Black Sheep or Scapegoats? Implementable Monitoring Policies under Unobservable Levels of Misbehavior
Journal
The journal of legal studies
ISSN
0047-2530
ISSN-Digital
1537-5366
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2016-06
Author(s)
Abstract
An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. Thereby, it can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of monitoring policies. When several monitoring intensities lead to an observationally identical outcome, only the minimum of these is implementable, which can lead to under-enforcement. A comparative statics analysis reveals that increasing the punishment can undermine deterrence, since the maximal implementable monitoring intensity decreases. When the agent is strongly intrinsically motivated to curb crime, our results are mirrored and only high monitoring intensities are implementable. Then, higher monetary rewards for detections lead to a lower monitoring intensity and to a higher level of misbehavior.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SEPS - Economic Policy
Publisher
Univ. of Chicago Press
Publisher place
Chicago, Ill.
Volume
45
Number
2
Start page
331
End page
366
Division(s)
Contact Email Address
berno.buechel@unisg.ch
Eprints ID
248783
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
Name
Buechel-Muehlheusser-Black-Sheep-or-Scapegoats_2016.pdf
Size
1.25 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
259d8f958f94746c14a2ef264b6e6db9