Nicolas Eschenbaum
Last Name
Eschenbaum
First name
Nicolas
Email
nicolas.eschenbaum@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 3088
Web Site
8 results
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Item type:Publication, Explaining Escalating Prices and Fines: A Unified ApproachThis paper provides an explanation for escalating prices and fines based on a unified analytical framework that nests monopoly pricing and optimal law enforcement. We show that escalation emerges as an optimal outcome if the principal (i) lacks commitment ability, and (ii) gives less than full weight to agent benefits. Escalation is driven by decreasing transfers for non-active agents rather than increasing transfers for active agents. Some forward-looking agents then strategically delay their activity, which drives a wedge between the optimal static transfer and the benefit of an indifferent agent. This wedge is the source of escalation.Type:journal articleJournal:Journal of Economic Behavior & OrganizationVolume:171 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, Dynamic Pricing in Bilateral Relationships: Experimental Evidence(2024-07-12); ; This paper provides experimental evidence on dynamic pricing in finite-horizon bilateral relationships, building on Hart and Tirole's (1988) canonical analysis. We study four different treatments that vary with respect to the seller's commitment ability and the mode of trade. For the sale without commitment model, we find that mean prices are gradually declining, which is in line with theory. Profits are similar to the sale with commitment model, where sellers leave a substantial rent to buyers. For the rental without commitment model, mean prices are higher than predicted and non-increasing toward the end of the horizon. For the rental with commitment model, mean prices are lower than predicted and essentially flat. Overall, we find that theory does a fairly good job at predicting mean prices but cannot capture the diverse patterns of individual price paths observed within relationships.Type:working paper - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Dynamic Monopoly Pricing With Multiple Varieties: Trading UpThis paper studies dynamic monopoly pricing for a class of settings that includes multiple durable, multiple rental, or a mix of varieties. We show that the driving force behind pricing dynamics is the seller’s incentive to switch consumers—buyers and non-buyers—to higher-valued consumption options by lowering prices (“trading up”). If consumers cannot be traded up from the static optimal allocation, pricing dynamics do not emerge in equilibrium. If consumers can be traded up, pricing dynamics arise until all trading-up opportunities are exhausted. We study the conditions under which pricing dynamics end in finite time and characterize the final prices at which dynamics end.Type:working paper - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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