Endogenous Timing in the Presence of Non-Monotonicities
Journal
Canadian Journal of Economics
ISSN
0008-4085
Type
forthcoming
Date Issued
2020
Author(s)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (Games and Economic Behavior, 1990, 2, pp. 29–46) by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non-monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent.We propose a taxonomy of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by Eaton (Canadian Journal of Economics, 2004, 37, pp. 805–29). We determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous-move Nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its Pareto efficiency.
based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by Eaton (Canadian Journal of Economics, 2004, 37, pp. 805–29). We determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous-move Nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its Pareto efficiency.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
None
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Blackwell Publishing Limited
Pages
44
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
259458