Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?
Journal
Management Science
ISSN
0025-1909
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2019-05-13
Author(s)
Abstract
We study the effects of cartel participation on top corporate managers. Although a strong public interest exists in regulating price fixing, we find little evidence that either corporate governance or the legal system holds managers of cartel firms accountable. Instead, managers of cartel firms enjoy greater job security, receive higher cash bonuses, and extract more ex post compensation through timely exercise of stock options. Legal sanctions against individual managers are infrequent, with enforcement actions focused on corporations rather than their officers. Managers appear to use concealment strategies actively to limit detection of cartel membership by their boards and auditors.
Language
English
Keywords
Price fixing
corporate governance
executive compensation.
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SOF - System-wide Risk in the Financial System
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
INFORMS
Publisher place
Maryland, USA
Volume
65
Number
10
Start page
4413
End page
4840
Pages
27
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Contact Email Address
markus.schmid@unisg.ch
Eprints ID
258336
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
Name
Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers.pdf
Size
571.78 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
f2dc5d94419cff9bfd3e46e84b6c70d3