Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Publication
    Contract Nonperformance Risk and Uncertainty in Insurance Markets
    (ELSEVIER, 2019-07) ;
    Landmann, Andreas
    ;
    Santana, Maria Isabel
    Insurance contracts may fail to perform, leading to a default on valid claims. We relax the standard assumption of known probabilities for such defaults by allowing for uncertainty. Within a large behavioral experiment, we show that introducing risk and uncertainty each leads to significant reductions in insurance demand and that the effects are comparable in magnitude (17.1 and 14.5 percentage points). Furthermore, risk- and ambiguity-averse participants are affected most. These findings are in line with models incorporating ambiguity attitudes or, alternatively, pessimistic beliefs. An analysis of the belief and decision dynamics suggests persistent pessimistic priors and disregard of peer experiences, leading to a stable uncertainty effect.
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    Scopus© Citations 11
  • Publication
    Can Group Incentives Alleviate Moral Hazard? The Role of Pro-Social Preferences
    (Elsevier, 2018-01) ; ;
    Landmann, Andreas
    ;
    Pradhan, Shailee
    Incentivizing unobservable effort in risky environments, such as in insurance, credit, and labor markets, is vital as moral hazard may otherwise cause significant welfare losses including the outright failure of markets. Ensuring incentive-compatibility through state-contingent contracts between principal and agent, however, is undesirable for risk-averse agents. We provide a theoretical intuition on how pro-social preferences between agents in a joint liability group con-tract can ensure incentive-compatibility. Two independent large-scale behavioral experiments framed in an insurance context support the hypotheses derived from our theory. In particular, effort decreases when making agents’ payoff less state-dependent, but this effect is mitigated with joint liability in a group scheme where agents are additionally motivated by pro-social concerns. Activating strategic motives slightly increases effort further; particularly in non-anonymous groups with high network strength. The results support existing evidence on joint liability groups and further suggest that even if peer pressure to ensure effort provision is absent, such group policies can improve efficiency when agents are pro-social.
    Scopus© Citations 13