Janine Crivelli
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Title
Dr.
Last Name
Crivelli
First name
Janine
Email
janine.crivelli@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 73 11

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  • Publication
    Board Oversight in Start-Up Fraud: Unveiling the Risks of Shared
    ( 2024)
    Janine Crivelli
    ;
    Manuel Hess
    ;
    April J. Spivack
    ;
    Joakim Wincent
    Research into venture fraud is still scant and there is limited insight for why and how it occurs beyond that the founding entrepreneur usually constitutes the main suspects. In this study, we examine the monitoring behavior of board members in start-up fraud and their potentially compromising relationships with the founding entrepreneur leading the venture. In contrast to emerging recommendations in the literature, our qualitative study of 14 prominent fraud cases exposes the limitations of shared stock ownership between founding entrepreneurs in the executive lead and board members. Whereas guidelines from previous work mostly related to agency theory suggest shared ownership should produce improved alignment with venture goals, we show this alignment mechanism indicates risk of monitoring failures and the perpetuation of insufficient supervision, enabling fraudulent activities among boards and CEOs. Furthermore, our model identifies the founding entrepreneur in the lead as a central issue, alongside a considerable risk of fraud reinforcement mechanisms. This risk is compounded by the tendency of board members to resort to 'freeze' or 'flight' responses as initial coping strategies when detecting fraudulent activities before confronting problems directly.
    Type: conference paper
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/120039
  • Publication
    The Paradox of Shared Ownership: Investigating Board Member Roles in Start-Up Fraud Cases
    ( 2024)
    Janine Crivelli
    ;
    Manuel Hess
    ;
    April J. Spivack
    ;
    Joakim Wincent
    Research into venture fraud is still scant and there is limited insight for why and how it occurs beyond that the founding entrepreneur usually constitutes the main suspects. In this study, we examine the monitoring behavior of board members in start-up fraud and their potentially compromising relationships with the founding entrepreneur leading the venture. In contrast to emerging recommendations in the literature, our qualitative study of 14 prominent fraud cases exposes the limitations of shared stock ownership between founding entrepreneurs in the executive lead and board members. Whereas guidelines from previous work mostly related to agency theory suggest shared ownership should produce improved alignment with venture goals, we show this alignment mechanism indicates risk of monitoring failures and the perpetuation of insufficient supervision, enabling fraudulent activities among boards and CEOs. Furthermore, our model identifies the founding entrepreneur in the lead as a central issue, alongside a considerable risk of fraud reinforcement mechanisms. This risk is compounded by the tendency of board members to resort to 'freeze' or 'flight' responses as initial coping strategies when detecting fraudulent activities before confronting problems directly.
    Type: conference paper
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/120040
  • Publication
    Type: conference paper
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/119572