Condorcet winners on median spaces
Journal
Social Choice & Welfare
ISSN
0176-1714
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2013-05-30
Author(s)
Abstract
We characterize the outcome of majority voting for single-peaked preferences
on median spaces. This large class of preferences covers a variety of multidimensional policy spaces including products of lines (e.g. grids), trees, and hypercubes. Our main result is the following: If a Condorcet winner (i.e. a winner in pairwise majority voting) exists, then it coincides with the appropriately defined median ("the median voter"). This result generalizes previous findings which are either restricted to a one-dimensional policy space or to the assumption that any two voters with the same preference peak must have identical preferences. The result applies to models of spatial competition between two political candidates. A bridge to the graph-theoretic literature is built.
on median spaces. This large class of preferences covers a variety of multidimensional policy spaces including products of lines (e.g. grids), trees, and hypercubes. Our main result is the following: If a Condorcet winner (i.e. a winner in pairwise majority voting) exists, then it coincides with the appropriately defined median ("the median voter"). This result generalizes previous findings which are either restricted to a one-dimensional policy space or to the assumption that any two voters with the same preference peak must have identical preferences. The result applies to models of spatial competition between two political candidates. A bridge to the graph-theoretic literature is built.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Springer
Number
42
Start page
735
End page
750
Pages
16
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
246695