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Collective Action, Business Cleavages and the Politics of Control: The Reform of Commercial Training in Switzerland
Type
conference paper
Date Issued
2017-03-15
Author(s)
Abstract (De)
The literature on business cleavages in collective skill formation systems observes a stark difference in the preferences of small and large firms. Small firms are less able to invest in training because they are very cost-sensitive. Because they recruit their labour force on the external labour market, they demand certified occupational skills. In contrast, large firms are in need of higher levels of skills to be able to compete on international markets. They therefore prefer high and general skills. At the same time, these firms increasingly turn towards a more segmentalist training system in which they have more control over the contents of training.
We add to this literature in three ways. First, we extend the discussion of firms’ preferences to teaching content in schools. We show that when school-based training is systematically taken into account, the skill preferences of small and large firms become clearer. Second, we highlight the distinction between firm preferences and the preferences of the associations that represent these firms. We demonstrate that the preferences of associations are often not aligned to their members’ preferences. Our third contribution refers to the question of who can enforce its preferences. We argue that business actors are most powerful when they have the capacity to act collectively and have a credible exit option at their disposal.
Empirically, we analyse the reform of commercial training in Switzerland, tracing developments from the mid-1980s until today. We thus take the reform of the most important apprenticeship in a prototypical collective skill formation system as an example to illustrate the patterns of preference formation and goal achievement within the business community in vocational education and training.
We add to this literature in three ways. First, we extend the discussion of firms’ preferences to teaching content in schools. We show that when school-based training is systematically taken into account, the skill preferences of small and large firms become clearer. Second, we highlight the distinction between firm preferences and the preferences of the associations that represent these firms. We demonstrate that the preferences of associations are often not aligned to their members’ preferences. Our third contribution refers to the question of who can enforce its preferences. We argue that business actors are most powerful when they have the capacity to act collectively and have a credible exit option at their disposal.
Empirically, we analyse the reform of commercial training in Switzerland, tracing developments from the mid-1980s until today. We thus take the reform of the most important apprenticeship in a prototypical collective skill formation system as an example to illustrate the patterns of preference formation and goal achievement within the business community in vocational education and training.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area
SEPS - Economic Policy
Event Title
SFIVET VET Congress 2017
Event Location
Zollikofen
Event Date
14.-16.3.2017
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
250958