Journal of Social and Political Philosophy 5.1 (2026): 26–41
DOI: 10.3366/jspp.2026.0128

www.euppublishing.com/jspp

On Cicero's *Sensus Communis*: Common Sense in the Social Laboratory of Rhetoric

THOMAS TELIOS

University of St. Gallen

Abstract:
This article reconstructs Cicero's original contribution to the concept of *sensus communis* by situating it within Roman rhetorical practice and Cicero's broader social philosophy. Departing from Aristotle's object-oriented and truth-seeking model of rhetoric, Cicero redefines rhetorical activity as a socially embedded, audience-oriented practice aimed at securing the welfare of the state. This shift transforms the rhetor into an orator-statesman whose task is not simply to discover truth, but to mobilise the shared norms, emotions, and expectations of the community. The article argues that Cicero's understanding of *sensus communis* – a socially produced horizon of shared norms, feelings, and ways of acting – functions as a communal precondition for persuasive public reasoning. By analysing Cicero's four *personae* in *De Officiis*, the study shows how Cicero anticipates a theory of collective subjectivity in which individuality emerges from the interplay of reason, singularity, circumstance, and judgement. Through close readings of *Pro Plancio* and *De Oratore*, the article ultimately presents *sensus communis* as both a mode of social belonging and a medium of self-determination within communal life.

Keywords: Cicero; *sensus communis*; Roman rhetoric; collective subjectivity; personae (*De Officiis*).

I. Introduction: Cicero and the Communal Character of Classic Roman Rhetoric

It is Hans-Georg Gadamer's merit to have reminded us of the 'classical' (Gadamer 2004: 18), pre-Scottish understanding of common sense as a rhetorical instrument and – in doing so – to have drawn attention to the communal emergence and social functionality of common sense. For the hermeneutist Gadamer, common sense cannot be an innate quality or faculty but the social-ontological aggregate of 'our words and deeds'; 'a sense that is acquired through living in the community and is determined by its structures and aims' (ibid.: 20).

Tracing such an understanding of common sense back to the 'classical tradition' (ibid.: 18) is not to lump the Roman *sensus communis* with the Greek *κοινὴ αἴσθησις* or to assume that the former is the direct successor to the latter. Aristotle and Cicero, the two most prominent proponents of the Greek and Roman rhetoric respectively, share, of course, the rejection of the instrumentalisation of rhetoric as sophistry.[1] However, *sensus communis* as the 'shared but unstated *mores* of the community, the manners by which the community *acts as a* community' (Schaeffer 1990: 2, emphasis added) is a genuine Roman discovery accomplished by Cicero through following semantic shifts:[2]

1. The first shift pertains to the task that Cicero attributes to rhetoric. For Aristotle, the scope of rhetoric is the discovery of 'the persuasive factors belonging in each case' (Aristotle 2018:

1355[b] 1.10). Contrarily, for Cicero, as he states in *De Inventione*, one of the first two works in Latin on rhetoric (the other being *Rhetorica ad Herennium* of unknown authorship), the function of rhetoric 'seems to be to speak in a manner suited to persuade an audience' (Cicero 1968: I.v.6, 15).While this does not connote a major departure from Aristotle's definition of the task of rhetoric, the decisive shift comes in the next subclause: '*finis persuadere dictione*', namely 'the goal is to be persuaded by speech' (ibid.: I.v.6, 15).[3] Seen this way, while the Aristotelian rhetor persuades in order to convey the truth they had discovered, Cicero's orator persuades for the sake of persuasion and does not shy away from using any means possible to make that happen. As Elisabeth Begemann comments, 'the good orator will choose those arguments which are most likely to support his cause and will abbreviate, distort, and misrepresent others that might weaken it' (Begemann 2022: 138).

2. In doing so, however, rhetoric forfeits its (Aristotelian) philosophic-syllogistic character. In lieu thereof, rhetoric becomes an instrument whose goal resides in guaranteeing, as Cicero unmistakeably puts it, 'the safety of the state at large' (Cicero/Sutton 1967a: I.34).
3. As a consequence, the role of the speaker is readjusted. Cicero transforms the speaker from an (Aristotelian) rhetor and truth-seeker to an orator and statesman. Cicero's rhetor is a statesman who is elevated to a 'helmsman of the state and the author of public policy' (ibid.: I.211). Their task is to 'utilise the means by which the state's interests are secured and advanced' (ibid.: I.211) and to put 'the thoughts and counsels of the mind in words, in such a way that it can drive the audience in whatever direction it has applied its weight' (ibid.: III.55). In doing so, however, the rhetor recalibrates themselves as an actor and rhetoric is resignified from a public act of philosophic scrutiny to a spectacle. As James M. May translates Cicero's appraisal of the actor Quintus Roscius, Cicero's role model, in *Brutus* (1966: 290, 1–7):

> I [Cicero] want my orator to have this experience: When people hear that he is to speak, all the places among the benches are taken, the tribunal is full, the clerks are gracious in assigning and giving up places, the crowd is varied, the juror intent. When he rises to speak, silence is signalled by the crowd, followed by repeated applause and much admiration. They laugh when he wishes; when he wishes they cry; so that if someone should catch sight of these proceedings from afar – even if he were unfamiliar with the case at issue – he would still recognize that an orator was pleasing his audience and that a Roscius was on the stage. (May 2002: 57)

4. This brings us to the final shift that Cicero carries out, namely the shift from (Aristotelian) object-oriented relationality to (Ciceronian) contextual relativity. For Aristotle, rhetoric paves the way (*ὁδοποιεῖν*) that renders it possible to 'examine the reason' why one is able 'to criticise or uphold an argument, to defend themselves or to accuse' (Aristotle 2018: Rh I1 1354[a]3–5).[4] By introducing his three types of rhetorical speeches (deliberative, forensic, epideictic) and by carving out the three means of persuasion (the character of the speaker, the appeal to the emotions of the audience/hearers, the power of argumentative reasoning and logic), Aristotle wishes to sensibilise the rhetor regarding the different contexts within which they will find themselves performing and to arm them with adequate and appropriate means to express their syllogistic arguments. The reason for the latter is that the rhetor's task according to Aristotle is to discover the inherent truth of facts, actions and persons, and then come up with the best way to present them. In this light, rhetoric is confirmed as object-oriented and relational: object-oriented since it accesses the truth

> content inherent to an object of knowledge and relational since the forms that rhetorical syllogisms acquire depend on the three different types of rhetorical speeches and means of persuasion. Cicero is equally inventive as Aristotle. He lays down the fundaments of rhetorical speechwriting and presents a thorough account of what he considers 'virtues of style' (*virtutes dicendi*).[5] However, neither the 'activities of the orator' nor the 'virtues of style' are relational but relative. They do not aim at deciphering the object at hand through the invention of means of persuasion but have the sole purpose of equipping the rhetor with all possible means to emerge victorious and triumphant over their opponents.[6]

Through these shifts, Cicero fortifies his understanding of *sensus communis* as what C.S. Lewis calls a 'social virtue' (Lewis 1960: 148), namely as a virtue acquired through and thanks to living within a community. As will be shown, and if properly read, Cicero's use of the term *sensus communis* allows us to think of common sense as a social precondition for the evaluation of a sound rhetorical argument. What I mean by social precondition is a communitarian understanding of *sensus communis* as institutionalised/instituted common sense. While Cicero – for the biggest part of twentieth century – has been appropriated by conservative thinkers such as Leo Strauss (1963; 1973; 1975) and Eric Voegelin (1952) and has been conventionally categorised as a republican (Schofield 2021; Nicgorski 2022) or – for an inexplicable reason – even as a libertarian thinker (Woolf 2015: 86),[7] the ways in which he introduces and uses *sensus communis* disclose Cicero as rather a communitarian thinker *avant la lettre*. As Will Kymlicka defines what he calls 'the social thesis' – communitarianism's centrepiece:

> citizens must feel that they *belong* to the same community. They must have a desire to continue to live together and govern together, and to share the same fate … Social unity, in short, requires that citizens identify with each other, and view their fellow citizens as one of 'us'. (Kymlicka 2002: 257)

There is no other concept that better demonstrates Cicero's deep communitarianism than the concept of the *sensus communis* that illustrates the ambivalent position of a subject that can determine itself while belonging to a community that imprints itself upon it and to which the subject needs to orient itself. To better explicate Cicero's understanding of *sensus communis*, I will now turn to John Dugan's (2005) social-constructivist reading of Cicero's philosophy of subjectivity as a self-fashioning project before proceeding to read Cicero's model of a subject consisting of four *personae* as a prototype for what I would like to call a theory of 'collective subjectivity'.

II. Cicero's Four *Personae* in *De Officiis*: Towards a Collective Understanding of the Subject

In his *Renaissance Self Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (1980) Stephen Greenblatt defines self-fashioning as a type of subjectivity production that 'involves [the subject's] submission to an absolute power or authority situated *at least partially outside the self*' (Greenblatt 1980: 9, emphasis added). Leaning on E. W. Leach's (1990) application of Greenblatt's concept of self-fashioning to Pliny, Dugan glosses three works of Cicero (*De Oratore*, *Brutus*, *Orator*) where rhetoric functions as such a technology of production of the self and where

the subject emanates as an externally conditioned and therefore heteronomously fashioned subjectivity. Dugan showcases the latter when analysing how Cicero, as a *novus homo* or 'new man' – i.e. one who succeeds in climbing the societal ladder while being 'deprived of the main means most Roman politicians used to gain an electoral edge: the ancestors who had given them their famous names' (Bishop 2019: 3) – appropriates the language of nobility for his own purposes. In Cicero's analysis of the 'new man' Dugan sees a subversive strategy of how – through hard work and mimetic adaptation – the '*novi homines* could … reverse the strategies and tropes the nobility used to exclude them from power' to establish themselves in the political arena (Dugan 2005: 12f.–13).[8] Similar to the ambivalences of the Foucauldian discourse that determines the subject while at the same time providing it with the conditions of its self-determination, and building on insights from Ellen Oliensis (1991) and Patrick Sinclair (1993), Dugan argues that 'Roman rhetoric itself is a discourse consumed with questions of the projection of identity, the formation of the self, and the proper use of speech for social acculturation and advancement' (Dugan 2005: 18).[9]

There is, however, an even better token to be found regarding Cicero's social-constructivist understanding of subjectivity, which could count as one of the first renditions of what I have elsewhere called (leaning on intersectionality theory) a 'collective subjectivity', i.e. a type of a subject that in order to become holistically intelligible needs to be analysed as comprising of more than one identity (Telios 2021; Telios 2023).[10] What I am referring to is, of course, Cicero's four *personae* theory of subjectivity that he develops in *De Officiis* leaning on the Stoics and above all Panaetius.

In *De Officiis*, Cicero sketches four *personae* that the individual embodies:[11] (1) a *persona* which is common to all human beings as partakers and users of the faculty of reason; (2) a *persona* which is singular to each human being granted by nature; (3) a *persona* imposed by chance or circumstance; (4) a *persona* that is the result of our own volition and decision.[12]

The first two *personae* appear in *De Officiis* I.107 while the last two appear in I.115. The first *persona* is a 'common *persona*' that all men share by partaking in reason (*omnes participes sumus rationis*). This *persona* does not just differentiate man from animal (*bestiis*). It is also the source for all that is honourable (*honestum*) and frames what should be considered as appropriate (*decorum*). By calling this *persona communis* Cicero begs the question of the origin of this shared commonality. The answer to that question is of course reason (*ratio*), yet it is unclear what kind of reason, whether a universal or a contextually determined and socially embedded reason. What is clear, however, is that we are neither 'endowed' with reason as Miller suggests (Cicero/Miller 1928: 109), nor do we 'share that reason' in John Higginbotham's translation (Cicero/Higginbotham 1967b: 76), or 'have a share in reason' as Margaret Atkins argues (Cicero/Atkins 1991: 42), all of them implying that reason is something that we consider ourselves entitled to possess. Rather, Cicero's term for the subject's relation to reason is *participes*, namely that we are all participants in reason or in Patrick G. Walsh's recent translation that 'all of us share by virtue of our participation in that reason' (Cicero/Walsh 2000: 37). The nuance regarding whether we participate in reason, or we are endowed with reason, and/or can share reason because we are entitled to reason is important. Being endowed with something presupposes a metaphysical assumption. Being entitled to reason and therefore being able to share it implies that reason is a fraction or property of the individual and that the individual can sovereignly dispose of it at its own discretion. On the contrary, Cicero's *participes* points to something different. To participate in something, this something needs to logically condition us both etiologically and

temporally. We participate in (a type of) reason because reason prevails in a community within which we are socialised. As such, it conditions us because it temporally precedes us. Further, we participate in (a type of) reason because our own mindset is a fraction of this reason. As such, it conditions us because it provides the cause that explains how our mindset is shaped.

The second *persona* reads *singulis* in the original Latin text, or in more detail: *altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa* (Cicero 1928: I.107). Whereas it is understandable why the older interpreters (e.g. Miller and Atkins), echoing their different and respective cultural spheres, opt for the term 'individual' to translate the Latin *singulus*, it is equally understandable why for us. after Jean-Luc Nancy's *Being Singular Plural* (2000), Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello's *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (2005) or Andreas Reckwitz's *The Society of Singularities* (2020), singularity is a concept that neither can nor should be confused with the concept of individuality. While individuality denotes an integral, sovereign, ahistorical, universalised and unembeddable entity, the concept of singularity – broadly speaking – refers to the irreducible and unique manifestation of a socialised atom. This atom embodies, in a highly differentiated, incommensurable and ingeniously synthesised manner, the full spectrum of social, political and aesthetic structures and institutions that shape it. However, in this process, it assumes that its origin lies within itself rather than in the surrounding structures that have formed it. This is the reason why both Walsh's and Higginbotham's translations are bolder and maybe even closer to the Latin text when translating Cicero's *singulis* as something 'assigned uniquely to each individual' (Cicero/Walsh 2000: 37) or as 'particular to each individual' (Cicero/Higginbotham 1967b: 76). These two translations bring to the fore the irreducibility of the components of which society consists. In this light, the second *persona* stands both in contrast and complementary to the reading of the first *persona* offered earlier. While through the first *persona* Cicero seems to argue for the fact that we are partakers in something that precedes us and therefore conditions us, with the second *persona* Cicero seems to want to avoid the post-hoc fallacy that as partakers of and participants in the same thing we are therefore the same. To recant Greenblatt, the fact that we are subjectivated or conditioned by something that is 'situated *at least partially outside the self*' and in which we partake does not mean that we become alike (Greenblatt 1980: 9). Rather, as Cicero argues further in *De Officiis* I.107, just as there are bodily characteristics that differentiate individuals from one another, there are also mental or intellectual characteristics that are singular to each individual and through which individuals can be distinguished and that provide the base for everyone's singular appearance. Although the subjects may partake of the same qualities such as reason, this does not render them same and – as I argue – the reason for that is rendered possible through the interjection of the third and fourth *persona.*

Cicero's third and fourth *personae* are not as clearly and elaborately analysed as the first two. The third *persona* provides the modal-temporal horizon within which the first and second *personae* accrue. As Cicero puts it, the third *persona* is one that '*casus aliqui aut tempus imponit*' (Cicero 1928: I.115). *Casus* and *tempus* are given as 'chance or circumstance' by all three interpreters (Cicero/Miller 1928: 117; Cicero/Atkins 1991: 45; Cicero/Walsh 2000: 39), but Higginbotham renders it as 'time and chance' (Cicero/Higginbotham 1967b: 80). Despite the unanimity regarding these terms, it is the different translations of Cicero's verb *imponit* that are interesting in order to grasp the potential semantic nuances of the third *persona*. Miller and Atkins use 'impose' (Cicero/Miller 1928: 117; Cicero/Atkins 1991: 45), while Walsh speaks of 'demand' (Cicero/Walsh 2000: 39). However, it is Higginbotham's

translation of *imponit* as 'allotted' (Cicero/Higginbotham 1967b: 80) that corresponds most fittingly to the interpretation of Cicero's four *personae* that I wish to bring forward. As Andrew R. Dyck mentions in his stupendous commentary on Cicero's *De Officiis* (1997: 284), by underlining *casus* and *tempus*, Panaetius – and consequently also Cicero – break from Stoic determinism. As Dyck puts it, *tempus* and *casus* are elaborations and further explications of the term *necessitas* that Cicero introduces in *De Officiis* I.114. For Dyck, *necessitas* connotes 'a condition imposed by external circumstances' (Dyck 1997: 285). This could lead to the assumption that the third *persona* is conditioned by reason and singularity, the first two *personae*. This is, however, not the case. Rather, all three are to be considered as invariants and equally constitutive parameters of the 'framework' from which the subject will emerge (ibid.: 286). The reason why Higginbotham's 'allotted' is more accurate than Miller's, Atkins's and Dyck's 'impose' or Walsh's 'demand' lies in the fact that whereas 'impose' seems to suggest a (cosmic, natural or spiritual) intentionality or (world) mind and 'demand' seems to presuppose a teleological cause that would allow for Stoic determinism to creep back in, 'allotted' funnels contingency as a constitutive principle of the individual's singular process of being.[13]

Finally, the fourth *persona* condones and reinforces the possibility for self-determination; an option that could be surmised as having gone astray amidst the individual's previous embedded – and therefore heteronomous – layers of external determination. Notwithstanding the fact that this analysis of Cicero's theory of subjectivity is indebted to Dugan's pioneering work on Cicero's subject as a Foucauldian 'self-fashioned' entity, it is obvious why in this regard the fourth *persona, nobismet ipsi iudicio nostro accommodamus* (Cicero 1928: I.115), is not, as Dugan states, 'the domain of individual *will*' or 'that aspect of the self which one can shape *according to design*' (Dugan 2005: 6, emphasis added). Even less is it what 'we choose for ourselves on our own initiative' (Cicero/Higginbotham 1967b: 80). Rather, Cicero's *iudicio* that Dugan interprets as 'will' and Higginbotham as 'own initiative' is debunked as a matter of 'choice' (Dyck 1997: 269), 'deliberate choice' (Cicero/Miller 1928: 117) or 'studied choice' (Cicero/Walsh 2000: 39) and finally a matter of 'decision' (Cicero/Atkins 1991: 45). Opting for a deliberate or studied choice or 'decision' over the expression of a 'will' or an 'initiative' rooted in the self to convey the term *iudicio* is crucial. *Iudicio* implies some form of judgement; a term that will reverberate and be made an essential element in Immanuel Kant's concept of *Gemeinsinn*. Cicero's *iudicio* may not be directly associated with common sense, yet it is tangential to the communal framework from which the subjectivity emanates and to which – as will be seen – the subject needs to orient itself through common sense in order to determine itself. Cicero's reference to the (necessity of) *iudicio* in his portrayal of the fourth *persona* connotes such a process of mediation and adjudication: It does not betoken the unlimited self-expression and self-manifestation of a sovereign will nor the unconstrained realisation of a pure subjective intention. Instead, it evinces the necessity to accommodate (*accommodamus*), i.e. adjudge, weigh and appoint the action it will follow from within a pregiven set of options. The subject's expression (fourth *persona*) is a form of (re-)articulation of the singular position that the subject finds itself in (second *persona*) as informed by the subject's participation in reason (first *persona*) and delimited or contingent to time, chance, circumstance or the subject's concrete situation (third *persona*). If read together, Cicero's four *personae* demonstrate (1) the subject's being conditioned by external factors such as reason and time; (2) the subject's singularisation thanks to the unique condensation and embeddedness of the conditioning factors within a social context; and (3) the possibility of

self-determination that arises from the subject being the intersecting and therefore dynamic product of the social embeddedness and contextualisation of the contingent parameters that condition the subject.

Cicero's collective theory of subjectivity does not necessarily render Cicero a radical social-constructivist who does not acknowledge (metaphysical) conditions or dispositions that frame the subject's self-fashioning. Nonetheless, it does imply that, in its decision-making deliberation on how to act as well as in its process of self-identification or self-fashioning, the subject must factor in both alleged pre-social qualities as well as social modes of subjectivity production. The four *personae* provide an eclectic amalgam of external determining factors (third *persona*: time and chance, circumstance or concrete occasion and situation), properties we partake of (first *persona*: reason), socially embedded and contextualised forms of appearance and being (second *persona*: singularity) and self-programming mechanisms (fourth *persona*: judgement). Dyck is correct in drawing attention to the fact that what motivates Cicero to carve out his quaternary matrix is the fact that 'moral decisions are complex' (Dyck 1997: 269 FN 154). Just as Dyck is also correct when pointing out that Cicero's four categories are indeed but an 'oversimplification' (ibid.: 269 FN 154). The *personae* are not a type of linear algorithm that the subject can go through in order to meet a decision. Rather, the *personae* are simultaneously in play throughout the whole process of the subject's becoming. However, this is the case only due to the subject's embeddedness within social structures. As Manfred Fuhrmann summarises what I argue could be addressed as Cicero's theory of embedded and collective identity:

> the identity at issue here is, as can be seen, not a subjective category, not a self seen from within one's own inside [*aus dem eigenen Inneren gesehenes Ich*], not a unity of experience and consciousness – it is a category [*Größe*] viewed from within society's 'chart' [*Stellenplan*], a conventional given [*Gegebenheit*], a 'pattern', in short: the *perpetuated social role*. (Fuhrmann 1979: 101, my translation, emphasis added)

In this light, Cicero's theory of subjectivity questions the unity of the subject by supplementing the integral individuality with a collective type of subjectivity that is the amalgam of more than one simultaneously acting presupposition (reason), embedded situation (singularity) or parameter (time and chance) that – to quote one last time Greenblatt's ingenious utterance – are 'at least partially outside' of the individual and delimit or provide the subject's scope of action (judgement).[14]

This is the role that – as I will show – *sensus communis* is called upon to serve, namely, to make the subject aware of its social embeddedness as well as of the conditionalisation of its actions upon presuppositions, inclinations/dispositions and preexisting (social, political and cultural) institutions or practices (morals and customs). In the few passages that Cicero mentions the term in his entire theoretical oeuvre on rhetoric, he never goes to great lengths to define the term, which is left not only imprecise but even convoluted and carrying different and often contradictory allusions and meanings. Therefore, in what follows, I will turn only to three significant appearances of the concept of *sensus communis* – one in *Pro Plancio* and two in *De Oratore* – that demarcate what is not only Cicero's most important contribution within the intellectual history of the concept of common sense, but – more importantly – a genuine theory of common sense as a synthetic and complex vector that by embedding and fashioning the subject within a community vests it simultaneously with agency and the capacity to determine and fashion itself.[15]

III. Cicero's *Sensus Communis*: Common Sense as Horizon of Social Belonging and Means towards Self-Determination

In *Pro Plancio*, a speech held in 54 BCE, Cicero defends his friend Gnaeus Plancius who after his election as *aedile* was accused by one of his defeated opponents of electoral malpractice. The opponent, Marcus Iuventius Laterensis, had argued that Plancius was unfit for a public office due to his father being a tax collector (*publicanus*), a strict person and a foul-mouth. In his speech, Cicero pretends to be both offended and surprised by the audacity of Laterensis in daring to assume that a son could be held accountable for the demeanour of his father. As Cicero argues, even if the father were indeed a mean or sordid person, due to his identity as a father he would still never stand up against his own son in front of a jury. As Cicero puts it, the latter corresponds to and echoes '*communi sensu omnium et dulcissima commendatione naturae*' that S. E. W. Bugter translates as 'the common norms of all men and the very welcome commendation of nature' (Bugter 1987: 89), and Charles D. Yonge renders as 'the common feelings of all men, and … the sweet recommendation of nature' (Cicero/Yonge 1917: §13). The aetiological singular ablative '*communis sensu omnium*' and '*dulcissima commendatione naturae*' seems to remedy the disturbed order between nature as a source of precepts or prescripts and common sense as a human condition or something pertaining to living within a community. While nature predates the subject and as such frames, guides and provides orientation, the commonality of norms and feelings alludes to a process that everyone can participate in and shape. Norms and feelings cannot be presumed to be common or shared. Rather, they first must achieve this status or 'standard', as Bugter puts it. To do so, however, norms and feelings need to be processed with a certain context. This context is for Cicero a social one. Only when filtered through a community where these norms and feelings are introduced, worked, discussed, examined, confirmed and sanctioned by all (*omnium*) can norms and feelings be reckoned as common.

Notwithstanding, this process is bidirectional. Working on and processing what will account as common and shared becomes a constitutive process for the community as such. Through abiding to certain norms and feelings that have proven themselves as common and shared, the disparate persons who pledge their loyalty to these shared and common norms and feelings consolidate themselves in a coherent social body that from now onwards can be considered as a community. Therefore, the fact that the father stands behind his son and never turns against him is not a matter dictated by nature but a social contract and convention agreed upon by all members within a certain circle and/or community. The one would not suffice without the other and it is out of this delicate dance that needs to equally include both nature and community that norms emanate. This is the reason why Cicero is very careful in expressing the love of a father towards his son not as a matter of obligation, but as the most sweet, subtle, delicate or loving (*dulcissima*) commendation (*commendatione*) that nature 'commit[s] to one for preservation' or 'intrust[s] to one's charge and care'. In this light, the fact that Cicero uses the term *commendatio* to describe and evaluate nature's contribution to the commonsensical expectedness that a father stands behind his son is not coincidental but symptomatic. As Lewis and Short define in their *Latin Dictionary* (1879), the verb *mandare* conveys the same meaning as the verb *commendare* from where the noun *commendatio* is derived. Only when related to an office or someone holding an office does *mandare* connote 'to order' or 'to command'. What then does Cicero aim at when expressing the solidarity and devotion within the family as a *commendatio* of nature? I can only think of two potential answers: first, by referring to the 'sweetest commendation' of nature, Cicero pays tribute to the affection and tenderness

characterising every (well-functioning) father–son relation. Undoubtedly, such a generalisation also serves Cicero's trial interests. Had it been a natural factuality that the fathers blindly stand behind their sons, then this would not speak specifically for the loving and caring relationship between Plancius and his father that Cicero seeks to establish so as to counteract his opponent's accusation. By using the expression '*dulcissima commendatione naturae*' Cicero allows for both: on the one hand he acknowledges that there is something natural and almost biological in a father protecting his son and, on the other hand, that the concrete social relationship binding Plancius and his father is so strong that it would have been unthinkable to suggest that Plancius' father would not have stood behind his son. Second, and for our purpose more significant, what Cicero points to when using the word *commendatio* is that what nature recommends is in accordance with and corroborates the status that the community also attributes to the father–son relation. If paternal solidarity were a natural mandate, imperative or law, then society or community would be irrelevant. However, this is not the case here. Rather, what nature does is to support and commend (*con*: with + *mandare*: entrust, order, commission, command) that which social processes have also already established. Nature seems to work auxiliary to society, and natural mandates seem to be ancillary to social norms and feelings. In this light, common sense seems to be for Cicero a collective event and more precisely a double collective event. What accounts as common must also be corroborated by nature. This does not reinstate 'nature' as an authority which would automatically indicate a dualism or dichotomy between culture and nature; a deeply modern diremption. However, what Cicero seems to suggest here is that a loving father–son relationship is not only a social good but also from a natural perspective something that we need to cherish and consider as a springboard.

Coming now to the second set of the appearances of *sensus communis* in *De Oratore*, Cicero's landmark study on rhetoric, the first appearance of the term (Cicero/Sutton 1967a: I.12) occurs in the introduction where Cicero directly delineates his own predicament when writing the *De Oratore*, the difficulties of rhetoric, as well as his requirements and expectations of the ideal orator. The second appearance takes place in the second book (Cicero/Sutton 1967a: II.68) as part of the fictional debate set in September 91 BCE at the villa of Marcus Antonius in Tusculum between two of the greatest rhetors of their time: the host, Marcus Antonius, and Lucius Licinius Crassus, Cicero's teacher. Quintus Mucius Scaevola, Gaius Aurelius Cotta and Publius Sulpicius Rufus are also present, and by asking questions or through minor contributions help move the discussion forward.

Concerning the concrete appearances of the concept of *sensus communis* in *De Oratore*, the first mention occurs at the point where Cicero tries to explain why there have been so few good rhetors in comparison to so many good proponents of the other arts. For Cicero, the answer lies in the fact that while the quality of all other artists lies in mastering something that transcends everyday use, 'all the procedures of oratory lie within everyone's reach, and are concerned with everyday experience and with human nature and speech' (ibid.: II.68). This is exactly the point where the term *sensus communis* appears. As Cicero writes, 'in oratory the very cardinal sin is to depart from the language of everyday life, and the usage approved by the sense of the community [*a consuetudine communis sensus abhorrere*]' (Cicero/Sutton 1967a: I.12).[16]

The second appearance of the term is in *De Oratore* II.68 during Marcus Antonius's lengthier speech on the domains and applications of rhetoric, the differences between rhetoric and philosophy (as well as between rhetoric and the other arts), and finally on the difficulties of forensic rhetoric speech. As Cicero argues via Marcus Antonius, rhetoric does not have the concrete and narrow characteristic style of historiography nor the abstract mannerism of philosophy. This renders rhetoric freer yet at the same time more demanding and necessarily

more holistic since it needs to include more than one point of reflection. As Cicero's Marcus Antonius puts it:

> Of course I hold that all things relating to the intercourse of fellow-citizens and the ways of mankind, or concerned with everyday life, the political system, our own corporate society, the common *sentiments* of humanity, natural inclinations and morals must be mastered by the orator; if not in the sense that he is to advise on these matters one by one, as the philosophers do, yet so far at least as to enable him to weave them skilfully into his discourse, and moreover to speak of these very things in the same way as the founders of rules of law, statutes and civil communities spoke, frankly and lucidly, with no formal train of argument or barren verbal controversy. (Cicero/Sutton 1967a: II.68)

There are two main issues that Cicero addresses and that at the same time belong to what is for me Cicero's most original contribution regarding common sense: The first pertains to the meaning of the concept of common sense. The second pertains to the (social, political and cultural) instances and institutions that function as vectors of sense-making and will be sedimented to form *sensus communis*. The former tackles the semantic broadness of the sense in common sense. The latter tackles what institutes the common in common sense.

Regarding how to understand the sense in common sense, there are both quantitative and qualitative arguments to be distilled from Cicero's *De Oratore* II.68. What Sutton translates as 'the common *sentiments* of humanity' (emphasis added) is translated by May/Wisse as 'the way people usually *think*' (Cicero/May/Wisse 2001: 141, emphasis added). Translating the Latin *sensus* through the binary dipole sentiment/thinking is not new. It has been already encountered above in *Pro Plancio* where Bugter translates '*communi sensu omnium*' as 'the common *norms* of all' (Bugter 1987: 89, emphasis added) and Yonge translates the same phrase as 'the common *feelings* of all' (Cicero/Yonge 1917: §13, emphasis added). As Short/Lewis (1879) demonstrate, 'sentiment', 'feeling', 'norm' or 'the way people usually think' are all legitimate translations of the word *sensus*. However, what seems to be constant within this translatory *kykeon* is the adjective 'common'. No matter whether sense is a 'feeling', a 'sentiment', a 'norm' or 'way people usually think', in order for it to advance to a common sense it needs to prove itself as 'the common feelings of *all (omnium)*' (Cicero/Yonge 1917: §13, emphasis added), 'the common norms of *all (omnium)*' (Bugter 1987: 89, emphasis added), 'the way *people (hominum)* usually think' (Cicero/May/Wisse 2001: 141) or 'the common sentiments of *humanity (hominum)*' (Cicero/Sutton 1967a: II.68, emphasis added). In this light, the instance that defines what can account as 'feeling', 'sentiment', 'norm' or 'way people usually think' is the surrounding community, namely the inclusive totality of everyone. Call this the quantitative criterium of sense in common sense. No 'sentiment', 'feeling', 'norm', or 'way people usually think' can achieve the standing of common sense if it does not engulf and embrace unequivocally all (*omnium*) members within a community or if it is contested by members within the community who would feel disenfranchised and thereby would contest the commonality – i.e. sharing – of a 'sentiment', 'feeling', 'norm', or 'way people usually think'. However, there is another, qualitative, argument that pertains to the fact that one need not define exclusively whether sense in common sense is solely a 'sentiment', a 'feeling', a 'norm', or 'way people usually think'. Cicero's text allows for a broader and more inclusive reading of sense and the different translations that it has undergone bear witness to this semantic pluralism. Whether sense is an (innate) sentiment, a (personal) feeling, a (social) norm or a human faculty and way of thinking does not necessarily exclude that it cannot be any of the others. Sense in common sense is not common only because it is shared by everyone, it is common because it is collectively overdetermined to include sentiments, feelings, norms and ways of thinking that inform each other, and it is out of this

interrelation and interwovenness of (innate) sentiments, (personal) feelings, (social) norms and human faculties that the sense appears and achieves the status of a common sense.

Regarding how to understand the common in common sense, it is important to turn to the (social, political and cultural) instances and institutions that Cicero lists through Marcus Antonius in the above quoted paragraph (Cicero/Sutton 1967a: II.68). What the rhetor needs to consider in his speech starts – in Sutton's translation – with matters of 'everyday life' (*in consuetudine vitae*) before expanding to embrace 'the political system' (*ratione reipublicae*), 'our own corporate society' (*in hac societate civili*), 'the common sentiments of humanity' (*in sensu hominum communi*), 'natural inclinations' (*in natura*) and last but not least 'morals' (*in moribus*). May/Wisse illustrate this progression in a way that is impossible to overlook. For May/Wisse, the rhetor needs to 'master everything that is relevant to the practices of citizens and the ways humans behave' (Cicero/May/Wisse 2001: 141). Then – and here lies the ingeniousness of the two translators – a semi-colon follows ';' rendering thus what follows into *paratheses*, i.e. qualifications and explanatory details, of what proceeds the semi-colon. Seen this way, 'all that is connected with normal life' (*in consuetudine vitae*), 'the functioning of the State' (*ratione reipublicae*), 'our social order' (*in hac societate civili*), 'the way people usually think' (*in sensu hominum communi*), 'human nature' (*in natura*) and, finally, 'character' (*in moribus*) are but explications of what 'practices of citizens (*usum civium*) and the ways humans behave (*morem hominum*)' consist of. Therefore, to explain how human beings behave (*morem hominum*), what defines them as citizens (*civium*) and what guides, regulates and influences as well as delimits, constrains and determines their (social and political) practices (*usum*) within a community (*usum civium*), one needs to take into account the following parameters: (1) everyday life micro-practices (*in consuetudine vitae*) in order to (2) see how they are influenced and influence political logics (*ratione reipublicae*) and (3) form or are formed by social structures and institutions (*in hac societate civili*), so as to (4) guarantee the unhindered inclusion of everyone into what will become only in retrospect a community of people/subjects (*in sensu hominum communi*), while at the same time taking into consideration not only (5) dispositions and inclinations found in nature (*in natura*), but also (6) what is possible within established ethical customs (*in moribus*).

Cicero, however, does not just point out that to understand human behaviour we need to radically include all possible forms of the subject as an everyday person, social participant, political member, interacting human being, natural being and ethical animal. He also alludes, first, to the bottom-up and, second, to the processual character of the common sense that enacts and indicates the different spheres, domains or registers that common sense needs to go through to qualify and establish itself as common. On the one hand, common sense is a bottom-up process of socialisation because it takes off at a local level beginning from the smallest cells of communal existence such as everyday life micro-practices (*in consuetudine vitae*) before zooming-out to become almost internationalist (*sensu hominum communi* with emphasis on the word *hominum*). On the other hand, common sense is processual – if not performative even – because neither what accounts as sense nor what accounts as common can be presupposed. If sense becomes common sense through the interwovenness of feelings, sentiments, norms and ways of thinking that everyone shares and if common sense becomes common by being consolidated through a variety of social, political and cultural norms and institutions, then it is safe to surmise that what will arise as common sense is the result of a performative common sense-making process; performative, because the community that enunciates something as common participates in its establishing.

This is finally how to understand the relationship between *De Oratore* I.12 and *De Oratore* II.68. Recall that *De Oratore* I.12 argues that what the rhetor is not allowed to do is to 'depart from the language of everyday life, and the usage approved by the sense of the community [*a consuetudine communis sensus abhorrere*]'. However, Cicero does not define in *De Oratore* I.12 what he qualifies as common sense, or 'sense of community'. In my reading, this is what *De Oratore* II.68 accomplishes. To define the 'sense of community' (*sensus communis*) in *De Oratore* I.12, one needs to consider parameters spanning from everyday practices, political reasonings and social structures, to global interactions, natural delimitations and locally prevalent customs that are mentioned in *De Oratore* II.68. This is a collective process that comprises the different registers (politics, society, ethical customs, natural horizons etc.) that need to be considered both in their distinctive character as well as in their entanglement. In addition, it needs to guarantee that it has been informed by all participating persons and that it has incorporated every form of its manifestation such as feeling, sentiment, norm and way of thinking.

From this perspective, common sense cannot be a quality that is assumed to be universally shared. Rather, if it wants to claim to be truly common, it needs to prove itself as the result of socio-political processes entangling all (*omnium*) members of a given social context. The broader the pool of participants the more inclusive is what accounts as common sense. Yet it cannot achieve the conceptual status of common sense before it has guaranteed that everyone has been included in the common sense-making process.

In this light, however, arguing that common sense is the result or product of a community would be only one side of the coin. The community is also manifested through the common sense-making process in a threefold manner: diagnostically, synthetically and normatively. Common sense unravels a diagnostic functionality, since it serves as the indicator of the existing and prevailing cultural, political and social norms, feelings/sentiments and ways of thinking within a community. In addition, common sense serves a synthetic function since it constitutes the point of condensation where everyday life micro-practices, natural dispositions and inclinations, feelings, sentiments, ways of thinking and customs encounter political logics and social structures in order to inform and form each other in a common sense that is the amalgam of all those parameters. Finally, common sense-making fulfils a normative function in that it sets the criterion of which group of people can count as a community. As a community can count only that assemblage whose collective self-definition is the immanent and radically inclusive result of interaction among the members within this community-to-be. As such, a truly common community cannot exclude anyone who wants to live in a community of everyone, except for the ones who want to live in a community of some or the few since that would reinstitute discrimination, privileges and hierarchies that divide and stratify the community.

Seen this way, Cicero's *sensus communis* discloses common sense as an exogenous and subjectivating factor that precedes and therefore conditions the subject's becoming. However, it is thanks to its conditionalisation from social and political instances and institutions that bring forward a collective type of subjectivity that the subject is endowed with the agency to reappropriate these institutions. Cicero's ingenuity lies in attributing this ability to the social function of rhetoric and in laying down the fundaments to read *sensus communis* as such a rhetoric, that is as both a determining and emancipatory device. Rhetoric, for Cicero, neither 'dulls the sword of the critique of reason itself' (Habermas 1987: 210) nor does it only offer 'a corrective to the disembodied Habermasian view of communicative rationality' (Connolly 2007: 146). Rather, Cicero's novelty lies in establishing rhetoric and thereby also common

sense in the variation of *sensus communis* as a social laboratory that brings together and commingles such elements as everyday life micro-practices, political logics, social structures and institutions, dispositions or inclinations, and, last but not least, ethical customs, only to infuse them in the subject and as such both fashion the subject accordingly and at the same time bestow upon it the means for its collective self-fashioning.

ORCID

Thomas Telios https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5801-6791

Notes

1. In regard to the task that rhetoric is supposed to fulfil according to Aristotle, his *Rhetoric* (2018) is of course the primary point of reference. In regard to Cicero, *De Oratore* is undoubtedly Cicero's most elaborate and philosophically profound treatise on rhetoric. However, there is a plethora of further works on rhetoric that tackle other important yet particular issues, like how to compose an argument (*De Inventione*), the subdivisions of rhetorical speeches (*De Partionibus Oratoriae*), the theatrical role of the orator and the role and importance of eloquence as well as a brief history of Roman oratory (*Brutus*), stylistic issues (*De Optimo Genere Oratorum*), and last but not least the five elements of a rhetoric speech (*Orator*).
2. Critchley (2002: 80) and Pettersson (2004: 156) speak of 'sociableness' and urbane wit as the basic elements that differentiate the Roman from the Greek understanding of the term.
3. For *De Inventione* I follow H.M. Hubbell's translation for Harvard's Loeb Classical Library. In C. D. Yonge's (1888) older translation for George Bell and Sons the subclause reads 'the end of it is to persuade by language'. Arguing that Cicero is more invested in persuasion rather the discovery of truth is not to say that Cicero's orator is unscrupulous or immoral. This would render them a sophist. In addition, and as will be shown in later passages of this article, rhetoric is seen as a discursive form against phenomena of injustice and as a way of self-realisation and social advancement within an elitist, highly stratified and less porous societal formation. However, the moral or ethical advantages that Ciceronian rhetoric pursues and fulfils do not overcome the fact that there is an onto-epistemological discrepancy between Aristotelian and Ciceronian rhetoric since it is only the former that strictly and decidedly seeks to uncover the truth by disclosing the true nature of things.
4. For this reason, rhetoric is more of a method (*μετά + ὁδός*), i.e. the way (*ὁδός*) to achieve or explain something, than a 'system', as John Henry Freese renders the Aristotelian *ὁδοποιεῖν* in his translation for the Loeb Classical Library; see also *Rhetoric* 1355^{a}11 where Aristotle speaks of *ἔντεχνος μέθοδος* that Freese still translates as 'system arranged according to the rules of art'.
5. The five 'activities of the orator' (*officia oratoris*) (cf. May/Wisse 2001: 10) are (1) the finding of the arguments (*inventio*; Cicero/Sutton 1967a: II.99–II.216); (2) their presentation and arrangement in a logical order and according to their importance and (*dispositio*; ibid.: II.179–II.180, II.307–II.332); (3) their ornamentation with suitable means and devices (*elocutio*; ibid.: I.94–I.95); (4) the techniques to retain the arguments present both regarding the rhetor as well as the audience (*memoria*; ibid.: II.350–II.360); and, finally, (5) the pleasing presentation of the speech through the use of well-considered body language and accurate voice intonation (*actio, pronuntiatio*; ibid.: III.31–III.47, III.213–III.227). The 'four qualities of style' (*virtutes dicendi*) are (1) correct Latin (ibid.: III.39–III.48); (2) clarity (ibid.: III.49–III.51); (3) distinction (ibid.: III.52–III.55); and (4) appropriateness (ibid.: III.91–III.95).
6. For a more detailed analysis regarding Cicero's Janus-faced instrumentalisation of rhetoric, cf. Remer 2022. For a deeper analysis on the morals of Cicero's rhetoric, the actuality of his understanding of rhetoric especially in regard to Aristotelian rhetoric as well as the political ramifications of Cicero's rhetoric in regard to our current representative democracies, cf. Remer 2017.
7. Hannah Arendt (1958; 1992) was pivotal in rehabilitating Cicero from the grasp of conservative thinkers like Strauss and Voegelin. Regarding especially Strauss' take on Cicero's *sensus communis*, see Strauss (1975). For a current overview regarding Cicero's influence on the Western political thought, cf. Kapust and Remer (2021). Regarding

Cicero's reception in twentieth century political philosophy and political theory, cf. Nicgorski (2012: 242–283). Finally, for a broader discussion concerning the political actuality not only of Cicero but of Roman thought, cf. Hammer (2008).

8. For an account of the subordinating power of rhetoric, see Connolly (2007: 23–56). Erik Gunderson (2000), Joy Connolly (2007) and Caroline Chong (2022) are indicative of a research viewpoint inspired by critical theory inter-subjectivity, gender and queer theory performativity, Foucauldian power-analytics and Gramscian hegemony critique, and have drawn attention to a series of social elements (such as power, the body, processual and social-constructivist understandings of identity, the role of social differences therein, questions concerning the need for communal belonging, race problematics etc.) that have long lain hidden in Cicero's theory of rhetoric and political philosophy.
9. As J. G. F. Powell points out (1995), Cicero's value lies in the fact that he sees in philosophy the means to change the/his world through political practices, where philosophy provides the frame or compass and rhetoric the means to achieve it.
10. In doing so, I am inspired by Connolly's (2007) preoccupation with the Ciceronian subject from a synthesis of various feminist viewpoints that criticise the predominant liberal understanding of subjectivity as an allegedly sovereign and autonomous entity, underline the subject's embedded emergence from within a social context comprising of different institutions and practices, draw attention to the subject's emotional and embodied structuration and tackle questions concerning the subject's agency towards self-determination itself. Despite the plethora of feminist perspectives that Connolly offers there is one significant thread of feminist thought that is missing and that is crucial to grasp Cicero's social constructivist understanding of rhetoric as a subjectivating instance, namely intersectionality. In this light, this article is to a certain extent an attempt to bridge this gap by applying the theoretical arsenal of intersectionality theory not only to Cicero's subjectivity but also to his theory of common sense. On the main traits of intersectionality, see Smooth (2013).
11. While Emma Dench (2013) uses the term 'multiple identities' to interlineate the different positions that Cicero as a *novus homo* and through his social ascension occupied throughout his life within the stratified Roman political and social hierarchy, when I speak of a prototype of a theory of collective subjectivity that can be extrapolated from Cicero's model of four *personae* in *De Officiis*, I underline the fact that the subject is simultaneously, at each and every time the assemblage and amalgam of more than one mode of subjectivity production.
12. Cicero's term of *persona* has been met with a variety of translations. Walter Miller translates it as 'character' (Cicero/Miller 1928: I.107) for the Loeb Classical Library. Contrarily, Margaret Atkins in her more recent translation for the *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought* series renders the term *persona* as 'role' and justifies her translation of the term *persona* as referring to 'a mask, a role, or the actor playing the role' (Cicero/Atkins 1991: 42, FN 1). Finally, in a stroke of genius, Andrew R. Dyck allows the term *persona* to appear untranslated in his stupendous commentary on Cicero's *De Officiis* (1997: 269) thankfully giving to the reader the chance to associate and interpret the term on their own judgment and according to what they are looking for. The state of affairs concerning the translations of the four *personae* is not less opaque. In what follows, I will try to stay as close as possible to the original text and use either my own or consult and discuss the different translations when suitable/appropriate. The reason for that is that if read from an intersectional and social-constructivist perspective, the Latin text opens different and more differentiated interpretations.
13. For a further argument of how Cicero breaks with Stoicism through his conceptualisation of *sensus communis*, see Baraz (2012: 132 FN16).
14. Philipp De Lacy already hints at this but rebuffs it since he still holds to an integral and liberal theory of sovereign subjectivity (cf. De Lacy 1977: 170).
15. Further passages where the concept of *sensus communis* appears include passages in *Pro Cluentio*, in *Pro Domo*, and a third time in *De Oratore* (III.195). In *Pro Cluentio* and *De Oratore* (III.195) (that Arendt comments on in her *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*) (Arendt 1992: 63–64), *sensus communis* unravels a set of meanings that became identical with the concept of common sense after the Scottish Enlightenment, namely common sense as indication of a pre-social natural law that permeates and regulates also the social fabric (*Pro Cluentio*) and common sense as a universal faculty of judgment (Cicero/Sutton 1967a: III.195). In *Pro Domo*, nonetheless, *sensus communis* seems to suggest a disseveration between a common nature and particular forms of nature. Unfortunately, I do not have the time here to pursue further this radically different and exciting view on common sense as *sensus communis naturae*.
16. May/Wisse translate the passage differently though without major semantic differentiations. Whereas Sutton renders *sensus communis* as something 'approved by the sense of the community', for May/Wisse *sensus communis* pertains to 'the generally accepted way of looking at things' (Cicero/May/Wisse 2001: 60).

Bibliography

Arendt, Hannah (1958) *The Human Condition*, University of Chicago Press.

Arendt, Hannah (1992) *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, University of Chicago Press.

Aristotle (2018) *Rhetoric*, trans. with Introduction and Notes C. D. C. Reeve, Hackett.

Baraz, Yelena (2012) *A Written Republic: Cicero's Philosophical Politics*, Princeton University Press.

Begemann, Elisabeth (2022) 'Determinism, Fate, and Responsibility' in *The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy*, eds. Jed W. Atkins and Thomas Bénatouïl, Cambridge University Press, 134–149.

Bishop, Caroline (2019) *Cicero, Greek Learning, and the Making of a Roman Classic*, Oxford University Press, 2019.

Boltanski, Luc and Eve Chiapello (2005) *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Gregory Elliott, Verso.

Bugter, S. E. W. (1987) 'Sensus Communis in the Works of M. Tullius Cicero' in *Common Sense: The Foundations for Social Science*, eds Fritz van Holthoon and David R. Olson, University Press of America, 83–99.

Cicero Tullius M. (1888) *Treatise on Rhetorical Invention*, trans. Charles D. Yonge, G. Bell and Sons.

Cicero Tullius M. (1917) 'Pro Plancio' in *The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, Vol.* 3, ed. and trans. Charles D. Yonge, G. Bell and Sons, 101–150.

Cicero Tullius M. (1928) *De Officiis*, trans. Walter Miller, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press.

Cicero Tullius M. (1939) *Brutus. Orator*, trans. George L. Hendrickson and Harry M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press.

Cicero Tullius M. (1966) *Brutus*, ed. Alan E. Douglas. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Cicero Tullius M. (1967a) *De Oratore (Books I–III)*, trans. Edward W. Sutton, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press.

Cicero Tullius M. (1967b) *On Moral Obligations*, trans. John Higginbotham, Faber and Faber.

Cicero Tullius M. (1968) *De Inventione. De Optimo Genere Oratorum. Topica*, trans. Harry Mortimer Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press.

Cicero Tullius M. (1991) *On Duties*, ed. Miriam T. Griffin, trans. E. Margaret Atkins, Cambridge University Press.

Cicero Tullius M. (2000) *On Obligations*, trans. with Introduction and Notes Patrick G. Walsh, Oxford University Press.

Chong, Caroline (2022) 'Intersectionality in Ciceronian Invective', *The Classical Quarterly*, 72: 2, 611–629.

Connolly, Joy (2007) *The State of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome*, Princeton University Press.

Critchley, Simon (2002) *On Humour*, Routledge.

De Lacy, Phillip H. (1977) 'The Four Stoic "*Personae*"', *Illinois Classical Studies*, 2, 163–172.

Dench, Emma (2013) 'Cicero and Roman Identity' in *The Cambridge Companion to Cicero*, ed. Catherine Steel, Cambridge University Press, 122–137.

Dyck, Andrew R. (1997) *A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis*, University of Michigan Press.

Dugan, John (2005) *Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-Fashioning in the Rhetorical Works*, Oxford University Press.

Fuhrmann, Manfred (1979) 'Persona, ein römischer Rollenbegriff" in *Identität*, ed. Odo Marquard and Karlheinz Stierle, Fink, 83–106.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg (2004) *Truth and Method*, trans. revised Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, Continuum.

Greenblatt, Stephen (1980) *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare*, Chicago University Press.

Gunderson, Erik (2000) *Staging Masculinity: The Rhetoric of Performance in the Roman World*, University of Michigan Press.

Habermas, Jürgen (1987) *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, trans. Frederick Lawrence, MIT Press.

Hammer, Dean (2008) *Roman Political Thought and the Modern Theoretical Imagination*, University of Oklahoma Press.

Kapust, Daniel J. and Gary Remer eds. (2021) *The Ciceronian Tradition in Political Theory*, University of Wisconsin Press.

Kymlicka, Will (2002) *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction*, Oxford University Press.

Leach Winsor, Eleanor (1990) 'The Politics of Self-Presentation: Pliny's "Letters" and Roman Portrait Sculpture', *Classical Antiquity*, 9:1, 14–39.

Lewis, Charlton T. and Charles Short (1879) *A Latin Dictionary*, Clarendon Press.

Lewis, Clive S. (1960) *Studies in Words*, Cambridge University Press.

May, James M. (2002) 'Ciceronian Oratory in Context' in *Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric*, ed. James M. May, Brill, 49–70.

May, James M. and Jakob Wisse (2001) 'Introduction' in Tullius M. Cicero, *On the Ideal Orator (De Oratore)*, trans. with Introduction, Appendixes, Glossary, and Indexes by James M. May and Jakob Wisse, Oxford University Press, 3–48.

Nancy, Jean-Luc (2000) *Being Singular Plural*, trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne O'Byrne, Stanford University Press.

Nicgorski, Walter ed. (2012) *Cicero's Practical Philosophy*, University of Notre Dame Press.

Nicgorski, Walter (2022) 'Cicero's Republicanism' in *The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy*, eds. Jed W. Atkins and Thomas Bénatouïl, Cambridge University Press, 215–230.

Oliensis, Ellen (1991) 'Canidia, Canicula, and the Decorum of Horace's Epodes', *Arethusa*, 24, 107–35.

Pettersson, Bo (2004) 'Exploring the common ground: *Sensus communis*, humor and the interpretation of comic poetry', *Journal of Literary Semantics*, 33: 2, 155–167.

Powell, J. G. F. (1995) 'Introduction: Cicero's Philosophical Works and their Background' in *Cicero the Philosopher. Twelve Papers*, ed. J. G. F. Powell, ClarendonPress, 1–37.

Reckwitz, Andreas (2020) *The Society of Singularities*, trans. Valentine A. Pakis, Polity.

Remer, Gary (2017) *Ethics and the Orator. The Ciceronian Tradition of Political Morality*, Chicago University Press.

Remer, Gary (2022) 'Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Politics' in *The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy*, eds Jed W. Atkins and Thomas Bénatouïl, Cambridge University Press, 200–214.

Schaeffer, John D. (1990) *Sensus communis: Vico, Rhetoric, and the Limits of Relativism*, Duke University Press.

Schofield, Malcolm (2021) *Cicero: Political Philosophy*, Oxford University Press.

Sinclair, Patrick (1993) 'The *Sententia* in *Rhetorica ad Herennium*: A study in the sociology of rhetoric', *American Journal of Philology*, 114: 4, 561–580.

Smooth, Wendy G. (2013) 'Intersectionality: From Theoretical Framework to Policy Intervention' in *Situating Intersectionality: Politics, Policy, and Power*, ed. Angelia R. Wilson, Palgrave, 11–41.

Strauss, Leo and Joseph Cropsey eds. (1963) *History of Political Philosophy*, Rand McNally, 1963.

Strauss, Leo (1973) *What Is Political Philosophy?*, Greenwood Press.

Strauss, Leo (1975) *Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo Strauss*, ed. with Introduction Hilail Gildin, Bobbs-Merrill.

Telios, Thomas (2021) *Das Subjekt als Gemeinwesen. Zur Konstitution kollektiver Handlungsfähigkeit*, Nomos Verlag.

Telios, Thomas (2023) 'Karen Barad and the Unresolved Challenge of Collectivity: A Case for New Materialisms', *Technophany: A Journal for Philosophy and Technology*, 2: 1, 1–21.

Voegelin, Eric (1952) *The New Science of Politics*, University of Chicago Press.

Woolf, Raphael (2015) *Cicero: The Philosophy of a Roman Sceptic*, Routledge.