Political Decisions in Multiple Referendums
Type
working paper
Date Issued
2014
Author(s)
Abstract
Multiple referendums alter the fundamental trade-off between gains and costs of voting because casting one vote costs about the same as casting more than one vote. This paper explores the consequences of multiple referendums by using unique individual voting data on federal referendums in Switzerland for the period of 1981-2010. The results suggest that voters are more likely to turn out for proposals that are combined with more salient proposals. However, the salience of concurrent proposals decreases political knowledge, increases the likelihood of casting an empty ballot, but has no effect on ideological voting. The effects are most pronounced for voters with lower levels of education.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SEPS - Economic Policy
Refereed
No
Publisher
mimeo
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
235034