.
[36] Andrew Rich, *Think Tanks, Public Policy and the Politics of Expertise* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 11.
[37] Simon James, "Review of Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process, by Diane Stone," *Public Administration*, Vol. 76, no. 2 (1998): 409-10.
[38] James McGann, Competition for Dollars, Scholars and Influence in the Public Policy Research Industry (Lanham: University Press of America, 1995), 9.
[39] Thomas Medvetz, *Think Tanks in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 8.
[40] William G Domhoff, "The Council on Foreign Relations and the Grand Area: Case Studies on the Origins of the IMF and the Vietnam War," *Class, Race and Corporate Power*, Vol. 2, no. 1 (2014): 2.

such a definition can neither explain opposition against ruling class interests, nor does it leave space to capture processes of knowledge production.

A second group of scholars who emphasize the plurality of opinions and democratic competition in the US conceptualize think tanks as yet another interest group on the same conceptual level as trade unions, human rights organizations and other non-governmental bodies. However, as Medvetz points out, the exclusive focus on decision-making processes built into such an approach obscures the many indirect ways by which think tanks exert influence.

A third group of researchers acknowledges the presence of think tanks, but generally assumes a quite autonomous role of the state. Hence, in their view, the role of think tanks and that of other non-governmental organizations is minimal to begin with.

The fourth and final group comprises a variety of typological approaches that examine think tanks' structure as organizations. As Abelson states, "scholars in this camp pay particularly close attention to the mandate and resources of think tanks and the many factors that influence the strategic choices they make".[41] Nevertheless, even in this context, the definition of think tanks as organizations has remained somewhat arbitrary as it is based on lists of ideal types. In R. Kent Weaver's pathbreaking account from 1989, for instance, think tanks come in three organizational forms: 'universities without students', 'contract research institutions', and 'advocacy think tanks'.[42]

This classification rests on the differentiation of staff, operational principles and product lines. Whereas 'universities without students' and 'contract research institutions' both value academic credentials and norms of objectivity, they diverge in the output they produce: monographs and articles vs. problem-focused analyses commissioned by state agencies. 'Advocacy think tanks', by contrast, recruit staff with various backgrounds, including from business, journalism and the military, and are deliberately partisan and ideological. Weaver's typology has been applied in several empirical studies, sometimes with a comparative view. Gellner, for example, uses it

[41] Donald E. Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), 50.
[42] R. Kent Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks," *PS: Political Science & Politics,* 22 (3) (1989): 568.

to compare what he calls "agencies of ideas" in Germany and the US.[43] Abelson and Carberry, in turn, compare the waves of think tank development in the USA and Canada, but add 'vanity' or 'legacy-based' think tanks, which are established by current or former office-holders, as a fourth category.[44]

A different kind of typology has been developed by McGann, who asks for the degree of think tanks' dependence on state institutions and, more recently, differentiates between 'political party affiliated', 'government affiliated', 'quasi government affiliated', 'autonomous and independent', 'quasi-independent', and 'university-affiliated' organizations.[45] This constitutes a conceptual advance insofar as the previous insistence on defining think tanks as "independent, non-interest-based, non-profit organizations" has been removed.[46] As I will show in chapter 6, this is particularly important in the Russian context due to the prevalence of the state over society.

Outside the Anglo-American Context

Given the fact that the requirement of "independence or autonomy from the state […] is a particular Anglo-American notion that does not travel well into other cultures",[47] scholars have been moving away from such typology-focused approaches. Stone and Denham, for example, do not take organizational structure as their starting point for offering a definition, but focus on the *functions* of policy research and corresponding sets of *practices.* They argue that there is no clear-cut boundary between organizations as think tanks and other entities. Instead, they hold that *a priori* distinctions such as the one between research institutes and publicity-seeking think

[43] Winand Gellner, *Ideenagenturen für Politik und Öffentlichkeit: Think Tanks in den USA und in Deutschland* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1995).
[44] Donald E. Abelson and Christine M. Carberry, "Following Suit or Falling behind? A Comparative Analysis of Think Tanks in Canada and the United States," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 31, no. 3 (Sept., 1998): 525-555.
[45] In an earlier article James McGann identifies 'academic diversified', 'academic specialized', 'contract'/'consulting', 'advocacy', 'policy enterprise', 'literary agent'/'publishing house', and 'state-based' types of think tanks, See James McGann, "Academics to Ideologues: A Brief History of the Public Policy Research Industry," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 24, no. 4 (December 1992): 733-40.
[46] Rich, Think Tanks, *Public Policy and the Politics of Expertise*, 11.
[47] Diane Stone and Mark Garnett, "Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Governance", in *Think Tanks across Nations: A Comparative Approach*, ed. Diane Stone, Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 3.

tanks set up a “false ontological divide between knowledge and power that denies the inherently political nature of research”.[48]

Medvetz, too, shifts the focus away from a list of predefined properties and towards the social conditions that shape the creation of think tank. He sees ‘think tanks’ enmeshed within the overlapping areas of the political field, the media field and the economic field. They are “constitutively hybrid organizations” in that they combine elements of all of these.[49] Studying the United States, Medvetz argues that the think tank label requires a set of complex *performances,* which credibly attest to the institutional independence, while *also* reaping symbolic profits from their association with these more established institutions.

Another issue with the think tank literature in relation to the study of Russian foreign policy think tanks is its overt US-focus. This can be explained with reference to how think tanks both as an institution and as a concept emerged historically. While organizations systematically engaged in policy studies but formally external to government agencies date back to the progressive era in 19th century America, the term ‘think tank’ was coined only during the Second World War, where it denoted a secure environment for discussing military plans.[50] According to Medvetz, think tanks resulted from the “formation of a large, segmented machinery of ‘technoscientific reason’ in the United States”.[51]

It is thus unsurprising that comparative studies which move beyond the Anglo-American case encounter considerable challenges in applying the think tank label. Nevertheless, US-based research on think tanks can be useful because it offers an opportunity for comparison. Given the Soviet state’s collapse in 1991, the institutional development of Russian (foreign policy) think tanks could, for example, be compared to the emergence of expert institutions in the interwar period when, according to Medvetz, “America engaged increasingly with the rest of the world” […] and foreign policy became the province of a relatively small, interconnected group of experts”.[52] Such historical periodization highlights the process of increasing institutionalization

[48] Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, *Think Tank Traditions. Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas* (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), 4.
[49] Medvetz, “Think Tanks as an Emergent Field,” 5.
[50] Paul Dickson, *Think Tanks* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 26.
[51] Medvetz, *Think Tanks in America*, 84.
[52] ibid. 78.

over time, which in the 1960s evolved into a tentative space of organizations known as 'think tanks'. As I will show in chapter 6, there has indeed been a historical dynamic in the Russian case, even if not necessarily a linear one.

Foreign Policy Think Tanks

Finally, a major issue that needs to be addressed when studying Russian foreign policy think tanks is that most studies, both conceptual and empirical, focus on organizations engaged in domestic politics issues pertaining to economics, the environment and social issues. By contrast, the study of the "subset of think tanks dealing specifically with international affairs has attracted far less scrutiny".[53] Despite the growing number of historical and comparative studies of single Anglo-American organizations,[54] there is thus still "very little conceptual research on foreign policy think tanks as a category of policy actor".[55] In fact, in most cases even typological discussions characteristic for the general think tank literature have not been integrated into their analysis. In the words of Cadier and Sus, think tanks in the foreign policy process "remain largely unidentified – and often ignored – subjects of analysis".[56]

Among the few available studies, Abelson's analyses of foreign policy think tanks in the US stand out.[57] When it comes to foreign policy think tanks outside of the US context, even fewer studies are available. Many authors identify a lack of publicly accessible data as the core problem. Studying Italy, Longhini, for example, claims that the country's think tanks have been shaped by developments in the United States, but admits that "there is little publicly accessible Italian data on think tanks".[58] Hence, she conducts an in-depth analysis of the largest and most influential organizations through data collection and interviews with the aim to improve the

[53] Priscilla Roberts, "A Century of International Affairs: Think Tanks in Historical Perspective," *International Journal*, Vol. 70, no. 4 (2015): 537.
[54] See for example Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984) and Inderjeet Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
[55] Richard Higgott and Diane Stone, "The Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the USA", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan., 1994): 16.
[56] Cadier and Sus, "Think Tank Involvement in Foreign Policymaking in the Czech Republic and Poland," 117.
[57] Donald E. Abelson, *Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and U. S. Foreign Policy* (Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2006).
[58] Anna Longhini, "Foreign Policy Think tanks in the Italian Political Context: Evolutions and Perspectives," *International Journal*, Vol. 70, no. 4 (2015): 575.

conceptualization of the topic, given the absence of any formal criteria applicable to the Italian context. This inductive approach based on a logic of discovery underpins my own study of Russian think tanks in chapter 6 as well.

Think Tanks as Platforms

In light of this discussion, I suggest that, instead of problematizing the conceptual fuzziness of the 'think tank' concept, it should be embraced as a hermeneutic device to explore the peculiarities of particular empirical contexts, specifically the social and cultural relations among Russian policy expert organizations on an interpersonal level and over time. Rather than trying to solve the problem of demarcation by an authoritative theoretical decision, the ontological questions about the properties and purposes of think tanks, as Medvetz argues, have to be incorporated into the empirical investigation itself.[59] Foreign policy think tanks, as indicated in the introduction to this chapter, should not be treated as unitary actors, but as institutional nodal points that provide a platform for individuals with multiple affiliations and ideas.[60] Such an approach seems to be particularly appropriate with respect to both the Russian case and foreign policy as an issue area because of the low level of institutionalization in Russian society, which yields permeable professional boundaries and leads to the primacy of informal political practices.[61]

2.2 Experts between Social Fields

This section first offers a brief overview of the concept of social fields as developed by Bourdieu. It clarifies the basic theoretical terminology, which guides the subsequent empirical analysis in chapters 4 to 6. I then illustrate how Bourdieu's toolbox has been used in Security Studies and review recent applications in the analysis of security experts. In this context I apply the sociological critique of Gil Eyal and his followers, who have argued that certain practices of knowledge production do not conform to the traditional notion of fields as "highly integrated" and "relatively

[59] Medvez, *Think Tanks in America*.
[60] Cadier and Sus, "Think Tank Involvement in Foreign Policymaking in the Czech Republic and Poland," 119.
[61] Alena Ledeneva*, Can Russia Modernise?: Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Michael Urban, *Cultures of Power in Post-Communist Russia: An Analysis of Elite Political Discourse* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

autonomous". As an alternative, they propose to investigate constellations in which agents have been unable to establish full jurisdiction over knowledge objects. In such interstitial and proto-fields or 'spaces between fields', social struggles intensify because the foundations of intellectual authority remain vulnerable to outside attacks. Foreign policy is a case in point.

2.2.1 Bourdieu's Theory of Social Fields

In Bourdieu's sociology, fields describe differentiated and 'relatively autonomous' social spaces constituted by 'agents' that include individuals, groups and institutions. For Bourdieu, the concept is a research tool whose main function is "to enable the scientific construction of social objects".[62] The notion, first introduced by Bourdieu in his discussion of Max Weber's sociology of religion,[63] is meant to avoid two opposing methodological logics: internalist and externalist explanations.

The internalist logic holds that the essence of social and cultural practices can be studied without reference to the conditions of their production. In other words, the context is not considered to be important for explanation. The externalist logic, in turn, locates the explanandum in those very conditions and only in them, as for example in the economic reductionism of various Marxist accounts of the social world, against which Bourdieu polemicizes. The concept of social fields, by contrast, embodies a *relational* mode of thinking that derives the meaning of social properties from their position in a system of relations, thereby cutting through the internalist-externalist opposition.

Correspondingly, in his discussion of Max Weber's sociology of religion, Bourdieu, instead of defining the religious agents in the form of ideal types, proposes to conceptualize them as relational positions within a structured totality – the *religious field* – "that determines both the form their interactions may assume and the representation they may have of these interactions".[64] It is important here to recognize the distinction Bourdieu makes between the interrelations of agents and their

[62] Pierre Bourdieu, "The Political Field, The Social Science Field and the Journalistic Field." in *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*, ed. Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 30.
[63] Pierre Bourdieu, "Legitimation and Structured Interests in Weber's Sociology of Religion." in *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity*, ed. Sam Whimster and Scott Lash (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).
[64] ibid. 121.

objective positions. For Bourdieu, it is the latter that are crucial for sociological analysis because "they *control* the form that interactions may take and the representations which the agents involved may have of them".[65]

In Bourdieu's view, the social world, then, consists of manifold structured spaces, which are to a varying degree independent of economic and political domination. They are organized around specific types and combinations of resources or capitals. The decisive element of the field concept is the differentiation of positions in accordance with the quantity and form of capital that agents possess, because they create relations of domination and sub-ordination among them. Like in a magnetic field,[66] there are *prima facie* invisible power lines that determine the specific structure of fields at any given moment in time, and distribute the chances of agents' success and failure.

Social fields are arenas of two types of power struggle. On the one hand, agents struggle over the *distribution* of capital within fields with the goal to accumulate the most valued forms of capital. On the other hand, there is a struggle about the ability to define which form of capital is deemed to be a *legitimate* power source in the first place. The latter is about the ability to establish classificatory hierarchies, thereby laying claim to the imposition of a distinct vision of the social world.

In his early writings, Bourdieu typically differentiates between four generic types of capital. Besides economic capital and cultural capital, these include social and symbolic capital. Economic capital in the form of financial assets is dominant and can be institutionalized as property rights. Cultural capital, by contrast, refers to non-financial social assets that come in three different forms: objectified (cultural goods), institutionalized (educational qualifications) and dispositional (behavior and taste). Social capital consists in obligations, which stem from relations to others. More specifically, Bourdieu uses the term to describe the "aggregate of the actual or

[65] Bourdieu, "Legitimation and Structured Interests in Weber's Sociology of Religion," 126, emphasis added.

[66] Social field theory takes inspiration from modern physics, particularly the study of electro-magnetism. In mathematical physics, for example, a field is taken as a region of space, in which the concrete characteristics of each point are a function of the total space-time coordinates. The space between material bodies itself possesses properties or forces which operate upon these bodies. Based on these ideas, Kurt Lewin was among the first social theorist to develop a field theoretical approach to the study of social relations, which conceptualizes the "external influence exerted on people by individual persons or by groups." See Harald Mey, *Field-theory. A study of its application in the social sciences* (New York: Routledge [1972] 2015), 384-385. Kindle.

potential resources, which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition".[67] The volume of social capital possessed by an actor is dependent on both the size of network ties and the amount and types of capital possessed by those with whom one is connected. Finally, symbolic capital signifies a property obtained by other forms of capital if they are misrecognized and, subsequently, naturalized as part of the order of things. In short, it refers to the "degree of accumulated prestige, celebrity or honour",[68] which agents establish when their position in the field is viewed as legitimate by others. According to Swartz, this element is the "most important contribution of Bourdieu's thinking to our understanding of power and domination",[69] because the mechanism helps to explain the tacit and unconscious support of unjust social orders by the dominated classes.

Overall, Bourdieu suggests that agents in social space are distributed according to three dimensions: the overall volume of capital, the structure of capital or the relation of cultural and economic capital, and the respective evolution of both over time. For the structure of fields, the second of these dimensions – the opposition of cultural and economic capital – is most important. Bourdieu develops this logic based on the study of artistic practices in 19th century France, which over time, as he argues, formed a relatively autonomous space of social interaction. In his account, the rise of industrialists and businessmen followed by the concentration of economic capital provided the precondition for the "expansion of the market for cultural goods".[70] The development of the printing press, which was linked to the accumulated wealth of bankers and industrialist, offered young people without fortunes the opportunity to earn a living as journalists. At the same time, careers as artists and writers, which before had been reserved to the nobility or the Parisian bourgeoisie, became accessible to the wider public.[71] In this context, the Bohemian lifestyle developed as a distinct form of living based on a double negation. Directed against both 'bourgeois art' and 'social art', whose products were oriented either towards the market or

[67] Pierre Bourdieu, "The forms of capital", in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. J. Richardson (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986), 241–58.
[68] Randal Johnson, "Editor's Introduction," in *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature by Pierre Bourdieu,* ed. Randal Johnson (Cambridge: Policy Press, 1993), 7.
[69] David Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 48.
[70] Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, 54.
[71] ibid. 54.

designed to support specific political and social causes, it became a novel position expressed by the slogan 'art for art's sake'.

This gesture or movement, which Bourdieu calls a "symbolic revolution",[72] established a degree of autonomy, freeing its protagonists from market forces as they accepted only their own competitors as clients. The figure of the 'pure artist', however, should not be confused with an idealist presupposition. To the contrary, Bourdieu insists that the conditions that constitute the position of art for art's sake are as much subject to economic analysis. The emergence of the art for art's sake posture rearranges the pre-existing relationships between the various producers of cultural goods. The position the 'pure artist' creates for him- or herself confirms at once the 'bourgeois' and the 'bourgeois artist', whose symbolic significance is co-produced by this relationship.

What is exceptional about the 'pure artist', however, is his efficient denial of commercial interests. In his world, the economic logic by which the value of literary and art work is subject to market forces, is suspended. For Bourdieu, the field's growing autonomy has the effect that by the end of the nineteenth century "the hierarchy among genres (and authors) according to specific criteria of peer judgment is almost exactly the inverse of the hierarchy according to commercial success".[73] This reversed economic order confronts economic with symbolic and cultural capital.

2.2.2 The Academic and Political Field in Security Studies

Bourdieu's concept of social fields informs most sociological approaches in Critical Security Studies.[74] The security label is viewed here as an indicator of practices and cultural codes which together create the 'security field'.[75] In contrast to the realist tradition, which presupposes the objective existence of security problems,[76] critical

[72] Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, 81.
[73] ibid. 114.
[74] C.A.S.T. (2006): "Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37(4) (2006): 458.
[75] Trine Villumsen Berling, "Bourdieu, International Relations and European security," *Theory and Society*, Vol. 41 (5) (2012): 460 et seq.; Ole Wæver, Securitization and Desecuritization", in *On Security*, ed. R. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995): 50-51; Michael C. Williams, "The Institutions of Security, Elements of a Theory of Security Organizations", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 32 (3) (1997): 288; Michael C. Williams, *Culture and Security, Symbolic Power and the politics of international security* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 33.
[76] Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 32-3.

scholars study how matters of security are socially constructed by actors equipped with different resources.

There are two basic ways in which Bourdieu's toolbox has been applied in this context. The dominant focus has been on field dynamics and the relative distribution of capital forms over time. Scholars working with this more structuralist notion predominantly want to understand how the end of the Cold War transformed the European "security field". Instead of viewing security and power as external to culture, Bourdieu's sociology allows them to integrate both within a web of symbolic relations. Williams, for example, argues that in the 1990s the configuration of capital forms shifted from an accent on material and military factors towards cultural and symbolic forms of power.[77] In grasping this transformation, he sets out to develop a concept of culture that evades the dual fallacy of reducing it either to a pure instrumental device of rational utility-maximizing agents, or to an all-encompassing structure that constrains free choice and determines identity. Drawing on Bourdieu's conceptual inventory – including field, habitus and capital, as well as power, interests and strategies – Williams suggests that the downgrading of military calculations and the simultaneous appraisal of cultural capital provoked a new set of power relations.[78]

A second strand of the literature focuses on the relationship between science and politics, and examines the role of security analysts. It problematizes their political responsibility in constructing and promoting 'world-making' concepts. Early discussions, however, did not advance beyond the general notion that scholastic practices are always political, insofar as they advocate distinct perspectives.[79] In 1999 Eriksson, for example, argued that academic practices have "unavoidable political consequences", but admitted that "future discussions are necessary to clarify […] why, how, and under what circumstances security analysts are likely to have an impact on political practice".[80] Wæver, at first, completely evaded the question of

[77] Williams, *Culture and Security, Symbolic Power and the politics of international security*, 2, 40.
[78] ibid. 40.
[79] Johan Eriksson, "Observers or Advocates?: On the Political Role of Security Analysts," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34: 3 (1999): 327; Johan Eriksson, "Debating the Politics of Security Studies. Response to Goldmann, Wæver and Williams," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34:3 (1999): 345-352; Kjell Goldmann, "Issues, Not Labels, Please!," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34:3 (1999): 331-333. Ole Wæver, "Securitizing Sectors? Reply to Eriksson." *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34:3 (1999): 334-340; Michael C. Williams, "The Practice of Security: Critical Contributions. Reply to Eriksson," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34:3 (1999): 341-344.
[80] Erikson, "Observers or Advocates?", 327.

security agents' agency beyond the state, assuming that 'speaking security', in general, is an elite task.[81]

In most efforts, the object of study in this second strand of research remained security policy proper, that is, the practices of state representatives broadly speaking. The partial exception to this rule is Didier Bigo, who first introduced the term "security field" as a conceptual device, referring to Bourdieu. As mentioned in the previous section, he does so by scrutinizing the role of liaison officers as new specialists in policing organizations across Europe. In studying the network of different European agencies, he shows how liaison officers contribute to the process of transnationalisation and how the stance of each agent is intelligible only when analyzed in relation to his or her "position within the field of security professionals".[82] More importantly, however, Bigo explicitly perceives the field of security as a knowledge field. As such, the distribution of positions does not primarily depend on cultural and economic capital as identified by Bourdieu, but is related to different types of knowledge that permit certain statements – in this case statements about how to manage threats and unease.[83]

The emphasis on multiple types of (expert) capital has received fresh impetus by writings on the history of Security Studies as an academic discipline. Here several scholars highlight the ambiguous position of Security Studies between theory and practice. Buzan and Hansen, for example, note that in the academic discipline of International Security Studies (ISS) specifically, "the boundary between the academic and the political, the scholar and the advisor, has […] always been a tenuous and debated one".[84] In their attempt to define the limits of ISS as an academic field, they state that it "has been constituted by an ambiguous juggling of the objective detachment of the analytical observer and the passionate ideological commitment of the concerned citizen".[85] Likewise, Wæver suggests that "international security studies as a whole stretches all the way from university based, disciplinary-anchored

[81] Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," In *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 54.
[82] Didier Bigo, "Liaison Officers in Europe: New Officers in the European Security Field" In *Issues in Transnational Policing.* ed. J. W. E. Scheptychki (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 92.
[83] ibid. 87.
[84] Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, 59.
[85] ibid. 62-63.

theorizing over more policy-oriented publications from both universities and think-tanks to non-publication advice".[86]

Over the last decade, the juxtaposition of academia and politics has been at the center of theoretical critique in studies of expertise in foreign and security policy. Inspired by pragmatist social theory, authors problematize the notion of a clear-cut boundary that separates scientists from practitioners. Instead, they argue that the relationship must be understood as a "patchwork of epistemic and political practices".[87] However, if foreign and security policy experts occupy different social fields, the isomorphic weightings of different kinds of capital becomes difficult, precisely because individual practices differ considerably from each other, and as Osborne argues, do not form a field in the Boudieusian sense.[88]

Stefano Guzzini has been the first to call for an institutional analysis of knowledge production on issues of security (and foreign) policy and the application of field theory in this context. In an article from 2003, he suggests that such an analysis needs to examine the "context within which foreign policy experts are socialized and work".[89] Moreover, he argues that an inquiry inspired by Bourdieu's field theory needs to investigate "the existing field of authority in foreign policy and the actual networks (political and academic), as well as their reproduction (or not) over time".[90] Yet, this promise has not been fulfilled. In his own empirical work, Guzzini has instead moved towards the study of foreign policy identity, examining the question of how the end of the Cold War led to a revival of geopolitical thinking as a response to "ontological insecurity".[91]

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[86] Ole Wæver, "Towards a Political Sociology of Security Studies;" *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 41 (6) (2010): 654.
[87] Christian Büger and Frank Gadinger, "Große Gräben, Brücken, Elfenbeintürme und Klöster? Die Wissensgemeinschaft Internationale Beziehungen und die Politik – Eine kulturtheoretische Neubeschreibung," in *Forschung und Beratung in der Wissensgesellschaft: das Feld der internationalen Beziehungen und der Außenpolitik*, ed. Gunther Hellmann (Baden-Baden. Nomos, 2007), 157.
[88] Thomas Osborne, "In defence of security," in *Security Expertise. Practice, power, responsibility*, ed. Trine Villumsen Berling and Christian Bueger (New York: Routledge, 2015), 63.
[89] Stefano Guzzini, "Self-fulfilling geopolitics? Or: the social production of foreign policy expertise in Europe," *DIIS Working Paper*: 23, (2003): 16
[90] ibid.
[91] Stefano Guzzini, "Introduction. The Argument: Geopolitics for Fixing the Coordinates of Foreign Policy Identity," in *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crisis*, (ed.) Stefano Guzzini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3.

The chapter on Russia in his edited volume, authored by Alexander Astrov and Natalia Morozova, focuses, in fact, on the "security imaginary" of the foreign policy expert community, rather than on that community itself, although they briefly comment on the affiliations of Aleksandr Dugin.[92]

Indeed, empirical studies that examine the social positions of expert(s) organizations within the field of security or foreign policy are rare. An exception is Villumsen (Berling), who argues that the shift in the European security field after 1989 brought in new actors, equipped with their own form of capital, particularly scientific knowledge.[93] She follows Bourdieu's definition of scientific capital as a "particular kind of symbolic capital, a capital based on knowledge and recognition".[94] While her critique of approaches that exclusively focus on state actors must we welcomed, there are two shortcomings to the way in which she incorporates scientific agents. These also have some relevance for studying the Russian case.

First, her narrative of how owners of scientific capital receive access to the security field and NATO looks primarily at think tanks, omitting the individual level. This choice, as she explains in a footnote, is deliberate to limit the scope of her work. She notes, however, that "an analysis of the backgrounds of specific individuals would be interesting and contribute to Bourdieusian research in international fields". More concretely, she argues that such a study could

> zoom in on how agents, while sharing the same general background, could be divided into subgroups comprising of people who have mainly received training in military schools in contrast to agents who have been trained in civilian schools.[95]

This observation is particularly relevant for the Russian case because of the permeability of social boundaries. As I will show in chapter 4, the collapse of the Soviet

[92] Alexander Astrov and Natalia Morozova, "Russia: geopolitics from the Heartland," in *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crisis*, (ed.) Stefano Guzzini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 194-195.
[93] Trine Villumsen, Theory as practice and capital. NATO in a Bourdieusian field of security in Europe towards a sociological approach to IR (Ph.d-serien). Copenhagen, PhD Series 2008/4: University of Copenhagen.
[94] Pierre Bourdieu, *Science of Science and Reflexivity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 34, cited in Villumsen, *Theory as practice and capital*, 137.
[95] Villumsen, *Theory as practice and capital*, 152.

Union enabled agents with similar backgrounds to occupy different, yet related positions within the foreign policy expert field.

Second, her conceptualization of cooperate scientific capital agents lacks a degree of differentiation, although she acknowledges a theory-practice divide. Her agents possess scientific capital if they are "recognized as speaking in the name of science – of truth".[96] Because Villumsen focuses on practices and functions of agents with links to the security field, this definition includes various "think tanks, research centers and classical scientific agents (universities)."[97] All of them stand "between scientific and practical knowledge", that is, they neither cherish the production of general theory typical for university-based research, nor do they represent the level of policy- and decision-making.[98] In her empirical discussion, she cites the members of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes – a voluntary cooperation of over 800 defense academies and security studies institutes across 60 states worldwide – and the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program, which provides various kinds of grants to international research groups in NATO member states and partnership countries.,[99] as examples of this type of agents. Yet, she stops short of an analysis of how these institutes and experts were able to join this exclusive network in the first place or whether there are distinctions in power between them. Whose (scientific) capital becomes influential and for what reasons?

Büger and Villumsen's treatment of the "assemblage"[100] of authors who participate in the production of the democratic peace theory as a 'world-making' concept provides another example of insufficient social differentiation. They examine the practices of three major institutionalized agents – US peace researchers, the Clinton Administration, and NATO – to argue that academics *first* established the democratic peace thesis as a fact and *subsequently* "managed to interest politicians in obtaining

[96] Villumsen, *Theory as practice and capital*, 137.
[97] ibid. 147.
[98] ibid. 145-146.
[99] ibid. 202.
[100] Theodore R. Schatzki, *The Site of the Social: A Philosophical Account of the Constitution of Social Life and Change* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 94; See also Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

certainty about [it]".[101] Although the authors indicate that in this process researchers and politicians mobilized each other as resources,[102] the social preconditions for this persuasion process remain unexplored. Instead, the three groups are presented as separate and independent participants of the practice field. This assumption of independence misses an important point about the relationship between science and politics in foreign affairs and security, particularly in the US. In fact, the testimonies of 'politicians' used by Büger and Villumsen to make the case for the influence of the democratic peace thesis on US politics during the Clinton Administration all come from individuals with mixed career patterns between academia and politics, including Strobe Talbott, Anthony Lake, and Joseph J. Kruzel. The concepts produced within academia would have been unable to gain political efficacy, were it not for these mediators. [103]

In order to study the field of foreign policy experts in Russia, it is necessary to go beyond the simple enumeration of individuals and institutions and their treatment as independent agents, that is, the fact of field participation per se. Instead, what needs to be investigated is the concrete place and function of agents, as well as their *relations within* the field. In chapters 5 and 6 I therefore ask how relevant institutions in Russia differ from each other and distinguish those with large amounts of resources from those with smaller stocks of different forms of capital. Focusing on the positions, interaction and power struggles among knowledge-based agents, whether they are academic institutions or not, highlights the uneven playing field, which is at the heart of Bourdieu's sociology. It prevents us from lumping together different groups of

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[101] Christian Büger and Trine Villumsen, "Beyond the gap: relevance, fields of practice and the securitizing consequences of (democratic peace) research," *Journal of International Relations and Development* (2007): 433.

[102] ibid. 433.

[103] Strobe Talbott has been a long-term friend of President Bill Clinton, with whom he studied together at Oxford University. In the 1980s he was the *Time*'s principal correspondent on Soviet-American relations. Following Bill Clinton's election as president in 1993, Talbott was invited into government, where he served as First Deputy Secretary of State. Anthony Lake had been Director of Policy Planning under President Jimmy Carter before becoming Professor of International Relations at Amherst College. He left academia in 1993 after he had been appointed National Security Advisor. Similarly, Joseph J. Kruzel, who is quoted as saying that "democratic peace laid the ground for a proactive policy formulation" (Büger & Villumsen 2007: 434), taught at Duke University and Ohio State University, where he was also the Director of the Program on International Security and Military Affairs. In 1993, Kruzel took a leave of absence from Ohio State to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO policy. See http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jkrunzel.htm and https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1995/08/21/us-officials-robert-frasure-and-joseph-kruzel-die/e1e670ad-e6b0-482c-ae1f-86abdaa32821/?utm_term=.b0ae4c63724d.

agents, which not only obliterates important social differences and similarities, but also obfuscates the causal mechanisms by which ideas produced within the academic realm find their way into the policy process.

In summary, the "hanging together" of academia and foreign and security policy-making is more complicated than a clear-cut theoretical opposition of 'science versus politics' might suggest. The web of relations contains individuals' hybrid career patterns which connect both, and possibly additional, social fields. Despite this level of complexity, I argue that the distribution of agents' social positions can be studied empirically. Before we can do so, however, we must theorize the central knowledge-based figure, who accomplishes such movement across fields: the expert.

2.2.3 Security and Foreign Policy Experts: From Fields to Spaces

In his landmark study *The Disenchantment of the Orient*, the US Sociologist Gil Eyal's tries to understand the transformation of the meaning of the "Orient" in the context of Jewish identity constructions in Israel.[104] In his account, the formation of the Israeli state dissolved the cognitive territory of the "Orient" as a coherent and unified knowledge system to create different and separate jurisdictions. The protagonists of this development were Orient experts, the so-called *mizrahan*, who produced "authoritative discourse" on matters related to the "Orient".[105]

In attempting to define these Orient experts, Eyal noticed something interesting: those who publish about the "Orient" in the official publication of the Israeli Oriental Society, the *Ha-Mizrach Ha-Hadash* (The New Orient), did not share any institutional or academic disciplinary affiliation. A considerable number of authors even lacked both university degrees and an academic position, and many of them were diplomats or journalists. Moreover, Eyal shows that the distribution of professional backgrounds of these authors changed over time. Whereas the number of academic staff increased, that of non-academics, both with and without degrees, declined. Depending on the nature of their acquired knowledge and the structure of the field, they faced different obstacles in gaining access to political decision-makers. Eyal concludes that Orient

[104] Gil Eyal, "Dangerous Liaisons between Military Intelligence and Middle Eastern Studies in Israel," *Theory and Society*, Vol. 31, no. 5 (Oct., 2002): 655 et seqq.; Gil Eyal, *The Disenchantment of the Orient* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 27 et seqq.
[105] Eyal, *The Disenchantment of the Orient*, 3.

experts cannot be defined by reference to a distinct topic or a specific institutional location. Instead, he introduces the notion of *family resemblance* as it has been popularized by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his philosophical analyses.[106]

Wittgenstein himself develops this notion based on a discussion of the concept of games. More specifically, he asks for the elements common to different games, such as board games, card games, ball games, etc. He discovers that the concept cannot be conclusively defined by reference to any one attribute, because games constitute a complicated network of overlapping similarities and differences.[107] In other words, the conceptual boundaries of games are "blurred or fuzzy"[108] as they proceed from a general cultural prototype but always remain open for further extension.

This methodological point is meaningful for empirical sociological analysis, because in the social world systems of classifications are constantly contested as means and outcomes of struggles for power. Enmeshed in social relations, agents strive to establish themselves as representatives of legitimate prototypes. If successful, they secure symbolic profits, which in turn improve their relative position within such relational systems. If we want to understand experts as social positions, we need to inquiry into these kinds of correlated practices by which they identify themselves *and* are recognized as 'experts' by others. Moreover, the constitution of both Orient experts in Israel, as discussed by Eyal, and foreign policy experts in Russia has been entangled with state-building processes – in the latter case the evolution of Russian statehood after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Uncertainty, political upheaval and the transition of power affected discourses and social positions, which transgressed existing boundaries and created new ones.

This multidimensional character of expert practices leads Eyal to adjust the field metaphor.[109] He objects that Bourdieu, despite his relational approach, constantly talks about the economic field, the artistic field, the academic field, the legal field, the literary field etc., and leaves them "in their place as distinct spheres whose contents

[106] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation* (New York: Macmillan, 1958).
[107] ibid.
[108] James W. Davis, *Terms of Inquiry. On the Theory and Practice of Political Science* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005), 34.
[109] Gil Eyal, "Spaces between Fields", in *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis*, ed. Philip S. Gorski (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 158-182. Kindle.

are clearly bounded and well distinguished from one another".[110] The relational point of view stops at the fields' borders.

Again, his empirical example concerns Orient experts in Israel. He asks what happens to the distinction between the academic and the bureaucratic field when former military intelligence officers join academic knowledge production about the Middle East within universities. Eyal suggests that there are modalities of action that occupy these borders between fields, which he imagines not as a fine line but as "thick boundary zones". Although Eyal notes that such zones can provide the basis for the creation of novel fields, their fuzzy nature may also be cultivated and reproduced in order to secure specific profits. There are a couple of empirical studies which have tried to implement this idea.

One of these is McQuade's study of the field of intelligence expertise in relation to so-called 'fusion-centers' established by the US Department of Homeland Security since 2005 to fight counterterrorism.[111] He identifies two basic types of agents who are competing for the right to define intelligence work proper: state policy officers and state homeland security officers (intelligence analysts). Following Eyal's concept, McQuade argues that both "spaces of intelligence expertise" differ in their approach to the mission of the fusion-centers, the objects of intelligence collection and the temporality of the work. McQuade argues that "intelligence experts have little control over the supply of or demand for their expertise". Instead, the kind of political knowledge they produce "is overdetermined by the bureaucratic field".[112]

By the same token, Stampnitzky suggests that "terrorism studies" do not conform to the sociological notions of professions, discipline, or even a bounded intellectual field, such as medicine or law. Although terrorism studies is a thriving discipline, she notes a widespread perception of failure among its protagonists, who lament the poor quality of theory, data and methods. As such, the study of terrorism is "oriented towards multiple arenas […], including academia, the media, and the state".[113] She concludes

[110] Eyal, "Spaces between Fields," 158.
[111] Brendan McQuade, "The Puzzle of Intelligence Expertise: Spaces of Intelligence Analysis and the Production of Political Knowledge," *Qualitative Sociology*, Vol. 39, no 3 (2016): 247-265.
[112] ibid. 261.
[113] Lisa Stampnitzky, "Disciplining an Unruly Field: Terrorism Experts and Theories of Scientific/Intellectual Production," *Qualitative Sociology*, Vol. 34, no. 1 (2011): 3.

that terrorism studies have failed to fulfill the expectations built into sociological theories of scientific and intellectual fields about autonomy and jurisdiction. One indicator for this she finds in the presence of "vastly different sorts of individuals, with varying training and differing institutional bases, who emerge as terrorism experts in different settings".[114] As she states most clearly, "there is no set career path to becoming a terrorism expert, nor is there any recognized credentialing body".[115] In consequence, the field of terrorism studies, according to Stampnitzky, is characterized by a low degree of autonomy, and weak, permeable boundaries, which allow for "a high degree of movement into and out of the space of production".[116]

In a similar manner, Medvetz discusses the various professional roles of think-thank-affiliated experts in the US. He identifies four different tropes that "function […] both as an anchoring metaphor and as a bundle of literal claims about the proper style and manner of a policy expert":[117] the academic scholar, the political aide, the entrepreneur, and the media specialist. In building up their own identity and professional ethos, policy experts combine features of all four of them. For Medvetz, this "dispositional hybridity" is also reflected in the intermediate location of think tanks as institutions in social space, because they simultaneously relate to the worlds of academia, politics, business and media. This particular position and functioning in social space, he argues, also results in the fuzziness of the think tank concept and the difficulties in finding a broadly accepted definition.

Medzihorsky adopts this approach in his discussion of policy experts in Post-Communist Slovakia.[118] He argues that after the downfall of communism intellectuals took on a new social position – the position of the policy expert – strategically located on the intersection of five distinct spheres: politics, business, academy, media *and* the transnational democracy and human rights focused network. Although the latter is introduced with the Slovakian case in mind, it can be generalized to all Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, including Russia, during the transition phase in

[114] Lisa Stampnityky, "Disciplining an Unruly Feld," 6.
[115] ibid. 8.
[116] ibid. 6.
[117] Thomas Medvetz, "'Public Policy is Like Having a Vaudeville Act': Languages of Duty and Difference among Think Tank-Affiliated Policy Experts," *Qualitative Sociology*, Vol. 33, no. 4 (2010): 550.
[118] Juraj Medzihorsky, *A New Grey Zone. Intellectuals Think Tanks and Politics in Post-Communist Slovakia* (Budapest: Central European University, Master Thesis, 2007).

the 1990s. Due to the lack of state financing, Western private and public donor organizations played a significant role in the development of local civil societies. The resulting social space created by the combination of these five factors Medzihorsky calls a “proto-field of think tanks”.

In conclusion, I argue that the practices of experts and think tanks in foreign policy conform more to the idea of spaces than fields. These agents, as I will show, come from different cultural backgrounds and professions. They lack control over their object of knowledge. Yet, this distinct situation is no transhistorical phenomenon. As Andrew Abbott shows with respect to professions, the degree of jurisdiction over an issue area may change over time between different kinds of work within a system.[119] He also notes the importance of the state bureaucracy in shaping professionalization, particularly in continental Europe.[120] Hence, the role of experts can be monopolized by one group that succeeds in controlling knowledge and by its application dominates outsiders, or it can be dispersed between different groups, each of which occupies a certain space between fields. These spaces then function as transmission belts between the specific logics and distinct norms of established fields. They are specific areas of conflict about epistemic authority, where the degree of indeterminacy is high. Controversies evolve around the content of political debates and the social positions of agents, that is, their endowment with specific forms of capital that they bring to the table. Both are negotiated simultaneously. The struggle is about the distribution of present and future opportunities to become recognized, to gain expert authority and exercise the right to speak. At the same time, these struggles are shaped by two external forces whose relationship generates a double-bind for experts: the availability of platforms for intellectual exchange in the public sphere and the constitution of state authority. As I will show in chapters 4 to 6, this feature is characteristic of the Russian field of foreign policy experts.

[119] Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions. An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
[120] ibid. 26-28.

2.3 Capturing Expert Positions: The State and the Public Sphere

In this last section I argue that experts and expert organizations are positioned in relation to the state and the public sphere as two meta-fields. Although Bourdieu conceptualizes the state as the monopolist of the legitimate use of symbolic violence, this aspect remains underexplored in his writings. The same goes for the role played by modern media (TV in the case of Bourdieu), their function within field theory, and the implications for the constitution of expert positions. In this context I suggest using the terms political and media capital, which the literature applies predominantly to candidates for public office. I argue that experts as mediators between fields are exposed to similar social conditions: they receive education and make experiences within established fields of practices, where the accumulation of cultural, economic and symbolic capital over time leads to an improvement of their relative position. These resources are key to gaining access to the state or the public in the first place. Yet, as I will demonstrate in chapters 4 to 6, it is the *volume* of political and media capital that determines which position agents occupy and what type of expert they become.

2.3.1 Political Capital and the State

In Bourdieu's writings, the role of political authority in structuring fields remains surprisingly underspecified. He applies three interrelated terms, whose meaning evolves over time: the political field, the field of power, and the state. The political field denotes the arrangement of political institutions and its prevalent norms and agents (*champ politique*).[121] It refers to the process by which political decisions are made and the institutionalized struggle for power. He uses it, however, also as a synonym for the field of power (*champ du pouvoir*), which acquires a wider metaphorical meaning as "the space of relations of force between agents or between institutions having in common the possession of the capital necessary to occupy the dominant positions in different fields".[122] It implies the struggle between the competing poles of cultural and

[121] Pierre Bourdieu, "Flaubert's Point of View," *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 14, no. 3, *The Sociology of Literature* (Spring, 1988): 545.
[122] Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, 215.

economic capital as the main organizing principles of social differentiation, [123] at least in France.

The emergence of the state as the center of political authority, as Bourdieu and Wacquant argue, "goes hand in hand with the constitution of the field of power".[124] In his definition of the state, elaborated most extensively in *On the State*, Bourdieu broadens Weber's definition of the state as the monopoly of legitimate violence to include the 'monopoly of legitimate physical *and symbolic* violence'.[125] Thus the state turns into a meta-field, which wields meta-capital, that is, "a capital that gives power over other kinds of capital, including economic capital",[126] and defines the very "categories of thought" through which the social world, even the state itself, can be perceived.[127] Bourdieu illustrates this point with reference to an example by Francois Perroux: the holder of a degree in geography wields meta-capital over the publisher of geography books, because the former decides who can publish or not.[128] The state, however, wields such capital "in every domain" and this gives power over other fields in their totality.[129] It is the people that belong to the field of power, so Bourdieu, who "struggle for power over the state, for this capital that gives power over the preservation and reproduction of the different species of capital".[130]

It is important to note that for Bourdieu the modern state emerged from "a process of concentration of different species of capital" [131] that has not yet been concluded. To him, this movement consists in the transformation from the old nobility based on ties of blood, to the new (state) nobility with juridicial education. This "nobility of competence"[132] finds its expression in the appointed officials, who Max Weber

[123] Swartz, *Culture and Power. The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*, 136-138.
[124] Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 114.
[125] Pierre Bourdieu, *On the State* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 346.
[126] ibid. 375.
[127] Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field," *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 12, no. 1 (Mar. 1994): 1.
[128] Pierre Bourdieu, *On the State*, 197.
[129] ibid. 197.
[130] ibid. 198.
[131] ibid. 375.
[132] ibid. 266.

famously described as a bureaucratic ideal type, whose function would be completely disassociated from the person, because domination resides in legal authority.[133]

Bourdieu, by contrast, in explaining the way the state nobility was formed from the upheaval of the French revolution, is interested in "a kind of uncertain state in which agents are precisely mixed with their function."[134] As I will show, in the empirical chapters, this notion of personal rather than bureaucratic power is particularly important for understanding the Russian case and the changing role of (foreign policy) experts within it, given the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the continuous process of state-building ever since.

Overall then, access to the state apparatus provides experts with the opportunity to receive additional symbolic capital and even to partake in the determination of conversion rates of other capital forms within fields. These possible profits associated with either *control of* or *proximity to* the state I call 'political capital'.

In Bourdieu's own work, the concept remains ambiguous. He adopts three different but underdeveloped meanings. In *Distinction*, political capital is identified as the capacity to answer political questions, which, as Bourdieu explains, rests on educational qualifications. More concretely, he speaks of political capital as the "possession of the theoretical and practical knowledge needed to produce political actions and judgements […] especially by the command of political language".[135] Thus, political capital at first appears as a type of cultural capital. However, in an essay he argues that "political capital is a form of symbolic capital […] by which agents confer on a person (or on an object) the very powers that they recognize in him (or it)".[136] Political capital here acquires the meaning of authority (*Herrschaft*) that is rooted in the charisma of agents.[137] Finally, in a lecture delivered in East Berlin in October 1989, which subsequently appeared as an appendix to the essay *Social Space and Symbolic Space,* Bourdieu introduces political capital as a "political type

[133] Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 217-222.
[134] Bourdieu, *On the State*, 329.
[135] Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 408.
[136] Pierre Bourdieu, "Political Representation. Elements for a Theory of the Political Field," in *Language and Symbolic Power*, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 192.
[137] Max Weber, "On Charisma and Institution-Building", in *Selected Papers*, ed. and with an introduction by S.N. Eisenstadt (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 55.

of social capital" that enables its holders to patrimonialize collective resources via membership in networks.[138] Hence, the concept appears simultaneously as a conglomerate of cultural, symbolic and social capital.

The legacy of this ambiguity about the term in Bourdieu's own work can be felt in the academic literature, where it is also applied unevenly and often serves merely as a rhetorical device to describe the degree of popularity enjoyed by politicians and their capacity to mobilize people for electoral success. Thus, it usually incorporates a fuzzy "bundle of personal powers, skills and structural attributes"[139] and remains undertheorized, ill-defined and little understood.[140]

Casey,[141] for example, defines political capital as the "sum of combining other types of capital for purposive political action".[142] She identifies institutional, human, social, economic, cultural, symbolic and moral capital as possible resources that take on a different form once they are applied in the political field. For example, she argues that pure economic capital as an ideal type turns into political capital if it is used to finance campaigning. Similarly, Schugurensky regards political capital as the "capacity to influence political decisions" and proposes five factors that contribute to its accumulation, including knowledge, skills, attitudes, closeness to power, and personal resources.[143] Bennister and Worthy, in turn, equate political capital with

[138] This approach stems from speculations about the application of Bourdieu's sociological model to the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union. For Bourdieu, the master distinction structuring social space in France had been the opposition between economic and cultural capital. In socialist societies, however, the value of economic capital depreciates due to the lack of private ownership of the means of production. Whereas the relative weight of cultural capital increases, the differentiation in "patterns of consumption and lifestyles" is primarily caused by political capital. The latter enables communist party appointees (*nomenklatura*) to acquire economic goods and social services, such as residences, cars and high-quality food or access to hospitals, schools and foreign travel, which were publicly unavailable in centrally planned economies. See Pierre Bourdieu, "Appendix. The 'Soviet' Variant and Political Capital," in *Practical Reason. On the theory of action*, Pierre Bourdieu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 16.
[139] Mark Bennister and Ben Worthy, "Getting It, Spending It, Losing It: Exploring Political Capital," Paper presented at the Political Studies Association Annual Conference (2012): 2.
[140] ibid. 2; See also Kimberly L. Casey, "Defining Political Capital: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu's Interconvertibility Theory," Paper Presented at the Illinois State University Conference for Students of Political Science (April 2008): 2.
[141] Casey incorrectly assigns Bourdieu's definition of political capital as a "political type of social capital" to *Distinction* and fails to notice the different approach in *Social Space and Symbolic Space*. See Casey, "Defining Political Capital: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu's Interconvertibility Theory," 6, fn. 8.
[142] Casey, "Defining Political Capital," 7.
[143] Daniel Schugurensky, "Citizenship Learning and Democratic Engagement: Political Capital Revisited," Paper presented at the 41st Annual Adult Education Research Conference, Vancouver: AERC (June 2-4, 2000): 6.

leadership and argue that it is "the key to acquiring leverage (over followers, executives, and electors), ascendancy, authority and influence".[144] Following t'Hart, they distinguish between six elements as roots of political capital, including a set of personal attributes (personality, charisma, skills), the relationship with followers, institutional positions, political context, rhetorical skills, and public trust.[145] At their core, all of these approaches assume that political capital emerges from a great variety of sources. In this sense, political capital turns into an aggregate.

This 'aggregated' definition, however, is both misleading and unhelpful in empirically analysing experts' political capital. The aggregation of terms risks concept stretching. If political capital simply refers to 'being politically influential', regardless on which basis this influence rests, its application becomes arbitrary.[146] Moreover, the multiplication of sources of political capital complicates its empirical measurement. This can be seen most clearly in Casey's proposal to develop a political capital index, which includes no less than seven different forms of capital and requires, among other things, opinion-based judgements on political skills, an assessment of the strength of personal network support, and interpretations of academic title ownership and its symbolic meaning.[147]

A second issue that hampers the use of the concept 'political capital' for studying experts is the fact that most authors apply it restrictively to the study of office-holders, political leaders and/or political parties, as mentioned above. In Scücs' and Strömberg's discussion of local elites, the term carries an even more restrictive, normative usage as the "governing elites' ability to mobilize resources that are directly or indirectly related to stable democratic development in differentiated, complex societies".[148] Schugurensky disagrees and argues that an exclusive focus on political

[144] Bennister and Worthy, "Getting It, Spending It, Losing It: Exploring Political Capital," 4.
[145] ibid. 5-12.
[146] In this way, political capital turns into a synonym of power.
[147] Another example is the leadership capital index developed by Bennister, t'Hart and Worthy. They split political capital into skills, relational capital and reputation, and define ten indicators, many of which involve expert evaluation of perceived abilities and effectiveness, the presence of political visions, and even the probability of future events such as the likelihood of credible leadership challenges. See Mark Bennister, Paul t'Hart and Ben Worthy, "Assessing the Authority of Political Office-Holders: The Leadership Capital Index," *West European Politics*, Vol. 38, no. 3 (2005): 417-440.
[148] Stefan Szücs and Lars Strömberg, "Introduction. Studying Local Elites and Democratic Development," in *Local Elites, Political Capital and Democratic Development Governing Leaders in Seven European Countries*, ed. Stefan Szücs and Lars Strömberg (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 21.

elites legitimizes common sense understandings of the political realm as being split between active political actors and passive supporters.[149] His critique stems from an emancipatory perspective that strives to empower marginalized subjects on the municipal level.

The main argument against limiting the range of agents and, consequently, the application of political capital to the electoral market and professional politicians, is an empirical one. A focus on election campaigns and leadership obscures important and sometimes decisive political action beyond formal state institutions. This is true for both liberal democratic and hybrid-authoritarian political regimes such as Russia, although for different reasons.

In the first case, a narrow definition of political capital owners easily overlooks the existing level of citizen participation and the role played by social movements, activist networks and civil society organizations in political decision-making. Even Bourdieu's concept of political capital as social capital tends to proceed from the idea of impotent ordinary citizens who are at the mercy of a small number of professionals with the necessary means to practice politics proper. In the second case, an exclusive emphasis on formal institutions, as they are, for example, enshrined in legal documents, underestimates the significance of informal, clientelistic and personal relations in the political process. In this context, Casey notes that in non-democratic regimes, electoral markets are replaced by power markets.[150] Russia is a case in point. In his discussion of Russian party entrepreneurship between 1989 and 2005, Hale, for instance, argues that the legacy of "patrimonial communism" produced political capital based on longstanding patronage networks strongly connected to state power, which eventually were translated into electoral success.[151]

Following Schugurensky's critique of narrow definitions of politics, Sørensen and Torfing provide a helpful conceptualization of political capital as the resource of ordinary members of society. Both authors are concerned with citizen participation in local democratic governance processes and the effects of such networks on their

[149] Schugurensky, "Citizenship Learning and Democratic Engagement: Political Capital Revisited," 5.
[150] Casey, "Defining Political Capital," 8, fn 9.
[151] Henry E. Hale, *Why not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 26-9.

political capital.[152] Political capital is understood here as a function of three factors: endowment, empowerment, and identity. The first points to the level of access agents have to the political decision-making process. As the authors emphasize, "these initial conditions are something the actors have, or do not have, by virtue of their position in specific institutions".[153] Empowerment relates to the capability to make a difference in decision-making processes that alter policies. Although Sørensen and Torfing list self-confidence, know-how, organizational talent and the ability to create coherence in meaning and direction in the political process as necessary competencies, they stress that "the institutional context of action plays a crucial role".[154] Finally, both authors underline the importance of political identity, which "is to a large extent shaped by the political roles existing political institutions offer".[155] In short, to them, institutional rather than personal attributes are the reference point for assessing political capital.

Sørensen and Torfing apply this approach to an empirical study of political decision-making processes in Skanderborg, a municipality in Easter Jutland in Denmark. They note that most network participants had been endowed with considerable amounts of capital from the very beginning. They had received a good education, possessed much free time and "typically had a long career of participation behind them".[156] Their ability to receive additional political capital via network membership thus emanated from previous prominence and their belongingness to societal elites.[157] This temporal dimension highlights the importance of previous struggles within fields for the accumulation of capital.[158] Moreover, it allows to differentiate between resources as causes and effects of political capital. In consequence, the forms of capital suggested by various authors as the foundation of political capital, particularly personal skills and social relations, can perfectly well function as a precondition for its acquisition or the result of its possession, but they do not themselves represent political capital. In fact,

[152] Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, "Network Politics, Political Capital, and Democracy," *International Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 26, no. 6 (2003): 625.
[153] ibid. 625.
[154] ibid. 624.
[155] ibid. 624.
[156] ibid. 626.
[157] Similarly, Schugurensky notes that "those with high political capital are likely to have also high levels of other forms of capital", see Schugurensky, "Citizenship Learning and Democratic Engagement: Political Capital Revisited," 10.
[158] Pierre Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power," *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 7, no. 1. (Spring 1989): 23.

whereas office holders, by definition, possess at least a minimum of political capital because the constituency via elections explicitly delegates to them the authority to take political decisions, experts lack popular mandates.[159] Their political capital stems not directly from a constituency in search for representation, but from social relations with political elites and decision-makers in the political field. Hence, political capital is institutionalized proximity to state institutions.

2.3.2 Media Capital and the Public Sphere

In his empirical work Bourdieu does not use the term 'media capital'.[160] In modern society, media representation, however, is key to the evaluation of experts. Media exposure can generate symbolic recognition and support from different audiences, including peers, state officials and the wider public. Davis and Seymour identify media capital as a resource that links the political field to the wider citizenry. They describe journalists as cultural intermediaries who move between professional fields[161] and distinguish two dimensions of media capital: audiences and sources. As regards the first dimension, agents acquire authority either with politicians and journalists within the political field (internal media capital) or with the wider public outside that field (media meta-capital). In relation to the second dimension, media capital is associated either with the position of agents as representatives of an organization (institutionalized media capital), or it stems from personal attributes and charisma (individualized media capital).

Although these four forms of media capital are analytically distinct, there is a complex interplay between them on an empirical level. The case study presented by Davis and Seymour illustrates this point. Explaining David Cameron's rise to the head of the British Conservative Party in 2005, they argue that Cameron initially lacked media meta-capital, but after the party conference in October that year gained the largest support. The authors provide two explanations for this sudden shift. First, Cameron had accumulated internal forms of media capital for a long time. He had cultivated

[159] As noted in the previous chapter, this aspect has caused concerns about the democratic legitimacy of expert rule.
[160] Bourdieu, however, discusses the role of television and the media field in his late work. See Pierre Bourdieu, *On Television* (New York: The New Press, 1998).
[161] Aeron Davis and Emily Seymour, "Generating Forms of Media Capital Inside and Outside a Field: the Strange Case of David Cameron in the UK Political Field," *Media, Culture & Society*, Vol. 32, no. 5 (2010): 742.

contacts with journalists and knew how the media field worked, which helped him to get his messages out and create attractive campaigning events. Second, he delivered a well-received speech at the party conference. Together, these two elements "created a tipping point within the journalist interpretive community"[162] that ultimately changed the reporting in his favour.

Again, the concept of media capital as developed by Davis and Seymour applies dominantly to candidates for public office. Yet, it can be argued that experts and expert organisations are exposed to similar social conditions in this case, too. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, potential experts receive education and make experiences within established fields of practices, where the accumulation of field-specific capital over time leads to an improvement in their relative position within the hierarchy of that field. Their performances are directed either at their peers within the traditional field they have emerged from, at journalists, politicians, or the wider public. Evaluations depend both on the quality of personal performances such as charisma, eloquence and knowledge, and on the institutional capital that is generated via organizational membership. As with political office holders, good personal relations to journalists and knowledge about how the media field works (internal media capital) can generate media coverage (media meta-capital), i.e. being quoted on specific issues. In turn, this coverage might affect public perceptions of both individual performances (individualized media capital) and the standing of the organization one is associated with (institutionalized media capital). At the most basic level, such capital accumulation can be measured "in terms of number of appearances and the size of the media outlet's circulation".[163]

Of course, the evaluations of agents *as* experts in the public sphere, i.e. their public standing, can be subject to change over time. This depends as much on the personal skills of agents, i.e. the quantity of written texts and the quality of public speaking, as it is related to developments within both the media and the political field, which are beyond experts' control. The media field determines issues and problems that become salient in the public sphere. Hence, changes in the salience of topics directly affect the visibility of experts. Likewise, an altered institutional or even political position

[162] Davis and Seymour, "Generating orms of media capital inside and outside a field," 754.
[163] ibid. 743.

can influence experts' position vis-à-vis both fields. Here there is arguably a link between the generation of political capital and media coverage, because access to elite networks generates authority. Chapters 4 and 5 will show that this is precisely what happens with many of the key experts in the field of Russian foreign policy. However, as I will show in chapter 6 with respect to CAST, it is also possible to bypass low political standing by focusing on the generation of internal media capital, which over time may increase the amount of media coverage. Internal media capital can be accumulated through journalistic-based social capital (social capital with journalists) and media cultural capital (knowledge about how news production works and journalists operate). In a second step, this knowledge may lead to political capital as well.

2.3.3 Combining Political and Media Capital: Types of Experts

How, then, do political and media capital interact with each other, and which social positions does their combination yield? To answer these questions, I propose a typology of experts based on their different amounts of media and political capital.

Again, it is useful to refer to Eyal's work and its use of Bourdieu's concept of the 'religious field' which, as mentioned above, understands religious agents as part of a structured totality "that determines both the form their interactions may assume and the representation they may have of these interactions."[164] Eyal takes it as a prototype for forms of expertise.[165] He shows that the study of the Orient has involved both academics and military intelligence officers that faced different obstacles in accordance with the nature of their acquired knowledge and the structure of the field. Similar to Bourdieu's characterization of the different positions in the religious field, he argues that experts are defined both by their practices' distance to the consumer and the level of professional closure that determines the public accessibility of their knowledge.


His field of Orient expertise, however, differs at least in two respects from the religious field. First, the consumers of orientalist knowledge are not necessarily laymen, but individuals with political power and administrative authority, including politicians,

[164] Bourdieu, "Legitimation and Structured Interests in Weber's Sociology of Religion," 121.
[165] See Eyal, "Dangerous Liaisons between Military Intelligence and Middle Eastern Studies in Israel", 653-693; Eyal, *The Disenchantment of the Orient*.

military decision-makers and state officials.[166] In consequence, so Eyal, it is "nearly impossible to *impose* on them a new definition of their needs".[167] Second, when supervising and monitoring Palestinians, Orient experts need to establish a distance that signals both objectivity and competence to the consumer. The social mechanisms used to this end include, for example, adherence to scientific methods and professional language.

Medvetz adopts these two dimensions and positions experts along two axes in a two-dimensional space: The horizontal line describes the level of experts' (in)dependence from/on the consumer in terms of the products of their expert practices, while the vertical line denotes the degree of openness or closure to outsiders (public engagement/disengagement). I follow Medvetz, but adapt his representation by using the categories of political and media capital instead (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Capital-based Positions of Foreign Policy Experts



Source: Own Depiction adapted from Thomas Medvetz, *Think Tanks in America*, 86.

[166] Eyal, *The Disenchantment of the Orient*, 30.
[167] ibid. 30, emphasis added.

In Medvetz's account, the combination of these two dimensions yields four ideal types of expert positions: 'house intellectuals', 'public intellectuals', 'technicians' and 'ivory tower intellectuals'. Both the 'house intellectual' and the 'public intellectual' speak publicly about issues of general interest. In contrast to the 'house intellectual', however, the 'public intellectual' is not close to political power. The 'technician' and the 'ivory tower intellectual', on the other hand, rarely appear in public and are thus not expected to present their knowledge in an intelligible manner. At the same time, the 'technician' is or has been part of a bureaucratic apparatus, whereas the 'ivory tower intellectual' resides in academic institutions, which, as a rule, create spaces for intellectual freedom.

Medvetz argues that the opposition between these dimensions poses a "perennial dilemma" for experts. To illustrate this point, he draws on the example of a doctor (as a professional medical expert), who undermines his own authority if he starts to prescribe just any drug to his patients. In his opinion, "no group of experts […] can become entirely deferential to its clients without also losing the quality that makes it 'expert'".[168] In consequence, his labels "describe only the most extreme positions", which are, however inherently unstable, because "the center of the field is the best position from which to fend off challenges from outsiders and maintain one's clients".[169]

I want to argue, however, that although these positions are indeed unstable, the "constant migration towards the center", in fact, does not take place. The reference to medicine, which constitutes a quite integrative field of practice that has established jurisdiction over its objects of knowledge, is misleading, because the practices of foreign policy experts lack such degree of autonomy. Rather, experts are subject to two masters: political decision-makers and the public. Beyond a certain threshold of political or media capital, which is indicated by the dashed line in Figure 1, agents lose the ability to act as experts, that is, as mediators between fields. In these cases, that is, in positions beyond the "expert threshold", agents remain within their professional field as journalists, academics or bureaucrats.

[168] Medvetz, *Think Tanks in America*, 87.
[169] ibid. 89.

Furthermore, one needs to qualify the issue of instability of positions. Although the media and political field to some extent determine the ability of agents to position themselves, once a position has been acquired, it creates inertia. Here the concept of spaces, which I have introduced in the previous section, building on Eyal's more recent work, is indeed helpful. Depending on the professional field experts are coming from, they occupy a distinct space with its very own personal attributes. As I will show in chapters 4 to 6, these spaces are empirically connected – e.g. the journalist who comments on foreign policy over time becomes a lecturer at university – but they exist in parallel and are not necessarily in competition with each other. In any case, they can always either appeal to the public or the state, which requires different sets of abilities.

A popular every-day distinction that has emerged independently of any systematic theoretical effort and emphasizes this point is the one between 'policy wonks' and 'policy hacks'. Berkeley Economist DeLong defines the first as "those who care about the substance" and the second – the spinmasters – as "those who want to get White House Mess privileges, or become media celebrities".[170] Translated into Bourdieu's analytical language, one may argue that 'wonks' prefer political capital, that is, proximity to decision-makers, in order to provide rational policy advice, whereas 'hacks' are oriented towards the media and the selling of policies in public, although they may similarly enjoy contacts to the political elite. Hence, the contrast between both is not exclusively limited to political and media capital as defined above, but also relates to their way of communicating and their possession of knowledge, and is expressed in their attitudes towards politics. 'Wonks' are all about content, while 'hacks' pay more attention to process and power. Emanuel and Reed, who both served in the Clinton Administration, speak of "two tribes" or the "ying and yang of politics",[171] and stress the enormous distance that exists between both as a result of increasing partisanship.

Nimmo and Combs introduce a similar duality that draws on the distinction of audiences one speaks to and receives recognition from. In their discussion of

[170] James Bradford DeLong, "Staff 'Loyalty' to Hillary Rodham Clinton," Feb. 24, 2008, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, https://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2008/02/staff-loyalty-t.html.
[171] Emanuel Rahm and Bruce Reed, *The Plan: Big Ideas for America* (New York: Public Affairs, 2006).

punditry, which they define as the practice of commenting on and reporting events performed by "a cadre of purported political knowledgeables",[172] they distinguish between 'priests' and 'bards'. The former speak *of* and *for* political elites because they "move within elites circles" and possess a reputation that "yields stature among political elites".[173] The latter appeal to the larger public, thereby turning into "media bard pundits". As such, they can be effectively used by the state to convey certain messages or to function as mouthpieces for existing policies without having to accept them as part of the political elite. They speak *for* the elite, but are not *of* it.

Again, the contrast between both types extends beyond the formal political-media capital dichotomy and includes personal attributes. 'Priestly pundits' are elitists and political insiders that gain their reputation from "knowing what is really happening".[174] In turn, they are serious about politics and value reasoned argumentation. By contrast, 'bardic pundits' appeal to popular sentiment based on common sense. Their influence does not stem from identification with elites, but "reside[s] in passion, a passion expressed to and shared with the populace".[175] Bards prefer story-telling over detached analysis, using rhetorical devices such as humor and irony. Both postures are not limited to certain professions, but include representatives of journalism, academia, the military, and the practice of law,[176] as well as "retired politicians, ex-bureaucrats, bureaucrats, entertainers and even teachers".[177] In fact, Combs and Nimmo go as far as to call punditry a profession or at least a craft and industry in the US.[178] These distinctions draw attention to the central dimensions I discussed at the end of the previous section: the state and the public sphere as two areas of (foreign policy) expert practices. As I will show empirically in subsequent chapters, it would be wrong, however, to assume that both types are mutually exclusive or that priestly pundits are absent from the media or exist primarily as in-house bureaucratic advisors.

[172] Dan D. Nimmo and James E. Combs, *The Political Pundits* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 113. Kindle.
[173] ibid. 438.
[174] ibid. 442.
[175] ibid. 799.
[176] ibid. 452.
[177] ibid. 202-204
[178] ibid. 204.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a discussion of the main conceptual elements that will be used in the following empirical study: experts, think tanks, social fields, and political and media capital. Instead of defining ideal types or providing lists of essential criteria for the identification of experts, intellectuals and think tanks, I have argued that we must contextualize them as entities within a set of relations. To this end I introduced the notion of social fields as it has been developed by Pierre Bourdieu and discussed its application within Critical Security Studies. Noticing the multidimensional social position of agents engaged in the production and dissemination of foreign policy knowledge, including journalists, academics, military officers etc., I suggested that experts are translators of social knowledge between fields. In turn, think tanks have been described as institutional nodal points that provide a platform for individuals with multiple affiliations and ideas, rather than compact organizations.

By adopting the idea of spaces between fields from Gil Eyal, I drew attention to instable and porous social boundaries within which experts and think tanks, whose positions are constantly negotiated, exist. In this context I introduced media and political capital as two kinds of resources through which they advance and gain authority. I further argued that the political capital of experts (and think tanks) can be understood as proximity to state institutions, whereas media capital relates to public visibility based on publications and citations. In the first case, agents receive predominantly symbolic and informational advantages due to the “legitimate monopoly” of the state, whereas in the second case the source of power is prominence as an authority among the constituency. Both forms of capital are interrelated. Their combination gives rise to distinct social positions of experts, depending on their respective volume. Furthermore, I suggested that in case of individual agents there is a certain threshold beyond which expert status (i.e., the ability to mediate) gets lost. In these cases, agents return to their original professional fields.

I hold that this inductive approach is both necessary and helpful when studying Russian foreign policy experts and think tanks for at least two reasons. First, we have a very limited knowledge about how individuals and organizations that exist as ‘experts’, ‘intellectuals’ and ‘think tanks’ come to be seen as such within non-Western

states. We do not know who they are, where they come from and how they relate to each other. Second, the social boundaries that have been established over time in the US and Western societies are not necessarily those which are prevalent in Russia. Hence, we need an inquiry into how they have emerged and which factors shape and construct them. Before I present my empirical analysis of Russian foreign policy experts and think tanks, however, chapter 3 introduces the empirical data and methods I have used to map this field.

3 Mapping the Field: Data Sources and Fieldwork

The empirical discussion in chapters 4 to 6 rests primarily on qualitative interviews with Russian foreign policy and security experts, but also on information about their political and media capital drawn from different databases. To provide the reader with an overview of the expert landscape, but also as a basis for managing the interview process, I make use of databases covering individuals and institutions in international relations and foreign policy research published by RIAC from 2011 to 2016. I discuss and review these databases and corresponding publications in section one of this chapter (3.1). I critically discuss the available data sets and indicate their structure and limits, before elaborating on my own process of data preparation to fill existing gaps and providing some descriptive statistics.

Section 3.2 offers a brief discussion of the data used for evaluating individuals' political and media capital as conceptualized in the previous chapter. I suggest to operationalize political capital, understood as institutionalized proximity to state institutions, in terms of membership in state expert councils. I capture media capital by the number of publications and references in Russian federal newspapers. This form of media capital can also be applied to expert organizations as a whole as it speaks to their public visibility.

Taking these data as a starting point, section 3.3 addresses the process of gathering information from more than 50 Moscow-based foreign policy experts through personal interviews conducted in 2017 and 2018. I introduce expert interviews as an empirical method of qualitative research and discuss key challenges of interviewing elites and experts in post-Soviet states as reflected in the relevant literature. I then present my own interview strategy and point to empirical problems in preparing and conducting my interviews with Russian foreign policy experts. As chapters 4 to 6 will show, the interviewees provided not only important factual information, much of which is difficult or impossible to access through other channels, but also rare accounts of personal relations and historical narratives about the evolvement and current state of the field of foreign policy expertise in Russia.

3.1 RIAC Databases

Attempts at gaining an overview of the expert landscape in post-Soviet Russia are not new. In summer 2011, RIAC (see also chapter 6) started to work on the creation of an expert database as one of the Council's first projects. Their point of departure was a first data collection published in 1999 by the Moscow Public Scientific Foundation (*Moskovskij Obŝestvennyj Naučnyj Fond*; MONF) on "centres of IR and security studies teaching and research in the Russian Federation and CIS memberstates".[1] This original directory,[2] edited by current RIAC Director Andrej Kortunov and MONF employee Aleksej Bogaturov (who later joined MGIMO, see chapter 4), provides information on 407 "scientists and specialists" from both Russia and CIS member states, including Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

This initial identification of experts, however, constituted an empirical challenge that speaks to the conceptual conundrum I have discussed in the previous chapter. In 1999 Bogaturov and Kortunov noted that simple formal criteria like academic titles or, to use Bourdieu's language, institutionalized cultural capital, were inappropriate to identify experts, because they would yield an overlarge and undifferentiated number of people.[3] In consequence, their own selection of individuals for the MONF database was based on a combination of different factors, a result of the authors' perception of the field:[4]

- level of activity and number of publications;
- academic reputation within the professional community, both in Russia and abroad;
- age (representatives of the younger generation whose professional career started after 1991);
- place of work (representatives of the Russian regions and members of the Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS));
- project collaboration with MONF or holders of MONF scholarships.

[1] Andrej Kortunov and Aleksej Bogaturov, *Meždunarodnye issledovaniâ v Rossii i SNG* [International Research in Russia and the CIS] (Moskva: Moskovskij rabočij, 1999), 5.
[2] The directory, in turn, draws on data collections provided by the Carnegie Moscow Center and the Federation of Peace and Federation of Peace and Accord in 1994 and 1996.
[3] Kortunov and Bogaturov, *Meždunarodnye issledovaniâ v Rossii i SNG* [International Research in Russia and the CIS], 6.
[4] ibid. 6.

Despite these criteria, the MONF directory contained several individuals who at the point of publication could be labeled 'politicians' rather than 'researchers' or 'analysts'. The list, for example, included oligarch and then CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky (*1946-†2013), member of the State Duma and leader of the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and the former Chairman of the social-liberal party Yabloko (1993-2008), Grigory Yavlinsky. Moreover, the directory covers former Russian state officials such as Presidential advisor and State Duma Deputy (1994-2000) Gennady Burbulis and former Russian Foreign Minister (1990-1996) Andrej Kozyrev.[5]

Based on the MONF directory and open source data on the leading staff of Russian research institutions, the RIAC team produced a new publication on international relations research containing 450 experts and 70 organizations, which was published in print in December 2011 after three months of work.[6] In August 2012 these data were published online,[7] and experts were invited to send their own information to complete the database.[8] By January 2013 the online version covered more than 500 experts.

Due to the success of the project, RIAC – together with researchers from the Institute of Demography at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow[9] – compiled another directory in 2013, this time on migration experts. The volume titled *The Russian migration field* (*Migracionnoe pole Rossii*) was published in March 2013 and contains information on 256 individuals and more than 200 organizations doing research on migration issues in Russia.[10] In a similar way, RIAC, this time in cooperation with the Moscow State Linguistic University (MSLU), prepared a directory on military experts

[5] This selective inclusion of political figures has been criticized by reviewers, see Il'â Galadžij, "Kto est' ktoi čto est' čto," [Who is who and what is what] *Nezvisimaâ Gazeta*, Nov. 4, 1999, accessed, Nov. 2, 2018, http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-11-04/6_whoiskto.html?id_user=Y.
[6] Igor' Ivanov,' (ed.), *Meždunarodnye issledovaniâ v Rossii. Spravočnik* [International Research in Russia. Directory] (Moskva: Speckniga, 2011).
[7] "RSMD predstavlâet interaktivnyj spravočnik Meždunarodnye issledovaniâ v Rossii" [RIAC presents interactive directory on International studies in Russia], Aug. 6, 2012, accessed Nov. 7, 2018, http://russiancouncil.ru/news/rsmd-predstavlyaet-interaktivnyy-spravochnik-mezhdunarodnye-/.
[8] According to one of the authors, it was impossible to automaticize this process online at the time. Experts had to send their information in electronic form, which were then processed by RIAC and integrated into the database.
[9] Ûliâ Florinskaâ, Dmitrij Poltaev and Liliâ Karačurina. Florinskaâ and Poltaev are also employed at the non-governmental Migration Research Center, which is based at the Laboratory for Analysis and Forecasting of Population Migration of the Institute of Economic Forecasting RAS.
[10] Igor' Ivanov (ed.), *Migracionnoe pole Rossii* [The Russian migration field], (Moskva: Speckniga, 2013).


and organizations in 2014. The responsible editors, retired military officers Vasiliĭ Belozërov from the Association of Military Political Scientists (*Associaciâ voennyh politologov*) and Aleksandr Vladimirov, who presides over the College of Military Experts (*Kollegiâ voennyh èkspertov*), compiled information on 185 individual experts and 50 organizations, but also for the first time listed 45 journals on military-political issues.

On the occasion of its fifth anniversary in 2015, RIAC decided to update the original database on international relations research and publish a new directory covering 1,000 experts and 100 organizations.[11] For this purpose, the data of the first publication from 2011 were combined with information that had been provided by around 70 experts for the online database. In addition, the RIAC team added other staff working at research institutions to the existing information about Directors and Department Heads. Finally, RIAC approached several thousand experts among its followers directly, but only received around 50 responses. The last data were collected in July 2015 and the directory was eventually published in 2016.

While working on the print publication, RIAC continued to expand the online database. At the time of writing, it covers all data included in the migration and the military databases with minor additions.[12] Moreover, it includes almost all experts presented by the first print publication on IR research in 2011 and a significant portion of those who had been included in the printed IR database in 2016. In total, the online database contains information on 968 experts, 298 organizations and 45 journals. Diagram 1 compares all six directories with regard to the number of entries in these three categories.

[11] The section on organizations differentiates between four categories: Institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences (21), State Research Institutes (3), Non-State Research Institutes (31), and Educational Organizations and Institutes (Universities, 45). For each organization the directory provides key data such as address, website, year of establishment, as well as information on the institute's leadership, its departments (if applicable), staff and main areas of research. Apart from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), the Diplomatic Academy (DA), the Higher School of Economics (HSE) and Moscow State University (MSU), the listed educational organizations and institutes refer to particular faculties or departments rather than entire universities.
[12] The online directory adds three experts assigned to migration and two experts assigned to military affairs.

Diagram 1: Expert databases on international research, migration studies and military-political research in Russia 1999-2018



Source: Own compilation based on existing expert databases.

The most comprehensive database on international relations experts thus remains the printed IR database 2016 (RIAC-IR 2016), whereas the data available online combine data on migration, military and IR experts, organizations and journals (RIAC-Online).

3.1.1 Database Composition


The six databases overlap and partially contain the same data. Approximately half of the experts presented in the initial MONF directory are either part of RIAC-IR 2016 or the RIAC online database.[13] Most of the others (189) are either not Russian citizens or passed away after the completion of the MONF database and before the compilation of the RIAC directory, including several prominent figures.[14] A final group has probably been excluded for reasons of age, because they emigrated or considered politics their main occupation. In 87 cases (46 percent) there is no reliable information on why they were excluded from the subsequent RIAC databases.

[13] 206 and 212 experts of those presented in the MONF directory are included in RIAC-IR 2016 and RIAC-online, respectively. In total, 218 MONF experts are part of at least one of these latter two databases.

[14] For example, Georgij Arbatov (*1923-†2010), Oleg Bogomolov (*1927-†2015), Fedor Burlackij (*1927-†2014), German Diligenskij, Mark Hrustalev (*1930-†2010), Sergej Kortunov (*1956-†2010), Èl'giz Pozdnâkov (*1929-†2016), Tat'âna Zaslavskaâ (*1930-†2010), Georgij Šahnazarov (*1924-†2001), Nikolaj Šmelev (*1936-†2014), Ivan Tûlin (*1947-†2007), Genrih Trofimenko, Vadim Cymburskij (*1957-†2009) and Anatolij Utkin (*1944-†2010).

As mentioned earlier, the RIAC online directory consists of three partially overlapping expert databases: migration (259), military (187) and international relations experts (591). Together they refer to 968 unique experts. As stated above, the migration and the military expert databases available online more or less match the printed versions, with only insignificant additions. Figure 2 presents the interrelationship of the three sub-databases of RIAC-online in the form of a Venn-diagram. The areas of overlap represent the approximate number of experts shared by the respective databases.

Figure 2: Overlaps of RIAC online databases




Source: Own compilation based on RIAC databases, created with https://www.meta-chart.com/venn.

As one can see here, the database of migration experts stands almost for itself and shares only one expert with RIAC-IR online, whereas the data of the IR and military expert databases overlap considerably, sharing 68 experts in total.

Similarly, the printed RIAC-IR 2016 database covering 1,000 experts significantly overlaps with the data available online. It includes 562 experts of the IR, 18 experts of the migration and 77 experts of the military expert directory. In total, both databases have 589 entries (42.7 percent) in common, whereas 411 experts (29.8 percent) are unique to RIAC-IR 2016 and 379 experts (27.5 percent) to the online directory. Together, they refer to 1,380 unique experts. Figure 3 illustrates this overlap of RIAC-IR 2016 and the combined databases (IR, military, migration) available online.

Figure 3: Overlaps between RIAC-IR 2016 and RIAC-online




Source: Own compilation based on RIAC databases, created with https://www.meta-chart.com/venn.

92 percent (348 experts) of the online directory's uniqueness, however, rests on the integration of those military and migration experts who are not covered by RIAC-IR 2016. By contrast, the 562 IR experts of the online directory covered by RIAC-IR 2016 make up for 95.1 percent of all experts assigned to international relations. The online directory merely adds another 29 IR experts, four of whom are simultaneously part of the military expert database. In comparison, the RIAC-IR 2016 contains information on over 400 experts who are not part of any other database.

All in all, the RIAC-IR 2016 is thus the most extensive database about Russian experts in foreign policy and international relations currently available. Figure 4 illustrates the approximate overlap of information on experts presented by the RIAC-IR 2016 database and the three online directories on IR, migration and military experts.

Figure 4: Informational Overlaps between RIAC-IR 2016 and the three RIAC-online databases



Source: Own compilation based on RIAC databases, created with https://www.meta-chart.com/venn.

3.1.2 Complementing the RIAC Dataset

The data provided by RIAC-IR 2016 are available as an excel file and in printed form. For the analysis of the social positions of individuals I relied exclusively on the information about experts, not institutions or journals. However, the data in the RIAC databases are neither complete nor systematically organized. For example, RIAC did not use a coherent survey to compile information on educational institutions and research interests. Hence, the database frequently applies different names for the same universities and institutes, whereas research interests appear as a random list of buzzwords suggested by experts themselves. Finally, RIAC did not take note of experts' year of birth, which makes it difficult to assess the distribution of age cohorts. In consequence, the RIAC data were unsuitable for automatic processing, which necessitated a complex and time-consuming reconstruction process in four steps.

First, I systematized the data of the RIAC-IR 2016 directory and constructed a new excel dataset that contained experts in an alphabetical order, listed by surname, name and father's name. The latter was particularly important to avoid misidentifications. Moreover, I added other IR experts covered by the RIAC-online directory (29 experts) and the RIAC-IR 2011 publication (2 experts). I also added a further 17 experts based


on my own knowledge of the field. In total, my foreign policy expert database therefore contains 1,055 experts.

Second, I extracted the data for the categories ‘place of education’, ‘academic titles’, ‘place of work’ and ‘research interests’. This process needs to be described as rather cumbersome, but was ultimately successful based on the application of various filters to the original excel sheet.

Third, I re-arranged the data for ‘place of education’ and ‘research interests’ and assigned entirely new categories in order to better compare experts. As regards universities and institutes, I double-checked the listed proper names given the fact that many of them were renamed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, while others ceased to exist or were merged together. For example, the dataset provides five different names for the Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod - National Research University. Similarly, the St. Petersburg State University is presented with four different names. Some of the names are, in fact, entirely wrong. In case of mergers, I reassigned the new name of the merged institution based on the assumption that social networks remained intact. By contrast, if the academic institution had been abolished without any formal successor organization, I preserved the original name as given in the dataset.

The professional backgrounds of experts contained in my dataset vary. In order to gain a (still rather cursory) overview of these backgrounds, it makes sense to assign a single occupation to each expert (i.e., the most dominant one): business, politics, media, academia, military, diplomacy, or ‘other’. I categorized experts predominantly based on information on their current place of work, which is provided in the RIAC-2016 database. I was able to identify occupations in 702 cases, which accounts for 66.5 percent of all experts. Diagram 2 illustrates the distribution of these occupations among my dataset.

Diagram 2: Distribution of Professional Sectors among Russian Foreign Policy Experts (n=702)



Source: Own compilation based on my expert database.

Three quarters of this sample of experts are employed at academic institutions. This number would be even higher, if I had included diplomats who joined academia after retirement, e.g. as lecturers at MGIMO or the Diplomatic Academy. However, I assigned these cases to 'diplomacy' because I assume that their professional socialization and experience in the diplomatic service is more decisive for the form of knowledge they possess.

This distribution suggests that foreign policy experts are dominantly recruited from the academic field, either from universities or the institutes of the Academy of Sciences. Yet, this tentative result could also be a product of the selection process. As one RIAC employee responsible for the data collection argues, the team paid particular attention to the existence of publications and, after adding the leaders of academic institutions, proceeded by including the main staff as well. Similarly, the overrepresentation of experts within the categories 'politics' and 'business' is to some extent related to the fact that RIAC included all of its own members in the database. This includes, for example, the current Director General of the Russian Space Agency and former Russian ambassador to NATO Dmitrij Rogozin, member of the Committee on Security and Defense of the Federation Council Aleksej Pushkov, the Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council Konstantin Kosačev, the former General Secretary of the CSTO Nikolaj Bordûža, the Chief Economist of the Russian government-owned development bank Vnesheconombank Andrej Klepač,


and the Director of the Kurchatov Institute for Nuclear Physics and Putin-confident, Mihail Koval'čuk.

Whereas journalism, military, politics, academia, diplomacy and business relate to traditional professional occupations, the category ‘other’ (32 experts) points to the emergence of particular practices that are neither purely academic, political, military nor media-related. They thus hint at the emergence of a space between fields. Three examples, which I will come back to in chapter 6, help to illustrate this point: Ruslan Puhov graduated in international relations from MGIMO, but founded his own think tank in 1997. It specializes in the applied analysis of global arms trade and consults Russian military technology companies. Similarly, Vladimir Orlov – a journalist by profession – established the Center for Political Research (*Centr političeskih issledovanij Rossii*; PIR-Center) in 1994 to provide analytical materials and organize workshops on disarmament issues. Finally, the current RIAC Director of Programs Ivan Timofeev used to work as a researcher at MGIMO – the same place where he defended his doctoral thesis on Russian political identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 2008. In other words, experts who work as policy analysts often originate from one of the established professional fields, but have become translators of norms and knowledge between these fields. I will elaborate on this idea in chapter 4.

3.1.3 Descriptive Statistics

My dataset yields more than 160 universities for the entire sample of 1,055 experts. Initially, I recorded data for all three education periods as defined by the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011: Master’s degree or equivalent (level 7), doctorate and habilitation (level 8). However, although the great majority of experts does hold doctorate degrees, information on the place of post-gradudate studies is rarely provided. From the raw data I was able to reconstruct the place of study on the Master’s level in 1,002 cases (95 percent). Diagram 3 illustrates the distribution among this sample.

Diagram 3: Distribution of places of study among Russian foreign policy experts (n=1,002)




Source: Own compilation based on my expert database.

This overview shows that most experts (57.6 percent) in the database studied at only three universities: MGIMO, Moscow State University (MSU) and its Institute for Asian and African Studies (ISAA MSU), and St. Petersburg State University (SPbGU). There are five universities with 15 or more graduates that together account for another ten percent. Besides the Russian State University for the Humanities (RGGU) in Moscow, the other four are regional institutes: the Far Eastern Federal University (DVFU), Tomsk State University (TGU), Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod (NNGU), and the Ural Federal University (UrFU). The dominance of MSU, MGIMO and SPbGU, which are simultaneously the three leading institutes of higher education in Russia, clearly indicates the elite status of foreign policy experts.

Information on the place of study have helped me in reconstructing the age of experts, because the data usually come with the year of graduation. In a substantial number of cases, however, I had to search for and add the year manually. The unitary Soviet education system allows to draw conclusions about the age of experts from the year of their graduation: before the mass introduction of the Bologna system with its BA and MA degrees in the mid-2000s, the usual specialist degree in the Soviet Union and Russia was obtained after five years of education. Pupils generally entered university at the age of 17. Hence, on average Soviet-Russian students are 22 years old upon graduation. The margin of error is approximately +/- one year. Diagram 4 illustrates the distribution of five age cohorts within my dataset. On average, the experts were born in 1959.

Diagram 4: Russian foreign policy expert age cohorts, n=946



Source: Own compilation based on my expert database.


The five cohorts represent distinct historical experiences. The Thaw Generation is associated with an upbringing and political socialization in the immediate post-Stalin period when alternative intellectual and cultural circles emerged. Some Soviet academics who belong to the younger part of this generation have served as advisors to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev, such as Georgij Arbatov (*1923-†2010) and late Russian Prime Minister Evgenij Primakov (*1929-†2015).[15] The Soviet babyboomers have played an important role in re-creating Russian society after the collapse of the Soviet Union.[16] As I will show in chapters 4 and 5, experts of this cohort have indeed been instrumental in structuring the post-Soviet expert field. For several reasons that I will outline in chapters 4 to 6, they still represent the dominant group. By contrast, the next cohort, which, following Anipkin, I term "the last Soviet Generation",[17] has been marginalized (at least in numbers), because the inception of their careers (particularly in academia) coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and led to professional shifts. The lifestory of Fedor Luk'ânov (*1967), which I present in chapter 4, but also the history of the founders of

[15] For the history of this expert generation and its role in Perestroika see English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, 2000.
[16] Dmitrij Travin, "Kak semidesâtniki sozdali Rossiû," *Zvezda*, no. 1, accessed Jan. 04, 2019, http://magazines.russ.ru/zvezda/2015/1/12tr.html.
[17] Mihail Anipkin, "Pokolenie,'lišnih lûdej': antropologičeskij portret poslednogo sovetskogo pokoleniâ," [Generation of superflous people: An anthropological portrait of the last Soviet generation] *Neprikosnovennyj zapas*, no.1 (2018): 290-308.

private think tanks presented in chapter 6, testify to this. Finally, there are two younger cohorts, the post-Soviet and the Putin generation, both of which represent the future of the field. In chapter 6 I indicate the transition from the Soviet babyboomers to the post-Soviet generation in leadership positions.

Finally, I extracted information on main research interests from the RIAC-IR 2016 directory and produced another excel-based dataset. In total, 789 (75 percent) of experts provided information in this category. However, the level of accuracy and specification differ considerably across the sample. Some experts provided merely one general term such as “International Politics” (*Meždunarodnye otnošeniâ*) to describe the content of their work, while others suggested a wide range of topics and geographical areas. This makes it difficult to assess the distribution of fields of expertise. For this reason, I filtered the data by key terms and abbreviations in Russian in a trial and error process, and eventually arrived at 110 descriptive terms. In a second step I assigned these terms to 13 aggregated categories (each containing between 1 and 20 descriptive terms), 5 of which were thematic and 8 geographic. A list of these terms can be found in Appendix I. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of these 13 categories among a sample of 789 experts (75 percent of my dataset) for whom data are available in RIAC-IR 2016. It also indicates interconnections between these categories where experts provided several areas of expertise.

Figure 5: Distribution of research interests among Russian foreign policy experts



Source: Own compilation based on RIAC-IR 2016, displayed with Netdraw (UCINET).

The size of the nodes illustrates the number of experts within that category. The thickness of the lines stands for the number of interrelations between research interests wherever experts provided more than one research interest.

Two important observations can be made: first, there are many experts with general knowledge in politics and culture (including history, media, ethics, education and migration as sub-categories, among others). There is also a considerable number of Russian experts who work on military and security-related issues. However, there is a very small number of (international) lawyers. Second, the number of experts interested in Asia (195) exceeds the number of those who work on Europe (177) or North America (120). This result is particularly interesting given the official pivot to Asia in Russian foreign policy since 2014. The comparatively low number of experts focusing on the post-Soviet space (81) comes as a surprise, however. It might reflect either a lack of specialists or the view that Russia's "near abroad" (*bližnee zarubež'e*) constitutes domestic rather than 'genuine' foreign policy.[18] Finally, Africa and Latin America are highly underrepresented areas of study among Russian foreign policy experts, which, however, corresponds to the general orientation of Russian and even Soviet foreign policy.

In conclusion, this overview of the RIAC data suggests that Russian foreign policy experts are a highly diverse group, with some subgroups being more dominant than others in terms of age, place of study, professional background and research interests. These results have provided me with a good idea about the field. They have also guided the interview process and the identification of experts. Based on this analysis, I could expect that the average interviewee would have studied at a Russian elite university (I myself attended the MGIMO as a Master's student and was affiliated with the HSE during my PhD fieldwork), be significantly older than me, and work at an institution of higher education. Overall, the cohort of Soviet baby boomers was likely to dominate among my interviewees. The next section looks at the two main

[18] In fact, as I have indicated elsewhere, Russia's policies towards Ukraine, for example, are predominantly handled by individuals that have been responsible for domestic affairs. See Alexander Graef, "Wer macht Außenpolitik in Russland? Akteure, Diskurse, Entscheidungen, [Who Makes Russian Foreign Policy? Actors, Discourses, Decisions] *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, 1 (2017): 1-11.

resources by which experts advance within the field – political and media capital – and suggests how to capture them empirically.

3.2 Expert Capital

In chapter 2 I argued that experts and expert organizations draw on two types of resources: political capital and media capital. I suggested that political capital can be conceptualized as institutionalized proximity to state institutions, whereas media capital refers to visibility in the public sphere that rests on the number of publications and references in the media. Both forms of capital are indicators of expert authority and the standing of agents within social space. Here I suggest two possible ways of capturing them empirically.

3.2.1 Political Capital

Given the diversity of expert backgrounds and the prominence of informal relations, particularly in Russian politics, there are different ways of operationalizing proximity to state institutions. One possibility is to look at membership in expert councils that are installed by the bureaucracy. In Russia, the establishment of such councils has indeed become rather popular in the last two decades. Whereas some argue that they are merely Potemkin villages for democratic window dressing that lack any real impact on policy-making, I hold that membership in these councils still provides information about the level of recognition provided by the state to individual experts. Experts who become members in such councils participate to some degree in legitimizing state power, but they also receive symbolic and cultural capital in the form of privileged access to information. Moreover, in some instances they may be able to influence political decision-making.

In order to get a feeling for the distribution of political capital among Russian experts, I selected eight councils that vary significantly in terms of their structure and membership. Moreover, their existence is linked to distinct time episodes in post-Soviet Russian history and they fulfill different functions. Whereas the Scientific Council of the Security Council, the Expert Council of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Presidential Council emerged in the 1990s, the Councils of the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Defense and the Public Chamber emerged

as the result of state efforts since 2005 to create linkages with Russian society. The Expert Council of the International Affairs Committee at the Federation Council, by contrast, has remained relatively exclusive and has been particularly effective under the chairmanship of Senator Anatolij Korobejnikov from 2003 to 2010. Finally, RIAC members do not constitute a permanent working group, although they meet annually.

Table 1 presents the overall distribution of council membership among experts in my dataset. Given the systematic inclusion of RIAC members in the data collection process, the greatest number of experts are indeed found within RIAC. Moreover, almost all current members of the Expert Council of the Minister of Foreign Affairs are included in the dataset. There is also a significant number of experts who have participated either in the meetings of the Scientific Council of the Security Council since 1999 or the Expert Council of the Committee of International Affairs at the Federation Council from 2003 to 2017. By contrast, the membership rate in Boris Yeltsin's Presidential Council, the Public Council of the Ministry of Defense, the Expert Council of the Ministry of Economic Development, and the Public Chamber is comparatively low.

Table 1: Membership of Russian foreign policy experts in selected expert councils

Nr	Expert Council	Period	Dataset (members)
1	Russian International Affairs Council	2011-2018	142
2	Scientific Council of the Security Council	1999-2017	52
3	Expert Council of the Committee of International Affairs at the Federation Council	2003-10, 2017	29
4	Expert Council of the Minister of Foreign Affairs	2017	24
5	Public Chamber	2007-2017	20
6	Public Council of the Ministry of Defense	2007-2017	8
7	Expert Council of the Ministry of Economic Development	2017	5
8	Presidential Council	1993-2000	3

Source: own count based on publicly available lists of members and one list provided to me by the Russian MFA.

As regards the Presidential Council, this underrepresentation can be explained with reference to the higher age of the council members and changes in the political elite since the beginning of Vladimir Putin's presidency in 2000. In case of the other three underrepresented councils, it is the thematic profile that determines membership. While the Public Council of the Ministry of Defense and the Public Chamber include

individuals of various professions, I did not systematically include military or financial experts in my dataset, which explains the low number of members within the Expert Council of the Ministry of Economic Development.

One important result of this empirical probe is that the great majority of experts in the dataset (853), approximately 81 percent, is not a member of any council. Although they still might possess political capital as there are other informal ways of generating it, this is still a reliable indicator of their limited capacity to participate in policy discussions and receive information from official sources. By contrast, state recognition, that is, the transfer of symbolic capital to experts, seems to be an exclusive good: Just five percent of the dataset, or 53 experts, simultaneously participate in two or more councils.

This result suggests that most experts in the dataset are unable to reach beyond what I have termed the “expert threshold”. In combination with the dominance of academic posts as indicated by Diagram 2 on page 2, this speaks to the dominant number of scholars as ‘ivory tower intellectuals’ in the dataset. They lack one important element of expert capital, namely the one expressed in access to the state and recognition by political authorities. Hence, these agents do not act as mediators, but remain embedded in their professional fields. However, they may overcome the threshold and take on the role of experts by generating media capital.

The empirical analysis of political capital for experts in chapter 4 and for think tanks as organizations in chapters 5 and 6 draws on these individuals’ membership data as indicators. Yet, given the complexity of factors that shape political capital, it is also a result of my own judgment based on knowledge about personal contacts and networks, opinions by fellow experts and Russian politicians as well as the overall life trajectory of experts. In the case of think tanks, their political capital is a function of the sum of capital accumulated by individual researchers, but particularly by those with high amounts of capital as they occupy leadership positions within their respective organizations.,The political capital of SVOP (chapter 5), i.e. its institutionalized proximity to state institutions, for example, is dependent on the changing number of political office holders among SVOP members. Similarly, chapter 6 assesses the political capital of selected think tanks based on the amount of political capital (expert council membership) accumulated by its individual members of staff.

3.2.2 Media Capital

My analysis of media capital relies on one database provided by the East View information services: the Russian central newspapers directory (UDB-COM). UDB-COM contains 104 titles covering all major federal Russian newspapers and journals, including the tabloids *Argumenty i fakty*, *Moskovskij komsomolets* and *Komsomol'skaâ Pravda*, as well as quality dailies such as Izvestiâ, *Kommersant*, Nezavisimaâ *gazeta*, *Novaâ gazeta*, *Pravda*, *Rossijskaâ gazeta* and *Vedomosti*, which represent different political ideologies. Moreover, the collection contains important English-speaking publications such as the *Moscow Times* and the English variants of the *New Times* and *Moskovskiye Novosti (Moscow News)*, as well as weekly published journals on culture and politics, including *Ogonëk*, *Literaturnaâ gazeta* and *Ekspert*. Almost half of all titles, however, ceased to exist before December 2017 and two have been removed from the database altogether.

The discussion in chapter 4 includes information about media capital for five selected experts. For this purpose, I measured the development of annual publication rates between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2017, i.e. for a period of 18 years. In order to distinguish between citations, which indicate expert authority, and authorship of articles that might be related to professional publishing (i.e. as journalists), I searched two times for each expert and for each of the 18 years. First, I used the category ‘author’ in the advanced search modus and applied the ‘exact phrase’ operator when searching for experts’ names and surnames. This way I received results about articles these experts had published as authors. Second, I used the category ‘entire article’ that applies to all references in both the text body and the title (as authors). Subsequently, I subtracted the number of references as author from references within entire articles to generate a measurement of ‘expert citation’. This resulted in two indicators that capture the positioning of an expert in relation to the media field over time: authorship and authority.

In Chapter 6, I present media capital data for think tanks that I generated in a similar manner. Here I searched for both acronyms and full names in a trial and error process. In some cases, I additionally searched for references to the founders or leading personnel of these think tanks in order to compare them to the total number of references for the whole organization. As Chapter 6 illustrates, media capital varies

significantly both among Russian foreign policy think tanks and over time, indicating power shifts.

3.3 Expert Interviews

As mentioned above, chapters 4 to 6 primarily draw on interviews with Russian experts in foreign and security policy. Based on the overview of the field presented in the previous two sections, they were conducted to understand the self-perception of individuals as experts and explore their relations with colleagues and institutions within the field. In other words, interviews are introduced as a method to generate data about social and symbolic capital.

3.3.1 Expert Interviews in Post-Soviet Russia

Although expert interviews are often used, there is almost no methodological literature about them. The exceptions come predominantly from German scholars, who have used expert interviews since the 1990s in administrative research with an interest in studying (expert) knowledge and technological impact assessment (*Technikfolgeabschätzung*). Here experts have largely been approached as a mere source of factual knowledge. Gläser and Laudel, for example, use the term 'expert' to describe this specific role of the interviewee as a source of specific knowledge about the object of study. Expert interviews, they write, are the methodological tool to access this knowledge.[19] Similarly, Kaiser approaches experts exclusively as a source of information for the study of political processes. The expert him- or herself is not of interest to the study.[20]

Van Audenhove argues that this approach draws on a quite limited understanding of knowledge. Instead of 'neutral facts', the knowledge experts possess stands in the context of power and (social) positions, which are important for the interpretation of data.[21] Hence, Bogner, Littig and Menz suggest to distinguish between different types

[19] Jochen Gläser and Grit Laudel, *Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse als Instrumente rekonstruierender Untersuchungen* (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 2006), 10.
[20] Robert Kaiser, *Qualitative Experteninterviews: Konzeptionelle Grundlagen und Praktische Durchführung* [Qualitative Expert Interviews: Conceptual Basis and Implementation] (Wiesbaden: Springer VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2014), 702-703. Kindle.
[21] Leo Van Audenhove, "Expert and Elite Interviews: Towards an Integrated View. Designing, Conducting and Analyzing Elite and Expert Interviews in the Social Sciences," Specialist Course, University of Ghent, 2017.

of expert interviews and various forms of interaction between the interviewee and the interviewer.[22] In their opinion, there are at least three types which are based on the respective research interest and the kind of knowledge one wants to access: explorative, systematizing, and theory generating interviews. Correspondingly, they argue that it is possible to extract technical, processual and interpretive knowledge (*Deutungswissen*) from the interview process.

The authors also reflect on the social relation that develops during interviews by introducing six roles the interviewer may adopt, often unconsciously: 'co-expert', 'expert outside the field', 'lay person', 'authority', 'confederate', and 'potential critic'. The interviewer, however, cannot always control which of these s/he adopts, because this depends on factors external to the interview process as such, for example the interviewer's sex, age, social position, and (professional) experience.

In the study of Russian politics and society, expert interviews are often used in empirical research,[23] but scholars rarely report on their experiences or the methodological steps they employ. There is also a rarely acknowledged difference between elite and expert interviews insofar as the former concentrate primarily on power relations, whereas the latter aim at knowledge.[24] They do overlap, however, particularly in my empirical case. In fact, as I have shown with respect to the RIAC data in section 3.1, most of my experts studied at leading Russian universities and some of them possess considerable amounts of political capital. Hence, they are for the most part members of the political and/or intellectual elite.

In his account of his experiences in conducting elite interviews in Russia, Richardson, for example, approaches elites within the context of studying identity conceptions. He highlights that gaining access to elites "can prove to be of the most challenging aspects of the research process".[25] This situation, he argues, is even more severe for


[22] Alexander Bogner, Beate Littig and Wolfang Menz, *Interviews mit Experten. Eine praxisorientierte Einführung* [Interviews with Experts. An Applied Introduction] (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2014), 475-6.
[23] For example, Libakova and Sertakova use expert interviews in the study of indigeneous people, whereas Schorsch draws on them to examine market entry strategies in Russia. See Natalia M. Libakova and Ekaterina A. Sertakova, "The Method of Expert Interview as an Effective Research Procedure of Studying the Indigenous Peoples of the North," *Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences*, 1 (2015): 114-129; Martin Schorsch, *Market Entry Strategies for Russia: A comprehensive survey based on expert interviews* (Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag, 2009).
[24] Van Audenhove, "Expert and Elite Interviews: Towards an Integrated View," 2017.
[25] Paul Benjamin Richardson, "Engaging the Russian Elite: Approaches, Methods and Ethics," *Politics*, Vol. 34 (2) (2014): 182.

young scholars in the early stages of their research. Indeed, besides Richardson several researchers have highlighted difficulties in approaching members of the elite, particularly via phone or email.[26] Richardson holds that during his fieldwork, he almost never received any answers to his emails, and it took many phone calls to arrange meetings for doing interviews. He also experienced "the tactic of constantly delaying" meetings pursued by his interviewees to motivate him to give up. This finding is common in the literature.[27] As I will show in the next sub-section, both elements have also been part of my research process.

3.3.2 Interview Strategy and Results

The formal interviewing process began in April 2017 and was completed in May 2018, as planned. Most interviews were conducted during the following phases: from May to June 2017 (19 interviews), from September to October 2017 (13 interviews), and from December 2017 to May 2018 (19 interviews) (see Diagram 5).

Diagram 5: Interview Schedule in Russia 2017-2018



Source: Own compilation based on interviews.

[26] Anna Drzewiecka, "The Joys and Perils of Conducting Field Research in Eastern Europe," *European Political Science* 6(3) (2007): 296; Sean P. Roberts, "Research in Challenging Environments: The Case of Russia's "Managed Democracy," *Qualitative Research*, 13 (3) (2012): 340.
[27] Roberts, "Research in Challenging Environments: The Case of Russia's Managed Democracy", 340.


Moreover, I conducted one interview each in April, August and November 2017. In addition, in October 2018 I conducted a second interview with Andrej Kortunov and in November 2018 one interview with Fedor Luk'ânov, whose results are central to the discussion in chapter 4. In total, I talked to 56 individuals, including 54 men and two women.

All interviews but one, which I had to record via Skype, were conducted in person in Moscow City or the wider region. Originally, I had planned to conduct interviews in Moscow, St. Petersburg and a number of regional cities, such as Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod and Tomsk. Early in the interview process, however, it became clear that interviews in the capital would provide me with sufficient material and the highest quality information. This is because Moscow has been and remains the center of Russian foreign policy-making and international relations research, although the landscape of academic teaching and research has widened considerably since the demise of the Soviet Union. Indeed, several experts, particularly on arms control issues and strategic studies, pointed me to interpersonal networks that exist between Tomsk (Oblast Tomsk, Western Siberia), Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk Oblast, Ural) and Moscow. In addition, St. Petersburg and the Faculty of International Relations at St. Petersburg State University have become important hubs of academic research. Nevertheless, in all these cities there is merely a handful of people that have been able to cross what I termed the "expert threshold" in chapter 2 by accumulating sufficient political and media capital. At the same time, many of the regional figures who did become successful and visible in public either moved to Moscow after graduation or went abroad.

I approached individuals in Russian either in person, via email or phone. 49 interviews (87.5 percent) were conducted in Russian and seven in English. I decided to do interviews in English only if I knew that the interviewee had a good command of the language. Most of these interviews were conducted in the first phase of empirical research from January to October 2017, when, despite my fluent Russian language skills, I still preferred English to feel more comfortable. This has also been a practical advantage in terms of time resources, because in these cases I did not need to translate the interview material.

My interviewees belong to different age cohorts, as mentioned in the previous section. These are (1) the Thaw Generation, (2) the Soviet babyboomers, (3) the last Soviet Generation, and the two post-Soviet generations (4 and 5). Diagram 6 presents the distribution of interviewees across these cohorts.

Diagram 6: Age distribution among interviewees




Source: Own compilation based on interview data.

As one can see, the three cohorts of working-age are almost equally represented in the sample, whereas the first and the fifth cohort are underrepresented. When compared with my quantitative expert dataset presented in sub-chapter 3.1 above, the Post-Soviet generation is overrepresented, whereas the Thaw Generation is completely marginalized. Moreover, the Soviet babyboomers do not dominate my sample. In consequence, the average age of my interviewees – 48 years in 2017 (*1969) – is roughly ten years below that of the experts in my quantitative dataset.

There are at least two reasons for this stronger representation of younger experts in the sample. First, it was easier to get in contact with younger people, both due to my own age and more flexible communication channels, but probably also because the lack of seniority provided them with more time. Second, a substantial number of interviewees works at privately founded think tanks (27 percent), which on average employ younger staff than, for example, academic institutions (Diagram 7). Although academic institutions, which include universities and the institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, represent more than 50 percent of all workplaces, this number

is still more than 20 percent below the results of the quantitative analysis presented in 3.1.

Diagram 7: Distribution of Workplaces among Interviewees



Source: Own compilation based on interview data.

These institutional affiliations are, however, not clear cut. As will become clear in subsequent chapters, many experts are simultaneously employed at several institutions or worked for different ones at earlier points in their career.

Meeting Experts

Before arriving in Moscow in early 2017 to conduct my field work, I had the chance to talk to two researchers from academic institutions at a policy conference in South-Eastern Europe in September 2015. At this point, however, I still had to specify my research topic and the conversations are therefore more accurately described as background talks rather than interviews. I also established contact with another Moscow-based expert in October 2015 in Kazan. I eventually interviewed all three of them in 2017.

As regards my other interviewees, three main events helped me to establish initial personal contacts. First, in December 2016 I participated in the educational program "Dialogue in the Name of the Future" (*Dialog vo imâ budušego*; Dialogue) organized by the *Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund* of the Russian Federation (*Fond podderžki publičnoj diplomatii im. A.M. Gorčakova*; Gorchakov-Fund).[28] The Dialogue

[28] "Dialog vo imâ budušego," [Dialogue in the name of the future] accessed Oct. 31, 2018, https://gorchakovfund.ru/project/view/dialog-vo-imya-budushchego/.

has been taking place annually in Moscow since 2011. At the time of my participation it was one of only two educational programs open to citizens of the European Union.[29]

Second, after my arrival in Moscow in February 2017 I took part in the "Meeting Russia" program, established by the not-for-profit *Center for the Support and Development of Public Initiatives Creative Diplomacy* (PICREADI), founded by Natal'â Burlinova in 2010.[30] The program brings together young (25-35 years) politicians, experts and civil society representatives from the European Union, the United States and Canada with Russian experts, politicians and journalists to share views on international relations and learn about Russian foreign policy.[31] The four-day program allowed me to meet several of my later interviewees.

During the final discussion of the program I also met representatives from the PIR-Center, which, as I have indicated above, was founded as a not-for-profit organization by Vladimir Orlov in 1994 (see chapter 6).[32] They drew my attention to their annual Summer School established in 2000, which focuses on issues of global security and arms control. In April 2017 I participated in the week-long program, which took place in Abramcevo in the Moscow region. During the school I was able to meet several experts, some of whom subsequently agreed to an interview.

Approaching Experts

I used an email account provided by the Higher School of Economics (HSE) to approach most of my interviewees. This was a deliberate choice to increase the chances that the Russian foreign policy experts I contacted would trust the sender,

[29] The other one is the "Baltic dialogue" (*Baltiskij dialog*) directed at cooperation with the Baltic States (Lithuania, Lativa and Estonia) and Poland. Moreover, the Gorchakov-Fund offers three educational programs available exclusively to citizens of CSTO member and observer states, plus Iran and Turkmenistan: the "Security Academy" (Akademiâ *Bezopasnosti* in cooperation with the CSTO), the "School of Central Asia" (*Škola po Central'noj Azii*) and the "Caspian Youth School" (Kaspiskaâ moložežnaâ škola). In addition, there are two dialogue formats, the "Balkan dialoge" (Balkanskij Dialog) and the "Caucasian dialogue" (Kavkazkij Dialog). The first is open to all citizens, whereas the second invites students and young professionals from Azerbaijan, Armnia, Georgia (including Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Iran, Slovenia and Turkey. See accessed Dec. 10, 2018, https://gorchakovfund.ru/projects/.

[30] accessed, Oct. 10, 2018, http://www.picreadi.ru/meeting-russia.

[31] Since 2018 the program has been dominantly financed with the help of presidential grants in the amount of 3.3 million rubles (43,000 euro; exchange rate from Sept. 1, 2018) that represent 96% of the entire project budget (3.5 million rubels). See accessed Oct. 31, 2018, https://президентскиегранты.рф/public/application/item?id=3edd27c6-8779-40f1-acce-365457479aae.

[32] As a result of the 'foreign agents' law passed by the State Duma in June 2012, the activities of PIR have partically commercialized since September 2016 (see chapter 6).

given that I am a young scholar from abroad. I used my Swiss university address if I had previously met the potential interviewee in person. However, I always added a signature that indicated my position as a visiting researcher at the HSE. Except for minor changes to respond to individual specifics, all emails took the same form.


When addressing experts, my goal was to include a wide range of subjects in order to gain an overview of the entire field. In some cases, I received access through snowball sampling, that is, one respondent recommended another expert as an interview partner. This was helpful when contacting a new interviewee since I was able to refer to an expert known to both of us, thereby establishing trust.

Conducting Interviews

In preparation for each interview I did biographical research on the expert in question. This helped me to ask more specific questions related to their range of personal experiences. I also set up an interview guide that was structured similarly for all interviews and consisted of four blocs: biographical questions, questions about their place of work, questions relating to the evaluation of the Russian foreign policy 'expert community' or specific think tanks, and questions about other experts. The exact questions, however, varied depending on the interviewee.

In 48 cases I was able to record the interviews; six interviewees declined the request for recording. In two cases I chose not to record the conversation to allow the interviewees to speak more freely. The interviews ranged from 17 minutes to almost two and a half hours in length. The majority of the 48 recorded interviews (28, or 58%) ranges from 30 to 59 minutes. 17 interviews are longer than one hour, whereas three interviews were shorter than 30 minutes. On average, the interviews are 57 minutes in length (Diagram 8).

Diagram 8: Distribution of recorded interview length (n=48)



Source: Own compilation based on recorded interview data.

3.3.3 Empirical Challenges

I faced three major challenges during the interviewing process, related to the establishment of contacts, the actual conducting of interviews, and the kind of empirical data I could gather from conversations with these experts.

Establishing Contacts

Despite my participation at several prominent events, some of which I have mentioned above, establishing contacts to potential interviewees was rather time-consuming. In several cases people did not respond, particularly when approached by email.

The difficulty in finding interview partners mirrors the experiences described by other scholars in the methodological literature on conducting interviews in post-socialist states and particularly in Russia as described in section 3.3.1. Even the possession of private telephone numbers did not always lead to success. In one instance, I contacted a potential interviewee many times only to be put off from week to week, eventually giving up. The greatest challenge, however, were the numerous postponements of meetings, meaning that in some cases it was ultimately impossible to conduct the interview. In this context, I did not expect to find that even after meeting in person and agreeing to an interview in principle, some prospective interviewees never responded to my attempt at making contact, or the contact information provided turned out to be of little use. In one instance, I contacted the interviewee *seven times* via email, starting in May 2017, and approached him briefly in person at two events, before he agreed to a fixed time for an interview. In another case, I met the person

three times on several occasions in Russia and abroad at several policy events, and wrote ten emails, before we finally arranged an interview appointment. Finally, in one case the expert unexpectedly passed away shortly before our interview.

Conducting Interviews

At the beginning of our conversation, some interviewees told me that they would not have more than twenty to thirty minutes, although I had mentioned the expected length of the interview in the email correspondence. In one case, an interview, which had been agreed to last 45 minutes, was cut short to less than 20 minutes because my interview partner had an important guest. Due to this high degree of unreliability, the nature of the interviews and the quality if information I was able to gather from them varied considerably.

Some experts were unwilling to answer more interpretive questions that I asked to collect background information and personal views on relations within the expert field. One interviewee merely noted in response to my question whether he could provide me with an evaluation about how his think tank had developed in the last years that ‘this would be a conversation for two hours’.

The role played by how interviewees perceived me as an interviewer should also not be underestimated. Senior experts, it appeared, saw me as a young researcher with limited knowledge rather than a co-expert on the same intellectual level as themselves. As a result, many interviewees often started with quite general statements or felt the need to explain basic features of the Russian political system to me.

Empirical Data

As indicated above, it quickly turned out that narrative interviews, which aim to gather data on an individual’s particular experiences, often with a personal evaluation of other people and organizations, were difficult to conduct with the type of people I was interviewing, given the often sensitive nature of their work and hence their unwillingness to give away too much about their personal views and relations. The type of information I gathered from the experts, therefore, has been predominantly factual and process-oriented. Nevertheless, I was also able to gather relevant data on institutional and personal relationships as well as the historical developments of think tanks in Russia.

When drawing on this interview material in the empirical discussion in chapters 4 to 6, I provide real names only in cases where the interviewees did not explicitly object to being quoted and if it does contribute to understanding the mearning of the quote. Otherwise I refer to organizational position to uniquely identify interviewees, while keeping them anonymous if necessary. Yet, in some cases where I believe the provided information to be too sensitive, I do not even report institutional affiliation as otherwise it might be possible to identify the interviewee in question, given the small size of the expert network. This is a critical ethical concern, particularly in the Russian case and concerning the sensitive topic of foreign policy. In instances when interviewees objected to being recorded, I used the information they provided as background knowledge.

4 Living Like an Expert

> From parts of the former academic and university-based intelligenciâ rose an exotic (wild) type of 'comprehensive' professional: One third – researcher, another third – lecturer at university or college, and the rest (depending on the premises and situation) – analyst-practitioner, political journalist, PR-campaign master or expert-consultant for members of parliament, vice-governors and charitable foundations. Life has become more diverse and difficult.[1]

This chapter examines five expert life stories. I illustrate how young but resourceful researchers within the Soviet academy of the late 1980s turned into experts, that is, *translators of social knowledge between fields*. I argue that the Gorbachev period with its increasing openness and transparency allowed them to deploy their cultural capital as a political resource in the nascent public sphere. Moreover, given the change in Soviet ideology ("new thinking"), some of them were able to start a political career, especially after the introduction of the Congress of People's Deputies in December 1988. In addition, these academics, familiar with the West, became favored contacts for foreign journalists to comment on and explain the revolutionary events within the Soviet Union. As a result, a network of intellectuals emerged that would eventually form parts of the Russian (foreign) policy elite in the 1990s.

I begin by introducing Andrej Kortunov (4.1), the Director General of RIAC. A rising IR specialist at ISKAN, he engaged in the management of foreign funds and educational projects in the Russian social sciences as early as 1991. The second expert, Aleksej Bogaturov (4.2), started his career as a Japanologist and East Asian area studies researcher, but in the 1990s and 2000s became Russia's most significant IR theorist and teacher of the next expert generation. Aleksej Arbatov (4.3), a policy entrepreneur from IMEMO, joined Russian politics for ten years, but then returned to academia and has remained Russia's most authoritative arms control specialist.

Vâčeslav Nikonov (4.4), by contrast, abandoned his promising career as a historian already in the late Soviet Union. In the 1990s he actively engaged in advisory work

[1] Aleksej Bogaturov, "Desât let paradigmy osvoeniâ," [Ten Years of the Paradigm of Learning] *Pro et Contra*, t. 5 (1) (2000): 195.

and campaigning. His career illustrates the translation work at the verge of politics and academia. Finally, Fedor Luk'ânov (4.5), a journalist by education and profession, has become an eminent foreign policy commentator. Since 2012 he has been the Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP, see chapter 5). Considerably younger than the other four experts, he is a transitional figure and stands in-between the Soviet and the post-Soviet experience. His life story illustrates how a late transformation of capital in post-Soviet Russia leads to expert status.

In each of the five cases I rely primarily on secondary data, although in some instances I have profited from personal conversations with these experts. Yet, the use of in-depth narrative interview techniques to reconstruct experiences and individual interpretations has not always been possible, primarily due to time constraints and, possibly, a lack of trust. Hence, where possible I draw on memoirs, secondary interviews and publications.

The biographies provide testimony to the increasing institutional fragmentation of the expert field in post-Soviet Russia. They illuminate the struggle through which the former academic elite sought to seize novel positions in overlapping social spaces: media, politics, academia and global philanthropy.

4.1 The Manager: Andrej Kortunov

> There are things, which a professional will not say. Yes, such things can be said by journalists, they can be said by politicians, but not by professionals who handle such problems.[2]

In the final years of the Soviet Union, foreign private foundations, particularly from the US, started to support Soviet-Russian science. At first limited to travel assistance and exchange, since 1992 major private donors such as the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation and the Open Society Foundation, but also private and state-sponsored foundations from the European Union, have provided individual grants to Russian researchers. The management of the grant provision system, particularly in the case of the US, relied on Russian personnel familiar with the local scientific infrastructure and in possession of necessary contacts to distribute funds efficiently. Andrej Kortunov was one of these people. After a successful academic career at ISKAN, he became a manager of Western-financed educational programs in the humanities and social sciences during the 1990s. Since 2010 he has been Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).

4.1.1 Upbringing and Education

Andrej Kortunov was born into a Soviet *nomenklatura* family. His father, Vadim Vasil'evič, [3] had joined the Communist Party in 1944 and, after the war, he set out for a successful party career. From 1965 to 1968 he worked in the Ideological Department of the Central Committee and afterwards briefly served in the Soviet Embassy in France.[4] Back in the Soviet Union, he became personal advisor on international affairs to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Nikolaj Podgordny.[5] For several years he and longtime Deputy Head of the International Department at the Central Committee, Vadim Zagladin, acted as the main editors of

[2] #12, Andrej Kortunov, RIAC, June 2017.
[3] Vadim Kortunov (1918-1995). See biographical data about Sergej Kortunov, "Kortunov, Sergej Vadimovič," accessed Aug. 10, 2018, http://www.rusperson.com/html/21/RU01007490.shtml.
[4] These biographical data are available at the forum "Za Pravdu i parvo," (For truth and law), accessed Aug. 12, 2018, http://www.pravda-pravo.ru/forum/index.php?topic=21.0.
[5] Leonid Mlečin, *Brežnev* [Brezhnev] (Moskva: Molodaâ gvardiâ, 2008), 220.

the annual "Handbook for the Propagandist-Meždunarodnik".[6] Given this family background, it seems only natural that Andrej Kortunov, after graduating from a special school with an intensified English language program, enrolled at the Faculty of International Relations at MGIMO in 1974 together with his older brother Sergej. As a student at MGIMO – a closed institution in Soviet times –, he had the opportunity to travel abroad and spent several months as an intern at the Soviet embassy in London. After graduation in 1979 he went on to pursue an academic career at ISKAN, where he advanced fast. His brother, meanwhile, joined the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before his sudden death in October 2010, Sergej Kortunov, in fact, was the more eminent political figure of the two brothers. As a Soviet diplomat he participated in US-Soviet negotiations and after the state's collapse he remained in service of the Russian MFA, where he headed the Export Control Department.[7] Through all these years, however, and despite their diverging views on Soviet-Russian foreign policy, they frequently worked together on projects. For example, in 1982 they co-authored a book on the position of the Soviet Union in international affairs.[8]

Whereas this book, an official textbook for Soviet lecturers of International Relations, bemoaned the aggressiveness of "imperialist" US circles, another publication co-authored with Aleksandr Nikitin on the United States three years later testified to the imminent changes in Soviet public space. Less ideological and overall more sympathetic, Kortunov and Nikitin critically examined the "American model" of socio-economic development. Characterizing the model as being full of dilemmas, the authors noted that "when we began to study the United States, we were most surprised by the unusual complexity of the political situations".[9] In one for the time unusual positive spirit they emphasized that

[6] See for example Vadim Zagladin and Vadim Kortunov, *Spravočnik propagandista- meždunarodnika* [Handbook of the Propagandist- Meždunarodnik] (Moskva: Politizdat, 1980).
[7] In April 1994 Kortunov became a consultant to President Boris Yeltsin's assistant on national security, Ûrij Baturin.
[8] Sergej Kortunov, Andrej Kortunov and Šamil Sultanov, *Meždunarodnve položenie SSSR* [The international standing of the USSR] (Moskva: Obŝestvo Znanie RSFSR, 1982).
[9] Andrei Kortunov and Alexander Nikitin, *The American Model on the Scales of History* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985). The positive spirit of the book might have been influenced by Kortunov's research stay at the Soviet embassy in Washington DC in 1984.

> we all look to the future of the American people with hope. During our many meetings with American friends, we became convinced that Americans have lost neither their spiritual strength, nor their creative energy.[10]

This optimistic and analytical tone in Kortunov's work set the stage for his support of Soviet foreign policy during the Gorbachev era.

4.1.2 'New Thinking' Advocate

In autumn 1985, during a trip to France, General Secretary Gorbachev had publicly presented the idea of "reasonable sufficiency" (*razumnaâ dostatočnost'*) as the new baseline of Soviet foreign and security policy. In January 1986, he announced a plan to abolish nuclear weapons by the year 2000.[11] This initiative was followed by a speech at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1986, in which Gorbachev emphasized that "our country is in favor of removing weapons of mass destruction from circulation and restrict military potential to the level of reasonable sufficiency".[12] From this point on, the concept was increasingly integrated into policy documents and speeches of the Soviet political leadership.[13] The idea was simple: Aiming at an end to the arms race, the Soviet Union would need to have just as many armed forces (particularly weapons of mass

[10] Kortunov and Nikitin, *The American Model on the Scales of History*, 9.
[11] In the US, this initiative was largely interpreted as a propaganda move to gain public legitimacy. President Reagan's initial reaction, however, was positive. See Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, "Gorbachev's Nuclear Initiative of January 1986 and the Road to Reykjavik," Oct. 12, 2016, accessed Aug. 13, 2018, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault-russia-programs/2016-10-12/gorbachevs-nuclear-initiative-january-1986.
[12] KPSS, Materialy XXVII s"ezda Kommunističeskoj partii Sovetskogo Soûza [Material of the 27th Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union] (Moskva: Politizdat, 1986).
[13] After spring 1986 several political publications started to refer to the concept of 'reasonable sufficiency' as the new cornerstone of Soviet security policy and its allies. For example, in May 1987 the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization stated that "the armed forces […] are maintained at a sufficient level of battle-readiness so as not to allow themselves to be taken by surprise. […] The Warsaw Treaty member-states have never attempted to possess armed forces or weapons above the level necessary for these purposes.", see "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw-Treaty Member States", Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), Records of the Political Consultative Committee, 1955-1991, transl. Paul Spitzer, May 2009, accessed July 10, 2018, http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/19204/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/5336d742-f85f-4286-8847-bcea87de21d6/en/Statement_Military_Doctrine_1987_en.pdf.

destruction, but also conventional weaponry) as was necessary to fend off an outside attack.[14]

The researchers at the institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, including Andrej Kortunov at ISKAN, immediately seized upon these political signals.[15] Already in 1986 Kortunov tried to place an article in the comparatively liberal journal *Ogonëk* that re-assessed the extent of Western military threat, but the editors were afraid to publish it.[16] After more than a year he finally succeeded.

In December 1987, Kortunov published his first article together with Sergej Karaganov and their teacher Vitalij Žurkin in ISKAN's house journal "US. Economics, Politics, Ideology" (*SŠA. Èkonomika, Politika, Ideologiâ)* on reasonable sufficiency. To them, the concept "was the most important element of new political thinking".[17] Following Gorbachev, the three authors argued that the previous gold standard of Soviet security – nuclear parity with the United States – had lost its stabilizing effect in the context of ever-increasing numbers of nuclear weapons. Besides the economic burden, the arms race created risks of "apocalyptic conflict due to technical mistakes".[18] 'Reasonable sufficiency', by contrast, would increase predictability of state behavior and therefore the level of security for all.[19]

The breakthrough came with a similar publication two months later in the party journal *Kommunist*, for which Žurkin's personal weight had been instrumental.[20] As ISKAN

[14] For a summary of the approach see David V. Dietrich and Raph M. Hitchens, "The Soviet Strategic Debate: Striving for reasonable Sufficiency," *The Journal for Soviet Military Studies*, 2:1 (1989): 1.
[15] Moreover, the political leadership, in fact, encouraged researchers at IMEMO and ISKAN to produce reports on these issues. In a Politburo meeting in February 1987 Gorbachev stated that one would need to "demand from our institutes – from Primakov, Arbatov – that they provide us with a detailed scientific analysis once in a quarter, every 100 days.", see Anatolij Černâev, Aleksandr Veber and Vadim Medvedev, V Politbûro CK KPSS… Po zapisâm Anatoliâ Černâeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiâ Šahnazarova (1985–1991) [In the Politburo of the ZK KPSS…The records of Anatolij Černâev, Vadim Medvedev, Georgij Šahnazarov (1985-1991) (Moskva: Gorbačev-Fond, 2008), 146-147. On the promotion of 'reasonable sufficiency' at IMEMO and the role played by Aleksej Arbatov and Evgenij Primakov, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change, Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997) 100-102.
[16] See the interview transcript of the conversation, Metta Spencer, "Andrei Kortunov (political expert, USA/Canada Inst)," March 1994, accessed Nov. 12, 2018, http://russianpeaceanddemocracy.com/andrei-kortunov-1994.
[17] Vitalij Žurkin, Sergej Karaganov and Andrej Kortunov, "O Razumnoj Dostatočnosti," [About reasonable sufficiency] *SŠA. Èkonomika, Politika, Ideologiâ*, 12 (1987): 11-21.
[18] ibid. 13.
[19] ibid. 20-1.
[20] Vitalij Žurkin, Sergej Karaganov and Andrej Kortunov, "Vyzovy bezopasnosti – starye i novye," [Security Challenges – old and new] *Kommunist*, 1 (1317), (Jan. 1988): 42-50.

Deputy Head and well-connected former *Pravda* editor, "he knew how to frame the idea without irritating some of the hardliners".[21] Overall, the key to success lay in the use of quotes by authoritative party leaders such as Gorbachev, Brezhnev or Lenin as argumentative hooks that provided legitimacy to unorthodox ideas. In an interview with the American sociologist Metta Spencer in March 1994, Kortunov commented on this strategy:

> People like myself just picked some of the slogans out of Gorbachev's statements and since the statements were very vague, you could interpret them in very different ways. Okay? And we, of course, didn't pretend that we were criticizing Gorbachev, but we were trying just to develop the ideas, to comment. […] Of course, it would just be perfect to find a quote. You could just put a footnote, saying, 'As Comrade Brezhnev stated back in 1975, we can avoid a nuclear war with imperialists.' And then you can just try to develop this idea into something useful. […] We realized that it was the rule of the games, and I studied Lenin very carefully. I remembered a number of very good quotes that could have been interpreted as Lenin had … forecasted or foreseen the reasonable sufficiency. So it was the name of the game, and everybody understood that, especially people who read Communist.[22]

In their *Kommunist* article, Kortunov and his colleagues proceeded from the idea that the security situation for the Soviet Union had changed dramatically in the last decades and therefore new policies were required. Whereas Soviet Generals prepared for a surprise massive attack as they had experienced in June 1941, the authors contended that due to the democratic political regimes in the West, citizens had no appetite for war. Moreover, in their opinion the core competition between socialism and capitalism had moved from the military to the economic sphere, where the Soviet Union needed to catch up. In turn, they perceived a resource-intensive arms race as unreasonable. Echoing Gorbachev, they also called for more openness and transparency in military affairs, which would strengthen Soviet security by reducing the effectiveness of Western propaganda.

These ideas, risky as they were, over time turned into the new common sense. However, in 1989/1990 the dispute between civilian strategists and like-minded military officers with orthodox hardliners as their common opponents over Soviet

[21] Spencer, "Andrei Kortunov (political expert, USA/Canada Inst)," 1994.
[22] ibid.

foreign and security policy was in full swing. Kortunov actively participated in this dispute. He published articles on the future of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the death order against British author Salman Rushdie and “minimum deterrence”, which he co-authored with KGB-General and ISKAN Deputy Director Radomir Bogdanov.[23] In several publications co-authored with Aleksej Izûmov Kortunov also discussed Soviet national interests and the diminishing effectiveness of military power.[24] As the “rising star”[25] at ISKAN, Kortunov increasingly joined his direct superior, Department Head Henry Trofimenko, in trips abroad, particularly to the United States, [26] and turned into a popular contact person for English-speaking media, outdoing his senior colleagues.[27] When Trofimenko remained in the United States in spring 1991 to teach at the University of Maryland, the “reform-minded” Kortunov inherited his position as the Head of the US Foreign Policy Department at the Institute.

4.1.3 Saving Russian Science

The growing political crisis in the Soviet Union, particularly since August 1991, did not affect ISKAN immediately. The work at the institute continued as normal, although the increasing political competition between Gorbachev and Yeltsin as well as the focus on economic issues affected bureaucratic demands, and the overall interest in strategic foreign policy matters dropped. In our interview, Kortunov remembers this situation:

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[23] Mikhail Bezrukov and Andrei Kortunov, “What Kind of Alliance Do We Need,” *New Times*, no 41, (1989): 7-9; Radomir Bogdanov and Andrei Kortunov, “On the Balance of Power,” *International Affairs* (August 1989): 3-13; Radomir Bogdanov and Andrei Kortunov, “Minimum Deterrent: Utopia or Real Prospect,” *Moscow News,* no. 23 (1989).

[24] Andrej Kortunov, “What is meant by state interests in foreign policy,” *Literaturnaja gazeta*, July 11, 1990 (transl. Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 42, no 30, (1990), 9-11), 14; Andrej Kortunov and Alexey Izyumov, “Clarifying our National Interests,” *The Literary Gazette International*, vol. 1, no. 14 (October 1990); Andrei Kortunov and Alexey Izyumov, “The End of New Thinking,” *Newsweek*, vol. 116, issue 27, Dec. 12, 1990; Andrej Kortunov and Aleksej Izûmov, “Suŝestvuet li dlâ SSSR vnešnââ ugroza i kakie vooruženny e sily nam nužny?,” [Is there an external threat to the USSR and what kind of arms do we need] *Nezavisimaâ gazeta*, no.11, 24.01.1991.

[25] Aleksej Bogaturov, “Oglâdyvaâs' na prošloe. Avtoočerk,” [Looking Back], *Meždunarodnye Processy*, vol. 12, no. 1-2 (2014): 132.

[26] For example, in June 1989 Kortunov and Trofimenko spoke at a conference of the Atlantic Council on the Soviet policies in the third world. See “Are U.S. & Soviet Third World Interests Reconcilable?,” C-Span, June 6, 1989, accessed Nov.10, 2018, https://www.c-span.org/video/?7997-1/soviet-world-interests.

[27] A search in the database factiva for the name “Andrei Kortunov” in 1990 and 1991 yields 32 and 72 hits respectively. In the same period, the results for ISKAN Deputy Directors Sergej Rogov and Sergej Plekhanov are 9 and 13, whileTrofimenko receives 0 and 10. The leading figure is ISKAN Director Georgij Arbatov, whose name yields 93 and 81 hits using the keywords “Georgi Arbatov” and “Georgy Arbatov”.

> I felt that with every year there was less demand for our work […] it was not clear with whom to work and who took decisions. […] This was the feeling in 1991-1992 and then a group of, at the time, comparatively young, ISKAN researchers [*ISKANovcy*] came to me with the proposal […] that we need to find new forms of how to organize research, new forms of interaction between science and politics.[28]

The fact that his colleagues approached him, speaks to the exceptional position Kortunov enjoyed within the institute as both a young scholar and Department Head, overseeing the work of more than 40 researchers. In our conversation in October 2018, Kortunov explained that

> I would not like to overstate my own role, but I suppose I was one of the leaders of the young generation. I was the Chairman of the Council of Young Scientists at ISKAN, I was the youngest Department Head of a big department. I worked very closely with [Georgij] Arbatov, with his deputies. I guess that is why our guys came to me with the idea to establish something new. At this time everyone did something new.[29]

This initiative resulted in the establishment of a new organization that was officially registered in February 1992: The Russian Scientific Foundation (*Rossijskij Naučnyj Fond*; RNF), with Kortunov as President.[30] The RNF provided an alternative to the traditional research system at the institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Whereas the situation at the renamed ISKRAN and in Soviet science more generally deteriorated over the course of 1992, the RNF – supported by various important political figures at the time, such as Moscow Mayor Gavril Popov and St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak – published policy reports, engaged academics from different institutes, and organised a host of events. Nevertheless, according to Kortunov, the possibilities of the RNF remained limited until the US Ford Foundation decided to become active in Russia in late 1992.

In 1992, the Moscow branch of the Ford Foundation (*Moskovskie otdelenie Rossijskogo naučnogo fonda*) developed a program to support Russian social science research and the provision of grants to aspiring young scholars: 'The Russian Social Science – A New Perspective' (*Rossijskaâ obŝestvennaâ nauka – novaâ perspektiva*). Over a period of seven years, the organization provided roughly 100

[28] #55, Andrej Kortunov, RIAC, Oct. 2018.
[29] ibid.
[30] The Russian Scientific Foundation should not be confused with the organization founded in 2013 by the Russian government under the same name.

annual grants in the amount of 1,500 US$ each to Russian political scientists, sociologists and economists, later also to historians and philosophers.[31] After re-registering in June 1996, the Moscow branch began operating as the Moscow Public Scientific Foundation (*Moskovskij obŝestvennyj naučnyj fond*; MONF).[32]

Through MONF, Kortunov turned into a new kind of professional that had hitherto been unknown in Soviet society. Like Tat'âna Ždanova, Kortunov's former colleague at ISKAN who headed the MacArthur Foundation in Russia from 1992 to 2007,[33] he formally remained part of the academic strata, but, in reality, became an educational manager – and thus a wanderer between two worlds. As one journalist who interviewed Kortunov in 2003 about his work at MONF noted:

> What had been a hobby, for Kortunov, became not only a job, but, to put it elegantly, his life's work [*delo žizni*]. Coming up with ever new programs and retrieving good money for them, our protagonist gradually and without noticing himself, became a professional. His profession [*special'nost'*] remains rare, almost exclusive. There is literally only a handful of such people.[34]

Within MONF existed various educational and academic programs, each directed by a central manager.[35] Moreover, under its roof, IMEMO arms control specialist Sergej Oznobiŝev, together with Kortunov's brother Sergej and Aleksandr Konovalov, established the Institute for Strategic Assessment (*Institut Strategičeskih Ocenok*) in

[31] For example, in 1994 MONF provided 107 scholarships to 35 political scientists, 33 sociologists and 39 economists, after receiving a total of 746 applications from both Russia and the wider CIS region.
[32] MONF was officially established on 18 June 1993 and remained active until December 2016, when it was abolished. See "Moskovskij naučnyj fond," [Moscow Science Foundation], accessed Nov. 10, 2018, https://zachestnyibiznes.ru/company/ul/1037739233234_7701019010_.
[33] Tat'âna Ždanova, like Kortunov and Aleksej Bogaturov, had been working at ISKAN where she defended her doctoral dissertation, written under Aleksej Bogaturov's supervision. Before heading the Russia branch of the Foundation, she spent three months at the McArthur Foundation as part of the Peace and International Cooperation Program in 1991, see Libby Morse, "Soviet schlolar's fear turns to hope," *Chicago Tribune*, Sept. 1, 1991, accessed Aug. 8, 2018, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1991-09-01-9103050815-story.html.
[34] Dmitrij Mysâkov, "Vvedenie v fondostroenie: Iz dvuh amerikanskih fondov polučitsâ odin rossijskij," [Introduction to the foundation of funds: Making one Russian from two American funds] *Poisk*, no. 8, (2003), 27.
[35] In 1997 MONF consisted of the following Centers and Programs: Center for Academic and Educational Programs (Elena L.Novikova), Center for Constitutional Research (Ol'ga B. Sidorovič), Center for Regional Legal Information (L.E. Lapteva), Moscow Center for Legal Information (S.V. Sirotkin), Program for the Promotion of Legal Education Reform in Russia (A.K. Soboleva), and the Center for Russian-Canadian Projects (V.B. Benevolenskij). In 2001 Vladimir Benevolenskij – another graduate of ISKAN – followed Kortunov as MONF director.

1996.[36] Most important, however, particularly for the younger generation of researchers and future experts, became the project which turned into an independent program titled “Convertible Education in Russia and the CIS” (*Konvertiruemoe obrazovanie v Rossii i SNG*): From 1997 onwards, MONF organized biannual summer and winter methodological schools under the leadership of Aleksej Bogaturov. Dmitrij Baluev, a former participant who today teaches at the Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod, where he heads the Department of Applied Political Science, commented in 2004 on the impact these schools had had for his personal development and for the creation of research networks in Russia:

> In these years, the teaching staff was kind of a snapshot of [Russian] national science of international relations. […] Together they provided a holistic view on the state of the discipline in our country, which enabled us to navigate, to determine our place in national science and to decide on the priorities of our creative development, which I am trying to do to this day. For junior scholars from Nižnij Novgorod, this was very important. There was no other way to receive a coherent picture of all-Russian academic life in the sphere of international research. The schools facilitated the formation of a collaborative network of teachers and researchers from different regions.[37]

In parallel with his work at MONF, Kortunov started to curate two more educational programs in the late 1990s, both of which were directed at the development of research facilities in the Russian regions. First, in 1998 the American-Hungarian investor George Soros approached Kortunov with the idea to represent his Open Society Foundation in Russia. Kortunov declined, but both men reached a compromise.[38] Instead of leading the Foundation, Kortunov would curate the ‘mega-project’ “The development of education in Russia” (*Razvitie obrazovaniâ v Rossii*). For Soros, this served as an alternative to the individual-based grant system, whose

[36] Ol'ga Novikova, “Moskovskij obshhestvenny'j nauchny'j fond,” [The Moscow Public Scientific Foundation] *Vestnik gumanitarnoj nauki*, no. 4 (36), (1997), accessed October 10, 2018, http://vestnik.rsuh.ru/article.html?id=55489. Both Aleksej Arbatov and Sergej V. Sobko participated in the foundation of the institute.
[37] Dmitrij Baluev, “Set', v kotoruû vse hotât popast',” [‘A network, in which everyone wants to end up’] *Meždunarodnye Processy*, t. 2, no. 2 (6): 151, accessed Aug. 10, 2018, http://intertrends.ru/old/sixth/015.htm.
[38] Mysâkov, “Vvedenie v fondostroenie: Iz dvuh amerikanskih fondov polučitsâ odin rossijskij,” [Introduction to the foundation of funds: Making one Russian from two American funds], 27.

financing he reduced significantly after 1999 due to the unfulfilled promises of the Russian government to meet its funding obligation.[39]

At its core, the new project supported prospective research at regional Russian universities, which were to profit from collaboration with research centers based in Moscow, or even abroad, over a period of two years. Moreover, as part of Soros' university internet centers,[40] the selected institutions used new technologies, including distance learning, electronic textbooks and multi-media courses, for education. In the first round more than 200 application from 33 universities were submitted, of which 20 to 25 were eventually selected.[41] Among the first participants were the Sociology Department at the University of Novosibirsk, the Political Science Departments in Tomsk and Samara, the Economic Departments in Ekaterinburg, Voronezh and Novgorod, and the Historical Department in Petrozavodsk.[42]

In autumn 1999, under the roof of MONF, Kortunov established the Center "Information. Science. Education" (*Informaciâ. Nauka. Obrazovanie*), or INO-Center. Three years later the center turned into an independent non-commercial organization under Kortunov's leadership.[43] The center emerged as the central partner of an agreement between the Russian Ministry of Education and the Carnegie Foundation, supported by the McArthur Foundation, to develop modern research centers in the social sciences and humanities at state universities in the Russian regions.[44] The central project of the INO-Center, "Interregional Research in the Social Sciences" (*Mežregional'nye issledovaniâ v obŝestvennyh naukah*; MION) was tasked to create regional hotspots for the realization of academic projects, publications, international cooperation, and the consolidation of the scientific community. For example, in 2003 with the help of INO, nine 'MION-centers' were opened in Southern Russia based at

[39] Andrej Kortunov, "Ot individual'noj podderžki - k megaproektam," [From individual support to megaprojects] *Inostranec*, Aug. 16, 1999.
[40] The program was initiated in 1999 with a budget of US$ 100 million.
[41] Kortunov, "Ot individual'noj podderžki - k megaproektam," [From individual support to megaprojects] 1999.
[42] Leonard Bernardo, "New Partnerships in Russian Higher Education," *Open Society News*, Fall 1999, 14.
[43] Andrej Kortunov, "INO-centr – organizaciâ 'novogo pokoleniâ'," [The INO-centre – an organization of the 'new generation'] *Vysšee obrazovanie v Rossii: Naučno-pedagogičeskij žurnal Ministerstva obrazovaniâ i nauki Rossijskoj Federacii*, no. 6, (2004): 21-24.
[44] Washington ProFile, "Rossijskuû nauku i obrazovanie podderživaût MIONy, interv'û s Dianoj Arsenân (Deana Arsenian)," [MIONs support Russian science and education, interview with Deana Arsenian], Dec. 1, 2003, accessed Oct. 16, 2018, http://www.museum.ru/N15652.

the Rostov State University (since 2006 Southern Federal University). Moreover, once established researchers got the opportunity to apply for individual and collective grants, the MION-centers libraries received Western academic literature. In this context, the INO-Center functioned as a hub for various projects that were pursued in parallel. This included, for example, the organization of meetings of donor organizations active in the field of Russian sciences, and the journal "Central-European Yearbook" with articles from leading scholars in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.[45]

4.1.4 New Eurasia and RIAC

In late 2003 Kortunov left MONF. In April 2004, the US Eurasia Foundation, whose Vice-President Kortunov had been for several years, initiated the establishment of the Foundation "New Eurasia" (*Novaâ Evraziâ*; FNE).[46] Together with the European Madariaga – College of Europe Foundation, headed by then EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and the Dynasty Foundation, established in 2002 by Russian businessman Dmitrij Zimin, the project was to finance and support civil society programs in Russia with a focus on social policy and youth education.[47] Andrej Kortunov was appointed President. At the official opening in December 2004 he described the task of this new initiative as to "prevent a situation, in which Russia and its Western partners could end up on opposite sides, as we have witnessed in the last few days in Ukraine."[48] Thus, in the mids of the 'Orange revolution', a series of protests that followed the Ukrainian Presidential elections and led to a reversal of the first official result, the foundation appeared as a distinct Western-Russian cooperation project, fostering dialogue.

Under Kortunov's leadership, between 2004 and 2013 FNE organized almost 100 different projects and programs in cooperation with 50 universities and spent more than 200 million rubles in the form of grants and donations sponsoring the work of

[45] The journal, however, was published only once in 2003. See Tat'âna Šakleina, Meždunarodnye otnošeniâ i bezopasnost', Central'no-Evropejskij ežegodnik," [International Relations and Security, Central-European yearbook] Vyp. 1, (Moskva: Logos, 2003).
[46] "Učrežden Fond "Novaâ Evraziâ," [The Foundation 'New Eurasia' has been founded], May 27, 2004, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, http://www.rmcenter.ru/about/news/1827/.
[47] Dmitrij Zimin is the founder of the telecommunication company PJSC VimpelCom
[48] RIA-novosti, "V Moskve otkryt fond 'Novaâ EvrAziâ'," [The Foundation 'New Eurasia' opens in Moscow], Dec. 1, 2004, accessed Aug. 10, 2018, https://ria.ru/economy/20041201/748589.html.

NGOs and research centers throughout Russia. In total 1.6 billion rubles were invested.[49]

In June 2015, however, two State Duma Deputies from the Communist party put forward an official request to the Ministry of Justice and the Russian Attorney General to review the activities of FNE in the context of the foreign-agents law that had been adopted in July 2012.[50] Although Kortunov argued at the time that the responsible authorities had cleared the center of all charges stating that the law did not apply to New Eurasia, particularly because FNE received minimal foreign sponsorship,[51] the organization terminated its activities in late 2017. Kortunov's career as a manager of Western funds and Russian science came to an end. Instead, he returned to foreign policy analysis and the Russian expert community.

Already in 2010, Kortunov had been appointed Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). The nomination, so Kortunov, had been "largely by chance", although when asked about possible reasons, he provides some concrete arguments, which are directly related to his previous experiences:


> I think, the fact that I had a rather large experience in building non-commercial organizations had an impact and, on the other hand, my basic training is in international relations after all, and, well, we [Igor' Ivanov, RIAC President] did know each other a little. He had read some of my publications. That is why, it seems to me, that here you have a mixture of somewhat unusual […] with professional knowledge. I think that is something which helped us when establishing RIAC.[52]

As will become clear in chapter 6, Kortunov's knowledge as a manager of funds and coordinator of large, diverse networks of academics, employees of NGO's and foreign sponsors came in handy, because the Council would be nothing else but this: A platform to unite different representatives of Russia's foreign policy community in project-related work. Kortunov's appointment, however, had also a distinct effect on his own position as an expert. Despite his prominence within the international

[49] "Fond Novaâ Evraziâ, 10 let – Ot dostignutyh rezul'tatov k budušim dostiženiâm," [Foundation New Eurasia, 10 years – From achieved results to future accomplishments] 2014, Jan. 16, 2015, accessed Aug. 11, 2018, https://de.slideshare.net/valentinakolobaeva/fne-2004-2014.
[50] Alena Sivkova, "Fond 'Novaâ Evraziâ' prosât priznat' inostrannym agentom," [Asked to recognize the foundation 'New Eurasia' as a foreign agent] *Izvestiâ*, June 16, 2015, accessed Jan. 16, 2019, https://iz.ru/news/587729.
[51] ibid.
[52] #12, Andrej Kortunov, RIAC, June 2017.

democracy and education promotion network and extensive national and international contacts, he had not turned into a public expert figure while working as a science manager, although he had never lost contact with fellow experts or politics completely. In fact, in the 1990s he participated in various informal gatherings such as Nikonov's Klub-93. His media capital, however, remained low, particularly during the 2000s, as shown in Diagram 9.

Diagram 9: Andrei Kortunov: Media Capital 2000-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

It began to increase only in 2012, when RIAC became fully operational. Since then he has been frequently cited for his authoritative opinion on international affairs in the Russian press. This sudden shift in public visibility emphasizes my theoretical argument about the significance of the media field in producing expert positions. It highlights the fact that, at least in Kortunov's case, media capital and public reception follow institutional position. Moreover, it stresses the analytical distinction between experts and expertise: Given his educational background, the 'science manager' Kortunov possessed foreign policy expertise. Yet, it was his position as Director General at RIAC through which he turned into a foreign policy expert.

4.2 The Theorist: Aleksej Bogaturov

> The *nomenklatura* has one advantage – organizational resources. They provide stability. If you want to achieve stability outside of it, you need to be above average. It is hard to earn money in the non-state sector at the mediocre level.[53]

A survey conducted in 2014 by Pavel and Andrey Tsygankov among 40 Russian scholars named Aleksej Bogaturov as Russia's most eminent IR theorist.[54] Almost 9 out of 10 respondents considered Bogaturov to be among the three most important IR scholars.[55] Moreover, asked for significant ideas introduced by Russian researchers and intellectuals since the end of the Soviet Union, three different concepts developed by Bogaturov in the 1990s and early 2000s stood out: 'conglomerate of enclaves', 'strategy of grinding', and 'unipolar multipolarity'. Besides Bogaturov no other single author was mentioned more than once.[56] Despite his sudden illness in 2011 and subsequent retreat from active work, Bogaturov remains visible both as a theoretician and academic teacher at MGIMO, whose students have often become prominent experts themselves.

4.2.1 Upbringing and Education

In contrast to many of his colleagues who studied international affairs in the Soviet Union, Bogaturov comes neither from a *nomenklatura* or Muscovite academic family, nor was he raised in the capital. His Greek father worked as an engineer, while his mother taught as a teacher at a middle school, although she later became headmaster and Deputy Minister of Enlightenment in the Kabardino Balkaria Autonomous SSR in the Northern Caucasus. Bogaturov, born in 1954, graduated from school with a golden medal for outstanding academic achievements[57] and applied successfully for

[53] Aleksej Bogaturov, *Kak stat' professional'nym meždunarodnikom v Rossii: opisanie opyta i pis'ma iz počti prožitoj žizni* [How to become a professional meždunarodnik in Russia: A description of experience and letters from a life that has almost ended] (Moskva: Russkaâ Panopama, 2018), 114.
[54] Andrej Cygankov and Pavel Cygankov, "Rossijskie Meždunarodniki-Teoretiki: Opyt Avtoportreta," [Russian IR Theorists: Experience of a self-portrait] *Mirovaâ Èkonomika i Meždunarodnye otnošeniâ*, no. 9 (2014): 92-102.
[55] ibid. 95.
[56] ibid. 93.
[57] The system of school medals to honor the best students in the Soviet Union was first established in May 1945. Golden medals allowed pupils to reduce their number of exams necessary for entering university.

a place at MGIMO. Having grown up in the Russian countryside, Bogaturov found himself in a challenging hierarchical environment. He recalls in 2014:

> Staying at the MGIMO turned out not to be easy. Those from better families chose easier languages. Provincials were less lucky. I will not go into details, but these are the facts: first, I was assigned to learn Pashto, but after two weeks I was moved to the group learning Sinhalese, and again two months later to the Japanese group. Needless to say, I did not pass the language exam the first time.[58]

While the random assignment to the Japanese learning group determined his academic career for nearly two decades, his difficulties in learning the language at first almost led to his forced removal from MGIMO. The arbitrary assignment procedure induced Bogaturov with a sense of aversion against the bureaucratic system and its *nomenklatura*. Even after graduation from university, the challenges continued. Without a Moscow *propiska,* i.e. a residency permit inaccessible for people from the Soviet regions, it was impossible for him to remain in the city without a permanent position. Since that time, so Bogaturov, he did not feel as an academic but rather as an "intellectual worker" (*proletarii umstvennogo truda*).[59]

Nevertheless, after graduation in 1976 Bogaturov was able to remain at MGIMO as a lecturer until his academic teacher Dmitrij Petrov offered him a position at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies (IDV) in autumn that year. Petrov, a graduate of the Moscow Oriental Institute and then the leading Soviet Japanologist,[60] had joined the institute a few months earlier from IMEMO to build up the Department for Japanese Studies.[61] Bogaturov spent more than ten years at the IDV. In 1983 he defended his dissertation on the issue of energy commodities in Japanese foreign policy. Although he continued to work on Japan, he increasingly engaged with theoretical questions. For this kind of work, his education at MGIMO had provided him with a distinct advantage over area specialists like his mentor Petrov, who belonged to the philological and historical

[58] Bogaturov, "Oglâdyvaâs' na prošloe. Avtoočerk," [Looking Back] 2014: 136-137; See also Bogaturov, *Kak stat' professional'nym meždunarodnikom v Rossii*.
[59] Bogaturov, "Oglâdyvaâs' na prošloe. Avtoočerk," [Looking Back] 2014: 129.
[60] Political Science as an institutionalized academic discipline did not exist in the Soviet Union before 1989.
[61] This change was not entirely voluntarily. Despite important publications on Japanese foreign policy and close personal contacts to IMEMO Director Inozemtsev, who had supported his appointment as the Institute's Party Secretary, his career stalled. In April 1970 the position of Deputy Director, already promised to Petrov, was assigned to Evgenij Primakov. When his salary as researcher was cut in April 1976, Petrov left furiously and disappointed. See Mihail Nosov, "Moj Institut," [My institute] *SŠA. Èkonomika-politika-kul'tura*, no.9 (2017): 58.

tradition. Rather than focusing narrowly on internal developments, he took Japan and Asia as empirical examples for the study of international political order. When the latter was set in motion at the end of the 1980s, Bogaturov became increasingly disappointed with the work at the "stagnant" IDV. In spring 1988 he left to take up a position at ISKAN.

4.2.2 Joining ISKAN

At ISKAN, Bogaturov discovered an entirely different, more vibrant working environment. In the late 1980s ISKAN brought together a circle of young ambitious and aspiring researchers with eminent figures of Soviet international relations and security research. Among the latter were the Institute's founding Director Georgij Arbatov and his Deputies Andrej Kokošin, Viktor Kremenûk and Vitalij Žurkin, but also the Heads of the Transpacific Section and the Department for Foreign Policy, Vladimir Lukin and Genrih Trofimenko. The younger cohort – Bogaturov's colleagues, who were about the same age as him – included Sergej Karaganov, Andrej Kortunov, Andrej Mel'vil', the Research Secretary Igor' Malašenko and the editor of "USA. Economics, Politics, Ideology",[62] Mihail Kožokin. All of them eventually became respected and influential figures in post-Soviet Russia. [63]

The Institute's position in the intellectual field of the time is well expressed by Bogaturov's own description. As an academic outsider, who had worked at a much less prestigious institution for more than a decade, he experienced a tremendous sense of awe:

> ISKAN was one of two main centers of intellectual brilliance and free thought. I was tremendously lucky to get in there. It was at the same time a great honor and quite scary, because to find oneself in such a sparkling environment was terrifying. The first year of my work I was imbued with this feeling.[64]

[62] The journal was renamed in 1998 as US and Canada. Economics, Politics, Culture (*SShA i Kanada. ėkonomika, politika, kul'tura*).
[63] When Bogaturov arrived at ISKAN, several researchers, including Žurkin, Karaganov and Shmelev, had already left ISKAN for the Institute of Europe, which was established in winter 1987. In 1989 Mel'vil' joined MGIMO where he participated in the establishment of the first official Soviet university department of political science. Mihail Kožokin is the younger brother of Evgenij Kožokin, the long-term director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (see chapter 6.3.4).
[64] Bogaturov, "Oglâdyvaâs' na prošloe. Avtoočerk," [Looking Back] 2014: 131-132.

Bogaturov started to work under the supervision of Mihail Nosov. As a former doctoral student of Petrov, Nosov had left IMEMO together with his supervisor in 1976.[65] In January 1990 Bogaturov and Nosov published an article in "USA. Economics, Politics, Ideology" on the relations between the United States and Japan. Their approach deviated from the economic crisis-inducing determinism in the capitalist West characteristic of orthodox Soviet writings.[66] For Bogaturov and Nosov, economic competition was to become the "centripetal force of the American-Japanese Union".[67] Conflicts and disagreements, they argued, were nothing but a childhood illness of intensifying interdependence.

Instrumental for Bogaturov's transformation from an area specialist to an IR theorist studying various aspects of international relations was ISKAN Deputy Director and leading Americanist Viktor Kremenûk.[68] In 1990-1991 he organized theoretical seminars to discuss the ongoing transformation of the world order. The participants, including Bogaturov, wrote theoretical papers in English on the reform of global governance.[69] With the support of Kremenûk, Bogaturov was appointed Head of the Comparative Foreign Policy Research section in 1991. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet republics turned into a novel area of research and Bogaturov became responsible for the section on US policies towards the CIS, which in 1993 eventually turned into the Department for US Policies in Eurasia.

As many of his colleagues after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Bogaturov used the opportunity to travel to the United States as a research and teaching fellow.[70] In 1993 he received an IREX (International Research & Exchanges Board) scholarship and

[65] Nosov, "Moj Institut," [My institute] 2017: 58.
[66] In his own memory Bogaturov falsely states that the publication stems from January 1989. See Bogaturov, "Oglâdyvaâs' na prošloe. Avtoočerk," [Looking Back] 2014: 132.
[67] Aleksej Bogaturov and Mihail Nosov, "Amerikano-âponskoe partnerstvo: poiski novoj modeli," [The American-Japanese Patnership: Searching for a new model] *SShA. Ėkonomika. Politika. Ideologiâ*, no. 1 (241), (ânvar' 1990): 40.
[68] Viktor Kremenûk (1940-2017) graduated from MGIMO in 1963 and subsequently worked for five years as a military translator at the Soviet Ministry of Defense. After two years as a journalist for Meždunarodnaâ Žizn', published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he joined IMEMO in 1970, where he introduced the role of the United States in the developing world as a novel research topic. From 1989 until his death he was ISKRAN Deputy Director.
[69] Aleksej Bogaturov, "Um mošnyj i nepodatlivyj. K 70-letiû Viktora Kremenûka," [A powerful and stubborn mind. On the occasion of the 70th birthday of Viktor Kremenûk] *Meždunarodnye processy*, no 2, t. 8 (2010): 134-139.
[70] For example, in 1992 and again in 1994 Andrej Mel'vil' taught seminars on Russian politics at the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. In 1993 a similar seminar was taught by Andrej Kortunov, See Andrej Mel'vil, *Berkli* [Berkeley], accessed Nov. 10, 2018, https://25.hse.ru/cities/berkeley.

subsequently spent three months at the prestigious Columbia University in New York.[71] In summer 1994 he returned to the city to teach a seminar about Russian politics, and afterwards spent the entire autumn semester at Princeton University. Here he wrote a monograph that established his reputation as an IR scholar: "The Great Powers at the Pacific Ocean" (*Velikie deržavy na Tihom Okeane*), published in 1997. The book was very well received by his colleagues, and other academic leaders and institute directors were forced to take him seriously a researcher. Ironically, 'The Great Powers', in which Bogaturov analyzed the surprising stability of the East Asian regional sub-system after the Second World War, simultaneously marked the end of his career as an area specialist and Japanologist. From this point on, he devoted himself almost exclusively to the study of International Relations theory and world order.

4.2.3 Surviving Russian Science

The success of his book, however, was preceded by personal financial trouble that put Bogaturov's academic career at risk. Upon his return from the US, the dire financial situation at ISKRAN forced him to leave the institute and start working as a lecturer at MGIMO. Together with Andrej Kortunov he also began working at MONF. Although Bogaturov did not like the purely administrative work, the money made him stay as he recalled recently:

> I just remembered the poverty from 1992 to 1995 too well. There were three months from March to June 1995 when I ate only grain sent by my father from Nal'čik [capital of Kabardino-Balkaria]. There was no money for butter, and I bought boiled sausage only three times a month.[72]

In the preface to 'Great Powers', written in April 1997, Bogaturov spoke of the immense difficulties he had faced and emphasized the importance of US material support. The text also reflects his opposition to the economic policies pursued by the Russian government from 1991 to 1992, on which he blamed his personal misery:

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[71] IREX had been established in 1968 based on an agreement by President Eisenhower and General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev from 1958. From 1958 to 1985 about 2,000 Soviet academics visited the United States, yet, usually for just one week. On the role of IREX and US-Soviet academic exchange in the Brezhnev era see Sergei Zhuk, "Academic Détente: IREX Files, Academic Reports, and 'American' Adventures of Soviet Americanists during the Brezhnev Era," *Cahiers du Monde Russe*, 54, nos. 1-2 (Janvier-Juin 2013): 297-328.

[72] Bogaturov, *Kak stat' professional'nym meždunarodnikom v Rossii*, 91.

> But writing – writing was impossible. One had to survive. Especially, when in 1991 they […], in the heat of the inevitable, but reckless and greedy reforms, started to destroy the fundaments of Russian science. It seemed heaven was against us. […] Dr. Konstantin Viktorovich Pleshakov,[73] Prof. Scott Thompson from the US Institute of Peace, Prof. Gilbert Rosman from Princeton University and Prof. Mark von Hagen from Columbia University helped me to survive in science from 1992 to 1996 and to receive access to material without which I could not have written this book.[74]

While Bogaturov's financial situation improved during the years 1996 to 1999, his academic productivity diminished. In summer 1998, besides his work at MONF, Bogaturov started to write regularly for different newspapers on domestic political issues, particularly for the weekly *Vek* (Century). Two articles co-authored with Aleksandr Vinogradov on the future of the party bloc Our House – Russia (*Nash dom – Rossiâ*) and the Russian constitutional order in late October 1998 published in *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*,[75] caught the attention of Aleksandr Šohin. In post-Soviet Russia social uplifts could work fast: Former academic economist Šohin, first Russian Minister of Labor and at the time parliamentary leader of Our House – Russia, invited Bogaturov to become his personal analyst.

In his new role, Bogaturov engaged in political consulting, which primarily meant supporting the election campaigns of Samara Oblast Governor Konstantin Titov and Stepan Sulaškin, who unsuccessfully agitated for a seat in the State Duma in the Tomsk region. Although these political contacts did not pay off directly in terms of career advancement, they nevertheless provided Bogaturov with a better sense for the political game. At MONF, however, Andrej Kortunov did not welcome these activities, and Bogaturov decided to leave MONF in spring 1999. Instead he joined his former workplace – ISKRAN – as Deputy Director. His return to ISKRAN, however, did not last long either. Already in January 2003 personal differences with director

[73] Constantine Pleshakov (*1959) studied at the Institute for Asian and African Studies (ISAA) at Moscow State University (MSU) and worked at ISKAN/ISKRAN from 1985 to 1996. In 1996 he emigrated to the US, where he currently teaches at Mount Holyoke College.
[74] Aleksej Bogaturov, Velikie deržavy na Tihom okeane. Istoriâ i teoriâ meždunarodnyh otnošenij v Vostočnoj Azii posle vtoroj mirovoj vojny (1945-1995) [The Great Powers at the Pacific Ocean. History and Theory of International relations in East Asia after the Second World War (1945-1995)] (Moskva: Konvert – MONF, 1997), 2.
[75] Aleksej Bogaturov and Aleksandr Vinogradov, "Problema vlasti i sindrom konstitucionnogo reformizma," [The problems of power and the constitutional reformism syndrome] *Nezavimisaâ Gazeta*, no. 195 (1766), Oct. 20, 1998; Aleksej Bogaturov and Aleksandr Vinogradov, "Pravyj centr i NDR," [The right center and NDR] *Nezavimisaâ Gazeta*, no. 201 (1772), Oct. 28, 1998.

Sergej Rogov led to Bogaturov's resignation. Since the financial income from his activities as a journalistic writer dried out, he took an offer by Vladimir Baranovskij to join IMEMO as a senior researcher.

4.2.4 Academic Teacher

While still working at MONF with Kortunov, Bogaturov succeeded in securing funds from the MacArthur Foundation to establish the Scientific-Educational Forum on International Relations (*Naučno-obrazovatel'nyj forum po meždunarodnym otnošeniâm*; NOFMO*).*[76] The forum took up its work in March 2000 and primarily offered educational seminars, but also functioned as a publishing house. As such it allowed Bogaturov to institutionalize his own cultural capital, for example by publishing what became his most significant intellectual achievement: the systemic history of international relations, a collaborative project with colleagues from ISKRAN begun in the mid-1990s and published in four volumes between autumn 2000 and December 2003.[77] Moreover, with the help of MONF and the McArthur Foundation Bogaturov set up the first post-Soviet Russian academic journal dedicated to IR theory and world politics: 'International Processes' (*Meždunarodnye processy*), established in winter 2002. Both NOFMO and the journal created institutional platforms for intellectual exchange among Russian academic academic researchers. They also became a training ground for the younger generation.

At the same time, the success of the journal and the publication of the 'systemic history' led to the expansion of Bogaturov's own social network. In September 2003 he became a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC, where he spent almost a year. In his memoirs Bogaturov argues that

[76] From 1999 to 2011 NOFMO received six grants from the McArthur Foundation, amounting to almost 2 million US$ in total. The first grant received in 1999 was just over 200,000 US$. See MacArthur Foundation, Grantees (Academic Educational Forum on International Relation), accessed Nov. 12, 2018, https://www.macfound.org/grantees/4/.

[77] Aleksej Bogaturov (ed.), *Sistemnaâ istoriâ meždunarodnyh otnošenij. Sobytiâ i dokumenty 1918-2003, Sobytiâ i dokumenty* [Systemic History of International Relations. Events and Documents 1918-2003] (Moskva: Naučno-obrazovatel'nyj forum po meždunarodnym otnošeniâm, 2004).

> I learned a lot of new things and made additional contacts among American scientists and analysts. […] Valuable professional contacts of this trip were - Strobe Talbott, Fiona Hill, Blair Ruble, Bruce Perrot and Clifford Gaddy. It is strange, but it was precisely in Washington, in spring 2004, right at the Brookings Institution that I met Sergeĭ Aleksandrovich Karaganov for the first time in person. We spoke cheerfully and at some length about different questions, but, to be honest, nothing concrete came out of it.[78]

This comparatively late meeting with Karaganov – at the time Russia's most prominent public intellectual and Chairman of SVOP (see chapter 5) – is illustrative of Bogaturov's social position and trajectory.[79] Whereas some of his former colleagues at ISKAN, including Karaganov, but also Vladimir Lukin and even Kortunov, had been able to accumulate political capital and sometimes even economic capital in the 1990s, Bogaturov, through all these years, had struggled to remain a 'pure' academic. The beginning of the 2000s marked the point of his transformation by accumulating resources and contacts.

Upon his return from the US, Bogaturov renewed and intensified his relationship with Andrej Kokošin. An intellectual and political heavyweight, Kokošin had been a researcher at ISKAN, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union served as First Deputy Minister of Defense, state military inspector and Secretary of the Security Council. Since 1999 he had led the Institute for International Security Problems (*Institut problem meždunarodnoj bezopasnosti*), which was established on his initiative at the Academy of Sciences (but was eventually closed in the 2010s). Although formally colleagues for almost three years during their time at ISKAN, Bogaturov and Kokošin did not know each other well until their second encounter in 2004. Fond of the journal *International Processes*, Kokošin invited Bogaturov to join the institute.

[78] Bogaturov, "Oglâdyvaâs' na prošloe. Avtoočerk," [Looking Back] 2014: 138. Nevertheless, the meeting eventually led to Bogaturov joining the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) in 2008.

[79] In 2005 Karaganov was the only Russian citizen on the list of the world's top 100 public intellectuals selected by the journals Foreign Policy and the Prospect Magazine. The public vote among readers put Karaganov on place 79, receiving 194 votes. See "The Prospects/FP Top 100 Public Intellectuals," *Foreign Policy*, Oct. 14, 2005, accessed Nov. 12, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2005/10/14/the-prospectfp-top-100-public-intellectuals/.


This collaboration opened a new kind of intellectual occupation to Bogaturov: applied policy analysis, which would eventually turn into his legacy as an academic.[80]

In September 2005, the Dean of the Faculty of Political Science at MGIMO, Aleksej Salmin, widely regarded to be one of the most knowledgeable and profound political thinkers in post-Soviet Russia,[81] passed away. Bogaturov succeeded him. As Dean of the Faculty he established the Department of Applied Foreign Policy Analysis (*Kafedra prikladnogo analiza meždunarodnyh problem*) and, with the support of Ivan Tûlin, was appointed MGIMO Vice Rector. This prominent position in the academic field did not translate into political capital, however. Likewise, apart from the short period of time in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when he actively wrote for newspapers, his media capital remained comparatively low and dried out completely after 2011 due to his illness (Diagram 10).

[80] Bogaturov argues that thanks to Andrej Kokošin's personal contacts, the analytical materials produced at the institute, largely on the situation in the CIS, reached political decision-makers. See Bogaturov, "Oglâdyvaâs' na prošloe. Avtoočerk," [Looking Back] 2014: 140.

[81] The former Director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies and current Vice-Rector of MGIMO, Evgenij Kožokin, for example, characterizes Salmin as somebody "whose scope and depth of understanding of political processes would make him an eminent authority in any Western state, including the US […] A.M. Salmin was the first highly original, independent thinker in the sphere of political science theory". See Evgenij Kožokin, "– nočnogo storoža," [The mystic of the state – the nightwatchman] *Voprosy gosudarsvennogo i municipal'nogo upravleniâ*, tom. 1, no. 1 (2007): 160. Similarly, Boris Makarenko remarks that "his universal knowledge did not lie in the amount of reading he had done, not in its quantity, but in the quality of mastery of the material. […] He was one of those giants on whose shoulders our national science rests". See Boris Makarenko, "Russkij Evropeec, Pamâti A. M. Salmina," [The Russian European, in memory of A. M. Salmin] Politiâ, no. 3 (38) (2005): 4.

Diagram 10: Aleksej Bogaturov: Media Capital 2000-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East View information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

He was rarely cited for authoritative opinion. In 2004 this led one of his academic students, Mihail Troickij, to suggest in an email exchange between them that he "could more deliberately unwind [his] position as an expert. However, […] as an expert with an untainted reputation, non-partisan. With convictions, but still objective."[82] Such a posture, Troickij believed, would create a special position and distinguish Bogaturov from those who had explicit political affiliations, including Georgij Satarov and Vâčeslav Nikonov. This contrast between "non-partisan" and politically affiliated experts points to my theoretical argument about different but relational expert positions, with Bogaturov representing the academic pole.

Bogaturov's path thus illustrates the challenges of doing academic research on Russian foreign policy (and international relations) after 1991. Without a *nomenklatura* background and the acquisition of necessary political or economic capital in the late 1980s, Bogaturov's position in the field depended on him excelling in academic writing within Russia. Despite his MGIMO education and the transfer to ISKAN in 1988, his professional status improved only slowly through hard work and foreign financial support, which enabled him to survive in academia. In consequence, he never accumulated the kind of political or media capital enjoyed by his former academic peers, including Kortunov and Nikonov (see 5.4). However, at MGIMO he turned into a father-figure and academic teacher for the next generation. His own

[82] Bogaturov, *Kak stat' professional'nym meždunarodnikom v Rossii*, 119.

doctoral students, Mihail Trojckij, Andrej Bajkov and, in particular, Andrej Sušencov (see 6.1.3), have become prominent experts themselves.

4.3 The Specialist: Aleksej Arbatov

> In our field, professional preparation is not limited to studying at universities, but also relates to the work in state and academic foreign policy organizations. The ability to become a specialist, and then to take one's course not just by grabbing something according to the idea 'you snooze, you lose', but based on solid knowledge and experience through long and persistent work. Only by such work do you ultimately become a specialist.[83]

In 1984 Aleksej Arbatov published his third book-length analysis of US nuclear weapons and security policies. His first book, his PhD dissertation that he defended in 1975, analyzed the American conception of 'national security' and the course of American nuclear policy during the 1960s.[84] His second book, published in 1980, widened this perspective by discussing the issue of security in the nuclear age broadly speaking.[85] With the third one, Arbatov defended his second dissertation, which earned him the academic title *doktor nauk* at the very young age of 34.[86] The publication also established him as a specialist on strategic questions, in particular US nuclear weapons policy. The concept of 'strategic stability', introduced by former US Minister of Defense Robert McNamara in 1964, became central to his thinking about international relations and Russia's place in the world. Strategic stability would prevent war based on mutually assured destruction.

4.3.1 Upbringing and Education

When Aleksej Arbatov became a student at MGIMO in 1968, his family name was already part of the highest echelon of Soviet intellectual circles. His father Georgij had

[83] Aleksej Arbatov, "Poterânnoe desâtiletie v kontrole nad vooruženiâmii," [Lost decade in arms control] *Meždunarodnye Processy*, t. 5, no. 2 (14), Jan-Apr. (2007): 103.
[84] Aleksej Arbatov, *Amerikanskaâ koncepciâ "nacional'noj bezopasnosti" i politika v oblasti raketno-âdernogo oružiâ v 60-e gody* [The American conception of national security in the field of nuclear missiles in the 1960s] Avtoreferat dissertatîi (Moskva: IMEMO, 1975).
[85] Aleksej Arbatov, *Bezopasnost' v âdernyj vek i politika Vašingtona* [Security in the nuclear century and the policy of Washington] (Moskva: Politizdat, 1980).
[86] Aleksej Arbatov, *Voenno-strategičeskij paritet i politika SŠA* [Military-strategic parity and US policy] (Moskva: Politizdat, 1984).

been the head of ISKAN[87] since 1967 and enjoyed personal access to KGB Chief Yuri Andropov and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.[88] This family background allowed Arbatov to take part in private discussions of international politics from an early age and to have meetings with leading intellectual and political figures of the time. It also meant particular support at home: throughout his life, Arbatov was very close to his father, to whom he turned for advice and consultation, both as a researcher and later as a politician. Functioning as a teacher and intellectual sparring partner to his son, Georgij Arbatov read many of his papers and motivated him to rewrite and improve them. Both the network and the support he received doubtlessly constituted an enormous advantage for his upbringing and subsequent career, as Arbatov admits:

> An advantage was the environment in which I grew up – an academic and diplomatic environment. From a quite young age I participated in discussions about important international political and economic problems. First, as a listener, but little by little I participated more fully in serious debates. And of course, the reputation and connections of my father also helped me. These were enormous advantages for which I am truly thankful.[89]

From the very start of his own academic endeavors at MGIMO, Arbatov focused on military-political issues, in particular those related to nuclear arms – a path that he pursued more by chance than by design:

> Back then I read in the special archives [spechran] Kissinger‘s book “Nuclear Weapons and foreign policy”. It had been translated into Russian, although ordinary people were not allowed to read it, but it was available in the special archives of the institute. I read it and I got so much interested in it that I devoted the rest of my life to this topic.[90]

Upon graduation in 1972, Arbatov went to the United States for the first time in his life. As part of a university student group he spent six months as an intern working at

[87] The institute was established as the “Institute for US Studies”. “Canada” was added in 1974.
[88] Georgij Arbatov was introduced to Andropov for the first time in 1958 by Otto Kuusinen. From May 1964 to the end of 1967 Arbatov participated in an informal discussion group established by Andropov in his position as the Head of the Central Committee Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers Parties of the Socialist Nations. Here he was able to discuss political issues in an open manner. See Georgi Arbatov, *The System, An Insider’s Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Random House, 1992).
[89] Arbatov, “Poterânnoe desâtiletie v kontrole nad vooruženiâmii,” 104.
[90] Vladimir Pozner, “Gost' Aleksej Arbatov,” [Guest Aleksej Arbatov] *Pozner*, Oct. 14, 2014, accessed Aug. 10, 2018, https://pozneronline.ru/2014/10/9280/2/.

the of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. He used the time to collect empirical material in Washington and Boston, which subsequently found its way into his diploma thesis and doctoral dissertation. But the trip also affected his political views, as Arbatov remembers in an interview in 2011:

> We saw to which extent the American system differed from ours, how democratic, stable, resilient and sustainable the political system was, how important pluralism [was]. […] And when we came back, it was as if we saw not only the dark streets, not only the small and dirty cars again, but above all this stale political atmosphere […]. All of this made me look differently at our system and to understand the extent to which it was lagging behind, how much it was musty and stagnant. [91]

His growing doubts about the Soviet system were also reinforced by the military intervention of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Prague in 1968, which ended the reform process under first secretary Alexander Dubček.[92] As he would argue many years later, "after graduation from the institute, me and my friends were already full-fledged anti-communists."[93] Arbatov left MGIMO with distinction in 1973 and was invited to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but declined. Instead, he decided to continue his studies as a graduate student at IMEMO, where he defended his doctoral dissertation in 1976.[94] He stayed at the Institute until 1993.

4.3.2 Policy Entrepreneur at IMEMO

In 1983, at the age of just 33, Arbatov became Head of the sector on Disarmament at IMEMO. With the appointment of Evgenij Primakov as IMEMO Director in October 1985, successor to Aleksandr Yakovlev, his career took a significant step forward. In an interview with Petr Čerkasov in 2012, Arbatov remarks that

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[91] Matvej Ganapol'skij, "Aleksej Arbatov: u SŠA nam sleduet perenât' otnošenie k gosudarstvu," [Aleksej Arabtov: From the US we should adopt the attitude towards the state], Sept. 15, 2011, accessed Aug. 11, 2018, https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/matgan-aleksei-arbatov-2011-09-15-129880938/253183.html.

[92] Arbatov especially emphasizes the role of later conversations with Vladimir Lukin at ISKAN for his interpretation of the events. See Aleksej Arbatov, "O Vladimire Lukine: v kalejdoskope vospominanij," [About Vladimir Lukin: In the kaleidoscope of memories], in *Â ne pervyj voin, ne poslednij" K 80-letiû V. P. Lukina, kniga pervaâ* [I am not the first warrior, and not the last one ,On the 80th birthday of V. P. Lukin, Book 1] ed. Vladimir Lukin/A. D. Dikareva (Moskva, Ves' Mir, 2018), 124-125.

[93] Sergej Šapalov, "Arbatov, syn Arbatova," [Arbatov, the son of Arbatov] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, Jan. 31, 2003, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, http://www.ng.ru/saturday/2003-01-31/13_arbatov.html.

[94] "Zvezda na Zvezde s Leonidom Âkubovičem. Aleksej Arbatov," [A VIP on the TV channel 'Star with Leonid Âkubovič. Aleksej Arbatov] *Telekanal Zvezda*, Aug. 28, 2017, accessed Aug. 7, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s7JxOTxvmbg.

> with the arrival of Primakov, a lot of things changed for me. First, in the heat of the moment my sector on Disarmament was integrated into the Department on International Relations. But I had a final talk with Primakov, and I convinced him to establish a new Department on Disarmament and Security instead. He agreed. We started to publish the yearbook "Disarmament and Security" (*Razoruzhenie i bezopasnost'*) and thanks to the contact of Evgenij Maksimovič to [Èduard] Shevardnadze and [Aleksandr] Âkovlev, we actively participated in all breakthroughs in the field of disarmament at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Some of our employees participated in negotiations. I would say that the real beginning of my scientific career goes back to this time, thanks to Primakov.[95]

During Gorbachev's rule, the new Department on Disarmament and Security turned into the core intellectual powerhouse for the General Secretary's "new thinking" in foreign policy. It provided both symbolic and substantial support for moving forward with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which were signed in December 1987 and July 1991 respectively. In this context, the annual publication of "Disarmament and Security", which started in 1987, was particularly noteworthy. For the first time in the Soviet Union, raw data on domestic military issues became publicly available. Because the Soviet military kept such information secret, most of the material had to be taken from Western public sources such as "The Military Balance", published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).[96]

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Arbatov initially set out to establish his own Institute of Strategic Studies (an impossible undertaking under Soviet rule) to provide an independent perspective on military issues.[97] As early as 1992 he followed up on this idea and founded the "Center for Geopolitical and Military Forecasts" (*Centr geopolitičeskih i voennyh prognozov*) at IMEMO, which provided analyses to the Ministry of Defense. Simultaneously, he began to engage in public disputes about Russia's defense policy. In doing so, the academic and civilian specialist Arbatov encountered former military officers and engineers active within the post-Soviet

[95] Petr Čerkasov, "Vozvraŝenie Primakova (1985-1989 gg.)," [The return of Primakov (1985-1989)] *Mirovaâ Èkonomika i Meždunarodnye Otnošeniâ*, no. 10 (2013): 104.
[96] #41, expert, IMEMO, Jan. 2018.
[97] Inga Prelovskaâ, "Politika po nasledstvu. Izvestnomu učenomu-amerikanistu Georgiû Arbatovu - 80 let," [Politics by inheritence. The famous historian and US specialist Georgij Arbatov turns 80 years] *Vremâ MN*, May 20, 2003, accessed July 10, 2018, https://www.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/2003_05/030520_vrmn_arbatov.html.

military-industrial complex. In this way, two professional spheres that had existed fairly separately from each other until 1991 established closer contacts.

Resulting public controversies illustrated the different role perceptions rooted in the opposition between technical, even technocratic, knowledge and political strategy, that is, security and defense policy proper. For example, in an early dispute that developed from August to October 1992 in the newspaper *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta* with Vladislav Repin, the main design engineer of the Soviet missile earning warning system, on the appropriate Russian nuclear strategy, Arbatov argued that

> one must not confuse professionalism and professional technical specialization. It is possible to understand the mechanics perfectly well and to be a grand strategy professional. But not necessarily. This depends on a great amount of knowledge and understandings in addition to strictly technical questions.[98]

Whereas Arbatov set out to develop strategic positions that could potentially support the nascent political transformation of US-Russian relations, his political and intellectual opponents focused exclusively on Russian defense as a domestic policy issue and a source of the state's international power.

4.3.3 From Academia to Politics

When the conflict between President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet turned into a constitutional crisis (which was eventually solved by military power in October 1993), Arbatov decided to get directly involved in politics. Two weeks after the storming of the White House in autumn 1993, which was followed by the imprisonment of the Supreme Soviet leaders and the prohibition of several nationalist and communist organizations and newspapers, Arbatov published an article in *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*. He argued that the Russian government had done nothing to prevent the growing radicalization in society. To the contrary, in his opinion it had openly provoked extremists via its liberal economic policy, while its inability to compromise had unnecessarily turned potential allies into enemies.[99]

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[98] Aleksej Arbatov, "Âdernaâ strategiâ i političeskij vybor. Otvet Kritiku," [Nuclear Strategy and political decision. An answer to the critic] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, Oct. 3, 1992.
[99] Aleksej Arbatov, "Fašizm ne prošel, no demokratiâ poterpela poraženie," [Fashism did not come, but democracy got defeated] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, no. 202 (626), Oct. 22, 1993.

At this point, Arbatov had already become a public figure. Soon he was approached by Grigorij Âvlinskij with the offer to join the election bloc Yabloko, which he had founded together with the former Head of the Control Directorate of Yeltsin's Presidential Administration, Ûrij Boldyrev, and the Russian ambassador in the US, Vladimir Lukin (coincidentally a close friend and former colleague of Georgij Arbatov at ISKAN).[100] Arbatov, who considered himself a social democrat[101] and shared Yavlinsky's critique of economic "shock therapy" pursued by Prime Minister Egor Gaidar,[102] agreed. Nonetheless, the decision to leave academia was not easy for him. In an interview with Harry Kreisler, the former Executive Director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, in March 2003, at the end of this last term in parliament, Arbatov reflects on this transformation that took place in winter 1993:

> It was certainly a very big leap and a very hard choice. I remember spending several sleepless nights thinking of my future when I had to make the choice to join politics and to leave the secure and familiar academic environment, which I loved very much and which I love still now, and which has enormous advantages. Besides already at that time I was beyond 40, so I was very well established, I had a great future in the academic community and changing it so drastically was not easy, but I am not sorry about it now.[103]

In the State Duma elections in December 1993 Yabloko received almost 8% of the popular vote. Lukin became the Chair of the Committee on International Affairs, while Arbatov was elected Vice Chair of the Defense Committee and Chair of the Sub-Committee on Arms Control and International Security.

The political life Aleksej Arbatov experienced in the Russian State Duma certainly differed from the academic environment he had been used to at IMEMO. In an

[100] Lukin remained ambassador until September 1993.
[101] In several interviews Arbatov mentions that he inherited his social democratic views from his father.
[102] In November 1991 Boris Yeltsin appointed Yegor Gaidar as Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economic policies. From June to December 1992 Gaidar acted as Russian Prime Minister. In September 1993 he was once again appointed First Deputy Prime Minister and remained in this position until April 1994.
[103] Harry Kreisler, "Conversations with History, Making Foreign Policy in a Democratic Russia, Alexey G. Arbatov," March 3, 2003, accessed June 12, 2018, https://conversations.berkeley.edu/index.php/arbatov_ [10:34-11:17].

interview in 2000, his wife Nadežda Arbatova, a colleague at IMEMO and former MGIMO classmate,[104] emphasizes that

> compared to the Duma, the academic environment is simply a glass-culture. When you get into the inferno of political passions, it is your fighting qualities that become valuable and not delicacy and good manners. […] He is now a professional politician and yet, although it happens quite often, he has not become a cynic. [105]

While the academic and the political sphere did function according to different norms of behavior, Arbatov, by his own account, also profited from his scientific background. In an interview shortly before the end of his tenure in the State Duma, in May 2003, he highlights this connection:

> Here one has wide access to information. As a participant of the legislative process, you can influence decision-making. At the same time, you are not connected to bureaucratic interests and you can freely express your opinion. In the committee I work on the same question as I do at the institute. *Science helps me in this work*.[106]

One of the main issues in parliament over the course of the 1990s, for example, became the START-II ratification process – a topic at the core of Arbatov's academic studies. The agreement had been signed by US President George H. W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in January 1993 and followed the START-I agreement concluded in July 1991. START- II set a goal of reducing the strategic arsenal of both states to 3,500 warheads by the year 2003. The main issue of contention between supporters and opponents of the agreement concerned the status of land-based ICBMs with 'multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles' (MIRV), prohibited by START-II. For Russia, this effectively meant the destruction of several hundred MIRV-capable missiles with up to 6,000 warheads in total[107] and to replace them with single warheads, leading to considerable costs. Although critical of the agreement, Arbatov proceeded from the idea that due to the financial burden, Russia's strategic forces would go below the treaty level unilaterally, even if START-

[104] Nadežda Arbatova (*1950) graduated from MGIMO in 1973 and subsequently joined IMEMO. She first specialized in question of Italian foreign policy, but later widened her focus to security issues in Europe.
[105] Pivovarova, "Ah Arbatov, Moj Arbatov!," http://www.grankin.ru/dosye/archiv/profil030400-69.htm.
[106] Prelovskaâ, "Politika po nasledstvu," emphasis added.
[107] Aleksej Arbatov, "Strategičeskie dilemmy Rossii. Zametki pered parlamentskimi slušaniâmi," [Russia's Strategic Dilemmas, Notes before the parlamanetary hearings] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, no. 165, Aug. 28, 1992.

II failed. This would create an advantage for the US, eliminate nuclear parity and, in effect, undermine strategic stability. Hence, he argued for START-II ratification, hoping to correct the treaties' deficiencies in a follow-up START-III agreement.

4.3.4 Arms Control Specialist

When Yabloko failed to pass the 5% threshold in the elections to the State Duma in December 2003,[108] Arbatov lost his status as Member of Parliament. Instead, in spring 2004 he joined the Carnegie Center Moscow to head its research program on non-proliferation.[109] Arbatov had already cooperated with Carnegie in the 1990s while working at IMEMO. In January 2002 his old department had been transformed into the Center for International Security (*Centr Meždunarodnoj Bezopasnosti*).

Whereas Arbatov's family background, as mentioned above, had been an advantage in his youth and for his earlier career, the political views of his father and his own political engagement in the State Duma after the collapse of the Soviet Union now created obstacles. His personal academic and political spheres began to merge. Political opponents used their power to deny Arbatov a further rise in the academic hierarchy. Arbatov recalls in an interview published in Bogaturov's journal *International Processes* in 2007:


> When at the end of the 1990s my native IMEMO nominated me to receive the title Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the section and the department supported my candidacy, but the General Assembly of the Academy of Sciences did not endorse me. Two years later I was once again nominated – but again failed miserably. Only the third time, in 2003, was I elected corresponding member by a small margin. […] Then I was reminded: The enemies of my father and my own enemies accounted for a sufficiently large group, and many were just annoyed by my family name and the fact that I was a member of the Duma then. They tried to sabotage my career. […] Now my family name creates much more difficulties than benefits. [110]

His drop out from parliament, however, also had an impact on his media capital and hence his public visibility. Immediately after 2003, his annual citations in the Russian

[108] Nevertheless, four individual members of Yabloko were able to win direct mandates in the Russian regions and consequently joined the State Duma.
[109] "Aleksej Arbatov vozglavit programmu po nerasprostraneniû v Moskovskom centre Karnegi," [Aleksej Arbatov leads the program on non-proliferation at the Carnegie Moscow Center] *Golos Ameriki*, March 5, 2004, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/a-33-a-2004-03-05-2-1/612730.html.
[110] Arbatov, "Poterânnoe desâtiletie v kontrole nad vooruženiâmii," 104.

federal press decreased twofold from more than 100 to merely 52; they never fully recovered (Diagram 11).

Diagram 11: Aleksej Arbatov: Media Capital 2000-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

At the same time, demand for Arbatov's authoritative opinion on both arms control issues and the Russian military fluctuates depending on the valid political agenda. Whereas he was cited relatively often during and after the Russian-Georgian War in 2008/2009 and the signing of New START in April 2010, the number of citations subsequently dropped to an all-time low in 2013, but more than doubled again with the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis and Russia's operations in Crimea and Donbass in 2014. This highlights his status as a specialist rather than a public intellectual with a wide profile.

4.4 The Politician: Vâčeslav Nikonov

> My position has always been ambivalent. On the one hand, I am a politician, on the other – a political expert. But experts are called upon only during political campaigns.[111]
>
> Analytics does not require detachment [*otstranennost'*]. Lyrical prose requires detachment.[112]

Since 2013 Vâčeslav Nikonov has been the Chairman of the Committee for Education in the Russian State Duma. An academic historian by training, a US specialist and in the 1980s the youngest *doktor nauk* of the Soviet Union, he has had an impressive career in Soviet-Russian politics. Starting at the Central Committee and the apparatus of President Mikhail Gorbachev, he became the assistant of the last KGB chief, supported President Boris Yeltsin, and joined the State Duma in 1993 simultaneously with Arbatov, albeit for a different party (Party of Russian Unity and Accord*;* PRES). After leaving the Duma two years later he successfully established himself as a political consultant and played an important role in Yeltsin's re-election in summer 1996.

In addition, Nikonov – the grandson of former Soviet Foreign Minister Vâčeslav Molotov – publishes extensively and in addition to his political office has been the Head of the Faculty of Public Administration at MSU since February 2011. As a member of the Russian political elite and a man of political practice he is simultaneously perceived as an analyst of that practice, based on his education and publications. Equipped with the necessary ideological flexibility, he has managed to administer political capital in support of Soviet-Russian Presidents from Gorbachev to Putin, while nurturing his cultural capital as an expert.

4.4.1 Upbringing and Education

Even compared to his colleagues with *nomenklatura* backgrounds, Nikonov's family must be described as privileged. His grandfather Vâčeslav Molotov had been Foreign Minister under Stalin from 1939 to 1949, and again after Stalin's death, from 1953 to

[111] Vâčeslav Nikonov, "Naslednik po kremlevskoj linii," [Kremlin heir] *Darin-Èksklûziv*, no.1 oktâbr' 1997, in *Èpoha peremen: Rossiâ 90-h glazami konservatora* [Epoch of Change: Russia in the 1990s from the point of view of a conservative] (Moskva: âzyki russkoj kul'tury, 1999), 863.
[112] Vâčeslav Nikonov, *Kod politiki* [The code of politics] (Moskva: Vagrius, 2006), 233.

1956. Hence, Nikonov, born in 1956, received valuable insights into the inner workings of (Soviet) politics and Russian history at a young age, which ultimately defined his professional life. In an interview to the radio channel Svoboda in 2011 Nikonov remarked that

> I knew much more about the history of our country and the world at the point when I finished school than the vast majority of my peers and colleagues. Of course, I already was very well informed and when I was five years old, I knew all capitals of the world and all heads of state. This is in my genes. This, clearly, was very helpful. It was a good family. Moreover, what I would like to note is the calm and *very ironic relationship towards state power* [in our family].[113]

Despite this rich social and cultural environment, the political status of the family quickly depreciated after Molotov was ousted in 1957. In fact, Molotov became an "enemy of the party and the people".[114] Thus, what had been an advantage until this point, turned into its exact opposite, causing both personal and professional problems for Molotov's relatives. The career of Nikonov's father Aleksej Dmitrievič Nikonov, Molotov's son-in-law, for example, immediately stalled. He had been the main editor for international affairs at the CPSU journal *Kommunist* where he had, among others, also acted briefly as the supervisor to later IMEMO Director Nikolaj Inozemcev.[115] In parallel he taught as a lecturer at MGIMO. Following Molotov's ouster, however, Aleksej lost both positions. After Molotov was expelled from the party and eventually retired completely in September 1963, Aleksej, probably supported by Inozemcev, was able to join IMEMO where he headed a section on military-political research during the 1970s.[116]

The fate of his grandfather also affected Vâčeslav Nikonov. He remembers that

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[113] Danila Gal'perovič, "Prezident fonda 'Politika' Vâčeslav Nikonov," [The President of the Politika Foundation, Vâčeslav Nikonov] *Svoboda*, June 26, 2011, accessed Aug. 10, 2018, https://www.svoboda.org/a/24248684.html.
[114] ibid.
[115] Čerkasov, *IMÈMO. Očerk istorii* [IMEMO. Historical Portrait], 116.
[116] Checkel cites the case of Aleksej Nikonov as an empirical example to support his theoretical argument about ideational entrepreneurship. He argues that Nikonov's inability to successfully promote research on technical security and military issues in the 1970s was the result of an institutional misfit between "individual ideas and the ideas dominant in the organization as a whole". However, it is equally likely that Nikonov's failure is related to his personal lack of political capital, given his family status at the time – a possibility that Checkel leaves unexplored. See Checkel*, Ideas and International Political Change, Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War*, 54.

> for some this [story with my grandfather] was interesting, and they started to treat me with great sympathy. But more often they showed antipathy or rather treated me as someone suspicious. Of course, I felt this and always came under pressure when questions about my granddad came up.[117]

In 1973 Nikonov began to study history at Moscow State University – a decision that was influenced by his father, who strongly advised him to enroll there instead of MGIMO, because 'nobody would teach him anything there'. Nikonov began to study history and, after graduation in 1978, stayed as a research assistant at the Department for Modern and Contemporary History. During this time, he actively engaged in public activities and intellectual debates, which, as he admitted later, helped him in learning how to speak and write both flawlessly and freely under stress and in front of cameras.[118] For example, in December 1977 he participated in one of the first episodes of the popular TV show "What? Where? When?" (*Čto? Gde? Kogda?).* [119] He had to answer questions sent in by viewers and discuss possible answers as part of a team of six experts within a one-minute time limit.[120] Later he joined debates with representatives of several US universities and afterwards continued to prepare MSU student debating teams for similar competitions.

In 1981 Nikonov defended his doctoral thesis (*aspirantura*) under the supervision of Evgenij Âz'kov on the ideological struggles within the US Republican Party from 1964 to 1968. However, as a Soviet citizen who was banned from travelling abroad (*nevyezdnoj*) – a direct consequence of his family ties to Molotov – he had been unable to collect necessary empirical material. This situation set him apart from elite students with a different political background. In an interview in the early 1990s he remembers that

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[117] Vâčeslav Nikonov, "Ded," *Trud*, Oct. 6, 1997, in *Èpoha peremen: Rossiâ 90-h glazami konservatora* [Epoch of Change: Russia in the 1990s from the point of view of a conservative], Vâčeslav Nikonov (Moskva: âzyki russkoj kul'tury, 1999), 865.
[118] Vâčeslav Nikonov, *Byt' liderom* [Being a leader] (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo MGU, 2011), 12-13.
[119] Svetlana Smetanina, "Vâčeslav Nikonov mečtal stat' geroem-lûbovnikom," [Vâčeslav Nikonov dreamed to become an actor playing romantic heros] *Kommersant'*, Aug. 30, 1997, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/183280.
[120] Mihail Braŝevskij, "Dural Lex, V gostâh: Vâčeslav Nikonov," *Èho Moskvy*, Feb. 25, 2012, accessed Sept. 10, 2018, https://echo.msk.ru/programs/lex/862173-echo/.

> the topic of the dissertation for the graduate studies at MSU presumed that the material would be collected in the United States, but in contrast to my colleagues I was not allowed to travel there for an internship: I was told that people were preparing hideous provocations against the grandson of Molotov and that is why I could not leave the Soviet Union.[121]

The appointment of Gorbachev as Secretary General changed all this. In fact, already in May 1984 his predecessor, Konstantin Chernenko, had reinstalled the party membership of Nikonov's grandfather. More importantly, however, his travel ban was lifted with the beginning of perestroika.[122] Nikonov seized the new opportunity and went for three months to the US.[123] After his return in late 1988 he engaged in debates about the election of the new Supreme Soviet, submitted his second dissertation (which allegedly made him the youngest *doktor nauk* in the Soviet Union at the age of 33), and was elected Secretary of the Communist Party at his Faculty. Although he had "never really planned" for a political career,[124] it seemed natural to him after all that a "political scientist sooner or later wants to try his hand in the respective discipline he has studied."[125]

4.4.2 Entering Soviet Politics

In 1989 Nikonov was invited to work for the CPSU Central Committee, first as an instructor for the sector on historical science and subsequently as the Deputy Chairman of the Department for Ideology.[126] One year later, thanks to Politburo member Vadim Medvedev, he transferred directly to the Presidential apparatus, where he became one of Gorbachev's speechwriters. Here he met several young men, who, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, would set out for successful careers in Russian politics and journalism, thereby defining the course of events in the 1990s. In an interview at the "Club of Women Interfering in Politics" (*Klub ženŝin, vmešivaûŝihsâ v politiku*) in the 1990s Nikonov notes that

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[121] Nikonov, "Naslednik po kremlevskoj linii," [Kremlin heir] 862.
[122] ibid. 862.
[123] Vâčeslav Nikonov, "Radi raboty v CK Vâčeslav Nikonov požertvoval borodoj," [For the work in the Central Committee Nikonov gave up his beard] *Kommersant'*, Sept. 6, 1997, accessed Dec. 12, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/183645.
[124] ibid.
[125] Nikonov, "Naslednik po kremlevskoj linii," [Kremlin heir] 862.
[126] "Nikonov Vâčeslav Alekseevič," accessed Oct. 10, 2018, http://www.olympicuniversity.ru/ru/about/administration/detail/-/content/entry/1949210.

> Mihail Sergeevič [Gorbachev] invited many 'young intellectuals' to the Central Committee; we were enrolled by the same decree together with Sergey Yastryhembsky, Igor' Malašenko and so on. […] Another assistant was Oleg Morozov,[127] the current leader of the faction 'Regions of Russia', and yet another one Armen Medvedev, who currently heads the Union of Filmmakers.[128]

Malašenko, as mentioned earlier, had been a colleague of Kortunov and Bogaturov at ISKAN, but joined the International Department of the Central Committee in March 1989 and took responsibility for Gorbachev's English press service in 1990 after his election as President. [129] Yastrzhembsky arrived in Moscow directly from Prague. Since 1986 he had been working as an editor and consultant for the Journal "Problems of Peace and Socialism" (*Problemy mira i socializma*), issued by the International Department of the Central Committee. Established in 1958, the journal had become a kind of safe haven for reform-oriented Soviet intellectuals.[130] A third colleague, Aleksej Pushkov, who had been friends with Yastrzhembsky since their student days at MGIMO,[131] was a Soviet diplomat before moving to Prague in 1983. In 1992 he became deputy to the main editor of the weekly newspaper "Moscow News" (*Moskovskij Novosti*), which illustrates the degree of political instability and level of porosity of social boundaries at the time. Several years later Pushkov recalled that

> I am not a journalist by education, but a diplomat and historian. I defended my dissertation on the history of US foreign policy. And the first 14 years I worked in this sphere professionally […] *I went into media because of powers beyond my control – the destruction of the Soviet state system in 1991*. I could not, to be honest, imagine myself in Yeltsin's state agencies, although the Minster of Foreign Affairs at the

[127] Oleg Morozov (*1953) was a member of the Russian State Duma from January 1994 to June 2012, and afterwards headed the domestic policy directorate of the Presidential Administration. Since September 2015 he has been a member of the Federation Council for the Tatarstan Republic.
[128] Mariâ Arbatova, "Vâčeslav Nikonov v 'Klub
e ženŝin', vmešivaûŝihsâ v politiku," [Vâčeslav Nikonov in the Club of Women interfering in Politics], accessed May 5, 2018, http://www.arbatova.ru/club/guest/15.html.
[129] Roman Super, "Čelovek, pridumavšij tri bukvy," [The man who invented three words] *Svoboda*, Feb 8, 2016, accessed Nov. 7, 2018, https://www.svoboda.org/a/27537358.html
[130] On the importance of the journal as a resort for critical thinking among Soviet state intellectuals see English, *Russia and the Idea of the West. Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War*, 70-78, 101, 110, 113, 131.
[131] Dmitrij Zelencov, "Muzy braka. Žemčužnuû svad'bu Alekseâ Puškova otmetili pesnâmi i tancami," [The muses of marriage. Pearl Wedding anniversary of Aleksej Puškov celebrated with songs and dances] *Kommersant*', Dec. 11, 2006, accessed Nov. 17, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/729190.

> time, Andrej Kozyrev, invited me twice to leadership positions at the MFA.[132]

The paths of these for men crossed again several times in the 1990s and 2000s, often while being in political opposition to each other. Pushkov set out to become a prominent anchorman at the TV channel ORT (and late politician) while opposing President Yeltsin,[133] whereas Malašenko, who became General Director of the TV channel NTV, and Nikonov worked as political consultants in Yeltsin's re-election campaign. Yastrzhembsky, in turn, was appointed Yeltsin's press secretary after the 1996 elections. All of them eventually became members of SVOP.

In Gorbachev's Presidential apparatus, Nikonov, in addition to his duties as speechwriter, acted as assistant to Chief of Staff Valerij Boldin. He also supported Security Council member and former Soviet Minister of the Interior Vadim Bakatin, whose political talents he valued.[134] He eventually backed the right horse. After the failed coup attempt in August 1991 that ended Boldin's career, Bakatin replaced plot member Vladimir Krûčkov as the Head of the Union's KGB. Nikonov became his personal assistant. In his memoirs the chief of the first KGB directorate at the time, [135] Leonid Šebaršin, remembering his impression of Nikonov at the time, argued that "he is almost unknown in public", but he is "young, presentable, flexible and polite […]. Without a doubt he is intellectually superior to his boss, and people who know say, he generates his ideas." [136]

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[132] Vladimir Suhomlinov, "Komu nužna sil'naâ Rossiâ?," [How needs a strong Russia] *Literaturnaâ Gazeta*, no. 20 (6415), May 15, 2013, accessed Aug. 17, 2018, www.lgz.ru/article/-20-6415-15-05-2013/komu-nuzhna-silnaya-rossiya/, emphasis added.

[133] Sergej Trusevič, "Aleksej Puškov: My dolžny čuvstvovat' za toboj silu'," [Aleksej Puškov: We need to feel the power behind you], *Stoletie*, accessed Nov. 11, 2018, http://www.stoletie.ru/obschestvo/aleksej_pushkov_my_dolzhny_chuvstvovat_za_toboj_silu.htm.

[134] For many years, Bakatin had been a regional party secretary in Kemerova (Western Siberia), but in October 1988 Gorbachev appointed him Soviet Minister of the Interior. A loyal party politician without a military background, Bakatin held democratic views and supported Gorbachev's political reforms, whose spirit he tried to implement in the Ministry. Although Bakatin left the MVD in December 1990, he remained close to Gorbachev and became a member of the newly established USSR Security Council responsible for domestic affairs. Finally, in June 1991 Bakatin participated as an independent candidate in the RSFSR presidential elections. Boris Yeltsin won by a wide margin (57.3%), whereas Bakatin received a mere 3.42% – the worst result among all participants.

[135] In October 1991 the first KGB directorate was transformed into a separate agency led by former IMEMO director Evgeniĭ Primakov. Despite an offer by Primakov to stay as an advisor, Šebaršin retired. See Evgenij Primakov, *Vstreči na perekrestah* [Meetings at the Crossroads] (Moskva, ZAO Izdatel'stvo Centopoligraf, 2016), 107-108.

[136] Leonid Šebaršin, *Rekviem po Rodine* [Requiem on the Fatherland] (Moskva: Algoritm, 2014), 151.

4.4.3 Political Campaign Expert

In January 1992 Bakatin was dismissed by President Yeltsin.[137] Instead, he joined the International Foundation for Economic and Social Reform (*Fond Reforma*) that had been established in April 1990 by the leading Soviet economists Sergej Šatalin, Leonid Abalkin and Nikolaj Petrakov to support market economic reforms.[138] Nikonov followed and became his advisor. While still working for *Reforma*, he soon established his own Foundation, *Politika*, which provided the basis for establishing the informal discussion club "Klub-93" in May 1993.[139] Here Nikonov was joined by members of Yeltsin's Presidential Council, including Andranik Migranjan and Georgij Satarov,[140] but also Aleksej Salmin – the political thinker, whose position at MGIMO Bogaturov would inherit in 2005. As a platform for intellectual debate, the club united diverse members of the Russian political and intellectual elite, Nikonov's colleagues, including Sergej Karganov, Andrej Kortunov and Igor' Malašenko.[141] Most of them had been critical of the constitutional project proposed by Yeltsin.[142] Yet, after the violent conflict with the Supreme Soviet in October 1993 and the successful constitutional referendum in December 1993, they called upon the different factions of the political elite to join forces and accept the status quo. In a political declaration published in the *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta* in February 1994, the Club members agreed that

> if we want to avoid sliding into chaos, the abyss of civil war or the establishment of a brutal authoritarian or totalitarian regime, we need a peculiar new social contract between state and society: All interested groups of the political elite must accept their share of joint responsibility for a way out of the crisis. […] Ideological differences are important, but

[137] Bakatin's removal from the position of the Director of the Inter-republican Security Service (*Meždrepublikanskaâ Služba Bezopasnosti*; MSB) was preceded by a scandal concerning the transfer of information to the US on espionage technology used by the KGB in the building of the US embassy, which after all led to Bakatin's dismissal, although the transfer had been co-ordinated among the different agencies. See Ûrij Pankov, "Vadim Bakatin: nelovkij žest dobroj voli," [Vadim Bakatin: A clumsy gesture of good will], Kommersant", Dec. 23, 1991, accessed Nov. 11, 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2120.

[138] "Fond Reforma: Gosudarstvo v gosuarstve?," [The Foundation Reforma: A state within the state?] *Kommersant" vlast'* №16, Apr. 30, 1990, Oct. 10, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/266165.

[139] "Intellektuanl'nyj Kulb politologov sozdan 3 iûnâ v Moskve," [Intellectual club of political scientists has been founded on June 3 in Moscow] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, Apr. 6, 1993.

[140] In February 1994 Satarov became a member of the Presidential Aide Service responsible for domestic politics and relations to the Russian State Duma. At the same time, he headed the INDEM Foundation established in 1990, together with Sergej Stankevič.

[141] Natal'â Gridneva, Ol'ga Pestereva and Irina Škarnikova, "Moskovskie kluby.
Doma političeskoj terpimosti," [Moscow Clubs. The home of political tolerance] *Kommersant"*, Jan. 27, 1998, accessed June 10, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/14037.

[142] Over the course of 1993, Nikonov engaged intensively in discussions about the future constitutional order of the state. Together with Šatalain and the American political scientist Peter Ordeshook he published several articles on the issue in Nezavisimaâ Gazeta.

> not so much that they should deprive the current government of real political support, which would condemn the country to anarchy or dictatorship.[143]

Nikonov not only accepted the new constitutional order, but was keen to become a part of it. In the elections to the first State Duma in December 1993, he successfully agitated for PRES, which was supportive of President Yeltsin. It had been established by lawyer Sergej Šahraj, co-author of the Belavezha Accords and the Russian constitution and since March 1993 Head of the State Committee of the Federation and nationalities. Šahraj managed to gain the support of several political heavyweights for PRES: Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Šohin, the economist who in 1998 would invite Aleksej Bogaturov, Yeltsin advisor Sergej Stan'kevič and even Prime Minister Viktor Černomyrdin.

Without making substantial commitments in terms of the political agenda, the party represented President Yeltsin‘s more conservative supporters.[144] However, after just two years in parliament, Nikonov became a political advisor and election campaigner for various politicians.[145] Two prominent examples stand out. First, in the summer of 1996 he supported the re-election campaign of President Yeltsin against Communist leader Gennadij Zûganov. Nikonov became Deputy Chair at the “All-Russian public movement in support of the President” (ODOP), an initiative by Yeltsin‘s former Chief of Staff Sergej Filatov, and also headed its press service. A comment in the Russian newspaper *Kommersant* at the time highlights Nikonov’s central role in the complex structure of the campaign, whose “analytical center” he headed:

> The service headed by Nikonov is the first body through which the transfers for the financing of the campaign activities are made. Usually the payment documents go through this chain: Nikonov – Filatov – Jarov – Čubajs.[146]

[143] “Opublikovano zaâvlenie členov Kluba-93,” [Statement of the Club-93 has been published] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, Feb. 1, 1993.
[144] Hale, *Why not Parties in Russia?*, 49.
[145] Besides the two examples mentioned here, Nikonov also supported the unsuccessful campaign of Ivan Rybkin (1995) and acted as an advisor to Murtaza Rahimov, the President of the Russian Republic of Bashkortostan (1998), and the governor of the Krasnoyarsk Krai Valerij Zubov.
[146] Natal'â Arhangel'skaâ, “V štabe El'cina, Organizatory, doverennye lica i imidžmejkery,” [Inside Yeltsin's headquarters, Organizers, trusted persons and image-maker] *Kommersant”*, Apr. 26, 1996, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/131888.

After the successful elections, Nikonov's political capital institutionalized. He became a member of the Presidential political consultative Council (*Političeskij konsul'tativnyj sovet)* that replaced the Public Chamber in June 1996.[147] He also joined the Presidential Human Rights Commission and became involved in the work of the Commission to the President for Countering Political Extremism (*Komissiâ pri Prezidente RF po protivodejstviû političeskomu èkstremizmu*).

The second major incident in Nikonov's career as a political advisor relates to the Duma election campaign in autumn 1999 when he changed sides. Instead of the Kremlin party *Edinstvo* (Unity) and President Yeltsin, he supported their direct opponents: the party bloc *Otečestvo-Vsâ Rossiâ* (Fatherland-All Russia; OVR) of former Prime Minister Evgenij Primakov and Moscow Mayor Ûrij Lužkov. Again, Nikonov joined their campaign as the Head of the Analytical Center,[148] assembling a small team of 10 people, some of whom he knew from his time at the Central Committee, e.g., Anatolij Milûkov and Aleksandr Cipko. The center was responsible for monitoring press coverage, conducting polls, and writing public speeches.[149] The election defeat of Primakov and Lužkov in December 1999, however, also ended Nikonov's tenure in the Center.

4.4.4 State Advocate


After the election of Vladimir Putin as Russian President in March 2000, Nikonov withdrew from the spotlight but remained an observer and public analyst representing his Foundation *Politika*. However, following the merger of the two rival parties, *Fatherland-All Russia* and *Unity*, in December 2001 to create the Presidential party *Edinaâ Rossiâ* (United Russia), he returned to politics as the President of the Foundation "*Edinstvo vo imâ Rossii*" (Union in the Name of Russia). Established in Summer 2003 by United Russia, the Foundation turned into the first party think tank with the aim to mobilize intellectual resources for generating political programs, with

[147] President RF, Ukaz от 25.06.1996 г. № 989 [Decree from June 25, 1996], accessed Nov. 5, 2018, http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/9661.
[148] Anton Lebedev, "Slučajnye svâzi," [Connections by chance] *Kommersant'*, July 20, 1999, accessed Nov. 11, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/15732.
[149] Irina Nagornyh, "Štabs-kapitany 'Otečetsvo'," [The captains of the headquarter of 'Fatherland'] *Kommersant"-Vlast'*, no. 17 (318), May 5, 1999; Gleb P'ânyh, "Zapahi otečestvennoj kuhni," [The smell of Fatherland's kitchen] *Kommersant"-Vlast'*, no. 12 (313), March 30, 1999.

President Putin as the integrative figure.[150] In this function he organized various discussions of experts, politicians and interest groups to discuss pressing issues.

In December 2005 Nikonov was elected as member of the newly established Public Chamber where he became Chair of the Commission on International Cooperation and Public Diplomacy. The following two years in the political spotlight led to an increase in his media capital as Diagram 12 illustrates. However, this position waned immediately after Nikonov in June 2007 became chairman of the Foundation *Russkij Mir* that President Putin had just founded per decree to promote Russian language and culture abroad, particularly in the post-Soviet space. While Nikonov declared that the work at Russkij Mir "would have priority for him",[151] his media capital plunged.

Diagram 12: Vâčeslav Nikonov: Media Capital 2000-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

Whereas in 2007 he had been cited more than 250 times by Russia's federal press, in 2009 and 2010 this number decreased by more than four times to 65 and 58, respectively. Once again, this development indicates the empirical relationship between institutional office and public visibility. Nikonov's knowledge and capacity remained unaltered, but his social role as an expert changed. The turning point in 2011 supports this view. In the State Duma elections in December Nikonov received a mandate for United Russia and ever since has been a politician. At the same time,

[150] Vadim Visloguzov, "Renta est', no iz"ât' ee nečem," [There is profit, but no way to seize it], Oct. 30, 2003, accessed Nov. 11, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/424211.
[151] "Nikonov: rabota v fonde Russkij mir' stanet dlâ menâ prioritetnoj," [Nikonov: The work in the Foundation Russkij mir will be my priority], RIA Novosti, June 26, 2007, accessed Dec. 11, 2018, https://ria.ru/20070626/67801034.html.

that is already in February, he joined his Alma Mater MSU where he was appointed Head of the Faculty of Public Administration.

This unusual simultaneous combination of political office and academic post highlights the double role Nikonov plays as an analyst and politician. It also hints at the permeability of social boundaries between fields in the Russian case. In fact, the degree of professionalization within the academic field that is the establishment of formal and exclusive jurisdiction, appears to be less pronounced when compared to Western Europe. Despite his prominence and personal wishes Nikonov has been unable to gain the chairmanship of the Committee on International Affairs in the State Duma. This might be related to the changing role of the State Duma which in foreign policy has become the hotbed of dramatic media advocacy rather than policy-making. In fact, in September 2016 there had been information within United Russia that Nikonov would follow his old colleague at Gorbarchev's office, Aleksej Pushkov, as chairman.[152] Yet, in the end he had to settle once more for the Committee on Education.

4.5 The Commentator: Fedor Luk'ânov

> Vladimir Pozner: On the website you are presented as a journalist and political scientist. If you would have to renounce one of those – journalist or political scientist – which would it be?
>
> Fedor Luk'ânov: Of course, I am a journalist. I do not have a political science education. I did not graduate from a political science faculty. […] You can be a journalist just like that, but as a political scientist you better have some basis.[153]

Since the late 2000s Fedor Luk'ânov has been among the most frequently cited Russian foreign policy experts. Born in 1967, the Chairman of SVOP belongs to a different generation than the four experts discussed above. Both time and education set him apart from the experience of these 'Soviet academics'. Whereas the latter

[152] "Istočnik: Nikonov vozglavit komitet po meždunarodnym delam v Gosdume," [Source: Nikonov heads the Committee on International Affairs in the State Duma] *RIA Novosti*, Sept. 22, 2016, accessed Dec. 10, 2018, https://ria.ru/20160922/1477597266.html?inj=1.
[153] Vladimir Pozner, "Fedor Luk'ânov," *Pervyj Kanal*, March 03, 2014, accessed June 7, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c1R74JmV7II.

graduated in the 1970s and started their careers during the period of political and societal stagnation (*period zastoj*) associated with Leonid Brezhnev, Luk'ânov came of age during the *perestroika* initiated by Gorbachev. Moreover, instead of area studies or international relations, Luk'ânov studied German philology. The collapse of the Soviet Union provided him with the opportunity to become a journalist, because social and state boundaries became porous and language skills were in demand. With this background, Luk'ânov is an interesting figure for two reasons. First, he plays the role of a mediator between the Soviet academics, born in the 1950s and the first post-Soviet generation, which as will become clear, slowly moves into leadership positions within the field. Second, he represents a distinct type of expert, that is, a position within the field which differs from the Soviet academics, who became part of the political elite in the 1990s. In consequence, he had to accumulate his expert capital in a different manner.

4.5.1 Upbringing and Education

Fedor Luk'ânov was raised in an intellectual family with a rich cultural background. Both parents were artists. His father Aleksandr Luk'ânov (1937-2003), originally from the small Chuvash Republic in the Volga region, became a successful cinema and theatre actor during the 1970s and participated in several popular Soviet comedy productions, such as Gentlemen of Fortune (*Džentl'meny udači*, 1971) and Unbelievable Adventures of Italians in Russia (*Neveroâtnye priklûčeniâ ital'âncev v Rossii,* 1974). His mother also started out as an actor, but later became a musician.

Luk'ânov studied at a school with intensified German language education. After graduating in 1984, he successfully applied at MSU to study German philology. His time as a student, however, did not last long. After just one year he was called up for military service and returned to MSU only in 1987. Thanks to the reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet life began to change during this short period, in particular as regards access to and circulation of information. This shift directly affected Luk'ânov's life. In 1989 he spent some weeks in Germany following the invitation of a German pensioner for whom he had worked as interpreter in Moscow. Moreover, in January 1990, as part of one of the first student groups, he studied in Stockholm for

three months.[154] Thanks to Gorbachev's reforms, his career prospects suddenly looked totally different compared with the situation a couple of years earlier. In our interview he recalls that

> at that time, of course, for people like me started an entirely new era, because, well, in previous years, what could one do with [knowledge of] a foreign language? One could embark upon an academic career as a philologist […] it was possible to join some foreign-trade or foreign-policy institution, although the main institute of course was the MGIMO […], or become a literary or technical translator. But when *Glasnost* began, it pulled out a flow of information and people. The world opened up. […] It became much easier to apply our profession, that is, foreign languages, in practice. When I was a student […], the most prestigious job placement for my fellow classmates was a joined Soviet-German, Soviet-Danish or Soviet-American enterprise, but the greatest success was to work as a translator for an entirely foreign company.[155]

Luk'ânov, however, was neither interested in an academic career, nor did he want to join business or become a translator. Instead, after completing an internship at Soviet Foreign Broadcasting (*Inoveŝanie*), which a friend of the family had made possible, he decided to pursue a career as a journalist. Nevertheless, more than twenty-five years later, at the occasion of his appointment as Research Professor (*professor-issledovatel'*) at the Higher School of Economics, he acknowledged that

> at that time I absolutely did not expect that I would find myself in this sphere. I prepared to become a Germanist, but not in the context of politics or international relations, but as a specialist in German lexicography.[156]

4.5.2 Journalism and Privatization

In summer 1991, the 24-year-old Luk'ânov graduated from the Philological Faculty of MSU as a translator for German and Swedish. However, already since October 1990 he had been working as a freelancer for Soviet Foreign Broadcasting (*Moskovskoe Radio* or *Inoveŝanie*). As part of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio

[154] #56 Fedor Luk'ânov, HSE, Nov. 2018, see also Fedor Luk'ânov, "Spasenie Duš, Finskaâ skazka s poučitel'noj moral'û," [Saving the Shower: A Finish fairytale with an instrutive moral] *Vremâ novostej*, 77 (77), July 10, 2000.
[155] #56 Fedor Luk'ânov, HSE, Nov. 2018.
[156] Sergej Karaganov, "Lekciâ Fedora Luk'ânova, Berlin i Moskva," [Lecture of Fedor Luk'ânov Berlin and Moscow] [07:00], May 18, 2015, accessed Nov. 10, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mucZEXpFi-o.

Broadcasting (*Gosteleradio)*,[157] Soviet Foreign Broadcasting essentially informed foreigners about Soviet politics according to party ideology, including propaganda and censorship, to create a positive image of the Union. A regular Soviet radio program directed at foreign audiences had already existed since October 1929, first in German and later also in French and English. By 1940 USSR foreign broadcasting was available in 13 languages, a number that increased to almost 30 during the Second World War and went beyond 70 in the 1970s.

When Luk'ânov joined *Inoveŝanie* in autumn 1990, working for the desk responsible for Scandinavia, the Soviet broadcasting system and Soviet media more generally were in the midst of major changes. New standards were implemented, including live on-air discussions at radio channels such as *Ûnost' i Maâk,* and simultaneous broadcasting (*radiomost*) from both superpowers where students from the Soviet Union and the United States could engage with each other.

In June 1990 the Supreme Soviet adopted the law "On the Press".[158] It was authored by three professional lawyers, who later set out for successful political and academic careers in post-Post Russia: Yeltsin's assistant for National Security, Ûrij Baturin, Russia's representative at the UNESCO and the current Chairman of the Presidential Human Rights Council, Mihail Fedotov, and MGIMO Professor Vladimir Èntin, who briefly worked with Fedotov in Paris. After the CPSU in March 1990 had lost its dominant ideological and political status through a change in the constitution and the abolishment of its role as the guiding force of Soviet society, the new law announced that "the press and other forms of mass information are free",[159] prohibiting any form of censorship. Moreover, it abolished the state monopoly on the mass media. Henceforth, any Soviet citizen of legal age had the right to register media organizations. In consequence, until August 1991 the number of new newspapers and journals increased drastically.[160] This turbulent atmosphere, full of hopes and new beginnings, motivated Luk'ânov, who – in contrast to his older colleagues – saw

[157] From May 1957 to May 1959 Soviet Foreign Broadcasting was part of the Soviet State Committee for Cultural Ties with Foreign countries.
[158] "Zakon no. 1552-1 'O pečati i drugih sredstvah massovoj informacii'," [Law no. 1552-1'On the Press and other mass media'], June 12, 1990.
[159] John Quigley, "Freedom of Expression in the Soviet Media," *Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev.* 11, 269 (1991): 270.
[160] Rafail Ovsepân, *Istoriâ novejšej otečestvennoj žurnalistiki (Fevr. 1917-90-e gg.)* [The history of modern Russian journalism (Feb. 1917-90)] (Moskva: Izd-vo Moskovskaâ universiteta, 1999), 193.

a bright future ahead. When in late August 1991 the counter-revolution attempted by the State Committee for the State on Emergency (*GKČP*) failed, his coverage of the events at *Inoveŝanie* was honored as among the best of that month.[161] In hindsight, however, Luk'ânov calls his views naïve and illustrative of the illusions many had about Russia's post-Soviet development.

> Those who were afraid, in fact, to some extent were so in vain, because what they feared – full scale purges, particularly in the ideological sphere, which actually no one wanted – failed to materialize. But in consequence, as we see, our life has not turned around the way we imagined back then. And the feelings which I then tried to put into my reporting right now look quite, well, quite … right now it is difficult to imagine that an adult, and I was already 23 years old, could seriously write something like that. [162]

Luk'ânov remained at *Inoveshchanie* until 1993. The entire organization was reorganized by Presidential decree in December 1992 and eventually transformed into *Golos Rossii*. However, the previous importance of broadcasting partially vanished, because the rationale for state propaganda ceased to exist. In turn, career prospects and salaries greatly diminished, which led Luk'ânov to search for other employment options.[163]

In early 1993, Luk'ânov joined the US strategic communication company Sawyer Miller Group, which engaged in political PR in support of the popularization of Russian privatization. Among other things, the New York firm, [164] which previously had handled more than a dozen election campaigns for the Democratic Party and received 11.8 US$ million from the US State Department Agency for International Development (USAID) for its services in Russia, developed a television advertising campaign promoting the acquisition of vouchers.[165] It also organized training courses in the Russian regions. Luk'ânov's job was to write different text types that, on the one hand,

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[161] Fedor Luk'ânov, "Kak stat' avtorom i èkspertom?," [How to become an author and expert?], Oct. 31, 2016, accessed June 17, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ramwt7driyg&list=PL60egliMGrP1b_T_HBM2G0jik6734Ptn0

[162] ibid. Luk'ânov was actually 24 years old at the time when he wrote this text.

[163] "Radiostanciâ 'Golos Rossii'," *RIA-Novosti*, Oct. 29, 2014, accessed Aug. 10, 2018, https://ria.ru/spravka/20141029/1030557376.html.

[164] Barry Siegel, "Spin doctors to the world: The Sawyer Miller Group uses the tricks of political campaigns to change the way you think about foreign governments, big business and any client in need of an image lift," *Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 24, 1991, accessed Dec. 10, 2018, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-24/magazine/tm-417_1_sawyer-miller/2.

[165] Ellen Mickiewicz, *Changing Channels. Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999), 156.

popularized the concept of privatization, and on the other hand criticized and opposed those economic proposals which came from the Russian Parliament as part of the quarrel with President Yeltsin and the Russian government. According to Luk'ânov,

> this was a purely political fight […] in consequence, informational support was very tight, aggressive. It was aggressive in relation to targeting public opinion, but primarily in its efforts to provoke opponents to take some steps, which could be presented to President Yeltsin as a, well, reactionary upheaval against the reforms.[166]

The new job provided him not only with a monthly income of one thousand US$ – an unusual large sum at the time, particularly given ruble depreciation and ongoing fiscal reforms,[167] – but also enabled him to experience the privatization process first hand. As he remembered in 2016,

> since the time I worked there, I have listened to all this talk about how the West actively supported our reforms with an [ironic] smile. I don't want to say anything bad about their intentions […] but *how they did it* is a different question.[168]

Despite the good money, however, Luk'ânov decided that he would not be able to continue with such activities. When, in the wake of the first State Duma elections, the Sawyer Miller Group lost its contract with the Russian State Committee for the Management of State Property to the US PR firm Burston Masteller in late 1993,[169] he left the company for good.

4.5.3 Foreign Affairs Journalist

In May 1994 Luk'ânov started to work as a correspondent for the newspaper *Segodnia*. It had been established in February 1993 by three Russian banks, including *Media-Most*, owned by Russian oligarch Vladimir Gusinskij.[170] After *Kommersant'* it became the second privately-owned newspaper in the Russian Federation. Luk'ânov joined the editorial team on Sweden and the European Union.

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[166] #56, Fedor Luk'ânov, HSE, Nov. 2018.
[167] At the beginning of 1993 the average monthly income of Russian citizens amounted to about 35,000 rubles, or 35 US$. In July 1993 the Russian Central Bank invalidated all Russian and former Soviet currencies issued before 1993, and obliged citizens to exchange savings of up to this sum within a two-week time period.
[168] Luk'ânov, "Kak stat' avtorom i èkspertom?," emphasis added.
[169] Mickiewicz, Changing Channels. Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia, 157.
[170] In April 2001 it was closed down due to the political and economic downfall of Vladimir Gusinskij.

With his study background, he mostly covered domestic affairs but also relations between Sweden and the European Union as well as Scandinavia more broadly. Throughout 1994, his texts almost exclusively commented on the political situation and debates about possible EU membership in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway. Whereas the first three joined the Union together in January 1995 after successful national referenda, Norway's citizens rejected membership.

Only one story covered by Luk'ânov in 1994 indirectly related to Russia. The Soviet-Swedish double agent Stig Bergling had escaped prison and fled to Moscow in 1987, later moved to Lebanon and returned to Sweden voluntarily in August 1994, where he spent three years in jail before receiving parole.[171] At the center of the sensitive political scandal was Sweden's then Prime Minister Carl Bildt, who in 2002 eventually became author and board member of the journal *Russia in Global Affairs* with Luk'ânov as editor. But when Luk'ânov covered the story in 1994 and 1995, he was still a young journalist at the beginning of this professional career and quite far removed from these political networks.

While Luk'ânov's reporting in 1994 was completely occupied with the EU membership campaign, in 1995 he increasingly touched upon different topics beyond Scandinavia, including US foreign policy and its conflict with Japan about economic sanctions and the imposition of tariffs. In 1996 and 1997 the range of topics covered in his texts diversified further to include the US presidential election campaign (which extended the Clinton Presidency for another four years), the Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq, French nuclear tests, conflicts within the European Union, and the election of the UN General Secretary. Scandinavian politics became less and less important.

Luk'ânov's breakthrough as a journalist with a broad focus on foreign policy rather than one particular geographic region happened only after he had left *Segodnia* and, in May 1998, became the Head of the international desk at *Vremia-MN* and later at *Vremâ Novostej*. *Vremia-MN* had been founded that same year as a result of a cooperation between the publishing house *Moskovskie Novosti* and the company

[171] The Bergling-affair negatively affected Swedish-Russian relations, because Swedish authorities believed that Bergling had continued to work for Russian Military Intelligence (GRU) after the collapse of the Soviet Union, although Russian officials – including Evgenij Primakov during a trip as the Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) to Sweden in 1991 – had consistently claimed that they did not know his place of residence.

ZAO Media-finans, a joint venture of three Russian banks and the Russian stock exchange.[172] Its general editor Vladimir Gurevič had been working for *Moskovskie Novosti* since the late 1980s, when the newspaper developed into the central mouthpiece of Gorbachev's perestroika under the leadership of owner Egor' Âkovlev. In spring 2000, however, the financial situation of *Vremâ-MN* worsened and the newspaper's journalists, including Luk'ânov, left as a collective sign of protest, having received a monthly salary of only $100 US.[173] Most of them instead joined *Vremâ Novostej*, a newspaper that Gurevič had been preparing for a while, financed by the electricity power grid provider Unified Energy System of Russia and Siberian Aluminium. Luk'ânov became Deputy Editor of the new paper, but as at *Vremâ-MN* remained responsible for the international desk. At *Vremâ Novostej*, which ceased to exist in 2010, he made a name for himself. As Karaganov recalls, he became "a quite significant figure on the map of Russian journalism".[174]

4.5.4 Becoming an Expert

The main career uplift for Luk'ânov, which also meant a shift in his social position, was somewhat coincidental, but also followed logically from his personal trajectory. In summer 2002 he was, quite unexpected for himself, invited by Sergej Karaganov to talk about the possibility of him becoming the editor of a new Russian policy journal, which Karaganov was determined to establish. The journal was to become the flagship publication of SVOP and be realized in cooperation with the journal Foreign Affairs and prominent international support. At the time, Karaganov and Luk'ânov had never met in person. As Luk'ânov learned later, Karaganov's decision had been motivated by the fact that he wanted "somebody outside of *this* sphere", the sphere of "experts, political scientists [*politologi*], meždunarodniki [and] researchers" to head the journal.[175] This point captures Luk'ânov's social position at the time: a journalist still alien to the foreign policy expert field. This, however, was about to change. In our interview he remembers that Karaganov's

[172] Dmitrij Piscov, "Končilis' tol'ko sponsor," [Only the sponsors are gone] *Kommersant'*, March 3, 2001, accessed Nov. 11, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/251690.
[173] Ol'ga Tatarenko, "Raspad holdinga 'Moskovskie novosti'," *Kommersant'*, March 7, 2000, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/142013.
[174] Karaganov, "Lekciâ Fedora Luk'ânova, Berlin i Moskva," [Lecture of Fedor Luk'ânov Berlin and Moscow], May 18, 2015.
[175] ibid.

> idea was that it should be a person from outside, who does not have that system of relations, well, with all these people and is, so to speak, independent [*svoboden*]. Maybe he would not be perceived as an equal, but, on the other hand, he would not owe anything to anyone. […] And the first one and a half years were a very hard challenge […] but then I increasingly got into it.[176]


Having had experience as a journalist and editor for over ten years, Luk'ânov at first expected to be well prepared for the job, but soon realized that *Russia in Global Affairs* required a different approach, for which he lacked adequate training. As he explained to students and young experts in a lecture in 2016:

> I hesitated for a long time, but then I nevertheless agreed, based on the idea that I, as a person with many years of experience in international journalism, would approximately know how to launch a journal on that topic […] But that turned out to be totally wrong. I found myself in a totally different genre.[177]

The importance of Luk'ânov's editorship at the journal Russia in Global Affairs, which indeed became a turning point for him, can be traced empirically by analyzing the number of references to his work in Russia's federal press. Whereas before 2006 his name was rarely mentioned except as an author of newspaper articles, he subsequently took on the role of a public expert, who was cited for his authoritative opinion on international affairs, first as the editor of Russia in Global Affairs and since 2012 as the Chairman of SVOP. Although he continued to write articles, the number of citations in 2009 in his capacity as an 'expert' began to exceed the number of articles published under his name, as Diagram 13 illustrates.

[176] Karaganov, "Lekciâ Fedora Luk'ânova, Berlin i Moskva."
[177] Luk'ânov, "Kak stat' avtorom i èkspertom?." He emphasized this point also during our conversation.

Diagram 13: Fedor Luk'ânov: Media Capital 2000-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

Between 2006 and 2009 there is a sharp decrease in publications as an author (journalist) but simultaneously Luk'ânov became increasingly popular as an expert, that is he was cited by the media as an authority. The growth continued until 2014. The following decrease could be related to the fact that Luk'ânov joined the Valdai Discussion Club as Director of Research and thus became more involved in time-consuming organizational matters. Moreover, in 2009 he started to publish a weekly column in *Rossijskaâ Gazeta*, which explains the increase of publications as a journalist from 2009 to 2011. This step too, however, has had significant symbolic meaning, given the fact that the newspaper was founded by the Russian government and publishes laws, Presidential decrees and other legal documents. Finally, the publications that cite Luk'ânov as an authority became more diverse over time and, since 2009, have included all important Russian intellectual newspapers and journals, including Kommersant", Izvestiâ, Ogonëk and Nezavisimaâ Gazeta. This transition from author to authority mirrors Luk'ânov's social transformation from a journalist-only into an expert, thereby entering a new field.

Despite his increasing prominence and acknowledgement by his peers, Luk'ânov himself identifies a distinct gap between his own position and that of colleagues from academia, as he emphasized in our interview:

> My position has its pros and cons […] I am more flexible. After all, a man of science […] has a persistent view and, as a rule, quite strict criteria […]. On the one hand, this is good, but on the other hand, it is also very restricting. […] However, and this is something I experience myself very sharply right now, I lack the knowledge and depth. I do not have this basic education of people who studied such disciplines, political science or international theory […] I understand that this is a limitation, and I would very much like to improve and widen my own knowledge, but in order to do that, I would need to stop everything else, and this is, unfortunately, not possible.
>
> I lack the necessary background, which, however, is to some extent compensated for by the rich experience which I have gotten over the years and of course, with an *understanding of the field*, because I know practically everyone who works in that field. I know whom to turn to if necessary.[178]

Luk'ânov's position and career development thus illustrate two important aspects. First, expert status in foreign policy and international affairs depends not necessarily on academic credentials or political experiences, but can be generated by presence in the public sphere. Second, Luk'ânov's rise to the top of the field of experts depended to some extent on sponsorship provided by Sergej Karaganov. Without the editorship at Russian in Global Affairs since 2002 as well as his subsequent membership in and chairmanship of SVOP, Luk'ânov might have remained a well-established journalist, but he would certainly have been unable to accumulate expert authority, that is, be cited by third parties for his opinion about foreign policy and international relations. This supports my theoretical assumption about diverse expert spaces that exist between social fields.


[178] #56, Fedor Luk'ânov, HSE, Nov. 2018.

4.6 Conclusion

> Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain.[179]

The collapse of the Soviet state depreciated the value of the cultural capital acquired by Soviet academics in the humanities and social sciences. It ruined all previous perspectives of economic security within the academic field. What had been a structured game of career advancement based on specific forms of capital and common rules gave way to individual survival strategies with newly emerging exit options. Previously fixed social boundaries became at once instable and porous. In this context, some *nomenklatura* academics used their cultural capital to gain political and economic advantages. These movements across established fields produced novel social spaces. The examples presented here represent five distinct positions as illustrated in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Experts within Spaces



[179] Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Planet ebook, 1523), 41, https://www.planetebook.com/free-ebooks/the-prince.pdf.

Vâčeslav Nikonov and Aleksej Arbatov harnessed the opportunity to transgress social boundaries and moved from academia to politics. These professional shifts between different fields were not entirely idiosyncratic, however. Instead, they constitute a more general phenomenon representative of distinct elite groups, as the example of Nikonov's colleagues at the Central Committee, e.g. Sergej Yastrzhembsky and Aleksej Pushkov, illustrates. [180] At the same time, the internal structure of the academic field changed dramatically. Research became dependent on foreign donors.

Aleksej Bogaturov's life path is a case in point. With the help of the MacArthur Foundation and other sponsors he remained within the field and eventually build up the necessary infrastructure to educate the next generation. Yet, despite this success, academic reputation did not easily translate into expert status. His low level of media and political capital suggests that his biography lacks important elements that would have facilitated the adoption of a more prominent role. In fact, it seems fair to argue that for Soviet academics the late 1980s and the immediate phase of transition from 1990 to 1992 mark the period that determined their subsequent social trajectory. It is in this time span that expert elite networks were built. Bogaturov, despite all his intellectual merits, remained on the margins (albeit within a privileged elite environment).

Kortunov's fate provides additional evidence for the importance of social networks, yet from the opposite direction. Although he had left academic life proper and turned into a science manager for most of the post-Soviet period, he easily adopted a prominent expert role and was appointed Director General at RIAC in 2010. Interpersonal relations, which Kortunov had, provide the basis for the confidence of political clients, which, in turn, result in high political capital of experts. Experts' media capital, on the other hand, seems to follow institutional positions since these function as shortcuts to communicate trustworthiness and signal authority to the media field. Luk'ânov, for example, generated epistemic authority as an expert only *after* he had been appointed editor of Russia in Global Affairs, thanks to the invitation by Sergej Karaganov.

[180] A similar, yet uncomparably more dramatic, process of capital transformation was accomplished by managers of former state enterprises ("red directors"), who used their institutional knowledge to generate profits from former state property.

The analysis of these five biographies thus illustrates the important distinctions that exist both in terms of power and practices within the social network of Russian foreign policy experts. Experts occupy different spaces that signal the ability to speak with authority and advance one's career in relation to the political and the media field. When the level of indeterminacy in appraising experts' performance is high, as in the case of foreign policy, both authority and social function depend on concrete social networks whose constellation may change over time. The next chapter examines this process of institutional change by shifting the level of analysis from individual agents to organizations.

5 The Council on Foreign and Defense Policy– With United Forces?

> By 2010, all Russian ministers shall be members of SVOP. Then we will ensure a real, stable change of power.[1]

The Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (*Sovet po Vnešnej i Oborony Politike*; SVOP) is often listed among the most important non-governmental institutions in Russian foreign and security policy debates. Pursiainen, for example, quotes Boris Yeltsin, who in 1997 allegedly characterized SVOP as a "real example of the progress of the democratic civic society, freedom of speech and attitudes in Russia".[2] Several authors have argued that SVOP is "the biggest and most influential centre among those which have been created for servicing foreign policy making",[3] "the most influential public Russian organization devoted to issues of national security",[4] and "one of the most influential think tanks on military affairs",[5] whose "influence […] grew in the 1990s".[6]

From an American perspective, the scholar and late special adviser to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Stephen Sestanovich, explained in 1996 that SVOP

> is a self-styled analogue to our own Council on Foreign Relations in its heyday, a comparison made credible by the former's success in bringing together corporate leaders and experts on international affairs.[7]

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[1] Sergej Karaganov, "SVOP — èto masonstvo, no bez masterkov," [SVOP — Freemasonry, but without masters] *Kommerant"*, Nov. 11, 1999, accessed Jan. 11, 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/16236.
[2] Christer Pursiainen, "The Role of Civil Society in Russian Foreign Policy. Actor, Factor or Outsider?" in *New and Old Actors in Russian Foreign Policy, Conference Proceedings* (Oslo, 26-27 November 1998), ed. Jakub M. Godzimirski (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1998), 138 [189]; see also Sabine Fischer, *Russlands Westpolitik in der Krise 1992-2000: Eine konstruktivistische Untersuchung* [Russia's Western Policy in crisis. 1991-2000: A constructivist study] (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2003), 176.
[3] Alexander Sergunin, *Russia's Policy on Europe: Decision-Making Mechanisms* (Nizhny Novgorod: Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University Press, 2007), 65; see also Alexander Sergunin, *Explaining Russian Foreign Policy Behaviour. Theory and Practice* (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2016), 80.
[4] Eugene B. Rumer, *Russian National Security and Foreign Policy in Transition* (United States Air Force, RAND, 1995), 35.
[5] Carolina Vendil Pallin, *Russian Military Reform. A Failed Exercise in Defense Decision Making* (London & New York: Routledge, 2009), 45.
[6] ibd. 94.
[7] Stephen Sestanovich, "Geotherapy: Russia's Neuroses, and Ours," *National Interest*, no. 45 (Fall 1996): 8.

In his study on Russian security thinking and its consequences for the development of the Russian air force from 1992 to 2002, Marcel de Haas explicitly mentions SVOP as a key but opaque actor and notes that "considering the composition of its membership, this body must have had a substantial influence on the contents of major RF [Russian Federation] documents on foreign and security policy".[8] Unsurprisingly, the Global Think Tank Index report prepared annually at the University of Pennsylvania lists SVOP among the 100 top think tanks worldwide throughout 2012 to 2014.

These assessments notwithstanding, Pynnöniemi, writing in 2003, suggests that SVOP's influence has "markedly declined" in recent years.[9] Moreover, there seems to be considerable confusion about the membership structure and organizational characteristics of the Council and its place and function in Russian society. Russian IR scholar Aleksandr Sergounin, for example, writing in 2009, claims that SVOP "is governed by an assembly of some 50 prominent figures in government, business, academia, and the mass media."[10] This is an interesting observation, given that SVOP, as I will show, had almost 190 members at the time, headed by a small presidium.

There is also a lot of factual inaccurate information about SVOP in circulation. In a 1995 report for the RAND Corporation on the evolution of Russian foreign and security policy thinking after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Rumer argues that, at the time of its founding, SVOP included Andrej Kokošin, Sergej Karaganov, Evgenij Ambarcumov, Sergej Egorov, Mark Masarskij and foreign minister Andrej Kozyrev. Egorov and Masarskij, however, joined SVOP only during its second conference in June 1992. Andrej Kozyrev has never been a SVOP member – after all, it was his 1992 foreign policy strategy that was perceived by SVOP members as naïve pro-Western and a sell-out of Russia's national interests.

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[8] Marcel De Haas, *Russian Security and Air Power 1992-2002* (London & New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 23.
[9] Pynnöniemi, "Russian Foreign Policy Think Tanks in 2002," 22.
[10] Alexander Sergounin, "Russia: IR at a Crossroads", in *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, ed. Arelene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver (London & New York: Roudledge, 2009), 229. See also Sergunin, *Russia's Policy on Europe: Decision-Making Mechanisms*, 39 and Sergunin, Explaining Russian Foreign Policy Behaviour. Sergunin copied this statement from the 'Who's Who in Russia' editions of the Sutter's International Red Series, but without any reference. See Giancarlo Colombo (ed.), *Who's Who in Russia 1999* (Bresso & Milano: Verlag AG Zurich, 1999), 1293.

It also need to be pointed out that since 2011, the Global Think Tanks Index has placed SVOP consistently among the 30 best 'government affiliated' think tanks, but in 2015 it was also nominated and listed in the new category of 'independent think tanks' (Table 2).[11] The authors of the report define "independent think tanks" as institutions that enjoy "significant independence from any one interest group or donor" and are "autonomous in their operation and funding from government".[12]

Table 2: SVOP's rank in the Global Think Tank Index Report 2011-2017

Year	Defense and National Security Think Tanks	Foreign Policy and International Affairs Think Tanks	Government Affiliated Think Tanks	Independent Think Tanks[13]	University Affiliated Think Tanks
2017	55	45	26	104	39
2016	58	41	24	107	34
2015	57	42	23	Listed	33
2014	57	38	24	-	29
2013	39	38	26	-	25
2012	-	23	28	-	38
2011	-	n/a	25	-	n/a

By contrast, the status 'government affiliated' translates as "situate[d] in the government" and "considered as a part of the government body".[14] This is either contradictory or points to an interesting institutional position that needs to be explained. Since 2012, SVOP has also been listed in the category "Best University Affiliated Think Tank" as it is associated with the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow.[15] SVOP, so it seems, is simultaneously independent, government affiliated, and university-based.

[11] In 2016 it was ranked in this category at place 107, moving up by three positions in 2017. See Table 1 and James McGann, *2015 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report* (University of Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania, 2016), 146.
[12] McGann, 2015 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report, 7.
[13] This category was introduced in 2015 with a list of think tanks, which are just provided in alphabetical order
[14] McGann, *2015 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report*, 7 and 42.
[15] James McGann, *2012 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report* (University of Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania, 2013), 97; James McGann, *2013 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report* (University of Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania, 2014), 98; James McGann, *2014 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report* (University of Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania, 2015), 132; James McGann, *2015 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report* (University of Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania, 2016), 127; James McGann, *2016 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report* (University of Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania, 2017), 125: James

In this chapter I argue that this hybrid status of SVOP, as reflected in the index, is neither an accident, nor the result of measurement errors. The conceptual confusion rather stems from the constitution of the Council as a horizontal network based on informal relations between members.[16] In this context, the identification of members, personal backgrounds, and political sentiments within the Council are essential for any sound judgment about the latter's impact and position in Russian politics.

In order to make this judgment, I proceed as follows. I first illustrate how SVOP was founded and describe its initial membership structure (5.1). I then analyze the development of membership over time and the position of the Council after the Russian Presidential elections in summer 1996. Here I especially highlight the significance of the relationship between SVOP and Prime Minister Evgenij Primakov, whose Presidential ambitions were actively supported by the network (5.2). In the final section (5.3) I trace SVOP's development during the 2000s and show how the Council transformed from a policy-making institution into a university-based policy-debating platform. Since it is my aim to determine the social space occupied by SVOP members, the discussion focuses less on the substance of the ideas produced by SVOP members as part of the political discourse, and more on the Council's organizational capacities and the political connections between its members with a view to prevailing power relations in Russia.

I thereby advance two claims, one conceptual, the other empirical. First, SVOP illustrates the difficulties of differentiating analytically between state and society, with interest groups and political parties acting as intermediaries in neo-patrimonial regimes.[17] In post-Communist societies, the boundaries between categories such as 'public' and 'private', 'bureaucracy' and 'market', 'legal' and 'illegal' are particularly blurred.[18] The locus of decision-making and loyalty depends on informal groups and

McGann, *2017 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report* (University of Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania, 157) .

[16] E. V. Kostylev, "Zarubežnye i otečestvennye mozgovye century," [Foreign and Domestic Think Tanks], in *Gumanitarnaja nauka i ideologija. Gumanitarnye nauki kak fabriki mysli, materialy naučnogo seminara*, Vyp. № 2, (Moskva: Naučnyj Èkspert, 2007), 295.

[17] This ambivalence has also been noted by Sabine Fischer, who characterizes the Russian foreign policy expert community as an "outsourced state" (*ausgelagerter Staat*), a group of actors that is neither synonymous with state structures, nor a genuine part of civil society, see Fischer, *Russlands Westpolitik in der Krise 1992-2000,* 177.

[18] Janine Wedel, "Flex Organizing and the Clan-State: Perspectives on Crime and Corruption in the New Russia", in *Ruling Russia: Crime, Law, and Justice in a Changing Society*, ed. William Pridemore (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 105.

networks, spanning the domains of politics, economics and, in the case of SVOP, the military and academia. These groups operate and mediate the interdependency between the state and the public sphere.[19] Thus, SVOP allows me to test the usefulness of the theoretical framework on expert spaces advanced in chapter 2.

My second claim is that the SVOP network changed significantly over time, both in terms of membership and functions. In the 1990s, the activities of the Council played an effective, yet selective political role in Russian policy-making profiting from low state capacity. The main reason for this was the membership structure at the time: from 1992 to 1999, SVOP represented the intellectual-political elite of the Yeltsin epoch, with close ties to the Presidential administration and state bureaucracy. The unexpected rise of Vladimir Putin in 1999 and the increasingly limited administrative resources among its members concentration of administrative resources, however, diminished the political capital of SVOP. Members lost their positions in political office. Cut off from direct political influence via institutional membership or close personal relations to the inner circle of presidential power, the activities of SVOP shifted to the provision of "enlightenment functions",[20] that is publication platforms, lectures and educational projects, and the consolidation of the Russian expert community.

5.1 Social Origins and Positions

SVOP is a product of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The initiative to establish the network emerged in the wake of the failed *coup d'etat* attempt in August 1991. As current SVOP Chairman Fedor Luk'ânov argues, this was a

> period of the most radical breakdown, when many people from this sphere [of experts] felt lost. Everything, the entire old state collapsed, but it was unclear where the new one would lead to, and it was the idea of Sergej Karaganov […] to provide a platform to exchange opinions, so that some general line could evolve from disparate voices, some vision about what the country and society needed.[21]

[19] Richard Sakwa, *The Crisis of Russian Democracy. The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 94.
[20] Vladimir Orlov, "Ob irlandskih monahah, ili rol' nezavisimyh èkspertnyh centrov i SMI v rossijskoj vnešneolitičeskoj diskussii," [On Irish monks, or the role of independent expert centers and mass media in Russian foreign policy discussions], *Indeks Bezpasnosti*, no. 1, 112 (2014): 90, accessed Jan. 11, 2019, http://pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14301348380.pdf.
[21] Vladimir Pozner, "Fedor Luk'ânov," *Pervyj Kanal*, March 03, 2014, accessed June 7, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c1R74JmV7II.

In late August 1991 Sergej Karaganov worked as Deputy Director at the Institute of Europe. Born into a family of intellectuals and artists,[22] he had studied economics at Moscow State University (MSU). After graduating in 1974 he joined ISKAN, where he quickly passed through the career stages. In early 1988 he followed Vitalij Žurkin, his academic teacher, to the newly established Institute of Europe (IoE). IoE had been founded on the initiative of IMEMO director Yevgeny Primakov, Politburo member Alexander Yakovlev, and the first Deputy Foreign Minister Anatolij Kovalev,[23] for the purpose of studying European integration.

In August 1991 Karaganov realized the magnitude of the crisis and reached out to Vladimir Rubanov, Vitalij Šlykov and Aleksandr Calko with the idea to assemble a goup of like-minded people. Colonel Rubanov had been the Head of the KGB Counterintelligence in the Oblast Voronezh in southern Russia before he joined the Moscow-based KGB Scientific Research Institute on the protection of state secrets in 1981.

Vitalij Šlykov had worked for decades as an agent of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff (GRU) and was involved in one of the most successful Soviet espionage operations at Silvermine, a top-secret center for tracking aircraft and ships in South Africa. In January 1983 he was arrested in Switzerland,[24] but after 20 months in prison returned to the Soviet Union to head the GRU Directorate for Military Economics, where he was responsible for the assessment of NATO‘s military and economic potential.[25] Upon retirement in early 1988, Šlykov joined IMEMO as a leading research associate in the section on military-political studies.

Finally, Major-General Aleksandr Calko had been a military officer in the Soviet air force, serving both at home and abroad. From 1982 to 1983 he participated in the Soviet War in Afghanistan, leading the 260th helicopter regiment, and subsequently returned to service in the Soviet Union, where, beginning in 1988, he commanded the

[22] Karaganov‘s father, Aleksandr Karaganov (1915-2007), was a famous Soviet literary and film critic. His mother, Sof'ia Karaganova, had previously been married to the poet Evgenij Dolmatovskij.
[23] Vitalij Žurkin, “O načale Instituta Evropy RAN,” [About the Beginnings of the Institute of Europe RAN], in: *Sovremennaâ Evropa*, no. 5 (2017): 117.
[24] “Vitaly Shlykov,” *The Telegraph*, Nov. 24, 2011, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/8913985/Vitaly-Šlykov.html.
[25] Alexei Pankin, “Vitaly Shlykov remembered,” *Russia beyond the Headlines*, Nov. 28, 2011, accessed Dec. 22, 2018, https://www.rbth.com/articles/2011/11/28/vitaly_shlykov_remembered_13823.html.

344th Army Aviation Centre for air crews combat training and transition in Toržok (Oblast Tver`).[26]

Firmly established in intelligence and military circles, the three men shared the spirit of Gorbachev's political reforms towards greater openness and transparency, arguing for broad military and security sector reform. In September 1988, for example, Rubanov published an article in the CPSU Central Committee journal *Kommunist* criticizing the Soviet "cult of secrecy". Among other things, he noted that

> the state is not strong in terms of glasnost' and the openness of information. Undue secrecy is the condition to and a sign of, its dangerous deformation and of its deviation from the goals and methods of socialist development.[27]

Moreover, in agreement with researchers at the institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, who struggled with the public unavailability of information on the Soviet military and instead had to rely on foreign publications, Rubanov stressed the following paradoxical situation: when classified data were released in negotiations and commented on in Western media, they remained a secret within the Soviet Union itself. He attributes the "cult of secrecy" to bureaucracy's plan to close itself off from external scrutiny and exercise an "unmonitored and irresponsible use of power for departmental, narrow-group goals".[28] In 1988, motivated by the same bad state of affairs as Rubanov, Vitalij Šlykov authored a series of articles on the NATO-Warsaw pact tank asymmetry. For the first time, they revealed the true scale of Soviet military losses during the Second World War due to mismanagement and lack of strategy, despite advantages in numbers.[29]

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[26] "344-j centr boevogo primeneniâ i pereučivaniâ letnogo sostava armejskoj aviacii," [3*44th* Army Aviation Centre for air crews combat training and transition] *redov.ru*, accessed September 14, 2018, http://www.redov.ru/transport_i_aviacija/aviacija_i_kosmonavtika_2010_05/p1.php.
[27] Vladimir Rubanov, "From the Cult of Secrecy to the Information Culture," *Soviet Law and Government*, vol. 28 (1) (1989): 14. Translated from Vladimir Rubanov, "Ot kul'ta sekretnosti k informacionnoj kul'ture," *Kommunist*, no. 13 (September 1988). For a summary of the points made by Rubanov in English see Mikhail Tsypkin, "Glasnost and Secrecy in the Soviet Military," Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey (December 1990): 16-17.
[28] Rubanov, "From the Cult of Secrecy to the Information Culture," 12.
[29] Vladimir Šlykov, "I tanki naši bystry," [And our tanks are fast] *Meždunarodnaâ Žizn'*, no. 9 (1988): 39-52; Vladimir Šlykov, "Bronâ Krepka (Tankovaâ asimmetriâ i real'naâ bezopasnost')," [The armour is strong (Tank asymmetry and real security)] *Meždunarodnaâ Žizn'*, no. 11 (1988): 39-52.

United in their advocacy for continuing reform in Soviet foreign and defense policy, Karaganov's small circle could thus build on its members' social standing in military and intellectual circles as well as their evolving political capital.

5.1.1 Assembling Members

In spring 1989, Rubanov, Šlykov and Calkov had been elected to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the RSFSR,[30] which provided them with an institutional basis for their ideas, but also helped to establish political contacts. In autumn 1990, Calko and Šlykov joined the State Committee for Public Security and Cooperation at the Ministry of Defense and the KGB of the USSR, where both severed as Deputy Chairmen to General Konstantin Kobets.[31] Moreover, after the failed August coup in 1991, Rubanov returned to the KGB, which he had left earlier due to conflicts with the head of the KGB, Vladimir Krûčkov, the leader of the coup. The new USSR KGB chief, former Soviet Minister of Interior Vadim Bakatin, appointed him Head of the Analytical Directorate.[32]

The fast changing and increasingly deteriorating political situation in the Soviet Union after August 1991, however, presented the four men with an extraordinary challenge. Their common effort evolved around three basic, but equally pressing issues, as Karaganov recalls in our interview:

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[30] Evgenij Šimin, "Nastoâšij polkovnik!," [A real Colonel!] *Tverskie Vedomosti*, Aug. 8, 2016, accessed Sept. 9, 2018, http://tver.bezformata.ru/listnews/nastoyashij-polkovnik/49403427/.

[31] After the declaration of state sovereignty by the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian SFSR on June 12, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR began to establish its own institutions and ministries in September 1990. In accordance with the law on the Republic's ministries and committees from July 14, 1990 the RSFSR Supreme Soviet established, among others, the "State Committee of the RSFSR for Public Security and Cooperation" at the Ministry of Defense and the "Committee on State Security of the USSR". On January 31, 1991 the committee was replaced by the State Committee on Defense and Security, while General Konstantin Kobets was appointed as its Chairman. On May 5, 1991 the latter was split into the Committee for Defense Issues and the Committee on Security, the former under the continued chairmanship of Kobets. Finally, on November 26, 1991 the Committee on State Security was re-organized as the Federal Security Agency of the RSFSR (AFB RSFSR). Yet, after another re-organization whose legality was successfully contested at the Constitutional Court, President Boris Yeltsin established the Ministry of Security on January 24, 1992. In December 1993 the Ministry was dissolved and replaced by the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service, which became the Federal Security Service (FSB) in April 1995. See Aleksandr Kolpakidi and Mihail Serâkov, *Ŝit i meč. Rukovoditeli organov gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti moskovskoj Rusi, Rossijskoj imperii, Sovetskogo Soûza i Rossijskoj Federacii* [Shield and Sword. The leadership of the state security authorities in the Moscow Rus, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation] (Moskva: Olma-press, 2002), 530.

[32] Vadim Bakatin, *Izbavlenie ot KGB* [Freedom from the KGB] (Moskva: Novosti, 1992), 71.

> I said that, first, we have to create some kind of horizontal organization to bring all kind of elites together, avert the collapse of the country and keep it afloat. Second, we needed to integrate the military within the new elites – both military and security elites. The third idea of the council was to create new workable relationships at a time when everything was collapsing. So these were the reasons: Save the country. Save the military and integrate them. Create a new network of friendships and relations.[33]

In winter 1991 Karaganov travelled around Moscow trying to convince people to join the group, particularly those who, in his opinion, were becoming increasingly important at that time: the leaders of business associations and nascent private companies. These included, for example, Arkadij Vol'skij and Anatolij Dubrovin, both with excellent relations to Soviet state enterprises and the growing banking sector. Vol'skij had been working for the Central Committee in various industry-related departments since 1969 and had advised General Secretaries Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko on economic issues in the 1980s. In 1990 he founded the Scientific-Industrial Union, which eventually transformed into the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP). Dubrovin, on the other hand, had spent his career as a lawyer in the service of the Soviet Interior Ministry. In summer 1991, however, he joined the Inkombank Group, which had been founded in October 1988 by the leading economist of the Soviet state Promstroibank,[34] Vladimir Vinogradov, and subsequently developed into one of Russia‘s leading private banks.[35]

According to Karaganov, the closeness of Rubanov, Šlykov and Calko to military and intelligence services was a particularly important asset when reaching out to and gaining authority within security elites. Moreover, Šlykov and Calko became instrumental in financing the common enterprise. Karaganov remembers that a representative of Inkombank brought several suitcases with money to support the defense of the White House during the attempted coup in August 1991.[36] One of the

[33] #28, Sergej Karaganov, SVOP, Oct. 2017.
[34] Promstroibank was created by the Soviet government in 1988 to fund specific state industrial programs. The other specialized banks for agriculture, household, foreign trade and the housing sector, respectively, were Agroprombank, Sberbank, Vneshekonombank, Zhilsotsbank. See Timothy Frye, “Governning the Banking Sector,” in *The State After Communism: Governance in the New Russia*, ed. Timothy J. Colton and Stephen Holmes (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 183.
[35] In the course of the Russian financial crisis in summer 1998 and the subsequent state default, the bank lost its license and had to file for bankruptcy.
[36] This person could have been Dubrovin.

suitcases was handed to the State Committee on Security as sponsorship for future public structures, whose activity were supposed to help to prevent similar civil conflicts and democratize civil-military relations in the country, while also upholding the national interests of Russia in the realm of foreign affairs.[37] This money, which, according to information of the Nezavisimaâ Gazeta in June 1992, amounted to four million rubles,[38] was used to buy computers to organize the everyday work of the Council.[39]

5.1.2 Members and Politics

In December 1988 the old Soviet standing parliament, the Supreme Soviet, established the Congress of People's Deputies as the new Soviet legislative with 2,250 members, which in turn was to elect 542 individuals for the reformed standing parliament that, however, kept its name, Supreme Soviet.[40] The elections took place in May 1989. In addition to three of the four initiators of SVOP (with the exception of Sergej Karaganov), later SVOP members Ûrij Ryžov and Sergej Stankevič, who had officially endorsed Boris Yeltsin, became Deputies of the Interregional Deputies Group (MDG) with 268 members.[41] The aeronautics specialist Ryžov had been rector of the prestigious Moscow Aviation Institute, but in January 1992 was appointed Russian ambassador to France, while Sergej Stankevič was to become Deputy to Popov in Moscow. Following the elections of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies in March 1990, later SVOP members Evgenij Ambarcumov, Svâtoslav Fedorov, Sergej Ûšenkov and Aleksandr Kotenkov, entered Soviet Politics as well.

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[37] SVOP, *Strategiâ dlâ Rossii: 10 let SVOP* [Strategy for Russia: 10 years of SVOP] (Moskva: Vagrius, 2002), 7. See also Karaganov, "SVOP — èto masonstvo, no bez masterkov," Nov. 11, 1999.
[38] "22 iûnâ, v Moskve, na territorii byvšej bližnej dači Stalina v Kunceve sostoâlos' učreditel'noe sobranie Soveta po Vnešnej i Oboronnoj Politike," [On June 22, in Moscow on the territory of the former close Dacha of Stalin in Kuntsevo the Council on Foreign and Defesen Policy helds its constitutent assembly] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, June 24, 1992.
[39] #28, Sergej Karaganov, SVOP, Oct. 2017.
[40] The proposal for the establishment of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR as the supreme legislative body was introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev during the 19th Party Conference in summer 1988. On December 1, 1988 the Supreme Soviet adopted constitutional changes in the "On the elections of the people's deputies of the USSR" act (*O vyborakh narodnykh deputatov SSSR*). The first elections took place from March to May 1989.
[41] Timothy J. Colton, *Yeltsin: A Life* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 169. The MDG united the Soviet democratic caucus, including the historian Ûrij Afanas'ev, the economist Gavriil Popov (who was elected head of the Moscow city administration in April 1990), the engineer Ûrij Boldyrev, the natural scientist Viktor Pal'm, and, most importantly, nuclear physicist and noble-prize winner Andrei Sakharov.

Thus, in total, from the nineteen men that on January 26, 1992 gathered for the constitutive conference of SVOP at the Institute of Europe,[42] the majority had begun to build a political career and due to Perestroika experienced an unexpected professional transformation from military officers and academics to politicians (Table 3). In addition to the agents mentioned above, Vladimir Lukin, a former colleague of both Karaganov and Kokošin at ISKAN, already in 1988 transferred to the Foreign Ministry under Eduard Shevardnadze, where he served as Deputy Director of its Far East division.

Table 3: SVOP members in January 1992

			Professional Sector	
Nr	**Member**	**born/died**	**1987**	**1992**
1	Evgenij Ambarcumov	*1929/†2010	Academia	Politics
2	Andrej Čerkasenko	*1962	Military	Business
3	Anatolij Dubrovin	*1940/†2011	State/Politics	Business
4	Svâtoslav Fedorov	*1927/†2000	Medicine	Politics
5	Igor' Golembiovskij	*1935/†2009	Media	Media
6	Grigorij Âvlinskij	*1952	Academia	Politics
7	Sergej Ûšenkov	*1950/†2003	Academia	Politics
8	Sergej Karaganov	*1951	Academia	Academia
9	Mihail Kolesnikov	*1939/†2017	Military	Military
10	Aleksandr Kotenkov	*1952	Military	Politics
11	Vladimir Lukin	*1937	Academia	Politics
12	Vladimir Petrovskij	*1933/†2014	Diplomacy	Diplomacy
13	Vladimir Rubanov	*1944	Military	Politics
14	Ûrij Ryžov	*1930/†2017	Academia	Politics
15	Vitalij Šlykov	*1934/†2011	Military	Politics
16	Sergej Stankevič	*1954	Academia	Politics
17	Vitalij Tret'âkov	*1953	Media	Media
18	Aleksandr Calko	*1946	Military	Politics
19	Arkadij Vol'skij	*1932/†2006	State/Politics	Business

In the newly elected RSFSR Supreme Soviet he first became Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and later was appointed Russian ambassador to the United States in January 1992. Andrej Čerkasenko,[43] who had served as a young officer in the Soviet army until 1991, became SVOP's first Executive Director and was

[42] At the time the institute did not have its own building but used the facilities of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, close to IMEMO.
[43] In the 1990s Čerkasenko worked in different chemical-industrial companies. In 2001 he became Director of Atompromresursy, a part of Minatom, the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy. Today he is Director General of APR-Resursy.

also responsible for the invention of both the coat of arms and the slogan of the Council, referencing Joseph I of Austria: *Viribus unitis* – With united forces. Before Karaganov eventually became the Chairman of the Council in late 1994, he agreed to take on the role of Deputy, while Calko took the chairmanship. This decision had a strategic element, as Karaganov recalls:

> I was Deputy Chairman. I insisted on that. […] It was important to have a fighting general, because one of the challenges of the work was to integrate the military. […] They had to have somebody [to identify with]. And he was a real […] general. A heroic man. A two-star general. He was a commander of a division, a fighting pilot. *He had the authority*.[44]

On February 25, 1992 SVOP was officially registered to become one of the first non-governmental organization in the Russian Federation. Four month later, on June 22, 1992, the 51st anniversary of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the SVOP members organized their first assembly at Volynskoe-2, which is part of a Dacha settlement built for the Soviet political elite at the south-western outskirts of Moscow. The 19 members were joined by 13 external invitees, including first Deputy Minister of Defense Kokošin, who delivered the evening speech. All of the external guests, including Dmitrij Rûrikov, Sergej Šahraj and Igor Yurgens, subsequently joined SVOP. Similar to the first group of members, most of them had either entered Soviet-Russian politics as political advisors or as Members of Parliament (Congress of People's Deputies or Supreme Soviet), or had become active in business associations and the increasingly privatized Soviet industries (Table 4).

[44] #28, Sergej Karaganov, SVOP, Oct. 2017, emphasis added.

Table 4: New SVOP Members in July 1992

			Professional Sector	
Nr	**Member**	**bornd/dead**	**1987**	**1992**
20	Sergej Egorov	*1928/†2010	State/Politics	Business
21	Andrej Fedorov	*1955	International Union of Students	Politics
22	Vladimir Ispravnikov	*1948/†2014	Academia	Politics
23	Andrej Kokošin	*1945	Academia	Politics
24	Evgenij Kožokin	*1954	Academia	Politics
25	V. E. Krivonogih	-	-	-
26	L. V. Kuznecov	-	-	-
27	Mark Masarskij	*1941	Business	Business
28	Nikolaj Mihajlov	*1937	Military Industry	Business
29	Aleksandr Mordovin	*1946/†2013	Military	Military
30	Dmitrij Rûrikov	*1947	Diplomacy	Politics
31	Sergej Šahraj	*1956	Academia	Politics
32	Lev Vainberg	*1944/†2010	Academia	Business
33	Iulij Voroncov	*1929/†2007	Diplomacy	Diplomacy
34	Igor Yurgens	*1952	Trade Union	Trade Union
35	Konstantin Zatulin	*1958	Komsomol	Business


Source: Own compilation based on the attendance list of the assembly meeting and biographical data.

In total, in summer 1992 more than half of all SVOP members were active in politics or had gained political experience in the various committees of the Congress of the Peoples' Deputies and the Supreme Soviet,[45] whereas a quarter represented businesses or business associations (Diagram 14).[46] By contrast, in 1987, just before the first elections to the first Congress of People's Deputies, many SVOP members had been engaged academics, most of them in the institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, including ISKAN, IMEMO and the Institute of World History. This constituted a significant social shift in professional terms. In 1992 only Karaganov remained. Moreover, the number of active military officers, including Šlykov, Rubanov and Calko, decreased significantly.

[45] Despite their positions as ambassadors, I count Vladimir Lukin and Ûrij Ryžov 1992 as politicians due to their previous experience as members of parliament. Moreover, their social position was different from career diplomats such as Iulij Voroncov and Vladimir Petrovskij. Both V. E. Krivonogih and L. V. Kuznecov are excluded from the diagram.

[46] The category "other" relates to Andrej Fedorov, Igor Iurgens, Konstantin Zatulin and Sviatoslav Fedorov.

Diagram 14: SVOP members, Changing Professional sectors



Source: Own compilation based on biographical data of SVOP members.

The plurality of experiences and backgrounds was, however, no hindrance to the success of the common enterprise. According to Karaganov, despite cultural differences, everyone involved was open and shared the same broad ideas:

> From the very beginning we never had any problems. I mean, of course, [we had] some different opinions but we helped each other. And of course one of us [Šlykov] had more relations with the former KGB. Calko [was] from the military. I had more relations with political and public circles and […] with the intellectual community.[47]

The mix of professions, experiences and different ideological approaches, so Karaganov, produced an unusually productive intellectual environment within the Council.[48] During the Russian constitutional crisis in autumn 1993 and the siege of the White House, SVOP members were to be found on both sides, but nevertheless held joint meetings.[49]

Karaganov also highlights certain ideological limits, e.g. when he argues that "the Council has always been open for a notably wide range of opinions and political views, from moderate right, to moderate left".[50] However, in 1991-1992 political-ideological issues among SVOP members were still overshadowed by the state's existential crisis and the absence of policy coordination. The pressing issue was to have a horizontal

[47] #28, Sergej Karaganov, SVOP, Oct. 2017.
[48] SVOP, *Strategiâ dlâ Rossii: 10 let SVOP* [Strategy for Russia: 10 years of SVOP], 5.
[49] ibid. 6.
[50] ibid. 3, emphasis added.

organization to unite individuals with different views engaged in ensuring the well-being of Russian society. Thus, from the very beginning, SVOP was construed as a hybrid, a "civil society organization, but not confronting the state, yet independent from and simultaneously supportive of it".[51]

5.1.3 Initial Positions

In August 1992 SVOP attracted public attention for the first time by publishing its theses on a 'Strategy for Russia', while the country celebrated the first-year anniversary of the GKČP's capitulation. The theses, published in the friendly outlet Nezavisimaâ Gazeta, were partially designed as a provocation for President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. They unequivocally called on the state to initiate serious discussions about national interests and to come up with a clear strategy. Moreover, SVOP argued that the gap between Russia and the West would probably increase. Russia should shift her focus to the near abroad and ensure regional stability.[52]

In his comment on the publication in the Nezavisimaâ Gazeta, SVOP member and main newspaper editor Vitalij Tret'âkov insisted that, although Sergej Karaganov stood out as the main author and coordinator, the theses were the product of individual suggestions which had been jointly adopted.[53] Rumer, in his RAND report on Russian foreign and security policy, notes that the report constituted the most balanced and sophisticated vision of Russia's national interests, but that it also stood in stark contrast to the neo-imperialist and anti-Western statements of SVOP members Stankevič and Ambarcumov.[54] These differences illustrates the role of SVOP as a platform for discussion, rather than a political club or community united by distinct political views.

In his comment, Tret'âkov made clear that his views did diverge from the analyses provided by SVOP's theses in some respect. For example, the final text of "Strategy for Russia" proceeded from the idea that for the foreseeable future Russia would remain a moderate authoritarian state with a mixed-state-capitalist economy.[55] By

[51] SVOP, *Strategiâ dlâ Rossii: 10 let SVOP* [Strategy for Russia: 10 years of SVOP], 5.
[52] SVOP, "Strategiâ dlâ Rossii," [Strategy for Russia] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, Aug. 19, 1992, accessed Sept. 15, 2017, http://www.svop.ru/files/meetings/m037913400978831.pdf.
[53] Vitalij Tret'âkov, *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, Aug. 19, 1992.
[54] Rumer, *Russian National Security and Foreign Policy in Transition*, 31.
[55] For a brief discussion of these theses see Rumer, *Russian National Security and Foreign Policy in Transition*, 31-35.

contrast, Tret'âkov suggested that it was equally likely that Russia would transform into a moderate democracy with an increasing bi-polarization between European and Eurasian republics beyond the Urals. While such additions might have changed the document's logic considerably, more details, he argued, would have made it impossible to find agreement among SVOP members fast enough to address the pressing problems faced by Russian society.

The 1992 theses were followed by a second "Strategy for Russia" in spring 1994.[56] In the one and a half years between the two publications the course of Russian foreign policy had changed. In a speech to the Civic Union conference on 28 February 1993, President Yeltsin had claimed for the first time that Russia had a 'vital interest in the cessation of armed conflicts on the territory of the former USSR', calling upon the UN to grant Russia special rights as the guarantor of peace in the region.[57] A new policy line was outlined in the Foreign Policy Concept published in April 1993, stating that despite the crisis Russia remained a great powers, whose priority would be to secure its military, political and economic interests in the "near-abroad".[58]

This shift was also reflected by SVOP. Whereas the first strategy had called upon decision-makers to formulate realistic political goals for the development of the Russian state, criticizing utopian illusions about full democratization and liberalization, the second strategy cut back on the nationalist undertones, which had become salient in political debate in the meantime. SVOP was working against the trend. Indeed, after the constitutional crisis in autumn 1993, which brought Russia to the brink of civil war, the State Duma elections in December were won by the nationalist LDPR, gaining almost 23% of the popular vote.[59] Hence, in the introduction to the second strategy SVOP members noted that the political goals formulated in the main theses from August 1992 had been almost completely achieved. The one-sided pro-Western orientation of Russia's policies allegedly practiced by foreign minister Andrej Kozyrev

[56] SVOP, "Strategiâ dlâ Rossii (2)", *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, May 27, 1994.
[57] Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* (New York, Routledge, 2008), 370.
[58] "Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation", Apr. 23, 1999, in *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities*, ed. Andrei Melville and Tatiana Shakleina (Budapest & New York: Central European University Press, 2005), 35.
[59] The "Party of Power" that supported the government "The Choice of Russia" (Vybor Rossii), led by former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, received only 15.51%, whereas PRES under the leadership of SVOP member Sergej Šahraj got merely 6.73%. The oppositional Communist Party received 12.4%, accessed Nov. 11, 2017, http://cikrf.ru/banners/vib_arhiv/gosduma/1993/1993_itogi_FS_obshefed_okrug.php.

– who, according to the document, had damaged national interests and evoked strong negative reactions in public – had been overcome. [60] However, SVOP also warned that the growing tendency of officials to resort to "great power rhetoric" was not backed up by real economic, political and military strength, and would fuel existing suspicions of Russian imperialist revenge. A political course based on equality and recognition of Russian interests abroad was to preclude any principled conflicts with the West. Given the economic weakness of the country, the document argued, any other strategy would be destructive.

SVOP members explicitly rejected the restoration of the Soviet Union, particularly any attempt, as promoted by ultra-nationalists, to practice expansionism by force. Such a policy, so the second strategic document, would be both amoral and unpractical, destroying the foundations on which political stability rested. This middle ground between following Western policies on the one hand and nationalist tendencies for revanche and isolation on the other, became known as "liberal imperialist" or "liberal nationalist". As Karaganov argued many years later, the term "internationalist nationalist" would have been even more apt, because the emphasis had to be on finding strong partners in world politics to increase Russia's economic and human capital. The main obstacle at the time, though, was less of an ideational nature, but related to the organization of the Russian policy process as stated in the second SVOP strategy in May 1994:

> None, even the most elementary strategy for the defence and realisation of the national interests of the country, can be implemented under the present condition of the institutions intended to formulate and implement it […]. Each official enjoys the freedom to have his own policy. This situation not only weakens the position of the country but also disgraces it. This is one of the most difficult challenges for Russian foreign policy.[61]

[60] The course of Russian foreign policy between January 1992 and February 1993 is often referred to as the 'romantic' or 'pro-Western phase'. Critics argue that this stance underestimates the uniqueness of the Russian state and its heritage and bemoan one-sided concessions, i.e. Russia's consent to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In his memoirs published in 1995, Kozyrev, however, argues that the romantic phase in the development of Russian foreign policy was not only natural but necessary to provide the right international conditions for domestic change. See Andrej Kozyrev, *Preobraženie* [Transformation] (Moskva: Meždunarodnye Otnošeniâ, 1995), 54.
[61] For this translation see Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, 375.

Although the Russian constitution adopted in December 1993 put the formal decision-making power on foreign policy firmly in the hands of the President, creating a super-presidential political system, policy coordination and strategy remained weak. This incapacity of the state provided the institutional premises for SVOP as a coordinating body.

5.2 SVOP and the Yeltsin Administration

5.2.1 The Politics of Membership

SVOP members' emphasis on strengthening state capacity is interesting, given the fact that many of them were directly involved in or had close relations to the Presidential Administration, either as part of Yeltsin's aides service or as members of the Presidential (consultative) Council. Whereas on the surface this might seem contradictory, low state capacity, internal power struggles and even bureaucratic chaos would continue to characterize most of Yeltsin's presidency. Being close to but not identical with the administration, SVOP members tried to improve this situation.

In August 1991, just before the attempted Soviet coup, Yeltsin had established the Presidential Administration of the RSFSR with Ûrij Petrov as its chief. At the same time, Viktor Ilûšin became the Head of the Presidential Secretariat, while Gennadij Burbulis, after the Presidential elections in June 1991, was appointed State Secretary and Head of the State Council.

The President also assembled a group of speechwriters who were, among others, responsible for analytical work, including former employees of his Alma Mater, the Ural State Technical University, such as Gennadij Harin and Lûdmila Pihoâ.[62] In summer 1992, the Presidential Secretariat was transformed into the Aides service but remained under the coordination of Viktor Ilûšin. Until 1996 the number of aides increased from three to ten, and each aide led a small team of two to three employees.[63] SVOP-member Dmitrij Rûrikov, who had been a member of Yeltsin's team since late August 1991,[64] took over the responsibility for foreign affairs. The

[62] Pihoâ joined SVOP in 1998.
[63] Ûrij Baturin et al., *Èpoha El'cina: Očerki političeskoj istorii* [The epoch of Yeltsin: portraits of political history] (Moskva: Vagrius, 2001), 207.
[64] Rasporâženie Prezidenta RSFSR, no. 29-rp, Aug. 28, 1991, accessed Dec. 28, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/157.

Aides service also included the Press-Secretary, the Head of the Protocol Service and the group of speechwriters headed by Pihoâ.

In addition to this nascent Presidential Administration, Burbulis in April 1992 transformed the former RSFSR State Council into the Presidential Consultative Council to provide a place for strategic policy discussions.[65] A new institution with 17 members was set up, including SVOP members Svâtoslav Fedorov and Ûrij Ryžov.[66] The work of the Council, however, turned out to be ineffective as the group of Presidential aides remembers:

> Instead of business-like discussions and analyses of the substance of problems, [the sessions] resulted in general conversations about the state of affairs from which it was difficult to derive concrete, rational proposals.[67]

In January 1993 the decision was made to re-organize the Consultative Council, and in February Yeltsin established the Presidential Council as a new organ.[68] Together with the team of speechwriters, the Head of the Presidents' Secretariat, Ilûšin, had to find professional and authoritative specialists with democratic credentials. In the end, the main selection criterium, however, was public popularity, that is, media capital. One of the new Council members, Georgij Satarov, at the time an applied mathematician at the Moscow State Pedagogical University, remembers that

> they paid attention to experts who were prominently present on TV. This is how I, Andranik Migranân, Sereža Karaganov and others got in. Experts who appeared on TV. They invited us, there was some selection, and we were chosen as experts who had already made a name for themselves in public.[69]

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[65] Baturin et al., *Èpoha El'cina: Očerki političeskoj istorii* [The epoch of Yeltsin: portraits of political history], 213.

[66] "Rasporâženie Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii no 57-rp, Voprosy Prezidentskogo konsul'tativnogo soveta" [Questions about the Presidential Consultative Council], Apr. 3, 1992, accessed Dec. 10, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/1154.

[67] Baturin et al., *Èpoha El'cina*, 212.

[68] Prezident RF, ukaz no. 273 "O soveršenstvovanii sistemy obespečeniâ deâtel'nosti Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii," [On improving the system supporting the activities of the President of the Russian Federation], Feb. 22, 1993, accessed Nov. 10, 2018, http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&prevDoc=102023752&backlink=1&&nd=102021740. Officially, the 28 members, including several SVOP members and SVOP associates, were appointed only in September 1994.

[69] Georgij Satarov, "Vse svobodny' - razgovor na svobodnye temy. V studii Georgij Satarov," [All are free – a conversation about free topics. In the studio Georgij Satarov] *Radio Svoboda*, March 28, 2004, accessed Oct.10, 2018 http://archive.svoboda.org/programs/SHEN/2004/SHEN.032804.asp.

In contrast to the previous formation, the work of the Council became important to Yeltsin for provision of both general information and more concrete policy advice. Several of the academic experts represented in the Council developed closer relations with the Presidential aides', eventually forming an unofficial sub-group consisting of Ûrij Baturin, Andranik Migranân, Sergej Karaganov, Georgij Satarov and Aleksej Salmin. As the collective of former Presidential aides remembers

> upon request of the employees of the aide's service and on their own initiative, [they] prepared analytical materials and forwarded memos to the President with concrete provisions and decisions.[70]

In addition, some individuals were invited as external experts to exchange opinions on specific issues, for example ISKRAN Deputy Director Sergej Rogov (who would be appointed ISKRAN director in 1995), as well as Andrej Kortunov and Vjačeslav Nikonov.[71] Membership in the Presidential Council also served as a career springboard: Both Baturin and Satarov in June 1993 and at the beginning of 1994 joined the team of Presidential aides and became responsible for national security and parliamentary relations, respectively.[72]

These close political relations between SVOP and the Yeltsin administration were critical for the political role played by SVOP in the first period after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In an interview with the radio channel Èho Moskvy in May 2014, Sergej Karaganov commented on his relations with the members of Yeltsin's Presidential administration as follows:

> I was simply close to the group of those aides. We were friends at the time; right now, of course, everyone has already moved in different directions: Krasnov, Baturin, Satarov, Ilûšin. We tried to do something, to help the country.[73]

The aides and SVOP members Satarov, Rûrikov and, since April 1997, Baturin had direct contact with Yeltsin and approached the President with analytical notes, initiatives and proposals, which were sometimes of a strategic character. Their ideas


[70] Baturin et al., *Èpoha El'cina*, 213.
[71] ibid. 213.
[72] Ûrij Baturin, "Bez Durakov," [Without Idiots], *Èho Moskvy*, April 6, 2006, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, https://echo.msk.ru/programs/korzun/42756/.
[73] Sergej Karaganov, "V Gostâh Sergej Karaganov," [As guest Sergej Karaganov] *Ėkho Moskvy*, May 25, 2014, accessed October 10, 2018, https://echo.msk.ru/programs/razbor_poleta/1326066-echo/.

and suggestions were often supported.[74] Yeltsin was then still both physically capable of and interested in intellectual exchange and discussion with respected specialists, which enabled single members of the Presidential Council to get indirectly involved in the decision-making process.[75]

5.2.2 After the 1996 Presidential Elections

In July 1996, Boris Yeltsin, heavily supported by the oligarch-controlled media, prevailed in the Presidential elections against the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Gennadij Zûganov. After the elections, SVOP's membership base started to increase substantially. Whereas in early 1996 the network consisted of less than 50 members, this number grew fast to 69 in 1997, 94 in 1998 and 107 in 1999 (Diagram 15).

Diagram 15: SVOP membership development 1991-2000



Source: Own compilation based on SVOP internal protocols and published lists of attendance at assembly meetings.

Whereas at first SVOP membership had been the result of personal friendship and word-of-mouth recommendation, the network over time established basic rules to make decisions about whom to invite. Today, membership in SVOP is still granted by personal invitation only, after which a formal vote is taken among the members of the Presidium. Each member has a veto to block the acceptance of candidates, without having to provide any explanation.[76] The collective decisions of the Presidium are

[74] Baturin et al., *Èpoha El'cina*, 208.
[75] ibid. 212.
[76] #28, Sergej Karaganov, SVOP, Oct. 2017.

usually adopted unanimously by the SVOP members at the annual assemblies. In 2002 Sergej Karaganov noted that candidates for membership

> must accomplish something in politics, science, or business to have the right to a compelling vote. They have to engage tentatively in the work of the organization. They have to have a high public and personal reputation.[77]

In theory, membership is for lifetime, but there are two possible reasons for forced exclusion: inactivity over a longer period (generally three years), or offensive behavior against other council members in public.

The implementation of these rules is strictly observed. Over time, more than 40 SVOP members have been excluded for reasons of inactivity. A smaller group had to leave involuntarily due to inappropriate behavior. [78] Two early prominent examples may suffice in order to illustrate this point. First, in 1995 the publisher and main editor of the newspaper Izvestiâ, Igor' Golembiovskij, was forced to leave the Council following his accusations of corruption against another SVOP member, the businessman and RSPP Vice-President Lev Vainberg.[79] Whereas SVOP supported Vainberg, Golembiovskii's newspaper, Izvestiâ, published several articles denouncing him, which ultimately led to his ouster. Second, in Spring 1997 founding member Sergej Stankevič,[80] a confident and former colleague of Satarov, was excuded from SVOP for "losing contact" with the network.[81] For several years, the Moscow Prosecutor office had repeatedly pressed charges against Stankevič due to the alleged misappropriation of funds in the amount of 10,000 US$, connected to the organization

[77] SVOP, *Strategiâ dlâ Rossii*, 5

[78] For six members the reasons for leaving the Council are unknown to me. This group includes Evgenij Ambarcumov (1992-2001), Mihail Vanin (1999-2003), Vladimir Vinogradov (2001), Mihail Kolesnikov (2001), Igor' Lisinenko (2003) and Vitalij Stepanov (1997-2003).

[79] Boris Pasternak, "Vaše Vliâtel'stvo," [Your Highness], *Ogonek*, no.7, p. 6, May 4, 1997, accessed Sept. 11, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2284955.

[80] Stankevič studied history at Moscow State Pedagogical University where he met Satarov. In October 1990 they founded the Center for Applied Political Research INDEM ("Informatics for democracy") supported by the editor of the newspaper Moskovskii novosti Egorov. In the late 1980's he became a leader of the informal club movement and a member of the Moscow City Council. In 1990 Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov appointed him as his Deputy, see Andrej Stepanov, "Devât' krugov Sergeâ Stankeviča," [The nine rounds of Sergeij Stankevič] *Kommersant"*, May 11, 1997, accessed Nov. 10, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2284980.

[81] "SVOP prosit sčitat' sebâ vliâtel'nym," [SVOP asks to regard itself as influential] *Kommersant"*, Apr. 23, 1997, accessed Sept. 13, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/176649.

of a theatre festival in July 1992.[82] In August 1994 the accusations were dropped. A year later, however, Stankevič lost the support of President Yeltsin, and Prosecutor General Aleksej Il'ûšenko reopened the case.[83] Still a member of the State Duma, he emigrated to Poland in November 1995. In April 1997 he was arrested in Warsaw, which led SVOP to reverse its decision. As Karaganov argued at the time, "we would not have liked that our behavior looks like a hasty recognition of guilt not yet proven. Sergej Stankevič has the right to receive our moral support."[84] This support was short-lived, however. Having returned to Russia in winter 1999, Stankevič was ultimately excluded from SVOP in February 2000.

This practice of excluding even prominent members highlights how SVOP pays attention to the semblance of unity at least in the public sphere and its political reputation. Here gain it becomes clear that the Council had been founded as a platform to debate the diverging point of views within the emerging Russian political elite in a trustful manner. Without protecting that space SVOP would lose its main function, particularly given the growth and growing political importance of the network after 1996.[85] In fact, after the Presidential elections the direct involvement of SVOP members in Russian politics reached its climax.[86] Although the Presidential Council, formally in existence until April 2001,[87] did not meet anymore after February 1996,[88] the political capital of SVOP grew due to new incoming members with important

[82] Maksim Varyvdin, "Sergej Stankevič k arestu byl moral'no gotov," [Sergej Stankevič has been morally prepared for arrest] *Kommersant'*, April 22, 1997, accessed Sept. 14, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/176582.
[83] Twenty years later Stankevič argues that the re-opening of the case was connected to his support of St. Petersburg Mayor Anatolij Sobčak as a possible alternative to Yeltsin in the Presidential elections in summer 1996. See Sergej Stankevič, "V Gostâh Sergej Stankevič" [As guest Sergej Stankevič], *Èho Moskvy*, June 18, 2018, accessed Nov. 10, 2018, https://echo.msk.ru/programs/razbor_poleta/2222236-echo/.
[84] "Panorama," [Panorama] *Ogonek*, May 25, 1997, accessed Sept. 13, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2285022.
[85] That the leadership continues to take this point seriously can be illustrated by two more recent cases. In 2010 Andrej Fedorov, one of SVOP's founding members and Director of its Political Programs since 1998 was excluded from the organization in 2010 for "non-ethical behavior towards SVOP members." Similarly, the former Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs and today's Senator in the Federation Council for the Oblast Pskov, Aleksej Puškov, who had joined SVOP in 1994, was excluded around 2010. The exact year, however, is unknown. The information was provided by an expert in a private discussion. 2010 was the year he attended the Council's Annual Assembly for the last time.
[86] Fischer, *Russlands Westpolitik in der Krise 1992-2000*, 176.
[87] Prezident RF, ukaz no. 463 "Ob uprazdnenii râda sovešatel'nyh i konsul'tativnyh organov pri Prezidente Rossijskoj Federacii" [On the abolishment of several advisory and consultative bodies to the President oft he Russian Federation], Apr. 25, 2001, accessed Nov. 11, 2018, http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/16866.
[88] Colton, *Yeltsin: A Life*, 398.

positions within the Yeltsin administration. Thus, SVOP transformed into a true meeting platform of the political elite that 'acted like a shadow Security Council'.

In April 1997 SVOP admitted thirteen new members, including Ûrij Baturin, Presidential aide to the President on national security,[89] and Sergej Yastrzhembsky, the President's Press Secretary and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration since March 1997. Among the new members were also former Presidential aide and Yastrzhembsky's Deputy, Aleksandr Livščic, and Yeltsin's representative to the State Duma, Aleksandr Kotenkov. Moreover, both Rûrikov and Satarov[90] remained aides to the President until April and October 1997, respectively.[91] Thus, if based purely on the number of formal affiliations with the state bureaucracy 1997, in fact, represents the year when SVOP possessed the largest amount of political capital.

At the beginning of 1997, eleven SVOP members were related to so-called 'power ministries' (*silovye struktury*), which "at several key junctures in Yeltsin's tenure […] played a key role in resolving the ultimate issues of who runs the state."[92] Although there is no commonly accepted definition, some researchers define them based on the existence of command over uniformed and/or military personnel. Pallin uses a legal-technical definition that relates the term to those institutions, which are directly subordinated to the Russian President.[93] I propose an alternative categorization broadly based on this definition, but stressing the informal proximity to Presidential decision-making on foreign and defense policy rather than the degree of formalization. SVOP members were represented in the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the Ministry of Interior, the Security Council, the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the

[89] Baturin remained part of the aides' service until January 1998.
[90] Satarov did not join SVOP until 1999 but, as illustrated, has been close to various SVOP members since 1990. He left SVOP in 2014.
[91] Rûrikov was allegedly dismissed because Yeltsin felt passed-by in his proposal on the union between Russia and Belarus. See Vladislav Dorofeev and Ûrij Kozlov, "To li ministr, to li èho holodnoj vojny," [Can't say whether its the Minister, or the echo of the Cold War], *Kommersant" Vlast'*, May 6, 1997, accessed Jan. 22, 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/13515. Timothy Colton supports the same hypothesis, see Colton, *Yeltsin: A Life*, 386-387.
[92] Brian D. Taylor, *Russia's Power Ministries: Coercion and Commerce* (Institute for National Security and Conterterrorism, Syracuse University, 2007), accessed Dec. 27, 2018, http://insct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Taylor_Russia_Power_Ministries_2007.pdf.
[93] Corolina Vendil Pallin, "The Russian Power Ministries: Tool and Insurance of Power," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 20, 1 (2007): 3.

Defense Council, [94] the latter of which existed for merely two years and was abolished in March 1998.[95]

The Defense Council

In the two years of its existence the Defense Council turned into an important political tool as it took over many of the competences of the Security Council, particularly on issues of military reform and development (*Voennoe stroitel'stvo*).[96] In June 1997 President Yeltsin established two commissions under its roof: the Commission on Military Construction with 17 members, headed by Prime Minister Viktor Černomyrdin, and the Commission on Financial and Economic Provisions of Military Reform, headed by Finance Minister Anatolij Čubajs with 25 members. Both commissions were to develop proposals the future development of the Russian military forces, the re-organization of the army and relevant financial questions for the period until 2001 and 2005.

Several SVOP members were directly involved in this work. Ûrij Baturin was appointed Secretary of the Defense Council, while Deputy Minister of Defense Andrej Kokošin joined both commissions and followed Baturin as Secretary in October 1997. In August 1997, Kokošin also became State Military Inspector; in March 1998 he was appointed Secretary of the Security Council. In addition, during the existence of the Defense Council, the Chief of the General Staff, Mihail Kolesnikov, Presidential aide Livščic and Sergej Stepašin were also part of the exclusive circle.[97] Stepašin, a close friend of foreign minister Primakov, had been director of the Federal Counter Intelligence Service, which in April 1995 transformed into the FSB. After November

[94] Ukaz Prezidenta RF, 25.07.1996, №1102, "O Sovete oborony Rossijskoj Federacii".
[95] There have been many speculations about the aim behind setting up the Defense Council. Vendil, for example, argues that the President created it to impair the Presidential ambitions of General Aleksandr Lebed, who, after supporting Yeltsin during the second round of the re-election, had been appointed Secretary of the Security Council. Kokošin, by contrast, suggests that the establishment of the Defense Council allowed to proceed with policy initiatives when Yeltsin's poor health prevented him from chairing the Security Council, see Andrej Kokošin, *Strategičeskoe upravlenie* [Strategic Management], (Moskva, ROSSPÈN, 2003), 302. Presidential aide Baturin holds that the launching of the institution was Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's idea and had been prepared in April by the State Duma well before the elections. This questions Vendil's version, see Baturin et al., *Èpoha El'cina*, 767.
[96] Sergej Kortunov writes that "the Defense Council existed for two years. During this time the apparatus achieved a lot of good results, but the work of the Security Council apparatus was more or less disorganized.", see Sergej Kortunov, *Stanovlenie politiki bezopasnosti. Formirovanie politiki nacional'noj bezopasnosti Rossii v kontekste problem globalizacii* [The Formation of Security Policy. The development of Russian national security policy in the context of the problems of globalization] (Moskva: Nauka, 2003).
[97] In October 1996 Kolesnikov was dismissed and lost his position in the Defense Council.


1995 he headed the Administrative Department of the Russian Government Apparatus and in July 1997 was appointed Minister of Justice.

The Defense Council also obtained a bureaucratic apparatus with more than 50 employees,[98] headed by three SVOP members: Vladimir Klimenko and his two deputies, Major General Pavel Zolotarëv and former diplomat Sergej Kortunov, the older brother of Andrej Kortunov, who had joined the Presidential Administration as an advisor to Baturin in winter 1994.[99] SVOP members were also to be found in three influential military posts: Valerij Manilov as First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Nikolaj Zlenko as Deputy Head of the Main Department of International Military Cooperation at the Ministry of Defense, and Viktor Mironov as Secretary of the Commission for Export Control. Finally, in the State Duma, SVOP member Vladimir Lukin headed the Committee on International Affairs for the social-liberal party Yabloko, whereas his political opponent and SVOP colleague Aleksej Podberëzkin from the KPRF became Deputy Chairman.

Following the re-election of President Yeltsin in July 1996 and based on the administrative positions of its members, SVOP thus reached its highest political capital score, while its membership grew steadily and significantly. In total, almost 50% of all members occupied positions within the state administration. Diagram 16 illustrates the distribution of affiliations and posts among SVOP members in relation to selected political institutions over time.

[98] M. A. Smith, “The Defense Council of the Russian Federation,” *Conflict Studies Research Center*, March 1997, 3.
[99] The third brother, Vadim Kortunov, is a philosopher and writer. Since 2017 he has been Director of the Center for Humanitarian Research at the Russian State University of Tourism and Services Studies (RSUTS).

Diagram 16: Political positions by SVOP members 1991-2000



Source: Own compilation based on SVOP internal protocols, published lists of attendance at assembly meetings and biographies of SVOP members.

Despite this institutional proximity between SVOP and the presidential administration, the rise of oligarchic groups, who received financial and political assistance in exchange for their support of Yeltsin during the elections,[100] and the declining health of the President made it more difficult to channel ideas into the increasingly disorganized policy process.[101] State decision-making remained hampered by "feudal patterns of political organization" and the "privatization of state institutions".[102] After the financial crisis and the default of August 1998, most SVOP members pinned their hopes on one man to 'bring the state back in': Evgenij Primakov.

5.2.3 SVOP and Evgenij Primakov

After five years as the director of the SVR, Primakov had been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 1996 and followed Sergej Kirienko as Russian Prime Minister in September 1998, although President Yeltsin had been reluctant to

[100] On August 14, 1996 Vladimir Potanin was appointed first deputy Prime Minister, while Boris Berezovskij became Deputy Secretary of the Security Council on October 29, 1996.
[101] Oxana Gaman-Golutvnia, for example, describes the Presidential elections as the watershed moment that marked the defeat of the bureaucratic elites against the oligarchs. See Oxana Gaman-Golutvina, "Changes in Elite Patterns," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 60 (3): 1035.
[102] ibid. 1034.

nominate him.[103] Already in July 1998 fellow SVOP member Vitalij Tret'âkov had advised Yeltsin in an article for the Nezavisimaâ Gazeta to renounce power, proposing the establishment of a provisional State Council headed by Primakov.[104] Yeltsin, of course, did not resign, but Primakov's personal leadership qualities and the desperate political situation, including the real danger of impeachment, changed the status quo.

Already as Foreign Minister Primakov had brought a different style into the office. Under his predecessor, Andrej Kozyrev, the coordination of Russian foreign policy had been enmeshed within a constant struggle between the MFA and the Presidential Administration.[105] Rumour had it that both SVOP and the SVR had actively sought to replace him.[106] This is not entirely implausible given the fact that Kozyrev and SVOP member Dmitrij Rûrikov, the President's aide (*pomoŝnik*) for international affairs since August 1991, had been in open conflict with each other.[107] For example, in preparing the Presidential address to the Federal Assembly in February 1995, Yeltsin's speechwriters, who included members of SVOP, had inserted a paragraph proposing the establishment of a special coordinating body. The suggested innovation, however, met the opposition of the MFA, which speaks to the general lack of coordination. Whereas the written version of the address, distributed among Federal Assembly members, merely hinted at the necessary "improvement of the foreign policy making process",[108] the delivered speech included the entire original paragraph.

Subsequently, Rûrikov was charged with the establishment of the new body, which resulted in the formation of the Foreign Affairs Council with about 20 employees within

[103] Yeltsin initially nominated former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, but the State Duma rejected him three times, after which Yeltsin decided to propose Primakov as an acceptable alternative.
[104] Vitalij Tret'âkov, "Vopros o vlasti," [The question about power] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, July 10, 1998. See also Colton, *Yeltsin: A Life*, 445.
[105] There are many instances which illustrate the lack of communication and coordination. For example, in May 1995 Kozyrev participated in a special meeting with NATO foreign ministers and signed the Individual Partnership Program "Areas on pursuance of broad, enhanced NATO-Russia dialogue and cooperation".
[106] Vladimir Korsunskij, "Klub po nacional'nym interesam," [Club on nationalist interests] *Kommersant-Vlast'*, Nov. 30, 1999, 18.
[107] Bobo Lo, by contrast, follows Mlechin claim that Rûrikov had been a "nondescript figure and a Kozyrev man", see Bobo Lo, *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era*, 37.
[108] Poslanie Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii [State of the Union of the President of the Russian Federation], Feb. 16, 1995, accessed Jan. 11, 2019, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/7521.

the Presidential Administration.[109] Conceived as a counterweight to Minister Kozyrev, the Council eventually transformed into the Foreign Policy Directorate, which, however, as Sergej Kortunov argues, exercised merely “technical functions”, [110] i.e. the organization of visits abroad. Nevertheless, when Primakov became Foreign Minister, he could count on this new structure within the administration, which was led by SVOP members: first Rûrikov and, after April 1997. Sergej Prihod'ko, who came from the MFA and remained in this position until April 2004.[111] The importance of these personal relations is hinted at by Karaganov when he notes that SVOP members are “united by a general goal and many informal friendships. I would never in my life go against [Igor'] Šabdurasulov [Deputy Chief of Staff at the Presidential Administration 1999-2000] and Prihod'ko, because they are SVOP members.”[112]

Since 1996 Primakov had been a regularly honorary guest at the annual assembly meetings. In April 1997 SVOP members had debated the pending formation of the Union state between Belarus and Russia, [113] but in March 1998 the focus had shifted to the final review of the third main strategic document (Strategiâ-III), where Primakov, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, presented his concept of a multipolar world order.[114] In February 1999 he arrived at *Lesnye Dali* as Russian Prime Minister to debate the economic crisis and his personal political fate. SVOP members had prepared their own report on these issues, which subsequently appeared in Nezavimisaâ Gazeta.[115] The document “*O vyhode iz krizisa*" attested to the "irresponsibility” of the President’s entourage and the political “incapacity and unpredictability of the President” since March 1998.[116] In consequence, the report

[109] Sergej Kortunov, *Covremennaâ vnešnââ politika Rossii. Strategiâ izbiratel'noj vovlečennosti* [Contemporary Russian foreign policy. The Strategy of selective engagement], (Moskva: GU-VŠÈ, 2009), 273.
[110] Sergej Kortunov, “Vnešnââ politika Rossii: nužen kapital'nyj remont,” [Russian Foreign Policy: in Need of Major Repairs], *Bezopasnost' Evrazii*, no. 3, 2008: 157-181, accessed Jan. 11, 2019, http://www.elibrary.az/docs/JURNAL/jrn2008_1062j.htm. The point is emphasized by another expert I interviewed, who argues that the Foreign Policy Directorate remains a technical department with low strategic capacy. It dominantly prepares official visits of the President to foreign states.
[111] In April 2004 Prihod'ko handed his positions over to his deputy, friend, and former MGIMO classmate Aleksandr Manžosin, who was the President’s foreign policy aide until September 2018.
[112] Karaganov, ”SVOP — èto masonstvo, no bez masterkov”.
[113] The meeting took place on February 13-14, 1999. See “Korotko,” [Briefly] *Novaâ Gazeta*, no. 71 (1396), April 18, 1997.
[114] Dmitrij Gornostaev, “Novoe v staroj koncepcii Primakova,” [The New in the Old Conception of Primakov] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, no. 45, March 17, 1998.
[115] SVOP, “O Vyhode iz Krizisa” [About exiting the crisis] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, Feb. 27, 1999.
[116] ibid. 1.

argued, both the political elite and the people had lost confidence in the state and financial institutions.

The report simultaneously highlighted the positive role Primakov had played since his appointment as Prime Minister, testifying to his high standing within SVOP, despite the political differences between its members:

> These processes [of the crises] slowed down and have become less visible owing to the arrival of E.M. Primakov, who simply in virtue of his authority and political weight, explicit impartiality and lack of corruption has partially absorbed the degradation of state power. […] The source of influence for Primakov and the government is the fact that a considerable part of the ruling elite views in him one of the most likely candidates for the Presidency.[117]

In spring 1999 both campaigns, the one for the parliament in December 1999 and the Presidential elections, originally scheduled for June 2000, were viewed as a continuous process by the major players involved.[118] Success in the first would guarantee good prospects in the second. Besides Primakov, who did not publicly announce his interest until December 1999, there were two prospective candidates to become new President: Communist leader Gennadij Zûganov and Moscow Mayor Ûrij Lužkov. In December 1998 Lužkov had established the election platform Fatherland (*Otečestvo*) for which he recruited a broad coalition of well-connected individuals, including many influential SVOP members such as the former Secretary of the Security Council, Andrej Kokošin, Yeltsin's former press secretary Sergej Yastrzhembsky and RSPP leader Arkadij Vol'skij.[119]

In May 1999 President Yeltsin unexpectedly dismissed Prime Minister Primakov and replaced him with Minister of the Interior and First Deputy Prime Minister Sergej Stepašin. For some time, Primakov left his personal future open, while managing to keep up his high approval ratings among the Russian electorate. After successful hip surgery in Switzerland, he returned to politics in July that year.[120] On August 4, 1999, Lužkov announced the fusion of his election bloc *Otečestvo* with *Vsâ Rossiâ*, the latter

[117] SVOP, "O Vyhode iz Krizisa," 2.
[118] Olga Shvetsova, "Resolving the Problem of Preelection Coordination", in *The 1999-2000 Elections in Russia. Their Impact and Legacy*, eds. Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 215.
[119] Timothy J. Colton, "Understanding Iurii Luzhkov," *Problems of Post-Communism*, 65:5 (1999): 20-21.
[120] Primakov, *Vstreči na perekrestah* [Meetings at the Crossroads], 561.

based on a coalition between regional governors and the small Agrarian Party, to *Otečestvo-Vsâ Rossiâ*. Leaving one place in its coordination council vacant, the party leaders explicitly counted on Primakov to lead the new platform into the upcoming elections.[121] On August 17, Primakov agreed and was elected Chairman of the Consecutive Council of *Otečestvo-Vsâ Rossiâ*.[122] Sergej Karaganov became his personal advisor for international affairs, while SVOP member and President of the All-Russian Insurance Association Igor Yurgens took responsibility for social issues.[123]

According to Sergej Karaganov, the idea to collaborate with Lužkov had been born in discussions within SVOP as "the only way out in the given situation".[124] Beginning in September 1999, as the new head of *Otečestvo-Vsâ Rossiâ*, Primakov initiated several round table discussions within SVOP to advance strategic debate. Their results eventually found their way into a comprehensive policy strategy published in spring 2000.[125] The overall support of SVOP members for Primakov, however, did not equal political consent. To the contrary, proposals made by the former Prime Minister, for example on amending the constitution to increase the power of the government, were heavily criticized.[126] Karaganov stressed this point of view at the time, arguing that

> SVOP is not the campaign headquarter of Evgenji Primakov. But many within the Council help SVOP member Evgenij Primakov, others like SVOP member Sergej Stepašin [agitated for the party Yabloko], still others work in the government and organize the war against the criminals.[127]

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[121] Petr Bologov, "Evgenij Primakov âvlâetsâ 'želatel'noj figuroj' dlâ formiruûšegosâ bloka ‚Vsâ Rossiâ – Otečetsvo, zaâvil Ûrij Lužkov," [Evgenij Primakov is the desirable figure for the emerging bloc All-Russia – Fatherland, declares Ûrij Lužkov] *Agentstvo RIA-novosti*, Aug. 1, 1999.
[122] Maksim Žukov and Dmitrij Kamyšev, "Dogovorilis'," [They made a deal] *Kommersant"-daily*, no. 147, Aug. 18, 1999.
[123] Evgenij Krasnikov, "Lučšie lûdi 'Otečestva'," [The best people of the 'Fatherland'], *Moskovskie Novosti*, no.40, Oct. 19, 1999.
[124] Sergej Karaganov,"SVOP — èto masonstvo, no bez masterkov."
[125] SVOP, Strategiâ dlâ Rossii: Povetska dnâ dlâ Prezidenta-2000 (Moskva, Vagrius, 2000).
[126] Lidiâ Androsenko, "Primakov predložil svoj variant reformy [Primakov proposes his variant of reforms]," Nezavimisaâ Gazeta, Sept. 29, 1999, accessed Dec. 13, 2018, http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-09-29/primakov.html and Aleksandr Sadčikov, "Sentâbr'skie tezisy Primakova," [The September theses of Primakov] *Izvestiâ*, September 28, 1999.
[127] Sergej Karaganov, "Plany smešeniâ Putina osuŝestvlâûtsâ ‚Cemej'," [The plans to remove Putin are implemented by the ‚family'] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, 11.11.1999, 3. For some reason Karaganov calls Stepašin Vladimir. I corrected this obvious misprint in the quote.

For Karaganov, “the criminals” were the representatives of ‘the family’ within the Kremlin, particularly oligarch Boris Berezovskij, who led the political campaign against Primakov and OVR via his control of the central TV channel “Public Television of Russia” (*Obŝestvennoe Televidenie Rossii*; OTR). In addition to an imputed illness and a conspiracy to murder former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze,[128] another rumour spread in November 1999 that SVOP, more specifically Sergej Karaganov, Igor' Malašenko and Sergej Yastrzhembsky, in cooperation with Western governments, were pursuing the removal of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.[129] The propaganda orchestrated by OTR owner Boris Boris Berezovskij had its effects. The day before the elections, Primakov publicly announced his intention to take part in the Presidential elections, but the subsequent State Duma election results ruined his prospects. The pre-election favourite OVR received a mere 13,33% share of votes and was superseded by both the KPRF (24.29%) and Union (*Edinstvo*) (23,32%), the Kremlin 'party of power' led by Sergej Šojgu.[130]

After the electoral defeat Primakov withdrew his name from the Presidential race in February 2000. Instead, in March 2000, Vladimir Putin, who had been purposefully brought in by ‘the family’ and Boris Berezovskij against a possible Primakov presidency, was elected after Boris Yeltsin had resigned on December 31, 1999, recommending Prime Minister Putin as his successor. The unexpected rise of Putin eventually challenged the social position of SVOP as a network within Russian politics – but in a different way than was expected at the time. As Karaganov, who might have become Foreign Minister if Primakov had won, emphasizes in our conversation, the expectation shared among SVOP members that “Putin and his crowd [were] to be the continuation of oligarchic relations, turned out to be totally false”.[131]

[128] “Programma Sergeâ Dorenko,” [The Program of Sergej Dorenko], Oct. 24, 1999, accessed September 9, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_tov4MQ4ck.
[129] Ivan Otdel'nov, “V Stambule zapadnye strany potrebuût ot El'cina otpravit' v otstavku Vladimira Putina?,” [Will Western countries in Istanbul demand from Yeltsin to dismiss Vladimir Putin?], *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, Nov. 6, 1999.
[130] For the official results see Svodnaâ tablica Central'noj izbiratel'noj komissii RFossijskoj Federacii [Summary table of the Central Electoral commission], accessed Nov. 10, 2018, http://cikrf.ru/banners/vib_arhiv/gosduma/1999/.
[131] #28, Sergej Karaganov, SVOP, Oct. 2017.

5.3 From Politics to the Public Sphere


After Vladimir Putin's election as President in March 2000 SVOP lost political capital relatively quickly. The main reason for this development, I argue, lies in the consolidation of political power within the Presidential Administration. State capacity increased and the bureaucratic cadres were replaced by Presidential appointees, particularly from St. Petersburg. As a result, SVOP members lost many of its direct contacts in the administration, a process that accelerated after the Duma elections in December 2003 when liberal and social-democratic parties were unable to pass the 5-percent threshold.

SVOP's declining political capital, however, was accompanied by an increasing media presence since the mid-2000s. Much of this was due to Sergej Karaganov. He not only established the policy journal *Russia in Global Affairs* with Fedor Luk'ânov as its main editor, but also joined the *National Research University Higher School of Economics* (HSE) as Dean of the new faculty of *World Economy and International Affairs* in September 2006. In this capacity he formed a new physical and intellectual home-base that he and his associates at SVOP would use to promote a Eurasian strategy for Russia. While the discussions within SVOP have remained hidden from the public eye, the label 'SVOP' has become more widely known as a sponsor of various expert platforms and publications. This transformation is illustrative of a general change within Russian politics and the relationship between the state and civil society.

5.3.1 Membership Development after 2000

The change of political elites towards the end of the first administration of Vladimir Putin significantly weakened the direct linkages to political decision-making enjoyed by SVOP. SVOP's political capital decreased and the ability to exert instrumental influence on foreign policy-making diminished. This process accelerated after winter 2003. Whereas in 1999 and 2003 still more than 50 SVOP members were in some capacity involved in politics, by 2017 this number had fallen to 34. Since the overall membership of SVOP doubled again during this period, jumping to more than 200, the total share of politically affiliated members in political office decreased to 17%. Diagram 17 illustrates this dynamic.


Diagram 17: SVOP members and members with political office 2001-2017



Source: Own compilation based on SVOP internal protocols, published lists of attendance at assembly meetings and biographies of SVOP members.

The decrease was accompanied by a qualitative shift of those political posts which remained occupied by older members of SVOP or were staffed by incoming ones. Whereas during the Yeltsin administration, as I have shown, many SVOP members were directly involved in Presidential politics, the number of individuals placed in the Presidential Administration and Federal Ministries markedly decreased under Putin. As displayed in Diagram 18, since 2007 no SVOP member has been simultaneously active in the Ministry of Defense or the General Staff.

Diagram 18: Distribution of selected state organs represented by SVOP members in political office 2001-2017



Source: Own compilation based on SVOP internal protocols, published lists of attendance at assembly meetings and biographies of SVOP members.

Likewise, after the liquidation of the Defense Council in March 1998 and the resignation of Evgenij Primakov as Prime Minister in May 1999, direct contacts of SVOP members to the Security Council or its apparatus ceased to exist.[132] At the same time, however, several SVOP members received seats in the State Duma elections in December 1999 and newly elected deputies were invited to the network. Between 1999 and 2003 the number of SVOP members represented in parliament increased from 11 to 19. Yet, after the Duma elections in December 2003 the number once again decreased and over time has become negligible. In 2017 only two SVOP members were represented in the State Duma. In both elections, 2003 and 2007, this had partially to do with the electoral defeat of opposition parties, particularly Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces (*Soûz Pravyh Sil*).[133] For example, in 2003, Alexej Arbatov (Yabloko), Vladimir Lukin (Yabloko), Irina Hakamada (Union of Right Forces) and Sergej Generalov (Union of Right Forces)[134] were not re-elected. Similarly, in 2007, Vladimir Ryžkov, who had been an independent candidate since 2000, and Yeltsin's former ambassador to France Ûrij Ryžov, a prominent human rights activists, lost their seats in the State Duma.

This decrease in SVOP's State Duma seats, positions in (power) ministries, and the Presidential Administration contrasts with the growing concentration of diplomats in SVOP, whose number has doubled since 2007. This amounts to a stabilization of connections between SVOP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), primarily due to limited access points to the inner circles of President Putin and established personal connections to Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov.[135] Over the course of the 2000s many of Lavrov's colleagues and deputy ministers were invited to SVOP.

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[132] The one exception is Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergej Lavrov, who is *ex officio* a permanent member of the Security Council.

[133] In December 2003 the newly established 'party of power', United Russia, gained 37.6% of the popular vote. By contrast, both Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces were unable to reach the 5% threshold and subsequently did not receive enough seats to form factions. However, due to the mixed electoral system at the time, some individuals were elected as direct candidates from single-member districts.

[134] Aleksandr Vladislavev (1936-2017), who had been a member of the faction *Otečestvo-Vsja Rossija* (Fatherland-All Russia) led by Moscow Mayor Jurij Lužkov and Evgenij Primakov, did not join United Russia, whereas Aleksandr Žukov, also a former Fatherland Deputy, was first re-elected for United Russia, but in March 2004 became Deputy Prime Minister. Lukin became Human Rights Ombudsman of the Russian Federation in February 2014.

[135] Lavrov graduated from MGIMO in 1972 and worked at the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations in New York from 1981 to 1988. After six years in Moscow he returned to the US as Russia's Permanent Representative to the UN in summer 1994. He spent the next ten years in New York before President Putin appointed him Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2004. Based on participant

For example, the current Russian ambassadors to France, the United Kingdom and China, Aleksej Meškov, Aleksandr Âkovenko and Andrej Denisov, served as Lavrov's (first) deputies. Similarly, Deputy Minister Sergej Râbkov, who worked with Lavrov in Washington at the beginning of the 2000s and supervises Russia's relations to the US, and Deputy Minister Aleksandr Gruško, who had been in this position from 2005 to 2012 before becoming Russia's ambassador to NATO (2012-2018), joined SVOP in 2009. In addition, Grigorij Karazin, SVOP member since 1998, has been the Russian ambassador in London from 2000 to 2005 and remains Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for relations with CIS countries. Finally, the current and the previous three directors (since 2001) of the Ministry's Department of Policy Planning (*Departament Vnešnepolitičeskogo Planirovanija*) are also members of SVOP. This includes Aleksandr Kuznecov, who subsequently served as ambassador to Spain, the former Russian ambassadors to the United Kingdom and Belgium, Aleksandr Karamenko and Aleksandr Tokovinin, as well as the current Director of the Department Oleg Stepanov, who was invited to join SVOP in 2017.

The Lavrov connection, however, extends to relations beyond the MFA and diplomacy as a professional field due to a shared educational background and longstanding friendship. At MGIMO Lavrov studied together with several SVOP members, including Andranik Migranân, MGIMO Rector Anatolij Torkunov and Ûrij Kobaladze, who headed the SVR Press office in the 1990s and later turned into a businessman. Together with Kobaladse, Russia's ambassador to China, Andrej Denisov and Andrej Burgov, the Vice-President of the world's leading producer of nickel *Norilsk Nickel*, Lavrov goes on vacation in the Altai mountains every year. This small group of close friends also includes Andrej Terehov, Mihail Nemojtin, Viktor Kononov, the singer Aleksandr Malinin and his younger brother Oleg.[136] These personal relations all go back to MGIMO student work groups joining the construction of the technical center at the TV Tower Ostankino.[137] Moreover, a small group of SVOP members who graduated from MGIMO in 1973 but joined the institutes of the Soviet Academy of

lists of the annual assembly, Lavrov has been a SVOP member at least since 2002. Internal SVOP documents that I used to re-construct the membership base, however, do not mention his admission.

[136] Andrej Bandenko, "Interv'û s Ûriem Georgievičem Kobaladze. Čast' 2," [Interview with Ûrij Georgievič Kobaladze. Part 2], accessed Dec. 12, 2018, https://medium.com/@smersh/the-most-famous-russian-secret-service-agent-part2-244c29a61a20.

[137] Natal'â Ratiani, "Horošaâ šutka – èto vsegda èkspromt," [A good joke – that is always impromptu] *Izvestiâ*, Sept. 13, 2005, accessed Dec. 22, 2018, https://iz.ru/news/305997.

Sciences instead of the diplomatic service, have been acquainted with Lavrov since their common student years, working and socializing together in and outside of university.[138]

Lavrov, one of the longest-serving ministers in the Putin administration,[139] therefore continues to play the role of a broker, who facilitates transactions and the flow of information between SVOP and the government. This central position of the Foreign Minister for the political capital of SVOP is also emphasized by one expert in an interview, arguing that "when Lavrov leaves – the group will change immediately"[140]

For SVOP, the MFA thus remains the central, and to some extent only institutionalized access point to Russian political decision-making, although the Ministry itself has lost much of the gravitas in the policy process which existed under Lavrov's predecessors Evgenij Primakov and Igor' Ivanov. This altered network position of SVOP is acknowledged by its members. One of them tells me that

> the role [of SVOP] changed because Russia changed. In the 1990s Russia was very much a debating society, politically speaking. There were different groups vying for influence within Russia. There were the oligarchical groups directing Russia's economic policy and Russia's overall direction. There were groups in the Duma that were dominated by the Communist party. That was real opposition to the Kremlin. The Kremlin itself had different clans inside. Society was in flux. The Council was a very important and influential player not just in the debate, but in, I would say, partly in the decision-making process. Because they had channels through which they could influence the foreign policy of the government. […] When Putin established real, effective monarchy […] the role of outsiders was greatly devalued. […] So rather than being a source of real influence, which the Council was in the 1990s, it has become a debating society. In the earlier days Russia was a debating society. Now, the council is a debating society within itself.[141]

This transformation of SVOP from a policy-making, almost secret council towards a public policy organization that essentially forms a "debating society", given Kremlin

[138] #13, expert, June 2017.
[139] The longest-serving Minister is Sergej Šojgu, who has been Russian Minister of Defense since 2012. From 1991 to 2012 he headed the State Committee for Emergency Situations, which in 1994 transformed into the Ministry of Emergency Situations.
[140] #38, expert, Jan. 2018.
[141] #27, expert, Oct. 2017.

control over the federal media space, is also observed by another SVOP member, who emphasizes the top-down approach in Russian foreign policy:

> In the 1990s SVOP consisted of young and rising academics, university professors and officials, there was the whole *tusovka* [crowd], people in the defense industry etc. So that was impactful, and it was in a democratic framework with different voices [and] parties, and Russian foreign policy was liberal, let's put it that way. Now Russian foreign policy starts with Mr. Putin and ends with Mr. Putin.[142]

Both quotes speak to the centralization of political decision-making since Vladimir Putin's arrival in the Kremlin. This process has shaped the social position of SVOP. Over time, it moved from the state as a meta-field to the public space, which, however, continues to exist in the shadow of political control.

5.3.2 Publications and Educational Projects

In parallel with political elite rotation and the decreasing political capital of SVOP members, the Council, since the early 2000s, has become more publicly visible. In other words, whereas its political capital decreased, its media capital expanded. SVOP is increasingly engages in the promotion of public debate, has developed educational projects and outreach platforms, especially since Fëdor Luk'ânov took over the SVOP Chairmanship from Karaganov in 2012.

Russia in Global Affairs

One of its flagship projects is the policy journal *Russia in Global Affairs* (*Rossija v Global'noj Politike; RGA*), which SVOP established in November 2002 to provide a platform comparable to that offered by the US journal *Foreign Affairs*. According to Luk'ânov, Karaganov purposefully attempted to launch a format that would allow to provide informed comments about trends in international politics for an educated but non-academic audience. The idea was to enable informed public discussions about international affairs at a moment when Russian power and influence in world politics were increasing. Besides, from the very beginning, the journal was supposed to improve the participation of Russian experts in global policy debates and foster mutual intellectual exchange. Initially published four times a year in Russian and English, the

[142] #30, expert, Oct. 2017.

Russian version has appeared bimonthly since January 2004. As a result, *Russian in Global Affairs* published around 1,000 articles between late 2002 and December 2017, whereas *Rossiâ v Global'noj Politike* published more than 1,600 articles in the same period. Moreover, the number of authors and their respective publication rate differ significantly in both versions. This is primarily related to the fact that RGA translates selected articles from *Foreign Affairs* into Russian, but does not reprint them in the English edition. On the other hand, RGA is sensitive to its respective audiences. For example, in 2004 and 2006 the English-speaking version translated two articles by prominent Eurasianist intellectual Aleksandr Dugin, which were never published in the Russian edition.

Between November 2002 and December 2017, the Russian version *Rossiâ v Global'noj Politike* published 1,604 articles by 922 individual authors, both Russian and foreign. At first glance, this speaks to a considerable diversity. However, the number of publications per author follows a distinct pattern. One can distinguish ‘one-off’, ‘occasional’ and ‘elite’ authors. Diagram 19 illustrates this distribution. More than 85% of authors published only once or twice and another 12% published three to six times. There is a small minority of 29 authors or the upper 3% with 7 and more articles, which, however, is responsible for 17% of all publications (Diagram 19).

This imbalance suggests an unequal distribution of resources, i.e., of media capital, which, as I have argued, is a significant attribute for gaining and holding expert status. Because RGA is a policy journal directed at a wider intellectual audience, high publication rates speak to prominence in applied analysis rather than academic writing.

Diagram 19: Distribution of authors and publications, Rossiâ v Global'noj Politike 2002-2017



Source: Own compilation based on data from the RGA website.

Who, then, are the authors with 7 or more published articles? Five of them are foreigners or academics, who work abroad, including Richard Haass, Thomas Gomart, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Chas W. Freeman and Arkady Moshes, a former researcher at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who has been working at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) since the late 1990s. Two others, SVOP founding member Vitalij Šlykov and eminent IMEMO researcher and Middle East specialist Georgij Mirskij passed away in 2011 and 2016, respectively. Of the 22 authors left, 17 are SVOP members. The five exceptions are Sergej Markedonov from the Russian State University for the Humanities (RGGU), Aleksandr Lukin (the son of Vladimir Lukin) and Nikolaj Silaev from MGIMO, Olg'a Buturina from the Institute of Europe and Tat'âna Romanova from the SPbGU.

The five leading figures are, however, all SVOP members, whereas the three top authors all belong to the RGA leadership team: Timofej Bordačëv (28), Sergej Karaganov (25) and editor Fedor Luk'ânov (16), who published an astonishing 99 articles, if his editorial notes are included in the count. Table 5 displays the 22 elite authors with more than six publications excluding the five ‘foreigners‘ and the two authors who passed away (Table 5).

Table 5: Elite authors of “Rossiâ v Global'noj Politike” 2002-2017

	Surname	Name	Birth	Articles	SVOP	Workplace
1	Bordačev	Timofej	*1973	28	Yes	HSE
2	Karaganov	Sergej	*1952	25	Yes	HSE
3	Luk'ânov	Fëdor	*1967	16	Yes	HSE
4	Lomanov	Aleksandr	*1968	14	Yes	IDV
5	Safrančuk	Ivan	*1976	12	Yes	HSE
6	Marekdonov	Sergej	*1972	11	No	RGGU
7	Lukin	Aleksandr	*1961	9	No	MGIMO
8	Arbatov	Aleksej	*1951	9	Yes	IMEMO
9	Ovčinskij	Vladimir	*1955	9	Yes	MVD
10	Inozemcev	Vladislav	*1968	9	Yes[143]	
11	Baturina	Ol'ga	*1961	9	No	Institute of Europe
12	Romanova	Tat'âna	*1974	9	No	SPbGU
13	Grigor'ev	Leonid	*1947	8	Yes	HSE
14	Miller	Aleksej	*1959	8	Yes	EUSP
15	Aksenënok	Aleksandr	*1942	7	Yes	VTB
16	Adamišin	Anatolij	*1934	7	Yes	AEAC
17	Orlov	Vladimir	*1968	7	Yes	PIR
18	Efremenko	Dmitrij	*1967	7	Yes	INION
19	Kosačev	Konstantin	*1962	7	Yes	Federation Council
20	Silaev	Nikolai	*1977	7	No	MGIMO
21	Dubinin	Sergej	*1950	7	Yes	VTB
22	Lavrov	Sergej	*1950	7	Yes	MFA

Thus, although RGA enables different Russian and international experts to comment on international affairs, it remains to some extent the house journal of SVOP.

Other Projects

Since 2012 the Council has also invested in what Luk’ânov terms “enlightenment functions“,[144] including webinars, the establishment of its own channel on youtube[145] and the co-organization of numerous round table discussions and seminars.[146] Two projects are especially noteworthy. Since May 2013 the Council has been organizing

[143] Inozemcev left SVOP in 2017.
[144] Fedor Luk’ânov in Orlov, “Ob irlandskih monahah,” 93.
[145] See “Sovet po vnešnej i oboronnoj politike – SVOP,” [Council on Foreign and Defense Policy – SVOP], accessed Dec. 12, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/user/svopevents/featured.
[146] See SVOP, “Otčet o deâtel'nosti SVOP v 2016-2017 gg.,” [Report about the activities of SVOP in 2016-2017], accessed Dec. 10, 2018, http://svop.ru/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/%D0%A1%D0%92%D0%9E%D0%9F-PR_%D0%A1%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0_%D0%90%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B5%D1%8F2017.pdf.

a public lecture at the cultural ZIL center in Moscow once a month.[147] Many lecturers are recruited from the SVOP membership base, but also from among leading researchers from Russian universities and RAN.

Another project focuses on the education of young, aspiring experts, in particular on the improvement of their writing skills in different genres, including analytical, journalistic and academic texts. Many young experts, so Luk'ânov, lacked such skills.[148] The annual program "Teach the Scientist" (*Uči Učenogo*), premiering in October 2016,[149] stretches over half a year and consists of one lecture and one practical exercise per month for a group of 15 to 20 participants.[150] Given SVOP's comparatively small budget, which, according to the newspaper Kommersant, amounted to merely 5.5 million rubles (135,000 Euro) in 2010,[151] this and other SVOP projects have benefitted from the establishment of the Faculty of Word Economy and International Affairs at the HSE, which has been serving as SVOP's home base since 2006, as I explain next.

5.3.3 The HSE – A New Home Base

In September 2006 Sergej Karaganov was appointed Dean of the newly established Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the HSE. Here he assembled a team of like-minded younger colleagues from St. Petersburg: Timofej Bordačëv and Dmitrij Suslov. After moving to Moscow at the beginning of the 2000s, Bordačëv had worked with Karaganov at the Institute of Europe RAN. Suslov had probably attracted Karaganov's interest while working as a journalist for the *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*. Subsequently, Bordačëv became Deputy Editor of RGA, whereas Suslov, writing his dissertation at ISKRAN, served as Vice-Director for Research Programs at SVOP from 2004. For a short period of time, Bordačëv was simultaneously engaged in the

[147] "Sovremennyj mir v èpohu peremen "Est' li Evropa posle Evrosoûza?," [The modern world in times of change "Is there a Europe beyond the European Union?], accessed Dec. 12, 2018, http://www.wehse.ru/news/news20130526150305.htm.
[148] "Fedor Luk'ânov priglašaet v školu "Uči učenogo," [Fedor Luk'ânov invites to the school "Teach the Scientist"], Aug. 24, 2016, accessed Sept. 11, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BIPLDh06N5g&list=PLpvA6Fh2EETBZFgVpU1EofqFOt3O07qz3&index=3.
[149] "'Uči učenogo'. Škola avtorov žurnala Rossiâ v global'noj politike," [Teach the Scientist. The school of authors of Russia in Global Affairs], Sept. 25, 2016, accessed Oct. 11, 2018, https://mgimo.ru/about/news/announce/shkola-avtorov-zhurnala-rossiya-v-globalnoy-politike/.
[150] See the website of the school, accessed Dec. 1, 2018, https://school.globalaffairs.ru/
[151] "Vnešnej i oboronnoj politike pridadut global'nosti, Dos'e," *Kommersant"*, no. 154, p. 3, Aug. 21, 2012, accessed Jan. 22, 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2005655.

non-commercial *Institute of Foreign and Defense Policy.* This institute had been registered by Karaganov as SVOP Chairman in August 2003,[152] sponsored by RSPP and the Open Russia Foundation.[153] Following the arrest of businessman and Open Russia founder Mikhail Khodorkovsky in October 2003,[154] however, the institute ceased to exist.

Instead, Karaganov established the *Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies (Centr Kompleksnyh Evropejskih i Meždunarodnyh Issledovanij*; CKEMI*)* at the HSE in October 2006 with initially seven employees. Bordačëv became Managing Director and Suslov his Deputy. From the start, CKEMI had been envisaged as the leading scientific-research center of the Faculty with a focus on EU-Russia relations and the institutional development of the European Union. [155] Over time, CKEMI widened its research activities and increasingly started to promote the study of Eurasia, the Far East and international cooperation within the framework of BRICS. Although applied research on the EU continued, the entire focus after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 shifted to a more critical and confrontational attitude towards EU-Russia cooperation that eventually resulted in the development of the "Greater Eurasia" paradigm, [156] as an alternative to both 'Wider Europe', promoted by the EU and 'Greater Europe', the preferred concept of the Russian leadership in the early 2000s.[157]

As Bordačëv noted in 2016, "since 2009 I have been more actively involved in what is called Russia's turn to the East".[158] This process received political support after

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[152] Ekaterina Dobrynina, "Dobro požalovat' v civilizovannyj mir," [Welcome to the civilized world], *Rossijskaâ Gazeta*, 204 (3318), Oct. 10, 2003; Sergej Karaganov, "V odinočku ničego ne dobit'sâ," [Alone you will not achieve anything] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, Sept. 29, 2003, accessed Dec. 23, 2018, https://www.hse.ru/news/1163627/1103591.html.

[153] "Čto takoe Otkrytaâ Rossiâ?," [What is Open Russia?], March 20, 2006, accessed Dec. 12, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/659096.

[154] The bank accounts of the Open Russia Foundation were blocked in March 2006. See Anna Geroeva, "Otkrytuû Rossiû" sbrosili so sčetov," [Open Russia has been dropped from the accounts] *Kommersant'*, no. 47, p. 6, March 20, 2006, accessed Nov. 10, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/658855.

[155] CKEMI, *Otčet o deâtel'nosti 2006-2007 gg.* [Report on activities 2006-2007], accessed Oct. 10, 2018, https://cceis.hse.ru/data/2010/12/19/1208307779/result.pdf.

[156] David G. Lewis, "Geopolitical Imaginaries in Russian Foreign Policy: The Evolution of 'Greater Eurasia'," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 70:10 (2018): 1612-1637.

[157] Marek Menkiszak, "Greater Europe, Putin's Vision of European (Dis)integration," accessed Nov. 12, 2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/greater_europe_net.pdf.

[158] Timofej Bordačev, "Kak pisat' analitičeskie doklady", Škola "Uči Učenogo," ["How to write analytical reports", The school "Teach the Scientist"], Dec. 20, 2016, accessed Dec. 10, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=avs1CnRU_oI.

2013 as an instrument to escape Russian geopolitical isolation. In this context, CKEMI turned into a policy-analytical but university-based brain trust for Sergej Karaganov and his team, providing the organizational capacity that SVOP as an informal club of diverse people could not provide by design. At the same time, RGA as the house journal of SVOP guaranteed the infusion of these concepts into Russian expert and policy debate.

5.4 Conclusion

SVOP constitutes a network of leading representatives of the Russian foreign policy expert community. Rather than a coherent organization with one uniform position, SVOP members hold diverse ideological views and have different professional backgrounds. At its core, SVOP membership is related to age based on common political experiences. In the late 1980s, its founding members represented an academic and military elite that had become members of the Soviet Congresses of People's Deputies. The disintegration of the Soviet Union enabled them to rapidly transform cultural into political and economic capital. This process ensured institutionalized proximity to state organs. Hence, in the decade following 1991 SVOP functioned as an informal gathering and coordination platform for political elites. Together they sought to influence the strategic agenda of Russian foreign and domestic-policy making.

The election of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia in March 2000 changed the composition of the political elite and thus pushed SVOP members increasingly out of political office. In addition, the victory over the oligarchs after 2003 and the streamlining of the legislative process through the foundation of United Russia as the Presidential party, diminished political competition, but strengthened administrative control. The need for strategic alternatives and the consolidation of elite positions within SVOP decreased. In consequence, SVOP transformed from a policy-making, almost secret council into a public policy organization that increasingly engages in educational projects, societal debate and the international promotion of Russian strategic concepts.

The discussion above gives substance to the argument that SVOP's functional shift is illustrative of a larger process within Russia, namely the dominant absorption of

political space by the state administration. Ironically, the concentration of political power within the Presidential Administration and in the hands of President Vladimir Putin have to some extent ‘professionalized’ the activities of SVOP as it became more disconnected from political decision-making, thereby strengthening its autonomy as a civil society organization.

6 The ‘State’ of Think Tanks

> The viability and sustainability of Moscow’s foreign policy course, and of individual policies, depends less on their ‘objective’ merits than on the alignment of supporters and opponents, their number, and above all their political and institutional weight.[1]

The previous chapter analyzed SVOP as a foreign policy expert network that functioned as an informal substitute for the development and coordination of state policies in the 1990s. In this final empirical chapter I remain on the organizational level of analysis and discuss foreign policy think tanks as they have emerged in Post-Soviet Russia. I show that since the dissolution of the Soviet Union organizational types have become more diverse. Instead of the monolithic structure of the institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which monopolized non-military knowledge production, there exists various institutional forms that generate spaces of interaction. Russian foreign policy think tanks pursue different agendas and occupy distinct positions based on media and political capital.

In the first part (6.1) I examine the contemporary position of three academic organizations that were established in the Soviet Union: The (Primakov) Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the Institute for the USA and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN), and the Institute for International Studies (IMI) at MGIMO. I argue that state collapse ended the institutionalized role these think tanks had played within the Soviet political field. They lost state funding and an entire generation of researchers left academia. Since the mid-2000 the overall situation has stabilized, however. Whereas individual institutes adapted by building personal political networks, the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN) has been unable to retain its former position.

The second part (6.2) considers organizations that dominantly evolved in the 1990s. Private policy entrepreneurs with different professional backgrounds used the new freedom to establish think tanks in highly specialized issue areas. I present four such organizations that together form a space of interaction: The Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, the Center for Political Research in Russia (PIR-

[1] Lo, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*, 32.

Center), the Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), and the Center for Energy and Security (CENESS). In the 1990s these think tanks depended heavily on foreign sponsorship, while Western think tanks provided institutional blueprints. I argue that state proximity has been essential for their enduring success and show how recent legislation that stigmatizes foreign sponsorship has forced non-commercial organizations to adapt their operations.

The third part (6.3) demonstrates how the Russian state since 2007 has increasingly invested in the creation of foreign policy think tanks. This development stands in the context of growing political ambitions and economic potential. Nevertheless, the source of this support has been neither monolithic nor unambiguous. Instead, different factions within the Russian state administration have sponsored think tanks to promote their respective (foreign policy) agendas. While some have taken an economic point of view built on the primacy of domestic modernization conflicts, others have promoted the concept of Russia as a great power, sometimes with civilizational overtones. I first introduce the Institute for Contemporary Development (INSOR) and the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) as representatives of the first group, before presenting the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI) as an example of the second one. In addition, the Russian state has sponsored international outreach platforms with the aim to consolidate the expert community: the Valdai Discussion Club and, more recently, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), whose efforts to map the post-Soviet expert landscape in Russia I have discussed in chapter 3.

6.1 After the Fall: Soviet Academic Institutes

In the Soviet Union, the Academy of Sciences was an essential part of the political field. By contrast, in post-Soviet Russia the Academy (RAN) has become a much more independent organization, although, as Aleksej Arbatov holds, it remained "related to state power [*vlast'*], especially to its military and political structures through numerous official and personal relations and contacts."[2] In the 1990s the living standard of academics both in the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities deteriorated even when compared to the overall downshift of Russian

[2] Aleksej Arbatov, "Poterânnoe desâtiletie v kontrole nad vooruženiâmii," 102.

salaries. Whereas in 1989-1990 the average academic still received almost 120% of the state-wide average income, this number dropped to around 65% in 1992-1993.[3] Moreover, state payments were regularly delayed, and the financial pledges made by the Russian government to the Russian Foundation for Fundamental Research (*Rossijskij Fond Fundamental'nyh Issledovanij*; RFFI)[4] and the Russian Humanitarian Research Foundation (*Rossijskij Gumanitarnyj Naučnyj Fond*; RGNF)[5] remained unfulfilled. The institutes of RAN lost significant parts of their previous funding and many members of staff. Some of its most talented and active researchers of the younger generation left. Still in March 2010 Sergej Rogov, at the time Director of the Institute for the USA and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN), argued that "it is no secret that over many years RAN has indeed been fighting for its survival".[6]

Nevertheless, since the late 2000s, the financial and staff situation has improved considerably, at least for some institutes. Simultaneously, RAN has been constantly reforming, while bureaucratic state control has been strengthened. In September 2013 the State Duma, following the initiative of the Ministry of Education and Science, adopted legislation that institutionally separated the management of RAN property from research management.[7] The former was assigned to the simultaneously established Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations (*Federal'naâ Agentsvo Naučnyh Organizacii*; FANO).[8] Although RAN has remained independent, its institutes were put under formal supervision of the new agency. In addition, the Russian government introduced a new monitoring and rating system in November

[3] Mihail Bunčuk, "Osnovnye napravleniâ i zadači soveršenstvovaniâ sistem nalogooblożeniâ, oplaty truda, drugih finansovo-èkonomičeskih instrumentov gosudarstvennogo upravleniâ v sfere IR," [Main areas and task for improving the tax system, remuneration, and other financial-economic instruments of state administration in the field of R&D], 1998, accessed Dec. 22, 2018, http://old.nasledie.ru/finansi/23_4/article.php?art=12.

[4] The RFFI was founded by Presidential decree in April 1992, see Prezident RF, ukaz, no. 426 "O neotložnyh merah po sohraneniû naučno-tehničeskogo potenciala Rossijskoj Federacii" [On urgent measures to save the scientific-technical potential of the Russian Federation].

[5] In 1994 the Russian government separated the RGNF from the institutional structure of the RFFI. In February 2016 the RGNF was dissolved. and became a part of the RFFI.

[6] Sergej Rogov, "Rossiâ dolžna stat' naučnoj sverhderžavoj. Nevostrebovannost' nauki kak ugroza nacional'noj bezopasnosti," [Russia needs to become a superpower of science. The neglect of science as a threat for national security], March 16, 2010, accessed Nov. 11, 2018, http://iskran.ru/news.php?id=91.

[7] "Federal'nyj zakon ot 27 sentâbrâ 2013 g. N 253-FZ," [Federal Law, Sept. 27, 2013, no. 253-F3], accessed Dec. 12, 2018, https://rg.ru/2013/09/27/ran-site-dok.html.

[8] Prezident RF, ukaz, no. 735, Sept. 27, 2013, "O Federal'nom agentstve naučnyh organizacij," [On the Federal Agency of Scientific Organizations] accessed Dec. 10, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/37631.

2013 to access research quality,[9] and in December 2014 changes in Russian labour legislation restricted the maximum age for directors and deputy directors of state research institutions to 65 years.[10] In consequence, several long-serving directors, some of whom had been appointed in the 1990s, were replaced by much younger colleagues. State control and monitoring of RAN thus intensified.[11]

In this section I evaluate the position of two RAN institutes that have been at the center of Soviet research in foreign and security policy: the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and the Institute for the USA and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN). I argue that IMEMO, after almost two decades of institutional decay, has been able to stabilize its standing. It successfully rejuvenated its research staff and developed good working relations with the political leadership. By contrast, ISKRAN lost its previously prominent position as reflected in its lack of political capital. Besides IMEMO and ISKRAN, I introduce the Institute for International Studies (*Institut Meždunarodnyh Issledovanij*; IMI) established at MGIMO. Despite its formal establishment in May 2009, the institute stems historically from Soviet times as the braintrust of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for policy research.

Table 6: Selected Institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences and MGIMO

	IMEMO	ISKRAN	IMI (MGIMO)
Founded	1956	1967	2009 (1976)
Legal Form	RAN	RAN	University (MFA)
Permanent Staff	317	<90	<60
Current Leadership	Fëdor Vojtolovskij, Aleksandr Dynkin	Valerij Garbuzov, Sergej Rogov	Andrej Sušencov

[9] "Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva RF ot 1 noâbrâ 2013 g. no. 979," http://www.sciencemon.ru/legal/acts/postanovlenie-pravitelstva-rf--ot-1-noyabrya-2013-979/
[10] Provided a decision by the staff assembly of the respective institutions, the maximum can be extended to 70 years. See "Federal'nyj zakon ot 22 dekabrâ 2014 g. N 443-FZ," [Federal Law, Dec. 22, 2014 N443-FZ] Dec. 26, 2014, accessed Dec. 12, 2018, https://rg.ru/2014/12/26/fz443-dok.html.
[11] In July 2017 the State Duma introduced amendments to the original law about the reorganization of RAN that changed the election procedure for the President of RAN. Since then prospective candidates need to receive the support of the Russian government. Two candidates, MSU Deputy Director Aleksej Hohlov and the Director of the Institute of ecology and genetic of micriorganisms, Valerij Čerešnev, were not admitted to registration.

6.1.1 The Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)

In September 2017 Fëdor Vojtolovskij, at the time 38-years old, followed Aleksandr Dynkin in the position as IMEMO Director. Dynkin (*1948) had led the institute since 2006 and belongs to a different generation. He currently serves as IMEMO President (Scientific Director). In the general elections to determine Dynkin's successor, Vojtolovskij prevailed with 230 to 88 votes against Aleksej Kuznecov (*1978), who became the Head of the Center for European Studies in 2009 and remains IMEMO Deputy Director.[12]

This comparatively late but radical regeneration of leading cadres points to the lack of competitive researchers within the last Soviet generation. It also speaks to the successful promotion of the young, first post-Soviet generation. This point is emphasized by IMEMO employees themselves. During a presentation at MGIMO in November 2009, Vojtolovskii noted that an entire generation of researchers – those who were 25 to 40 years old at the beginning of the 1990s – had left Russian science. Most of them either changed their field of work, went abroad, or joined universities or private research institutions, where the financial situation was somewhat better.[13] In our conversation, Vojtolovskij remembers that when he arrived at IMEMO as a young researcher in 2001, "the financial situation […] was still very negative […]. [T]here were very few young people, but today the pictures looks quite different. Right now, 35 percent of all employees are younger than 39."[14] Another researcher I interviewed supports this view when he comments on Vojtolovskij's election as IMEMO Director in September 2017 as follows:

> [H]e is a young man, not even 40 years old. He is quite professional and respected in the MFA [...]. Of course, it would have been better to have someone who is 50+, because life experience makes a difference, especially for us in the social sciences and specialists in international relations, but there is this gap [of a generation] and it has not yet been

[12] "Vybory direktora IMÈMO RAN," [Elections of the Director of IMEMO RAN] Sept. 27, 2017, accessed Dec. 11, 2018, https://www.imemo.ru/index.php?page_id=502&id=3545.
[13] Fedor Vojtolovskij, "Problemy organizacii issledovatel'skoj deâtel'nosti molodyh učenyh v akademičeskoj nauki," [The problems of organizing research activities of young researchers in the academic sciences] MGIMO, Nov. 30, 2009, accessed Dec. 12 2019, https://mgimo.ru/files/128526/Voitolovskiy.pdf.
[14] #43, Fedor Vojtolovskij, IMEMO, Feb. 2018, See also IMÈMO, Doklad o realizacii v 2016 godu Programmy razvitiâ [IMEMO, Report about the relization of the Development program in 2016], 13.

> closed. This is the consequence of the 1990s […] – nobody came [here].[15]

The development of the number of research staff at IMEMO illustrates this steady demise that shaped the 1990s and most of the 2000s. Whereas in 1986 the institute had more than 700 researchers and almost 1,000 employees, these numbers dropped significantly after 1991.[16] With currently 317 researchers, it is again at the level of the late 1950s, yet remains by far the largest area studies institute within RAN. At the same time, the average age of researchers has increased from 40.5 years in 1982 to more than 56 in 2016, which speaks to the inability to attract university graduates in the two decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union.[17]

Since 2009 the situation of scientific cadres and funding, however, has improved. Vojtolovskij claims that "in the last ten years we received 15 to 20 new young employees each year."[18] Similar to another IMEMO researcher I spoke to, who joined in the late 1990s,[19] he emphasizes the active staff policy conducted by former IMEMO director Dynkin as the main reason for this recovery. Moreover, salaries increased to the level of lecturers at leading universities such as MGIMO and HSE. IMEMO also attracts external sources by renting parts of its 21-floor office building in the southern district of Moscow out to businesses, and by commercializing its analytical work. Vojtolovskii explains:

> We learned how to live under conditions of the market economy. We learned how to find contracts, to make money. These are state contracts, Russian companies, we are doing in-depth consulting based on serious scientific methodology.[20]

In addition, the state budget has increased in the last couple of years as well.[21] According to information collected by data scientist Pavel Kulikov, the total budget of

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[15] #36, expert, Dec. 2017.
[16] Petr Čerkasov, *IMÈMO. Očerk istorii* [IMEMO. Historical Portrait] (Moskva: Ves' Mir, 2016), 428 and 741.
[17] IMÈMO, *Doklad o realizacii v 2016 godu Programmy razvitiâ* [IMEMO, Report about the relization of the Development program in 2016], 13.
[18] #43, Fedor Vojtolovskij, IMEMO, Feb. 2018.
[19] #17, expert, IMEMO, June 2017.
[20] #43, Fedor Vojtolovskij, IMEMO, Feb. 2018.
[21] Dynkin claims that as deputy director at the beginning of the 1990s, he received approximately 40$ US per month, see Ekaterina Karpenko, "'Maâčila ugroza goloda': Rossiâ posle defolta, Aleksandr Dynkin o tom, kak menâlas' Rossiâ v 1990-e gody," [The danger of hunger loomed: Russia after the default. Aleksandr Dynkin about how Russia changed in the 1990s"], Aug. 17, 2018, accessed Nov. 17, 2018, https://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2018/08/15_a_11897581.shtml.

IMEMO increased from 271 million rubles (6.5 million euro) in 2012 to almost 390 million rubles (9.4 million euro) in 2015.[22] At the same time, the share of external funding in each of these years amounts to roughly one third.[23]

As a result, IMEMO's capacity in applied policy analysis has been significantly strengthened. In April 2011, following the initiative of former IMEMO Director Primakov, the Center for Situational Analysis (*Centr Situacionnogo Analiza*; CSA RAN) was opened as a separate institute within RAN, yet closely related to IMEMO. With a budget of about 4.8 million rubles (118.000 Euro) in 2013, the CSA received facilities at the institute. Its seven researchers, including first Managing Director Vladimir Baranovskij, were simultaneously employed at CSA and IMEMO on permanent contracts. In June 2016, the CSA was re-integrated into IMEMO and Irina Kobrinskaâ followed Baranovskij as Director.

The Center provides a platform to pool knowledge available within and beyond IMEMO for the conduct of applied policy analysis. One of its major contributions is the popularizing of situational analysis (*sitanalis*), a method Primakov had introduced in 1961 as a combination of expert brainstorming and systematic forecasting.[24] The first official analysis was conducted in October 1970 at IMEMO on the potential consequences of the Treaty of Moscow between the USSR and West Germany.[25] In the seven years since its foundation, the CSA has published several situational analyses on various topics in major Russian newspapers, ranging from the threat of

[22] Kulikov claims that this data is based on the information provided by IMEMO to the Federal Treasury of the Russian Federation, See https://edu2you.ru/result/488250 and https://edu2you.ru/result/487168. The relevant documents, which are available on the website, however, do not entail data on the annual budget, See, accessed Sept. 09, 2018, https://www.bus.gov.ru/pub/agency/141347. On the other hand, according to the RAN state budget plan for 2013, IMEMO receives 179.793 million rubles (4.3 million euro), which is just a little less than the amount provided by Kulikov under the category "Subsidies for implementation of state targets" in 2012 (190.032 million ruble) and 2013 (200.632 million ruble). See Položenie №1 k postanovleniû Prezidiuma RAN [Provision no. 1 to the order of the Presidium of RAN], Nov. 11, 2012, № 266, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, http://www.ras.ru/FStorage/Download.aspx?id=7106c9f9-c518-4266-95ff-3d3274d15df6. I use the same exchange rate in both cases (31.12.2011) to emphasize the absolute increase. Based on the actual exchange rates in 2011 and 2014, respectively, the budget decreased from 6.5 million euro (1: 41.4938) to 5.27 million euro (1: 73.8161).

[23] Two researchers at IMEMO provide different numbers. One argues that the share of external funding amounts to up to 86%, whereas another holds that the share is closer to 50%. The latter number is likely to be closer to the truth.

[24] Evgenij Primakov and Mark Hrustalev, *Situacionnye analizy, metodika provedeniâ, očerki tekušej politiki* [Situational analyses, methodology, essays on current policy], Vypusk 1, (Moskva: Naučno-obrazovatel'nyj forum po meždunarodnym otnošeniâm, MGIMO MID Rossii, 2006), 6.

[25] Čerkasov, *IMÈMO. Očerk istorii* [IMEMO. Historical Portrait], 400.

religious Islamic radicalization[26] to the study of offshores and financial capital flight from Russia.[27]

Experts with high political capital, that is, multiple memberships in state expert councils, are dominantly senior researchers from the institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Under its roof, IMEMO is the institutional home to many of them. Besides President Dynkin and Director Vojtolovskij, Center Head Aleksej Arbatov and Vladimir Baranovskij are members of RIAC, SVOP, the Scientific Council of Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov, and the Scientific Council of the Security Council. Moreover, the Department Directors Andrej Zagorskij and Sergej Afon'cev are RIAC members, while Deputy Director Vasilij Miheev is also a member of SVOP. No other Russian academic institution hosts more experts with such high political capital. In addition, former SVR Director and diplomat Vjačeslav Trubnikov joined IMEMO in October 2009 as a member of the institute's directorate and senior researcher at the Center for Asia Pacific Studies under the leadership of Miheev.[28]

This political prominence of many IMEMO researchers does not come by chance, but builds on a complex web of social relations. I have already mentioned the decisive role Evgenij Primakov played in sponsoring younger researchers at IMEMO in the late 1980s, including Arbatov and Baranovskij, and his centrality to the political mission of SVOP. As former IMEMO Director, chief of the SVR, late Foreign Minister and, from September 1998 to May 1999, Prime Minister he was, as one expert I spoke to puts it, "the mentor of the entire [foreign policy] community".[29] As Prime Minister he invited Aleksandr Dynkin in 1998, at the time IMEMO Deputy Director, to join his government as his personal economic advisor.[30] Here Dynkin gained political experience and established a wide network of personal contacts, which continue to be of great benefit

[26] "Neotložnaâ k rešeniû problema," [Responding to an urgent problem] *Rossijskaâ Gazeta*, Apr. 4, 2012, accessed Oct. 10, 2018 https://rg.ru/2012/04/04/islam.html.
[27] "Ofšory v global'noj èkonomike: mirovoj opyt i rossijskie realii," [Offhshores in the World Economy: Global experience and Russian realities], *Kommersant',* June 20, 2012, accessed Oct. 08, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1962493.
[28] According to Dynkin, his arrival has considerably strengthened the applied character of the work at IMEMO, see Andrej Vaganov, "Fabrika mysli № 34," [Think Tank no. 34] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, Feb. 27, 2013, accessed, Nov. 11, 2018, http://www.ng.ru/nauka/2013-02-27/9_fabrica.html.
[29] #38, expert, Jan. 2018.
[30] From 1997 to summer 1998 Dynkin had worked as an advisor to the Minister of Science and Technology, physicist Vladimir Fortov, who from 2013 to 2017 acted as President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, See Karpenko, "'Maâčila ugroza goloda'."

to IMEMO and have played a major role in securing its political capital even after Primakov left politics in September 2001.


This particular experience sets Dynkin apart from his predecessors as directors at IMEMO, Vladlen Martynov (1989-2000) and Nodari Simonija (2000-2006). One researcher emphasizes in our interview that informal networks and particular personal attributes are paramount for the political position of the institute, and more generally to gain authority as an expert in the political field. According to him, there is no institutionalized system of power in Russia, and therefore the personal factor plays a big role. It would thus be particularly important who the IMEMO Director is and that he is 'able to go into the office of the 'big boss'' based on an 'appropriate background'. IMEMO-Director Martynov, he says, did not have such a background and therefore did not have access to President Yeltsin. Dynkin, however, was able to establish a relationship with Putin's circles, including Lavrov and Kudrin, and also introduced Vojtolovskij to the circles in which he is an insider [*svoj čelovek*].[31]

When Primakov passed away in June 2015, IMEMO, following a proposal by Dynkin, adopted his name and has thus been operating as the *Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations* since July 2015.[32] Another innovation related to Primakov are the annual Primakov Readings (*Primakovskie čtenia)* that were organized in October 2015 for the first time and have become the central Russian conference for foreign policy experts.[33] As a cooperative project of IMEMO, the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (which Primakov led for almost ten years) and the Moscow World Trade Center, the lectures quickly managed to increase IMEMO's international status as the leading Russian research institution in International Relations. Whereas in 2015 the readings had been largely ignored by the English-speaking press, references to the event have steadily increased since then, popularizing the institute.[34] Its increasing financial and intellectual capacity is

[31] #38, expert, Jan. 2018.
[32] "IMÈMO RAN hodatajstvoval o prisvoenii institutu imeni Primakova," [IMEMO RAN applied to assign the institute the name of Primakov] *Interfax*, July 3, 2015, accessed Sept. 10, 2018, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/451424.
[33] For more information on the Primakov Readings see https://www.imemo.ru/Primakov_Readings_2015, accessed Nov. 11, 2018.
[34] A search on the database factiva for "Primakov Readings" yields 12 hits for 2015, but 99 for 2016, 153 for 2016 and 246 for 2018.

also reflected in the strong and overall stable media presence of IMEMO in the last decade, as Diagram 20 illustrates.

Diagram 20: IMEMO: Media Capital 1992-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).


6.1.2 The Institute for the USA and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN)

ISKRAN has been less successful in upholding the position it inherited from the Soviet Union. One person has driven the fate of the institute over most of the post-Soviet period: Sergej Rogov (*1948). Rogov had led the institute since 1995, taking over from founding Director Georgij Arbatov. Following the new regulations established by the Russian government concerning the age of institutes' directors, he handed over to Valerij Garbuzov in December 2015, but remained ISKRAN's Scientific Director. Despite stepping down from the directorship, Sergej Rogov remains the central figure at ISKRAN in terms of political capital. He is a full member of RIAC, the Scientific Council of the Security Council, and the Scientific Council of the Foreign Minister, though not a SVOP member. He has been consistently engaging in political advisory work for state organs, starting in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, since 2014 he has increasingly withdrawn from public debate.

Garbuzov inherited Rogov's public role, although he had not previously been a prominent figure. Since 2014, he has been ISKRAN's most visible representative. Diagram 21 below illustrates this change in public relevance. It shows that the media presence of Rogov has been volatile and dependent on major political events,

including the US Presidential elections in 2000 and the signing and ratification of the New START treaty in 2009-2010.

Diagram 21: Sergej Rogov and Valerij Garbuzov: Media Capital 1992-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

Garbuzov's media capital, by contrast, peaked only once (in 2008), but increased steadily between 2012 and 2016. In 2016 it reached an all-time high, which is related to the US Presidential elections. There is every indication that this growth is causally related to his position at ISKRAN, which suggests that the media field relies dominantly on institutional credentials when assigning expert status.

From the perspective of political capital, however, Garbuzov's role seems to be much less significant. Although he became a member of RIAC after his appointment as ISKRAN Director, he has not been involved in any other expert councils. This divergence of political and media capital supports the point I made earlier about the multidimensional positioning of experts between the public sphere and the state. Although Garbuzov is present in the former, he remains insignificant to the latter. One researcher I spoke to underlines this observation when he suggests that

> Rogov is, after all, an academic [full member of RAN]. For some time, he kept the institute afloat, but now there is a new director [Garbuzov], who is not even a corresponding member of RAN, just *doktor nauk.* If you ask, even in our Academy, and this is a big organization, if you ask,

> who the director of ISKRAN is, I assure you that very few know who he is.[35]

This lack of political capital and academic credentials of its director has had negative effects on the ability of ISKRAN to attract funding and establish personal relations with the ministerial bureaucracy, first with the FANO and since 2018 with the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. Moreover, Russian experts emphasize the overall difficult financial situation, particularly when compared to IMEMO, which affects long-term perspectives. The researcher just quoted, for example, notes in our conversation that

> currently, [the] institute [IMEMO] is, relatively speaking, in a better position than ISKRAN. It is closer to state power. It has sufficiently solid funding. ISKRAN experiences a very difficult time, both in terms of finances and the ability to attract young researchers. The issue of funding is closely related to the latter, because young people need to build a life and they do not go where they are paid poorly.[36]

Thus, the generational change at ISKRAN has been less pronounced than at IMEMO. This personal assessment is supported by available financial data for the period from 2013 to 2017, presented in Table 7.

Table 7: ISKRAN, Funding 2013-2017

	State sponsorship		External funding	
Year	ruble (in million)	euro (in million)[37]	ruble	euro
2013	68.65	1.65	-	-
2014	89.00	2.10	156,867	3,780
2015	82.70	2.00	268,732	6,474
2016	68.50	1.65	79 million	1.9 million
2017	73.30	1.77	-	-

Source: Own compilation based on ISKRAN financial planning reports[38]

[35] #54, expert, May 2018.
[36] ibid.
[37] For reasons of comparability I use the official exchange rate from December 31, 2012 (1 euro=41.4938 rubles). This approach is justified because more than 90% of the institute's expenses are salaries, which are paid in rubles.
[38] ISKRAN, *Plan finansovo-hozâjstvennoj deâtel'nosti na 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 i 2017 gg.* [Plan about financia and economic activities 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017], accessed Oct. 10, 2018, http://www.iskran.ru/ur-doks.php.

These figures suggest that in contrast to IMEMO, state sponsorship of ISKRAN has indeed been quite volatile, while the amount of external funding remains minimal: 156,867 rubles (3,780 euro) in 2014, and 268,732 rubles (6,474 euro) in 2015. In 2016, however, ISKRAN received 79 million rubles (1.9 million euro) for paid services, even exceeding the income from the state budget in the same year. The reasons for this sudden increase in external funding are unknown. Pavel Kulikov provides slightly different figures. In his account, ISKRAN received 69.16 million, 71.93 million, 89.91 million and 71.70 million rubles annually for the years 2012 to 2015 provided by the state. Moreover, according to his data, ISKRAN has generated some (albeit minimal) additional income through commissioned analytical work in the amount of 2.38 million rubles and 2.25 million rubles for 2012 and 2013 respectively, and 10 million rubles in 2015 (Table 8).

Table 8: ISKRAN, Funding 2012-2015[39]

	State sponsorship		External funding	
Year	ruble (in million)	euro (in million)	ruble (in million)	euro
2012	69.16	1.66	2.38	57,358
2013	71.93	1.73	2.25	54,225
2014	89.91	2.17	-	-
2015	71.70	1.73	10.00	241,000

Source: own compilation based on data collected by Pavel Kulikov.

Overall, it is fair to assume that ISKRAN receives between 70 and 90 million rubles, or 1.6 to 2.2 million euro annually from the state budget, which is approximately one fifth of what IMEMO receives. Despite these funding issues, the overall media capital of ISKRAN remains high, at least for the moment. Again, it fluctuates depending on external events and Russian-US relations.


For example, the signing of the New START treaty in April 2010 and the US Presidential elections in November 2016 led to substantial increases in public references to ISKRAN's work, but this attention was short-lived. Hence, the visibility of the institute and its public authority is driven by existing demands within the media field. An illustrative example is provided by the period from 2000 to 2004, during which

[39] As in the previous table, I take the official exchange rate from Dec. 31, 2012 (1 euro=41.4938 rubles) for reasons of comparability over time.

the media presence of ISKRAN to some extent was generated by the behavior of one person: Igor' Sutâgin.

In late October 1999, the FSB had executed a search warrant at his home and in the same month Sutâgin, at the time a senior researcher at ISKRAN, was officially charged with treason (Art. 275 UK RF). A physicist by education, Sutâgin had received his doctorate in history of international relations at ISKRAN in 1991 and afterwards remained at the institute. Since 1998 he had been the Head of the sector for military-technical and military-economic policy at the Foreign Policy Department. In April 2004 he was sentenced to 15 years in prison but was pardoned in 2010 and together with Sergej Skripal, among others, was swapped with ten Russian citizens accused of espionage in the US. As can be seen in Diagram 22 above, almost fifty percent of all newspaper articles about ISKRAN in 2004 and a substantial part from 2001 to 2003 reference Sutâgin.

Diagram 22: ISKRAN: Media Capital with and without 'Sutâgin' 1992-2017



Source: own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

This negative publicity and the politicization of the case might also have affected ISKRAN's position vis-à-vis the Russian state administration. Even after Sutâgin had been arrested ISKRAN Director Rogov continued to support his family financially during the almost five years he spent under investigative custody.[40]

[40] Alek Ahundov, "Kassaciâ. Igor' Sutâgin ne ostanetsâ bez raboty," [Cassation. Igor' Sutâgin will not remain without a job] *Kommersant",* Apr. 15, 2004, accessed Nov. 10, 2018., https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/466833.

Rogov called the entire case a “tragedy”, particularly because he holds that Sutâgin did not have any access to secret information that could have harmed state interests to a serious extent.[41] On the other hand, ISKRAN deputy director Mihail Nosov indicates that the case had a negative influence, despite attempts of Rogov to solve the issue. In 2017 he remembers that

> Rogov was able to mitigate the blow ISKRAN received due to the arrest of Igor' Sutâgin by issuing a reprimand for an ‘unauthorized trip to Hungary‘. But there were no less blows due to other traitors.[42]

These events and Nosov’s interpretation contrast with the arrival of former officials at ISKRAN, which illustrates the complexity of state-society relations. In 1999 and 2002 two former generals joined the institute: Pavel Zolotarëv and Viktor Esin. Both had been central military figures in the 1990s. Major general Zolotarëv headed the Informational-Analytical Center of the Russian MOD from 1993 to 1997 and subsequently, as noted in the previous chapter, joined the apparatus of the Defense Council, also becoming a member of SVOP in the process. In August 1998, he established the *Interregional Foundation for the Support of Military Reform*, which organized various international conferences and seminars. The entire Russian military and strategic studies expert elite participated. Major general Esin was first Deputy Commander-In-Chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) from 1994 to 1997. Afterwards, he served in the administration of the Security Council, where he eventually met ISKRAN Director Rogov in his capacity as a member of the Scientific Council. Upon retirement in 2002, Rogov invited Esin to join ISKRAN, where he started to teach at the Faculty for World Politics at the State Academy University for the Humanities (GAUGN). At the same time, Esin remained at the MOD as an advisor to the RVSN.

6.1.3 The Institute for International Studies (MGIMO)

In the Western literature, the MGIMO as the University of the Russian MFA remains understudied.[43] Given the fact that many researchers from the institutes of the

[41] “V Gostâh: Sergej Rogov, Prigovor Sutâginu [Setence of Sutyagin],” *Èho Moskvy*, Apr. 7, 2004, accessed Jan. 12, 2019, https://echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/25310/.
[42] Mihail Nosov, “Moj Institut,” [My institute] *SŠA. Èkonomika-politika-kul'tura*, no.9 (2017): 58.
[43] I could not find a single study published before 1991 that discusses MGIMO. This lack of information can be explained with the restricted access of foreigners to this institution in the Soviet Union. For the most important study on MGIMO in English after 1991 see Martin Müller, *Making*

Academy of Sciences received their education at MGIMO, this comes as a surprise. Moreover, contradicting popular assumptions, researchers from both institutions maintained intensive professional contacts, [44] publishing together or on similar issues. Sometimes the institutions even exchanged staff. As one researcher I spoke to notes, the people of the RAN institutes and MGIMO were all very familiar with each other. Sometimes people were chosen for some projects not because they were specialists, but because one director was a good friend of the other director.[45]

In May 1976, MGIMO established its own research center for applied policy studies, which subsequently established a distinct intellectual tradition under the roof of the *Problem Scientific-Research Laboratory of Systems Analysis in International Relations (Problemnaâ naučno-issledovatel'skaâ laboratorâ sistemnogo analiza meždunarodnyh otnošenij; PRONIL)*, or *Problemka*.[46] Following several institutional reforms after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it eventually transformed into the *Institute for International Studies* (IMI) in May 2009.

The concept behind *Problemka* originated in the increasing popularity of quantitative systems analysis, particularly in the United States, and its use for the modelling of decisions and outcomes in foreign policy and international relations. The Laboratory's initiator and first director, Vladislav Tihomirov, had joined MGIMO from the Soviet military-industrial complex, through which he became friends with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev – a decisive factor for the success of the laboratory. Under Tihomirov's short-term leadership,[47] the work of *Problemka* focused on the quantitative modelling of international relations. Scholars combined cybernetics and

Great Power Identities in Russia: an Ethnographic Discourse Analysis of Education at a Russian Elite University (Zürich: LIT, 2009).

[44] Omelicheva and Zubytska, for example, argue that scientists working at the Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences "had minimal contact with the university faculties and engaged in mostly 'fundamental' research with limited practical value", see Mariya Y. Omelicheva and Lidyia Zubytska, "An Unending Quest for Russia's Place in the World: The Discursive Co-evolution of the Study and Practice of International Relations in Russia," *New Perspectives*, Vol. 24, no.1 (2016): 27. They cite Graham as evidence, disregarding the fact that the author deals exclusively with the natural and the technical sciences, see Loren R. Graham, *Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[45] #38, expert, Jan. 2018.

[46] "Prikaz po MGIMO MID SSSR №506 ot 11 maâ 1976 g. Ob organizacii Problemnoj naučno-issledovatel'skoj laboratorii sistemnogo analiza v oblasti meždunarodnyh otnošenij [Order for MGIMO MID SSSR no. 506," May 11, 1976. On the organization of the Problem Scientific-Research Laboratory of Systems Analysis in International Relations]

[47] Tihomirov left the MGIMO in 1978 for Geneva where he worked as a diplomat at the UN Institute of Training and Research Policy Efficiency Studies.

computer modeling to identify, analyze and manage economic and political risks in societies, which were understood as complex systems.[48]

After the Iranian revolution in 1979, *Problemka* used this kind of complex systems analysis to estimate the chances of regime collapse in relation to the suppression of the Tudeh Party.[49] In another instance, the laboratory, upon request of the Directorate for Planning Foreign Policy Measures (*Upravlenie planirovaniâ vnešnepolitičeskih meropriâtij*), conducted an analysis to predict the outcome of the negotiations at the 1980 CSCE conference in Madrid. Despite differences and conflicts with the Foreign Ministry,[50] this work continued, particularly through the support of senior diplomats such as Vladimir Petrovskij at the Directorate.[51] Moreover, immediately after its establishment, the *Problemka* profited from the fact that in 1969 MGIMO's Pro-Rector for Academic Affairs, Dmitrij Ermolenko,[52] joined the Ministry to head the so-called "scientific group" as the main ministerial advisor at the Directorate for Planning Foreign Policy Measures.[53]

However, already during the 1980s, it became clear that computer-based quantitative analyses of foreign policy issues failed to fulfill initial hopes of providing tangible results that could be used in practice. The modeling did not keep pace with the increasing complexity of international relations, whereas the ontological premises were ill-understood. As the former senior researcher at the *Problemka* and its late Director Viktor Sergeev argues,

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[48] Mark Hrustalev, "Dve vetvi TMO v Rossii," [Two branches of IR theory in Russia] *Meždunarodnye processy*, t. 4, no. 2 (11), (2006): 121. See also Timothy A. Nunan, *Developing Power. Modernization, Economic Development, and Governance in Cold War Afghanistan*, Thesis Ph. D. (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2013), 61.
[49] Hrustalev, "Dve vetvi TMO v Rossii," 122.
[50] ibid. 122.
[51] ibid. 122.
[52] A MGIMO graduate, Ermolenko had been a classmate of Roland Timerbaev and Vadim Zagladin in the 1940s, see Abdulhan Ahtamzân, "Ermolenko D.V. – pervyj prorektor MGIMO iz vypusknikov vuza," [Ermolenko D. V. – the first MGIMO Vice-Rector of MGIMO from the university graduates] *Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta*, 1 (28) (2013).
[53] The main tasks of the group, which later transformed into a department, were to study foreign know-how in the field of international relations and sociology, and assess its possible application in the day-to-day work of the Ministry. In this context the team became particularly interested in the ideas of US realist and idealist thinkers, for example John Kenneth Galbraith and Woodrow Wilson, but also discussed post-industrialist development theories, for example those developed by Walter Rostow. See Ivan Tûlin, *Vydaûŝiesâ učenye MGIMO - Universiteta MID Rossii*, Vyp. 2: Dmitrij Vladimirovič Ermolenko (1923-1986) [Ivan Tûlin, Distinguished scientists at MGIMO – University of the Russian MFA, Vyp. 2: Dmitrij Vladimirovič Ermolenko (1923-1986)] (Moskva: MGIMO, 2000).

> in the United States, but also in the Soviet Union these methods were applied as if society was organized like the physical world. Relatively soon the weakness of this approach became clear. […] As a consequence, this strand failed to develop in the Soviet Union as well as in the United States. *Because the world of politics is not a carbon world*. These technologies inspired such people like Singer [and] Axelrod, though the latter quite soon shifted to the analysis of language and political consciousness.[54]

In addition, the laboratory increasingly lacked both adequate funds and qualified personnel. Vadim Lukov and Viktor Sergeev, who had been directly involved in the mathematical realization of the Madrid study, left MGIMO. While Lukov joined the MFA and headed the Directorate for Foreign Policy Planning in the 1990s, Sergeev followed an invitation by Andrej Kokošin to join (what was then) ISKAN in 1985.

These transfers from university to the institutes of the Academy of Sciences and the MFA have been partially related to the fact that, for younger scholars aspiring to a career in research, the work at MGIMO remained unattractive. The payment at the institute fell behind that of the Ministry and the level of income did not increase before researchers obtained the next academic title, *doktor nauk*.[55] Working on a second dissertation, however, was difficult due to the high workload. In consequence, careers progressed slowly and with a comparably small financial reward, even for Soviet standards. Moreover, the collaboration with the Ministry required that most results were never published but remained "for internal use only". In addition, many papers were collectively and not individually authored. Thus, policy analysts found it difficult to get their name out and advance within the Soviet academic field.[56]

In parallel, however, the *Problemka* developed its own tradition in studying theoretical questions in international relations. In the Soviet Union, the study of IR theory officially did not exist, given the Marxist-Leninist state ideology. Tihomirov's successor Ivan Tûlin, who headed the *Problemka* from late 1978 to 1990, played a particularly important role in this development. Himself a MGIMO graduate, Tûlin had been working as an assistant to Dmitrij Ermolenko and fulfilled the same function at MGIMO as his teacher did at the MFA – he connected IR scholars to practitioners of

[54] Aleksandr Čečevišnikov, "40 let IMI: O Problemnoj laboratorii k institutu meždunarodnyh Issledovanij," [40 years IMI: From the Problem Laboratory to the Institute of International Studies] *Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta*, 2 (47) (2016): 238, emphasis added.
[55] Čečevišnikov, "40 let IMI," 238.
[56] ibid. 238.

international relations.[57] The intellectual core group of the *Problemka,* besides Tûlin, Mark Hrustalev and Anatolij Zlobin, introduced new topics, particularly international conflict management and the theory of negotiations as applied in the Madrid study. In doing so, the work done at the laboratory went beyond the existing ideological framework at the time, which, as MGIMO Professor Marina Lebedeva puts it, "from an analytical point of view was absolutely revolutionary".[58]

In 1990 Tûlin became MGIMO Vice-Rector. In turn, the Problemka was re-organized and transformed into the *Center for International Studies (Centr meždunarodnyh issledovanij*) with Mark Hrustalev as its new Director. In the following decade the work of the center degenerated as official demand for policy coordination and planning plunged into crisis. Aleksandr Orlov, who eventually became Director in 2004, and Aleksandr Čečevišnikov emphasize this general tendency, especially characteristic for the first half of the 1990s:

> After 1992 the layered system of preparing governmental decisions in the field of foreign policy, which had been created in the 1970s and 1980s, largely ended due to the lack of demand from the MFA leadership at the time. This reflected the overall decline in the culture of foreign policy planning, the dumbing down of approaches to some fundamental questions of modern international relations.[59]

This downshift was partially stopped towards the end of the 1990s.[60] In 1998 Viktor Sergeev, who, after his time at ISKAN, had spent several years at Leeds University as a guest professor, returned to MGIMO as Director of the Center (see Table 9).

Problemka was in bad shape, however. The number of scholars at the new Center of International Studies was reduced from 40 to 15 and the "salaries were symbolic".[61] Sergeev emphasizes this point, arguing that "we existed at the expense of foreign

[57] Aleksej Šestopal, "Ivan Georgičevič Tûlin i teoriâ meždunarodnyh otnošenij, Naučnye školy MGIMO v licah," [Ivan Georgičevič Tûlin and the theory of international relations, Scientific schools of MGIMO in personal portraits], tom 1 (Moskva: MGIMO, 2013), 373. See also Aleksandr Orlov and Aleksandr Čečevišnikov, *Analitika MGIMO. 40 let: 1976-2016* [MGIMO Analytics. 40 Years. 1976-2016] (Moskva: IMI MGIMO MID Rossii, 2016), 11.
[58] Čečevišnikov, "40 let IMI," 238.
[59] Aleksandr Orlov and Aleksandr Čečevišnikov, "Naučno-praktičeskie èkspertizy i analitika IMI," [Scientific-practical expertise and analysis at IMI] *Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta*, 38(5) (2014): 57.
[60] ibid. 57.
[61] Orlov and Čečevišnikov, *Analitika MGIMO*, 16.

business trips and grants".[62] In 2004 returning interest on the part of the MFA in analytical work, however, led to yet another reorganization.

Table 9: Transformation of the Problemka at MGIMO 1976-2018

	Time	Name (English)	Name (Russian)	Director
1	1976-1978	Problem Laboratory	Problemnaâ Laboratoriâ	Vladislav Tihomirov
	1978-1990			Ivan Tûlin
2	1990-1998	Center of International Studies	Centr Meždunarodnyh Issledovanij	Mark Hrustalev
3	1998-2004			Viktor Sergeev
4	2004-2009	Scientific-coordination Council on International Studies	Naučno-koordinacionnyj sovet po meždunarodnym issledovaniâm	Aleksandr Orlov
5	2009-2018	Institute of International Studies	Institut Meždunarodnyh Issledovanij	Aleksandr Orlov
6	Since 2018			Andrej Sušencov

The Center became the Scientific-coordination Council on International Studies (NKSMI) and Aleksandr Orlov replaced Sergeev as Director. In contrast to the latter, Orlov had been a career diplomat. Before taking over the NKSMI directorship, he had been Deputy Director of the Department for Foreign Policy Planning – the direct bureaucratic contact point at the MFA for the NKSMI and MGIMO.

With his arrival, the publication activities of the Center broadened. For example, in November 2004 the NKSMI started to publish analytical notes (*analitičeskie zapiski*) and in June 2015 analytical reports (*analitičeskie doklady*) were added. Both are publicly available and part of the information provided by the NKSMI to the MFA.

In May 2009 this advisory function was officially fixed when the NKSMI transformed into the Institute of International Studies (IMI). In contrast to the compact *Problemka*, however, today's IMI represents a loose cooperation of at first 11 Centers and three sectors with very different profiles. Most of them had already been part of the NKSMI. Today there are 10 Centers, each with 2 to 8 researchers, and only one sector, which is responsible for organizational matters. They cover either geographical areas (including East Asia, the Middle East, the Post-Soviet Spaces, Europe and the

[62] Orlov and Čečevišnikov, *Analitika MGIMO*, 17.

Caucasus) or substantial themes, such as Euro-Atlantic Security, Global Problems and the BRICS. Initially there had also been an Analytical Center, first led by Ivan Timofeev, who left MGIMO in 2011 to become Program Director at RIAC. Just like IMEMO, its task was to provide situational analyses and to monitor the development of regional conflicts, including in Ukraine, Afghanistan and Iraq.[63] In 2017 it was transformed into the Center for Afghanistan and Central Asia.

According to the IMI statute, the institute "provides expert analyses within the research plan of the MFA" and guarantees "research and expert support" for the ministry.[64] In this context, the MFA annually issues a list of research topics which are, however, not mandatory and can be changed and expanded. Moreover, researchers at IMI are free to suggest topics on their own initiative.[65] In addition, IMI provides commissioned analytical work to other state institutions. For example, from 2009 to 2010 the Center for Caucasus and Regional Security Studies prepared a report for the Russian Olympic Committee evaluating the security situation for the Olympic Summer Games in Sochi. In 2011 the Center for Middle Eastern Studies also advanced scenarios of regional developments commissioned by the Foreign Policy Directorate of the Presidential Administration. In 2010 and 2011, IMI researchers from the Center for Global Problems, on behalf of the Analytical Center for the Government (*Analitičeskij centr pri Pravitel'stv RF*),[66] analysed the prevalent worldview of the US

[63] Viktor Mizin, "Intellekutal'nyj resurs rossijskoj vnešnej politiki," [The intellectual resource of Russian foreign policy] *Obrazovatel'nye Modeli MGIMO*, no. 4 (25) (2012): 139.
[64] "Institut Meždunarodnyh Issledovanij," [Institute for International Studies], Položenie, Ob Institute meždunarodnyh issledovanij MGIMO (U) MID Rossii| [Regulation, On the Institute for International Seudies MGIMO (U) MID Rossii], Prikaz № 275, May 26, 2009, MGIMO (U) MID Rossii.
[65] #25, expert, MGIMO, Sept. 2017.
[66] The Analytical Center for the Government evolved from the Main Computing Center of the USSR State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN) which existed from 1959 to 1991. After 1991 it transformed into the Center on the Economic Environment and Forecasting (*Centr èkonomičeskoj kon"ûnktury i prognozirovaniâ*) of the Russian Ministry of the Economy; since 1993 it has existed as the Center on the Economic Environment (Centr èkonomičeskoj kon"ûnktury). In December 2005 the Russian government merged the Center with the Work Center for Economic Reforms for the Government (*Rabočij centr èkonomičeskih reform*) to create the Analytical Center. The Center focuses on socio-economic and economic policies. See Nikolaj Smirnov, "Otkrytye, no nadežnye," [Discoveries, but reliable], *osp.ru*, June 14, 2011, accessed Dec. 12, 2018, https://www.osp.ru/news/articles/2011/24/13009067/ and "Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva RF no. 777," [Order of the Government of the Russian Federation], Dec. 20, 2005, no. 777, http://www.pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&prevDoc=102085550&backlink=1&&nd=102103612.

administration under President Barack Obama and published parts of the results in the form of an analytical report in November 2011.[67]

In October 2018 Orlov was replaced by Andrej Sušencov (*1983) as IMI Director. As in the case of MGIMO, this constitutes a significant regeneration of leadership from the Soviet to the post-Soviet generation. Besides his position at MGIMO, Sušencov, who used to be a doctoral student of Aleksej Bogaturov, has served as one of the program directors at the Valdai discussion club (see section 6.3) since 2014 and has become a member of SVOP.

6.2 A New Beginning: Private Think Tanks

The disintegration of the Soviet Union abolished ideological supervision and legal restrictions for private initiatives. In the 1990s, new research centers and networks formally independent from the state emerged. Many of them, however, remained one-man shows and dissolved as quickly as they had appeared. Given the absence of governmental demand and state funding, long-term success depended either on foreign sponsorship or the commercialization of research activities. Hence, Russian foreign policy expert institutions, which are financially independent from the state, universities and the RAN come in two forms: enterprises and non-commercial organizations (NCO). However, since 2011, changing legislation – particularly the foreign agents' law from June 2012 and the law on undesirable organizations from May 2015 – has diminished their ability to attract sponsorship from abroad.

Here I present four such private think tanks: The Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies ('CACEES'),[68] the Center for Political Research in Russia (PIR-Center), the Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), and the Center for Energy and Security (CENESS) (Table 10). Together they form a distinct network of arms control, military and energy specialists that represents one space within the Russian field of experts.

[67] Viktor Sergeev, Elena Alekseenkova, Kirill Koktyš, Anna Orlova, Kirill Petrov, and Ekaterina Čimiris, *Novoe prostranstvo mirovoj politiki: vzglâd iz SŠA* [The new space of world politics: the US view], Analitičeskie doklady, Institut Meždunarodnyh Issledovanij, MGIMO, Vypusk 6 (30) (2011), https://mgimo.ru/upload/iblock/d60/d6064bd254321e4e7541c4dd79c6cadd.pdf.
[68] This abbreviation has never been used by the center. I apply it here for practical purposes.

Table 10: Private Foreign and Security Policy Think Tanks

	'CACEES'	PIR-Center	CAST	CENESS
Founded	1992	1994	1997	2009
Permanent Staff	5-10	5-10	5-10	<5
Legal Form	NCO	NCO/Business	Business	NCO
Founder	Anatolij D'âkov	Vladimir Orlov	Ruslan Puhov, Konstantin Makienko	Anton Hlopkov
Topics	Nuclear physics, arms control (technical)	Non-proliferation, arms control, cyber security, international conflict	Arms trade, conventional arms, Russian military	Nuclear energy, non-proliferation

6.2.1 The Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies

The Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies (henceforth Center for Arms Control) at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT) stands out from the great majority of foreign and security policy think tanks for two reasons. First, as it emerged from within a technical Soviet-Russian university, its employees and researchers had a natural science background. This implied distinct views and access to information that had been unavailable to most researchers at IMEMO and ISKRAN for years. Second, although the Centre was closed as a research center in 2012 and dissolved completely in 2015 given its imminent categorisation as a 'foreign agent', it did shape the field of experts for more than two decades. As the first of its kind, it became a central element within the Russian expert network on arms control and served as a model to colleagues.

In the 1980s the central figure at MIPT was eminent Soviet physicist Sergej Kapica. A long-term participant in the Pugwash Conferences of Science and World Affairs as well as a famous science presenter with his own TV show, he had led the Department for General Physics since 1965. In spring 1988, the Soviet Pugwash Committee initiated a youth group in advance of the 38th Pugwash Conference "Global Problems and Common Security" that was to take place for the first time in the Soviet Union in August that year.[69] Both things laid the foundation for intensifying international

[69] "Molodëžnoe otdelenie Rossijskogo Paguošskogo komiteta pri Prezidume Rossijskoj Akademii Nauk," [The Youth section under the Russian Pugwash Committee at the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences], accessed Oct. 10, 2018, http://www.pugwash.ru/pugwash_young.

cooperation. At MIPT, Kapica proposed the organization of international annual summer schools of young researchers. Supported by the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Danger (*Komitet sovetskih učenyh v zaŝitu mira, protiv âdernoj ugrozy*), Anatolij D'âkov, at Kapica's faculty since 1975, took responsibility for the summer schools. Invitation letters were sent to four universities in the US, the UK and China, and in summer 1989 the first international group of students, post-docs and professors arrived at MIPT. The following year, the summer school was organized at Princeton University.

Inspired by what he saw at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies in Princeton, D'âkov, after his return to the Soviet Union, decided to establish his own organization at MIPT. With financial help from the Sakharov Foundation and US physicist Frank von Hippel, he established the Center for Arms Control in January 1992 as the first Russian non-governmental research organization in this field. As one researcher notes, the first task was to amass knowledge:

> As soon as we had formed [the center], we needed to some degree receive the necessary knowledge […] we needed to understand and look further into these questions. […] In autumn 1992 we organized a lecture series at [the] center. These were weekly lectures. We invited people from different places. Specialists from the MFA and the MOD came to us as well as specialists from the Academy of Sciences […]. We gradually familiarized ourselves with the issues, which concerned anything related to disarmament, but we were also interested in all questions concerning the development of energy and environment protection.[70]

After 1992 the lecture series turned into a regular seminar at MIPT. Thus, the Center for Arms Control, while retaining its own funding, functioned as a sub-division of the university and existed as its main department in the field of energetics. The curriculum consisted of a general program in studying physics and an optional seminar on security policy, to which with external guests were invited regularly. In consequence, the Center for Arms Control developed an intra-Russian network that, for example, included Aleksej Arbatov from IMEMO, who arrived as a lecturer, and Vladimir Orlov, to whom D'âkov provided "valuable advice" when he later established the PIR-Center

[70] #51, expert, Apr. 2018.

(see below). Orlov later claimed that he "saw him as a teacher [to] […] look up to".[71] Good working relations developed with researchers from the RAN institutes, for example with Andrej Zargorskij and Aleksej Arbatov from IMEMO. There is an obvious feeling of mutual respect when debating issues of strategic stability and nuclear weapons. Although researchers felt that the technical education at MIPT provided distinct advantages, the detailed knowledge of leading social scientists among arms controllers, such as of Aleksej Arbatov and Sergej Rogov, was beyond dispute.[72]

In the 1990s the activities of the center resulted in publications that brought technical information on Soviet-Russian nuclear forces to Russian society for the first time. For example, in 1992 the young research group at the Center translated the book "Soviet Nuclear Weapons", originally published by the Natural Resources Defense Council in 1988 as part of the Nuclear Weapons Databook series, into Russian.[73] As the main editor of the publication Pavel Podvig argues, the publication "became the first ever Russian-language book in open circulation that described the Soviet nuclear arsenal".[74] In 1996, the success of the translation inspired research on another book that provided "up-to-date information about the state of the Russian nuclear forces and the industrial infrastructure",[75] but was based on Russian sources. For this project, the Center's team (including Podvig, Evgenij Mâsnikov, Boris Železov, Timur Kadyšev and Maksim Tarasenko) joined forces with Oleg Buharin, a former employee at the Center, who had remained at Princeton University after a longer research trip to the US in 1990, and two researchers from ISKRAN: Boris Železov and Igor' Sutâgin. The result was published in November 1998 as "Russian Strategic Nuclear Weapons" (*Strategičekoe âdernoe vooruženie Rossii*). The book became quite successful, especially with the Russian military and Minatom, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry.[76] The Moscow-based Peter the Great Strategic Rocket Forces Academy, for example, ordered ten volumes.

[71] Vladimir Orlov, "Brave New PIR: Turning the 20-year Journey into Generation 2.0," in *Security Index*, Vol. 20, issue 3-4 (2014): 4, https://doi.org/10.1080/19934270.2014.986364.
[72] #40, expert, Jan. 2018.
[73] Tomas Kohran, Uil'âm Arkin, Robert Norris, Džefri Sèndsom, *Âdernoe vooruženie SSSR* [USSR Nulcear Forces] (Moskva: IzDat, 1992), perevod Pavel Podvig.
[74] Pavel Podvig, The first Russian-language source of information about Soviet nuclear forces, accessed December 19, 2018, http://russianforces.org/project/.
[75] ibid.
[76] Pavel Podvig, The first Russian-language source of information about Soviet nuclear forces, accessed December 19, 2018, http://russianforces.org/project/.


In October 1999, however, the FSB seized all undistributed copies, claiming that it unveiled state secrets. The seizure, although unfounded, was related to the arrest of ISKRAN researcher Sutâgin discussed in the previous section. Astonishingly, however, his arrest did not affect the work of the Center, which undermines theoretical conceptions of the Russian state as one unitary institutionalized actor. Rather, it stresses the idea of a conglomerate of individual agents and groups with different interests. One expert emphasizes this point, arguing that state power consists of many branches and that the people within the bureaucracy understood that the case was unrelated to the Center and its employees.[77] In fact, although the Center never executed state commissioned orders, state cooperation has been intense and beneficial, because the researchers provided valuable input to concrete people. As researchers, so the impression, they were very much respected by all state organs they worked with, even occasionally receiving letters of gratitude from the Ministries.[78]

Hence, despite the incident with Sutâgin and the FSB operation, the Center continued to develop dynamically over the 2000s, partially due to consistent financial support from foreign foundations. Besides the initial sponsorship by the Sakharov Foundation, the Center received money from the Ploughshares Fund from 1991 onwards. Moreover, Ploughshares sponsored the Center's website with 25,000 US$ in 2001/2002.[79] The main source of funding, however, came from the MacArthur Foundation, which provided more than 230,000 US$ in the first years to support research and education at the Center.[80] The heyday of the Center began in 2000 when it received almost 1,000,000 US$ for three years to establish a graduate program in economics and business management.[81] In total, the MacArthur foundation sponsored the Center with more than 2,500,000 US$ between 1993 and 2009.[82]

[77] #40, expert, Jan. 2018.
[78] ibid.
[79] "The Ploughshares Fund, 2001/2002", 8, accessed Nov. 11, 2018, https://www.ploughshares.org/sites/default/files/pf_AR_2002.pdf
[80] MacArthur Foundation, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, accessed Dec. 10, 2018, https://www.macfound.org/grantees/116/.
[81] ibid.
[82] Additional but more modest financial support was provided by the John Merck Fund, the W. Alton Jones Foundation and International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity. See "Occasional Report: Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies," *Science & Global Security*, 4 (2): 253.

In parallel with increasing funding, the beginning of the 2000s marked the period of the highest media capital enjoyed by the Center. As illustrated by Diagram 23, its public visibility reached an all-time high in 2002.

Diagram 23: Center for Arms Control: Media Capital, 1992-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM)

Nevertheless, the overall level of media capital has remained low, even when compared to the other private centers with similar resources discussed below. This situation, I would suggest, is related to the technical work and the specialized character of issues the Center deals with, which do not easily gain wider popularity within the public space.

In 2011 the media capital plunged and Russian newspapers have almost ceased to cite the Center altogether since, which is related to its institutional decay. In October 2011 the State Duma introduced changes to the Russia law on non-commercial organizations that made it impossible for the MIPT to legally supervise the Center. In consequence, the Center became completely independent, but lost its facilities. The special guest lectures offered in addition to the MIPT curriculum continued, however. Nevertheless, the overall political climate changed. Fruitful cooperation with Russian institutions for the provision of sensible data, which were essential for the Center‘s work, became increasingly impossible, given the Center’s full foreign sponsorship. Anticipating its registration as a foreign agent[83] and the law on undesirable organizations,[84] to which its main sponsor, the MacArthur Foundation, became

[83] Federal'nyj zakon ot 20.07.2012 № 121-FZ [Federal Law, July 20, 2012, no. 121-F3], http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201207230003.
[84] Federal'nyj zakon ot 23.05.2015 № 129-FZ [Federal Law, May 23, 2015 no. 129-F3] http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201505230001?index=0&rangeSize=1.

subject, the Center ceased to exist after almost 25 years. The next think tank I discuss, the PIR-Center, now just PIR, has experienced similar challenges.

6.2.2 The Center for Political Research in Russia (PIR)

The PIR-Center is closely linked to Vladimir Orlov, its founder and long-term Director. In 1990 he graduated from MGIMO and subsequently joined the weekly newspaper *Moskovskie Novosti* as a correspondent for international affairs. As the voice of perestroika, *Moskovskie novosti* was among the most popular and authoritative newspapers in the Soviet Union during the late 1980s.

In September 1990 *Moskovskie novosti* achieved state independence and became a hub for a new, younger generation of Russian journalists, including Orlov, who used its editorial office as the first home of what would become the PIR-Center. In December 1991 Orlov covered the referendum of independence in Ukraine, which sealed the fate of the Union. It also brought the issue of the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy to the fore, a subject Orlov, by his own account, found "very interesting and promising".[85] At the same time, the risk of unsanctioned proliferation of nuclear materials from former Soviet republics, including Russia, became a central concern among specialists and politicians in the US.

Orlov, just 23 years old in 1991, became involved in these emerging debates. He became part of a network of Russian and US security analysts and conducted his own investigations within the framework of a cooperation between MGIMO, the Moscow Association of Non-Proliferation headed by MGIMO scholar Andrej Zagorskij, and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies established in 1989 at the Monterey Institute for International Studies in California.[86] In April 1992 Orlov went to Monterey to present his results and establish contacts with a great variety of specialists.[87] He met with William Potter, the founder of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, which eventually served as a role model for the PIR-Center, and retired Russian diplomat Roland Timerbaev, one of the authors of the Non-Proliferation

[85] Orlov, "Brave New PIR," 2.
[86] Andrei Zagorski, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Proliferation Risks," *Security Dialogue*, 23 (3), (1992): 39, footnote 12. On the Center for Nonproliferation Studies see Judith Miller, "For Arms Control Study, One School Rules," *New York Times*, Jan. 13, 2000, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/13/us/for-arms-control-study-one-school-rules.html.
[87] Vladimir Orlov, "Mechanisms of Export Control of Nuclear Materials in the Russian Federation and Illicit Nuclear Export, presentation at a conference in Monterey," March 1992.

Treaty (NPT) and teacher at Potter's center between 1992 and 1995.[88] Both men shaped Orlov's views about non-proliferation and became his close friends and mentors.[89]

With the help of Timerbaev, Vadim Kozjulin, a former study colleague at MGIMO, and SVR major general Gennadji Evstaf'ev, who served as the Head of the Department on Non-proliferation and Export Control,[90] Orlov set up the journal Nuclear Control (*Âdernyj kontrol'*) as a print media project in April 1994. Hence, rather than a deliberate attempt to establish a 'private think tank', Orlov insists that

> the PIR-Center was launched as an *informal club for exchanging research and opinions* on nuclear nonproliferation. It had the *Yaderny Kontrol* journal at its center and was essentially set up as an auxiliary project […]. [N]either its own leadership nor any external players […] had set any strategic goals for that organization. For the first two years we were left to our own devices; we did not pursue any ambitious tasks […]. Back at the time, *PIR Center was more of an editorial office than a research center*.[91]

This journalistic orientation was reflected in the original meaning of the PIR-acronym: *Publishing, Information and Research Center.* The quick success of *Yaderny Kontrol,* however, led to its institutionalization as a policy research center. Three elements were key: first, Orlov received official political support from Presidential aide Ûrij Baturin, who also authored a welcome address in the first edition of *Âdernyj kontrol'*.[92] Second, his Alma Mater MGIMO provided facilities thanks to the interest of rector Anatolij Torkunov and Vice-rector Ivan Tûlin.[93] Third, initial financial support was provided by the MacArthur Foundation, which sponsored the publication of *Âdernyj kontrol'* from 1995 to 1999 with more than 150,000 US$.[94] Subsequent increases in

[88] In a letter dating from November 1990 Timerbaev called on Soviet experts to establish a non-governmental expert organization in the field of non-proliferation, which eventually led to the establishment of the Moscow Association of Non-Proliferation mentioned above. See Roland Timerbaev, *Rasskazy o bylom, Vospominaniâ o peregovorah po nerasprostraneniû, razoruženiû i o mnogom drugom, Rossijskaâ političeskaâ ènciklopediâ* [Stories about what has been, Memories about negotiations on non-proliferation, disarmament and about other things] (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2007), 175-177.
[89] Orlov, "Brave New PIR," 2.
[90] Vladimir Orlov, "Âdernaâ èkspertiza razvedčika Evstaf'ev," [The Nuclear Expertise of Intelligence Agent Evstaf'ev] *Moskovskie Novosti* № 35, Aug. 29, 1993.
[91] Orlov, "Brave New PIR," 3-4, emphasis added.
[92] Ûrij Baturin, "Obrašenie k čitatelâm," [address to the readers] *Âdernyj Kontrol',* no 0, noâbr' 1994.
[93] Orlov, "Brave New PIR," 3.
[94] McArthur Foundation, Grantees, Center for Policy Studies in Russia - PIR Center, accessed Nov. 10, 2018, https://www.macfound.org/grantees/132/.

funding enabled the PIR-Center to expand to new areas,[95] thereby transforming into what Orlov terms a “boutique think-tank”.[96] Moving away from the narrow focus on nuclear non-proliferation, it launched new projects on chemical weapons, missile technology, non-proliferation, military and technical cooperation and civilian controls of military activities.[97] In this context, Orlov argues that

> the PIR Center began to grow in terms of staff numbers, financial resources, and the number of projects. In some years during that period we published as many as four different journals and bulletins at the same time and held more than 10 conferences and workshops every year.[98]

An important element and unique feature became the annual Summer Schools organized since 2001 to educate the new generation of experts and specialists. On the one hand, the Summer Schools established a wide interpersonal regional network, particularly because, as a rule, two third of its 30 to 35 participants joined from the CIS beyond Russia. On the other hand, it was through these schools and in combination with frequent internships that the PIR-center acquired new employees, who over time became an integral part of the organization. All members of the current operational leadership have participated in the school or worked as interns. For example, director Al'bert Zul'harneev joined the PIR-Center in 2007 from Yekaterinburg via an internship and remained in Moscow. Similarly, Andrej Baklickij and Oleg Demidov, responsible for arms control and cyber-security, both participated in PIR Summer and Winter Schools in 2011 and later joined the PIR-Center as consultants.

The PIR-Center itself consists of three structural elements. The decision-making organ, the Executive Board, which has been headed by retired Lieutenant-General Evgenij Bužinskij since April 2014, has ten members, including the founders Vadim Kozjulin and Vladimir Orlov, younger experts such as Dmitrij Polikanov (MGIMO), the journalists Elena Černenko and Ekaterina Stepanova (IMEMO), and eminent military

[95] From 2001 onwards, the McArthur Foundation increased the size of its grants to the PIR Center considerably. The sponsorship grew from merely 250,000 US$ over a period of six years (1995-2001), to 600,000-700,000 US$ every three years (2001-2012). See McArthur Foundation, Grantees, Center for Policy Studies in Russia - PIR Center, accessed Nov. 10, 2018, https://www.macfound.org/grantees/132/.
[96] Orlov, “Brave New PIR,” 5.
[97] ibid. 5.
[98] ibid. 7.

officers, diplomats and academics, including major general Evgenij Maslin, former SVR Director Vjačeslav Trubnikov (IMEMO), arms control specialist Ûrij Fëdorov (IMEMO), and economist Vladimir Mau (RANEPA).

Everyday operations are overseen by a small and young team, whose core consists of Al'bert Zul'harneev, Baklickij and Demidov. In addition, Adlan Margoev heads the PIR-Center's main program "Russia and nuclear non-proliferation", while Ûliâ Ceškovskaâ assists Vladimir Orlov, who stepped down as Director in 2015 but continues to work as a consultant.

Finally, the PIR-Center draws on an 'expert council' that currently consist of 75 individual and 10 corporate members from 15 countries. Thus, besides offering its own programs, the PIR-Center serves as a platform and meeting point, enabling international dialogue within the specialized field of arms control and non-proliferation.

In 2007, the journal *Âdernyj kontrol'*, which had been published since 1992, was replaced by Security Index (*Indeks Bezopasnosti*). As a result, the range of topics substantially widened. Instead of an exclusive focus on nuclear non-proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, it shifted to different areas of international security, including information security, energy security, the protection of critical infrastructure, export control, migration, and terrorism. The geographical scope also increased, moving from an emphasis on Russia to international issues. In addition, the journal's distribution increased, adding another 2,000 subscribers. It also established liaison offices in Geneva and Monterey. In short, the PIR-Center became a truly globalized institution. Orlov remembers:

> I found the idea that we might examine the world through the eyes of experts in Moscow alone inadmissible. My aim is to provide you a chorus of expert voices: a real polyphony from throughout today's world, examining the world – and the world order – of tomorrow.[99]


Around the same time, the media presence of the PIR-Center within Russia improved considerably, particularly because in April 2010 the Russian Federation and the US signed the New START treaty. But the increase had another reason that illustrates the significance of the PIR-Center's educational projects for its public visibility: from 2011 to 2017 there were 313 references to the PIR-Center in Russia's federal press.

[99] Orlov, "Brave New PIR," 9.

More than a quarter of them (28%) are related to articles authored by Elena Černenko, the Deputy Head of the Foreign Desk at the newspaper *Kommersant'* (Diagram 24). In 2013 roughly 50% of all references to the PIR-Center fell upon her articles, which cited PIR-employees for authoritative opinions.

This is not by chance: the year before, Černenko had participated at the Global Politics Summer School offered by the PIR-Center and subsequently joined both a permanent working group on international information security and the Executive Board of the Center.

Diagram 24: PIR-Center: Media Capital 1994-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

After thriving for almost two decades, the PIR-Center began to face enormous difficulties as a result of the adoption of the 'foreign agent' law in July 2012 and the changing political climate within Russia. Given the involvement of numerous former officials and current diplomats in its activities, the PIR provides hard evidence for the political shift and the altered balance of power among the political elite. In February 2014, the state-funded Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (*Rossijskij Institut Strategičeskih Issledovanij*; RISI), in cooperation with the Center of Current Policy (*Centr Aktual'noj Politiki*; CAP), published a report assessing the activity of eight Russian scientific institutions, networks and think tanks, including the PIR-Center. The unnamed authors of the report argued that "positions contradicting Russian state

interests have become a sustainable premise of mass consciousness and thinking among a considerable part of the Russian expert community".[100]

In reference to the PIR-Center, the report claimed that it had cooperated with US organizations "famous for their close relations with the state administration and the intelligence services".[101] It accused the Center of "actively infiltrating the Russian expert and information space with American/Western positions, thereby influencing public opinion".[102] In the conclusion, the authors stated that the PIR-Center "qualifies as an organization performing the role of a foreign agent",[103] but emphasized that "the more important risk concerns the systematic and objective collection of information on highly sensitive questions of Russian security".[104] In September 2014, seven months after the release of the report, the Russian Ministry of Justice registered the PIR-Center as the 14th foreign agent, following a request by the Moscow prosecutor's office.[105]

It is unknown whether the RISI-report directly influenced this decision. It has been suggested, however, that the foreign agent campaign was a political intrigue initiated by Andrej Krutskih. The diplomat and Presidential envoy for International Cooperation on Information Security had allegedly become dissatisfied with the advances of the PIR-Center in the area of cyber-security. If this is indeed the case, it is worth noting that Krutskih had publicly applauded the Center's efforts in this area[106] and participated as a lecturer in a PIR-Center training course on information security in March 2014.[107]

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[100] Rossijskij Institut Strategičeskih Issledovanij and Centr aktunal'noj politiki, *Doklad* [Report], Feb.2014, accessed Dec. 22, 2018, https://www.oprf.ru/files/2014dok/doklad_ordzhonikidze24042014.pdf.
[101] ibid. 32.
[102] ibid. 32.
[103] ibid. 42.
[104] ibid. 43.
[105] https://minjust.ru/ru/press/news/v-reestr-nekommercheskih-organizaciy-vypolnyayushchih-funkcii-inostrannogo-agenta-vneseny, Sept. 3, 2014.
[106] On the website of the PIR-Center Krutskih is quoted as saying that "I believe that it is particularly important, that the PIR-Center has established this [research] direction and continues to actively develop it further", See Global'noe upravlenie internetom i meždunarodnaâ informacionnaâ bezopasnost' [Global administration of the internet and international information security], accessed Oct. 14, 2018, http://pircenter.org/projects/10-international-information-security-and-global-internet-governance.
[107] "Lektory treningovogo kursa," [Lecturers oft he training course], March 17-19, 2014, accessed Dec. 12, 2018, http://pircenter.org/pages/812-training-course-instructors.

Regardless of the reason, the PIR-Center struggled for almost one and a half years to clear its name from the registry. This was eventually achieved in late February 2016,[108] allegedly with support from Foreign Minister Lavrov. In consequence, however, the Center had to relinquish all previous direct funding from foreign donors, and the number of permanently employed staff was reduced from more than ten to only five. Moreover, the journal *Indeks Bezopasnosti*, whose publication continued to be supported by foreign sources, had to be legally separated from the PIR-Center and was outsourced to the enterprise *OOO PIR-Press*, but eventually ceased to exist. Short of funds, the annual Summer School that originally had lasted for two weeks is now only one week long.

This unexpected development illustrates the importance of economic capital and state control over non-commercial organizations. Commenting on the overall financial situation in June 2014, Orlov notes that "the climate in this country is not conducive to organizations like ours bearing fruit".[109] In fact, financial dependence on foreign donors, the *sine qua non* survival strategy of the 1990s, has become a political disadvantage. Hence, different think tanks have chosen a client-based commercial business models as an alternative. The Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) is another example of this.

6.2.3 The Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST)

When the Soviet Union began to crumble, the future founders of CAST, Ruslan Puhov and Konstantin Makienko, were students at MGIMO. Just like Orlov, Puhov had been enrolled at the Faculty of International Journalism, while Makienko studied at the Department for Eastern Studies at the Faculty for International Relations. Chance brought them together. After the Soviet state collapsed, MGIMO introduced the first MA program in Russia in 1993, a cooperation with the *Institut d'études politiques de Paris.* Both young men had learned French at MGIMO and enrolled in the program. Puhov remembers that

[108] "ANO 'Naučnyj centr meždunarodnyh issledovanij PIR isklûčena iz reestra NKO, vypolnâûŝih funkcii inostrannogo agenta'," [ANO Scientific Center for Internaitonal Studies PIR has been excluded from the registry of NKO excercising the function of foreign agents], March 3, 2016, accessed Oct. 13, 2018, http://www.pircenter.org/news/6815-removal-of-pir-center-nonprofit-organization-from-foreign-agents-list.
[109] Orlov, "Brave New PIR," 9.

> they were very urgently looking for students who wanted to participate. But because the program was in French, one needed a very high command of the language. And this was a very strange situation: people were afraid to apply. This was a new system after all. And the first Pro-Rector of MGIMO, Ivan Tûlin, himself tried to convince students to participate. And I was one of these students.[110]

In autumn 1994 Puhov and Makienko went to Paris. They lived together at the Russian embassy and became friends. In addition to academic studies, the program offered its participants an internship at a Paris-based organization. Makienko was placed at the *Centre de Recherches sur les Strategies et les Technologies* where he started to work on questions related to the defense industry and arms trade. Puhov joined the Russian embassy, and wrote his MA thesis comparing the positions of France and Russia in post-Cold War international arms trade. Their time spent in Paris became decisive for Makienko's and Puhov's professional development. Puhov recalls the following during our conversation:

> In addition to our education and personal friendship, we developed an interest in this topic – the role of weapons in international relations. He [Makienko] helped me. And of course, the French educational system is different from the Russian one. It shapes the mind in a different way. We were taught to write differently, to hold different presentations. Because Russians […], well, we are descendants of Byzantines. We are no Cartesians.[111]

After returning to Moscow in late 1995, the young men were looking for employment options. Puhov, who aspired to a diplomatic career, was disappointed after the internship at the embassy, while Makienko had received an offer to write his doctoral thesis in France, but remained hesitant. Puhov remembers how a former classmate from MGIMO, Aleksej Zaharov, [112] turned the balance:

> And at this moment my close personal friend, [Aleksej Zaharov], […] worked as the Deputy Director at the PIR-Center. He said: There is the PIR-Center and we have two programs. One deals with the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The other one with the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons […]. And our Director wants to open a new program

[110] #32, Ruslan Puhov, CAST, Oct. 2017.
[111] ibid.
[112] Zaharov started as a journalist at *Moskovskie Novosti* and simultaneously joined the PIR-Center, for which he created one of the first websites in Russia. He later became a successful businessman by establishing the recruiting platform *Superjob.ru* in 2001. See Galina Položevec, "Mne legko žit' s moim biznesom" [, accessed, Nov. 11, 2018, http://bit.samag.ru/interwiev/more/31.

> on conventional weapons. And he said, I know you have a talented friend – Konstantin Makienko. I would like to invite him.[113]

Makienko decided to take the offer, but insisted to take Puhov with him. They started to work for the PIR-Center in February 1996. Both stayed at the PIR for a relatively short time due to personal conflicts with Orlov. They left in the first half of 1997, but took the bulletin on conventional weapons they had been responsible for with them. In 2003 Puhov remembered that

> [w]e decided we would create a trade publication for people who were either producing and selling arms legally, like state-run trade, or those who wanted to learn more about it — such as a foreign defense attaché in Moscow, or the owner of a transportation company, or a bank interested in giving a loan to a Russian enterprise and get the investment back once the contract is fulfilled. *We thought about what was interesting for our clients, not interesting for us*, and we published our first issue of *Eksport Vooruženii* ['Weapons Exports'] in April 1996 and sent out something like 300 copies that we made on printers. I remember that I killed several cartridges in my friends' offices, but we only had two subscribers at first – the Czech Air Force attaché and the South Korean Air Force attaché.[114]

Since 2001 the production of commissioned analyses has turned into the main financial source.[115] From the start, CAST cultivated journalistic and media contacts as an instrument to improve its position within the field. Puhkov and Makienko even argue that

> there has been no alternative to an intensive cooperation with the press and TV. Only in this way were we able to start a dialogue with industry representatives and governmental institutions relatively fast. […] By building up contacts with the journalistic community, we achieved noticeable advantages in receiving information over traditional academic and university-based research organizations.[116]

These journalists, who constitute a specific and dense group covering the Russian military-industrial complex, have turned into the "surrogate of the analytical


[113] #32, Ruslan Puhov, CAST, Oct. 2017.
[114] Matthew Bodner, "Analyst: Russian Industry Faces Challenges Unique to 'Putin's Russia'," DefenseNews, Aug. 11, 2015, accessed Oct. 12, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/interviews/2015/08/09/analyst-russian-industry-faces-challenges-unique-to-putin-s-russia/.
[115] Ruslan Puhov and Konstantin Makienko, "Centr analiza strategij i tehnologij," [Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies] *Pro et Contra*, tom 8, no. 2 (2003): 111.
[116] ibid. 112.

community",[117] given the absence of an institutionalized Russian field of non-governmental organizations in this issue area. Since its foundation, the central press contact for CAST has been the military correspondent of the Russian newspaper *Vedomosti,* Aleksej Nikol'skij, who frequently cites Puhov and Makienko for authoritative opinions. From 1997 to 2017 Nikol'skij was responsible for almost a quarter of all references to CAST (23.3%) in Russia's federal press. Since 2013 Puhov and Makienko seem to have increasingly switched roles in relation to the media. Whereas Puhov turned into the main public representative of CAST, Makienko remains in the background, responsible for daily management. At the same time, the public visibility of CAST in Russia's federal press reached a turning point in 2001 and increased steadily until 2007, but since 2011 has dropped again to the level of the early 2000s (Diagram 25). The overall level, however, has remained very high and is on par with the much larger institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences and state sponsored think tanks.

The journal 'Weapons Export' (*Eksport Vooruženii*) remains the flagship publication of CAST. According to the organization's website, "its subscribers include Russian government agencies and defense industry players, financial institutions, embassies, Russian and foreign research institutions and defense industry experts and journalists".[118] Moreover, in 2004 the Center launched the English-speaking journal *Moscow Defense Brief* – a quarterly publication that includes brief versions of *Eksport Vooruženii* articles, as well as original pieces.[119] In contrast to the PIR-Center, these publications account for much of CAST's income. Both journals are distributed based on subscription and are comparatively expensive.[120]

[117] Ruslan Puhov and Konstantin Makienko, "Centr analiza strategij i tehnologij," [Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies] *Pro et Contra*, tom 8, no. 2 (2003): 113.
[118] "Subscription, Eksport Vooruzheniy", accessed Oct. 10, 2018, http://cast.ru/eng/subscribe/.
[119] The journal ceased to exist in late 2018.
[120] *Eksport Vooruženii*, for example, comes in both a printed and a digital version, and costs between 93,000 and 200,000 rubles (1,200-2,500 euro) annually. Subscription to the English-speaking *Moscow Defense Brief* costs 558US$ (500 euro).

Diagram 25: CAST: Media Capital 1997-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

In addition, since 2008 CAST has published several monographs and edited volumes on various topics, including the 2008 Georgian-Russian conflict, the Russian army reform, the Chinese defense industry, military aspects of the Ukrainian crisis, and Russia's military engagement in Syria.[121] It also established two internet blogs popular among specialists[122] and the daily newsletter *Periskop,* which analyzes Russian and international reporting on military-technical cooperation, arms trade and the military-industrial complex.

The center has realized projects for Russian state defense holdings, private Russian high-technology companies, Russian banks and various administrative bodies. In 2010, CAST won a public tender for 200,000 rubles, offered by the Presidential Administration via the state order system (*goszakupki*) on the potentials of the Chinese defense industry. Talking to the Russian newspaper *Kommersant* in 2012, Puhov emphasizes that

> we did not compete because of the money. We spent all of the 200,000 rubles, if not more, for doing the work […]. It is simply that the competition is an important precedent and important for the image.

[121] For a complete list of publications see http://cast.ru/books/?PAGEN_1=2.
[122] See https://bmpd.livejournal.com/ and http://periscope2.ru/.

> Winning it was a great privilege, so we, possibly, would have done it even for free.[123]

This was the only time when CAST participated directly in analytical work for the Presidential Administration. Moreover, according to Puhov, there has been no official feedback from the contracting authorities whatsoever, although in private talks with representatives from Rosoboronexport, the Russian state agency for the import and export of defense related products, "one feels that they know about our main recommendations, that is, they are taken into account".[124]

In Puhov's opinion, both the possibilities to influence policy discourse and decisions and the quality of non-governmental expertise vary depending on the issue concerned. For example, he argues that on questions of world arms trade and the (inter)-national defense industry

> our expertise is demanded from the Presidential Administration, the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation and defense enterprises themselves […]. On questions of military construction and reform of the armed forces I would say the following: There is a certain number of very competent, brilliant analysts with a good military education in Russia today. But there is no serious non-governmental military expertise.[125]

CAST remains the single non-governmental organization in the field working on arms trade issues.

6.2.4 The Center for Energy and Security (CENESS)

In summer 2008, the managing director of the PIR-Center, Anton Hlopkov, established his own organization. It was officially registered in April 2009 as the Center for Energy and Security (*Centr Ènergetiki i Bezopasnosti*; CENESS).[126] In

[123] Aleksandr Gabuev and Elena Černenko, "Po stranam i stečeniâm obstoâtel'stv," *Kommersant'* vlast', no. 39, Oct. 1, 2012, accessed June 6, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2025883.
[124] ibid.
[125] Ruslan Puhov, "'V voennom dele novye idei obespečivaet ne molodost', a opyt'," [In military affairs new ideas do not come with youth but the experience] *Russkij Reporter*, no. 38 (316) (2013), accessed June 10, 2018, http://expert.ru/russian_reporter/2013/38/ruslan-puhov-v-voennom-dele-novyie--idei-obespechivaet-ne-molodost-a-opyit/.
[126] The Russian name translates as Center for Energy and Security. However, CENESS uses the name Center for Energy and Security Studies in English.

contrast to his civilian colleagues with a background in journalism, history or international relations, Hlopkov had studied nuclear physics at the prestigious Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, which was renamed *National Research Nuclear University* (MEPhl) in 2009. After receiving his first degree, Hlopkov enrolled in the joined US-Russian MA program on "Material Protection, Control and Accounting", the first Russian degree program to educate Safeguards and Security specialists in nuclear non-proliferation.[127] The program brought him in contact with the PIR-Center, whose employees and experts were actively involved in a lecture course offered as part of the program throughout 1997 to 2006.[128] Hlopkov remembers:

> I was intrigued by the possibility to apply my technical knowledge in political science and the field of international relations. I became interested especially because a joint Russian-US Master Program on Nuclear Nonproliferation [run by MEPhl] involved one lecturer from MGIMO, a specialist on non-proliferation, Il'dar Ahtamzân, and former Russian ambassador to the IAEA, Roland Timerbaev.[129]

Since 2000 Hlopkov had been working for PIR, first as an intern and, after his graduation, as an employee responsible for PIR's educational projects, particularly the annual Summer School. From 2003 to 2007 he functioned as Vladimir Orlov's deputy, and in the last two years before the establishment of CENESS he acted as PIR's Managing Director. The motivation for establishing his own center, as he told me, came from his preference for a more technical approach and emphasis on non-proliferation at a time when PIR had been transforming into a "boutique think-tank"[130]:

> I left the PIR-Center primarily because I wanted to stay in the non-proliferation area. PIR increasingly widened its research agenda (information security etc.), but I wanted to concentrate on non-proliferation and develop a deeper understanding of it. My approach is that it is better to study some limited topic in all its aspects.[131]

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[127] The program has been actively supported and financed by the US Department of Energy (DOE) in the context of improving security at sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material and warheads in Russia. In 1995 the DOE established the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program to implement these efforts, see https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07404.pdf.
[128] PIR-Center, "MEPhI lecture course Nuclear Nonproliferation: International Legal, Political and Economic Aspects," accessed Dec. 12, 23018, http://xn----jtbhwghdp7a.xn--p1ai/index.php?id=207.
[129] #45, Anton Hlopkov, CENESS, Feb. 2018.
[130] Orlov, "Brave New PIR," 5.
[131] #45, Anton Hlopkov, CENESS, Feb. 2018.

This approach echoes the strategy expressed by Ruslan Puhov at CAST, who actively supported Hlopkov in founding the new center. Hlopkov deliberately organized it in the form of a loose interpersonal network of contributors, rather than an institute with a fixed organizational form. His own technical background set the agenda and enabled CENESS to occupy its own niche within the field. First, CENESS moved away from the study of nuclear weapons and nuclear arms control issues, the focus of both PIR and 'CACEES'. Instead, it established non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy as its primary areas of specialization. Both issues account for 80-90% of his daily work, while questions of arms control, although to some extent part of the center's portfolio, remain marginal. The technicalities involved in these issue areas provide Hlopkov with a comparative advantage:

> Many […] do not know the difference between a heavy-water and a light-water reactor. […] I have seen such reactors. I know how they work. It is the same with military officers [in the area of arms control]. They understand some details of this topic better. They have an advantage. But as far as nuclear energy is concerned, it is me who has the advantage.[132]


In addition, while state demand for arms control expertise has markedly declined since the late 1990s, the peaceful use of nuclear energy in combination with the promotion of Russian nuclear energy abroad have become dominant topics. The work of CENESS also profits from the fact that the MFA lacks technical specialists.[133] Likewise, the continued overall difficulties of the institutes of the Academy of Sciences to provide policy knowledge in a clear and timely manner have had en impact on CENESS' sucess. Besides greater flexibility, finding one's own niche and specialization seem to have been especially important and most helpful in advancing CENESS' status, as Hlopkov emphasized several times during our conversation.

> We try to find a niche. […] It is a very specialized field. For example, we got the offer to do something in the area of conventional arms. We declined. Right now, everyone talks about cyber, but that is not our topic. It has nothing to do with us. We are only active in everything nuclear.[134]

[132] #45, Anton Hlopkov, CENESS, Feb. 2018.
[133] One exception to this rule is former Russian ambassador to the US (2008-2017) Sergej Kislâk, who studied at MEPhl and has been actively involved in the work of the PIR-Center, both as a lecturer and as a member of Trialog. From 1995 to 1998 he was the head of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament at the MFA.
[134] #45, Anton Hlopkov CENESS, Feb. 2018.

In contrast to both PIR and CAST, CENESS also follows a different business model based on a combination of domestic and foreign funding. At the same time, the level of publicity is low. The journal *Âdernyj Klub*, which is published twice a year, serves to summarize annual activities and analyses, rather than enabling expert debate or providing financial revenues as in the case of *Indeks bezopasnosti* (PIR-Center), *Èksport Vooruženij* and the *Moscow Defense Brief* (CAST). CENESS does not maintain any public outreach via social media platforms such as Twitter or Facebook. Active in a sensitive area and with fewer than five permanent employees, CENESS has thus remained largely invisible to the public as Diagram 26 illustrates.

Diagram 26: Anton Hlopkov and CENESS: Media Capital, 2008-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

Since its informal establishment in 2008, the term "Center for Energy and Security" (*Centr Ènergetiki i Bezopasnosti*) has been mentioned less than four times per year on average in Russia's federal print media. Director Hlopkov appears as the sole representative of CENESS in public.

The political capital of CENESS, by contrast, is comparatively high. Despite its brief history and small size, it has been successful in promoting its expertise and becoming recognized by Russian state organs as a serious and trusted partner. CENESS enjoys particularly good contacts with ROSATOM, the Russian state nuclear energy corporation, for which it realizes different projects. The greatest success of CENESS was the organization of the *Moscow Non-proliferation Conference* in March 2010, which has since taken place every other year, attracting more than 200 high-ranking

Russian international participants.[135] In 2010 the conference was sponsored by the Dutch, Canadian, Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the British Embassy in Moscow, and the US Department of Energy. In addition, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the German Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation served as official partners.

Moreover, CENESS holds a wide network of personal contacts to former and current state bureaucrats involved in nuclear energy and non-proliferation. For example, Mihail Lysenko, who currently serves as the Director of the Department for International Cooperation at ROSATOM and was Russian Ambassador to New Zealand from 2004 to 2008, acts as an external advisor to CENESS. CENESS' active positioning has also improved the personal position of its Director. In January 2011,[136] 33-year-old Hlopkov became the youngest member of the Scientific Council of the Russian Security Councils.[137] In 2015 he was invited to join SVOP and became an associated expert with both the Valdai Discussion Club and RIAC.

6.3 The State Returns: Ideology and Politics

> The rise, of course, is related to a certain level of political stability and the increased horizon of foreign and economic policy planning. And when this happens, there comes the time for think tanks, but when there is complete chaos it's the time for talk tank experts.

This section examines organizations that have been indirectly sponsored by the Kremlin or are financed exclusively via the state budget. They are, as a rule, led by agents with very high political capital, i.e. members of the political elite. However, as the Russian state consists of competing factions, I illustrate what role these think tanks have played in the intra-state struggles for power over the past ten years. Their development thus serves as an indicator for the relative strength of these political groups. I discuss five organizations and analyze their institutional development over

[135] The conferences took place in September 2012 and November 2014, respectively. The fourth conference was organized in October 2017.
[136] Prezident RF," ukaz, no. 74" ot 21 ânvarâ 2011 (President RF, ukaz, no. 74, Jan 31, 2011).
[137] He remained the youngest member until 2013 when current IMEMO Director Fedor Vojtolovskij joined the Council.

time: the Institute for Contemporary Development (INSOR), the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI), the Valdai Discussion Club (Valdai), the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), and the Center for Strategic Research (CSR). Each of them occupies a distinct position within the field, based on their political and media capital.

Table 11: State-sponsored foreign and security policy think tanks

	INSOR	RISI	Valdai	RIAC	CSR
Founded	2008	1992	2004	2010	1999
Legal Form	NCO	State Org	Foundation	NCP	NCO
Permanent Staff	15	120	10-20	35	10-40
Currrent Leadership	Igor Yurgens, Sergej Kulik	Mikhail Fradkov	Andrej Bystrickij, Fedor Luk'ânov	Igor' Ivanov, Andrej Kortunov	Maksim Oreškin, Aleksandr Sinicyn

6.3.1 The Institute for Contemporary Development (INSOR)

INSOR emerged as a non-commercial foundation out of the Centre for the Development of an Information Society (*Centr razvitiâ informacionnogo obŝestva*; RIO) in March 2008. RIO itself was founded in 2003 as a common project of several institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Moscow Technical University of Communication and Informatics, and the Center for Post-Industrial Society Studies led by Russian economist and SVOP-member Vladislav Inozemcev. From the start, RIO could count on political support from the Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications and Minister Leonid Reiman, who became RIO-Director. In February 2006 he was followed by SVOP-member Igor Yurgens,[138] at the time Vice-President of the Russian investment bank *Renaissance Capital* responsible for

[138] In the Soviet Union Yurgens career had quickly advanced. Born into a *nomenklatura* family, he graduated from MSU as an economist and afterwards served as an advisor to the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade-Unions (VTsSPS). In 1980 he left for Paris to work for the UNESCO, but five years later returned to the Soviet Union and re-joined the VTsSPS. After 1991 the organization eventually transformed into the General Confederation of Trade Unions (*Vseobŝaâ Konfederaciâ Profsoûzov*; VKP). Yurgens remained at VKP as First Deputy, but in 1998 became President of the All-Russian Insurance Association and, since 2002, besides his appointment at Renaissance Capital, has served as Vice President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP).

governmental relations.[139] In addition, the former Deputy Head of the Russian government apparatus, Aleksej Volin, who had curated PR and information policy until summer 2003, joined as Deputy Director.[140]

Under Yurgens leadership, RIO advanced proposals for Russia's long-term socio-economic modernization. They were supposed to succeed the CSR development program "Strategy-2010" published in May 2000. In July 2006, President Vladimir Putin ordered the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade to prepare concepts for a new strategy.[141] Unofficially, this work was to be conducted by the Centre for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (*Centr makroèkonomičeskogo analiza i kratkosročnogo prognozirovaniâ*), founded in 2000 by Deputy Minister Andrej Belousov. RIO became its direct competitor. Their different proposals stood in the context of the subsequent contest between First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev and Minister of Defense Sergej Ivanov. Since spring 2007, both had courted the support of President Putin to become official nominees in the Presidential elections in spring 2008. RIO and Yurgens sided with Medvedev.[142] They were mandated to establish an expert platform to develop national projects in four different areas: housing, health care, education, and demography and rural development.[143]

Medvedev's eventual victory in the internal power play enabled Yurgens to proceed with his ideas, which led to the transformation of RIO and the establishment of INSOR. At INSOR's official opening ceremony in March 2008, the President argued that "the authorities do not need compliments or flattery from the expert community, they need

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[139] "'RIO-Centr' sdelal sebe kadrovuû in"ekciû," [The RIO-center gave himself a personnel injection], Feb. 22, 2006, accessed Nov. 11, 2018, https://www.comnews.ru/node/14817.
[140] Vladimir Bol'šov, "Èkonomičeskie mysli vprok. Načalas' kampaniâ po razrabotke strategii dlâ preemnika Putina," [Economic ideas in advance. The campaign for the development of a strategy for Putin's successor has begun], April 10, 2006, accessed Nov. 10, 2018, https://www.hse.ru/news/1163619/1131371.html.
[141] The exact mandates provided by the Russian President at the time have not been made public. However, the assignments [poručeniâ] followed the session of the State Council from July 21, 2006. See "Vyderžki iz stenografičeskogo otčeta o zasedanii Gosudarstvennogo soveta," [Excerpts from the verbatim record of the session of the State Council], July 21, 2006, accessed Dec. 22, 2019, http://government.ru/info/6217/.
[142] At the Krasnoyarks Business Forum in March 2007 RIO presented a brochure titled "Coalition for the future", which, as Yurgens later admitted, was designed to support Medvedev, See Igor' Ûrgens, "Â za Medvedeva, potomu čto vižu v nem râd kačestv," [I am for Medvedev, because I see in him a number of qualities] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, Apr. 5, 2011, http://www.ng.ru/ng_politics/2011-04-05/9_medvedev.html?mpril.
[143] Igor' Ûrgens, "My proigrali ohranitelâ," [We lost against the preservers] *Novoe Vremâ*, March 03, 2012, accessed Oct. 3, 2018, https://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/50506.

public and comprehensive discussion".[144] Although Medvedev joined INSOR as the Head of the Board of Trustees, the institute initially did not receive any financial support from the state budget.[145] As a platform for intellectual exchange with 15 researchers joining INSOR from different organizations, including the HSE, MSU, IMEMO, the Institute of Philosophy RAN and RSPP,[146] the "Presidential" think-tank supported the socio-economic reform agenda announced by Medvedev in September 2009.[147]

In February 2010 INSOR presented a comprehensive agenda titled "Russia in the 21st Century. Vision for the Future."[148] For the first time, it addressed foreign and security policy directly. Although with a strong emphasis on economic, social and institutional reforms, the report nevertheless projected the status of Russia as a "strategic ally of the EU that in the foreseeable future could be transformed into membership".[149] Moreover, the authors proposed that Russia, with "a substantially altered NATO", would "successfully conclude negotiations about its accession to the alliance".[150] In March 2011, these speculations about Russia's future were supported by the publication of a strategy, whose final version appeared in May.[151] In "Attaining the Future: Strategy 2012" the authors of the section on foreign policy, Yurgens and Sergej Kulik (a former ISKRAN researcher, who had worked in the Presidential

[144] Oleg Shchedrov, "Russia's Medvedev urges social, economic debate," *Reuters*, March 18, 2008, accessed Aug. 10, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-medvedev-experts/russias-medvedev-urges-social-economic-debate-idUSL1880846820080318.
[145] Svetlana Bočarova, "Budem uvažat' prezidenta, kotorogo vyberut, i prem'era, kotorogo naznačat," [We will respect the President who is elected and the Prime Minister who is appointed] *gazeta.ru*, Sept. 28, 2011, accessd Dec. 15, 2018, https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2011/09/28_a_3783678.shtml.
[146] Igor' Ûrgens, "Ne svoâ igra," [Not his game] *Profil'*, №7 (755), Feb. 27, 2012, accessed Oct. 20, 2018, http://www.rspp.ru/viewpoint/view/172.
[147] In September Medvedev published an article on the online portal gazeta.ru titled "Rossiâ, vpered!," [Go Russia!] *gazeta.ru*, Sept. 10, 2009, accessed Oct. 19, 2018, https://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2009/09/10_a_3258568.shtml. The articles is also available in English, see Dmitry Medvedev, "Dmitry Medvedev's Article, Go Russia!," Sept. 10, 2009, accessed Oct. 19, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/5413.
[148] Institut Sovremennogo Razvitiâ, *Rossiâ XXI veka: obraz želaemogo zavtra* (Moskva: Èkon-Inform, 2010).
[149] ibid. 42.
[150] ibid. 42.
[151] Institut Sovremennogo Razvitiâ, "Obratenie Budušego. Strategiâ-2012 (2011)," [Attaining the Future. Strategy-2012], accessed Oct. 8, 2018, http://www.insor-russia.ru/files/Finding_of_the_Future%20.FULL_.pdf. There is a synopsis available in English, see Institute of Contemporary Development, Attaining the Future. Strategy 2012, Synopsis (2011), accessed Oct. 8, 2018, http://www.insor-russia.ru/files/INSOR_Attaining_the_Future_final.pdf.

Administration from 1997 to 2008),[152] insisted on the creation of "modernization alliances" with various countries and regions, particularly with the EU. A non-confrontational policy and consistent improvement of relations to the West would be a *conditio sine qua non*.[153] Russian foreign policy was to be transformed into an "instrument of domestic modernization"[154] that would allow Russia to turn into a "full and responsible member of international economic and political alliances of democratic countries".[155]

The ability of INSOR to promote these ideas politically depended, however, entirely on Medvedev's position and personal fate. Already in October 2010, Yurgens had publicly announced his support for Medvedev's re-election in March 2012.[156] Still in September 2011, at the third annual Yaroslavl Global Policy Forum that INSOR had initiated as an international debating platform, Yurgens was convinced that the President would announce his candidacy. In an interview he recalled that

> on 9 September 2011, at the Yaroslavl Policy Forum Medvedev delivered the speech of a Presidential candidate. He held it in a room full of world leaders, who we had brought together at his behest. I remember how one quite famous Frenchwoman, the President of the Académie française [Secretary Hélène Carrère d'Encausse] told me: If Sarkozy had held such a speech, I would applaud. Anyway, on September 9, he delivered the speech of a candidate for the Presidency of the Russian Federation from the standpoint of the progressive [part of society].[157]

In fact, on 21 September Yurgens told readers of the newspaper Kommersant that Medvedev would run with the support of Prime Minister Putin.[158] But just three days later, at the Party Congress of United Russia, Medvedev announced the candicacy of

[152] From 1997 to 1999 Kulik worked as Deputy Head of the Foreign Policy Directorate. From 2001 to 2004 he was Deputy Director of the Information Directorate, and from 2004 to 2008 he headed the Department responsible for EU-Russia relations.
[153] Institut Sovremennogo Razvitiâ, "Obratenie Budušego. Strategiâ-2012," 289.
[154] ibid. 289.
[155] ibid. 290.
[156] Igor' Ûrgens, "Modernizaciâ vozmožna, esli èlita počuvstvuet sebâ graždanami Rossii," [Modernization is possible, if the elites consider themselves citizens of Russia] *Kommersant*', Oct. 21, 2010, accessed Nov. 11, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1525920.
[157] Igor' Ûrgens, "My proigrali ohranitelâ," [We lost against the preservers] March 03, 2012.
[158] "Online-interv'û s Igorem Ûrgensom," [Online-interview with Igor' Ûrgens], Sept. 21, 2011, accessed Dec. 12, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1778339.

Vladimir Putin, and agreed to lead the party list in the State Duma elections in November 2011.[159]

This sudden turn, unexpected for Yurgens, illustrates the nature of political decision-making in Russia. Despite its formal proximity to the President, INSOR and Yurgens were caught on the wrong foot. Medvedev's, that is, INSOR's strategy of economic and societal modernization had come off second best. With the nomination of Putin, vested interests of the military-industrial complex, the army and the strategic oil and gas sector prevailed. As Yurgens stated in October 2011,

> the lobby of preservers [*ohraniteli*] and stabilizers has turned out to be stronger and bigger in numbers. And the resources they control have proven to be more important. That is the military-industrial complex, the defense procurement industry, the farmer and agricultural organizations, people in uniform, the oil and gas complex.[160]

In an interview in March 2012 he put the defeat in even more drastic terms:

> The coalition "For the future", our four 'I's' [institutions, innovation, infrastructure, investments] – we lost against the 'preservers' [*ohraniteli*]. They just beat us.[161]

It is telling that Yurgens at the time already anticipated changes within Russian domestic and foreign policy. The nomination of Vladimir Putin alone, however, symbolized the defeat of the modernization agenda. Although INSOR at first continued with its work, its recommendations, particularly in domestic affairs, lost their 'customer' within the administration. The break became irrevocable when Yurgens in February 2012 openly suggested that Medvedev would not be strong enough to initiate reforms due to his lack of political independence. Instead he proposed the return of Aleksej Kudrin,[162] whom President Medvedev had dismissed as Minister of Finance in late September 2011.[163]

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[159] "S"ezd partii 'Edinaâ Rossiâ'," [Convention of the Party 'United Russia'] Sept. 24, 2011, accessed Dec. 11, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/12802.
[160] Viktor Hamraev, "Lobbi ohranitelej i stabilizatorov okazalos' sil'nee i mnogočislennee," [The lobby of preservers and stabilizers has turned out to be stronger and bigger in numbers], Oct. 18, 2011, accessed Oct. 3, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1797405.
[161] Igor' Ûrgens, "My proigrali ohranitelâ."
[162] "Medvedev otpravil v otstavku Kudrina," [Medvedv has dismissed Kudrin] *RIA Novosti*, Sept. 26, 2011, accessed Oct. 28, 2018, https://ria.ru/20110926/444133698.html.
[163] Henry Meyer and Ilya Arkhipov, "Medvedev Adviser Says Kudrin Would Be Better Premier," *Bloomberg*, Feb. 20, 2012, accessed Dec. 2, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-20/medvedev-adviser-says-kudrin-would-be-better-prime-minister.

In September 2012 Medvedev left the INSOR's Board of Trustees and in May 2013, after long-term rumors, Yurgens stepped down from his position as Chairman (although he eventually returned in spring 2014).[164] Instead, he re-joined the All-Russian Insurance Association as President, the same position he had already held from 1998 to 2002.[165] In his opinion, analyses that were not in demand would turn into pamphlets and declarations and "experts get tired from this."[166] With a dead end in domestic policy, he announced that INSOR would increasingly focus on foreign policy, because publications "would be sought by sectoral-specific professionals within the MFA and the Security Council."[167] However, some of the experts that had been working on domestic policy for INSOR, including IMEMO Deputy Director Evgenij Gontmaher, joined the Civil Initiatives Committee (*Komitet graždanskih iniciativ)* that Aleksej Kudrin had initiated in April 2012 together with 35 like-minded supporters as a new platform to unite the advocates of socio-economic modernization.[168] Subsequently, INSOR turned into a client of Kudrin's Committee, providing analyses and personnel. As INSOR's political and media capital declined, other think tanks have seized its structural position, yet with quite different ideological orientations. The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies is a case in point.

6.3.2 The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI)

The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (*Rossijskij Institut Strategičeskih Issledovanij*; RISI) provides policy research to state organs, including the Presidential Administration, on issues of foreign policy and national security. Having remained in the background for many years, the recent heightening of the Western-Russian conflict has led to speculations about RISI's potential influence and political status. For example, a policy document published anonymously in February 2014 by the

[164] It is unclear to me whether Yurgens ever properly left INSOR. In an interview with the TV channel Dožd' in March 2014 he is again introduced as the President of INSOR. See Igor' Ûrgens, "U Putina byl primerno takoj razgovor s druz'âmi o Kryme: ty čto bol'še lûbiš' – den'gi ili rodinu?," [Igor' Ûrgens, Putin had approximately such a talk with his friends about Crimea: What do you love more – money or the fatherland?] March 17, 2014, accessed Dec. 14, 2018. https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/govorite_s_yuliey_taratutoy/igor_jurgens_u_putina_byl_primerno_takoj_razgovor_s_druzjami_o_kryme_ty_chto_bolshe_ljubish_dengi_ili_rodinu-365199/.
[165] Viktor Hramraev, "Igor' Ûrgens razošelsâ s èkspertnymi ocenkami," [Igor' Ûrgens parted from expert assessments] *Kommersant'*, June 6, 2013, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2206328.
[166] ibid.
[167] ibid.
[168] "O komitete," [About the Committee], accessed Dec. 10, 2018, https://komitetgi.ru/about/.

Russian newspaper *Novaâ Gazeta*,[169] proposing concrete steps for how to deal with Ukraine, has been ascribed to RISI.[170] In April 2017 US officials accused the institute of providing the blueprint for Russian efforts to interfere in the US Presidential elections in November 2016.[171] Several unidentified Russian sources interviewed by the *Moscow Times*, however, dismissed such claims of political influence as spurious.[172]

In late February 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed decree No 202 establishing RISI as a new strategic research institution and appointing counter-intelligence officer Ûrij Scepinskij as its Director. Major general Scepinskij, a confidant of the last head of the Soviet KGB Directorate (PGU)[173] Leonid Šerbašin, had spent his career mostly at the Central Economic-Mathematical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. After the failed coup in August 1991, he became Director of the PGU Scientific Research Institute for Intelligence Problems (*Naučno-issledovatel'skij institut razvedyvatel'nyh problem*), which eventually provided the institutional basis for RISI.[174] Nevertheless, RISI emerged as a novel state-sponsored institute, formally independent from the intelligence services. Just one and a half years after his appointment, Scepinskij was forced to resign.[175] In the conflict

[169] Andrej Lipskij, "Predstavlâetsâ pravil'nym iniciirovat' prisoedinenie vostočnyh oblastej Ukrainy k Rossii," [It seems appropriate to initiate the accession of the Eastern regions of Ukraine to Russia] *Novaâ Gazeta*, Feb. 25, 2015, acccessed Sept. 08, 2018, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2015/02/24/63168-171-predstavlyaetsya-pravilnym-initsiirovat-prisoedinenie-vostochnyh-oblastey-ukrainy-k-rossii-187.

[170] Stefan Dobbert, Christo Grosev, Meike Dülffer, "Putin und der geheime Ukraine-Plan," [Putin and the secret plan for Ukraine] *Die ZEIT*, Feb. 25, 2015, accessed Sept. 09, 2018, https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-02/russland-strategiepapier-nowaja-gazeta-malofejew-risi.

[171] Ned Parter, Jonathan Landay and John Walcott, "Putin-linked think tank drew up plan to sway 2016 US election – documents," *Reuters*, Apr. 19, 2017, accessed Aug. 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-election-exclusive/putin-linked-think-tank-drew-up-plan-to-sway-2016-us-election-documents-idUSKBN17L2N3.

[172] Matthew Bodner and Alexey Kovalev, "Where Old Spooks Are Sent to Retire: Russia's Institute of Strategic Studies," *The Moscow Times*, Apr. 20, 2017, accessed Aug. 8, 2018, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/where-old-spooks-are-sent-to-die-russias-institute-of-strategic-studies-57775.

[173] The first main KGB Directorate (PGU) was responsible for foreign intelligence operations. In February 1989 Leonid Šerbašin followed Vladimir Krjučkov as PGU Director. Krjučkov, in turn, was appointed KGB Head. After the coup d'etat attempt in late August 1991, Šerbašin was replaced by Evgenij Primakov and declined the offer to remain as his advisor.

[174] Russkaja Služba BBC, "Kak ustroen RISI i mog li on povlijat' na pobedu Trampa," [How does RISI work and could have influenced the victory of Trump], Apr. 21, 2017, accessed June 10, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-39662290. Apart from the 5th Directorate, the KGB did not possess any separate research structures.

[175] Sergej Kirjušin, "Naskok na Skokova. Kto dyšet prem'eru v zatylok?," [Slagging Skokov. Who is closing in on the Prime Minister?] *Nezavisimaâ Gazeta*, Apr. 9, 1993, 66 (490).

between President Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament, the Supreme Soviet (*Verhovnyj Sovet*), which was violently resolved in September 1993 in favor of the President, he found himself on the wrong side, the Parliament, and was thus dismissed.[176]

In April 1994 Evgenij Kožokin replaced Scepinskij as RISI Director. In March 1990 the specialist for modern French history had been elected to the RSFSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies, where he became a member of the Committee on International Affairs, headed by former ISKAN scholar and later Russian ambassador to the US, Vladimir Lukin. Despite this position, in which capacity Kožokin travelled frequently to hotspots of interregional conflict at the Russian border, his interest in domestic issues prevailed, particularly after the 1993 constitutional crisis. In our interview he emphasizes this point:

> I understood that our greatest problems lay not in international relations, but in domestic affairs, and so I decided to change my field of work and accepted the invitation by [Sergej] Šahraj, who at that time was Deputy Prime Minister and headed an important committee, the State Committee on National Affairs and the Federation.[177] […] I joined this state committee as his Deputy, that is, in the rank of a deputy minister.[178]

Conflicts with Šahraj over the regional implementation of the constitutional referendum in December 1993, however, forced Kožokin to leave the ministry. As chance would have it, he was offered the vacant directorship at RISI: "I decided that leading the institute would be interesting, although I was warned that it was not in a very good condition. But I came and led it for almost fifteen years."[179]

When Kožokin arrived at RISI, he found a mixed group of around 50 analysts, including former security officers and civilians with a great variety of personal and educational backgrounds. A considerable information department collected and analyzed open source materials. Searching for new employees, Kožokin deliberately

[176] Scepinskij later re-joined Russian counterintelligence (*Federal'naâ Služba Kontrrazvetki*; FSK) as Deputy Head of the Analytical Directorate and became a close associate of FSK Director Sergej Stepašin, whom he followed as a personal advisor to the Russian audit chamber in April 2000.
[177] From April 1992 to March 1993 the committee existed as the 'State Committee on National Affairs', but on 3 March 1993 it was reorganized and renamed 'State Committee on National Affairs and the Federation'.
[178] #42, Evgenij Kožokin, MGIMO, Feb. 2018.
[179] ibid.

approached his own Alma Mater, MSU, and in particular the Historical Faculty from which he had graduated in 1977. In our conversation he recalls the following:

> I invited very many completely new people, primarily from university. Many of my colleagues came, well, not colleagues, but younger people. I asked at the Historical Faculty for strong students and they recommended some. And then I knew what our department [*kafedra*] stood for. People came here [to RISI] to study modernity, but I had a young man who specialized at the Department for Archeology, another studied the Middle Ages. They all came and retrained to analyze the present; from different institutions. Some joined after retiring from the army, others from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[180]

For example, Oleg Barabanov, a Professor at MGIMO who currently serves as one of the Program Directors at the Valdai Discussion Club (discussed below), started his career at RISI in 1997 after receiving his post-graduate degree from the Faculty of History of MSU.[181] In addition, several researchers from ISKRAN joined the new institute, including long-term RISI Deputy Director Vasilij Krivohiža[182] and Anatolij Trynkov, who headed RISI's Research Department on International Security until 1998.[183] Echoing Kožokin's comment, Krivohiža argued in 1995 that the

> specialists working here […] for the most part have good academic training and corresponding experience of working in practical organizations. […] [W]e hold various seminars, which, with proper organization, permits compensating for the shortage of narrow specialists.[184]

This and the statement by Kožokin above suggest that rather than any alleged lopsided recruitment of retired intelligence officers, RISI research staff, at least during Kožokin's tenure as Director, came from various institutions and backgrounds.[185] In 2007 the institute employed approximately 70 researchers working in six departments

[180] #42, Evgenij Kožokin, MGIMO, Feb. 2018.
[181] For biographical data of Oleg Barabanov see https://mgimo.ru/people/barabanov/.
[182] Krivohiža left RISI in 2003 and joined the apparatus of the Federation Council responsible for international relations. In 2012 he returned to ISKRAN as a researcher. For biographical data see http://viperson.ru/people/krivohizha-vasiliy-iosifovich, accessed Nov. 11, 2018.
[183] For biographical data of Anatolij Trynkov see http://viperson.ru/people/trynkov-anatoliy-arsenievich.
[184] See https://fas.org/irp/world/russia/fbis/InstituteofStrategicResearch.html.
[185] The newspaper *The Moscow Times* quotes an anonymous source "familiar with the situation at RISI", calling the institute "a retirement home for old intelligence officers and analysts", see Bodner and Kovalev, "Where Old Spooks Are Sent to Retire.".

on international security, the near abroad, military-strategic questions, international economic security, and market economic issues.[186]

In April 2009 President Dmitri Medvedev dismissed Evgenij Kožokin and appointed General-lieutenant Leonid Rešetnikov as Director.[187] Rešetnikov had received his education at Sofia University in Bulgaria where he specialized in Balkan and Russian emigration to the region. After two years at the *Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System* (RAN) in Moscow, he joined the PGU, which transformed into the SVR in post-Soviet Russia. Here he headed the Directorate for Information and Analysis.[188]

Coinciding with Rešetnikov‘s arrival was RISI’s transformation into a federal scientific institution financed through the state budget, with the President of the Russian Federation as its funder.[189] In consequence, the institute received new departments and more resources, and substantially increased its public activities. The renewed charter tied the research activities of RISI formally to the strategy and priorities formulated by the Russian President in his annual address to the Federal Assembly. It also obliged researchers to publish widely both academically and for wider audiences, establish contacts with scientific institutes in Russia and abroad, and take part in academic conferences. In an interview with the journal *Meždunarodnaâ žizn'* of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012, Rešetnikov emphasized the significance of this institutional reform. He noted that

> the new life of the institute started in April 2009, when its Charter was changed. According to the Charter, the President of the Russian Federation became the founder of the Institute. This fact has increased the volumes of our information, our research, our policy briefs consumed by the Presidential Administration and other state bodies. The structure


[186] E. V. Kostylev, “Zarubežnye i otečestvennye mozgovye century,” [Foreign and Domestic Think Tanks], in *Gumanitarnaja nauka i ideologija. Gumanitarnye nauki kak fabriki mysli, materialy naučnogo seminara*, 283; Nina Belâeva and Dmitrij Zajcev, Sravnitel'nyj analiz rossijskih i zarubežnyh analitičeskih centrov: case study [Comparative analysis of Russian and foreign analytical centers: case study] (Movkva: Gosudarstvennyj universitet Vyššaâ Škola Èkonomiki, 2007), 118.
[187] President RF, ukaz no. 479 “O direktore federal'nogo gosudarstvennogo naučnogo učreždeniâ ‘Rossijskij institut strategičeskih issledovanii,” [On the director of the Federal State Scientific Institution Russian Institute for Strategic Studies] Apr. 29, 2009, acceed Nov. 15, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/29202.
[188] For further biographical data see for example “Biografiâ Rešetnikova Leonida,” [Biography of Rešetnikov], accessed Oct. 10, 2018, http://www.obeschania.ru/persons/reshetnikov-leonid.
[189] President RF, ukaz, no. 478, “Voprosy federal'nogo gosudarstvennogo naučnogo učreždeniâ Rossijskij institut strategičeskih issledovanii,” [Questions of the Federal State Scientific Institutions Russian Institute for Strategic Studies], Apr. 29, 2009, accessed Nov. 10, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/29201.

> of the Institute was also changed: now we have new departments, but the research fields in general remained the same.[190]

Rešetnikov himself added the Humanitarian Research Center as a new department under the leadership of Mikhail Smolin, with the aim to study "the contentious issues of foreign relations history and the role of the religious factor".[191] Another particularly interesting figure in this context is Petr Mul'tatuli, who joined RISI in June 2010 and became one of Rešetnikov's advisors.

Overall, the number of analysts increased to more than 120.[192] In fact, my analysis of available biographical data suggests that most of the current employees joined RISI between 2009 and 2016. In total, almost 80 percent of a sample of 72 analysts (2016) were hired after 2008, in most cases coming directly from university.

Diagram 27: RISI employees in 2016, year of recruitment (n=72)




Source: Own compilation based on information available on RISI website.

[190] Leonid Rešetnikov, "RISI – 20 let," [RISI – 20 years] *Meždunarodnaâ žizn'*, no. 2 (2012): 179-192, transl. adapted from Alexandra Kononeko and Alexander Kornilov, "The Russian Institute of Strategic Studies: The Organizational Dimension," *Bilge Strateji*, Cilt 6, Sayı 10, Bahar (2014), 16.
[191] Kornilov and Kononova, "The Russian Institute of Strategic Studies: The Organizational Dimension," 18.
[192] There is competing information about the overall number of employees. In spring 2012 Rešetnikov stated that RISI had more than 100 experts, but over 180 employees in total, see Leonid Rešetnikov, "RISI – 20 let.". In another interview in September 2013 he argued that the total number of employees amounted to 207 persons, of whom 120-125 were involved in analytical work, see Leonid Rešetnikov, "My dolžny vybrat'sâ na svoj, tretij put' Rossii," [We need to get off to our own third way of Russia], Sept. 23, 2013, accessed Aug. 23, 2018, http://www.stoletie.ru/rossiya_i_mir/leonid_reshetnikov_my_dolzhny_vybratsa_na_svoj_tretij_put_rossii_348.htm. My own count in August 2016, based on information of the institute's website, resulted in 121 analysts. This number includes all analysts working in Moscow and the directors of the regional representations (including Simferopol, Sevastopol and Triaspol). Individuals at the press and communication office, RISI TV and the organizational-administrative department based in Moscow are excluded.

RISI researchers are therefore comparatively young (Diagram 28). Almost two thirds of a sample of 78 analysts, for whom this information was available, were born after 1970. With an average age of 43 years in 2016, the RISI staff is, for example, considerable younger than the research collective at IMEMO.

Diagram 28: RISI employees in 2016, age group distribution (n=78)



Source: Own compilation based on information available on RISI website and publicly available biographical data.

In addition to this rejuvenation, under Rešetnikov the institute established a number of regional information-analytical centers within Russia and appointed contact persons abroad. Whereas under Kožokin the institute possessed merely one such center in Kaliningrad throughout the period 1996 to 2008, between August to November 2009 representations were opened in Rostov, St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg. After the annexation of Crimea, similar centers opened in Simferopol and Sevastopol in April and September 2015, respectively. Moreover, since March 2014 RISI has been represented in Tiraspol.[193] Finally, over the course of 2013 RISI appointed individual representatives in Helsinki, Belgrade and Warsaw.[194]

[193] "V Tiraspole otkryvaetsâ informacioono-analitičeskij centr Rossijskogo Instituta Strategičeskih Issledovanij," [The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies opens an informational-analytical center in Tiraspol] March 10, 2014, accessed Sept. 12, 2018, https://novostipmr.com/ru/news/14-03-10/v-tiraspole-otkryvaetsya-informacionno-analiticheskiy-centr.


[194] In April 2013, RISI – together with the Faculty for Modern and Contemporary History at SPbGU and the Russian Center for Science and Culture in Helsinki – co-organized the international conference "Russia and the States of Northern Europe: Problems of Identity in History" (Rossiâ i strany Severnoj Evropy: problemy identičnosti v istorii"). At the time, Rešetnikov stated that RISI's representation in Helsinki would help to establish contacts with colleagues in Norway and Sweden. Priority would be given to discussions about the economic situation in the EU, the common use of the Arctic and the position of Northern Europe towards NATO. In June 2013, Vladimir Baryškin, a Professor of History at St. Petersburg State University (SPbGU), was appointed RISI's contact person for Helsinki, see "Rossijskie istoriki budut «iskat' ponimaniâ s Finlândiej» v Hel'sinki za sčet bûdžeta RF," [Russian historians will try to seek 'Understanding with Finland' in Helsinki at expense

Under Kožokin‘s leadership from 1994 to 2009, RISI remained largely invisible to the public. This situation radically changed with the return of Vladimir Putin to the Presidency in March 2012 and the activation of RISI, advocating the new nationalist agenda in domestic and foreign policy. This development mirrors the declining media presence of INSOR. Both institutions thus reflect the changing configuration of the expert field and the political relations between think tanks and politics between 2011 and 2016.

In contrast to INSOR, researchers at RISI were increasingly quoted in newspaper articles. Whereas from 1992 to 2004 RISI had rarely been mentioned at all, references to the institute in Russia‘s federal press increased from 2004 to 2007 and remained on a comparably high level until 2011. From 2012 onwards, references increased even more rapidly and reached almost 180 hits in 2016. After the dismissal of Rešetnikov and the appointment of Mikhail Fradkov as Director in January 2017, however, interest dropped again (Diagram 29).

of the Rusian state budget], Apr. 9, 2013, accessed Dec. 10, 2018, http://fontankafi.ru/articles/9724/ and Vladimir Losev, “Istoriki Evropy za odnim stolom,” [Historians of Europe at one table] May, 2013, accessed Dec. 12, 2018, http://www.kauppatie.com/2013/05-2013/rus-9.shtml. In 2014, sociology lecturer and historian Johan Bäckman, the spokesman of the Finnish Anti-Fascist Committee, took over as RISI’s official representative for Scandinavia based in Helsinki. Since April 2009 Bäckman has been persona non grata in Estonia. From 2013 to 2017 the RISI representative in Warsaw has been Dmitrij Karnauhov. He was deported from Poland in October 2017 following accusations by the Polish security services that he had been active as an intelligence agent, see Ûrij Legejdo, “Rossijskogo učenogo-istorika vydvorili iz Pol'ši i ob”âvili ‘špionom‘,” [A Russian historian has been expelled from Poland and was declared a spy] *tvzvezda.ru*, Oct. 12, 2017, accessed Nov. 8, 2018, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201710121342-993s.htm. In November 2013 RISI opened another representation in Belgrade, which has been led by Dinara Gračeva since 2015. She also represents the online portal “Ruska reč” (Russian word), which is part of *Russia Beyond the Headlines* (Russia Beyond, RBTH).

Diagram 29: RISI: Media Capital 1992-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

Rešetnikov views Russia as a distinct civilization, the civilization of Jesus Christ that poses an alternative to the Western world. In November 2016, still in his capacity as RISI director, he defined the main task of the institute as facilitating a return to this "natural way of development", from which the "parties of devil" had successfully dissuaded the Russia people.[195] To him, the politico-military conflict in Ukraine has reached a religious momentum aimed at the ousting of the Russian orthodoxy. Since the "other side" wants to "kill, eliminate and, at the very best, expel", peace would be impossible.[196]

Kononeko and Kornilov hold that Rešetnikov's "prominence within the realm of the Russian scientific community seems to be indisputable."[197] Yet several academic experts argue that his reputation has never been excellent and suffered tremendously after he started to promote an orthodox religious agenda. In November 2016, President Putin dismissed Rešetnikov[198] and appointed SVR director Mikhail Fradkov as his successor two months later.[199]

[195] Leonid Rešetnikov, "Nam nado osoznat': Rossiâ – èto osobaâ duhovnaâ civilizaciâ," [We must realize: Russia – this is a special spiritual civilization], Nov. 25, 2015, accessed Oct. 25, 2018, https://pravoslavie.ru/98922.html.
[196] Leonid Rešetnikov, "Rossiâ vpervye boretâ na svâtoj zemle s vopolŝeniem satanskih sil!," [Russia fights for the first time on holy ground with the embodiment of the devil's forces!], Jan. 15, 2016, https://pravoslavie.ru/89697.html.
[197] Alexander Kornilov and Alexandra Kononova, "The Russian Institute of Strategic Studies," 7.
[198] Prezident RF, "ukaz, no. 583," Nov. 2, 2016.
[199] Prezident RF, "ukaz, no. 584," Nov. 2, 2016.

There have been speculations about the reasons for Rešetnikov's dismissal, its significance for the work done at RISI, and possible political consequences. One expert I interviewed interprets his dismissal as the direct outcome of a changing balance of power between different expert groups and a reaction to the report on foreign agents published by RISI in February 2014, noting that 'it is better not to mess with us' – 'us' being the academic expert community based in the institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences. This statement must be read in context with the growing opposition Rešetnikov encountered from the MFA as the main channel of communication with the academic expert community. For example, in June 2014 Rešetnikov, referring to an event at the War College in Paris, stated that "as soon as the foreign ministry guys [MIDovcy] leave, everyone comes to us, Russians, and says: 'You are the sole bulwark [against the European way]."[200]

The line Rešetnikov draws here is not simply between RISI and the Russian MFA as the representative of the "European way", but also between Western elites and 'the people', who he believes view Russia as their last hope. In another instance in late December 2016, that is after he had been dismissed by the President, Rešetnikov came into direct conflict with the MFA. During a public event Rešetnikov had warned against a "Ukrainian scenario" in Belarus and attempts to separate Belarussians and Russians. Moreover, he called Belarus "a historical part of great Russia" and "part of our people", emphasizing the "artificial invention" of the Belarusian language.[201] In response, Belarus issued an official protest statement and summoned the Russian Minister Counsellor in Minsk Vadim Gusev. [202] Influential Deputy Foreign Minister and

[200] Leonid Rešetnikov, "Nam ostaetsâ tretij put' – duhovnyj. I byt' otdel'noj civilizaciej," [We are left with a third, spritiual way. And to be a separate civilization] June 09, 2014, accessed Sept. 9, 2018, https://161.ru/text/gorod/804670.html.

[201] "Direktor instituta v RF zaâvil, čto Belarus' idet po puti Ukrainy, a belorusskij âzyk sozdali bol'ševiki," [Institute's director in the RF declared that Belarus will go the way of Urkaine, and the Belarussian langauge has been created by the Bolsheviks] *gordonua.com*, Dec. 21, 2016, accessed Sept. 3, 2018, https://gordonua.com/news/worldnews/direktor-instituta-v-rf-zayavil-chto-belarus-idet-po-puti-ukrainy-a-belorusskiy-yazyk-sozdali-bolsheviki-165251.html.

[202] Valentin Loginov and Igor' Krûčkov, "Belorussiâ trebuet ot Rossii ne trogat' âzyk. Uhodâŝij direktor RISI obostril otnošeniâ s Belorussiej," [Belarus demands from Russia not to mess with the language. Leaving RISI director strained relations with Belarus] *gazeta.ru*, Dec. 12, 2016, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/12/22_a_10444547.shtml.

SVOP member Grigorij Karasin diplomatically conveyed that he was "quite astonished" by Rešetnikov's declaration.[203]

Besides opposition from the MFA and leading academics, the Presidential Administration, too, seems to have become gradually more critical of Rešetnikov's personal religious agenda. Several former RISI analysts have argued that under his leadership the institute started to produce poor-quality analyses and ideologized materials, which might have contributed to his dismissal. Arabist Pavel Gusterin, for example, holds that Rešetnikov had reduced the entire institute to his "personal office," leaving no space for analytical work that contradicted his interests and monarchist convictions. Instead of profound analysis, Gusterin argues, the political leadership had received propaganda, and employees had started to participate in talk shows on Russian TV instead of writing analyses.[204] This view is supported by Aleksandr Sytin, whom Kožokin had brought in from the oil company Yukos in 2004. In October 2014 he was forced to resign from RISI and since then has been particularly outspoken about these developments.[205] In January 2015 he argued that despite his professional background,

> Rešetnikov, far from the strict military organization of information and analysis, brought with himself entirely different principles […]. New people, who had grown a beard, successively arrived at the Institute […], demonstrating in public their orthodox religiosity by placing icons at their computers.[206]

In Sytin's opinion, with the beginning of Vladimir Putin's third term in office (2012), Rešetnikov had formed his "orthodox-imperial commanding bloc" that provided the Presidential Administration with distorted information about the events in Ukraine.[207] Whereas Sytin levels his critique against RISI as a whole by arguing that employees

[203] "Karasin prokommentiroval zaâvlenie direktora RISI po otnošeniâm RF i Belorussii," [Karasin has commented on the statement of RISI director concerning the relations between the Russian Federation and Belarus] Dec. 23, 2016, accessed Oct. 12, 2018, https://tass.ru/politika/3899704.
[204] Pavel Gusterin, "Leonid Rešetnikov kak strategy," [Leonid Rešetnikov as strategist], Nov. 05, 2016, accessed Oct 13, 2018, https://topwar.ru/103202-leonid-reshetnikov-kak-strateg.html.
[205] According to former RISI director Kožokin, however, Sytin simply holds a grudge against RISI after his expulsion and should not be taken seriously. It is unclear whether his judgement relates specifically to the published statements from January 2015, in particular to Sytin's critique of Ukraine specialist Tamara Guzenkova, whom Kožokin had brought to RISI, or Sytin's general assessment of the the work at RISI under the leadership of Rešetnikov.
[206] Aleksandr Sytin, "Anatomiâ provala: O mehanizme prinâtiâ vnešnepolitičeskih rešenij Kremlâ," [Anatomy of failure: On the mechanism of the Kremlin's foreign policy decision-making], Jan. 5, 2015, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, http://bramaby.com/ls/blog/rus/1841.html.
[207] ibid.

did share the ideological views of the political leadership, another employee of the institute argues in our interview that

> within state institutions there are people with different views. We do not have this overdetermination, marching all in one direction […]. This is not characteristic for state institutions […], in contrast to, for example, [radio channel] *Èho Moskvy*, where 99 percent work like that, despite the fact that they call themselves independent.[208]

Although this statement undermines conceptions of RISI as a homogeneous institute, the reforms launched by new Director Fradkov in May 2017 support the general argument about the dissatisfaction of the political leadership with the analytical work at RISI.[209]

Fradkov abolished the Center for Humanitarian Studies. Its director, Mikhail Smolin, and several advisors close to Rešetnikov, including Petr Mul'tatuli, left RISI. The institute's leadership and all Deputy Directors, except for Aleksandr Panov, were replaced. Moreover, Fradkov established a new Center for Research Coordination, for which he invited Igor' Borovkov as Head, and split the Center for Euro-Atlantic and Defense Studies into the Center for Transatlantic Studies and the Center for European Studies. Several department heads were replaced by other or incoming experts.[210] Fradkov himself hints at the weak quality of the analytical materials produced by RISI when he argues in the context of the reorganization that "we need to be more professional" and "do our work with high quality".[211] One interviewee, who knows Fradkov personally, emphasizes the latter's professional qualities, particularly in comparison with Rešetnikov. In our interview he says that

> Fradkov does not tolerate empty words. […] The previous one […], Rešetnikov, was fine with that, but Fradkov comes from the SVR. Here you have a different approach.[212]

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[208] #31, expert, RISI, Oct. 2017.
[209] "Strukturnaâ reorganizaciâ v RISI" [Structural reorganization at RISI], May 2, 2017, accessed Jan. 5, 2019, https://riss.ru/events/40480/
[210] For example, the Center for Asia and the Middle East is now headed by Vladimir Fitin, the former trade representative of the Russian Federation in Turkey, see http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/553356.
[211] "Strukturnaâ reorganizaciâ v RISI" [Structural reorganization at RISI], May 2, 2017, accessed Jan. 5, 2019, https://riss.ru/events/40480/
[212] #48, expert, March 2018. The interviewee obviously did not know or missed the fact that Rešetnikov has been a SVR officer. In any case, the interviewee thereby points to the fact that Rešetnikov's views and approach are not characteristic for the SVR as such.

It remains to be seen if the change from Rešetnikov to Fradkov at the helm of RISI will once again change the general direction of the institute‘s work and alter its standing within the field.

6.3.3 The Valdai Discussion Club

The Valdai Discussion Club (henceforth “Valdai”) emerged from the international conference “Russia at the Edge of the Centuries: Hopes and Realities”, organized in September 2004 by SVOP and the state news agency RIA Novosti in Veliki Novgorod, located near the lake Valdai.[213] The event was a brainchild of Svetlana Mironûk, editor-in-chief at *RIA Novosti*, but SVOP Chairman Sergej Karaganov and his team actively engaged in its intellectual conceptualization. The conference culminated in a meeting between the 39 foreign participants from Germany, France and the UK and President Vladimir Putin at his state residency in Novo-Ogarevo.[214]

In the four years following the conference, the Valdai Discussion Club institutionalised itself as an annual debating platform focusing on the participation of international experts and the facilitation of meetings with Russian officials, including the Russian President. In September 2005, 45 foreign and 22 Russian experts met in the city of Tver, 150 km northwest of Moscow. The conference under the title “Russia as a Political Kaleidoscope” included meetings with Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov, Defense Minister Sergej Ivanov, Presidential Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, and President Putin.[215] In 2006, the multi-day conference moved to Moscow and Khanty-Mansiysk, and the two following years it took place in Kazan and Rostov-on-Don.

After 2009, the activities of Valdai intensified considerably. Besides the annual Valdai conference in September, the Club started to organize international events on Russian politics and international relations in cooperation with foreign partners. For example, in 2009 Valdai hosted conferences in London and Amman, and in 2010

[213] Fedor Luk'ânov, “Večnye cennosti avtarkii,” [The eternal values of autarky], Sept. 9, 2004, accessed Jan. 23, 2019, https://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2004/09/08_a_168862.shtml.
[214] This meeting unexpectedly turned into the first Presidential press conferences after the Beslan school siege in North Ossetia, where over 300 people were killed after Islamic militants occupied a school, taking pupils and teachers hostage. See Ivan Gordeev, “Osmyslenie Beslana,” [Comprehending Beslan], *vremya.ru*, Sept. 8. 2004, accessed Oct. 27, 2018, http://www.vremya.ru/2004/162/60/107051.html.
[215] The Valdai Story, see http://hst.valdaiclub.com/en

events were organized in Berlin, Shanghai, Beijing and Valetta. A first meeting of the working group on the future of US-Russia relations took place at Harvard University in May 2010,[216] co-sponsored by various US foundations, including the Carnegie Corporation, the Open Society Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation.[217] It was followed by similar conferences in Moscow[218] in December 2010 and in Boston in May 2011.[219]

In December 2013, Valdai's co-founder Svetlana Mironûk was unexpectedly released from her duties at *RIA Novosti*. Simultaneously, a decree by President Putin abolished the latter organization and instead established the unitary state news agency *Rossiâ Segodnâ* under the leadership of Dmitrij Kiselev.[220] Already in 2011, the Presidential Administration had objected when Mironûk took up her MBA studies at the University of Chicago. In her words, she was advised that a Russian state media administrator at her level of seniority should not travel to the United States to receive an education.[221] Ever since, she had been in conflict with Mihail Lesin, former aide to President Putin, and Aleksej Gromov, first Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, about the role and purpose of state media.[222]

The transformation of *RIA Novosti* to *Rossiâ Segodnâ* and the replacement of Mironûk with Kisilev, whose views on media and state propaganda considerably differed from the "progressive bureaucrat", as one expert puts it, led to Valdai's re-organization. The Club decided to split from *RIA Novosti*. Instead, RIAC, the HSE and the MGIMO

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[216] Working group on the future of US/Russian relations, http://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/working_group_on_the_future_of_u_s_russian_relations_d3c

[217] For information about the Working Group see https://us-russiafuture.org/about/, accessed Augt. 25, 2018.

[218] "Valdai Discussion Club Working Group on the Future of the Russian-US Relations. 2nd Meeting," Dec. 05, 2010, accessed Aug. 24, 2018, http://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/valdai_discussion_club_working_group_on_the_future_of_the_russian_u_s_relations_2nd_meeting_december_c90/.

[219] "Valdajskij klub". Spravka," [Club Valdai, Note] *Rossijskaâ Gazeta*, Sept. 20, 2010, accessed Aug. 10, 2018, https://rg.ru/2010/10/01/valday-klub.html.

[220] President RF, ukaz, no. 894, "O nekotoryh merah po povyšeniû èffektivnosti deâtel'nosti gosudarstvennyh sredstv massovoj informacii," [On certain measure to increase the effectivity of the activities of state mass media], Dec. 9, 2013, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/37871.

[221] Ûliâ Taratuta, "Svetlana Mironûk: ‚Â točno znaû, čto nikogda bol'še ne budu rabotat' na gosudarstvo'," [I know for sure, that I will never again work for the state], *forbes.ru*, Oct. 30, 2015, accessed Dec. 10, 2018, http://www.forbes.ru/forbes-woman/karera/304331-svetlana-mironyuk-ya-tochno-znayu-chto-nikogda-bolshe-ne-budu-rabotat-na.

[222] ibid.

were brought in as new partners. The Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai Discussion Club, which had been established in March 2011, subsequently assumed all legal responsibility for the management of the Club's projects. In parallel, Valdai's organizational procedures and agenda were reformed. What had, according to one Valdai member, been a "tourist office with an intellectual-propagandist odour" turned into an analytical center.[223]


As regards the change in agenda, the analytical focus shifted from the international distribution of information about Russian politics to the promotion of distinct Russian views on international affairs. For this purpose, Valdai established five annually changing policy research programs, each led by one representative of the participating organizations. Andrej Sušencov, the former student of Aleksej Bogaturov and now Director of the Institute of International Studies at MGIMO, became responsible for the study of war and armed conflict. Dmitrij Suslov, a former journalist from St. Petersburg and Karaganov associate at HSE, focuses on issues of regionalization and US-Russia relations. Timofej Bordačëv, who heads CKEMI at HSE, has been curating the program on Eurasia since 2015. Ivan Timofeev, Program Director at RIAC, and MGIMO Professor Oleg Barabanov are responsible for different topics, including social stability and the transformation of global institutions. SVOP Chairman Fedor Luk'ânov functions as Valdai's Research Director.

The 2014 relaunch also widened Valdai's publication activities and multiplied its outreach platforms. The bi-monthly reports, which had been published since winter 2009, became more numerous and comprehensive. Since October 2014, the organization has also been publishing short analytical articles, the so-called "Valdai Papers" authored by Russian and international experts.[224] Moreover, short video interviews with conference participants were introduced as a new multimedia format. In addition, the number of participants at the annual meetings of the Valdai Discussion Club and the scale of the event itself continuously increases. From 2004 to 2009, the average number of experts participating at the meetings remained between 60 and 80 persons. Since 2012, this number has constantly been above 100, including

[223] Sergej Podosenov, "Valdajskij klub ždet perestrojki," [The Valdai Club awaits reconstructions], *gazeta.ru*, July 21, 2014, accessed Sept. 13, 2018, https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/07/18_a_6118873.shtml
[224] "Valdai papers", accessed Sept. 10, 2018, http://valdaiclub.com/a/valdai-papers.

representatives from more than 30 countries. At the 10th anniversary conference of Valdai in September 2013, almost 200 Russian and international experts participated.[225] Simultaneously, Valdai's media capital suddenly increased, which once more emphasizes the empirical relationship between institutional capacities and the reception within the media field (Diagram 30).f

Diagram 30: Valdai Club: Media Capital 2004-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

Whereas initially media capital had been low, the shift towards international events in 2008/2009 increased public visibility, which reached a new level after the 10th anniversary.

After changing venues for several years, the annual Valdai conference has been organized in Sochi since 2014. In 2015 the Club began to cooperate with the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, where it held a separate session for the first time. The Club now also holds its own sessions at other international forums, including the Russian Business Week in March 2016 and the Eastern Economic Forum in September 2016.

[225] "Ežegodnye zasedaniâ diskussionnogo kluba 'Valdaj'," [Annual meetings of the Valdai discussion club] *ria.ru*, Oct. 18, 2018, accessed Nov. 10, 2018, https://ria.ru/20181015/1530522198.html.

6.3.4 The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)

In February 2010, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev issued an order that established the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) as a non-commercial partnership under the patronage of the MFA and the Ministry of Education.[226] It took the MFA, however, more than a year to complete the necessary procedures and establish the legal basis for the provision of state funding for daily operations.[227] The idea for RIAC emerged in the context of various efforts to improve the Russian image abroad and popularize distinct Russian perspectives internationally. SVOP Honorary Chairman Sergej Karaganov commented in our interview that "many people in the administration wanted to establish RIAC as a counterproject and that SVOP had challenged this idea for several years, but then it turned out that these people simply wanted a state-run organization".[228]

On the occasion of the second annual meeting in 2011 – the first had taken place in July 2010 – RIAC President and former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor' Ivanov noted that "the Council has been created as an instrument to unite the Russian foreign policy community, and not as a bureaucratic structure or an alternative to one or another already existing organization".[229] In his opinion, the knowledge accumulated at the MFA, although otherwise excellent, was insufficient to forecast complex developments in international relations, such as the Arab Spring. Instead, one would need to mobilize the entire scientific potential, establish permanent monitoring, consult with international experts, and stay in contact with a wide range of societal groups.[230]

Hence, RIAC was established as a platform rather than an analytical center, and – in the words of Program Director Ivan Timofeev – is comparable in its function to the

[226] President RF, Rasporâženie, no. 59-rp, "O sozdanii nekommerčeskogo partnerstva Rossijskij sovet po meždunarodnym delam," [On the establishment of the non-commercial partnership Russian International Affairs Council], Feb. 2, 2010, accessed Nov. 10, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/30576.
[227] Ministerstvo inostrannyh del RF, prikaz, no. 8288, "Ob utverždenii Pravil predostavleniâ iz federal'nogo bûdžeta subsidii nekommerčeskomu partnerstvu "Rossijskij sovet po meždunarodnym delam," [On confirming the rules for allocating subsidies from the federal budget to the non-commercial partnership Russian International Affairs Council], May 30, 2011, accessed Jan. 11, 2019, https://rg.ru/2011/06/15/nko-dok.html.
[228] #28Sergej Karaganov, SVOP, Oct. 2017.
[229] Vladislav Vorob'ev, "U diplomatov poâvilsâ novyj instrument," [Diplomats received a new instrument] *Rossijskaâ Gazeta*, № 5533 (157), July 7, 2011, accessed May 12, 2018, https://rg.ru/2011/07/21/rsmd.html.
[230] ibid.

Council on Foreign Relations in the US or the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).[231] As such, it has a small in-house staff of currently around 35 employees,[232] who in 2011/2012 were dominantly recruited directly from university, first as interns and later as project managers. In our interview one expert illustrates the vibrant atmosphere at the time:

> At the very beginning, it felt like a start-up and that was partially what made it a very good experience for a young professional, because everybody had to do everything. There was no free labor, no free time. If you could do something, you did it. If you had to carry boxes, you would carry boxes. The next minute you were in a hired car with a driver and met some super high-level guy, a foreign prime minister or somebody whose books you read as a student. And the next minute you were choosing sandwiches, picking between a salmon sandwich and a beef sandwich. It was an amazing place to learn. Over time, of course, it got more formalized. People wanted to tap into the available resources. Projects, information, attention. A lot of the work started to focus on picking the right people to work with.[233]

The expert work, by contrast, builds upon various forms of cooperation with different established research institutions, including the institutes of the Academy of Sciences and individual researchers. Major events are organized by reaching out to stakeholders, for which RIAC draws on an extensive membership base of both individuals and corporations, which include, for example, the Alfa-bank Group, the technology state cooperation Rostec, and energy companies such as Lukoil and Transneft.[234] Together they unite representatives of the Russian academic community, business, diplomacy and politics. Since 2011 this individual membership base has greatly increased. Whereas in 2011 RIAC started with around 80 members, the number rose to over 130 in March 2015 and today stands at 157.[235] RIAC's Director General Kortunov explains that


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[231] Ivan Timofeev, "Sovety po meždunarodnym delam: zarubežnyj opyt i rossijskij proekt," [Councils on International Affairs: foreign experience and the Russian project] *Meždunarodnaâ žizn'*, no. 1 (Jan. 2012): 17.
[232] #12, Andrej Kortunov, RIAC, June 2017.
[233] #49, expert, March 2018.
[234] "Korporativnye členy," [Corporate Members], accessed Jan. 15, 2019, http://russiancouncil.ru/management/corporatemembers/.
[235] Own compilation, based on data partially available at http://russiancouncil.ru/management/members/.

> for us, these people are important, because they have *different experiences and represent various types of knowledge*. […] Some of them, in addition to being of interest to us in their private capacity, also represent important organizations. In this way, their membership helps us to widen our contacts with partners in universities [and] in academia, but also in the business environment. […] For us, the membership is not formal. After all, this is a meaningful cooperation with people, who we believe – I do not really like the term, but nevertheless – constitute the elite of our community of *Meždunarodniki*.[236]

The term *meždunarodniki* elite, as used by Kortunov, is apt here to the extent that members are, first and foremost, multiplicators who bring substantial financial or institutional capital to RIAC. They include a great variety of individuals representing different professions and personal backgrounds. Diagram 31 illustrates the composition of this membership.

Diagram 31: Composition of RIAC membership



Source: Own compilation based on biographical data.

The diagram shows that most members are either active or retired diplomats (32) or have an academic background (55). Moreover, a significant part represents Russian (state) businesses or prominent political appointees such as Foreign Minister Lavrov, Presidential Press Secretary Dmitrij Peskov, and several members of either the State Duma or the Federation Council, as well as key foreign policy advisors to both the President and the Prime Minister. By contrast, representatives of the Russian military

[236] #12, Andrej Kortunov, RIAC, June 2017, emphasis added.

or the security services are largely absent.[237] In other words, RIAC as an organization has few points of contact with so-called *silovye struktury* (security forces).

Academics, however, become RIAC members primarily based on their institutional rather than their cultural capital. That is, instead of their research activity, it is their leadership roles as (Research) Directors at institutes of the Academy of Sciences (15) or Rectors of major Russian universities (20) that justify their RIAC membership.[238] By contrast, those who have become RIAC members, but do not preside over entire institutes or universities, appear to be endowed with political and/or cultural capital that is to some extent independent of the concrete institutional position they occupy.

This applies to at least seven academics, because they are senior researchers with political experience or long-term members of respective political networks: Aleksej Arbatov (IMEMO), Vladimir Baranvoskij (IMEMO), Evgenij Kožokin (MGIMO), Andrej Kokošin (MSU), Sergej Karaganov (SVOP/HSE), Andrej Zagorskij (IMEMO/MGIMO), and Andrej Mel'vil' (HSE). The four partial exceptions are younger experts. Each of them has accumulated both cultural and political capital, albeit in different spheres. Whereas Ivan Timofeev is Director of Programs at RIAC, Artem Mal'gin has been assistant to MGIMO Rector Torkunov since 2004 and was appointed MGIMO Vice-Rector for general affairs in 2012. Sergej Afontsev is a rather productive economist from IMEMO and received the prestigious Eugen Varga Prize for outstanding scientific work in the field of international economics in 2010. Puhov is the most interesting case, because he lacks the institutional background or social relations characteristic for the academic field. Yet, as I have shown in my discussion of CAST, he has been able to gain political capital and establish himself as an expert on military affairs.

Despite its diversity, RIAC membership is ideologically structured. Representatives of the extreme right or left, who at some point in time were quite prominent political commentators in the Russian public sphere, such as Aleksandr Dugin or Sergej

[237] The individual representatives are all former officers, including General Evgenii Buzhinskii, Valentin Korabel'nikov and Anatolii Kulikov. Moreover, Valentin Sobolev and Viacheslav Trubnikov have an extensive background in intelligence. I categorize the latter two as 'academia' and 'business', because Trubnikov joined IMEMO in 2009, while Sobolev has been Chairman of the Board of Directors at the insurance company OOO "VSK – liniâ žizni" since 2012.
[238] The Kurchatov Institute is the only technical institution of the Academy of Sciences represented by RIAC members. This is due to the political personality of its director, not so much the knowledge produced and the expertise available at the institute in terms of foreign policy advice.

Kurginân, are neither members of RIAC, nor do they cooperate with the organization. Kortunov points to these symbolic and social boundaries, when he tells me that

> it has been precisely our task to present, if possible, a spectrum, with the exclusion of clear fringe types [*marginaly*] and people, who from our point of view are not real professionals. You see, opinions may differ, but if somebody claims to have professional knowledge, then this already imposes certain limits on him. There are things that a professional will not say. Yes, such things can be said by journalists, they can be said by politicians, but not by professionals who handle such problems.[239]

In consequence, although RIAC represents a broad spectrum of social and intellectual positions, it constitutes the mainstream of the Russian foreign policy expert community as it is dominated by MFA officials and academics from the Russian Academy of Sciences.


The integrating figure of both professional spheres remains RIAC President and former Foreign Minister Igor' Ivanov, whose personal qualities are held in high regard by others in the field. Several of my interviewees emphasized the fact that Ivanov had put real effort in writing his second doctoral dissertation. In particular, scholars appreciated that Ivanov took time to revise his thesis following the input of his supervisors at IMEMO, which, as Sergej Oznobiŝev from IMEMO argued in 2007, revealed "a totally different form of engagement with science."[240] In 2005, Ivanov, still in his capacity as Secretary of the Russian Security Council, received the academic title *doktor nauk* after defending his thesis on "Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalization."[241]

Since 2012, given this prominent support and its wide social network, RIAC has thus succeeded in becoming the main communication platform within the field. To some extent it has replaced the functions played by SVOP in the 1990s, at least in terms of strategic coordination, debate and international outreach, though on an entirely different scale. In contrast to SVOP, the organization is primarily financed by the state budget via the MFA. In 2012, the first full year of operation, almost all expenses (104

[239] #12, Andrej Kortunov, RIAC, June 2017.
[240] Vladimir Kara-Murza, "Aleksandr Šaravin ob otstavke Igorâ Ivanova," [Aleksandr Šaravin about the resignation of Igor' Ivanov], *svoboda.org*, July 9, 2007, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, https://www.svoboda.org/a/401773.html.
[241] "A potentia ad actum, Zaŝity dissertacij," [A potential ad actum, defense of dissertations], accessed Nov. 10, 2018, http://intertrends.ru/old/eleventh/020.htm.

million rubles) originated from the state budget, including the federal, the regional and the municipal levels. By contrast, in 2016 and 2017 a substantial part of expenses was covered by Russian businesses, private citizens or commercial initiatives, such as analytical services. The business funding mostly comes from membership fees of corporate RIAC members. Overall, officially declared expenses suggest that the share of the state has remained comparably stable at around 100 million rubles per year, although in 2017 it decreased by 25% to 83 million rubles. (Diagram 32).


Diagram 32: RIAC: Annual expenses in million rubles



A slightly different picture is presented by the Russian newspaper *RBK*, which claims that the volume of general state subsidies has steadily decreased. From more than 100 million rubles in 2014 it fell to 81 million rubles in 2017, and with 80 million and 79 million rubles will continue to decline in 2018 and 2019.[242] Within the Russian context, however, the funding for RIAC is substantial and, for example, remains higher than the annual budget of ISKRAN, although the latter employs almost three times as many full time staff. Whereas administrative costs, including personnel, account for 50 to 70% of expenses, RIAC invests heavily in the organization of conferences, but also finances the publication of reports, analyses, monographs and edited volumes by Russian experts. In parallel, since 2011 the media capital of RIAC has been constantly increasing (Diagram 33), which is an indicator of its visibility in the public sphere.

[242] Ivan Tkačëv, Pavel Koškin, Oleg Makarov and Anton Fejnberg, "Èkonomiâ na 'mâgkoj sile' Rossiâ sokratit rashody na vnešnepolitičeskuû povestku," [Saving up on Soft Power. Russia reduces the costs of the foreign policy agenda], *RBK*, July 24, 2017, accessed Aug. 10, 2018, https://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2017/07/24/59723c879a794741088d42d8.

Diagram 33: RIAC: Media Capital 2010-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

6.3.5 The Center for Strategic Research (CSR)

CSR was established in December 1999 to develop a program on social-economic issues for Putin's Presidential election campaign (Strategy-2010).[243] Since then it has provided the institutional platform for the leading personnel of the economic bloc within the Russian government. Most of its members are former colleagues of President Putin from his time at the city administration of St. Petersburg in the first half of the 1990s. After Putin's victory in the Presidential elections in March 2000, CSR Chairman German Gref was appointed Minister of Economic Development. Many of his colleagues and members of the initial team followed suit. Putin's first Chief of Staff at the Presidential Administration and Deputy Russian Prime Minister, Dmitrij Kosak, chaired CSR's Board of Trustees from 2000 to 2003. Gref's former deputies at the Ministry, Mihail Dmitriev and Èl'vira Nabiullina, subsequently served as CSR Presidents (Table 12).

In 2007 Nabiullina re-joined the Russian government, following Gref as Minister. Since June 2013 she has been the Head of the Russian Central Bank. Aleksej Ul'ûkaev joined the Russian government as Deputy to Finance Minister Aleksej Kudrin in 2000 and served as Deputy Head of the Central Bank from 2004 to 2013.

[243] Today, RIAC is located at the exact same spot where CSR was founded in 1999: The business center Alexander House, named after its former owner, billionaire Aleskandr Smolenskij.

Table 12: CSR Leadership 1999-2018

Period	Name	Function
since 2018	Maksim Oreškin	President
	Aleksandr Sinicyn	Chairman of the Board
2016-2018	Aleksej Kudrin	Chairman of the Board
	Pavel Kadočnikov	President
2014-2016	Vladimir Knâginin	President
2005-2014	Mihail Dmitriev	President
2003-2005	Èl'vira Nabiullina	President
1999-2002	Dmitrij Mezencev	President
	German Gref	Chairman of the Board

He succeeded Nabiullina as Minister of Economic Development, but was detained in November 2016 due to allegations that he had received 2 million US$ in bribes. After the tenure of former Finance Minister Aleksej Kudrin, who was appointed Head of the Russian Audit Chamber in May 2018, CSR is currently led by Maksim Oreškin, Ul'ûkaev's successor as Minister of Economic Development. With his appointment, the Ministry, in addition to several academic institutions (primarily the HSE, MGIMO and RANEPA),[244] emerged as one of the official founders of CSR.[245] Thus, CSR is to some extent the think tank of the Russian Ministry of Economic Development (MED). It is the only institution that effectively practices the "revolving door" principle, that is, a permanent exchange of personnel between a think tank and the government. Hence, the volume of activities and the size of staff at CSR have fluctuated considerably depending on political demand and the influence of the MED leadership.

CSR's volatile position is reflected in the development of its media capital over time, illustrated in Diagram 34. Immediately after its establishment and the publication of "Strategy-2010" in May 2000, which in June became the official government agenda,[246] references to CSR jumped up, but plunged again the year after. Over the course of the 2000s, the number of references remained relatively stable, while the


[244] In addition, these were Institute for National-Economic Prognoses RAN, the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government's Analytical Center, and the Institute of Economic Analysis

[245] Pravitel'stvo RF, "Rasporâženie, no. 2203-r," Oct. 13, 2018, accessed Nov. 10, 2018, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201810160009.

[246] "Istoriâ proektov dolgosročnyh strategij razvitiâ Rossii. Dos'e," [The history of projects for long-term strategic development planning of Russia. Dosier] *tass.ru*, May 30, 2017, accessed Nov. 10, 2018, https://tass.ru/info/4294051.

work of CSR continued in the context of implementing the developed socio-economic strategy.

Diagram 34: CSR: Media Capital 1999-2017



Source: Own compilation based on East-view information services, Russian Central Newspapers (UDB-COM).

In 2011 and 2012 CSR once again moved into the public spotlight. On the one hand, economists associated with CSR participated in the elaboration of the follow-up 'Strategy-2020'. Already in May 2008 Vladimir Putin, in his capacity as Prime Minister, had instructed the government to work on a long-term socio-economic development plan. However, the financial crisis put this work on hold. In January 2011 the government returned to the project and established 21 working groups under the leadership of HSE and RANEPA. In March 2012 the final report – a comprehensive and detailed overview of Russian socio-economic and financial policy – was officially presented, [247] but remained merely a declaratory document.

On the other hand, in March 2011 CSR published a report titled "Political crisis in Russia and possible mechanisms of its development" (*Političeskij krizis v Rossii i vozmožnye mehanizmy ego razvitiâ*) that warned against upcoming public protests in major cities. Moreover, in November 2011, that is, after Medvedev's retreat and the nomination of Vladimir Putin as Presidential Candidate, CSR presented another report that suggested that the cycle of political popularity of the Russian leadership had reached bedrock.[248] According to the report entitled "Driving forces and

[247] http://2020strategy.ru/data/2012/03/13/1214585985/itog.pdf
[248] Sergej Belanovskij, "Dvižuŝie sily i perspektivy političeskoj transformacii Rossii, Centr Strategičeskih Razrabotok," https://www.kommersant.ru/docs/2011/_2011d211-csr.doc.

perspectives of Russia's political transformation" (*Dvižušie sily i perspektivy političeskoj transformacii Rossii)*, previously enthusiastic supporters ("fanatics") of Vladimir Putin had disappeared and since 2005 the rating had been sustained merely due the lack of political alternatives.[249]

In fact, Putin's approving ratings had dropped constantly since winter 2010: from almost 80% to an all-time low of 63% a year later.[250] At the same time, public trust in his work fell from 63% to 48%.[251] In turn, the report argued that the readiness to participate in public protests was increasing among those dissatisfied with Putin,[252] whereas chances for rebranding Putting as a political figure had diminished due to the diversification of the electorate into two opposing groups and the absence of alternative communication strategies. CSR warned that within this political climate a result of more than 40% for the party of power "United Russia" in the State Duma elections would be interpreted as fraught, delegitimizing the electoral process and the State Duma itself. The report was presented at the annual Valdai Discussion Club meeting on November 7, 2011 in Kaluga.[253]

The projection about mass protest movements proved to be correct. Protests began in December 2011 after the State Duma elections and continued in 2012. Yet, CSR misread the ability of the Russian political leadership to consolidate its electoral base. Whereas CSR (just as INSOR) targeted the Russian urban middle class and focused on political, social and technological modernization, the Kremlin, after the re-election of President Putin in March 2012, appealed to conservative-nationalist cultural values and major industrial interest groups. Recipes for economic and political reform developed by CSR, which worked within different economic and social strata, retreated from the official agenda.

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[249] Belanovskij, "Dvižušie sily i perspektivy političeskoj transformacii Rossii, Centr Strategičeskih Razrabotok," https://www.kommersant.ru/docs/2011/_2011d211-csr.doc.
[250] Daniel Treisman, "Putin's popularity since 2010: why did support for the Kremlin plunge, then stabilize?," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 30:5 (2014): 371-372.
[251] Sergej Belanovskij, "Žiznennyj cikl brenda «Putin» podhodit k koncu," [The life circle of the brand Putin is coming to an end], *Republic*, Nov. 11, 2011, accessed Dec. 12, 2018, https://republic.ru/posts/l/698445.
[252] ibid.
[253] "VIII konferenciâ Meždunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba 'Valdaj' na temu 'Vybory 2011-2012 i budušee Rossii. Scenarii razvitiâ na 5-8 let'," [VIII Conference of the International Discussion Club Valdai on the topic 'The elections 2011-2012 and the future of Russia. Scenarios for 5 to 8 years], Nov. 7, 2011, accessed Dec. 23, 2018, http://old.svop.ru/meeting/meeting90.htm.

Thus, after 2012 CSR lost increasingly in political capital and its media capital simultaneously plummeted. Whereas in 2012 Russian newspapers referred to CSR more than 220 times, in 2015 the number dropped sharply to 37. This development mirrors the positioning of INSOR. Both think tanks, although sponsored by different groups within the Russian state administration, were united in their emphasis on socio-economic issues and the primacy of domestic modernization over foreign policy goals related to Russia's great power posture. This stands in contrast to the agenda promoted by RISI as described in the previous section, and the more nationalist, even civilizational rhetoric of President Putin, as expressed most clearly in his speech at the Valdai Discussion Club in September 2013.[254]

In December 2013, the contract of CSR President Mihail Dmitriev, who had been one of the authors of the Russian pension reform in 2002, was not extended.[255] He had been a consistent critic of new legislation introduced in September 2013 that limited the cumulative pension system and effectively transferred substantial financial resources from the pension fund to the Russian reserve fund for operative expenses.[256] In January 2014 he was forced to resign after two unsuccessful attempts to get re-elected to the CSR board.[257] Although Dmitriev eventually remained at CSR as Director of Research, the leadership passed to Vladimir Knâginin in April 2014.[258]

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[254] Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Sept. 19, 2013, accessed Nov. 11, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243.

[255] Mariâ Železnova and Maksim Glikin, "Mihail Dmitriev lišilsâ posta prezidenta CSR," [Mihail Dmitriev lost his position as President of CSR] *Vedomosti*, Jan. 16, 2014, accessed Oct. 11, 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2014/01/16/csr-ostalsya-bez-rukovodstva.

[256] Ol'ga Kuvšinova, "'Dlâ investorov signal odnoznačnyj: èto konfiskaciâ', - Mihail Dmitriev, prezident fonda 'Centr strategičeskih razrabotok'," ['For investors the signal is clear: This is a confiscation', - Mihail Dmitriev, President of the Foundation 'Center for Strategic Research'] *Vedomosti*, Oct. 10, 2013, accessed Oct. 12, 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2013/10/10/dlya-investorov-signal-odnoznachnyj-eto-konfiskaciya.
mihail?utm_campaign=vedomosti&utm_content=link&utm_medium=widget&utm_source=vedomosti. In January 2018 the Reserve Fund was abolished and merged with the Russian National Wealth Fund.

[257] His main opponent had been former CSR Chairman and then Secretary General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Dmitrij Mezencev.

[258] Knâginin is allegedly close to Putin confidant and main owner of the Bank Rossiâ Ûrij Kovalčuk ("Putin's banker"), with whom he has worked at the Foundation CSR Severo-Zapad and in his investment management company ABR Management. See Natal'â Korčenkova and Anna Puškarskaâ, "Mihail Dmitriev polučil komandu na vyhod," [Mihail Dmitriev received the command to withdraw] *Kommersant'*, Apr. 14, 2014, accessed Oct. 7, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2452018 and Elizaveta Ser'gina and Anastasiâ Golicyna, "U Ûriâ Koval'čuka poâvilas' venčurnaâ kompaniâ," [Ûrij Kovalčuk received a venture capital company] *Vedomosti*, Oct. 29, 2013, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2013/10/29/u-yuriya-kovalchuka-poyavilas-svoya-venchurnaya-kompaniya.

During his tenure, the work of CSR swayed towards regional rather than federal strategic projects. In an interview with the online newspaper *Republic*, he highlights the self-image of CSR as a contract research organization with a client base:

> What matters [for research] is to have external feedback, that it is needed by someone beyond the person who does the research. It needs either to have a client, somebody to cooperate with or a partner. […] The requirement is to be the one, who is needed. We must be needed by someone: the state or society.[259]

In winter 2015, a new demand from the state finally emerged. CSR was re-activated and completely reorganized. Central to this unexpected shift was former Minister of Finance Aleksej Kudrin. In April 2016 he accepted the President's offer to join CSR as Chairman of the Board. In parallel, President Putin signed a decree in May 2016 that established a working group, divided into eight subgroups,[260] to serve the intellectual input of his economic council.[261] Kudrin became its Co-chair. Tasked with the development of proposals for structural reforms and sustainable economic development, it provided the institutional link between CSR and the Presidential Administration.

Besides its own permanent staff of several dozen employees, CSR turned into a collaborative platform that engaged more than 1,000 individuals from various academic institutions in Russia.[262] For its work it received 343 million rubels (4.3 million euro) in 2016,[263] of which, however, merely 10% (33 million rubles; 0.4 million euro) came from the state budget, the rest being provided by "Russian companies and citizens", whose identity has not been revealed.[264] Although the focus of the work

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[259] Lola Tagaeva, "Vladimir Knâginin: 'U vsego dolžen byt' libo zakazčik, libo kooperant, libo partner'," [Everyting needs to have a costumer, or a cooperation parter, or a partner] *republic.ru*, Apr. 15, 2014, acccessed Dec. 13, 2018, https://republic.ru/posts/l/1084505.

[260] The eight subgroups were: Human Capital and Social Policy; Institutions and Society; Infrastructural Development; Macroeconomics and Finance; Technology and Sectoral Development; Entrepreneurship; State Administration; External Challenges and Security.

[261] Rasporâženie Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 16.05.2016 g. № 122-rp, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/40794.

[262] Igor' Ûrgens, "Ot prezidenta sejčas zavisit bol'še, čem ot Politbûro vo vremena SSSR," [More depends on the President today than on the Politburo during the USSR], RTVi, Nov. 25, 2018, accessed Nov. 30, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_81WN5uVyiw [31:20-31:24].

[263] Exchang rate 1: 79.2630, Dec. 31, 2015.

[264] Ivan Tkačëv and Anton Fejnberg, "Centr Kudrina raskryl istočniki svoego finansirovaniâ," [The Kudrin Center opened the sources of its funding], *RBK*, Oct. 11, 2017, accessed Oct. 10, 2018, https://www.rbc.ru/economics/11/10/2017/59dcd97f9a7947da7e8ca48f.

remained on socio-economic and financial issues, CSR for the very first time started to cover foreign and security policy as well – something that IMEMO Director Aleksandr Dynkin had campaigned for. As one expert explained to me,

> there was a new approach. CSR had basically never dealt with foreign and security policy before. There was the desire to make the strategy that CSR was supposed to develop less technocratic, but also broader. And two important dimensions were added to the typical kind of strategizing: institutions and societal issues, like law enforcement reform, prison reform, judicial reform, etc., [...] and foreign policy and general international engagement. There was the opinion, personally shared by Mr. Kudrin, that without progress in those domains, proper domestic economic structural reform would not be possible.[265]

In consequence, both the working group of the Presidential Economic Council and CSR received a sub-group on "External Challenges and Security", the first chaired by Dynkin himself and the second one by Sergej Utkin, who simultaneously remained as a researcher at IMEMO's Center for Situational Analysis. Comparing the work at CSR to IMEMO, Utkin emphasizes the different research cultures prevalent in each organization. He thereby supports observations made earlier about the deficits of the Academy of Sciences in terms of operative efficiency when producing policy-related work:

> When we talk about the character of the work, I would say that it is quite similar to what I do at IMEMO, but maybe at a different level. Here we simply have a different dynamic, a higher intensity, including events and meetings. At the Academy of Sciences you can allow yourself to take it a little slower.[266]

At CSR Utkin assembled a small team of young experts formally associated with different organizations, including RIAC, the PIR-Center and IMEMO. In addition, arms control specialists Aleksej Arbatov and General Vladimir Dvorkin left the Carnegie Moscow Center to make participation possible.[267]

In 2017 the foreign policy team prepared several publications in cooperation with RIAC. These included theses on Russia's foreign policy and Russia's global

[265] #49, expert, March 2018.
[266] #10, Sergej Utkin, CSR, May 2017.
[267] Moreover, several senior colleagues from the participating institutions were involved on a strategic and management level, for example Vladimir Baranovskij (IMEMO), Andrej Kortunov (RIAC), Igor' Ivanov (RIAC), Anatolij Torkunov (MGIMO) and Marina Larionova (RANEPA), Aleksandr Knobel (Gaidar Institute), Artem Malgin (MGIMO) amd Andrej Baikov (MGIMO).

positioning between 2017 and 2024, and an edited volume on world order containing various essays on the occasion of the 100th year anniversary of the 14-points of US President Woodrow Wilson. Moreover, CSR published three single-authored papers on migration policy, information security, and Russia's cooperation with international financial institutions.

All these projects are the result of cooperation with various individuals and institutions outside of CSR. For example, the theses on foreign policy came out of a project run together with RIAC, drawing on the results of a parallel study conducted at IMEMO. The collective of authors responsible for the essays in the edited volume on Wilson's 14-points included experts working at RIAC, IMEMO, the PIR-Center, HSE and the Center for Sociological Research. The single-authored papers were written by Kseniâ Proka (VAVT), Oleg Demidov (PIR-Center) and Irina Ivahnûk (MSU), respectively. In May 2017 CSR submitted the economic development plan and foreign policy proposal to President Putin.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have moved beyond factional statements noting the existence of Russian foreign policy think tanks, which continue to dominate the literature about the subject. Instead, I have examined the institutional development of twelve think tanks over time and analyzed their position within the Russian domestic social space along the dimensions of media and political capital.

In the first part I argued that in the post-Soviet period the institutes of the Academy of Sciences lost their previous exclusive position. Although they remain the workplace for many Russian academics with high personal political capital, the enduring financial and institutional weakness of the RAN prevents a more dynamic development. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that over the past decade the overall situation has improved, although the ability to generate media and political capital differs considerably between institutes.

The direct comparison of IMEMO and ISKRAN – the dominant Soviet institutions in civilian foreign and security policy analysis – illustrates how their position depends on leadership. Whereas IMEMO has succeeded in expanding its policy research and media activities and accomplished a necessary generational shift, the future of

ISKRAN remains unclear, both in terms of funding and personnel. On the other hand, the Institute for International Studies at MGIMO, which builds on the tradition of the Soviet Problem Laboratory, was turned into the think tank of the Russian MFA in 2009. Its broad staff base within MGIMO and the official sponsorship from the MFA guarantee it privileged access to information and the foreign policy bureaucracy.

In the second part I analyzed four think tanks that evolved after the collapse of the Soviet Union on private initiative. External funding in the 1990s, mostly from US private foundations, has been an essential factor in their establishment. This support extends beyond finances, because institutional forms prevalent in the West have served as blueprints for Russian policy entrepreneurs. Whereas the Center for Arms Control at MIPT was inspired by the Princeton University Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, which has been part of the Woodrow Wilson School since 2002, the foundation of the PIR-Center would have been impossible without William Potter's Center for Nonproliferation at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, California. In founding CAST, Ruslan Puhov and Konstantin Makienko were also guided by their experience as interns at the Foundation for Strategic Research (*Fondation pour la recherche stratégique*) in Paris. In 2008, Anton Hlopkov could build upon his work at PIR and count on the active support by CAST when building CENESS.

The four think tanks are comparable in terms of the number of their permanent staff and the issue areas they cover. Yet, they differ in their underlying business model. Whereas the PIR-Center, the Center for Arms Control and CENESS were established as non-commercial organizations, CAST is a private enterprise. This legal distinction has been essential in the context of the 'foreign agents' law adopted by the State Duma in June 2012. Whereas the PIR-Center was forced to relinquish foreign sponsorship, find new financial sources, i.e. Presidential grants, and subsequently reduced its activities, the Center for Arms Control dissolved completely. By contrast, CAST has remained unaffected.

The third part followed the institutional emergence and development of five organizations sponsored by the Russian state. It illustrates the existence of multiple interest groups within the administration. Given the weakness of Russian political parties, these think tanks often come in the form of institutional platforms for elite

debate. In the past decade, the main conflict has been between proponents of economic and socio-political modernization on the one hand and advocates of internal stability and great power ambitions on the other hand. In addition to substantial ideological divides, the competition concerns different electoral bases and the primacy of domestic or foreign policy.

The first group is represented by INSOR and CSR, whose leading political figures, Igor Yurgens and Aleksej Kudrin, have frequently cooperated. Their policy impact has fluctuated depending on Presidential support. The original CSR team is closely linked to the Ministry of Economic Development and provides the leadership of the economic bloc within the Russian government. Its ‘Strategy-2010’ has served as the blueprint for economic reform in Vladimir Putin’s first term in office. Likewise, INSOR has been able to influence political agenda-setting from 2008 to 2011 due to sponsorship by President Dmitri Medvedev. Since 2012 both think tanks, except for CSR under Kudrin in 2016-2017, have been sidelined, however. Instead, the Presidential Administration has sponsored RISI, whose leadership has been actively engaged in promoting a value-based, religious foreign policy agenda that culminates in the idea of Russia as a separate anti-Western civilization. Nevertheless, since the replacement of former Director Leonid Rešetnikov in January 2017, the political heyday of these concepts seems to have passed.

Besides concrete policy research, the Presidential Administration has supported the establishment of institutions to consolidate the mainstream of the Russian foreign policy community and promote its participation in global debates. The Valdai Discussion Club and RIAC are prime examples of this. Although closely linked, they pursue different agendas and are operated by separate expert networks. Whereas Valdai speaks for the leadership of SVOP and the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the HSE with its focus on Greater Eurasia, RIAC essentially represents the MFA and MGIMO, particularly those parts with experiences in dealing with Europe and the United States. Both serve as platforms to engage domestic and international experts.

7 Conclusion: Experts, Think Tanks and the State

> This cycle will pass, and the next will come. There will be, God forbid, a new perestroika, and we will all find ourselves at the start again. The main thing is to preserve this connection [with the people].[1]

This thesis set out to study the social relations that exist between academic experts, think tanks and foreign policy professionals in Russia. I have taken issue with the a-theoretical depiction of these agents and criticized the lack of proper conceptualization. In the introduction I showed that the scarce academic literature on the topic comes dominantly in the form of overview reports and lists of institutions without rigorous analysis, mostly provided by 'insiders' of the field themselves. These publications often do not go beyond stating the mere existence of foreign policy experts and think tanks in post-Soviet Russia or providing short evaluative statements. Common classifications such as 'governmental' vs. 'non-governmental' organizations or the qualification of agents as 'experts' vs. 'non-experts' based on personal judgments do not capture the specific social conditions prevalent in Russia and in Russian foreign and security policy as a field of knowledge.

Examining Russia as my empirical case has thus allowed me to uncover and address distinct research gaps within the study of policy experts and think tanks more generally. I have argued that much of the broad literature on experts and intellectuals is based on arbitrary decisions that take for granted what must be explained, namely how social boundaries come into existence through constant production and re-negotiation of forms of capital and claims to authority. Instead, authors generally determine agency in terms of specific forms of knowledge and/or the accomplishment of tasks with reference to essentialist attributes.

Correspondingly, I criticized the academic study of think tanks for reifying their object of study. Although many authors acknowledge the fuzziness of the concept, they nevertheless continue to accept the boundaries of their object of study as self-explanatory. The social fact of the existence of think tanks and the policy expertise carried by them, in other words, is often simply assumed or settled with reference to

[1] Fedor Luk'ânov in Orlov, "Ob irlandskih monahah," 93.

an arbitrary definition of some kind. This issue, as I have argued, is particularly prominent when examining foreign policy think tanks specifically. Here even the typological discussions characteristic of the general think tank literature have seldomly been integrated into empirical analyses, which is partially due to the limitation of available data.

Based on this three-part critique, the present thesis makes several important contributions to the existing literature on Russian think tanks, the study of foreign and security policy experts, and the sociology of expertise more generally.

7.1 Theoretical Findings and Contribution

In my theoretical discussion of experts and think tanks in chapter 2 I moved away from approaches that *a priori* privilege specific types of actors based on attributes ascribed to them. Instead of identifying agents either by their subjective claims to knowledge or any external demarcation, I suggested to analyze their relative social position in a holistic manner and to examine the different resources they bring to the table. For this purpose, I applied the notion of 'social fields' as it has been developed by Pierre Bourdieu to the study of experts and think tanks. However, I suggested that Bourdieu's assumptions about the level of social integration and autonomy characteristic for his field analyses of French academia, the arts and law, need to be adapted for the study of foreign and security policy.

More specifically, following Gil Eyal's pathbreaking contributions in his study of Orient experts in Israel, I argued that foreign policy expertise does not constitute a field on its own, because as a form of knowledge it remains to a considerable degree undetermined given the complex ontology of social phenomena. This renders the establishment of formal jurisdiction and control over the objects of knowledge difficult, if not impossible. Hence, agents who claim authoritative knowledge about foreign and security policy come from various professional backgrounds, move between academic, government and even military positions and work at different institutions. In the "thick boundary zones" between these established fields, specific logics and distinct norms are constantly being negotiated in interaction with the different forms of capital that these agents command, struggling for the distribution of present and future opportunities to become recognized, to gain expert authority and exercise the

right to speak. Therefore, foreign and security policy expertise permanently exists as a space between fields.

To determine the social positions of foreign policy experts and think tanks, I advanced Bourdieu's and Eyal's conceptual toolbox by arguing that the state and the public sphere function as two meta-fields whose constitution and mutual relations both enable and constrain experts' movements depending on the combined effect of political capital and media capital – an idea originally introduced by Thomas Medvetz in his work on policy experts and think tanks in the US. I suggested that experts possess political capital if they enjoy institutionalized proximity to state institutions, and media capital if they are visible in the public sphere through authored publications and appearances in the media. In addition, I suggested that agents need to pass a certain threshold that defines the minimum of capital endowment needed for taking up the role of an expert, either in relation to the state or the public sphere. Below this threshold, agents lose the ability to act as experts, that is, as mediators between fields. Instead, they remain within their professional field as journalists, academics or bureaucrats, etc.

In this context, I also showed that due to the indeterminate ontological quality of foreign policy knowledge and (hence) the low level of experts' autonomy vis-à-vis the multiple consumers of their expertise, there is no tendency to move towards the center of the field. Instead, foreign and security policy experts – other than medical or legal professionals who are part of fairly integrated fields of practice that have established jurisdiction over their objects of knowledge – are able to maintain niches and create distinct spaces.

Finally, I highlighted that the amount of expert capital as a combination of media capital and political capital is not static, but subject to change over time due to dynamics in both fields and spaces (a point that is generally neglected by Bourdieu). For this reason, the historical dimension has been particularly important in my empirical analysis of Russian foreign and security policy experts and think tanks.

Overall, the relationship between think tanks and experts on the one hand and between think tanks, experts and the Russian state on the other hand has been subject to considerable change over the last thirty years. This has had implications for how we understand the state and its meta-capital within Bourdieu's field theoretical

thinking. In the Soviet Union, the institutes of the Academy of Sciences were an inseparable part of the state as a meta-field, which in turn was symbiotically embedded within the CPSU. Experts functioned largely as in-house advisors and, if travelling internationally, party envoys, whereas the opposite pole of the expert space I have discussed here, the media field, did not exist as such. In other words, the state's meta-capital via party structures reached throughout the entire Soviet society, disabling the formation of partially autonomous expert spaces. With Gorbachev reforms after 1987 this situation started to erode and societal sub-fields with some degree of autonomy from the state's meta-capital emerged, particularly within the economy.

The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union depleted the once dominant meta-capital f the state. Instead, as in a kind of mirror image of the past, non-state actors, criminal networks, new entrepreneurs and former bureaucrats, who benefited from their intimate knowledge of the Soviet state and its assets, acquired considerable economic and political capital. At the same time, a pluralistic public sphere emerged that, while independent from the state, became dominated by the economic interests of a small number of businessmen.

This double movement, which can be described as a process of social differentiation, opened several new possibilities for (foreign policy) experts. In fact, the availability of relatively autonomous social fields became the precondition for the existence of experts as social figures in the way in which I have used the term here, as translators of social knowledge and mediators between fields. Thus, as I have shown, in the 1990s former academics, but also journalists and military officers, turned into politicians, entrepreneurs, election campaigners, personal advisors and media pundits, and some of them founded their own think tanks.

This increasing autonomy went hand in hand with the merging of some (former) experts with political power as the example of SVOP illustrates.

The rule of Vladimir Putin since 2000 once again led to an increase of state meta-capital, which in turn shaped the constitution of other social fields, particularly the media and the economy. Due to the (ex)change of elites, experts formally well-connected and/or in political positions lost status and influence, that is, their political capital. Paradoxically, the increase in the state's meta-capital also re-created social

boundaries between the actual political leadership and societal elite circles that had begun to merge in the 1990s, making the state's boundaries fuzzier. In other words, the space for struggle for power over the state (i.e., the 'field of power') shrunk: Soviet academics who had become politically active returned to scientific work and the function and autonomy of political institutions beyond the Presidential Administration, such as the State Duma, was significantly reduced.

The socio-historical trajectory of experts in post-Soviet Russia, then, resembles a back and forth movement corresponding to the status of the state, which alternated between authoritarian rule and "uncertain" statehood. In both cases, however, the Russian state and its institutions have been a far cry from the ideal-type bureaucracy envisioned by Max Weber as the main attribute of late modernity. The association of bureaucratic functions with the power, emotions and ideas of particular persons, rather than the existence of value-neutral institutions, largely explains the volatility of positions of both (foreign policy) experts and think tanks.

7.2 Empirical Findings and Contribution

My empirical chapters have addressed different levels of field analysis, covering both individual and institutional agents. Each of them draws on unique and novel data that were not previously available and therefore constitute one of the major contributions of this study to the literature. In chapter 3 I presented an analysis of quantitative data containing information about basic sociological attributes of individual experts from related fields. For this purpose, I made use of databases covering individuals and institutions in international relations and foreign policy research published by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) from 2011 to 2016.

Given the poor quality of the data collection, however, I had to re-calibrate and systematize the data of these directories and complement them with additional information, thus arriving at a final dataset that contained a total number of 1,055 experts. I extracted (and added, whenever necessary) data about year of graduation (which allowed to make inferences about age), place of work, place and year of education, and research interests for large parts of this group. I was thereby able to provide a first tentative statistical analysis of the Russian expert community. Among other things, it shows that a majority of these experts studied at just three leading

Russian universities: MGIMO, MSU and SPbGU. Moreover, experts differ with respect to their place of work. Although more than three quarters of those for which data are available are employed at academic institutions, including universities and the institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, there is also a considerable number of diplomats and those engaged directly in politics. Nevertheless, the dominance of academic institutions points to the fact that despite the heterogenous structure of the field of experts, the academic field remains the main reservoir for producing expert (positions) and expertise in Russian foreign and security policy.

The results also indicate that the generation of Soviet babyboomers, between 1949 and 1961, is dominant. By contrast, the “last Soviet generation”, born between 1962 and 1975, is underrepresented. In combination with the findings on their places of work, this supports the general observation, made by both scholars and people within the field, that in the 1990s young people did not join Russian academia or engaged in foreign policy research because of the severe economic crisis and lack of demand from the state. Likewise, the distribution of research interests illustrates both the traditional priorities of Russian foreign policy – Europe and North-America – and the increasing shift towards Asia, beginning in 2008/2009 and gaining momentum in 2014. At the same time, the dataset includes almost no experts on Latin America and Africa.

This quantitative overview provided me with a good starting point and orientation for the qualitative empirical study of experts and think tanks in chapters 4 to 6. In each case, the analysis built on the concepts of media capital and political capital mentioned above. For individual experts, the latter was operationalized as membership in expert councils, while the former referred to the number of references in Russia’s federal press over time, applying to both individuals and organizations. The empirical probe of expert council membership among the dataset suggested that the great majority (81 percent) does not participate in any council, which indicates that most of these agents are, in fact, unlikely to move beyond the expert threshold. This points to the fact that in order to take on the role of an expert as a mediator between fields, one already needs to have a considerable amount of field specific capital, i.e., academic credentials, political or diplomatic experience. Only a small minority elite, predominantly form the cohort of Soviet babyboomers, has been able to achieve this position.

In chapter 4 I followed the life stories of five agents that I selected as representatives of this elite to understand how they succeeded in gaining such prominence. The analysis showed that four of them, all born in the 1950s, had set out for promising academic careers in the late Soviet Union. The Gorbachev period with its increasing openness and transparency, however, allowed them to deploy their cultural capital as a political resource in the nascent public sphere, thereby generating media capital. Moreover, given the change in the ideology that shaped Soviet domestic and foreign policy, some of them were able to start a political career, especially after the introduction of the Congress of People's Deputies in December 1988.

The examples of Andrej Kortunov, Aleksei Arbatov and Vâčeslav Nikonov, who today all possess high amounts of political capital (although varying over time), show, the time of the late 1980s and the immediate phase of transition from 1990 to 1992 was the decisive period determining their subsequent social trajectories. The example of Aleksej Bogaturov, Russia's most eminent IR theorist, in particular, underlines the importance of changing social relations and shifts in position. Although Kortunov's, Arbatov's and Nikonov's contemporary and a fellow academic, he was successful at remaining an 'ivory tower intellectual' throughout the 1990s. Nevertheless, his academic reputation did not easily translate into expert status. His low level of media and political capital rather suggests that his biography lacks important elements that would have made it easier for him to take on a more prominent public role.

The fifth example, by contrast, Fedor Luk'ânov, belongs to the "last Soviet generation". His social trajectory is very different from those experts born in the 1950s because the collapse of the Soviet Union rendered an academic career impossible. However, it also provided totally new opportunities. I showed how Luk'ânov, a German philologist by education, first became a journalist writing mainly about Scandinavia but increasingly broadened his agenda to foreign affairs. When he became editor of the policy journal *Russia in Global Affairs* in 2002, he effectively transitioned from professional journalist to foreign policy expert. Ever since, both his political and media capital have been constantly growing. His life story shows empirically what I expected based on my theoretical approach to the expert field: Luk'ânov crossed from a professional field, journalism, over to the field of experts by reaching the necessary capital threshold.

Besides these original results in the study of Russian foreign and security experts, my empirical work also breaks new ground in the analysis of corresponding think tanks. First, in chapter 5 I examined the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) as the most prominent network of foreign policy experts in the 1990s. My analysis focused on the social space occupied by SVOP members, thereby correcting several false assumptions and wrongheaded evaluations about the Council, its constitution and political importance prominent in the literature. In order to do so, I constructed a unique dataset on the development of membership and the societal positions of SVOP members over time. The analysis showed that the 'decreasing influence' of SVOP, which some authors have claimed, is related to an institutional shift in membership. Whereas its founding members represented an academic and military elite that became politically active in the late 1980s, the eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union enabled old and new members to rapidly transform cultural into political and economic capital. This process ensured institutionalized proximity to state organs. Hence, in the decade following 1991 SVOP functioned as an informal gathering and coordination platform for political elites.

Somewhat ironically, the concentration of political power within the Presidential Administration after 2000 'professionalized' the activities of SVOP: it transformed from a policy-making, secret council into a more accessible public policy organization that increasingly engages in educational projects, societal debate and the international promotion of Russian strategic concepts. It thus became more disconnected from the political field (i.e., the state) and strengthened its autonomy as a civil society organization. As indicated in chapter 2, from a comparative historical point of view, this process of increasing institutionalization over time that strengthens the boundaries of fields and leads to the emergence of new ones, mirrors the shift of the Council on Foreign Relations in the US: from an exclusive circle of a small number of political elites towards a broader organization with public advocacy functions since the 1950s.

Taking SVOP as an indicator for changing state-society relations in Russia and their effect on the position of foreign and security policy experts, the final empirical chapter 7 analyzed the current landscape of foreign and security policy think tanks. I examined twelve organizations, following historical chronology.

Instead of perpetuating the narrative of crisis that accompanies most evaluations of the Russian Academy of Sciences and former Soviet institutes, I showed that over the past decade the overall financial and institutional decay has stopped. Indeed, some institutes, such as IMEMO and the IMI at MGIMO, have been able to generate considerable political and media capital due to good management and the building of close social relations with the political leadership. By contrast, ISKRAN has so far not succeeded in regaining its previously prominent position.

The 1990s saw the emergence of think tanks based on private initiative. Many of them, however, have remained one-man shows and some have dissolved as quickly as they appeared. Given the absence of governmental demand and state funding, long-term success depended either on foreign sponsorship or the commercialization of research activities. Hence, Russian foreign policy expert institutions that are financially independent from the state, universities and the RAN come in two forms: non-commercial organizations (whose reliance on foreign sponsorship has been turned into a liability by the foreign agents' law from June 2012 and the law on undesirable organizations from May 2015) and small private enterprises.

My analysis of the people behind these private think tanks, who at first lacked the necessary political and social capital (i.e. personal relations with the Russian elite), shows that expert authority can be generated via public visibility. In the case of CAST, journalists acted as gatekeepers, whose cooperation ensured the generation of media capital over time, which ultimately led to the generation of political capital. At the same time, low levels of media capital are not necessarily an indicator of political irrelevance. As the examples of CENESS and the Center for Arms Control illustrate, the ability to offer specific and technical advice may provide political capital despite low media capital. In fact, in sensitive areas such as foreign and security policy, public discretion may be an essential asset to establish trust with state institutions, especially in Russia.

In the last part of chapter 6 I suggested that since 2007 the Russian state itself has increasingly invested in the creation of foreign policy think tanks to support its growing political ambitions and economic potential. Yet, the source of this sponsorship has been neither monolithic nor unambiguous. Instead, different factions within the Russian state administration have sponsored think tanks to promote their respective

(foreign policy) agendas, with the primacy of domestic modernization conflicts and the concept of Russia as a great power forming the two ends of the spectrum.

In order to illustrate this point, I presented the trajectories of INSOR, CSR and RISI, providing information on their institutional structure and evaluating the development of their political and media capital over time. The analysis showed that these think tanks' access to policy-making and influence depends largely on the political will of one person: the Russian President. The intensity of the activities of these think tanks has therefore been fluctuating, depending on the initiative of and support from the Presidential Administration.

Another aspect that has come out of my analysis is the consolidation of the mainstream expert community and the increasing participation of Russian experts in global debates over the last two decades. Besides the growing public engagement of SVOP, the Valdai Discussion Club and RIAC are prime examples of this development. Although both of these organizations are closely linked, they pursue different agendas and are operated by different expert networks.

Overall, I conclude that the clear-cut distinction between state and society is not a very useful analytical tool when studying foreign policy experts and expertise in Russia, given the dominance of the state. Foreign policy as a field of knowledge is closely related to state authority in both its material and symbolic dimensions, not only, but especially in Russia. While private institutions exist, experts and think tanks need to engage with the state if they want to prosper and develop. In the cases I have covered, state support has been crucial. Yet, perception of the state as a unitary actor do not capture the complexity of power relations, which is important if we want to understand why, when and how certain think tanks thrive, while others are shrinking.

From the perspective of field theory, the degree of social closure of expert practices in Russian foreign and security policy is even less pronounced than in the United States. Whereas Medvetz has been able to identify an emerging field of US think tanks that, although based on more established social fields, develops its own distinct characteristics, the Russian case indicates a greater permeability of social boundaries. Struggles about epistemic jurisdictions are common and individual positions are more prone to radical change given the volatile nature of the political field.

7.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

This study is built on the conviction that we need to examine the social relations between academic experts, think tanks and foreign policy professionals in order to improve our understanding of how state power operates in Russia. We still know very little about this web of relationships. Even Bourdieu, in his study of the field of power in France, noted that there is a "wide gap between the requirements of object construction and the available data".[2] In the Russian case, the limitations are much more severe.

This thesis constitutes a first explorative study that provides the necessary foundation for further research on the subject. A central limitation has been the absence of and the restrictive access to data, which made a time-consuming empirical research process necessary. Moreover, due to the lack of available studies, the central focus of this thesis has been the analytical description of agents and relationships, rather than the provision of any causal analysis. I have asked questions concerning the when, who, out of what, in what manner and how, rather than the *why*.[3] Nevertheless, my analysis does not merely provide a thick description, but embeds comprehensive empirical data in a larger narrative about the historical development and the social constitution of the field of foreign and security policy experts in post-Soviet Russia. My key interest concerned how this field has developed and how the social positions of agents within it have changed over time in order to enable an understanding of their power relations vis-à-vis each other.

Based on the results of my research presented here as well as additional empirical material generated during the research process, but not included in this thesis, there are at least two promising areas which should be developed further.

First, several of my interview partners expressed their disrespect for debating on Russian state TV, which they saw as silly propaganda events and shallow policy advocacy. Indeed, most of my interviewees do not participate in TV debates or at least not frequently. If they do, they appear in specific formats only. Hence, it would be interesting to compare experts who are prominent on TV and, for example, experts

[2] Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility.Elite School in the Field of Power*, trans. Lauretta C. Clough (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 266.
[3] John Gerring, "Mere Description," *British Journal of Political Science*, 42, no. 4 (2012): 722.

with high political capital to assess the degree to which both groups are distinct or overlap. Such an analysis would not only provide a more accurate picture of the relationship between the media and the political field, but would also contribute to the study of Russian state propaganda. Its results could tell us, for instance, whether the Russian state pursues different communication strategies. Are there experts who are actually ‘speaking truth to power’, or do they just reproduce state discourse?

Second, as I have attempted to lay out in the empirical groundwork, this thesis has focused on social positions of agents and the reconstruction of the contours of the expert field as such. However, one central hypothesis in Bourdieu’s sociology is the existence of some form of structural resonance (homology) between social positions and aesthetic preferences (habitus) or, as in this case, between the degree of state proximity and policy positions. In other words, one would need to systematically compare the results presented here with the content of foreign policy debates produced by these experts and think tanks. In order to accomplish this task, it would be necessary to select a particular group of experts who are working on similar issues. My quantitative data on the distribution of research interests, but also the larger group of arms control, non-proliferation and military experts I have identified in chapter 6 could provide a useful starting point.

As Fedor Luk’ânov suggests himself suggests in the comment provided at the beginning of this chapter, the current state of the field of experts is but a snapshot in time. More than two decades after the end of the Soviet Union, everything in today’s Russia remains in flux.

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Appendix

Appendix I: *Thematic and Geographic Aggregates of Research Interests*

Themes	Terms	Geographic Areas	Terms
Politics	10	Asia	12
Culture	20	Europe	16
Military & Security	11	North America	3
Economics	16	Post-Soviet Space	9
Law	4	Middle East	6
		Africa	1
		Latin America	1
		Artic	1

Appendix II: *Interviews*

Nr	**Interviewee**	**Organization**	**Time**	**Language**
#1	Expert	Gorchakov Fund	Apr. 2017	Russian
#2	Expert	MGIMO	May 2017	Russian
#3	Expert	State Duma	May 2017	Russian
#4	Expert	Kommersant	May 2017	English
#5	Expert	PIR	May 2017	Russian
#6	Expert	PIR	May 2017	English
#7	Expert	MFA	May 2017	Russian
#8	Expert	CSR	May 2017	Russian
#9	Expert	MGIMO	May 2017	Russian
#10	Sergej Utkin	CSR	May 2017	Russian
#11	Expert	HSE	June 2017	Russian
#12	Andrej Kortunov	RIAC	June 2017	Russian
#13	Expert		June 2017	Russian
#14	Expert	PIR	June 2017	Russian
#15	Expert	CAST	June 2017	Russian
#16	Expert	RIAC	June 2017	Russian
#17	Expert	IMEMO	June 2017	Russian
#18	Expert	MGIMO	June 2017	English
#19	Expert	HSE	June 2017	Russian
#20	Expert	Institute of Europe	June 2017	Russian
#21	Expert		Aug. 2017	Russian

#22	Expert	Carnegie Center Moscow	Sept. 2017	Russian
#23	Expert	PIR	Sept. 2017	Russian
#24	Expert	MGIMO	Sept. 2017	Russian
#25	Expert	MGIMO	Sept. 2017	Russian
#26	Expert	PICREADI	Oct. 2017	Russian
#27	Expert		Oct. 2017	English
#28	Sergej Karaganov	SVOP	Oct. 2017	English
#29	Expert	IPMA	Oct. 2017	Russian
#30	Expert		Oct. 2017	Russian
#31	Expert	RISI	Oct. 2017	Russian
#32	Ruslan Puhov	CAST	Oct. 2017	Russian
#33	Expert	IMEMO	Oct. 2017	Russian
#34	Expert	PIR	Oct. 2017	Russian
#35	Expert	Institute of CIS	Nov. 2017	Russian
#36	Expert		Dec. 2017	Russian
#37	Expert	MGLU	Dec. 2017	Russian
#38	Expert		Jan. 2018	Russian
#39	Konstantin Èggert	Dozhd	Jan. 2018	Russian
#40	Expert		Jan. 2018	Russian
#41	Expert	IMEMO	Jan. 2018	Russian
#42	Evgenij Kožokin	MGIMO	Feb. 2018	Russian
#43	Fedor Vojtolovskij	IMEMO	Feb. 2018	Russian
#44	Expert	MFA	Feb. 2018	Russian
#45	Anton Hlopkov	CENESS	Feb. 2018	Russian
#46	Expert	Institute of Europe	Feb. 2018	Russian
#47	Expert	HSE	March 2018	Russian
#48	Expert		March 2018	Russian
#49	Expert		March 2018	English
#50	Expert		Apr. 2018	Russian
#51	Expert		Apr. 2018	Russian
#52	Expert		Apr. 2018	Russian
#53	Expert		May 2018	Russian
#54	Expert		May 2018	Russian
#55	Andrej Kortunov	RIAC	Oct. 2018	Russian
#56	Fedor Luk'ânov	HSE	Nov. 2018	Russian

Curriculum Vitae

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Employment

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04/2014 – 12/2016	Graduate Assistant at the Institute of Political Science (HSG), University of St. Gallen, Chair of International Relations, Prof. James W. Davis PhD

Education

09/2014 – 05/2019	PhD (Dr. phil) in International Affairs and Political Economy (DIA), University of St. Gallen School of Economics and Political Science (SEPS-HSG) Thesis: “Foreign Policy Experts, Think Tanks and the Russian State. A Field Theoretical Approach”
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