Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment
Journal
Economics Letters
ISSN
0165-1765
ISSN-Digital
1873-7374
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2001-06-01
Author(s)
Fischbacher, Urs
;
Gaechter, Simon
;
Fehr, Ernst
Abstract
In this note we consider Cournot oligopoly. Due to the consideration of several consumers and/or technologies, the profit function is not differentiable everywhere. We show that Cournot equilibrium never occurs in outputs where profit functions are not-differentiable. This result validates the procedure of differentiating profit functions to perform comparative statics in models where profit functions are not differentiable everywhere.
Language
English
Keywords
Voluntary contributions
Conditional cooperation
Free riding
Strategy-method
Experiments
HSG Classification
not classified
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Elsevier
Publisher place
Amsterdam
Volume
71
Number
3
Start page
397
End page
404
Pages
8
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
10370