Matthias Haslberger
Title
Dr.
Last Name
Haslberger
First name
Matthias
Email
matthias.haslberger@unisg.ch
ORCID
37 results
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Item type:Publication, The Missing Link: Technological Change, Dual VET, and Social Policy Preferences(Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2026-04-07); ; Durazzi, NiccoloHow does technological change affect social policy preferences? We advance this lively debate by focusing on the role of dual vocational education and training (VET). Existing literature would lead us to expect that dual VET increases demand for compensatory social policy and magnifies the effect of automation risk on such demands. In contrast, we contend that dual VET weakens demand for compensatory social policy through three non-mutually exclusive mechanisms that we refer to as (i) material self-interest; (ii) workplace socialization; and (iii) skill certification. We further hypothesize that dual VET mitigates the association between automation risk and social policy preferences. Analyzing cross-national individual data from the European Social Survey and national-level data on education systems, we find strong evidence for our argument. The paper advances the debate on social policy preferences in the age of automation and sheds new light on the relationship between skill formation and social policy preferences.Type:journal articleJournal:British Journal of Political ScienceVolume:56 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Homeownership and political efficacy: how housing wealth shapes whether people feel heard(2026-01-26); ;Mads Andreas ElkjærBen AnsellWhy do some citizens feel that political institutions are responsive to people like them, while others do not? Existing research highlights the role of education and income in shaping external political efficacy, but little is known about the role of wealth. This article argues that homeownership serves as a key marker of economic and social success, shaping perceptions of political inclusion, particularly later in life. While younger renters may still aspire to homeownership, older renters are more likely to confront the realisation that they will never make it onto the property ladder, undermining their efficacy. This argument is examined using original survey data from over 10,000 adults in the United Kingdom. The findings show that homeownership is positively associated with external political efficacy, particularly among older individuals. These results emphasise housing wealth as a critical driver of political inclusion and highlight its broader implications for democratic legitimacy in unequal societies.Type:journal articleJournal:West European PoliticsScopus© Citations 1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Why is it so Hard to Counteract Wealth Inequality? Evidence from the United Kingdom(2025-07) ;Mads Andreas Elkjær ;Ben Ansell ;Laure Bokobza ;Asli CansunarDespite high and rising levels of wealth inequality, many advanced democracies have cut taxes on inherited wealth in recent decades. To explain this puzzle, the authors argue that taxing inherited wealth is politically difficult because, paradoxically, the people who have the strongest material interest in higher taxes—low-wealth renters—are those least likely to express a clear opinion about inheritance taxation. Instead, the political terrain is shaped by the preferences of homeowners and their children, who have a strong material interest in lower inheritance taxes. Empirically, the authors first evaluate this argument using original survey data from the United Kingdom. In two survey experiments, they next examine how exposure to information influences views on inheritance taxation. While the authors find no effect of providing statistical information about the distribution of housing wealth, preferences are influenced by explanatory information that explicitly outlines the potential effects of inheritance taxation.Type:journal articleJournal:World PoliticsVolume:77Issue:3 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Rage against the machine? Generative AI exposure, subjective risk, and policy preferencesHow does novel technology change public policy demands? Scholars interested in the effect of automation on policy preferences have commonly argued that exposure to automation technology increases subjective risk, which in turn predicts demand for insurance. Generative AI potentially challenges this dynamic. Based on a pre-registered online experiment with a sample of 1041 UK working-age adults we show that direct exposure to generative AI in realistic work tasks does not increase subjective risk but strengthens support for activating social policy. To understand this constellation of attitudes, we argue that exposure to technology may activate sociotropic preferences to support individuals who might be negatively affected by AI. Text analysis shows cautious optimism and thoughtful engagement with the implications of AI for work and social policy. Our findings suggest that the current uncertainty over the relative winners and losers from AI opens a window of opportunity to expand activating social policies.Type:journal articleJournal:Journal of European Public PolicyScopus© Citations 5 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Subjective Technology Risk and Education Preferences: VET as a Safe Haven or Dead End?(2025-08-12); Scherwin M. BajkaEducation equips individuals with valuable skills to protect them against employment risks associated with the digital transition. As scholars debate whether vocational education and training (VET) or general education better insures against technology-induced employment risk, we ask how this type of risk, as perceived by individuals, shapes their education preferences. Our analyses, based on a survey of over 11,500 respondents across seven European countries, show that VET is regarded as a safe haven by those perceiving heightened risk. This relationship remains robust when controlling for various alternative explanations and is consistent across countries. Subgroup interactions indicate that men, high-income earners, respondents with tertiary education, and those politically on the right more strongly favor VET in response to subjective technology risk. Hence, our study suggests that VET's practical, job-oriented focus is perceived as better protection against the growing uncertainty over skill demands in the twin transition than general education.Type:journal articleJournal:Regulation & GovernanceScopus© Citations 3 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Yesterday’s model for tomorrow’s economy? Dual VET and wage inequality in the knowledge economy(2025-08-25); Type:journal articleJournal:Journal of European Social PolicyScopus© Citations 3 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Center-Right Parties and Post-War Secondary Education(2023-01-01) ;Giudici, Anja ;Gingrich, Jane ;Chevalier, Tom<jats:p>The massification of secondary schooling constitutes the key educational project of the first post-war period. However, the resulting educational structures differed in terms of streaming and standardization. Despite their historical opposition to such expansion, center-right parties contributed to shaping these reforms. They generally opposed standardization because their distributive strategy rested on support from elites and middle classes. However, their stance on streaming varied. Centre-right parties supported streaming when they were linked to teachers and private providers who opposed comprehensive reforms, but supported de-streaming where such groups aligned with the left. This article shows how center-right parties in Bavaria, France, and Italy, with common partisan distributive aims, introduced varied public service reforms following from their links to different vested producers. It argues that theorizing such reforms requires considering both distributive and productive environments.</jats:p>Type:journal articleJournal:Comparative PoliticsVolume:55Issue:2Scopus© Citations 19 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Rehinking the measurement of occupational task content(2021-08-21)Which tasks workers perform in their jobs is critical for how technological change plays out in the labour market. This article critically reviews existing measures of occupational task content and makes the case for rethinking how this concept is operationalised. It identifies serious shortcomings relating to the theoretical content and the empirical implementation of existing measures. Based on survey data from European Union countries between 2000 and 2015, it then introduces novel measures of routine task intensity and task complexity at the International Standard Classification of Occupations 1988 two-digit level that address these shortcomings. The indices will contribute to a more theoretically informed understanding of technological change and benefit both labour economists and sociologists in investigating the nature of recent technological change.Type:journal articleJournal:The Economic and Labour Relations ReviewVolume:33Issue:1Scopus© Citations 14 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Routine-biased technological change does not always lead to polarisation: Evidence from 10 OECD countries, 1995–2013(2021-07-16)This article deals with a central paradox in the occupational polarisation literature: most scholars accept that technological change is biased against routine-intensive occupations, but in many countries, we do not see the pattern of occupational polarisation that the theory usually predicts. I argue and show empirically using a dataset of 10 OECD countries between 1995 and 2013 that technological change is both routine-biased and skill-biased, but that the result of routine-biased technological change may be occupational upgrading rather than polarisation. This is due to differences in occupational routine-wage hierarchies: only where routine occupations cluster around the middle of the wage distribution are we likely to see polarisation. Where routine occupations are concentrated near the bottom of the wage hierarchy, upgrading occupational change is the norm. Based on research on the US, the former has been widely assumed, but it does not hold true in all countries. Overall, this article shows that much previous work on routine-biased technological change and polarisation was built on premises that do not travel well. This underscores the importance of comparative research for building and testing robust general theories.Type:journal articleJournal:Research in Social Stratification and MobilityVolume:74Scopus© Citations 25 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Rage Against the Machine? AI Use, Threat Perceptions, and Policy Preferences(2025-01-10); ;Gingrich, JaneBhatia, JasmineHow does novel technology change public policy demands? Scholars interested in the effect of automation on policy preferences have commonly argued that exposure to automation technology increases subjective risk, which in turn predicts demand for insurance. Generative AI potentially challenges this dynamic. Based on a pre-registered online experiment with a sample of 1,041 UK working-age adults we show that direct exposure to generative AI in realistic work tasks does not increase subjective risk but does strengthen support for activating social policy. To understand this constellation of attitudes, we argue that exposure to technology may activate sociotropic preferences to support individuals who might be negatively affected by AI. Text analysis shows cautious optimism and thoughtful engagement with the implications of AI for work and social policy. Our findings suggest that the current uncertainty over the relative winners and losers from AI opens a window of opportunity to expand activating social policies.Type:conference paper