Do Rapid Political and Trade Liberalizations Increase Corruption?
Journal
European Journal of Political Economy
ISSN
0176-2680
ISSN-Digital
1873-5703
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2007-12-01
Author(s)
Abstract
Corruption scandals seem to abound in countries that have undergone reform. However, there has been no study of whether different combinations of reforms cause an increase in corruption. Theory provides some guidance as to the direction of causality-on the one hand, reforms make politicians accountable to voters as well as introducing more competition, which should decrease corruption. On the other hand, reforms may not be credible, which provides for an incentive for corruption. This paper uses the numerous cases of political and economic liberalizations that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s to examine this issue. The findings are that undertaking both types of reforms in rapid succession leads to a decrease in corruption, while countries that liberalized more than 5 years after democratizing experienced an increase in corruption.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SEPS - Global Democratic Governance
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Elsevier
Publisher place
Amsterdam
Volume
23
Number
4
Start page
1053
End page
1076
Pages
24
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
175377