Deliberate temporal organizing in politics: addressing grand challenges

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Abstract

Deliberate temporal organizing plays a crucial role in addressing grand challenges by structuring actions and strategies across time to tackle issues that evolve and intensify. The study examines how geopolitical and environmental challenges are addressed through governmental foresight reports. Concretely, the Government Report on the Future aims to shape the Finland of future generations and to strengthen Finland's preparedness for the future. Empirically, we are interested in how Members of Parliament (MPs) perceive the importance of such foresight work for their decision-making process. The present paper acts as a critical steppingstone for our ongoing research project. With the high interest and importance attributed to the foresight work done in the Finnish parliament, we recognize the possible implications to understand a highly relevant setting for futures work and temporal organizing.

Introduction

"[W]hen confronted with disruptive events, organizations must bounce forward into the ensuing future." (Hernes et al., 2024) Given the environmental complexity in which governments act, such temporal bouncing forward becomes an increasing necessity. As a form of temporal organizing, governmental actors turn increasingly to using methods of foresight, such as scenarios (Pouru-Mikkola et al., 2023). Foresight is seen by research as a set of practices that help in the "way finding" into the uncertainty of the future (Sarpong et al., 2013), which can help managing the effects of changing time trajectories over the time (Cashore et al., 2021) and thus fostering an understanding of potential resulting opportunities and threats.

Thereby, these future-oriented methods focus on shaping and influencing policies and strategies (Guston, 2014). Also, to address the limited concrete impact of foresight exercises on the policymaking process, a need for stronger connection to the political agenda has been emphasized to reduce decoupling and enhance direct relevance (Andersen & Rasmussen, 2014).

On the other hand, limited research has focused on the political structures and the recipients and potential users of foresight outputs, particularly parliamentarians. This politically guided temporal organizing refers to a process in which future-related time horizons, priorities, and scenarios are initially shaped by civil servants and experts, but in which politicians typically participate in the later stages by modifying selected components and conclusions. Although technical foresight work – such as scenario development – is often conducted separately from direct political processes, there is an ongoing dialogue. This is particularly evident in how political goals, such as those set in government programs, indirectly shape and influence foresight activities and strategic directions taken in these reports. This is notable given the critical importance of understanding the connection between the availability of foresight reports and the receptiveness of decision-makers. Understanding this dialogue helps in understanding the success factors and potential pitfalls of foresight activities and reports of the public administration. This paper approaches the question by analyzing combinations of factors and how they, individually or in combination, influence politicians' willingness to consider future-oriented knowledge and foresight reports. Therefore, the research question for the present paper is the following:

> *RQ*: Why do Members of Parliament use public sector foresight reports in political decision-making?

By researching this question, we contribute to the field of organization theory by focusing on the receivers of additional information, who can be described to be the institutional "consumers" of foresight reports, and how they can draw additional value from the insights that they gain from foresight in their political decision-making process (Konrad & Böhle, 2019). This is important as a central aim of foresight is the contribution to political decisions by providing the decision-makers with an understanding of the uncertainties.

Theoretical background

Temporality and temporal organizing

Temporality manifests in multiple forms within organizational life and decision-making processes, including the political sphere. Recent publications in organizational science and strategy have increasingly focused on the concept of temporality (Bansal et al., 2022; Blagoev & Schreyögg, 2024; Burgelman et al., 2018; Lundgren-Henriksson & Tidström, 2021). It is assumed to be a core element that shapes behavior of people in organizational contexts (Granqvist & Gustafsson, 2016). For example, coordination and uncertainty of events and their temporality have been studies in an ethnographic study for firefighters (Geiger et al., 2021). Temporality has been argued to be one of the most central logics through which grand challenges can be addressed and overcome (Gümüsay et al., 2020). For strategic action, the notion of time and temporal intentionality have been studied in-depth (Välikangas et al., 2024). The effects of different temporal structures among actors can be hugely consequential. Finally, structuring the future and deliberately using temporality in policy design has been studied before (Bauer, 2018).

Research focusing on the active organization and reorganization of time has argued this gives the concerned organization an agentic capacity to influence the perception of their respective audience on time (Rindova & Martins, 2022). The concept of temporal framing (e.g. Wright & Nyberg, 2017) provides a useful analytical lens, particularly when examining how narratives around timing evolve. When conducting "temporal work", organizational actors aim to generate new temporal cycles or resolve tensions among differing understandings to create a more shared perspective of what the future may hold for the organization (Geiger et al., 2021; Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013). Temporal work refers to projections of the future by individuals involved. Ability to imagine alternative futures is influenced and can be limited by their past experiences (Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013). Recently, Hampel and Dalpiaz (2023) have examined how organizations navigate identity challenges stemming from conflicting interpretations of their

past. Imaginaries of future alternatives can be enlarged if individuals allow freedom relative to the past (Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013). Distinctively, foresight is presented as a way to enact temporal organizing (Sarpong et al., 2013).

Conceptualizing foresight in policymaking

Research describes foresight as a distinct process using selected methods with the final aim of developing an understanding of alternative courses of action and anticipatory intelligence on the future (Piirainen & Gonzalez, 2015). Importantly, foresight aims to actively influence policies, and is therefore seen as a useful tool in anticipatory policy-making (Heo & Seo, 2021). Therewith, it is a tool of creating futures through practice, thus shaping temporal structures in organizations (Cunha, 2004; Orlikowski & Yates, 2002).

Foresight in the public sector frequently focuses on supporting the political decision-making of the respective country and influence the country's future path (Schmidt, 2015). Thereby, foresight presents alternatives to politicians which allow them to make better-informed decisions (Minkkinen et al., 2019). Most foresight engagements communicate their findings in the form of a report (Jütersonke & Munro, 2024). However, these reports are frequently criticized as far removed from actual problems in day-to-day decision-making and the policy cycle (SOIF, 2021). A core reason for this is what is considered a "legislative short-termism" (Koskimaa & Raunio, 2023a).

Consequently, research has identified that there is a tendency for foresight in policy to shorten the temporal horizon (Bauer, 2018). This temporal movement is highly counterintuitive, as foresight reports would aim to extend the temporal horizon of their recipients. This makes it a highly relevant topic for further investigation.

Influencing factors on parliamentary decision making

An MP's participation in a committee, irrespective of their personal interests, increases the relevance of information that is deliberated in the context of the work of the committee (Miler, 2017). As the Finnish parliament has one standing committee tasked with anticipatory work and discussing the governmental foresight report, this is also true for topics of the future. This "Committee for the Future" actively takes the role of shaping priorities and setting the agenda of futures work in the Finnish Parliament. Hence, it is a crucial element for the integration of foresight in the Finnish political cycle (Koskimaa & Raunio, 2023b).

Additionally, an important aspect is the familiarity parliamentarians have with foresight methods. Familiarity enhances understanding and acceptance of complex methodologies, thus potentially increasing their utilization in policy decisions (Gary, 2019). The participation in the Committee gives MPs such familiarization, therefore adding to their ability to benefit from the foresight reports. Following this, the first hypothesis is:

> *H_1*: Parliamentarians who participate in the foresight process (PART=1) are more likely to exhibit high willingness to use the report's results (Y=1) than those who do not participate (PART=0).

A further factor that is analyzed in research is the proximity of administrations' foresight projects to decision-makers, talking about the organizational setup. This could either increase short-termism and politicization of decisions or enhance the relevance of the report and the willingness of politicians to actually use the insights (Jütersonke & Munro, 2024).

Further, research has identified an additional gap between the foresight producers and political decision-makers, concretely the challenge of too few directly applicable contents, denying a simple route between the foresight report having an influence on the political decisions (Schmertzing, 2021). The second hypothesis, thus, is the following.

> *H_2*: Parliamentarians who perceive the foresight report's recommendations as politically actionable (POLACT=1) are more likely to exhibit high willingness to use the report's results (Y=1) than those who do not (POLACT=0).

In the Finnish political system, the administration is in the executive branch of the government. The executive in Finland is set up as a coalition government (Nousiainen, 2001). When looking at a coalition government, there is a tendency for more oversight to be requested by the opposition via committees in parliament (Ban et al., 2023). This is relevant also in the Finnish case, as the report includes one part written by political appointees from within the coalition government. When interpreting the request for more oversight by the opposition as a heightened caution towards the outputs of government, the following hypothesis is derived.

> *H_3*: Members of the governing parties (GOV=1) are more likely to exhibit high willingness to use the foresight report's results (Y=1) than members of the opposition (GOV=0).

As membership in a committee is not solely determined by the personal interests of the MPs, we assume that there are also parliamentarians who are not members of the Committee and still

have an interest in the topic of futures, driving them to give it more attention. This means that they show selective exposure to topic-specific issues (Bolsen & Leeper, 2013). This theory of self-interest has been established as a predictor for memorability (Krosnick, 1989), and also explains a higher degree of knowledge in a topic by attributing the topic with higher value (Visser et al., 2006). Furthermore, given that not all people with a possible interest are necessarily in the relevant committee, adding the hypothesis helps to avoid an inverse causality for H_1. The final hypothesis thus complements the others by examining the personal interest of policymakers to engage with foresight.

> *H_4*: Parliamentarians who place a higher priority on long-term policy impacts (FUT=1) are more likely to exhibit high willingness to use the foresight report's results (Y=1) than those who do not (FUT=0).

Overall, these hypotheses are linked through the Technology Acceptance Model as follows:




Figure 1: Illustration of Technology Acceptance Model

Method and data analysis – Original idea

The methodological approach of choice is a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), as presented by Kahwati and Kane (2020). QCA is helpful as it maintains cases as a holistic unit but allows for can also generate findings across cases as it incorporates qualitative and quantitative data and allows for an analysis (Kahwati & Kane, 2020). Additionally, it is the appropriate method to understand combinations of factors leading to a given outcome – or its non-appearance.

This method is mainly applicable to complex and multidimensional problems that do not allow for one-dimensional answers (Hancké, 2009). Thus, the method is a suitable and well-established method in organizational science, as both the field and the method focus on systemic challenges and aim to tackle them in a structured way. Hence, the present paper aims to

understand the reasons or combinations of them which lead to policymakers using foresight reports published by their respective national public administration. This is per the theoretical argument that foresight should provide information and options for policymakers in their decision-making (Jones, 2017).

Data collection

The main part of data collection has been conducted, concretely sending the questionnaire to the MPs of Finland. They are considered as the research objects of the QCA, the "cases" who will have individual combinations of values for each hypothesis. To ensure a comprehensive understanding of the willingness of parliamentarians to use foresight reports in decision-making, all Finnish MPs who were elected before 2023 were members of the target sample. They were contacted via email with a non-tracking link to participate in the survey. Additionally, we have already collected and started to analyze background materials, such as reports, studies, and parliamentary debate transcripts focusing on foresight, at this stage. Since the QCA survey received fewer variation in the outcome variable than would be necessary – which we will elaborate on below – we intend to use further longitudinal qualitative data as the main dataset for the paper in the next phase.

Challenge of Access when Surveying Members of Parliament

Compared to direct analyses of political behaviors, the literature on meta-analyses of surveys in legislative research is relatively limited. This is despite the fact that surveys are used regularly to study different aspects of parliamentary work. A previous analysis showed that most of these surveys are characterized by a low response rate (Bailer, 2014). Building on that, a comparative study came to the results that mainly elite level surveys, including MPs, suffer from low response rates, similar to upper echelon managers in private companies (Walgrave & Joly, 2017). The proposed approach was to approach them via the staffers in their offices (Walgrave & Joly, 2017), who can be described as agenda setters and gatekeepers (Vis & Stolwijk, 2020). Hence, we opted for including the personal assistants in copy of each email to the MPs. To minimize potential risks in data collection, we proactively translated the questionnaire into both national languages, Finnish and Swedish. We also tested the functionality of the questionnaire in advance with people who were not part of the target group and asked for their feedback on its usability.

What further complicated our outreach in our specific case is a combination of contextual factors. First, during the initial weeks of reaching out, there was a general election on municipal

and regional level, in which most of the MPs stood for reelection. The MPs were hardly reachable and predominantly seemed to focus on their domestic outreach. Second, there were two additional challenges that could not have been foreseen. Decisions to be made were even more time-pressured than usual, and in addition, there was once a technical issue with the survey form that were beyond the researchers' control. Such unforeseeable events can have drastic impacts on the data collection. As we were aware of the general challenge of conducting surveys with high level experts. Therefore, we preemptively chose a longer timeline with several rounds of follow ups with the MPs. The multistage data collection approach finally helped us to continuously gain new participants, resulting in the N of 10 valid responses at the time of writing.

Method and data analysis – Recent developments

In the collected questionnaire data, we realized a very low variance in the outcome variable. The Finnish MPs who responded mostly seemed to agree that they actively use the Foresight Report published by the administration in their decision making. A reflection about certain underlying biases can be found in the discussion section. However, this could also indicate a deeply rooted importance of the temporal work being conducted in both the administrative setting and in the parliament itself.

To understand the institutional setting and be able to use the various data that we have collected, both longitudinal and current in nature, we are currently in the process of refining our understanding of the case and we will explore it qualitatively through a case study approach. We draw on the previous work by Stonig and Müller-Stewens (2025), who have analyzed temporal complexity using a case study analysis. This helps us to see and understand how temporal work has been previously understood in relevant organizational research and allows us to draw on their conclusions for a further discussion of the relevance of the setting in our future work.

Case setting and context

To gain a deeper understanding, we will conduct a longitudinal case study of a national parliament with an active integration of strategic foresight. To overcome legislative short-termism, Finland utilizes foresight methods to create a shared understanding of long-term radical changes in the operating environment. Finland is seen as an international role model for implementing foresight into its political system (Heo & Seo, 2021), especially in parliament

(Paliokaitė & Sadauskaitė, 2023). In this endeavor, Finland engages with a multitude of stakeholders and has a distributed approach to foresight (Rosenström & Raleigh, 2015).

Finland is also a relevant case from the institutional heritage as a repeated practice. The Government's Report on the Future is submitted to Parliament each electoral term to highlight key future issues requiring attention in policymaking. Launched in 1993, the report serves as a basis for dialogue on upcoming challenges and possibilities. It is structured in two parts: the first outlines collaborative foresight work by ministries on future trends, while the second focuses on specific phenomena identified for deeper exploration and solutions. Kurki (2021) presents a well-documented analysis of how the different parts are structured and how they present a holistic vision for the Finnish case.

Our initial analysis of the qualitative data shows that the report achieves its main purpose of getting MPs talking about the future. In representatives' speeches, emphasis was placed on their own political interests through the Report, highlighting the individual relevance for decision-making. Furthermore, several speeches emphasized the need to make better use of the work of the Committee for the Future, which is regarded more highly internationally than within Parliament itself. The influence of the consideration of foresight in parliament has been shown by research to create positive spillover effects (Koskimaa & Raunio, 2023b).

The last full Government Report on the Future was published in January 2023. However, the process for the next report has already started, with the most recent Report, a so-called "Environmental Analysis" published in November 2024, focusing on building a shared understanding of the strategic operating environment, its uncertainties, and potential future scenarios through collaboration across ministries. It lays the groundwork for strategic foresight and ongoing monitoring to enhance coherence, consistency, and long-term planning in governmental decision-making.

The first part of the Futures Report focuses on scenario work extending to 2045. The initial phase of the scenario process involves the "Environmental Analysis" with the examination of international and national data, an expert survey, and cross-sectoral processing of the results. Based on this, the report examines various contextual changes shaping Finland's future and their impacts. Environmental drivers of change belong to the key areas addressed in the governmental futures work. The report states how climate warming is accelerating, biodiversity is declining, and the state of the natural environment is deteriorating.

Ongoing data collection

To collect the relevant data, we have started to conduct a multi-stage research approach. Using multiple stages came naturally given the various types of data that we have access to. Our secondary data includes the public records of previous discussions and the published reports. Our primary data consist of the collected responses by the MPs, which are both closed-ended questions but also open-ended ones, and direct experiences from one of the authors.

We have collected relevant archival data, such as reports, studies, and parliamentary debate transcripts. As these are all written in Finnish, the work on this end was distributed so that the native Finnish speaker would gain an overview of the subjects that were being discussed and what the context was. To help gain a broad understanding, the non-Finnish speaker used AI-supported translation systems.

We support our analysis through a qualitative online questionnaire conducted between March and June 2025 with current Finnish Members of Parliament. Our focus is particularly on the open-ended questions. The MPs and their respective personal assistants were contacted directly via publicly available email addresses. However, we encountered significant challenges in carrying out the questionnaire, as discussed in the initial phase when we had originally aimed to conduct a fully developed QCA.

In the following phases, we focus on analyzing the discussions related to the Government Report on the Future. The report has been published and discussed in the Finnish Parliament for 28 years already. We examine how environmental analysis, futures assessment, and perceptions of the future have evolved, and how grand challenges have been perceived over time.

Results

The study examines whether foresight can help address grand challenges such as geopolitical and climate crises. Practices of deliberate temporal organizing, such as foresight reports, can help in developing such perspectives and help to make clear what vision of the future is targeted in political decisions. However, the use of futures knowledge to support decision-making seems to be limited, and we aim to build an understanding of this connection.

We first present the results of the closed-ended questions. While we have received 10 responses, only six of them were useable for this step, as the other four were not yet in parliament when the report was published and thus could not fulfill all our criteria. When looking at the responses

in Table 1, which can also be found in Appendix 1 in some more detail, we see that four of the six respondents say that they actively use the insights of the report for their policy-making decisions.

Table 1: Responses to QCA-Questions

Y	H1	H2	H3	H4	**N**
1	1	1	0	1	**2**
1	0	1	0	1	**1**
1	0	1	0	0	**1**
0	0	1	0	1	**1**
0	0	0	1	1	**1**

This outcome is interesting not only in the context of a QCA but especially also when aiming to understand it in a case setting. From a QCA perspective, these insights do not allow for any conclusive insights. Especially given a duplication of a combination then leading to a different outcome is not explainable without additional context. However, the results also show that the report is seen as generally politically actionable by five of the six respondents. This leads to an interesting setup, which we hope to further analyze in-depth using the case study approach.

For this, we will also look closer into the open-ended questions, which can be found in translated form in Appendix 2. Across the answers, a number of shared themes emerge. Most notably, respondents emphasize independent academic expertise, sometimes contrasted with the perceived over-reliance on representatives of interest groups. This suggests a desire for foresight inputs that are analytically grounded and seen as impartial. There is also a recurring emphasis on experts who can provide long-term perspectives rather than short-term commentary, reinforcing the idea that foresight must offer a temporal horizon that extends beyond electoral cycles.

In addition to independence and temporal depth, a third pattern relates to communication and accessibility. Several responses underscore the importance of experts being able to convey complex insights in a concise, understandable, and citizen-oriented manner. This implies that foresight is not only valued for its content but also for its form—suggesting a communicative dimension to expert legitimacy in parliamentary settings.

Overall, at first glance, the results indicate that successful foresight integration in parliamentary work is associated with three interlinked expert characteristics: independence, long-term vision, and communicative clarity. These findings help contextualize the institutional space within which foresight activities are embedded and provide early indications of the normative criteria by which foresight contributions are judged.

Discussion

With no fully fledged results, the discussion logically has to remain somewhat limited. However, we want to discuss certain limitations of our results and foreshadow what we hope to achieve with the final results when working with it as a case study.

With a highly selective sample and a very prominent group of experts, the insights we hope to gain from them and the relevance of their insights cannot be understated. While a response rate of 5% is comparatively low, the specificity of their insights and their level of expertise sets apart their responses from what could be found out using other methods.

Finally, we have previously mentioned that there might exist certain underlying biases that influence our outcomes, especially in the answers to the questionnaire. We want to explicitly discuss two of them in the following. The two are the selection bias and the acquiescence bias.

While the findings suggest a generally positive valuation of foresight among respondents, it is important to acknowledge the potential for selection bias. The individuals who completed the survey may be disproportionately supportive of or familiar with foresight practices, thereby skewing the overall results (Bethlehem, 2010). However, this bias is partially mitigated by the structure of the data collection process: although the survey experienced a relatively low attrition rate overall, the majority of participants who exited the questionnaire did so before answering a single item—likely before becoming aware of the topic. This reduces the likelihood that only those already favorably disposed toward foresight proceeded to respond.

A second methodological consideration concerns the possibility of acquiescence bias, a common limitation in self-reported data wherein respondents tend to agree with statements regardless of their content (Danner et al., 2015). While this bias cannot be entirely ruled out, the open-ended responses provide a valuable counterbalance. Many MPs demonstrated detailed familiarity with foresight procedures and offered unsolicited reflections that went beyond the questionnaire prompts. This suggests that responses were not merely affirmative by default but

reflected genuine engagement with and insight into the institutional dynamics of foresight in the parliamentary context.

Conclusively, with our research, we add to ongoing research focusing on parliamentary futures work, especially but not exclusively in the Finnish context (Koskimaa & Raunio, 2022, 2023b; Kurki, 2021; Weber et al., 2019). The relevance and timeliness of our research further strengthens our determination to add to this debate. As clear next steps, we want to link the analysis of the longitudinal insights with the insights that we have gained from the questionnaire. There seems to exist a relevant overlap in the answers and the topics that have been discussed in parliament. Further, with the response to Question 4 by the participant with ID# 20, we see that the topic has not lost its relevance in the current political sphere.

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Appendix 1: Individual responses to closed questions

Response ID#	H1	H2	H3	H4	Y
2	0	1	0	1	1
9	1	1	0	1	1
20	1	1	0	1	1
31	0	1	0	1	0
42	0	1	0	0	1
61	0	0	1	1	0

Appendix 2: Open responses (Translated by ChatGPT 4o model)

Question 1: What types of experts do you generally consider the most useful for decision-making?

ID#	**Answer**
2	Experts who have a precise understanding of current developments and can forecast future scenarios from today. Regarding the future of technology, “forward-looking experts” are interesting—for example, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Education Committee heard researcher Erkki Kurenniemi, whose technological visions were decades ahead of others.
9	Bold and visionary experts who provide clear conclusions and/or policy recommendations.
20	Researchers. We hear far too many "experts" from interest groups in committees.
31	Independent researchers.
49	Experts with a long-term perspective or a far-reaching outlook. Also professors and researchers.
55	Experts from organisations, researchers.
60	Those who can present their views concisely, simply, and in plain language. Examples help understanding.
61	Academic experts and experts from citizens' organisations.
62	Concrete [experts].

Question 2: How do you think the Parliament could better prepare for long-term future events?

ID#	Answer
2	All committees' work should more strongly include a future perspective. Committee work could also include more roundtable discussions where politicians and researchers exchange views. Sometimes organisations like Tutkas and Arkadia Society were more active in organising events and discussions.
9	A lot of future work is done, but the problem is excessive description and "drowning" in various reports. Where is the focus? Less is more.
20	It is most important to bring the future perspective comprehensively into legislative drafting so that it remains naturally present in parliamentary debate. Future resilience must be required in planning and preparation, if necessary by law.
31	Parliament’s rules of procedure should be changed so that meetings take less time, leaving more time for reading and events.
49	Should be addressed as part of committee-specific work and strategy efforts. In parliamentary groups.
55	For example, by hearing the research community.
61	Sectoral committees should also be required to assess sustainability and long-term perspectives.
62	By doing more parliamentary cooperation.

Question 3: What factors do you think hinder or delay the Parliament's preparation for long-term future events?

ID#	Answer
2	A populist way of handling issues generally shortens the time perspective. For example, recent discussions on fuel prices versus combating climate change.
9	The number of short-term and everyday issues that pile up.
20	Overwhelming problems in recent years (COVID, Russian invasion, U.S. policy shifts), and a sensationalist media and social media.
31	Hurry, the hectic nature of politics.
49	Acute issues and urgency. Reactiveness, which leaves less time for ideation and other things.
55	Lack of understanding.
60	Leftist politics, which disregard the country's economic situation.
61	The budget's time horizon and lack of comprehensive impact assessments.
62	The general trend is that electoral terms feel increasingly short. Halfway through the government term, after the mid-term negotiations, parties already turn their attention to upcoming elections, leaving development work behind.

Question 4: Anything else you consider important or any other comments?

ID#	Answer
2	The Committee for the Future has had varying significance at different stages of parliamentary work. When it was established on the initiative of MP Eero Paloheimo, it was considered highly significant. It is important that the committee retains its weight. Historical examples include future scenarios about Russia. Similarly, current future scenarios could be significant, e.g., concerning European security architecture or Europe's global relations.
9	In government administration, strategic papers—roadmaps, compasses, etc.—should focus on quality over quantity. Sharper papers and clearer policy recommendations instead of mere descriptions and lists. It's also important to realise that as much as one would like to focus on the next 15 years, political decision-makers are forced to address immediate problems.
20	The government's foresight report is an important instrument, but it needs improvement. We have done a lot of work to combine the resources of the government and Parliament in futures work.