The Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle: Why the Swiss Do Not Want to Tax the Rich
Journal
New Political Economy
ISSN
1356-3467
ISSN-Digital
1469-9923
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2019
Author(s)
Abstract
In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to impose a tax on the super rich in a popular vote and thereby fund a redistributive policy. However, a large majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’
Language
English
Keywords
Politics of inequality
interest groups
redistribution
structural power
taxation
voting behaviour
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SEPS - Global Democratic Governance
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Taylor and Francis
Publisher place
London [u.a.]
Volume
24
Number
1
Start page
103
End page
124
Pages
22
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
253545