Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated
Journal
Economics of Governance
ISSN
1435-6104
ISSN-Digital
1435-8131
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2002-07-01
Author(s)
Feld, LarsP.
;
Frey, BrunoS.
Abstract
Tax compliance has been studied in economics by analysing the individual decision of a representative person between paying and evading taxes. A neglected aspect of tax compliance is the interaction of taxpayers and tax authorities. The relationship between the two actors can be understood as an implicit or "psychological" contract. Studies on tax evasion in Switzerland show that the more strongly the political participation rights are developed, the more important this contract is, and the higher tax morale is. In this paper, empirical evidence based on a survey of tax authorities of the 26 Swiss states (cantons) is presented, indicating that the differences in the treatment of taxpayers by tax authorities can be explained by differences in political participation rights as well.
Language
English
Keywords
tax evasion
tax authority
tax compliance
direct democracy
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
No
Publisher
Springer
Publisher place
Berlin
Volume
3
Number
2
Start page
87
End page
99
Pages
13
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
16035