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Carl David Mildenberger
Title
PD Dr. Dr.
Last Name
Mildenberger
First name
Carl David
Email
carldavid.mildenberger@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 3091
Homepage
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1 - 10 of 14
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Inquiry
Scopus© Citations 4 -
Publication
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationVolume: 154
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PublicationA Liberal Theory of ExternalitiesUnlike exploitative exchanges, exchanges featuring externalities have never seemed to pose particular problems to liberal theories of justice. State interference with exchanges featuring externalities seems permissible, like it is for coercive or deceptive exchanges. This is because exchanges featuring negative externalities seem to be clear cases of the two exchanging parties harming a third one via the exchange—and thus of conduct violating the harm principle. This essay aims to put this idea into question. I will argue that exchanges featuring negative externalities are not unjust in this straightforward way, i.e. because they would constitute an instance of wrongfully causing or risking a bodily or material harm. In fact, unless we are subscribing to particularly demanding variants of liberalism—e.g. perfectionist liberalism—or unless we are exclusively focusing on borderline cases of externalities—i.e. of effects of exchanges hardly to be called externalities—there is no liberal theory of how exchanges featuring externalities are unjust.Type: journal articleJournal: Philosophical studiesVolume: online
Scopus© Citations 11 -
PublicationVirtual KillingDebates that revolve around the topic of morality and fiction rarely explicitly treat virtual worlds like, for example, Second Life. The reason for this disregard cannot be that all users of virtual worlds only do the right thing while online—for they sometimes even virtually kill each other. Is it wrong to kill other people in a virtual world? It depends. This essay analyzes on what it depends, why it is that killing people in a virtual world sometimes is wrong, and how different virtual killings are wrong in different ways. I argue that killing people online is wrong if it is an instance of deliberately and non-consensually evoking disagreeable emotions in others. Establishing this conclusion requires substantial conceptual work, as virtual worlds feature new kinds of fictional agency, particular emotional responses to fiction, and unique ways in which the fiction of the virtual world relates to the wrongness of the killing.Type: journal articleJournal: Philosophical studiesVolume: 174Issue: 1
Scopus© Citations 3 -
PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Public ChoiceVolume: 164
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und UnternehmensethikVolume: 15Issue: 3
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Constitutional Political EconomyVolume: 24Issue: 3
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