Delays in Leniency Application: Is there Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door?
Series
TILEC Discussion Paper
ISSN
1572-4042
Type
working paper
Date Issued
2012
Author(s)
Abstract
This paper studies cartels' strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that conspirators often apply for leniency long after a cartel collapses. We estimate hazard and probit models to study the determinants of leniency-application delays. Statistical tests find that delays are symmetrically affected by antitrust policies and macroeconomic fluctuations. Our results shed light on the design of enforcement programs against cartels and other forms of conspiracy.
Language
English
Keywords
corporate leniency program
cartel
leniency application delays
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
No
Publisher place
Tilburg
Number
2012-044
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
244899