Nicolas Eschenbaum
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Eschenbaum
First name
Nicolas
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nicolas.eschenbaum@unisg.ch
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+41 71 224 3088
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Explaining Escalating Prices and Fines: A Unified Approach

2020 , Bühler, Stefan , Eschenbaum, Nicolas

This paper provides an explanation for escalating prices and fines based on a unified analytical framework that nests monopoly pricing and optimal law enforcement. We show that escalation emerges as an optimal outcome if the principal (i) lacks commitment ability, and (ii) gives less than full weight to agent benefits. Escalation is driven by decreasing transfers for non-active agents rather than increasing transfers for active agents. Some forward-looking agents then strategically delay their activity, which drives a wedge between the optimal static transfer and the benefit of an indifferent agent. This wedge is the source of escalation.

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Dealing With Uncertainty: The Value of Reputation in an Institutional Void

, Eschenbaum, Nicolas , Liebert, Helge

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Geographic Market Definition in Swiss Grocery Retailing: A Non-Parametric Approach

2017-11 , Eschenbaum, Nicolas

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Robust Algorithmic Collusion

, Eschenbaum, Nicolas , Mellgren, Filip , Zahn, Philipp

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Dynamic Monopoly Pricing With Multiple Varieties: Trading Up

2021-12 , Bühler, Stefan , Eschenbaum, Nicolas

This paper studies dynamic monopoly pricing for a class of settings that includes multiple durable, multiple rental, or a mix of varieties. We show that the driving force behind pricing dynamics is the seller’s incentive to switch consumers—buyers and non-buyers—to higher-valued consumption options by lowering prices (“trading up”). If consumers cannot be traded up from the static optimal allocation, pricing dynamics do not emerge in equilibrium. If consumers can be traded up, pricing dynamics arise until all trading-up opportunities are exhausted. We study the conditions under which pricing dynamics end in finite time and characterize the final prices at which dynamics end.

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Explaining Escalating Fines and Prices: The Curse of Positive Selection

, Bühler, Stefan , Eschenbaum, Nicolas

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Explaining Escalating Prices and Fines: A Unified Approach

2019-07 , Bühler, Stefan , Eschenbaum, Nicolas

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