On the Effectiveness of Debt Brakes: The Swiss Experience
ISBN
0-262-14098-5
Type
book section
Date Issued
2008
Author(s)
Editor(s)
Sturm, J.-E.
Neck, R.
Abstract
The Swiss fiscal system is characterised by an extensive fiscal federalism with high fiscal autonomy at all governmental levels, by direct popular rights which include fiscal referenda at the cantonal and local levels, and by particular constitutional and/or statutory fiscal restraints in order to prevent excessive public debt. In this paper, the effects of these constitutional clauses on public deficit and debt are investigated. Using a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, we provide evidence that fiscal constraints significantly reduce budget deficits, while direct democracy leads to significantly lower public debt.
Language
English
Keywords
Direct Democracy
Referenda
Initiatives
Public Debt
Budget Deficits
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Book title
Sustainability of Public Debt
Publisher
MIT Press
Publisher place
Cambridge, USA
Start page
223
End page
255
Pages
33
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
52478