Inefficiency as a Strategic Device in Group Contests Against Dominant Opponents
Journal
Economic Inquiry
ISSN
0095-2583
ISSN-Digital
1465-7295
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2013-10
Author(s)
Abstract
Contests between groups are prone to intra-group externalities (free-riding). Yet,
costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might be undesirable, both individually and socially. In contests between two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them
because they compound differences in strength between groups. If the groups are of
relatively similar strengths, they are both worse off when they rein in their intra-group
externalities compared to a situation where they do not. If groups' strengths differ
sufficiently, the relatively strong group benefits at the expense of the relatively weak
one.
costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might be undesirable, both individually and socially. In contests between two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them
because they compound differences in strength between groups. If the groups are of
relatively similar strengths, they are both worse off when they rein in their intra-group
externalities compared to a situation where they do not. If groups' strengths differ
sufficiently, the relatively strong group benefits at the expense of the relatively weak
one.
Language
English
Keywords
High and low prices
Range
Fractional cointegration
Exit/entry trading signals
Chart/technical analysis
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
Publisher place
Oxford UK
Volume
51
Number
4
Start page
2083
End page
2095
Pages
13
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
223604