Incomplete Grid-access Contracts and the Strategic Use of Balancing Energy
Type
applied research project
Start Date
January 1, 2009
End Date
June 30, 2012
Status
ongoing
Keywords
Ancillary services
electricity market
moral hazard
Description
Ancillary services are needed to keep electric power transmission grids in balance. They thus serve as an insurance device against unexpected demand or supply fluctuations. As with any other insurance system too, ancillary services set incentives for moral hazard. Using unique data provided by a German transmission system operator, we empirically provide empirical evidence for the existence and the magnitude of moral hazard.
Leader contributor(s)
Partner(s)
Roland Füss & Mathias Gerner (EBS Business School)
Funder
Topic(s)
Industrial organization
Method(s)
time-series econometrics
Range
HSG Internal
Range (De)
HSG Intern
Eprints ID
208863