Does depoliticization work? An examination of global financial and taxation governance

Depoliticization has been described as one of the most important concepts for understanding current patterns of governance in advanced industrial societies. Governments depoliticize issues in two main ways, discursively and via delegation, and they do so for several reasons: To shield highly contested issues from public discussion; to remove the temptation for politicians to think short-term; or to address issues that cross borders. This thesis is interested in looking to where issues with distributional consequences have been depoliticized, to gauge whether the policy is successful, and see who benefits and loses from depoliticization. I employ a variety of methods, utilizing a case-study, a co-variational analysis, and a large-N panel-data regression. My focus is also varied, employing a multi-level approach moving from domestic politics, to international politics, and beyond the state to transgovernmental networks (TGNs). The first study looks at how large banks in the US, especially those deemed too big to fail, exploit their privileged position on the Federal Advisory Council to lobby the Federal Reserve. I find that the Federal Reserve responds only to the preferences of the very largest banks in the US, and that the impact of their lobbying has grown since the financial crisis of 2008. The second study analyses the plan by the Biden administration to tax the foreign profits of its corporations at a minimum level, with serious consequences for countries such as Ireland, who are so reliant on corporate taxation that they have depoliticized their economic model from public contestation. That the Biden plan endangers the model, shows the exogenously contingent nature of Irelands infrastructural power. Yet, I also demonstrate how political polarization in the US may seriously undermine the Biden plan, showing how infrastructural power in the US is itself endogenously contingent. The third paper investigates if TGNs develop features of democratic governance. The results suggest that democratic governance correlates with the pooled authority, but only if there is delegation to non-state bodies within the networks present. My results suggest that although depoliticization is heralded as an important tool of statecraft, when depoliticization tactics are employed at the domestic or international level, it is not always successful. However, I find that when depoliticisation is deployed beyond the state, in TGN, under certain conditions it can be successful policy tool. This finding suggests interesting and productive future avenues for study of the depoliticization.

Depoliticization has been described as one of the most important concepts for understanding current patterns of governance in advanced industrial societies. Governments depoliticize issues in two main ways, discursively and via delegation, and they do so for several reasons: To shield highly contested issues from public discussion; to remove the temptation for politicians to think short-term; or to address issues that cross borders. This thesis is interested in looking to where issues with distributional consequences have been depoliticized, to gauge whether the policy is successful, and see who benefits and loses from depoliticization. I employ a variety of methods, utilizing a case-study, a co-variational analysis, and a large-N panel-data regression. My focus is also varied, employing a multi-level approach moving from domestic politics, to international politics, and beyond the state to transgovernmental networks (TGNs). The first study looks at how large banks in the US, especially those deemed too big to fail, exploit their privileged position on the Federal Advisory Council to lobby the Federal Reserve. I find that the Federal Reserve responds only to the preferences of the very largest banks in the US, and that the impact of their lobbying has grown since the financial crisis of 2008. The second study analyses the plan by the Biden administration to tax the foreign profits of its corporations at a minimum level, with serious consequences for countries such as Ireland, who are so reliant on corporate taxation that they have depoliticized their economic model from public contestation. That the Biden plan endangers the model, shows the exogenously contingent nature of Irelands infrastructural power. Yet, I also demonstrate how political polarization in the US may seriously undermine the Biden plan, showing how infrastructural power in the US is itself endogenously contingent. The third paper investigates if TGNs develop features of democratic governance. The results suggest that democratic governance correlates with the pooled authority, but only if there is delegation to non-state bodies within the networks present. My results suggest that although depoliticization is heralded as an important tool of statecraft, when depoliticization tactics are employed at the domestic or international level, it is not always successful. However, I find that when depoliticisation is deployed beyond the state, in TGN, under certain conditions it can be successful policy tool. This finding suggests interesting and productive future avenues for study of the depoliticization.