Reto Gubelmann
Title
Dr.
Last Name
Gubelmann
First name
Reto
Email
reto.gubelmann@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 75 25
20 results
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Item type:Publication, Large Language Models, Agency, and Why Speech Acts are Beyond Them (For Now) - A Kantian-Cum-Pragmatist CaseThis article sets in with the question whether current or foreseeable transformer-based large language models (LLMs), such as the ones powering OpenAI's ChatGPT, could be language users in a way comparable to humans. It answers the question negatively, presenting the following argument. Apart from niche uses, to use language means to act. But LLMs are unable to act because they lack intentions. This, in turn, is because they are the wrong kind of being: agents with intentions need to be autonomous organisms while LLMs are heteronomous mechanisms. To conclude, the article argues, based on structural aspects of transformer-based LLMs, that these LLMs have taken a first step away from mechanistic artificiality to autonomous self-constitution, which means that these models are (slowly) moving into a direction that someday might result in non-human, but equally non-artificial agents, thus subverting the time-honored Kantian distinction between organism and mechanism.Type:journal articleJournal:Philosophy & TechnologyScopus© Citations 28 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Capturing the Varieties of Natural Language Inference: A Systematic Survey of Existing Datasets and Two Novel Benchmarks(2023-11-20); ; Transformer-based Pre-Trained Language Models currently dominate the field of Natural Language Inference (NLI). We first survey existing NLI datasets, and we systematize them according to the different kinds of logical inferences that are being distinguished. This shows two gaps in the current dataset landscape, which we propose to address with one dataset that has been developed in argumentative writing research as well as a new one building on syllogistic logic. Throughout, we also explore the promises of ChatGPT. Our results show that our new datasets do pose a challenge to existing methods and models, including ChatGPT, and that tackling this challenge via fine-tuning yields only partly satisfactory results.Type:journal articleJournal:Journal of Logic, Language and InformationScopus© Citations 20 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, A Loosely Wittgensteinian Conception of the Linguistic Understanding of Large Language Models like BERT, GPT-3, and ChatGPTIn this article, I develop a loosely Wittgensteinian conception of what it takes for a being, including an AI system, to understand language, and I suggest that current state of the art systems are closer to fulfilling these requirements than one might think. Developing and defending this claim has both empirical and conceptual aspects. The conceptual aspects concern the criteria that are reasonably applied when judging whether some being understands language; the empirical aspects concern the question whether a given being fulfills these criteria. On the conceptual side, the article builds on Glock’s concept of intelligence, Taylor’s conception of intrinsic rightness as well as Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. On the empirical side, it is argued that current transformer-based NNLP models, such as BERT and GPT-3 come close to fulfilling these criteria.Type:journal articleJournal:Grazer Philosophische StudienVolume:99Issue:4 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Context Matters: A Pragmatic Study of PLMs’ Negation UnderstandingIn linguistics, there are two main perspectives on negation: a semantic and a pragmatic view. So far, research in NLP on negation has almost exclusively adhered to the semantic view. In this article, we adopt the pragmatic paradigm to conduct a study of negation understanding focusing on transformer-based PLMs. Our results differ from previous, semantics-based studies and therefore help to contribute a more comprehensive – and, given the results, much more optimistic – picture of the PLMs’ negation understanding.Type:journal articleJournal:Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational LinguisticsVolume:1Scopus© Citations 25 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, On What it Means to Pay Your Fair Share: Towards Automatically
Mapping Different Conceptions of Tax Justice in Legal Research Literature(2022-11); ; ; Type:journal article - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, A Philosophically-Informed Contribution to the Generalization Problem of Neural Natural Language Inference: Shallow Heuristics, Bias, and the Varieties of Inference(Association for Computational Linguistics, 2022); ; Type:journal article - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Exploring the Promises of Tranformer-Based LMs for the Representation of Normative Claims in the Legal DomainType:journal articleIssue:arXiv:2108.11215 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Maddy vs. Quine on Innate Concepts. Revisiting A Perennial Debate in Light of Recent Empirical ResultsIn his posthumously published work, Quine abandons his empiricist principle that humans do not have any innate concepts, or knowledge. He does so in light of empirical research that Penelope Maddy capitalizes on to develop her own naturalized epistemology. The empirical research in question is due to the pioneering work of developmental psychologist Elisabeth Spelke. Spelke employs the method of habituation and preferential looking to argue that human infants have innate concepts, and that they have some knowledge about what can and cannot happen to physical objects. Taking into account empirical studies as well as methodological considerations, this article examines whether this research can support these strong philosophical conclusions drawn from it, finding that it likely cannot provide such support.Type:journal articleJournal:PhilosophiaVolume:48 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, FROM SHARED STIMULI TO PREESTABLISHED HARMONY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF QUINE’S THINKING ON INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVE VALIDITY(2019-10)W. V. O. Quine is generally seen as one of the foremost empiricists of the twentieth century. For large parts of his career, the label “empiricist” is accurate; in his mature work, however, he integrated decidedly antiempiricist elements in his epistemology. From The Roots of Reference onward, he enlists natural selection and innate cognitive structures to ensure that scientific concepts have a “degree of objective validity.” From From Stimulus to Science onward, he also explains the very possibility of communication via a preestablished harmony of innate cognitive structures that is guaranteed by natural selection. This article reconstrues the reasons that compelled Quine to these commitments, and it details the development of Quine’s thinking on these topics across more than 3 decades; in particular, the article argues that recognizing that so-called stimulus meanings are private decisively shaped Quine’s views. By means of a critical evaluation, the article argues that natural selection can make plausible that scientific concepts have a degree of objective validity—if this Quinean claim is properly understood; in contrast, the article suggests, with recourse to research by Robert C. Richardson, that it is doubtful whether natural selection can underpin the preestablished harmony that Quine requires to explain communication.Type:journal articleJournal:HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of ScienceVolume:9DOI:10.1086/703253