Maddy vs. Quine on Innate Concepts. Revisiting A Perennial Debate in Light of Recent Empirical Results
Journal
Philosophia
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2020
Author(s)
Abstract
In his posthumously published work, Quine abandons his empiricist principle that humans do not have any innate concepts, or knowledge. He does so in light of empirical research that Penelope Maddy capitalizes on to develop her own naturalized epistemology. The empirical research in question is due to the pioneering work of developmental psychologist Elisabeth Spelke. Spelke employs the method of habituation and preferential looking to argue that human infants have innate concepts, and that they have some knowledge about what can and cannot happen to physical objects. Taking into account empirical studies as well as methodological considerations, this article examines whether this research can support these strong philosophical conclusions drawn from it, finding that it likely cannot provide such support.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
None
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Springer
Volume
48
Start page
159
End page
177
Pages
18
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
266269
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
Name
quinevsmaddyinnate_aam.pdf
Size
438.93 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
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