Good Family Guy or Bad Family Boy? The Role of Pay Incentives for Family Affiliated Family Officers
Type
conference paper
Author(s)
Gaska, Michael
Abstract
Despite of decades of research on family firms, findings on agency costs in such enterprises are disparate. Whereas traditional agency theorists point out agency benefits as a result of aligned interest within business families, contrary streams emphasize new types of agency costs resulting from altruism and self-control. However, research on coping with these special family firm-related agency costs, in particular on the role of pay incentives as important agency cost control instruments, is fragmented. Specifically, the relevance of incentives for family agents still leaves relevant gaps. Based on a sample of eight single family offices I evaluate the necessity of incentivizing family agents in family businesses in order to account for family firm-specific agency costs. By discovering determinants of incentive structures for family agents, i.e. socio-cultural and financial factors, as well as the business context, I significantly extend agency theoretical perspectives on family businesses and contribute to reconciling disparate research on agency threats and costs.
Language
English
Subject(s)
Contact Email Address
gaska@sfof.ch
Eprints ID
254448
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GoodFamilyGuyOrBadFamilyBoy_Michael Gaska.pdf
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