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Stefan Bühler
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Bühler
First name
Stefan
Email
stefan.buehler@unisg.ch
ORCID
Phone
+41 71 224 2303
Homepage
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1 - 8 of 8
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PublicationCarbon Footprinting and Pricing Under Climate Concerns( 2022-03)
;Bertini, Marco ;Halbheer, DanielLehmann, Donald R.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of MarketingVolume: 86Issue: 2Scopus© Citations 9 -
PublicationPayment EvasionThis paper shows that a firm can use the purchase price and the fine imposed on detected payment evaders to discriminate between unobservable consumer types. Assuming that consumers self-select into regular buyers and payment evaders, we show that the firm typically engages in second-degree price discrimination in which the purchase price exceeds the expected fine. In addition, we find that higher fines do not necessarily reduce payment evasion. We illustrate with data from fare dodging on public transportation.Type: journal articleJournal: The journal of industrial economicsVolume: 65Issue: 4DOI: 10.1111/joie.12144
Scopus© Citations 10 -
PublicationPersuading Consumers With Social AttitudesThis paper provides a formal analysis of persuasive advertising when firms compete for consumers with heterogenous social attitudes towards the consumption by others. Deriving product demand from primitives, we show that the demand-enhancing effect of persuasive advertising varies across consumers and increases in the average degree of conformity. In equilibrium, both quality and cost leaders choose higher advertising intensities and charge higher prices than their competitors. In addition, we show that an increase in the average degree of conformity among consumers reinforces asymmetries between firms.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationVolume: 84Issue: 1
Scopus© Citations 7 -
PublicationDeregulating Network Industries: Dealing with Price-Quality TradeoffsThis paper examines the effects of introducing competition into monopolized network industries on prices and infrastructure quality. Analyzing a model with reduced-form demand, we first show that deregulating an integrated monopoly cannot simultaneously decrease the retail price and increase infrastructure quality. Second, we derive conditions under which reducing both retail price and infrastructure quality relative to the integrated monopoly outcome increases welfare. Third, we argue that restructuring and setting very low access charges may yield welfare losses as infrastructure investment is undermined. We provide an extensive analysis of the linear demand model and discuss policy implications.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of Regulatory EconomicsVolume: 30Issue: 1
Scopus© Citations 14 -
PublicationÖkonomische Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe(Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag, 2010)
;Halbheer, Daniel ;Amstutz, MarcReinert, ManiType: book section -
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PublicationConsumer ResistanceThis paper shows that reference-dependent preferences trigger consumer resistance and studies how such consumer behavior impacts pricing and cost communication. We show that consumer resistance reduces the pricing power and profit of the firm. We also show that consumer resistance may provide an incentive for the firm to engage in cost transparency. While cheap communication does not affect consumer behavior, we demonstrate that persuasive communication may increase sales and profit. Finally, we establish that a firm can benefit from operational transparency if cost is monotone increasing in the quality of the production process.
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PublicationRestructuring Network Industries: Dealing with Price-Quality Tradeoffs( 2004)
;Gärtner, DennisHalbheer, Daniel