Opportunity and Inequality across Generations
Journal
Journal of Public Economics
ISSN
0047-2727
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2022-04
Author(s)
Abstract
We analyze how intergenerational mobility and inequality would change relative to the status quo if dynasties had access to optimal insurance against low ability of future generations. Based on a dynamic, dynastic Mirrleesian model, we find that insurance against intergenerational ability risk increases in the social optimum relative to the status quo. This implies less intergenerational mobility in terms of welfare but no quantitatively significant change in earnings mobility. Earnings mobility is thus similar across economies with different incentives and welfare, illustrating that changes in earnings mobility cannot be interpreted readily in welfare terms without further analysis.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Elsevier
Volume
208
Number
104623
Pages
33
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
266160