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Why peers engage in costly control of free riding: Evidence from a mixed-methods study
Type
book section
Date Issued
2020
Author(s)
Editor(s)
Atinc, Guclu
Abstract (De)
Globalization and digitalization have spurred a shift in organizations toward relying more strongly on teams—more specifically, toward relying on project-based, diverse, often-fluid expert teams, which enable organizations to more quickly adapt to swiftly changing environments and to foster innovation (c.f. e.g., Kozlowski & Bell, 2003; McGrath & Argote, 2008). Yet, this development has also created new challenges for organizations. The members of such knowledge teams often consider themselves individual experts moreso than parts of a team with shared goals (Gratton & Erickson, 2007). This perspective fosters free-riding behavior, that is, moments when an “individual working in a group setting fails to contribute his or her fair share to a group effort” (Aggarwal & O'Brien, 2008, p. 256). In addition, the complexity of knowledge work makes the most commonly used instrument to curb free riding in teams—formal managerial control—hard to apply (Kirsch, 1996). Hence, in knowledge-intensive teamwork, individuals who possess more information about team-member performances than supervisors (Barclay & Harland, 1995)—that is, peers—should control free riding.
However, peer control of free riding constitutes a second-order social dilemma situation. The dilemma results from the fact that control exerted by peers in response to free riding, for example, by social sanctions or social compensation (Williams & Sommer, 1997), implies costs for the controllers but at the same time produces direct positive externalities for other non-controlling peers who cannot be excluded from the consumption of the benefits of the exerted control. Such control costs comprise, for instance, the risk of retaliation, potential loss of relationship, the loss of time or money, or at least emotional tensions (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Hence, from a rational choice perspective, controlling other team members’ free riding constitutes a ‘second-order’ public good, which must be assumed to suffer from underproduction (c.f. e.g., Coleman, 1994, pp. 270-271).
Nevertheless, contrary to that reasoning, under certain conditions, group members appear to be willing to sanction non-collaborative colleague behavior irrespective of the costs implied. For example, this phenomenon has been observed in field situations (see e.g., Ostrom, 1990) as well as in laboratory public goods experiments (see e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Yet, the literature does not offer a consistent picture and understanding of why group members decide to do so. Moreover, examinations of factors relevant to group members’ control decisions are mainly experimental—field knowledge is scarce (Di Stefano, King, & Verona, 2015). Consequently, in order to understand how peer control of free riding can be facilitated, it is necessary to identify the cognitive mechanisms and related factors that drive such behavior. Following this aim, this study sought to uncover why peers are willing to engage in the costly control of free riding.
We approach this question as follows: first, we summarize insights from social dilemma literature on why group members engage in peer control and introduce a theoretical model of decision-making in social dilemma situations. Second, we conduct a qualitative interview study where we identify salient context factors that drive peer-control behavior in knowledge-intensive teamwork. Third, we test our hypotheses with a factorial survey.
However, peer control of free riding constitutes a second-order social dilemma situation. The dilemma results from the fact that control exerted by peers in response to free riding, for example, by social sanctions or social compensation (Williams & Sommer, 1997), implies costs for the controllers but at the same time produces direct positive externalities for other non-controlling peers who cannot be excluded from the consumption of the benefits of the exerted control. Such control costs comprise, for instance, the risk of retaliation, potential loss of relationship, the loss of time or money, or at least emotional tensions (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Hence, from a rational choice perspective, controlling other team members’ free riding constitutes a ‘second-order’ public good, which must be assumed to suffer from underproduction (c.f. e.g., Coleman, 1994, pp. 270-271).
Nevertheless, contrary to that reasoning, under certain conditions, group members appear to be willing to sanction non-collaborative colleague behavior irrespective of the costs implied. For example, this phenomenon has been observed in field situations (see e.g., Ostrom, 1990) as well as in laboratory public goods experiments (see e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Yet, the literature does not offer a consistent picture and understanding of why group members decide to do so. Moreover, examinations of factors relevant to group members’ control decisions are mainly experimental—field knowledge is scarce (Di Stefano, King, & Verona, 2015). Consequently, in order to understand how peer control of free riding can be facilitated, it is necessary to identify the cognitive mechanisms and related factors that drive such behavior. Following this aim, this study sought to uncover why peers are willing to engage in the costly control of free riding.
We approach this question as follows: first, we summarize insights from social dilemma literature on why group members engage in peer control and introduce a theoretical model of decision-making in social dilemma situations. Second, we conduct a qualitative interview study where we identify salient context factors that drive peer-control behavior in knowledge-intensive teamwork. Third, we test our hypotheses with a factorial survey.
Language
English
Book title
Proceedings of the Eightieth Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management.
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
260180