Mixed Matching Markets
Series
VWA Discussion Paper Number 10
Type
working paper
Date Issued
2008
Author(s)
Abstract
We introduce a new model for two-sided markets that generalizes sta-
ble marriages as well as assignment games. Our model is a further gen-
eralization of the model introduced by Eriksson and Karlander (2000). We prove that the core of our model is always non-empty by providing an algorithm that determines a stable solution in O(n^4).
ble marriages as well as assignment games. Our model is a further gen-
eralization of the model introduced by Eriksson and Karlander (2000). We prove that the core of our model is always non-empty by providing an algorithm that determines a stable solution in O(n^4).
Language
English
Keywords
matching theory
graph theory
solution algorithm
two-sided markets
labour market
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
No
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
42637
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Name
fu10-08.pdf
Size
209.9 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
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