Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution
Journal
Journal of Public Economics
ISSN
0047-2727
ISSN-Digital
1879-2316
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2003-10-01
Author(s)
Abstract
This paper develops a contractarian theory of the state and the existence of redistribution. The existence of rules of redistribution is explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of agents. No veil of ignorance is needed. This avoids obligational problems inherent in most other contractarian theories of justice. Hence, this paper departs from the standard legitimization of redistribution as fundamental insurance and interprets it as stemming from a principle of reciprocity in trade. Since this paper deals with an anarchic society, the implementation of redistributional rules
is constrained by the assumption of self-enforcement. We show that this assumption changes the interpretation of the state: the state is characterized by a particular design of equilibrium strategies, not by the existence of enforcement agencies.
is constrained by the assumption of self-enforcement. We show that this assumption changes the interpretation of the state: the state is characterized by a particular design of equilibrium strategies, not by the existence of enforcement agencies.
Language
English
Keywords
Anarchy
Constitutions
Redistribution
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Elsevier
Publisher place
Amsterdam
Volume
87
Number
11
Start page
2431
End page
2457
Pages
27
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
223631