Now showing 1 - 10 of 15
  • Publication
    Is Director Industry Experience Valuable?
    (Financial Management Association, 2016) ;
    Oesch, David
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    We investigate whether investor reactions to the announcement of a new outside director appointment significantly depend upon the director's experience in the appointing firm's industry. Our sample includes 688 outside director appointments to boards of S&P 500 companies from 2005 to 2010. We find significantly higher announcement returns upon appointments of experienced versus inexperienced directors. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use the deaths of 200 directors holding 280 outside directorships as an identification strategy and find significantly more negative announcement returns associated with the deaths of experienced versus inexperienced directors. However, while our results are robust to accounting for time-fixed unobservable director and firm characteristics, we still cannot completely rule out endogenous firm-director matching driving our results.
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    Scopus© Citations 31
  • Publication
    Peer Pressure in Corporate Earnings Management
    We show that peer firms play an important role in shaping corporate earnings management decisions. To overcome identification issues in isolating peer effects, we use fund flow-induced selling pressure by passive openend equity mutual funds as exogenous shocks to firms’ stock prices. Managers respond to such exogenous price shocks by adjusting earnings management policies. We then measure individual firms’ reactions to changes in earnings management at peer firms as a result of such exogenous price shocks. The documented peer effect in earnings management is not only statistically, but also economically significant. Our results are robust to alternative measures of fund flow-induced selling pressure and earnings management, and to estimating instrumental variables regressions in which we instrument peer firms’ earnings management with mutual fund flow-induced selling pressure.
  • Publication
    Industry Expert Directors
    ( 2015-12-16)
    Drobetz, Wolfgang
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    Oesch, David
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    We analyze the valuation effect of board industry experience and channels through which industry experience of outside directors affects firm value. Our analysis shows that firms with more experienced outside directors are valued at a premium compared to firms with less experienced outside directors. Additional analyses, including a quasi-experimental setting based on director deaths, mitigate endogeneity concerns. Further tests show that the board industry experience-firm value relation is more pronounced for firms with larger investment programs, larger cash reserves, and during crises. In contrast, it is weaker in more dynamic industries where the value of previously acquired experience is likely to be diminished. We also provide some evidence that corporate governance problems in firms, in particular entrenched CEOs, and a limited supply of industry experts prevent firms from appointing more industry experts to their boards, even though this would be value-increasing. Overall, our findings are consistent with board industry experience being a valuable corporate governance mechanism.
  • Publication
    Industry Expert Directors
    (SoF-HSG, )
    Drobetz, Wolfgang
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    Oesch, David
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    We analyze the valuation effect of board industry experience and channels through which in- dustry experience of outside directors affects firm value. Our analysis shows that firms with more experienced outside directors are valued at a premium compared to firms with less expe- rienced outside directors. Additional analyses, including a quasi-experimental setting based on director deaths, mitigate endogeneity concerns. Further tests show that the board industry ex- perience-firm value relation is more pronounced for firms with larger investment programs, larger cash reserves, and during crises. In contrast, it is weaker in more dynamic industries where the value of previously acquired experience is likely to be diminished. We also provide some evidence that corporate governance problems in firms, in particular entrenched CEOs, and a limited supply of industry experts prevent firms from appointing more industry experts to their boards, even though this would be value-increasing. Overall, our findings are consistent with board industry experience being a valuable corporate governance mechanism.
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  • Publication
    Managerial Networks and Shareholder Value: Evidence from Sudden Deaths
    Nielsen, Kirsten Tangaa
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    This paper investigates the causal effect of connections among top executives and directors of different firms on shareholder value using a quasi-natural experiment. Our identification strategy rests on the idea that sudden deaths trigger unexpected and exogenous dissolutions of connections, which enables us to isolate the value of managerial connections by studying stock price reactions at firms where managers connected to a suddenly deceased manager work. Our results show that firms connected to a suddenly deceased manager experience a statistically significant reduction in shareholder value between 1.6 and 2.6 million USD, which is consistent with the notion that managerial connections foster shareholder value. When exploring the cross-sectional variation, we find evidence that connections to inside directors, connections established via previously shared work engagements, and within-industry connections are most valuable.
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  • Publication
    CEO Turnover and Director Reputation
    This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. We find that outside directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover experience a large and persistent increase in withheld votes at subsequent board re-elections relative to non-turnover-interlocked directors. Increases in withheld votes are confined to departures without a successor in place, performance-induced turnovers, and turnovers that occur during the most productive time within a CEO's tenure. Reputational losses are larger for board committee members responsible for hiring and monitoring the ousted CEO and for directors affiliated with the CEO. Involvement in a forced CEO turnover is not associated with a long-term loss in directorships, but lost directorships are replaced by directorships at smaller firms. Our results imply that forced CEO turnovers signal a governance failure at the board level and that investors rely on salient actions to update their beliefs about directors' hidden qualities.
  • Publication
    Retail Customer Reactions to Private Equity Acquisitions *
    ( 2023-05-22)
    Vesa Pursiainen
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    Aktas, Nihat
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    Braun, Reiner
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    Bertoni, Fabio
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    Cumming, Douglas
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    Groh, Alexander
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    Kim, Hyeik
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    Lin, Tse-Chun
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    Marchuk, Tatyana
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    Nefedova, Tamara
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    Paaso, Mikael
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    Phalippou, Ludovic
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    Schmalz, Martin
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    Schneider, Christoph
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    Valta, Philip
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    Acquisition announcements by private equity funds are associated with significant reductions in customer visits to target firm outlets, measured using aggregated mobile phone data. These reductions occur in primary but not in secondary buyouts. Customer reviews do not become more negative. Following deal completion, the customer losses are reversed. Thus, the initial decrease is unlikely to be the consequence of operational changes. The decrease in visits is smaller in areas with higher economic connectedness, income, stock market participation, and self-employment rates, and larger in altruistic, Republican-voting and individualistic regions. The decrease is also larger for outlets facing more competition.
  • Publication
    Inflation and Individual Investors' Behavior: Evidence from the German Hyperinflation
    ( 2021-03-15)
    Braggion, Fabio
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    This paper analyzes how individual investors respond to inflation. We introduce a unique dataset containing information on local inflation and security portfolios of more than 2,000 clients of a German bank between 1920 and 1924, covering the hyperinflation. We find that individual investors buy less (sell more) stocks when facing higher local inflation. This effect is more pronounced for less sophisticated investors. We also document a positive relation between local inflation and forgone returns following stock sales. Our findings are consistent with individual investors suffering from money illusion. Alternative explanations such as consumption needs are unlikely to drive our results.
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