Petra Maria Thiemann
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Thiemann
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Petra Maria
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  • Publication
    After-School care and parents' Labor supply
    (Elsevier, 2016-10)
    Felfe, Christina
    ;
    Lechner, Michael
    ;
    Thiemann, Petra
    Does the provision of after-school care promote maternal employment and thus help to foster gender equality in labor supply? We address this question by exploiting variation in cantonal (state) regulations of after-school care provision in Switzerland. To establish exogeneity of cantonal regulations with respect to employment opportunities and preferences of the population, we restrict our analysis to confined regions along cantonal borders. While no impact of the after-school care provision on parental employment exists overall, we find a positive impact on the full-time employment of mothers.
    Type: journal article
    Journal: Labour Economics
    Volume: 42
    DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2016.06.009
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/103846
    Scopus© Citations 23
  • Publication
    Financial work incentives for disability benefit recipients: lessons from a randomised field experiment
    (Springer Open, 2015-09)
    Bütler, Monika
    ;
    Deuchert, Eva
    ;
    Lechner, Michael
    ;
    Staubli, Stefan
    ;
    Thiemann, Petra
    Disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose part or all of their benefits if earnings exceed certain thresholds (“cash-cliffs”). This implicit taxation is considered the prime reason for the low number of beneficiaries who expand work and reduce benefit receipt. We analyse a conditional cash programme that incentivises work related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. Four thousand DI beneficiaries received an offer to claim up to CHF 72,000 (USD 77,000) if they expand work and reduce benefits. Initial reactions to the programme announcement, measured by call-back rates, are modest. By the end of the field phase, the take-up rate is only 0.5 %.
    Type: journal article
    Journal: IZA Journal of Labor Policy
    Volume: 4
    Issue: 18
    DOI: 10.1186/s40173-015-0044-7
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/105997
    Scopus© Citations 15
  • Publication
    Financial work incentives for disability benefit recipients: Lessons from a randomized field experiment
    (University of St. Gallen Department of Economics Working Paper Series, 2014-02)
    Bütler, Monika
    ;
    Lechner, Michael
    ;
    Deuchert, Eva
    ;
    Staubli, Stefan
    ;
    Thiemann, Petra
    Disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose some of their benefits if their earnings exceed certain thresholds (“cash-cliffs”). When this reduction is too high, this implicit taxation of earnings is considered to be one of the prime reasons for the low outflow from DI. This paper analyzes a conditional cash program that incentivizes work related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. A randomized group of DI beneficiaries receive the offer to claim a payment of up to CHF 72,000 (USD 71,000) if they take up or expand employment and reduce DI claims. This paper presents the results of the short-term evaluation by analyzing the first reactions to the announcement of seed capital. Overall, the interest in taking-up the financial incentive is low at only 3%. Individuals close to cash-cliffs react more on seed capital but the overall magnitude is small. Our results suggest that work-disincentives imposed by cash-cliffs are unlikely to be the main driver for low employment and outflow from the Swiss disability insurance system, despite the fact that the partial disability insurance system generates a non-linear budget set and bunching behavior at cash-cliffs prior to the implementation of seed capital.
    Type: discussion paper
    Issue: 2014-06
    DOI: 10.1186/s40173-015-0044-7
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/87324
    Scopus© Citations 15