Elections and the Strategic Use of Budget Deficits
Journal
Public Choice
ISSN
0048-5829
ISSN-Digital
1573-7101
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2011-07-01
Author(s)
Abstract
We present a model in which a conservative incumbent with preferences for low public spending can strategically run a budget deficit to prevent the left-wing opposition candidate from choosing high public spending if elected, and possibly also to ensure his own reelection. We find that the incumbent never manipulates the opposition candidate's public spending if he can ensure his own reelection; and that a conservative incumbent who runs a budget deficit to ensure his reelection may somewhat paradoxically choose high public spending before the election.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Springer
Publisher place
Dordrecht
Volume
148
Number
1-2
Start page
149
End page
161
Pages
13
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
234969