Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions and Development
Journal
The Economic Journal
ISSN
0013-0133
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2008-08
Author(s)
Sunde, Uwe
;
Cervellati, Matteo
;
Fortunato, Piergiuseppe
Abstract
This article studies the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favourable economic institutions in the form of a state of law and absence of societal conflict arise in equilibrium. Democracies are neither necessary nor sufficient to implement a state of law, even if they may be instrumental. Efficient oligarchies can emerge and persist supported by the consensus of all groups. A taxonomy of politico-economic equilibria shows the endogenous evolution of institutions depending on economic inequality and natural resource abundance, implying a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and institutional quality.
Language
English
Keywords
inequality
democratization
institutions
state of law
long-term development
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Royal Economic Society
Volume
118
Number
531
Start page
1354
End page
1384
Pages
31
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
51806