Direct Democracy, Coalition Size, and Public Spending
Journal
Journal of Public Policy
ISSN
0143-814X
Type
forthcoming
Date Issued
2022
Author(s)
Abstract
This article contributes to the literature on direct democracy and public spending in two ways. First, we explore how direct democratic institutions interact with a specific aspect of the representative system, the size of the governing coalition, to influence public spending. Second, based on newly collected data, we examine the relationship between three different direct democratic institutions, coalition size and public spending over the period from 1860 to 2015. Empirically, we find that initiatives increase the size of the public sector under single-party governments, but this positive relationship disappears as coalition size increases. In contrast, we find that financial referendums slow down the growth of public spending, while law referendums are not systematically associated with public spending. Finally, we find that the relationship between direct democratic institutions, coalition size and public spending does not change over time despite the long period under investigation.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SEPS - Global Democratic Governance
Refereed
No
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Volume
42
Number
2
Start page
224
End page
246
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
261279