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Can Tax Evasion Tame Leviathan Governments?
Journal
Public Choice
ISSN
0048-5829
ISSN-Digital
1573-7101
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2008-06-06
Author(s)
Brevik, Frode
Abstract
This paper asks to what extent institutional features that facilitate tax evasion may keep Leviathan governments at bay. The specific feature we look at is banking secrecy abroad. The analysis draws on a 16-generation OLG model in which tax rates are determined in a repeated game between voters and a rent-seeking Leviathan government. Key insights are: (1) Effects on any generation alive when change takes place may differ substantially from steady-state effects that accrue for generations yet to be born. (2) There is considerable intergenerational diversity in these effects that is not monotonic as we move from young to old. Combined, these results suggest that the political economy of pertinent institutional change may be quite complex.
[http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2006/DP19_Ga.pdf Download discussion paper version]
[https://commerce.metapress.com/content/p3793k08l4r0l395/resource-secured/?target=fulltext.pdf&sid=0bt0is554pvvtav1n2gyhq55&sh=www.springerlink.com Download article (requires subscription)]
[http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2006/DP19_Ga.pdf Download discussion paper version]
[https://commerce.metapress.com/content/p3793k08l4r0l395/resource-secured/?target=fulltext.pdf&sid=0bt0is554pvvtav1n2gyhq55&sh=www.springerlink.com Download article (requires subscription)]
Language
English
Keywords
Leviathan government
income tax
tax evasion
public spending
rent seeking
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Springer Science + Business Media
Publisher place
Dordrecht
Volume
136
Number
1-2, Jul
Start page
103
End page
122
Pages
20
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
45530