The Common External Tariff in a Customs Union: Voting, Logrolling, and National Government Interests
Journal
Economics & Politics
ISSN
0954-1985
ISSN-Digital
1468-0343
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2007-11-01
Author(s)
Abstract
Missing from the analysis of customs unions has been a consideration of collective decision-making by countries regarding the union's common trade policy. In the case of the common European external tariff, how governments voted was not public information. This paper uses a unique dataset to derive member states' tariff preferences, which are then used to establish the decision rule before 1987, when individual governments had veto power. Results indicate a principle of unanimity, as well as the presence of logrolling. The political equilibrium for the common external tariff is also illustrated to have shifted as a result of union enlargements.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SEPS - Global Democratic Governance
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Blackwell
Publisher place
Oxford
Volume
19
Number
3
Start page
345
End page
368
Pages
24
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
175376