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Publication

Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide Over the Eurozone Bailouts

2014-10-01 , Bechtel, Michael M. , Hainmueller, Jens , Margalit, Yotam

Why do voters agree to bear the costs of bailing out other countries? Despite the prominence of public opinion in the ongoing debate over the eurozone bailouts, voters' preferences on the topic are poorly understood. We conduct the first systematic analysis of this issue using observational and experimental survey data from Germany, the country shouldering the largest share of the EU's financial rescue fund. Testing a range of theoretical explanations, we find that individuals' own economic standing has limited explanatory power in accounting for their position on the bailouts. In contrast, social dispositions such as altruism and cosmopolitanism robustly correlate with support for the bailouts. The results indicate that the divide in public opinion over the bailouts is not drawn along distributive lines separating domestic winners and losers. Instead, the bailout debate is better understood as a foreign policy issue that pits economic nationalist sentiments versus greater cosmopolitan affinity and other-regarding concerns.

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Publication

The Ideological Basis of the Grexit Debate

2015-11-14 , Bansak, Kirk , Bechtel, Michael M. , Hainmueller, Jens , Margalit, Yotam

What explains the sharp divide among European publics over the ``Grexit," that is, the possibility of allowing Greece to default and leave the Eurozone? Being part of a currency union can provide its member states with benefits, but when a member state faces default, maintaining the currency union can impose substantial redistributive costs on the other members, giving rise to disagreements over the desired policy response. We explore such an instance, examining the divisions underlying the Grexit debate using original survey data from four of the largest European economies. We contend that differences in economic self-interest among citizens, as well as the often-mentioned chasm between supporters of mainstream and extremist parties, provide little insight into the domestic divide over the Grexit. Instead, we argue that the key factor was the split between left and right. We lay out a set of theoretical explanations for the prominence of left-right ideology in structuring the public debate. Testing these arguments, we find that the primary mechanism was a systematic difference between left and right voters in expectations about the economic consequences of a Grexit for Europe as a whole, the outcome of which some perceive as the free market's dictate.