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Matias Dewey
Title
PD Dr.
Last Name
Dewey
First name
Matias
Email
matias.dewey@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 2784
Homepage
Now showing
1 - 10 of 19
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Revista de Ciencia PolíticaVolume: 32Issue: 3
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PublicationThe strength of collusion: A conceptual framework for interpreting hybrid social orders(SAGE, )
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Latin American Politics and Society
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PublicationGoverning through non‐enforcement: Regulatory forbearance as industrial policy in advanced economiesPolitical economy scholarship generally assumes that governments are interested in enforcing economic regulations. Cases of non‐enforcement are predominantly studied in the context of developing countries and are chiefly associated with states' deficient institutional capacity. This article casts doubts on these assumptions by showing how governments in advanced democracies manipulate the regulatory regime and generate selective non‐enforcement of economic regulations to shape markets at their discretion. We argue that regulatory forbearance becomes an attractive form of industrial policy when governments are prevented from intervening discretionally in markets due to legal obstacles, which they cannot overcome; or when the productive structure of the country makes alternative forms of intervention unviable. Drawing on the study of tax non‐enforcement in two most‐different cases of strong and weak state capacity such as Germany and Italy, the article theorizes three techniques through which governments manipulate regulatory regimes: legal and organizational sabotage and shirking. By shedding light on the economic logic of forbearance, the article points at non‐enforcement as an overlooked mode of regulatory governance and suggests the need to inquire further into governments' strategic agency behind regulatory regimes.Type: journal articleJournal: Regulation & Governance
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PublicationThe Political Economy of Law EnforcementThe legal order is the legitimate foundation of liberal democracy. Its incomplete enforcement of the law can therefore appear dysfunctional, reflecting weak institutions, state capture, and corrupt practices. This paper casts doubt on such categorical assessments by systematically examining the reasons for and intentions behind incomplete enforcement. It argues that law enforcement is part of the political process that is deeply affected by the constellation of actors concerned. Choices over law enforcement produce social order that is analytically distinct from the production of legal norms and their formal implementation. By analyzing different types of partial enforcement, its rationales, and intended effects, we propose an approach that studies law enforcement as an integral part of public policy analysis and of the study of socioeconomic orders.Type: journal articleJournal: MaxPo Discussion PaperVolume: 21Issue: 1
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PublicationDomestic obstacles to labor standards: law enforcement and informal institutions in Argentina’s garment industryThe obstacles to implementing labor standards in the garment industry have been addressed by a significant body of literature which increasingly considers local institutions. This includes viewing states and government actors as predictors of compliance. Yet fine-grained studies on how the interplay of informal institutions and local actors’ interests prevents standards being implemented are still lacking. Drawing on seven months of ethnographic fieldwork at the main supply center for sweatshop produced and counterfeit clothing in Buenos Aires, Argentina, this article shows how these actors’ tolerance toward the sweatshop economy obstructs the implementation of labor standards. According to empirical evidence, this tolerance means protecting certain actors, i.e. non-enforcing the law. Accordingly, the paper distinguishes between two types of protection: provided by state or by political actors. By uncovering the workings of informal institutions and the political actors’ logics, this article helps to understand why deplorable labor conditions in the garment industry persist.
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PublicationThe other taxation: An ethnographic account of “off the books” state financingThis article contends that previous research has failed to consider resources that are systematically collected by way of informal taxation and channeled to support the provision of public services. Drawing on extensive ethnographic fieldwork in the markets for stolen auto parts and counterfeit clothing in Greater Buenos Aires, this article describes how state agencies informally tax these economies, and “follows the money” extracted. While a portion of these resources does end up in private pockets, the article shows that a greater share of the resources are directed toward enhancing state performance: welfare programs, everyday police duties, and political activities. An analysis of informal state financing schemes helps us to understand a state’s true capacities and its structural transformation over time.Type: journal articleJournal: Latin American Research ReviewVolume: 53Issue: 4
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PublicationTranslating institutional templates: a historical account of the consequences of importing policing models into Argentina( 2017)
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: ContextsVolume: 16Issue: 3
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: MiríadaVolume: 5Issue: 9