Persuasion, Binary Choice, and the Costs of Dishonesty
Journal
Economics Letters
ISSN
0165-1765
ISSN-Digital
1873-7374
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2014-08-01
Author(s)
Abstract
We study the strategic interaction between a decision maker who needs to take a binary decision but is uncertain about relevant facts and an informed expert who can send a message to the decision maker but has a preference over the decision. We show that the probability that the expert can persuade the decision maker to take the expert's preferred decision is a hump-shaped function of his costs of sending dishonest messages.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Elsevier
Publisher place
Amsterdam
Volume
124
Number
2
Start page
195
End page
198
Pages
4
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
235017