Beveridge versus Bismarck Public-Pension Systems in Integrated Markets
Journal
Regional Science and Urban Economics
ISSN
0166-0462
ISSN-Digital
1879-2308
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2007-11-01
Author(s)
Abstract (De)
The two basic systems according to which pay-as-you-go-financed public-pension systems can be organized are the (Anglo-Saxon) Beveridge system and the (continental) Bismarck system. An ideal Beveridge system provides flat-rate benefits, whereas an ideal Bismarck system provides earnings-related benefits. This paper analyzes the circumstances under which a Beveridge system can be sustainable in systems competition with a Bismarck system. The analysis reveals a much more complicated redistributive structure of the pension systems than only between high and low incomes. As a consequence, the sustainability depends on growth rates, and equilibria can exist where, contrary to the first intuition, even poor individuals prefer a Bismarck and rich individuals prefer a Beveridge system.
Language
German
Keywords
Market integration
System competition
Pension systems
HSG Classification
not classified
Refereed
No
Publisher
Elsevier
Publisher place
Amsterdam
Volume
37
Number
6
Start page
649
End page
669
Pages
21
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
45721