Costly Exclusion, Property-Rights Enforcement, and the Optimal Supply of Rival and Non-Rival Goods
Journal
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)
ISSN
0932-4569
ISSN-Digital
1614-0559
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2015-09-01
Author(s)
Abstract
We analyze the optimal relationship between the public and private enforcement of property rights for the case of rival and nonrival goods. Exclusion is interpreted as a costly activity, which allows it to endogenize the distinctions between public and club goods on the one hand and between private and common-pool goods on the other. We characterize optimality conditions for the private provision of rival and nonrival goods, characterize optimal enforcement policies, and compare the solutions with other institutional alternatives.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Mohr Siebeck
Publisher place
Tübingen
Volume
171
Number
3
Start page
405
End page
431
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
235038