Strategic Re-Framing as a Vote Winner : Why Vote-Seeking Governments Pursue Unpopular Reforms
Journal
Scandinavian Political Studies
ISSN
0080-6757
ISSN-Digital
1467-9477
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2013-03
Author(s)
Abstract
Most political science accounts assume that governments in Western democracies avoid unpopular reforms to protect their re-election chances. Nevertheless, governments sometimes embark on electorally risky reforms - even in times when they have no slack in the polls. In this article, it is argued that pursuing unpopular reforms can be a perfectly rational strategy for vote-seeking governments. Based on a simple game theoretical model that compares strategic framing with the classic blame avoidance strategy, it is demonstrated that unpopular policy reforms allow governments to pursue gains of both policy and votes by opting for a highly visible strategy of reframing the substantive reform issue in question. This general argument is illustrated with the substantial 2011 retrenchment of Danish early retirement benefits. This particular welfare state programme was highly popular. Nevertheless, the incumbent Liberal prime minister proposed to abolish it only a few months prior to a national election while his government was trailing significantly in the polls.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SEPS - Global Democratic Governance
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
Publisher place
Oxford UK
Volume
36
Number
1
Start page
23
End page
42
Pages
20
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
226908